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MATIENZO VS.

ABELLERA
G.R. NO. L-45839 - JUNE 1, 1988

FACTS:

The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The respondents,
however, admittedly operate colorum or kabit taxicab units. On or about the second week of February, 1977,
private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) for the legalization of
their unauthorized excess taxicab units citing PD 101, promulgated on January 17, 1973, to eradicate the
harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and
responsible operators. Within a matter of days, the respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the
application for hearing and granting applicants provisional authority to operate their excess taxicab units for
which legalization was sought.

Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the grant of provisional permits or authority, as well as the
annulment of permits already granted under PD 101, the petitioners allege that the BOT acted without jurisdiction
in taking cognizance of the petitions for legalization and awarding special permits to the private respondents. Citing
Section 4 of PD 101, the petitioners argue that neither the BOT chairman nor any member thereof had the power, at
the time the petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize the clandestine operations under PD 101 as such power
had been limited to a period of six (6) months from and after the promulgation of the Decree on January 17, 1973.
They state that, thereafter, the power lapses and becomes functus officio.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BOT can still legalize clandestine and unlawful taxicab operations under Section 1 of PD 101 despite
the lapse of six (6) months after the promulgation of the Decree.

RULING:
Yes.

A reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to issue provisional permits as a
step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged time limitation. There is nothing in
Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to suggest the expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the
Decree. Rather, it merely provides for the withdrawal of the States waiver of its right to punish said colorum
operators for their illegal acts. In other words, the cited section declares when the period of moratorium suspending
the relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no impediment to the Boards exercise
of jurisdiction under its broad powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to
achieve the avowed purpose of PD 101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service Act, Nov. 7, 1936).

It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain power, the authority
given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created, and that which is
incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as germane to the law.
Necessarily, too, where the end is required, the appropriate means are deemed given.

MATIENZO V ABELLERA

FACTS

Petitioners and private respondents are taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The respondents, however, admit to
operate colorum or kabit taxis, thus, they applied for legalization of their unauthorized excess tacis citing PD 101.
Respondent Board set such applications for hearing and granted provisional authority to operate. Petitioners argue
that the Board cannot do this as the six month period in the Transitory Provision has lapsed and has become functus
officio.

ISSUES W/N the board can grant such permits.

RULING

YES. The power vested by PD 101 to BOT was to grant special permits of limited term for the operation of public
utility motor vehicles as may, in the judgment of the Board, be necessary to replace or convert clandestine
operators into legitimate and responsible operators. Such power remains even after the six months prescribed in
the law as such period merely provides for the withdrawal of the States waiver of its right to punish said colorum
operators. Notice and hearing are not required for the grant of such temporary authority because of its provisional
nature and that the primary application shall be given a full hearing.
To determine whether a Board or Commission has power, it should be (1) liberally construed in light of its purpose
for which is was created and (2) that incidentally necessary to a full implementation of legislative intent as being
germane to the law.

Thus, the BOR shall, from time to time, re-study the public need for public utilities in any area in the Phils for the
purpose of re-evaluating the policies.

VILLEGAS VS SUBIDO G.R. NO. L-26534 NOVEMBER 28, 1969 30 SCRA 498
Topic: Extent of Jurisdiction p114

Action:

Facts: Commissioner directed that petitioners Barbers, Paralejas and Lazaro be replaced as station commanders of
the three police precincts of Manila as their continued employment as such was illegal, the eligibility required being
that of an inspector first class, allegedly not possessed by them.

Mayor: to disregard said directive, it being in excess of the authority vested in [the Civil Service] Commission." As
noted in such communication: "This Office is not aware of any provision of law requiring that Precinct or Station
Commanders should be at least a Police or Detective Major or an Inspector First Class. Paragraph 4, Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 2260,

ISSUE: Can the CSC direct the mayor?

HELD: No , The reliance of then respondent Commissioner was not on any law or rule but simply on his own concept
of what policy to pursue, in this instance in accordance with his own personal predilection. Here he appeared to be
unalterably convinced that to allow women laborers to work outside their offices as street sweepers would run
counter to Filipino tradition.

A public official must be able to point to a particular provision of law or rule justifying the exercise of a challenged
authority. Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The government
itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are
likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that
they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence
of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. What they do suffers from a fatal infirmity. That principle cannot be
sufficiently stressed. In the appropriate language of Chief Justice Hughes: It must be conceded that departmental
zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. Neither the high dignity of the office nor
the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such
an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid.

Held: The question, to repeat, is one of power. What is clear is that it is petitioner City Mayor that could so designate
the other petitioners to assume the position of station commanders. That power is his, and his alone. He is not
required by law to share it with respondent Commissioner, who must justify by the valid conferment of authority the
action taken by him in requiring that the City Mayor replace the other petitioners. Power is not to be presumed, it
must be shown. Respondent Commissioner failed to do so. It was not surprising therefore that the lower court ruled
against him. As set forth at the outset, we sustain the lower court and affirm the judgment appealed from.

if there are constitutional overtones to this litigation, petitioners, not the respondents, are the beneficiaries. As they
did correctly point out, not even the President is vested with the power of control over local officials. He exercises
only "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law,

. . . ."25 Respondent Civil Service Commissioner cannot be deemed then to be possessed of a greater prerogative,
being himself an official of a lower category in the executive branch. Moreover, what the Constitution enjoins on the
President as well as all those entrusted with executive functions is to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed."26 Certainly, it is a manifestation of less than fealty to such a duty if an executive official like respondent
would enforce a statutory provision not as written but as expanded and enlarged by him through a process of
strained construction.

4. One last word. Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The
government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers
therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no
presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or
implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. What they do suffers from a fatal infirmity. That
principle cannot be sufficiently stressed. In the appropriate language of Chief Justice Hughes: "It must be conceded
that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute."27 Neither the high
dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law
becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS COURT OF APPEALS
231 SCRA 292
G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

FACTS

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of
the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects
on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.
The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an
open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required
under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
The LLDA found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams could considerably
affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform,
which may have contaminated the sample during collection or handling.
On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of
Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist
from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias
Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being
utilized as a dumpsite.
The City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order
In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to
promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its
territorial jurisdiction.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the
consolidated cases an order denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing
its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite
during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the court.

COURT OF APPEALS

On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court
has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order,
including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since appeal
therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease
and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983.

ISSUE
Whether or not the LLDA has the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the
open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering
the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in the area
brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite

SUPREME COURT

Yes.

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum.

It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically
mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared
national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area
and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan
21 with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality
of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and
pollution.
Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has
the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants
emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.

In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and
approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the
region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are
related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region.

ISSUE
Whether or not the LLDA has the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act
No. 4850 and its amendatory laws

SUPREME COURT
Yes.

By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." 24
(Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in
the exercise of its jurisdiction.

To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order" in
a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National
Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813
and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a
denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983.

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives vitality
to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution.
Article II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment.
This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a
fundamental human right.

CARINO V. CAPULONG
(Authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational institution a discretionary duty)

ISSUES:

1) WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction

2) WON the authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational institution is a discretionary duty?

