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GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp

Governmental Powers

Police Power or the General Welfare Clause (Sec. 16 of LGC)

1) Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras
Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title – Police Power Not Validly Exercise

FACTS: Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality
of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la
Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said
ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and
are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued
against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA
938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE
POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF
CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote
general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a
lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs
employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited,
certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness,
consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as
consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of
a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering
public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass
too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose
sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate
not prohibit the business of cabarets.

2) Binay vs Domingo
G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991

Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends
P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed
P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the
municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the
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GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp
Governmental Powers
municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the
program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of
funds for the implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution has no
connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2)
government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal
protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.

Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare
clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Held:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was
born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non
laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the
legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto
they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as
shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain
peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.

2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies
of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate
with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety,
comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great
public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the
municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with
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etc. but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity. is the welfare of the paupers. the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1. social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise." This decision. 1992. security. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled. 1998 (Ordinance No. selling. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. it is not limited thereto." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. the promotion of the general welfare. emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil. it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. Resolution No. PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF). housing the urban poor. Thus. re-enacted under Resolution No.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers whatever affects the peace. Resolution No. 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS. Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching. 3. 3 of 24 . Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. and general welfare of the community. in and coming from Palawan waters. however must not be taken as a precedent. of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. 1993 TO JANUARY 1. "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services. Thus. gathering. possessing. buying. Precious to the hearts of our legislators. 243. and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. health. 3) Tano v Socrates FACTS: On Dec 15. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life. and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years. though not complete. should have more in law. morals. Paupers may be reasonably classified. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism. 15-92: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1. Different groups may receive varying treatment. 1993 to January 1. down to our local councilors. 60.

their livelihood. Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.. Article XII of the Constitution. in violation of Section 2. praying that the court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law. The so- called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. invoking the invalidity of the above-stated enactments as violative of their preferential rights. The enactment of these laws was a valid exercise of the police power of the LGU to protect public interests and the public right to a balanced and healthier ecology. development and utilization.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers The petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were charged for violating the above ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial governments. both under the Constitution and applicable laws. but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. their “exploration. The enacted resolution and ordinance of the LGU were not violative of their preferential rights.. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. In 4 of 24 . marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity. In addition. Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen. The LGUs are endowed with the power to enact fishery laws in its municipal waters which necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances in order to effectively carry out the enforcement of fishery laws in their local community. Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. Besides.shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The general welfare clause of the local government code mandates for the liberal interpretation in giving the LGUs more power to accelerate economic development and to upgrade the life of the people in the community. The rights and privileges invoked by the petitioners are not absolute. ISSUE: Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional? HELD: No. The petitioners now allege that they have the preferential rights as marginal fishermen granted with privileges provided in Section 149 of the Local Government Code. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine. and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade.

Inns. 5 of 24 . and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels. 4) White Light Corp v City of Manila Facts: On December 3. the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted. hotels. from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay. alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance). and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. it is an invalid exercise of police power.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power. Also. they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety. Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement. comfort. Short-Time Admission Rates. Finally. motels. The respondents. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission. filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. beerhouses. they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter. as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. 1992. inns. pension houses. convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances. lodging houses and other similar establishments. peace. the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution. in turn. who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila. operation and maintenance of cafes. Lodging Houses. good order. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC). The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC). including tourist guides and transports.” The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day. restaurants. and Sta. When elevated to CA. Titanium Corporation (TC). City Mayor Alfredo S.” Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment. RTC declared Ordinance No. the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality. Motels. Pension Houses.

GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers CA. the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general. v. (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade. Ordinance No. and (6) must not be unreasonable. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State. First. namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second. Held: No. The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling. the petitioners appealed before the SC. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power. Hence. Hon. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law. it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. Issue: Whether Ordinance No. but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association. Inc. (2) must not be unfair or oppressive. it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement. wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. it is unconstitutional. this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens The test of a valid ordinance is well established. and as such. the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. 6 of 24 . reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. (3) must not be partial or discriminatory. Third. City Mayor of Manila. (5) must be general and consistent with public policy. This could be described as the middle case. At its core. The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid. in turn.

GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex. by themselves. for even under the guise of protecting the public interest. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police 7 of 24 . prostitution. An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. These goals. SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar. the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. Yet. are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites. require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. as distinguished from those of a particular class. personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Those means must align with the Constitution. It must appear that the interests of the public generally. subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare. the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest. they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty. but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator. then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. Indeed. drug use and alike. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. More importantly. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.

jr. No pronouncement as to costs. 8027. drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers work would be more effective in easing the situation. Further. 2002. approved the said ordinance on November 28. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted Ordinance No. on June 26. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. In that resolution. the Petition is GRANTED. within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program. SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Petron and Shell. Ordinance No. the City of Manila and the Department of Energy permits the Oil Companies to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements. However well¬- intentioned the ordinance may be. 8027 reclassified the area of Pandacan and Sta. the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a memorandum of understanding with the oil companies in which they agreed that :scaling down of Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. Jose L. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. the Sanggunian declared that the memorandum of understanding was effective 8 of 24 . Ordinance No. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so- called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. WHEREFORE. Ana from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. and it became effective on December 28. ATIENZA CASE DIGEST Facts: On November 20. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. However. 5) SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. 97. 2001. Moreover. Under the memorandum of understanding. Hon. 2001. 2001. and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. is REINSTATED. Branch 9. it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. Atienza. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of understanding in Resolution No.

▪ On 21 March 1997. on January 30. 8027. s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance. he has the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027. 1987 Consti. Sec. As operator of the airport. MIAA negotiated with the respondent City of Parañaque with regards to the real estate tax 9 of 24 . 97 to April 30. 2003. 2002. which states that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to the MIAA under Section 21 of its Charter. On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding were contradictory with Ordinance No. Atienza. Jr. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. Issue: Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty. Jose L.. In Dimaporo v. Jr. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. Thus. the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30. improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. as City Mayor of Manila. it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. 128-196 of LGC) 1) MIAA v CA FACTS: ▪ Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) as stated in EO 903 (the MIAA Charter). 8027. Resolution No. 8027. One of these is Ordinance No. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 8027. Held: YES. Thereafter.. 13. Mitra. And Whether or not the June 26. 5-7 of Article X. 061. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the courts. the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. As the chief executive of the city. it administers the land. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers only for a period of six months starting July 25. as mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 2002 memorandum of understanding and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. 2003. Taxing Power (Local Taxation: Sec. 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies.

On 7 February 2003. not integrated within the department framework. MIAA filed a petition with the CA. It opined that Section 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax. the CA dismissed the petition because the MIAA filed it beyond the 60-day reglementary period. should the it failed to pay. Also. while Section 10 of 24 . Thus.On 28 June 2001. the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) effective immediately. but an instrumentality of the National Government. Section 2(10) of the Administrative Code defines a government "instrumentality" as “any agency of the National Government. However. the OGCC issued Opinion No.. It then paid some of the real estate tax already due. ▪ Meanwhile. It sought to restrain the respondent from imposing real estate tax on. and enjoying operational autonomy. issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor threatened to sell the said lands and buildings at a public auction. in January 2003.On 9 August 2001. which expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of "government-owned and-controlled corporations" (GOCC) upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code. respondents only received the TRO threehours after the conclusion of the public auction. an international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Code. administering special funds. The latter pointed out that Section 206 of the Local Government Code requires persons exempt from real estate tax to show proof of exemption. the respondent already posted notices of auction sale on 7 February 2003. vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law. ▪ On 1 October 2001. ▪ On 29 March 2005.”. the Court heard the parties in oral arguments. usually through a charter. the MIAA filed before the SC a motion to restrain respondents from auctioning the Airport Lands and Buildings.First.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers imposed. respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax. Thus. ISSUE: ▪ Whether or not the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax? HELD: ▪ Yes. and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings. it pointed out that it cannot claim ownership over these properties since the real owner is the Republic of the Philippines. However. The appellate court also denied its motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration. the City Treasurer. 147 clarifying its previous Opinion. On 5 October 2001. A day before the public auction. MIAA admits that its Charter has placed the title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in its name. the said properties are inalienable and are not subject to real estate tax by local governments. MIAA thus sought a clarification of the OGCC Opinion.. endowed with some if not all corporate powers. ▪ On 17 July 2001. it received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency. ▪ Respondents invoke Section 193 of the Local Government Code. MIAA's Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax. MIAA is not a GOCC. levying against.

