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Rules on Succession - Doctrine of Condonation
Rules on Succession

1) Talaga v COMELEC (G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012)

PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs.
Respondents. (G.R. No. 197015)

On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M.
Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the
position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010
national and local elections.

Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-CMD, declared in his CoC that he
was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to. Four days later, or on
December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the
Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of
Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms
as a City Mayor of Lucena, which was docketed as SPA 09-029 (DC). He alleged
therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three
consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City
in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.

Except the preventive suspension imposed upon Ramon from 13 October 2005 to 14
November 2005 and from 4 September 2009 to 30 October 2009 pursuant to
Sandiganbayan 4th Division Resolution in Criminal Case No. 27738 dated 3 October
2005, the public service as city mayor of the respondent is continuous and
uninterrupted under the existing laws and jurisprudence

Ramon countered that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from
office during his second and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not
then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence7 to the effect that an
involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of continuity of service
for purposes of the application of the three-term limit rule.

On December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, holding that preventive suspension, being a mere
temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect of the three-term
limit rule. Thus, on December 30, 2009, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a Manifestation
with Motion to Resolve, taking into account the intervening ruling in Aldovino.

Acting on Ramon’s Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, the COMELEC First Division
issued a Resolution on April 19, 2010,10 disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is hereby declared DISQUALIFIED to run for
Mayor of Lucena City for the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.
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Rules on Succession - Doctrine of Condonation


Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration against the April 19, 2010
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. Later on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of
May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for
Reconsideration. At 4:30 p.m. on the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC
for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto the
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the
party that had nominated Ramon.

On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on Ramon’s Ex parte Manifestation of
Withdrawal, declared the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution dated April 19, 2010
final and executory. On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained
printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara
Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited
with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes.

Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the
suspension of Barbara Ruby’s proclamation.

On July 26, 2010, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City,
sought to intervene,23 positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because
Barbara Ruby’s substitution had been invalid and Castillo had clearly lost the

COMELEC in its Resolution maintained that— A close perusal of the petition filed
by Castillo in SPA 10-029 (Dc) shows that it was actually for the
disqualification of Ramon for having served three consecutive terms, which
is a ground for his disqualification under the Constitution in relation to
Section 4(b)3 of Resolution 8696. There was no mention therein that Ramon
has committed material representation that would be a ground for the
cancellation or denial of due course to the CoC of Ramon under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code… Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid
down in Miranda v. Abaya is not applicable. Ramon was rightly substituted by Ruby.
As such, the votes for Ramon cannot be considered as stray votes but should be
counted in favor of Ruby since the substituted and the substitute carry the same
surname – Talaga, as provided in Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006.

ISSUE: 1) W/N Barbara Ruby can validly substitute her husband, Ramon, as candidate
for the position of Mayor of Lucena City.
2) Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of who among the contending
parties should assume the contested elective position.

1) NO. Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non (indispensable) for a valid
substitution. There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from
running in an electoral race. One is through a petition for disqualification and the
other through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.

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Rules on Succession - Doctrine of Condonation
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be
no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code.
It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be
validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a
candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a

Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. — If
after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate
of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for
any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political
party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified…

Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73
of the Omnibus Election Code may not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can
only give effect to a substitution if the substitute candidate submits prior to the
election a sworn CoC as required by Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code.

It is underscored, however, that a Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or
confused with a Section 68 petition (i.e., prohibited acts of candidates, and the fact of
a candidate’s permanent residency in another country when that fact affects the
residency requirement of a candidate). The remedies under the two sections are
different, for they are based on different grounds, and can result in different
eventualities. A person who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to
continue as a candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due
course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his
status is that of a person who has not filed a CoC. Miranda v. Abaya has
clarified that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly
substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified;
but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78
cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate.