HELD:
(1)Yes
(2) Yes

RATIO:

(1) In the case at bar, private respondents' application for a permit to operate AMACC-Davao City as an educational
institution was denied by the petitioners. Otherwise stated, the private respondents do not have a permit to operate
or a certificate of recognition from the government to undertake educational or school operations. In fine, the
private respondents do not have any existing right that needed to be protected during the pendency of their
principal action for mandamus. Hence, the "closing" and/or "padlocking" of AMACC-Davao City would not and did
not violate any right of the private respondents.

Moreover, it is not the function of the WPI to restrain a public officer from performing a duty imposed by law or to
permit the doing of that which is declared unlawful. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations, the establishment and operation of schools are subject to the prior authorization of the
government. And, as sanctions for operating without permit, the DECS is authorized either to impose the total
closure of school and/or to disqualify the school from conferring title or degree in the non-recognized program or
course of studies. In ordering the total closure of AMACC-Davao City, the petitioners were only performing their
duties as public officers; hence, the respondent Judge should not have issued the writ of preliminary injunction. In
issuing the writ, he allowed the private respondents to continue the operation of AMACC-Davao City as an
educational institution without a permit or certificate of government recognition, thereby sanctioning the act which
is unlawful.

(2) The action filed by the private respondents in the court below is a petition for mandamus to compel the
petitioners to approve their application to operate AMACC-Davao City as an educational institution. As a rule,
mandamus will lie only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a discretionary function. A
ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its
performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the exercise of judgment.

In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial duty of the petitioners. It is a
discretionary duty or function on the part of the petitioners because it had to be exercised in accordance with
and not in violation of the law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Establishment or recognition of private schools through government grant of permits is governed by law,
specifically Batas Pambansa Blg. 232. The authority to grant permit is vested upon the judgment of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports, which prescribes the rules and regulations governing the recognition on private
schools (Section 27, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232).

Whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
Rather it is a discretionary duty to be exercised in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed.

In the case at bar, petitioner has been operating a school without a permit in blatant violation of law. Public
respondent has no ministerial duty to issue to petitioner a permit to operate a school in Davao City before petitioner
has even filed an application or before his application has been first processed in accordance with the rules and
regulations on the matter. Certainly, public respondent is not enjoined by any law to grant such permit or to allow
such operation without a permit, without first processing an application. To do so is violation of the Educational Act

Marcos burial: Ocampo vs. Enriquez (majority opinion digest)


Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. vs. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al., G.R. No. 225973; Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs.
Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, G.R. No. 226097, November 8, 2016

Facts:

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly
announced that he would allow the burial former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani
("LNMB").

On August 7, 2016, Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the Chief of Staff of
the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan
ng Mga Bayani. Duterte won the May 9, 2016 election and formally assumed his office at the Rizal Hall in the
Malacanan Palace.

On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernest C. Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine Army regarding the
Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and Petition for
Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court.

ISSUES

1) Whether the respondents Secretary of National Defense and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in
compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to implement his election campaign promise to have the
remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB?

2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the Constitution,
domestic and international laws?
3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their cronies, and the
pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former President
to interment at the LNMB?

4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of former President Marcos at the
LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as to the
conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be brought back to and interred in the Philippines?

RULING

The petitions must be dismissed.

Procedural issues

Political question

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB
involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the excercise of his powers under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of
the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a
question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There being no taint
of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte's decision on that political
question is outside the ambit of judicial review.

Locus standi

Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus because they failed
to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB.

Petitioners cannot also file as taxpayers. They merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds, without showing
that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the
laws or jurisprudence.

Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, failed to disclose the direct or potential injury which they may
suffer as a result of the act complained of. Their interest in this case is too general and shared by other groups, such
that their duty to uphold the rule of law, without more, is inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal standing.

Petitioners also failed to prove that the case is of transcendental importance. At this point in time, the interment of
Marcos at a cemetery originally established as a national military cemetery and declared a national shrine would
have no profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of our national life considering that more than
twenty-seven (27) years since his death and thirty (30) years after his ouster have already passed. Significantly,
petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional rights.

As to petitioners Senator De Lima and Congressman Lagman, they failed to show that the burial of Marcos
encroaches on their prerogatives as legislators.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Petitioners violated the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy,
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of
the assailed memorandum and directive before the Secretary ofNational Defense. The Secretary of National
Defense should be given opportunity to correct himself, if warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G 161-375
was issued upon his order. Questions on the implementation and interpretation thereof demand the exercise of
sound administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of his office to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact. If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision of the Secretary,
they could elevate the matter before the Office of the President which has control and supervision over the
Department of National Defense (DND).

Hierarchy of Courts
While direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and
injunction when proven necessary.

Substantive issues

I. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law of
jurisprudence

While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as
providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed
Marcos burial at the LNMB.

Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision considering that a law should be passed
by the Congress to clearly define and effectuate the principle embodied therein. Pursuant thereto, Congress
enacted the Code of Conduct on Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
Plunder Act, and Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007. To complement these statutes, the Executive Branch has issued various
orders, memoranda, and instructions relative to the norms of behavior/code of conduct/ethical standards of officials
and employees; workflow charts/public transactions; rules and policies on gifts and benefits; whistle blowing and
reporting; and client feedback program

Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution is also misplaced. Sec. 3(2)
of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty of educational institutions in teaching the values of patriotism and
nationalism and respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on sequestration or
freeze orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. Clearly, with respect to these provisions, there
is no direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB.

The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII is likewise not violated by public respondents. Being the Chief Executive,
the President represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his or her department. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take
"necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law. The mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being
inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the other executive functions. It is best construed as an
imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power. The provision simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily,
the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.

There is no violation of RA 289

Petitioners miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition that the LNMB and the
National Pantheon are one and the same. This is not at all unexpected because the LNMB is distinct and separate
from the burial place envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of President Quirino's
Proclamation No. 431, which was later on revoked by President Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different from
that covered by Marcos' Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does not exist at present. To date, the
Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its construction or the creation of the Board on
National Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a
singular interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.

Furthermore, to apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero" would
be violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal remains
resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is
based on the grant of authority to the President under existing laws and regulations. Also, the Court shares the view
of the OSG that the proposed interment is not equivalent to the consecration of Marcos' mortal remains. The act in
itself does not confer upon him the status of a "hero." Despite its name, which is actually a misnomer, the purpose
of the LNMB, both from legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the
title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero." Lastly, petitioners'
repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and "state honors," without showing proof as to what kind of burial or honors
that will be accorded to the remains of Marcos, is speculative until the specifics of the interment have been finalized
by public respondents.

RA 10639 is not violated


The Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are not exclusive as
it includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It would be undue to extend the law beyond what it
actually contemplates. With its victim-oriented perspective, our legislators could have easily inserted a provision
specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a "reparation" for the Human Rights Violations Victims
(HRVVs). The law is silent and should remain to be so. This Court cannot read into the law what is simply not there.
It is irregular, if not unconstitutional, for Us to presume the legislative will by supplying material details into the law.
That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.

The enforcement of the HRVV s' rights under R.A. No 10368 will surely not be impaired by the interment of Marcos
at the LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the assailed act has no causal connection and legal relation to the law. The
subject memorandum and directive of public respondents do not and cannot interfere with the statutory powers and
functions of the Board and the Commission. More importantly, the HRVVs' entitlements to the benefits provided for
by R.A. No 10368 and other domestic laws are not curtailed. R.A. No. 10368 does not amend or repeal, whether
express or implied, the provisions of the Administrative Code or AFP Regulations G 161-375.

