Darkness and Light: The Zoroastrian View

DOUGLAS A . Fox

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A N ENDURING problem in the philosophy of religion is that of
/ \ accounting for the moral ambivalence of the world. If man is neither
_/ \_ absolutely good nor absolutely evil, does this imply that his creator
is similarly mixed in character? Or has the cosmos two creators, one good
and one evil? Or, as Marcion claimed, do we have to reckon with an evil
creator but a righteous savior?
Zoroastrianism has popularly been represented as the classic example of
a radical dualism that presents us with two gods: Ahura Mazda, who is good,
and Angra Mainyu, the evil one (or Ohrmazd and Ahriman respectively, to
give them their Pahlavi names). With considerable satisfaction, Jewish and
Christian spokesmen have pointed to this dualism as evidence that while
Zarathustra was undoubtedly a minor religious genius, he does not threaten
the Judeo-Christian claim that monotheism was the discovery of their tradi-
tion, at least so far as living religions are concerned. In our century, however,
Parsi scholarship has launched an assault designed to capture for its cause
the citadel of monotheistic originality, and it has found redoubtable Anglo-
European allies, one of the most recent of whom is R. C. Zaehner.
Professor Zaehner virtually opens his important book The Dawn and
Twilight of Zoroastrianism with these stirring words: "Never has a great
religious thinker been more grossly travestied travestied by his own
followers who straightway obscured the purity of his monotheistic vision,
travestied by the Magi in the Levant who presented him to the Graeco-
Roman world not only as the author of a rigid religious dualism which made
good and evil two rival and co-eternal principles, but also as a magician,
astrologer, and quack."1 These are strong words indeed especially when
we remember that some of those ascribing dualism to the prophet are actually
Parsis of great learning who regard precisely this feature of what they take
to be their founder's message as one of his most permanently useful insights.
Thus, for instance, M. N. Dhalla, a high priest of the Parsis in northwestern

DOUGLAS A. FOX (B.A., University of Sydney; M.A., University of Chicago;

S.T.M., Th.D., Pacific School of Religion) is Assistant Professor of Religion at The
Colorado College. He has contributed to a number of journals. His article, "Personal Logic
and Christian Affirmation," appeared in this Journal in October, 1964.
1
R. C. Zaehner, The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism, New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1961, p. 19.
129
130 DOUGLAS A. FOX

India, is concerned in his Zoroastrian Theology to defend dualism as the most

tenable solution to the problem of evil rather than to deny that Zarathustra
ever proposed it.
The purpose of the present article is to re-examine Zarathustra's theism
and to show that the subsequent history of the conflict between dualism and
monotheism in Zoroastrianism is of a dialectical order that produces useful
material for the continuing discussion of the nature of God and the source
and function of evil.

T H E GATHAS

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The place to begin our inquiry is clearly with that handful of Gathas,
or hymns, which are the most ancient of all the Zoroastrian scriptures and
which, therefore, whether from the hand of the prophet himself or not, may
be expected to reproduce his thought most faithfully.
In Yasna 30 we have a hymn in which is described the origin of the world.
It attributes all that is in the cosmos to twin spirits, one good and the other
evil. The third and fourth verses read as follows: "Now the two primal
Spirits, who revealed themselves in vision as Twins, as the Better and the
Bad in thought and word and action. . . . And when these twin Spirits came
together in the beginning, they established Life and Not-Life." 2 This is
Moulton's translation and it is in essential agreement at all important points
with every major interpretation of the passage.
Unmistakably, we have here a dualism. All that comprises the world is
the creation of one or the other of these two primal spirits, the good or
positive elements ("Life") coming from one, and the evil or negative ele-
ments ("Not-Life") from the other. These spirits are Spenta Mainyu ("Good"
or "Holy" Spirit) and Angra Mainyu ("Evil" or "Destructive" Spirit)
respectively. The question that must be answered is this: Are these spirits
twin deities, truly primal, or are they secondary beings, both creatures of a
single God who reigns above them? Zarathustra's name for the only God he
was prepared to worship was Ahura Mazda ("Wise Lord"). Thus, our
question becomes: Is Spenta Mainyu identical with Ahura Mazda, or is
Ahura Mazda somehow above the creative spirit?
M. N. Dhalla argues for the simple identity of the good spirit and God:
"When Zarathustra expounds his famous doctrine of the duality of the
primeval spirits, the name of Ahura Mazda, the great God of Goodness, is
replaced by his appellative, Spenta Mainyu, 'Holy Spirit.' " 3 This argument,
however, is not undisputed. Martin Haug, for example, contends in an inval-
uable pioneering work published in 1878 that the twin spirits formed only
two parts of the one divine being. James Hope Moulton echoes this view,
2
James Hope Moulton, The Teaching of Zarathushtra, Bombay: Meherji Byramji
Mithaiwala, 1916, p. 349.
1
Maneckji Nusservanji Dhalla, Zoroastrian Theology, New York (publisher unlisted),
1914, p. 25.
DARKNESS AND LIGHT: THE ZOROASTRIAN VIEW 131