To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced
both by the Constitution and statutory law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987
Constitution provides:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code reiterates the constitutional three-term
limit for all elective local officials, to wit:

Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
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and votes cast for him shall not be counted. 2) Elected Vice-Mayor should succeed in this case. Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat case. the ruling in Cayat was applicable in his favor. Barbara Ruby’s filing of her CoC in substitution of Ramon significantly differentiated this case from the factual circumstances obtaining in Cayat. Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition — the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. Castillo could not assume the 4 of 35 . considering that for all intents and purposes the COMELEC’s declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all. Yet. his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run.Doctrine of Condonation of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. Commission on Elections should not apply to him because Ramon’s disqualification became final prior to the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment declaring the candidate’s disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become final before the elections. he cites Cayat v. 2010 elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case. v. To repeat. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid. Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Castillo asserts that he was entitled to assume the position of Mayor of Lucena City for having obtained the highest number of votes among the remaining qualified candidates. Indeed. The invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC made his situation even worse than that of a nuisance candidate because the nuisance candidate may remain eligible despite cancellation of his CoC or despite the denial of due course to the CoC pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for. We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. Castillo submits that the doctrine on the rejection of the second-placer espoused in Labo." To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions. we cannot agree with Castillo’s assertion that with Ramon’s disqualification becoming final prior to the May 10. where the Court said: x x x In Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. 2009 in the COMELEC. Jr. Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve on December 30. Instead.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . Commission on Elections. Resultantly. This is a mandatory provision of law.

petitioner Romeo Gamboa and respondents Marcelo Aguirre. namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified.R. the Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested office could not assume the office despite the disqualification of the first placer because the second placer was "not the choice of the sovereign will. 134213. in which case the eligible candidate with the second highest number of votes may be deemed elected. In fact. Indeed. Mayor. 2) Gamboa v. the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. should be applied. in law and in fact. and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. The case of Labo. But the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because the second element was absent. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor. and Juan Araneta were leveled Negros Occidental Governor.Doctrine of Condonation office for he was only a second placer. Vice-Governor and SP members. Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes. to wit: Section 44. respectively. the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. Vice-Governor. there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramon’s ineligibility. respondents questioned the authority of petitioner to preside therein in view of his designation as acting governor and asked him to vacate the 5 of 35 . she was not an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her CoC on May 4.” The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites concur. she was not. the COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May 20. Under this sole exception. Jr. A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted. elected vice-mayor. was ruled to assume position of mayor. On the other hand. and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC. Lastly.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . 2010 was beyond the period fixed by law. Aguirre (G. There. Jr. Also. No. or a full year after the decisions. 2011. x x x Roderick Alcala. When the Sangguniang Panlalawigan held its regular session. Rafael Coscolluela. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of the fact of Barbara Ruby’s ineligibility as the substitute. To begin with. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor. 20 July 1999) FACTS: In the 1995 elections. and Vice-Mayor. Sometime in August 1995. the governor designated as Acting Governor for the duration of the former's official trip abroad until his return. a candidate.

The Local Government Code provides that the vice governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP. The offices of provincial governor and vice governor are essentially executive in nature. This means. Respondents filed before the lower court a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition. duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor. In the meantime. When the vacancy however is merely temporary. that for purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers. ISSUE: Whether or not Gamboa. In another session. He only acts as the governor but does not become the governor. His assumption of powers of the provincial chief executive does not create a permanent vacancy in his position as vice governor. A vice governor who is concurrently an acting governor is actually a quasi- governor. he becomes the governor and assumes the higher office for the unexpired term of his predecessor. fictions. The latter. however. local executive power is vested alone in the governor. Therefore. including the power to preside over the sessions of the SP. In addition to such function.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . while serving as acting governor. The trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the acting governor.Doctrine of Condonation Chair. temporarily relinquished the powers. since the nature of it calls for a full-time occupant to discharge them. The governor is not included in the SP members and thus. This is clear from the law when it provides that local legislative power shall be vested in the SP. Disciplinary Actions 6 of 35 . he does not relinquish not abandon his position and title by merely becoming an acting governor. in case of permanent vacancy. HELD: YES. which is the legislative body of the province. the vice governor who became an acting governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the office. the vice governor shall automatically exercise the powers (subject to certain limitations) and perform the duties and functions of the governor. the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect among themselves a temporary presiding officer. whereas plain members of the provincial board perform functions partaking of a legislative character. seven members of the SP voted to allow petitioner to continue presiding while four others voted against it. he does not assume the latter's office. Art. When the vice governor exercises the powers and duties of governor. the governor re-assumed his office. refused to do so. Thus. he is deemed considered as a non member of the SP for the time being. Petitioner filed a petition for review. 49(b) of the Local Government Code provides that in the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to toe side at the sangguniang session.