There is no violation of International Human Rights Laws

The nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting through the public
respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already
engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn,
it must be said that the preservation and popularization of our history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief
Executive; it is a joint and collective endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.

Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of the Human Rights Victims' Claims Board and the
HRVV Memorial Commission in the memorialization of HRVV s, the National Historical Commission of the Philippines
(NHCP), formerly known as the National Historical Institute (NHJ), is mandated to act as the primary government
agency responsible for history and is authorized to determine all factual matters relating to official Philippine
history.

II. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of
malice, ill will or personal bias

The LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in PD 105

P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D. No. 105, the LNMB was not
expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in the latter. The proposition that the LNMB is implicitly
covered in the catchall phrase "and others which may be proclaimed in the future as National Shrines" is erroneous
because: (1) As stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105; (2) Following the canon of statutory
construction known as ejusdem generis, 138 the LNMB is not a site "of the birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or
death of great and eminent leaders of the nation,"; and (3) Since its establishment, the LNMB has been a military
shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO.

Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and hallowed" refer to the LNMB as a place
and not to each and every mortal remains interred therein. Hence, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not
diminish said cemetery as a revered and respected ground. Neither does it negate the presumed individual or
collective "heroism" of the men and women buried or will be buried therein. The "nation's esteem and reverence for
her war dead, " as originally contemplated by President Magsaysay in issuing Proclamation No. 86, still stands
unaffected. That being said, the interment of Marcos, therefore, does not constitute a violation of the physical,
historical, and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national military shrine.

The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO, which is empowered to administer,
develop, and maintain military shrines, is under the supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in tum, is under
the Office of the President.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing provision of the
Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn,
by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former
President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the
incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his predecessors,
and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most
effective in carrying out his mandate.
Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use and for specific
public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the reserved land shall remain subject to the specific
public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. At present, there is no law or executive
issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is located from the use it was originally intended by the
past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and Commander-in-
Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee,
whether recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the public use requirement. The
disbursement of public funds to cover the expenses incidental to the burial is granted to compensate him for
valuable public services rendered.

Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos' remains interred at the LNMB was inspired by his desire
for national healing and reconciliation. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over
petitioners' highly disputed factual allegation that, in the guise of exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief
Executive is actually motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses. As
the purpose is not self-evident, petitioners have the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of their claim.
They failed. Even so, this Court cannot take cognizance of factual issues since We are not a trier of facts.

AFP Regulations G 161-375 must be sustained

Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees;
(b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; ( c) Secretaries of National Defense; ( d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; ( e)
General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active draftees and
trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations
or combat related activities; (g) Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and the PNP;
(h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries,
Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the
Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and G) Former Presidents, Secretaries of
Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and
Chief of Staff.

Similar to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel who
were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b) Authorized personnel who were
convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.

In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G 161-375 remains to be the
sole authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they
were empowered to do so, former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, who were
themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the rules by expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the
LNMB. The validity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 must, therefor, be sustained for having been issued by the AFP
Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense, who is the alter ego of the President.

AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of clear and unmistakable showing that it
has been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Neither could it be
considered ultra vires for purportedly providing incomplete, whimsical, and capricious standards for qualification for
burial at the LNMB.

It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to argue that the word "bayani" in the
LNMB has become a misnomer since while a symbolism of heroism may attach to the LNMB as a national shrine for
military memorial, the same does not automatically attach to its feature as a military cemetery and to those who
were already laid or will be laid therein. As stated, the purpose of the LNMB, both from the legal and historical
perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those
interred therein should be treated as a "hero."

In fact, the privilege of internment at the LNMB has been loosen up through the years. Since 1986, the list of eligible
includes not only those who rendered active military service or military-related activities but also non-military
personnel who were recognized for their significant contributions to the Philippine society (such as government
dignitaries, statesmen, national artists, and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been
approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of National Defense). In 1998, the widows of former
Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff were added to the list. Whether or not the extension
of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted in order to be consistent with the original
purpose of the LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar since it is indubitable that Marcos had rendered
significant active military service and military-related activities.
Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of
National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee. For his alleged human rights
abuses and corrupt practices, we may disregard Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot
deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the awards he received. In this
sense, We agree with the proposition that Marcos should be viewed and judged in his totality as a person. While he
was not all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who erred like us.

Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the disqualifications stated in AFP
Regulations G 161-3 7 5. He was neither convicted by final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor
dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.

The fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude. No less
than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person shall not be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.

Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no property right to safeguard because even if
one is eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact would only give him or her the privilege to be interred therein.
Unless there is a favorable recommendation from the Commander- in-Chief, the Congress or the Secretary of
National Defense, no right can be said to have ripen. Until then, such inchoate right is not legally demandable and
enforceable.

Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of equal protection clause are not met. 181 In this
case, there is a real and substantial distinction between a military personnel and a former President. The conditions
of dishonorable discharge under the Articles of War attach only to the members of the military. There is also no
substantial distinction between Marcos and the three Philippine Presidents buried at the LNMB (Presidents Quirino,
Garcia, and Macapagal). All of them were not convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. In addition, the
classification between a military personnel and a former President is germane to the purposes of Proclamation No.
208 and P.D. No. 1076. While the LNMB is a national shrine for military memorials, it is also an active military
cemetery that recognizes the status or position held by the persons interred therein.

Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO expressly recognized him as a retired
veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended. Petitioners have not shown that he was dishonorably discharged
from military service under APP Circular 17, Series of 1987 (Administrative Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term of
Enlistment) for violating Articles 94, 95 and 97 of the Articles of War. The NHCP study is incomplete with respect to
his entire military career as it failed to cite and include the official records of the AFP.

The word "service" in AFP Regulations G 161-375 should be construed as that rendered by a military person in the
AFP, including civil service, from the time of his/her commission, enlistment, probation, training or drafting, up to
the date of his/her separation or retirement from the AFP. Civil service after honorable separation and retirement
from the AFP is outside the context of "service" under AFP Regulations G 161-375.

Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during the EDSA Revolution is
tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from the military service. The fact that the
President is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the 1987 Constitution only enshrines the principle of
supremacy of civilian authority over the military. Not being a military person who may be prosecuted before the
court martial, the President can hardly be deemed "dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service"
as contemplated by AFP Regulations G 161-375. Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an extra-
constitutional and direct sovereign act of the people which is beyond the ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere
administrative regulation.

IIt is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the people through the so-called EDSA
Revolution. Said political act of the people should not be automatically given a particular legal meaning other than
its obvious consequence - that of ousting him as president. To do otherwise would lead the Court to the treacherous
and perilous path of having to make choices from multifarious inferences or theories arising from the various acts of
the people. It is not the function of the Court, for instance, to divine the exact implications or significance of the
number of votes obtained in elections, or the message from the number of participants in public assemblies. If the
Court is not to fall into the pitfalls of getting embroiled in political and oftentimes emotional, if not acrimonious,
debates, it must remain steadfast in abiding by its recognized guiding stars - clear constitutional and legal rules -
not by the uncertain, ambiguous and confusing messages from the actions of the people.

