You are on page 1of 5

1

DACOYCOY V. CA, 195 SCRA 641 (1991) on the ground of improper venue (SC Resolution 15 October
FACTS Jesus Dacoycoy filed before RTC of Antipolo, Rizal a 1991, Sec. 4).
complaint against private respondent Rufino de Guzman
praying for annulment of 2 deeds of sale involving a parcel of
riceland located in Lingayen, Pangasinan, the surrender of
the produce, and damages. Before summons could be FORTUNE MOTORS V. CA, 178 SCRA 564
served on de Guzman, RTC judge ordered counsel for (1989)
petitioner to confer with respondent trial judge on the matter FACTS Metrobank extended various loans to Fortune which
of venue. After said conference, RTC dismissed the complaint was secured by a real estate mortgage on the Fortune
due to improper venue. RTC found that petitioners action is building and lot in Makati. For failure of Fortune to pay the
a real action as it sought not only the annulment of the deeds loans, Metrobank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure
of sale but also recovery of ownership of the riceland which proceedings. After notice were served, posted and published,
was outside of the RTCs territorial jurisdiction. Petitioner the mortgaged property was sold at a public auction to
appealed to IAC which affirmed RTCs order of dismissal. Metrobank as the highest bidder.

Petitioner faults the IAC in affirming RTC finding that the 3days after the expiration of the 1yr redemption period,
venue was improperly laid when de Guzman has not even Fortune filed a complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial
answered the complaint nor waived the venue. foreclosure sale alleging that the foreclosure was premature
because its obligation to Metrobank was not yet due,
HELD Petition granted. The court can not motu proprio publication of the notice of sale was incomplete, there was
dismiss the case on ground of improper venue. Objections to no public auction, and the price for which the property was
venue may be waived by the parties. Improper venue does sold was shockingly low.
not necessarily divest the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the controversy. Before summons could be served, Metrobank filed a MtD the
complaint on the ground that the venue of the action was
Even granting that the action of petitioner is a real action, improperly laid in Manila for the subject real property is
respondent trial court would still have jurisdiction over the situated in Makati, therefore the action to annul the
case, it being a RTC vested with the exclusive original foreclosure sale should be filed in Makati RTC.
jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein. MtD was opposed by Fortune alleging that its action is a
personal action and that the issue is the validity of the
de Leon: This does not apply in summary procedure cases extrajudicial proceedings so that it may have a new 1yr
where the court may motu propio dismiss the complaint even redemption period.
2

Manila RTC issued an order reserving the resolution of Clavecilla filed a petition for prohibition and prelim injunction
Metrobanks MtD until after the trial on the merits as the with the CFI praying that judge Antillon be enjoined from
grounds relied upon by the defendant were not clear and further proceeding with the case on the ground of improper
indubitable. Metrobank filed a MfR but was denied by Manila venue. Respondents filed MtD the petition but was opposed
RTC. Metrobank appealed to CA. CA granted and dismissed by Clavecilla. CFI held that Clavecilla may be sued in Manila
the annulment case without prejudice to its being filed in the where it has its principal office or in CDO where it was served
proper venue. with summons thru the branch manager. In other word, CFI
upheld the authority of MTC to take cognizance of the case.
HELD An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure
sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of In appealing, Clavecilla contends that the suit against it
real property. Both are actions that affect title and seek should be filed in Manila where it holds its principal office.
recovery of the real property sold. It is therefore a real action
which should be commenced and tried in the province where HELD The residence of the corporation is the place where its
the property or part thereof lies. Petition denied. CA principal office is established. Branch offices are not
decision affirmed. residences where it may be sued. The phrase where he
(defendant) may be found as to venue of actions applies
only to non-residents. It does not apply to defendants
CLAVECILLA RADIO V. ANTILLON, 19
SCRA 379 (1967) residing in the Philippines.

