Professional Documents
Culture Documents
by J. M. E. MORAVCSIK
(Sophist 259e56)*. In these lines Plato states that rational
discourse is made possible by the interwovenness of the Forms. The
task of the Interpreter is to discover what the nature of this inter-
wovenness is, and to ascertain the exact nature of the relationship
between the interwovenness of the Forms and the structure of
rational discourse. At present there is considerable disagreement
concerning these issues. In this paper the main difficulties of
259e56 will be outlined, and some recent attempts to overcome
these difficulties will be surveyed. It will be indicated where and
why I dissent from the positions taken by several contemporary
authors, and a new Interpretation will be presented which attempts
to show that a plurality of Forms, woven into a pattern, underlies
each meaningful sentence, and that the interwovenness can be
explained by reference to formal concepts. The importance which
in my opinion Plato attaches to formal concepts in the Sophist
has implications for the Interpretation of the theory of Forms s
found in the later dialogues.
We must consider 259e56 in context in order to appreciate its
f ll significance. As Bonitz said1 scholars have long recognized that
Sophist 237264 contains the inner core of the dialogue with the
explanation of meaningful falsehood s the dominant theme. Plato's
opponents are presented s denying the possibility of meaningful
falsehood. They insist that both truth and meaning depend on a
simple correspondence between the units of discourse and the
elements of reality. They believe that a statement is rendered both
true and meaningful by its correspondence with some fact. Since
Plato believes s most of us do that some meaningful sentences
are false, he sets out to provide an alternative explanation of truth
and meaning. The search for adequate alternatives to the correspon-
dence theory of meaning has occupied the minds of many philo-
sophers since Plato. It is a live topic even in contemporary philo
* Burnet's numbering of lines is followed throughout the paper.
i H. Bonitz Platonische Studien 2nd ed. Berlin 1875, p. 168.
9 Arch. Gcsch, Philosophie Bd. 42
Ackrill is not satisfied with this solution and offers a new Inter-
pretation of the lines which rests on two theses. The first of these
concerns the connection between the interwovenness of the Forms
and the combining of words into Statements. Ackrill maintains
that the interwovenness of a plurality of Forms need not be
represented by Statements; it may be and on his view, it is
something merely presupposed by meaningful discourse. In defense
of this claim it must be pointed out that the language of the lines
in question is compatible with it. In saying that the
makes discourse possible Plato is not necessarily saying that it
underlies and is represented by every Statement.
Ackrill's other thesis is that the relations signified by the term
'' are those of compatibility and incompatibility. This
Interpretation is supported by the argument that the compatibility
of several Forms is a prerequisite to the correct application of a
plurality of attributes to a single individual. If no Form were
compatible with some other Form, every entity could have only
one attribute; each entity would have to have its "own sentence"
so to speak. As far s incompatibilit}' is concerned Ackrill argues
that the attribution of each Form to some individual gains meaning
by ruling out a number of possible states of affairs. To say of
someone that he is wise is to deny that he is foolish. The negative
power of this Statement is derived from the fact that Wisdom and
Folly which we conceive here s Forms are incompatible.
Thus even a Statement like 'Theaetetus is sitting" presupposes
relations of incompatibility between Forms. The Statement quoted
rules out the possibilities that Theaetetus is flying or standing.
With this in mind one might say that the incompatibility of Fly-
ing and Sitting is presupposed by the meaning of our example.
Thus AckrilTs solution re-establishes the consistency of 259e56
with Plato's examples of sentences. On his account even Statements
which have an individual s their subject presuppose the inter-
wovenness of a plurality of Forms.
Ackrill's Interpretation has been criticized by Bluck who also
presents an account of his own5. Bluck objects to Ackrill's claim
that the does not underlie each Statement but is merely
presupposed by any Statement. He also objects to the claim that
the is a static condition; Bluck interprets it s something
performed by human beings. Finally, Bluck rejects Ackrill's
6
R. S. Bluck "False Statement in the Sophist". Journal of HeUenic Studie*
vol.77 1957 pt. II. pp. 181-186.
Onr task is now to see how cithcr the fact that Forms can be
ptvdiraled of euch other or the fact that Idcntity, relational Being,
and thrir negatives arc all pervasive connectors, imderlies the com-
binintf of words into Statements. For according to our second
rritrrion i t is clear that the of 259e must be some aspect
the demonstrated previously.