CIR V CTA
GR No 106611, July 21, 1994

FACTS:

Citytrust filed a petition with the Court of Tax Appeals claiming the refund of its income tax overpayments for the
years 1983, 1984 and 1985 in the total amount of P19,971,745. The CIR could not present any evidence due to the
repeated failure of the tax credit/refund division of the BIR to transmit the records of the case and the investigation
report to the Solicitor General. The case was decided in favor of City Trust. Upon motion of reconsideration,
petitioner alleged that through an inter-office memorandum of the Tax Credit/Refund Division, dated August 8,
1991, he came to know only that Citytrust had outstanding tax liabilities for 1984 in the amount of P56,588,740.91
representing deficiency income and business taxes.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the BIR was denied its day in court
2. Whether the CTA erred in denying petitioners supplemental motion for reconsideration alleging bringing to said
courts attention the existence of deficiency income and business taxes

RULING:
1. Yes, the BIR is denied its day in court. When it was petitioners turn to present evident evidence, several
postponements were sought by its counsel, the Solicitor General, due to the unavailability of the necessary records
which were not transmitted by the Refund Audit Division of the BIR to said counsel. It was under such predicament
and in deference to the tax court that the counsel was constrained to submit the case for decision without
presenting any evidence. It is a long and firmly settled rule of law that the Government is not bound by the errors
committed by its agents.
2. Yes. The fact of such deficiency assessment is intimately related and inextricably intertwined with the right of the
bank. The private respondent cannot be entitled to refund and at the same time be liable for a deficiency tax
assessment for the same year.

Administrative Law; Public Officers; Damages; The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages
which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks; However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts
done in bad faith which being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity
for official actions. The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer
arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who
acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may
have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to
judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in
his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer
protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Same; Same; Same; A public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be
validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad
faith; Instances Where a Public Officer May Be Validly Sued in His/Her Private Capacity for Acts Done in the Course
of the Performance of the Functions of the Office.In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
309 SCRA 602 (1999), that a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another,
may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice
or bad faith. Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity
for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with
malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Same; Same; Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability of
superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties; while said provisions deal
in particular with the liability of government officials, the subject thereof is general, i.e., acts done in the
performance of official duties, without specifying the action or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the
official concerned. On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule
on the civil liability of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. For
both superior and subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements
that will make them liable for damages. Note that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of
government officials, the subject thereof is general, i.e.,acts done in the performance of official duties, without
specifying the action or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.

Same; Same; Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public
officers. Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an
act that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights
and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights
by public officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the
Administrative Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32
of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress from a
particular class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the
Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties, Article
32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek
damages for violation of constitutional rights.

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.

FACTS:

This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are
currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the maximum tax
shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying
Champion, Hope, and More (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already
covered.

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of
the laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her
because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She
claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her
acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.

The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under
Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the
discharge of the functions of his/her office
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising
from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within
his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been
caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected
by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may
arise where the subordinate public officers act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA,
a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done
in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a
general law (the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as
the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which
the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act
was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act
which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that
defendant acted without evil intent.

VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION


GR No. 141309, JUNE 19 2007
Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent Fortune
Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are
"Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior
to its effectivity, cigarette brands Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad
valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner
issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a
foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion"
cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are
currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum
tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack."

Fortune filed an MfR on 20 Jul, requesting the RMC's recall but it was denied on 30 Jul, and payment of the AV tax
deficiency (9M~) was demanded within 10 days. Fortune filed a petition for review with the CTaxApp (CTA) which
issued an injunction enjoining RMC's implementation (defective, invalid, unenforceable). This was affirmed by the
CA, and SC in Comm, BIR v. CA, since the RMC fell short of the requirements for a valid admin issuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner in her private
capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without
due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that:

(1) respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her
official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the
Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts;
(2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith;

On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of
petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to present evidence

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was
dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act
with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the
general law on the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the
instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is grounded on her acts done in the
performance of her functions as a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which
should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice,
or gross negligence. She further averred that the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of
damages for violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public officers; while Section 38,
Book I of the Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public officers liability, such that, if the complaint,
as in the instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same is dismissible for failure to
state a cause of action

Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the public officers "acts" from which civil
liability may arise, is a general law; while Article 32 which deals specifically with the public officers violation of
constitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine whether the complaint states a cause of action
or not. Citing the case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon,14 respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is
enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is not required that said public
officer should have acted with malice or in bad faith

ISSUE/S:

(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of
the functions of his/her office?

(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern in
determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action?

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising
from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within
his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been
caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected
by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may
arise where the subordinate public officers act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA,
a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done
in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that the
decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code.

The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code Commission, as follows:

"DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights, Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so
amended as to make a public official liable for violation of another persons constitutional rights only if the public
official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this suggestion for these reasons:

"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there
should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the
effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an
end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.

Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as
the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property, or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which
the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act
was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act
which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort is not precluded by the fact that
defendant acted without evil intent.

Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability of superior and
subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. For both superior and subordinate public
officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements that will make them liable for
damages. Note that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of government officials, the subject
thereof is general, i.e., "acts" done in the performance of official duties, without specifying the action or omission
that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.

Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an "act" that
may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and
liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by
public officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative
Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same
Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular
class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the
Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties, Article
32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek
damages for violation of constitutional rights.

Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Commission on Human Rights; Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to
have no jurisdiction on adjudicatory powers over certain specific type of cases like alleged human rights violations
involving civil or political rights.The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has
the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, it
has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged human rights violations in volving civil or political rights. The Court declares the
Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights.The most that may be conceded to the Commission. in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered
such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusion in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations invoking civil and political rights.As should at once be observed,
only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The
Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of
said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by
it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request
the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice
or even quasi-judicial bodies do.But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the
technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Commission on Human Rights having merely the power to investigate
cannot and should not try and resolve on the merits the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90775.
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power to investigate, cannot and should
not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90775, as
it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The matters are undoubtedly and clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education and also within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being
within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Isidro Cario vs The Commission on Human Rights

Distinction between the power to adjudicate and the power to investigate

FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of public
authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying away from their classes,
converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served
them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order,
eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90
days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed
to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout
signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service
of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with
RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was
eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding
the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that
the striking teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been replaced without a chance to
reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission
is empowered to investigate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

HELD:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even
a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.

Power to Investigate

The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of
any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of
violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also
request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the
conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies
do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have
well understood and quite distinct meanings.

Investigate vs. Adjudicate

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study.
The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or
inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of
course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of
settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation,"
"investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve,
rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court
case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge"
means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in
a case of controversy . . . ."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not
"try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has
announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits"
the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are
prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions,
and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this
effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where
the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said
acts or omissions.

Who has Power to Adjudicate?

These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary
powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.

Manner of Appeal

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary
cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves
are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of
Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which
may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education
himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually
the Supreme Court.

204 SCRA 483 Political Law Constitutional Law The Constitutional Commissions Commission on Human Rights
Adjudicatory Power of the CHR

On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies
in order to air grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was
then investigated, and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cario ordered the dismissal from the service
of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In
the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from
continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Cario.

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the
alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of
human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits
and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial.