A. insisting that the MCIAA is a government-controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of Labor Code that took effect on January 1. it is exempt from real estate tax. states that “Taxes. fees or charges of any kind on the National Government. ports and bridges constructed by the State. cities. on October 11. Thus. roadsteads.078. barangays. its agencies and instrumentalities. and supervision of the Mactan International Airport and Lahug Airport.A. Article 420 of the Civil Code states that some of the properties that belong to the State are “Those intended for public use. efficient. 1992. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a “taxable person” 11 of 24 . Mr. fees or charges of any kind in the National Government. such as roads. Officer in Charge. Eustaquio B. it is exempt from local taxation. Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified claiming in its favor the afore cited Section 14 of R. 6958. mandated to principally undertake the economical. its agencies and instrumentalities and local government units “ cannot be imposed. xxx Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner’s realty tax account.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers 133(o) of the Local Government Code. However. petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its charter. Section 133.229. rivers. demanded payment from realty taxes in the total amount of P2. the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines. 2) Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v Marcos FACTS: Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority was created by virtue of R. 6958. Thus. torrents. and others of similar character”. Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu. citing Section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991. and Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code exempts from real estate tax any "[r]eal property owned by the Republic of the Philippines”. Second. municipalities shall not extend to the levi of the following: xxx Taxes. and effective control. The exercise of the taxing powers of the provinces. and LGU’s. and such other airports as may be established in Cebu. It was also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions. banks. canals. management. Since the time of its creation. shores.79. Common limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. Cesa. 1994.

As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons. The Section 11 of the amendatory contained the following tax provision: “The grantee. the government of Quezon City enacted an ordinance otherwise known as the Quezon City Revenue Code withdrawing tax exemption privileges.A. No. It was only exempted from the payment of realty taxes. cooperatives. Congress enacted R. buildings and personal property. Statutes granting tax exemptions shall be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally construed in favor of the taxing authority. buildings and personal property. March 6. xxx“. otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of 1991” (LGC) took effect. MCIAA’s exemption from payment of taxes is withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC. section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule. viz. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes. Inc. G. ISSUE: Whether or not Bayantel’s real properties in Quezon City are exempt from real property taxes under its franchise. exclusive of the franchise. its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate. A clash between the inherent taxing power of the legislature.R. No. Section 14 (a) of R.A. HELD: YES. exclusive of this franchise. broadcasting and telecasting.162015. 3) City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunications.) No. Barely few months after the LGC took effect. Section 232 of the Code grants local government units within the Metro Manila Area the power to levy tax on real properties. In 1992. 7160. radiophone. they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC. The petitioner cannot claim that it was never a “taxable person” under its Charter. which necessarily includes the power to exempt. except real property tax. No. Inc. non stock and nonprofit hospitals and educational institutions and unless otherwise provided in the LGC. 3259 (1961) to establish and operate radio stations for domestic telecommunications. except those granted to local water districts. R. 7633. and the local government’s delegated power to tax under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution must be ruled in favor of the former. 3259 states: “The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate. including government-owned and controlled corporations. amending Bayantel’s original franchise. (Bayantel) is a legislative franchise holder under Republic Act (R. The grant of taxing powers to LGUs under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to 12 of 24 .A. duly registered under RA 6938.A. 2006 FACTS: Respondent Bayan Telecommunications.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers HELD: Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. xxx”. No. In 1993.

The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. RTC’s Ruling: 1. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision. pursuant to a declared national policy. Petitioner’s Argument: 1. A. the Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an express and real intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGC’s delegated taxing power. doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. 112497August 4. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply means that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers. namely. owned by the franchisee. Section 11 thereof with exactly the same defining phrase “exclusive of this franchise” is the basis for Bayantel’s exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC. but reinstated it anyway. The legislative intent expressed in the phrase “exclusive of this franchise” cannot be construed other than distinguishing between two (2) sets of properties. the Congress using. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. It is worthy to note that the properties subject of the present controversy are only those which are admittedly falling under the first category. Grounds of non-compliance of procedure a. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. 4) Drilon vs Lim GR No. and (b) those properties which are not so used. In plain language. No written notices as required by Art 276 of Rules of Local Government Code b. 1994 The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code. Not published 13 of 24 . No. perfectly aware that the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantel’s former exemption from realty taxes.) 2. directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. Since R. The annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (a) those actually.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers certain persons. be they real or personal. all of the franchisee’s (Bayantel’s) properties that are actually. directly and exclusively used in its radio or telecommunications business.