FACTS New Cagayan Grocery Bacolod Branch sent a


YOUNG AUTO V. CA, 223 SCRA 670
message (REURTEL WASHED NOT AVAILABLE REFINED (1993)
TWENTY FIFTY IF AGREEABLE SHALL SHIP LATER REPLY) to
New Cagayan Grocery CDO Branch thru Clavecilla Radio Facts: Young Auto (YASCO) sold its shares of stock in
Bacolod. Clavecilla Radio Cagayan received the message. Consolidated Mktg & Devt Corp (CMDC) to Roxas. Purchase
However, in delivering the same to New Cagayan Grocery price 8M, dp 4M check bal 4M in pd checks 1M each. After
CDO, the word NOT between the word WASHED and execution of the agreement, Roxas took full control of the
AVAILABLE was omitted, thus changing entirely the four markets of CMDC. However YASCO held on to stock
contents and purport of the message and causing the certificates as security pending full payment. First 4M was
addressee to suffer damages. honored but the four 1M checks were dishonored. Roxas sold
one of the markets to a 3 rd party. Out of the proceeds, YASCO
New Cagayan filed a complaint against Clavecilla in the MTC. rcvd 600k leaving a bal of 3.4M
After service of summons, Clavecilla filed MtD the complaint
on the grounds that it states no cause of action and the YASCO filed a complaint against Roxas in Cebu RTC praying
venue is improperly laid. New Cagayan interposed that Roxas be ordered to pay the bal or that full control of the
opposition to which Clavecilla filed its rejoinder. Thereafter, 3 markets be turned over to YASCO. Roxas filed MtD, ground:
MTC judge Antillon denied MtD for lack of merit. improper venue. RTC dismissed MTD.
3

Roxas appealed to CA. CA ordered dismissal of the complaint Issue: Whether or not the venue was properly laid
on the ground of improper venue. YASCO appealed to SC. Held: Negative. Although the immediate remedy sought by Cacnio is to
compel petitioner to accept payment made by the former, it is obvious that
The Articles of Incorporation of Young Auto Motors stated that this relief is merely the first step to establish Cacnios title to the property.
its principal office was in Cebu. In its transactions with Roxas, Moreover, Cacnios complaint is a means resorted to by him in order that
Young Auto stated in its letterhead that its principal office he could retain the possession of said property. In short, venue in the main
was in Manila. Young Auto sued Roxas in Cebu based on such case was improperly laid and the CFI of QC should have properly granted
the motion to dismiss.
transactions. Roxas files MTD on the ground of improper
venue.
LIZARES V. CALAUAG, 4 SCRA 746 (1962)
Held: A corporation is a resident of the place where its FACTS: Flaviano Cacnio bought from Dr. Antonio Lizares on
principal office is located as stated in the articles of installment a parcel of land located in Sinkang Subd Bacolod
incorporation. Hence, Cebu was a valid venue for Youngs City. Cacnio made a downpayment p of Php1,206 bal
action. Php10,858 to be paid in 10yearly installments.
Escolin: If it was Roxas who filed the case against Young in Cacnio received a letter from Lizares demanding payment of
Pasay City based on the address in the letterhead, Young arrears in installment payments, interests, and taxes. Cacnio
would be estopped from objecting on the ground of improper sent a check to pay the amount due but Lizares returned the
venue. check and refused the tender of payment. Cacnio instituted
a civil case in the Rizal CFI praying that Lizares be ordered
to accept the payment being made by him.
Dr. Antonio Lizares vs. Hon. Hermogenes Caluag (QC- CFI Judge)
and Flaviano Cacnio Petitioner MtD the complaint due to improper venue for the
action affects the title or possession of real property located
Facts: Flaviano Cacnio alleged that he brought from petitioner Lizares on
installment Lot 4, Block 1 of the Sinkang Subdivision in Bacolod City. in Bacolod. CFI denied MtD holding that it was a personal
Cacnio received a letter of demand from Lizares representing arrears in the action. Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA denied petition.
payment of installment plus regular and overdue interest. Cacnio then sent
a check drawn by one Antonio Bernardo in favor of Lizares. But according HELD: An action praying that defendant be ordered "to
to Cacnio, Lizares refused the check and returned it. Cacnio instituted a accept the payment being made" by plaintiff for the lot which
civil case in the CFI of Quezon City, praying for compensatory damages
the latter contracted to buy on installment basis from the
plus attorneys fees.
former, to pay plaintiff compensatory damages and
Petitioner Lizares moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the venue attorney's fees and to enjoin defendant and his agents from
is improperly laid, for the action affects title to or possession of real repossessing the lot in question, is one that affects title to
property locates in Bacolod City which was the subject matter of the
land, and "shall be commenced and tried in the province
contract. This was denied by the respondent court upon the ground that
the action was in personam. where the property or any part thereof lies," because,
although the immediate remedy is to compel the defendant
4