Same; Same; Administrative Law; Department Secretaries are authorized to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under their jurisdiction.The Administrative Code of 1987
vests department secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for
officers and employees under the formers jurisdiction. Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary authority over
respondents. Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the jurisdiction of the
President, in line with the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. While the Chief
Executive directly dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless recognized the health secretarys disciplinary
authority over respondents when he remanded the PCAGCs findings against them for the secretarys appropriate
action.

Same; Same; Same; As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to
investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be based; Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad
Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly
their authority was limited to conducting investigations and preparing their findings and recommendations.As a
matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report the
facts from which a decision may be based. In the present case, the secretary effectively delegated the power to
investigate to the PCAGC. Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under
AO 298 had the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to conducting
investigations and preparing their findings and recommendations. The power to impose sanctions belonged to the
disciplining authority, who had to observe due process prior to imposing penalties.

Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Cardinal Principles in Administrative Due Process.Due process in administrative
proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing,
which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be
substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have
acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the
views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the
reasons for it and the various issues involved.

Same; Same; Same; Same; While the department secretary has the competence and the authority to decide what
action should be taken against officials and employees who have been administratively charged and investigated,
the actual exercise of the disciplining authoritys prerogative requires a prior independent consideration of the law
and the facts, and failure to comply with this requirement results in an invalid decision.The health secretary has
the competence and the authority to decide what action should be taken against officials and employees who have
been administratively charged and investigated. However, the actual exercise of the disciplining authoritys
prerogative requires a prior independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with this
requirement results in an invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an
investigators recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered. There can be no
shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation, and the livelihood of the person administratively charged.
In the present case, the health secretarys two-page Order dismissing respondents pales in comparison with the
presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior to the issuance of his seven-page decision, President Fidel V.
Ramos conducted a restudy of the doctors case. He even noted a violation that had not been considered by the
PCAGC. On the other hand, Health Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica simply and blindly relied on the dispositive
portion of the Commissions Resolution. She even misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the recommendation with
regard to Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Like that of President Ramos, the decision of Secretary Reodica should have contained a
factual finding and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable respondents to know the bases for their
dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desired.The Presidents endorsement of the
records of the case for the appropriate action of the health secretary did not constitute a directive for the
immediate dismissal of respondents. Like that of President Ramos, the decision of Secretary Reodica should have
contained a factual finding and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable respondents to know the bases for
their dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desired.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The end does not justify the meansguilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed,
unless due process is first observed, this is the essence of fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.In
representation of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General insists that respondents are guilty of the charges
and, like Dr. Majarais, deserve dismissal from the service. Suffice it to stress that the issue in this case is not the
guilt of respondents, but solely due process. In closing, the Court reiterates the oft-quoted aphorism that the end
does not justify the means. Guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is first observed.
This is the essence of fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.

DOH vs Camposano

Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions, the disciplining authority must
make an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its face, a decision imposing administrative sanctions
must show the bases for its conclusions. While the investigation of a case may be delegated to and conducted by
another body or group of officials, the disciplining authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence gathered and
indicate the applicable law. In this manner, the respondents would be informed of the bases for the sanctions and
thus be able to prepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedure is part of the sporting idea of fair play in a
democracy.

Facts:
Respondents are former employees of the DOH-NCR. Some concerned DOH-NCR employees filed a complaint before
the DOH Resident Ombudsman against respondents arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of
1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth P330,000.00 from
Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory.

Issue: WON there has been a failure to comply with administrative due process

Held:
The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under the former's jurisdiction.[16] Thus, the health
secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents.

The Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health recommending the filing of a
formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against respondents and their co-respondents.
The Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the them for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of
RA 3019.Then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Administrative Order No. 298 creating an ad-hoc
committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed
to the PCAGC. The PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH. After the investigation, it issued a resolution
disposing respondents (guilty as charged) and so recommends to his Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos that the
penalty of dismissal from the government service be imposed thereon. President Ramos issued AO 390 that
DISMISSED them from the service. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision on the ground that the PCAGC's
jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only to presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had no
power to investigate the charges against respondents. Moreover, in simply and completely relying on the PCAGC's
findings, the secretary of health failed to comply with administrative due process.

Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the jurisdiction of the President, in line
with the principle that the 'power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint.[17] While the Chief Executive
directly dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless recognized the health secretary's disciplinary authority over
respondents when he remanded the PCAGC's findings against them for the secretary's 'appropriate action.

As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report
the facts from which a decision may be based.[19] In the present case, the secretary effectively delegated the
power to investigate to the PCAGC.
Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the power to
impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to conducting investigations and preparing
their findings and recommendations. The power to impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who had
to observe due process prior to imposing penalties.

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the
respondents' right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit supporting evidence,
must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to
support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision,
the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have
simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that
respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.

The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the present factual milieu.
Noncompliance with the sixth requisite is equally evident from the health secretary's Order dismissing the
respondents thus guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is first observed. This is the
essence of fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.

Ople v Torres

FACTS
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System," was
issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996. Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate
A.O. No. 308 on several grounds. One of them is that: The establishment of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No.308 by the President is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of congress. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative
order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No.308 establishes a
system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and
foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.

On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No. 308 was issued within the executive and administrative
powers of the president without encroaching on the legislative powers of congress.

ISSUE
Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate.

HELD
Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution has vested this
power in the Congress. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. Any power
deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has
lodged it elsewhere.

The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance. As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department.
He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. Corollary to the power of control, the President
also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order.
Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his
duties effectively.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.

From these precepts, the Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by
an administrative order.

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The Court rejects the argument that A.O. No. 308
implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and incorporates in
a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance and embodies changes
in administrative structure and procedures designed to serve the people.

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It
establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state policies - the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy
interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. As said administrative order redefines
the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident
that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.

Smart Communications, Inc. Et Al. vs. National Telecommunications Commission (Ntc) G.R. 151908, August 12, 2003

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE & QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS; RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; DOCTRINE


OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION;WHEN APPLICABLE

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ET AL. V. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC)


G.R. 151908, August 12, 2003

Facts: The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which promulgated rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services. Petitioners filed with the RTC a petition to declare the circular as unconstitutional. A
motion to dismiss was filed by the NTC on the ground of petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC
denied the motion to dismiss but on certiorari, the CA reversed RTC.

Held: 1. Administrative bodies had (a) quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and (b) quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine
of non-delegability and separability of powers. To be valid, such rules and regulations must conform to, and be
consistent with, the provisions of enabling statute.
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies
are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial.
2. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative body contravenes the law
or the constitution is within the judicial power as defined by the Constitution which is the duty of the Courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there haw been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The NTC circular was issued pursuant to its quasi-
legislative or rule-making power. Hence, the action must be filed directly with the regular courts without requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
3. Where the act of administrative agency was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, exhaustion of
administrative remedy is required, before going to court.
4. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the same must be referred to an administrative
agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine of primary jurisdiction
applies where the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within
the special competence of an administrative body. In such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral
of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

Facts:

The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000,
promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services.

The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation and three certified true copies thereof furnished the UP Law Center. It was published in the newspaper,
The Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000. Meanwhile, the provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale
and use of prepaid cards and the unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service took effect 90 days from the
effectivity of the Memorandum Circular.

On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which
contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. This was
followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities.

Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications
Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner
Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing
Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order.

Petitioners alleged that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call
cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the
Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against
deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of
the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and
that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable.
Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Complaint-in-Intervention and this was granted by the trial court.

Respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Likewise, Globe and Islacom filed a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No.
152063, assigning the following errors. Thus, two petitions were consolidated in a Resolution dated February 17,
2003.

Issues:

1. Whether NTC has a jurisdiction and not the regular courts over the case; and
2. Whether Billing Circular issued by NTC is unconstitutional and contrary to law and public policy.

Held:
Jurisdiction: NTC vs. RTC

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative


adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-
delegability and separability of powers.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an
administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to
the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises
of the regulatory statute administered.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. Q-00-42221. The Court of Appeals
erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing the case.

Constitutionality of the Circular

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party
need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed
act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated
October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power.

Ruling:

Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical
matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of
the cellular telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards and this is judicially known to be within the
knowledge of a good percentage of our population and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the
Constitution.

Hence, the consolidated petitions are granted but the decision of the Court of Appeals on the civil cases are
reversed and set aside. Thus, it is remanded to the court a quo for continuation of the proceedings.

EDU V. ERICTA

G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970 En Banc [Non-delegation of power; police power]

FACTS:
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule squarely on the constitutionality
of the Reflector Law in this proceeding for certiorari and prohibition against respondent Judge Ericta of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a
pending suit in his court for certiorari and prohibition, filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the
validity of such enactment as well as such administrative order.

Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducin g
what was set forth in the Act. Thus: No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be
registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory built in reflector commercial glass
reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and
clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of li ght shall be visible 477 meters away at night. Then came a
section on dimensions, placement and color.
As to dimensions the following is provided for Glass reflectors - Not less than 3 inches in diameter or not less than
3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape - at least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The painted or taped area may be
bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner. Provision is then made as to how such re flectors are to be placed,
installed, pasted or painted.
There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or painted four
reectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in front and those in the
rear end of the body thereof. The color required of each reflectors, whether built-in, commercial glass, reflectorized
tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed
on the sides and in the rear shall all be red.

Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus Non-compliance with the requirements
contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already
registered, its registration maybe suspended in pursuance of the provisions of Section 16 of RA. 4136 Provided,
however, that in the case of the violation of Section 1 A and B and paragraph 8, Sec 3 hereof, a fine of not less ten
nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed.

ISSUE:
Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and valid.

RULING:
Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public safety and order.

Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." The police power
is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.

The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative Order No. 2
issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for
being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took effect
on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act.

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its
legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments
may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to
make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions
when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not
abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority.

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No.
4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the
prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of
petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into
actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2
can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo.

PEOPLE VS. MACEREN

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be inharmony with
the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect itsgeneral provisions. By such
regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agencycannot amend an act of Congress.

FACTS: The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes electro
fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Lawand the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The
municipal court quashed the complaint andheld that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the
executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence,
this appeal to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?


HELD:NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheriesexceeded their
authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does notexpressly prohibit electro fishing. As
electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it.Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a
penal provision to that effect couldhave been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot
delegate to anexecutive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize
theissuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where thelegislature has
delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgaterules to carry out an express
legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards,which have the effect of extending, or which
conflict with the authority granting statute, do notrepresent a valid precise of the rule-making power.

REPUBLIC V. DRUGMAKERS LABORATORIES


GR No. 190837, March 5, 2014

FACTS: The DOH, thru then Secretary Alfredo R.A. Bengzon, issued Administrative Order No. AO 67, s. 1989, entitled
Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical Products. It required drug manufacturers to
register certain drug and medicine products with the FDA before they may release the same to the market for sale.
In this relation, a satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence (BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a
CPR for these products. However, the implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because
there was no local facility capable of conducting the same. The issuance of the Circular No. 1, s. 1997 resumed the
FDAs implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement with the establishment of BA/BE testing facilities in the
country. Thereafter, the FDA issued Circular No. 8, s. 1997 which provided additional implementation details
concerning the BA/BE testing requirement on drug products.

ISSUE: Who has the power to validly issue and implement Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997: Secretary of Health or
FDA? Do the assailed circulars partake of administrative rules and regulations and, as such, must comply with the
requirements of prior hearing, consultation and publication?

RULING: The FDA has sufficient authority to issue the circulars and since they would not affect the substantive
rights of the parties that they seek to govern, as they are not administrative regulations, no prior hearing,
consultation, and publication are needed for their validity. Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 cannot be considered as
administrative regulations because they do not: (a) implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof;
(b) interpret, clarify, or explain existing statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain the
existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends. The only purpose of the
circulars is for the FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67, s. 1989,
including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720.

ASTEC vs. ERC


September 18, 2012

FACTS: The Petitioners BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I, QUEZELCO II, and PRESCO are rural electric cooperatives
established under P.D. 269 or the National Electrification Administration Decree. The Petitioners are no-profit
organizations engaged in the distribution of electricity. On 8 December 1994, R.A. 7832 was enacted, which
imposed a cap on the recoverable rate of system loss that the rural electric cooperatives may charge to their
customers. Pursuant to said law, the Energy Regulatory Board issued Orders on 19 February 1997 and 25 April
1997provisionally authorizing the petitioners and other rural electric cooperatives to use a prescribed formula or the
computation of the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA). On 8 June 2001, R.A. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created the Energy
Regulatory Commission (ERC). In an Order dated 17 June 2003, the ERC noted that the PPA formula which was
approved by the ERB was silent on whether the PPA formula approved by the ERB was based on gross or net of
discounts. For uniformity, the ERC ruled that for past PPAs, power cost shall still be based ongross while for future
PPAs, power cost shall be based on net.

Several rural electric cooperatives filed motions for reconsideration on the following grounds: 1) that they are non-
profit organizations such that their rates do not include any possible extra revenue except the discounts; and 2)
that they are burdened with expenses in their continuing expansion programs for rural electrification. On 14 January
2005, the ERC issued an Order, in which it stressed that the purchased power cost is a pass though cost to
customers and, therefore, the rural electric cooperatives should only recover from their members and patrons the
actual cost of power purchased from power suppliers. Consistent with this, any discounts extended to rural electric
cooperatives must necessarily be extended to end- users by charging only the net cost of purchased power.

The ERC then directed the Petitioners to refund their respective over-recoveries to end-users arising from the
implementation of R.A. 7832.The motions for reconsideration filed by the Petitioners were denied by the ERC.

Court of Appeals: denied the petitions for review of the rural electric cooperatives, and affirmed the Orders of the
ERC directing the various rural electric cooperatives to refund their respective over-recoveries.
ISSUE 1:
Whether the policy guidelines issued by the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are
ineffective and invalid for lack of 1) publication, 2) non-submission to the U.P. Law Center, and their 3) retroactive
application.

HELD:
1) No, publication is not necessary for the effectivity of the policy guidelines. The policy guidelines of the ERC on the
treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers give no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed.

RATIO:
1) Publication is a basic postulate of procedural due process. The purpose of publication is to duly inform the public
of the contents of the laws which govern them and regulate their activities. Art. 2 of the Civil Code, as amended by
E.O. No. 200, as well as E.O. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 both provide that[l]aws shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.