adding: "Is it not clear that what Zarathustra was mainly thinking of is the
fact of choice? There are always two directions to be t a k e n . . . . If anyone
likes to say that Evil existed from all eternity, he is perfectly right if he only
means that a thing cannot be Good unless we can conceive of its opposite
which is not Good. The 'Spirits' are both eternal if this is all we mean." 4
With Moulton, a new possibility begins to emerge, for if the twin spirits
are merely a picturesque way of representing the necessity of choice between
good and evil, they need not be held to have anything to do with the nature of
God. They may be entirely immanent. Two modern Parsis, Framoze Ardeshir
Bode and Piloo Nanavutty, take this road and say that the spirits signify

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"the twin aspects of the human mind, and have no meaning apart from its
workings and the moral choice of the individual."6 This, however, is to go
much too far. Such a way of thinking is closer, perhaps, to certain forms of
Hindu idealism than to the very realistic tone of the Gathas, with their con-
cern for words and deeds as well as thought, and for the very earthy aspects
of existence.
Clearly, the verses quoted so far will not settle the issue. W e must look
further. In Yasna 44, verse 5, the prophet uses the rhetorical question as a
mode of affirmation, achieving an effect very similar to that of Job 38 and 39.
By this method he affirms Ahura's creatorship of the astral order, the earth,
waters, plants, winds and clouds. Then, with special significance for us, he
writes: "This I ask thee, tell me truly, Ahura. What artist made light and
darkness? What artist made sleep and waking? Who made morning, noon,
and night, that call the understanding man to his duty?" 6 There is here no
attempt to divide the various parts of creation between two creators, and it
is especially significant that light and darkness are attributed to the one
creator, though darkness is commonly, in Zoroastrianism, the province and
creation of Angra Mainyu.
Have we a conflict here? Has the prophet forgotten that he has imputed
creation to two spirits? I think not. Rather, it seems to me, we must find a
way of reconciling the two statements. As we shall see, such a way is avail-
able. It is enough for the moment to note that darkness as well as light, sleep
as well as waking, night as well as day, are the work of one creator.
W e may observe next that while Zarathustra sees the cosmos as a battle-
field between good and evil forces, he clearly foresees a final triumph for
Ahura Mazda and the good. He brands what is not good "The Lie," and in
Yasna 30:10 he declares: "Then truly on the Lie shall come the destruction
of delight; but they that get the good name shall be partakers of the promised
reward in the fair abode of Good Thought, of Mazdah, and of Right." 7
This is but one example of the prophet's confident forecasts of the ultimate
4
Moulton, op. cit., p. 20.
6
Framoze Ardeshir Bode and Piloo Nanavutty, Songs of Zarathushtra, London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1952, p. 36.
Moulton, op. cit., p. 367.
Ibid., p. 351.
 J

132 DOUGLAS A. FOX

success of Ahura Mazda, and it must lead us to ask whether one can believe **
in an eschatologically triumphant God and at the same time believe that at
the beginning of things he was matched by a malevolent power. Most Christian
philosophers recognize that there are many problems in E. S. Brightman's
celebrated notion of a co-eternal "Given," a sort of recalcitrance in the
material with which God has to work. These problems are sharpened greatly
when the Given is personalized as a twin deity. Either, then, the two spirits <"
are not equal in power or they are not the ultimate sources of authority.
Finally, we should note Yasna 47:3. Addressing Ahura Mazda, the
prophet says: "Thou art the holy Father of this Spirit, which has created for
us the luck-bringing cattle." 8 This means no less than that Ahura Mazda