Doctrine of Condonation 1) Rodolfo Ganzon vs Court of Appeals 200 SCRA 271 – Political Law – Control Power – Local Government FACTS: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. Control. 131255. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers. May 20. HELD: Yes. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power. 1998) 7 of 35 . The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension. “In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. on the other hand. 2) Joson v Executive Secretary Torres (G. means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. No. which supposedly excludes the power of investigation. can suspend and or remove local officials.R. It is a mistaken impression because legally.” But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires. as the alter ego of the president. as the President’s alter ego. The Secretary of Local Government. control and supervision. and denied her control. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government. this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials. “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.

The act of respondent in allegedly barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men constitutes grave misconduct. No. The allegations of complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong. Section 5 of A. and (c) given the gravity of the offense. As the Disciplining Authority. 8 of 35 . What is delegated is the power to investigate. O. not the Secretary of DILG. (c) The resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue delegation. petitioner was declared in default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive suspension. Petitioner later “Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation”.O.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . For failure to file an answer after three (3) extensions. Respondent who is the chief executive of the province is in a position to influence the witnesses. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials. There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A. No. 23. No. Later. 23 that provide that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. “(c) No. the Executive Secretary. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference. not the power to discipline. the history of violent confrontational politics in the province dictates that extreme precautionary measures be taken. A. The rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process. No. there is great probability that the respondent. RULING “(a) Yes. ISSUES Whether or not: (a) Preventive suspension is proper. This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted. A. who continues to hold office. adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. The case was endorsed to the DILG. the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. The former imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing. “(b) Yes. could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The DILG resolution is valid. O. Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined. (b) Procedural due process is violated. Further.Doctrine of Condonation FACTS: A complaint against petitioner Governor Joson before the Office of the President for belligerently barging into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men. by authority of the President. however. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation.O. that it is the President who is the Disciplining Authority. DILG denied the motion declaring that the submission of position papers substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings.

contrary to petitioner Joson’s claim. all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department. may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. and. Each head of a department is. the Province sought the issuance of a writ of possession from the Regional Trial Court. the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . c) oppression and abuse of authority under Section 60 (c) and (e) of the Local Government Code in OP case 5471 and d) abuse of authority and negligence in OP case 5450. The NPC challenged 9 of 35 . refused to pay the said tax liability. As head of the Executive Department. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. are. as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments. 117589-92. however. Guingona GR No. May 22 1996 FACTS: This Supreme Court case involves four administrative complaints filed against Albay Governor Salalima and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay. performed and promulgated in the regular course of business. The latter. The Province of Albay imposed real property tax against the National Power Corporation. Relevant to our discussion on whether or not LGUs can hire private lawyers in cases filed against it is OP case 5469. and must be. b) grave abuse of authority under Section 60 (e) of the Local Government Code in OP cae 5649. Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. the Province of Albay took over the properties of NPC and sold them in an auction sale. the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency “…which recognizes the establishment of a single executive. 3) Salalima v. the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments. unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The complaints seek to hold the petitioners liable for a) wanton disregard of law amounting to abuse of authority in OP case 5470. Upon the failure of NPC to redeem the property. Due to its refusal to pay. the President. claiming that it is tax exempt. This is not undue delegation.” This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in the Constitution. except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally.Doctrine of Condonation delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee. The Province was the sole bidder.