Simple informative Statements are of two types; they either
nssert (deny) identity, or they are of subject-predicate form. In
considering Statements of identity (or non identity) we can account
easily for a plurality of Forms underlying those Statements which
havc Forms s their subjects. In the Statement ''Motion is not
identical with Rest1' we have two Forms connected with at least
one "Vowel-form". It is more difficult to account for an underlying
plurality when one considers Statements of identity which have
individuals s their subjects. Light on this problem is shed by
passages like 256ce, which indicate that according to Plato
Statements of identity or non identity contain not one but two
connectors. E. g. "Motion is other than Rest" would appear in the
terminology developed in 253258 s ,,Motion partakes of the
Other in relation to Rest"17. From this we can see that according
to Plato's conception a plurality of Forms underlies each statement
of identity regardless of subject-matter.
When we turn to Statements of subject-predicate type we find
that the predication of one Form to another obviously involves the
interwovenness of two Forms, effected by a Vowel-form. E. g.
" Justice is a virtue" is equivalent to " Justice partakes of Virtue"
or "Virtue is (applicable) in relation to Justice" where we have
two Forms joined by a connecting Form. In surveying other possible
interpretations our gravest difficulty was the explanation of
Statements like "Xheaetetus is sitting". It is therefore most im-
portant to see that the Interpretation considered here can deal
satisfactorily even with Statements of this type. In every statement
which has an individual or individuals s its subject matter we find
at least one predicate expression and implicit or explicit the
copula or its negative counterpart. The predicate expression surely
Stands for a Form. But more important that that, this Interpretation
17
This raises two difficulties. Did Plato regard identity s symmetrical or s
asymmetrical ? Did he conceive of identity s a connector operating on the same
level s the copula or s a Vowel-form twice removed irom the Consonant-forms
which it helps to connect ? In becoming aware of these difficulties I have benefited
greatly from the fine logical analysis of Prof. K. D rr op. cit. especially pp. 178
and 180.
The limitations arise from the fact that in this dialogue we are
concerned with drawing contrasts between the various meanings
of 'is' and 'is not', and this preoccupation surely philosophical
in nature prevents us from dealing with other, equally important,
Problems of Being.
In view of these objections Peck's Claims cannot be regarded s
sound, and my Interpretation of 259e56 is not threatened by
them.
In conclusion let me sum up the most important implications of
what Plato says in 259e56. Plato believes that the changing
dynamic combination of words, yielding meaningful discourse, is
based on the static interwovenness of the Forms. For discourse is
changing, man-made; and the language of 262d26 shows that
Plato regards it s such. But he also believes that one of the essential
tasks of meaningful discourse is to convey Information. Fundamental
to the conveying of Information is the ability to order the elements
of reality according to concepts23. What makes this ordering
possible, according to Plato, is the general fact that the elements
of reality are identifiable and describable. This he expresses by
saying that the Vowel-forms pervade everything. If they did not,
the world would be either an unindividuated whole s Parmenides
suggestedor an unstructured totality s Heraclitus maintained.
By separating the Vowel-forms from those which he likens to
consonants Plato shows that he is not unaware of the distinction
between sort- and formal concepts. He emphasizes the reality of
the formal concepts because he believes that their reality makes
intelligible discourse possible24. This emphasis has implications for
the Interpretation of the theory of Forms s we find it in the later
dialogues. Thus for Plato the general structure of Statements of
identity or non identity and the logical form of Statements which
contain descriptions is not arbitrary, nor conventional, but rather
something based on the nature of reality. In this way Plato succeeds
in deriving the possibility of meaningful discourse from his theory
of Forms, without falling into the pitfalls of the correspondence
theory of meaning.
23
The term 'concept' is used in this paper at times to designate Platonic
Forms. This use is meant to parallel Bonitz's use oi Begriff"; see H. Bonitz op.
dt. pp. 183184. Bonitz makes it quite clear that what he means by Begriff"
is something which has a reality oi its own, independmt of the human mind.
24
That Plato did not confuse sort- and formal concepts and that he regarded
formal concepts s having reality of their own, has been pointed out by H. Honit/
op cit. p. 196.