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is the "Father" of Spenta Mainyu. But if the two Mainyus are "twins,"
Ahura Mazda must also be the Father of Angra Mainyu. This places him *
above, and ontologically prior to, both realities, and it implies an essential
monotheism, even if there is a secondary dualism within it. If this is the
status of Mazda it becomes possible to see why Yasna 44 can refer to him as
the creator of light as well as darkness, of Spenta's realm and Angra's also.
Inasmuch as he is the Father of both creative spirits he is the ultimate author
of all things, the spirits' power being derived from him. *
R. C. Zaehner finds this last point decisive9 and argues, in contradiction
to Dhalla's view that Zarathustra simply substitutes "Spenta Mainyu" for
"Ahura Mazda" in Yasna 30, that only later and corrupt Zoroastrian thought
identifies the two. I am inclined to agree with Zaehner because such a view
seems to fit better the context presented by the Gathas as a whole.
There remain two factors, however, that qualify Zarathustra's monotheism.
One is simply its inconclusiveness. It is significant that to reach any conclusion
about his view we must take widely separated utterances into account. In no
single, coherent statement does the prophet unambiguously proclaim mono-
theism. This makes it possible to hold that his thought was inconsistent.
The second qualifying factor is of a different sort. W e have noted
Moulton's view that Zarathustra, in speaking of the twins, stresses primarily
the perennial need to choose between the better and the worse. This need is
underlined when we find that Ahura Mazda himself must make such a choice.
Yasna 32:2 has him saying: "Holy and good Right-Mindedness do we choose:
let it be ours." 10 Elsewhere it is clear that God's need to make a choice is
related to a duality in the nature of things in which Truth is in tension with the
Lie. Are we met, then, by an ontological rivalry older than the twins or than
Ahura himself? Are we once again faced with a theological pluralism? I doubt
it, because although the Lie (Druj) is personified in the Gathas, neither it nor
Truth smacks of deity as Ahura does; they are simply the alternatives chosen
by the twin spirits. There is, however, a lack of clarity about the status of
these entities. Perhaps Zarathustra thought of them as potentialities needing

8
Ibid., p. 377.
Zaehner, op. cit., p. 50.
10
Ibid., p . 4 3 .
DARKNESS AND LIGHT: THE ZOROASTRIAN VIEW 133

the decisions of God and of lesser beings for their actualization, but one cannot
affirm this without putting words into the prophet's mouth.
If, despite these qualifications, we agree that Zarathustra meant to be a
monotheist, can it nevertheless be said that his concept of the two spirits is
a failure in his system? Duchesne-Guillemin argues that the spirits are a sign
of philosophical incompetence, "adaptations of old myths to a system into
which they could not be perfectly fitted."11 I do not find such a view neces-
sary, since the Gathas give us a consistent enough picture into which the
spirits fit smoothly. There is a supreme creator who alone is God; but he
has created two spirits, his sons, through whom the creation of the universe

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is effected. They, like God before them, have to choose Truth or the Lie,
and each chooses differently. But there is only one God, and since he has
chosen the cause of Truth, it must finally prosper and its adherents be
rewarded.
It might even be said that Zarathustra has shown remarkable philosophical
ability, for he has achieved the best of two worlds! He has a realistic view of
both good and evil, leading him to an intelligible ethical dualism, yet he
retains the ontological and eschatological advantages of a monotheism in
which God is seen as good. Jewish and Christian thinkers who borrowed
from Persia to fill out their satanology would have done well to look further
and see the manner in which the supremacy of God was preserved by
Zarathustra; instead, they elevated Satan to a place where, as an independent
though created evil power, he threatened the divine autonomy. It must be
conceded, however, that Jews and Christians borrowed from a later and
decadent Zoroastrianism.

LATER DUALISM

Soon after the death of Zarathustra the Medes acquired by conquest

a temporary leadership over a more or less unified kingdom. This heralded
a change in religious leadership as well, for the Magi, the priestly caste
of Media, usurped the place of their Chorasmian counterparts, the Athravans
(to whom Zarathustra had probably belonged). Even after Cyrus overthrew
the last Median king and established the Persian Achaemenid dynasty the
Magi retained religious control and governed the development of the religion
they had inherited.
It is probable that the Magi added a number of innovations to Zoroastri-
anism. None was more significant than their clear-cut, rigid dualism in the
concept of deity. This they achieved by diminishing the individuality of
Spenta Mainyu until he dissolved into Ahura Mazda, and then setting Mazda
in direct conflict with Angra Mainyu, whose power was allowed to increase.
This occurred, moreover, within the context of a general corruption of the

11
J. Duchesne-Guillemin, The Western Response to Zoroaster, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1958, pp. 62-3.
1 34 DOUGLAS A. FOX

religion. Pre-Zarathustrian deities, whom the prophet had either attacked or

ignored, began to reappear, and divine and semi-divine figures multiplied
profusely. All this is repeatedly attested by the later Avestan writings and
reaches a point at which Ahura Mazda is so reduced in authority that he is
represented as offering sacrifice to other gods in order to obtain favors of
them (Yasnas 5:17-19; IS-.2-A).
Even now, however, there is some slight qualification of the Mazda-
Angra Mainyu dualism. It is clear from the Bundahis that Angra is not, at
any rate for all Zoroastrians, omniscient, for he is not aware of the existence
of Ahura at first, and cannot foresee the future but must be informed of it
by his Adversary. Moreover, it is still destined that he will finally be defeated.