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. Carnago had filed a memorandum in the SC. 1989. in his official capacity. Ricaforte. 1989. The Province. On November 14.Doctrine of Condonation this in a petition filed with the Supreme Court. Jesus Carnago entered his appearance with the SC as a collaborating counsel.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . On June 2. Carnago appeared as counsel in the NPC case. 1989. filed its comment on the said petition on May 17. He charged 50. on August 25. Moreover. OP’s RATIO Section 481 of the LGC states that the legal officer of the province has the duty to represent the LGU in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the LGU or any official thereof. Only Atty. Sec. authorizing Salalima to engage the services of a Manila-based law firm to handle the case. 129-89. 1993. the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Province. through its legal office Atty. informing him that Atty. However. A private lawyer has no standing in such a case. In the case Municipality of Bocaue v. He then proposed that his law firm and that of Atty. Carnago enter into a retainer agreement with the Province in connection with the case. As such. the Provincial Auditor informed the Province that COA had disallowed the payments for lack of prior written conformity of the Solicitor General and a written concurrence of COA. Atty. In response to this. Manotok are applicable in this case. 1989. on May 31. 000 as acceptance fee and a contingency fee of 18%. In hiring the private lawyers. It appears that Cortes and Reyna did not render any form of legal service in relation thereto. the petitioners violated the LGC and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme court. An administrative complaint was later on filed against the petitioners with the Office of the President. On June 4. the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 10 of 35 . Atty. The latter then paid the lawyers amounting to around 7 million. the transaction was also full of irregularities. 1990. the Supreme Court ruled that the LGU cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial legal officer or provincial fiscal who can represent it. Resolution 01-90 authorized Salalima to contract with Cortes and Reyna Law Firm and NOT with Atty. Salalima exceeded the authority given to him in doing so. The disbursement of 7M as payment was disallowed by COA for failure to comply with the prerequisite conformity from the SolGen and the COA. 481 and Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok. The OP found that the petitioners incurred administrative liability in hiring private lawyers to defend it in the NPC case. Carnago. 01-90 authorizing Salalima to sign a retainer contract with Cortes and Reyna Law Firm. is a party. Antonio Jose Cortes of Cortes and Reyna Law Firm sent a letter to Salalima.

67(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC). RULING: OP Decision imposing penalties is reversed and set aside. Jr. the SC ruled that offenses committed or acts done in a previous term are generally held not to furnish a cause for removal in the current term of office. Because of these findings. A contrary rule would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests between reelected officials and their political enemies who may not stop to hound the former during his new term with administrative cases for acts alleged to have been committed during his previous term. Petitioner filed a petition for 11 of 35 . sound policy dictates such a rule. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was dismissed. ALBAY. Salalima and Vice governor Azana. This is because each term is separate from other terms and that the reelection operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . while the members of the SP were suspended for 4 months. respondents FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against respondent incumbent Mayor and obtained favorable decision suspending the latter. vs.. The Office of the President thru the Executive Secretary directed “stay of execution”. the 1992 elections took place wherein the petitioners were reelected. GUINGONA. The petitioners appealed the case to the SC. petitioner. CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. HON. 4) Berces.1995) ACHILLES C. In the meantime. The total attorney’s fees of 38 Million is clearly unconscionable. SR. they can no longer be held to answer for these in view of the fact that they have already been reelected. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. JR. Pascual. BERCES. No. Also. Their reelection operates as condonation of any misconduct committed in their prior term. 112099.R. vs. CORRAL OF TIWI. Such a rule is founded on the theory that an official’s reelection expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was committed during the previous term.Doctrine of Condonation The provincial legal officer had already filed a comment in the SC. Executive Secretary (G. Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution in accordance with Sec. the OP imposed the penalty of suspension for 6 months against Gov. ISSUE: WON the petitioners incurred administrative liabilities in hiring private lawyers to represent the Province HELD: Whether or not they incurred liabilities.. RATIO: In Pascual v. What Carnago filed was merely a memorandum. February 21.