2) Procedural due process demands that administrative rules and regulations be published in order to be effective.
In Taada vs. Tuvera, the S.C. held: ALL statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

3) Exceptions to the requirement of publication:

3.1. An interpretative regulation, to be effective, needs nothing more than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. It adds nothing to the law and does not affect
the substantial rights of any person.

3.2 A regulation that is merely internal in nature. It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the general public.

3.3 Letter of instruction issued by an administrative agency concerning rules or guidelines to be followed by
subordinates in the performance of their duties

4) The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are interpretative
regulations. The policy guidelines merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 and its IRR, particularly on the computation of the
cost of purchased power. The policy guidelines did not modify, amend or supplant the IRR.

4.1. ERCs policy guidelines on the treatment of discounts merely interpret the cost of purchased power as a
component of the PPA formula under R.A. 7832s IRR. The guidelines merely affirmed the plain and unambiguous
meaning of cost in said IRR. Cost is an item of outlay, and must therefore exclude discounts since these are
not amounts paid or charged for the sale of electricity, but are reductions in rates.

4.2. ERCs policy guidelines uphold and preserve the nature of the PPA formula. The nature of the PPA formula
precludes an interpretation that includes discounts in the computation of the cost of purchased power. The PPA
formula is an adjustment mechanism the purpose of which is purely for the recovery of cost.

HELD:
2) As interpretative regulations, the policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power
suppliers are also not required to be filed with the U.P. Law Center in order to be effective.

RATIO:
1) The Administrative Code of 1987 requires every rule adopted by an agency to be filedwith the U.P. Law Center to
be effective.

2) However, in Board of Trustees of the GSIS v. Velasco, it was held that not all rules and regulations adopted by
every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature are not required to be filed with the U.P. Law Center. (Paragraph 9 (a) of the Guidelines for
Receiving and Publication of Rules andRegulations Filed with the U.P. Law Center)

MANILA JOCKEY V. CA

Manila Jockey Club v CA


FACTS
On June 18, 1948, Congress approved Republic Act No. 309, entitled An Act to Regulate Horse Racing in the
Philippines. This Act consolidated all existing laws and amended inconsistent provisions relative to horse racing. It
provided for the distribution of gross receipts from the sale of betting tickets, but is silent on the allocation of so-
called breakages. Thus the practice, according to the petitioners, was to use the breakages for the anti-bookies
drive and other sales promotions activities of the horse racing clubs.

On March 20, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 420 was issued creating the Philippine Racing Commission
(PHILRACOM), giving it exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect of the conduct of horse racing, including
the framing and scheduling of races. By virtue of this power, the PHILRACOM authorized the holding of races on
Wednesdays starting on December 22, 1976.

Petitioners made a joint query regarding the ownership of breakages accumulated during Wednesday races. In
response to the query, PHILRACOM rendered its opinion in a letter dated September 20, 1978. It declared that the
breakages belonged to the racing clubs concerned.

On December 16, 1986 President Corazon Aquino amended certain provisions Sec. 4 of R.A. 6631 and Sec. 6 of R.A.
6632 through Executive Orders No. 88 and 89.

On April 23, 1987, PHILRACOM itself addressed a query to the Office of the President asking which agency is entitled
to dispose of the proceeds of the breakages derived from the Tuesday and Wednesday races.

In a letter dated May 21, 1987, the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., replied that the disposition of the breakages rightfully belongs to PHILRACOM, not only those derived
from the Saturday, Sunday and holiday races, but also from the Tuesday and Wednesday races in accordance with
the distribution scheme prescribed in said Executive Orders.

Controversy arose when herein respondent PHILRACOM, sent a series of demand letters to petitioners MJCI and
PRCI, requesting its share in the breakages of mid-week-races and proof of remittances to other legal beneficiaries
as provided under the franchise laws.

ISSUE
Who are the rightful beneficiaries of the breakages derived from mid-week races? This issue also carries an ancillary
question: assuming PHILRACOM is entitled to the mid-week breakages under the law, should the petitioners remit
the money from the time the mid-week races started, or only upon the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 88 and 89?

HELD
A reasonable reading of the horse racing laws favors the determination that the entities enumerated in the
distribution scheme provided under R.A. Nos. 6631 and 6632, as amended by Executive Orders 88 and 89, are the
rightful beneficiaries of breakages from mid-week races. Petitioners should therefore remit the proceeds of
breakages to those benefactors designated by the aforesaid laws.

The holding of horse races on Wednesdays is in addition to the existing schedule of races authorized by law. Since
this new schedule became part of R.A. 6631 and 6632 the set of procedures in the franchise laws applicable to the
conduct of horse racing business must likewise be applicable to Wednesday or other mid-week races.

A fortiori, the granting of the mid-week races does not require another legislative act to reiterate the manner of
allocating the proceeds of betting tickets. Neither does the allocation of breakages under the same provision need
to be isolated to construe another distribution scheme. No law can be viewed in a condition of isolation or as the
beginning of a new legal system.

Proceeding to the subsidiary issue, the period for the remittance of breakages to the beneficiaries should have
commenced from the time PHILRACOM authorized the holding of mid-week races because R.A. Nos. 6631 and 6632
were already in effect then. The petitioners contend that they cannot be held retroactively liable to respondent
PHILRACOM for breakages prior to the effectivity of E.O. Nos. 88 and 89.

They assert that the real intent behind E.O. Nos. 88 and 89 was to favor the respondent PHILRACOM anew with the
benefits which formerly had accrued in favor of Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation (PAAF). They opine that since
laws operate prospectively unless the legislator intends to give them retroactive effect, the accrual of these
breakages should start on December 16, 1986, the date of effectivity of E.O. Nos. 88 and 89. Now, even if one of the
benefactors of breakages, the PAAF, as provided by R.A. 6631 and 6632 had ceased operation, it is still not proper
for the petitioners to presume that they were entitled to PAAFs share. When the petitioners mistakenly appropriated
the breakages for themselves, they became the implied trustees for those legally entitled to the proceeds.

While herein petitioners might have relied on a prior opinion issued by an administrative body, the well-entrenched
principle is that the State could not be estopped by a mistake committed by its officials or agents. Although there
was an initial interpretation of the law by PHILRACOM, a court of law could not be precluded from setting that
interpretation aside if later on it is shown to be inappropriate.

Abakada Guro Party-list et. al vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 168056) - Digest

Facts:
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took effect
on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of
petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.

The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: That the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to
12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two
and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);

or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent
(1%)

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is an abdication by
Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti.
They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included within
the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable
upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods.

Petitioners further alleged that delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism.
They insist that accountability, responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and they
should not pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also effectively nullified
the Presidents power of control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates
like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Justice.

Issue:
Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of
the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power?

Ruling:
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively,
legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law-
complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the
expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its
exercise which determines the validity of its delegation.

The exceptions are:

(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution

(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution

(c) delegation to the people at large

(d) delegation to local governments

(e) delegation to administrative bodies

For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient standard is one which
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.

In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the
entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No
discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word
SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the
conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to
impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.

Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact--- whether by
December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national
government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. If either of these two
instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the
President.

In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of
Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The
Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented,
considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective
to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and
verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.

Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who
must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which
the legislative process can go forward.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.