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Yet his power is sufficient to be a real limitation upon Mazda, and we must
therefore ask ourselves why and how such a relapse could gain the status of
orthodoxy.
The answer is, I suspect, that the new dualism constituted a kind of
protest. The Magi and their followers were unable to accept the implication
that the good God could have had any part, even indirectly, in the creation
of that which is evil. They thought they were defending his integrity by
separating him radically from the source of all that opposed his honor. As an
Augustine or a Calvin could not believe that the will of God might wait upon
the decision of men, so these ancient theologians felt it necessary to repudiate
the suggestion that anything made by God could oppose him.

T H E SASSANIAN REACTION

After Alexander brought the Achaemenid empire to defeat in 330 B. C ,

there followed five hundred years of rule by first a Seleucid and then a Parthian
dynasty. Unhappily, the records tell us very little of the state of religion in
Iran during this time. But with the emergence of the Sassanians (whose
founder, Ardashir, traced his lineage to the Achaemenids) Zoroastrianism is
found to be resurgent. There is a new note of nationalism within it, however,
and this plus new challenges, particularly from Judaism, Christianity, and
Manichaeism, produced a high degree of intolerance and a willingness to
persecute, which cost Mani and many others their lives.
However, the Zoroastrianism we meet in this era is by no means thor-
oughly unified. On the contrary, a number of vigorous sects appear, three of
which are of sufficient relevance for us to mention. The first represents a
continuing stream of dualism not greatly different from that of former days.
Now, however, this view is no longer the unchallenged orthodoxy, for op-
posed to it are at least two forms of renewed monotheism. One of these, for
which our evidence comes mainly from Muslim writers, seems to have held
simply that Ahura Mazda created the evil spirit, Angra Mainyu. Details of
this view are not available for a satisfying study, but its presence should be
noted. The other form of monotheism is found in the Zurvanite heresy, of
which only traces remain in the Pahlavi books themselves, but whose strength
DARKNESS AND LIGHT: THE ZOROASTRIAN VIEW 135

and general position is well attested by the volume of Christian and Mani-
chaean apologetic reaction. Zurvan is the personification of Infinite Time or
Destiny, and he emerges now as a supreme deity. Since Ohrmazd is locked in
desperate battle with Ahriman (as they are called in the Pahlavi of this
period) the Zurvanites evidently find it necessary to account for the Gathic
teaching that God had created the two warring spirits, and instead of recover-
ing the separation of Mazda and Spenta Mainyu they elevate Zurvan to the
position of God above all.
It would seem, then, that the debate between dualists and monotheists,
whether of the more conventional or the Zurvanite kind, waxed strong and
that both sides won temporary victories. All forms of Zoroastrianism, how-

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ever, were now so wedded to Iranian nationalism that when the ruling Sas-
sanians fell to Muslim power in 652 the religion they had endorsed was dealt
an almost fatal blow. Never again did it rise to any significance in its home-
land and although some Zoroastrians emigrated to India and successfully
established a community there, it has remained a fairly static movement
making virtually no inroads on the indigenous faiths of that land.

T H E CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE

The general thesis of this essay is that in Zoroastrianism, dualism emerges

as a protest against Zarathustra's somewhat uncertain monotheism, and that
subsequent forms of monotheism are, in turn, protests against the objectionable
features of dualism. In the vicissitudes of this struggle we may, accordingly,
find certain of the problems entailed in some of the alternatives open to any
religious thinker. Let us briefly summarize the chief of these alternative views
upon the question of God and the problem of evil, and glance at the objec-
tions raised to the particular ones that Zoroastrians have attempted to defend.
When we try to account for existence as the workmanship of a good God
four possibilities seem to open to us:
(1) Theological and ethical monism. This means that only good exists,
and we must find a way of explaining the presence of apparent evils. W e may
resort to the cliche that nothing is good or bad intrinsically, "but thinking
makes it so." This is, however, to head straight for a subjectivism that at
best borders on solipsism. This was never a Zoroastrian idea. Certain strands
of both Hindu and Buddhist philosophy may be held to fit it when they affirm
the essential goodness of Being while denying reality to particularity. Such
a stance can be accepted only if we are prepared to admit the illusoriness of
material and temporal existence.
(2) Theological monism and ethical dualism. Here we have a belief in one
God who somehow sets the stage for us on which a conflict arises requiring
that we make moral decisions. Or, we may presume that the stage had already
been set, independently of God, so that he too must choose. Zoroastrianism
certainly experimented with this alternative in both the forms indicated.
When it stressed the supreme creatorship of Ahura or Zurvan it often seemed
136 DOUGLAS A. FOX