In its petition.373.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers c.720. 5) Batangas City v Pilipinas Shell Corp FACTS: Respondent.00 as Mayor's Permit Fee based on the gross sales of its Tabagao Refinery.71 for fees and other charges which include the amount of P1. 2002.253. on February 20.299. respondent maintained that petitioners have no authority to impose the said taxes and fees. On May 13. In addition. Two grounds of declaring Manila Revenue Code null and void (1) inclusion of certain ultra vires provisions (2) non-compliance with prescribed procedure in its enactment but were followed. 2001. petitioners denied respondent's protest and declared that under Section 14 of the Batangas City Tax Code of 2002. However.656. confiscatory. was only paying the amount of P98. sent a notice of assessment to respondent demanding the payment of P92. It further argued that the Mayor's Permit Fees are exorbitant. and argued that the levy of local business taxes on the business of manufacturing and distributing gasoline and other petroleum products is contrary to law and against national policy.851. petitioner Batangas City. The assessment was allegedly pursuant of Section 134 of the LGC of 1991 and Section 23 of its Batangas City Tax Code of 2002. 3. respondent was also required and assessed to pay the amount of P4.50 and P312. Supervision sees to it that the rules are followed. In response. arbitrary. On June 17. Control lays down the rules in the doing of act and if not followed order the act undone or re- done.34 as Mayor's Permit. respondent filed a protest on April 17. 2002 contending among others that it is not liable for the payment of the local business tax either as a manufacturer or distributor of petroleum products.04 as business taxes for its manufacture and distribution of petroleum products. What he found only was that it was illegal. through its City Legal Officer. 2002. 14 of 24 .964. unreasonable and not commensurable with the cost of issuing a license. 2. respondent filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Section 195 of the LGC of 1991 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City. It further contended that the Mayor's Permit Fee levied by petitioners were unreasonable and confiscatory. they are empowered to withhold the issuance of the Mayor's Permit for failure of respondent to pay the business taxes on its manufacture and distribution of petroleum products. That act is not control but supervision. The requirements are upon approval of local development plans and public investment programs of LGU not to tax ordinances.180. Pilipinas Shell. Not translated to tagalog Supreme Court’s Argument: 1. Section 187 authorizes the petitioner to review only the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance.

including the Mayor's Permit Fees upon respondent. Trial thereafter ensued. We do not agree. 15 of 24 . HELD: In its petition.525. in relation to Section 143(h) of the same Code. respondent paid under protest the Mayor's Permit Fees for the year 2003 amounting to P774. petitioners assert that any activity that involves the production or manufacture and the distribution or selling of any kind or nature as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit can be taxed by the LGUs. petitioners contended that the City of Batangas can legally impose taxes on the business of manufacturing and distribution of petroleum products.50 as manufacturer and P3.010. it offered the amount of PI50. They posit that the authority granted to them by Section 143(h) of the LGC is so broad that it practically covers any business that the sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax. which was rejected by petitioners. value-added or percentage tax under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) provided that the same shall not exceed two percent of the gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year.50 as distributor. which imposed a limit to the power of petitioners to collect the said business taxes.000. the same is not all encompassing as it is subject to limitations as explicitly stated in Section 5.00 as compromise Mayor's Permit Fee without prejudice to the outcome of the case then pending. When respondent applied for the issuance of the Mayor's Permit in 2004. ISSUE: Whether an LGU is empowered under the LGC to impose business taxes on persons or entities engaged in the business of manufacturing and distribution of petroleum products.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers In its Answer. At the outset. However. RTC of Batangas City rendered a Decision sustaining the imposition of business taxes by petitioners upon the manufacture and distribution of petroleum products by respondent. even including businesses which are already subject to excise. it must be emphasized that although the power to tax is inherent in the State. In the interim.840. Article X of the 1987 Constitution. the same is not true for LGUs because although the mandate to impose taxes granted to LGUs is categorical and long established in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. the RTC withheld the imposition of Mayor's Permit Fee in deference to the provisions of Section 147 of the LGC.

the exercise of taxing powers of provinces. municipalities. On the contrary. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former. consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. the rate of tax shall not exceed two percent (2%) of gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year and provided further. 16 of 24 . Section 143 of the LGC defines the general power of LGUs to tax businesses within its jurisdiction. the omnibus grant of power to LGUs under Section 143(h) of the LGC cannot overcome the specific exception or exemption in Section 133(h) of the same Code. that in line with existing national policy.Unless otherwise provided herein.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers SECTION 5. fees. Second. as amended. as amended. Generalia specialibus non derogant. Thus. and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.The Municipality may impose taxes on the following businesses: xxxx (h) On any business not otherwise specified in the preceding paragraphs which the sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax provided that that on any business subject to the excise tax. fees. This is in accord with the rule on statutory construction that specific provisions must prevail over general ones. The power of a province to tax is limited to the extent that such power is delegated to it either by the Constitution or by statute. fees or charges on petroleum products. and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide. Tax on Business. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. Among the common limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs under Section 133 of the LGC is paragraph (h) which states: SECTION 133. . Such taxes. cities. and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following: XXXX (h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code. any business engaged in the production. . Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes. A special and specific provision prevails over a general provision irrespective of their relative positions in the statute. Section 5. VAT or percentage tax under the NIRC. and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments. manufacture. Article 232(h) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the LGC of 1991 states: ARTICLE 232. and taxes. Article X of the 1987 Constitution is clear on this point. the particular enactment must be operative.