to accept the tender of payment allegedly made, it is obvious Held: No.For purposes of venue of personal actions, the
that this relief is merely the first step to establish plaintiff's venue is to be determined where the plaintiff or the
title to real property. defendant is actually located. It is actual residence, not legal
domicile, which is relevant.
Escolin: In the Bar exams of 1978, Wigberto Taada was the
Bar examiner. There was a question using the facts of de Leon: The meaning of residence in determining venue of
Lizares. The consensus was the case should be filed in the personal actions is the same as residence in determinng
place where the property was located. Taada cited the venue of estate proceedings.
Hernandez case in ruling that the case should be filed in the
residence of the plaintiff. Eventually, both where considered CAPATI V. OCAMPO, 113 SCRA 794 (1982)
correct.
Facts: Plaintiff Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor,
de Leon: So where should we side now? Pampanga, was the contractor of the Feati Bank for the
construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. He
ESUERTE V. CA, 193 SCRA 541 (1991) entered into a sub-contract with the defendant Jesus
Ocampo, a resident of Naga City where he undertook to
FACTS: An action for damages was filed by private construct the vault walls, exterior walls and columns of the
respondent Beverly Tan against herein petitioners Patria said Feati building in accordance with the specifications
Esuerte and Herminia Jayme with Regional Trial Court of indicated therein. Defendant further bound himself to
Cebu. Private respondent as plaintiff in the Civil Case is a complete said construction on or before June 5, 1967. To
legal resident of Cebu City. Her parents live there. However, emphasize this time frame Ocampo affixed his signature
at the time of her filing of the complaint against petitioners, below the following stipulation in bold letters: TIME IS
she was a temporary resident of Bacolod City. She was then ESSENTIAL, TO BE FINISHED 5 JUNE 67.
employed with the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial
Hospital, Bacolod City, as resident physician. Moreover, the At the back of the contract which reads:
acts complained of were committed in Bacolod City. The
private respondents were all residents of Bacolod City at the 14. That all actions arising out, or relating to this contract
time of the bringing of the action. Though Tan's employment may be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of
was only temporary there was no showing when this Naga.
employment will end. Claiming that defendant finished the construction in question
Issue: WON the case filed in Cebu will prosper. only on June 20, 1967, plaintiff filed in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga an action for recovery of
consequential damages.

Ocampo (defendant) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint


on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid.
5

Capati (plaintiff) filed an opposition to the motion, claiming Escolin: the rules now allow raising the issue of improper
that their agreement to hold the venue in the Court of First venue as an affirmative defense in the answer even if there
Instance of Naga City was merely optional to both was failure to raise it in a motion to dismiss (Rule 16, Sec. 6).
contracting parties.
ENUE OF LIBEL CASE WHERE OFFENDED PARTY IS AN PUBLIC
CFI of Pampanga decided that it is an improper venue. OFFICIAL. From the provision of Article 360, third
paragraph of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
Held: Stipulation as to venue which uses the word may is 4363, it is clear that an offended party who is at the same
permissive and does not limit the venue of the action only to time a public official can only institute an action arising from
the venue stipulated. libel in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and
the place where the alleged libelous articles were printed and
UNIMASTERS V. CA, 267 SCRA (1997) first published.
Stipulation as to venue which uses the word shall is
IMPROPER VENUE; MUST BE RAISED IN A MOTION TO DISMISS
permissive and does not limit the venue of the action only to
PRIOR TO A RESPONSIVE PLEADING. Unless and until the
the venue stipulated.
defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss prior to
Escolin: They should have used the words solely, a responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be said to have
exclusively, or only. Shall is not enough to confer been improperly laid since, for all practical intents and
exclusive venue with a court. purposes, the venue though technically wrong may yet be
considered acceptable to the parties for whose convenience
DIAZ V. ADIONG, 219 SCRA 631 (1993) the rules on venue had been devised.

Facts:

Filing of answer waives MTD on ground of improper venue.