5) Malinao v Reyes (G. Cruz. 18 (1987). this issue is already moot and academic as a result of the expiration of Red’s term during which the act complained of was allegedly committed. On August 12. In any case.Doctrine of Condonation certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction. 68 of R. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF MARINDUQUE and WILFREDO RED.A. 18. 12 of 35 . 1994. March 29. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. On September 5. RATIO: The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an “appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. No. assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued with grave abuses of discretion. LUISITO REYES. “Stay of execution” applied. members of the Sanggunian. Marinduque FACTS: Malinao filed an administrative case against Mayor Red for abuse of authority and denial of due process with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque. the Sanggunian. and further proceedings are barred by his reelection. found Red guilty. it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention. 68 of LGC (1991) impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. Petitioner argued that Sec. In the absence of an express repeal. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. Malinao argued that the First Sanggunian decision had already become final and executory for failure of Red to appeal. in his capacity as Mayor of Sta. HELD: NO. ISSUE: Whether or not the second Decision is valid. vote signed only by presiding chairman. 7160 repealed Sec. No. there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. voting 7 to 2.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . the second decision of acquittal is valid. by a vote of 5 to 3. Petition was dismissed.R. HELD: Yes. acquitted Red of the charges against him. [Sec 66(b) LGC]. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. Reelection abates any administrative disciplinary proceedings against the local elective official.” As worded. 1996) VIRGINIA MALINAO vs. 117618. 18. 6 of Administrative Order No. This vote was embodied in a Decision which was signed by all the members. HON. An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. in his capacity as Governor of the Province of Marinduque.

would merit the penalty of removal from office. In order to render a decision in an administrative case involving elected local officials. if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave nature and. • August 2005 . Punong Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos (Bayombong. and not the petitioner. 13 of 35 . thus was declared by SB in default. are empowered to remove an elective local official from office. if found guilty. the case should be filed with the regional trial court.Doctrine of Condonation [Under Sec.The Decision was conveyed to the Municipal Mayor (Severino Bagasao) for its implementation. in accordance with Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Mayor issued a Memorandum.Order of SB null and void. FACTS: • December 2004 – Severino Martinez. The proper courts. • Martinez failed to file an Answer. • Pursuant to Section 61 of the LGC. the SB is the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials. Misconduct in Office and violation of the Anti-Graft and Practices Act by petitioner (Sanggunian Barangay) through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan. the decision of the Sanggunian must be in writing. as the courts (RTC) are exclusively vested with this under Section 60 of the LGC. • TC . However. • Charges. Thus. the Decision remains valid until reversed and must be executed by him. stating that SB is not empowered to order Martinez’s removal from service. stating clearly the facts and the reasons for such a decision. Nueva Vizcaya) was administratively charged with Dishonesty. among others (6 in all) were for failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income of their solid waste management project particularly the sale of fertilizer and recyclable materials derived from composting and garbage collection. 6) Sangguniang Barangay of Don Marcos v Punong Barangay Martinez DOCTRINE: The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) or Sangguniang Panglungsod (SP) cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from office. • July 2005 .LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . The most extreme penalty that the Sanggunian may impose is suspension. • Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction before the trial court against SB and Mayor. the penalty of suspension cannot exceed the unexpired term of the official and any administrative disciplinary proceeding against said official is abated if in the meantime he is re-elected because such re-election is a condonation of whatever misconduct he might have committed during his previous term. 66 (b) of the LGC.the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed the penalty of removal from office. There was also a charge for failure to liquidate his travelling expenses for the 2003 Lakbay-aral.