to be determined by competent City Authorities. the QC Charter. 2009 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in CTAEB No. Himlayang Pilipino filed the CFI at QC a petition for declaratory relief. LGC. and other petroleum products shall not be subject to any local tax imposed in this Article. The Decision dated January 22. prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the ordinance for being contrary to the Constitution." For seven years. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application. the Court hereby resolves to DENY present petition.19. specifically. However. S-64 entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers refining. the City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino Inc in writing that Sec 9 of Ordinance 6118 would be enforced. in view of the foregoing. 17 of 24 . Because of this. manufacture. shall not be subject to any local tax imposed by Article 232. distribution or sale of oil. this provision has not been enforced until the Quezon City Council passed the resolution requesting the City Engineer of Quezon City to stop and further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in QC where the owners thereof failed to donate the required 6% for pauper burial.18 Article 232 defines with more particularity the capacity of a municipality to impose taxes on businesses. refining. 2009 and Resolution dated April 13. thus the City Council of QC filed the petition for review before the SC. 350 are AFFIRMED. it admits of certain exceptions. WHEREFORE. that businesses engaged in the production. and other petroleum products. 6118. distribution or sale of oil. Eminent Domain (Sec. MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides: "At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. Local Autonomy Act and Revised Administrative Code.III of 1987 Consti.9 of Art. Pursuant to such resolution. Sec. The lower court declared said provision null and void. gasoline. Rule 97 of Rules of Court) 1) City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino FACTS: Section 9 of City Ordinance No. gasoline.

trades. subject to the provisions of the general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries and governing funerals and disposal of the dead' because such provision does not authorize confiscation of property to serve as burial grounds. 537 authorizing the city council to 'prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and provide for their burial in such proper place and in such manner as the council may determine. 2. It cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax. good order. Does QC council have the authority to issue create the provision in question? 2. Himlayang Pilipino." On the other hand." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's police power. the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. There is nothing in the Charter of Question City that would justify provision in question. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. NO. peace. The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof. The police power of Quezon City provides: 18 of 24 . Inc. Neither is the provision justified under R. 6118. in the exercise of local police power. ISSUES: 1. promote the prosperity. " to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety. and occupation as may be established or practiced in the City because the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. fix the license fee. and regulate such other business.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers The QC Council argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers.A. NO. and for the protection of property therein. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter. S-64 is a valid exercise of police power? HELD: 1. improve the morals. Is Section 9 of Ordinance No.

promote. improve the morals. Batas Pambansa Blg. safety. and for the protection of property therein. The provision in question is not merely regulation but an outright confiscation. Similarly. good order. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health. 142971. health.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers "To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO [G. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance. the prosperity. May 7. the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. No. The provision can neither be sustained on the ground of presumption of validity of a duly enacted legislation. It deprives a person of its property without compensation. 2002] 19 of 24 . or the general welfare of the people. and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. parks. such as opium and firearms. when the Local Government Code. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets." In a long line of cases. in turn. are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home- owners. good order. and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section. peace. 2) CITY OF CEBU vs. playgrounds. police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with conducive and wholesome environments and the beneficiaries of the regulation. comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof.R. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. The necessities of public safety. morals. the confiscation of an illegally possessed article.

which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. the trial court issued this order condemning the property and ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for the property.A. The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the land for a public purpose.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers FACTS: On 17 September 1993. to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the “Voice of the Philippines” project.50. No.558. petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. Court of Appeals. No. The respondents then filed a manifestation with a motion 20 of 24 . which affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto. CA G.80. Petitioner made a deposit of P517. the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. The lower court fixed the amount of just compensation at P20. vs..339. for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at P20.826. We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint.339. Malolos. 7160.” 3) REPUBLIC vs.826.50.R. On 26 February 1979. i. It would appear that the National Government failed to pay the respondents the just compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. 146587 July 2. In the case at bar. 2002 FACTS: Petitioner (Philippine Information Agency) instituted expropriation proceedings covering a total of 544.e.980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway. or more than 9 years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings. Bulacan. ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. HELD: No. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.

Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense. the Santos heirs remained unpaid and no action was on their case until petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount P4. whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State. Despite the court’s order. its scope matching that of taxation. WON the respondents are entitled to the return of the property in question HELD: 1. Rule 39 of the 1964/1997 ROC which states that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within 5 years from the date of its entry. In response. in many respects.664. the power is inherent. WON the petitioner may appropriate the property 2.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers seeking payment for the expropriated property. Meanwhile. The RTC Bulacan ruled in favor of the Santos heirs declaring its 26 February 1979 Decision to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription in accordance with Sec. by filing the action. in the due exercise of the power.000/sq. In the hands of the legislature. Thus. The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings.m. the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession 21 of 24 . as an old case so puts it. The Santos heirs submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6/sq. even that of police power itself. 6.000 by way of just compensation.m. 22 transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated land to the Bulacan State University. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and. Pres. RTC denied petitioner’s Motion to Permit Deposit and ordered the return of the expropriated property to the heirs of Santos. Estrada issued Proc. No. at most. ISSUES: 1. all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it. for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. as previously fixed to its current zonal value of P5. the court issued a writ of execution for the implementation thereof. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. or to cause the return of the expropriated property. it requires no recognition by the Constitution.

For local governments to be able to wield the power. 2. themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No. and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. By final and executory judgment in 22 of 24 . in what amount. on the one hand. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers of the property. as the condemnor and as the owner of the property.the first is public employment or the actual use by the public. by enabling law. this Court ruled - “The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and. and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property. Thus. pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. and second. but even then. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property. petitioner. The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA. be delegated to it by the national legislature. its demands upon the individual so increases. not to prove a right to possession. it must. In determining “public use. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. NO. 7160 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government. the only limitation being that it be for public use. this delegated power of eminent domain is not. Obviously. and private rights. but merely delegated and of limited application.” two approaches are utilized . de Villaroya where the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. Surely. but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property. which is to say that as society advances. Vda. it is. respondents would exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Republic where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten years after the termination of the expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment. which. a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. a power of eminent. domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests. by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. and the second is public advantage or benefit. It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant growth. the power is not without its limits: first. It might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon. decidedly. strictly speaking. upon the other hand. however. the taking must be for public use. if so. but only of inferior. in Valdehueza vs. to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent.

which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated . respondents should have commenced the proper action upon the finality of the judgment which. are bound. Respondents. The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings provides not only for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties. indeed. or five years after the 1979 judgment had become final. respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales. and ordered sold to the government. by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title. broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in 23 of 24 . long final. as part of an airport. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-payment. thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the judgment. The landowner was merely given the relief of recovering compensation for his property computed at its market value at the time it was taken and appropriated by the State. which may be deemed just and equitable under the premises'. utilized and. as well as their privies. for all intents and purposes. An in rem proceeding. thus. condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to compel payment against herein petitioner would militate against them. condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation." The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso vs. "Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such other remedies.GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers said proceedings. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment. in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the same argument could likewise apply against them. exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. Pasay City where the recovery of possession of property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner was denied even while no requisite expropriation proceedings were first instituted. they were condemned for public use. Consistently with the rule that one should take good care of his own concern. Petitioner has occupied. the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title. Respondents first instituted proceedings for payment against petitioner on 09 May 1984. as well as the annotations upon their title certificates.but only to demand the fair market value of the same. resulted in a permanent deprivation of their ownership and possession of the property. plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots . The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property. in the expropriation suit.

GENERAL POWERS and ATTRIBUTES of LGUs Pub Corp Governmental Powers the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives. providing that. if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case. between the taking of the property and the actual payment. In fine. it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government..00 per square meter. in its 1979 decision. until the due amount shall have been fully paid. private respondents. the only authority left to it being to order its execution. dated 01 March 2000. the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated. although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property. was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and “took” the property in September 1969. deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6. 19 September 1969. and one who desires to sell. in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation. with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property. at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance. a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency. the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order. Thus. being an effective forbearance. Article 1250 of the Civil Code. the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. The Bulacan trial court. i. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed. Verily. All given. legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred. 24 of 24 . In other words. has strict application only to contractual obligations.e.