SM LND, INC v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPEMENT AUTHORITY


G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014
CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

FACTS:
Pursuant to RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), the BCDA opened for disposition and
development its Bonifacio South Property. Jumping on the opportunity, SM Land, Inc. (SMLI) submitted to the BCDA
an unsolicited proposal for the development of the lot through a Public-Private Joint Venture Agreement which was
accepted by the BCDA. However, the BCDA clarified that its act should not be construed to bind the agency to enter
into a joint venture agreement with SMLI but only constitutes an authorization to conduct detailed negotiations with
SMLI and iron out the terms and conditions of the agreement.

Upon arriving at mutually acceptable terms and conditions, a Certification of Successful Negotiations (Certification)
was issued by the BCDA and signed by both parties with the provisions that the BCDA undertook to subject SMLIs
Original Proposal to Competitive Challenge and committed itself to commence the activities for the solicitation for
comparative proposals. Then, instead of proceeding with the Competitive Challenge, the BCDA corresponded with
SMLI stating that it will welcome any voluntary and unconditional proposal to improve the original offer, with the
assurance that the BCDA will nonetheless respect any right which may have accrued in favor of SMLI. In turn, SMLI
increased the total secured payments with an upfront payment.

Without responding to SMLIs new proposal, the BCDA sent a memorandum to the Office of the President (OP)
categorically recommending the termination of the Competitive Challenge. Alarmed by this development, SMLI
urged the BCDA to proceed with the Competitive Challenge as agreed upon. However, the BCDA, via the assailed
Supplemental Notice No. 5, terminated the Competitive Challenge altogether. In the meantime, the BCDA issued in
favor of SMLI a check without explanation attached to it but its value corresponds to the proposal security posted by
SMLI, with interest. SMLI attempted to return the check but to no avail. The BCDA caused the publication of an
Invitation to Bid for the development of the subject property. This impelled SMLI to file an Urgent Manifestation
with Reiterative Motion to Resolve SMLIs Application for Temporary Restraining (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction.

The Court issued the TRO prayed for by SMLI and enjoined BCDA from proceeding with the new selection process for
the development of the property. For its part, SMLI alleged in its petition that the Certification issued by the BCDA
and signed by the parties constituted a contract and that under the said contract, BCDA cannot renege on its
obligation to conduct and complete the Competitive Challenge. The BCDA relies chiefly on the reservation clause in
the Terms of Reference (TOR), which mapped out the procedure to be followed in the Competitive Challenge, which
allegedly authorized the agency to unilaterally cancel the Competitive Challenge. BCDA add that the terms and
conditions agreed upon are disadvantageous to the government, and that it cannot legally be barred by estoppel in
correcting a mistake committed by its agents.
ISSUES:
Whether or not BCDA correct in issuing Supplemental Notice No. 5, which unilaterally aborted the Competitive
Challenge, and in subjecting the development of the project to public bidding?

RULING:
NO. SMLI has the right to a completed Competitive Challenge pursuant to the Detailed Guidelines for Competitive
Challenge Procedure for Public-Private Joint Ventures (NEDA JV Guidelines) and the Certification issued by the BCDA.
The reservation clause adverted to by the BCDA cannot, in any way, prejudice said right. NEDA promulgated the
NEDA Joint Venture Guidelines, which detailed two (2) modes of selecting a private sector Joint Venture partner: by
competitive selection or through negotiated agreements. Competitive selection involves a selection process based
on transparent criteria, which should not constrain or limit competition, and is open to participation, by any
interested and qualified private entity. Furthermore, it is well to point out that after BCDA accepted the unsolicited
proposal of SMLI and after both parties successfully concluded the detailed negotiations on the terms and
conditions of the project, SMLI acquired the status of an Original Proponent.

An Original Proponent, per the TOR, pertains to the party whose unsolicited proposal for the development and
privatization of the subject property through Joint Venture with BCDA has been accepted by the latter, subject to
certain conditions, and is now being subjected to a Competitive Challenge. In this regard, SMLI insists that as an
Original Proponent, it obtained the right to a completed Competitive Challenge. A scrutiny of the NEDA JV Guidelines
reveals that certain rights are conferred to an Original Proponent. As correctly pointed out by SMLI, these rights
include the right to the conduct and completion of a competitive challenge. By their mutual consent and in signing
the Certification, both parties, in effect, entered into a binding agreement to subject the unsolicited proposal to the
Competitive Challenge. Evidently, the Certification partakes of a contract wherein BCDA committed itself to proceed
with the Third Stage of the process and simultaneously grants SMLI the right to expect that the BCDA will fulfill its
obligations under the same. The preconditions to the conduct of the Competitive Challenge having been met, what
is left, therefore, is to subject the terms agreed upon to a Competitive Challenge

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA

FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for charges against the
Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated
death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum
circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been
given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Nevertheless, POEA
assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers.

RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. ... "The
governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or
surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the
details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of
the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to
step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

KMU V. GARCIA

FACTS:
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released memoranda allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within
15% above and below the official LTFRB rate for a period of one year. Provincial Bus Operators Association of the
Philippines applied for fare rate increase. This was opposed by the Philippine Consumer Foundation, Inc. and Perla
Bautista as they were exorbitant and unreasonable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provincial bus operators have authority to reduce and increase fare rates based on the order of
the LTFRB

HELD:
The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing rates of public services and
the LTFRB is likewise vested with the same. Such delegation is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing
complexity of modern life. The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range is
illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari
protest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. A further delegation of power would constitute a negation
of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing
the provincial bus operators to change their fares would lead to a chaotic situation and would leave the riding public
at the mercy of transport operators.

PEOPLE V. MACEREN
Lesson: The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it has been enacted.

SCs words: The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of
the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is
not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing.

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or
to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of
Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see
Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar vs. Phil.
Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).

There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making powers. Section 4 of
the Fisheries Law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time issue instructions, orders, and regulations
consistent" with that law, "as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof. That power is
now vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by section 7 of the Revised Fisheries Law, Presidential Decree No.
704.

Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Commissioner of Fisheries "to prepare and execute upon the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, forms, instructions, rules and regulations consistent
with the purpose" of that enactment "and for the development of fisheries."

A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make rules and regulations to
carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal
statute. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary
implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 SE 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130).

Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate
rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the
effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the
rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate (State vs. Miles, 5 Wash. 2nd
322; 105 Pac. 2nd 51).

In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls
within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with
special care. (State vs. Miles, supra).

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, supra


SCs words: There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz,, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he
will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 14 Both
tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step
into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is
especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is
permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to
which they legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and
more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become
the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities
and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon
present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the
details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been
applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before
it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard
guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself
which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas
Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

CERVANTES V. AUDITOR GENERAL

This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor General denying petitioners claim for quarters allowance as
manager of the National Abaca and other Fibers Corp. (NAFCO).
Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of P15,000.00
NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650 for 1949.
This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise council under
Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the Auditor general on two
grounds:
o a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to P15,000/year.
o b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.

ISSUES: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void.
Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.
DECISION: R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is not illegal delegation of legislative power to the executive as argued by
petitioner but a mandate for the President to streamline GOCCs operation. Executive Order 93 is valid because it
was promulgated within the 1 year period given. Petition for review DISMISSED with costs