to imply that in creating Angra Mainyu along with Spenta Mainyu, God
willed the actualization of alternatives. If one goes this far (i. e., beyond the
affirmation that God willed only the possibility of evil but not its actuality),
God then becomes indirectly responsible for the presence of evil. In this case
it is doubtful whether we really escape imputing evil, and therefore imper-
fection, to God, despite our placing an agent between God and evil itself.
This point may become clearer if, by contrast, we think of the biblical
myth of the Fall. Here God deals directly with man, and in presenting man
with the mere possibility of choosing disobedience, God does not himself
necessarily will that choice. But if God creates two secondary spirits and
through them wishes to present man with the need for decision, he must

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intend one of the spirits to oppose the other and thus to be evil. This form
of Zoroastrianism, then, hardly escapes imputing evil ultimately to God
himself, and in a way which the Bible avoids.
On the other hand, when the Lie is presumed to stand in tension with
Truth in the very structure of what is, so that God does not create this
dichotomy but must also make his choice, we seem to spare him any taint of
evil, yet at the expense of denying him ultimacy. The good is not good because
God chooses it, but he chooses it because it is good; he is responder rather
than initiator. A challenge to the omnipotence of God is certainly posed anew
by this alternative.
(3) Theological and ethical dualism. W e have in this scheme two gods,
one of whom is good, the other evil. Man, therefore, has to choose whom he
shall serve, and it is possible to save the god of our choice from any hint of
malignity. This, too, was a Zoroastrian experiment, and a powerful one,
which attained the stature of orthodoxy for a time. Yet it evoked a protesting
reaction in favor of monotheism, and the reason, in part at least, was un-
doubtedly the unsatisfactoriness of twin deities. In such a situation one really
has no "God" at all but two mutually limiting beings who are distinguished
in certain definable ways from the rest of us they have more power, more
knowledge, and so on. On what grounds are we to choose between them?
After all, one could argue that the espousal by such a being of a particular
course of action would carry its own justification. Furthermore, who is saving
whom here? Is it not men who, by choosing in sufficient numbers one of these
gods in a way that gives him sovereignty, actually save their god?
(4) Theological dualism and ethical monism. This alternative was never
considered in Zoroastrianism and could hardly have been entertained, because
ethical monism, regardless of the number of gods, presumably implies some
form of determinism or predestination. Zoroastrians have been emphatic
defenders of the essential freedom of man (except for some heretics in the
Sassanian times). This, indeed, was one of the objections to a particular form
of Zurvanism, which while it maintained a monotheism stressed the identity
of Zurvan and Destiny. Zoroastrians give the impression that they would prefer
to live in an imperfect world rather than be denied the kind of character that
requires the confrontation of alternatives at the moral level. In short, for them
DARKNESS AND LIGHT: THE ZOROASTRIAN VIEW 137

(with reference at least to the present, temporal stage of man's existence)

any possibly perfect world would have to remain potentially imperfect. Only
in some transtemporal realm may men expect a Paradise in which evil is no
longer a possibility.

CONCLUSION

I have attempted to show that while at various periods Zoroastrianism has

accepted a theological dualism, Zarathustra himself must be given at least
qualified credit for a monotheistic insight. The history of Zoroastrian theology
reveals poignantly the difficulty of accounting for the existence of evil when

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one believes in a supreme and benign deity. Yet it seems to me that one can
employ the available data to support a credible theory. When Zarathustra's
system is suitably demythologized, in a way that leads us through the imagery
of twin spirits, the Lie, and the other ideas to the heart of that system, we find
a God who establishes the good of the world (at least by choosing it) but who
makes potential what is disruptive and evil. He even accepts the actualization
of such evil and makes it serve his ultimate purpose: the creation of free but
loyal persons. This view becomes still more palatable if, like the later Zoro-
astrians, we add the consideration that the very experience of degradation
and hell is used by God to restore his people to himself. The problems that
most seriously confront this scheme enter when intermediate beings are
introduced, even when these are not represented as contending deities.