Court invalidated Article 125. RTCs. Ratio for making it an exclusive judicial prerogative The Sanggunian Brgy contends that administrative cases involving elective barangay officials may be filed with. 3. i. 2. In Salalima v. therefore. rendering this petition moot and academic. the Court will nevertheless settle a legal question that is capable of repetition yet evading review. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions.. from office. This would counter the rationale for making the removal of elective officials an exclusive judicial prerogative. Legislative Intent – Only RTC During the deliberations of the Senate on the LGC. 14 of 35 . Villapando: It is beyond cavil.. heard and decided by the SP or SB concerned.—An elective local official may be disciplined. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied. It further claims that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of removal. that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Textual Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials from office: “Section 60. suspended. the Sandiganbayan and the appellate courts. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. The rule is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the disciplining authority. for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. or removed from office on any of the following grounds: … An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. Pablico v.e. thus. Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (which provides that “An elective local official may be removed from office … by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. PETITION DENIED. impose a penalty of removal from office. SC affirmed RTC. an elective local official. after the SP or SB finds that a penalty of removal is warranted. Jr.Doctrine of Condonation Note: Although Martinez’s term as Punong Baranggay expired in 2007 and. RATIO: 1.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials was evident. which can. ISSUE/HELD: WON the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez. Guingona. thereafter. and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith. the Court en banc categorically ruled that the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials. NO. the legislative intent to confine to the courts.

Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure for the filing of an administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before the SP or SB. the case should be filed with the regional trial court. no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been exhausted. amounting to lack of jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved are essentially judicial. it is apparent that the SB acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order removing Martinez from office. In this case. and their discretion in imposing the extreme penalty of removal from office is thus left to be exercised by political factions which stand to benefit from the removal from office of the local elective official concerned. Courts not merely an implementing arm of SB Argument of Sanggunian is an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers. it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. would merit the penalty of removal from office. the court. if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave nature and. the very evil which Congress sought to avoid when it enacted Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus. then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court. 4. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not inflexible As a general rule. Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only after a trial before the appropriate court. this rule is not applicable where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal. LGUs are not deprived of the right to discipline local elective officials. Elevating the removal of an elective local official from office from an administrative case to a court case may be justified by the fact that such removal not only punishes the official concerned but also. However.Doctrine of Condonation It must not be tainted with partisan politics and used to defeat the will of the voting public. Once the court assumes jurisdiction. they are prevented from imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal. The courts would be stripped of their power of review. Furthermore. the Sangguniang cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from office. However. On the other hand. Power of the Sanggunian As the law stands. Such act was patently illegal 15 of 35 . deprives the electorate of the services of the official for whom they voted. in effect. rather. Congress itself saw it fit to vest that power in a more impartial tribunal. as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code. 5. if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . where court rules of procedure and evidence can ensure impartiality and fairness and protect against political maneuverings. the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension. if found guilty. thus placing the courts under the orders of the legislative bodies of local governments. 1.

whether expressly or impliedly.. 7) Hagad v. Baricede. had now been vested with the Office of the President.e. criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ouano. 3019 (Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). 108072. Martinez was no longer required to avail himself of an administrative appeal in order to annul the said Order of the Sangguniang Bayan. No. There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored. No. every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 16 of 35 . The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try. a TRO against Hagad was filed and granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him from enforcing suspension. and a clear finding thereof must surface. as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other . interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi.Articles 170 (falsification of legislative documents) and 171 (falsification by public officers) of the Revised Penal Code. HELD: No. 1992. the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers). hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since. and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.5M to P7M without authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue. 16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not removed by LG Code of 1991. On September 1992. Thus. his direct recourse to regular courts of justice was justified. the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. 1995) FACTS: On July 22. No. Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol. all public officials of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson. under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991. i. The respondent officials were allegedly causing alteration of Ordinance No. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent. Hence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898) has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective official by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160.A. before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. and R. as well as to effect their preventive suspension.A. therefore. Gozo-Dadole (G. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible. The rule is expressed in the maxim. There respondents were charged with having violated R. let alone irreconcilable. 018/92 by increasing the allotted appropriation from P3.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . as amended. December 12. all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal.Doctrine of Condonation and.R.

6770. and the jurisdiction continues until the case is terminated. Ombudsman decision was thus rendered with jurisdiction and should be upheld. 2010 CARPIO. 8) OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN. disqualifying him from public office. 2003. CA reversed. 1. the body in w/c the complaint is filed first. in cases of 2 agencies exercising concurrent jurisdiction. in fine.: SUMMARY: Two complaints for abuse of authority. while Ombudsman did so on Sept. [allegation of forum shopping. Negros Occidental. ruling that the Ombudsman had concurrent jurisdiction with the SB under RA 8749 and the LGC. No. 10. CAB: Complaint with the Ombudsman was filed first. On appeal by the Ombudsman. G. the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President.A. claiming that the SB still had jurisdiction because he never received a decision or resolution dismissing that complaint. No. so when it took of cognizance of [opted to assume jurisdiction over] the case. SB served notice on Rodriguez on Sept.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . dishonesty.A. Rodriguez replied that the dismissal was invalid because only the vice-mayor signed it. to the exclusion of the SB. did not effect a change from what already prevailed. acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof. 8. and which opts to take cognizance of the case. holding that SB still had jurisdiction because it was the first to serve notice on Rodriguez. J. ROLSON RODRIGUEZ. motion to dismiss filed by Rodriguez] the complainants eventually withdrew the SB complaint so they could focus on the complaint with the Ombudsman. one in the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Binalbagan. Rodriguez filed MTD. 7160). because Rodriguez is a punong barangay (SG 14). July 23.R. jurisdiction had already vested. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R. On appeal. In the Ombudsman proceeding. 17 of 35 . The complaint before the Ombudsman was filed on Aug. No. SC reversed CA and affirmed the Ombudsman decision. misconduct. petitioner. and forfeiting his benefits and CSC eligibility. Ombudsman rendered a decision dismissing Rodriguez from his position. complaint in the SB was filed Sept. and another in the Ombudsman.Doctrine of Condonation The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R. and neglect were filed against P/B Rodriguez. respondent. 26. After several motions filed. Complainants argued that the case was dismissed after the Vice-Mayor granted their motion to withdraw. 172700. Contrary to CA conclusion and Rodriguez’ contention that jurisdiction is acquired by service of summons [thus SB acquired jurisdiction first]. Later. vs. to the extent of the common grant.

Binalbagan. 4. o Rodriguez: Sige fa-file ako. Administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman. He also argued that the complainants violated the rule against forum shopping. SB still had jurisdiction over his person because he has not received any resolution or decision indicating the dismissal of the SB case. Unlike the sangguniang bayan. through counsel. NATURE: Petition for review under ROC 45. Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases against elective barangay officials with salary grade below 27. 29. 2003 – OMB required Rodriguez to file his answer. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly remove an erring public official other than members of Congress and the Judiciary who may be removed only by impeachment. 2003 – Rodriguez moved to dismiss the OMB complaint on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping. Rosario.. moved to withdraw the SB complaint to prioritize the OMB complaint. Rule III. 24. 2003 – Yulo dismissed the SB complaint. • Sep. • Oct. • Complainants. 2003 – Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB) received a complaint against P/B Rolson RODRIGUEZ of Sto. only a proper court may do so. dishonesty. 8. o MR denied. • Sep. the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. YULO. e. 26. • Nov. 18 of 35 . OMB: Magfile ka ng position paper. the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an elective barangay official. 10. 1. o Rodriguez insisted that the SB complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping o Complainants admitted to forum shopping (LOL) and claimed that they were not assisted by counsel when they filed the complaint. 2003 – Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Binalbagan. 2003 – Rodriguez moved to dismiss the complaint in the SB for being baseless in fact and in law. oppression.g. Negros Occidental. 2003 – Yulo issued a notice ordering Rodriguez to file an answer within 15 days from receipt of such notice. and neglect of duty. Sec. 2004 – OMB ordered both parties to file position papers. punong barangay. 8. Rodriguez filed MR. misconduct in office. FACTS • Aug. • Sep. Apart from the Ombudsman.5(g). The complaint alleged abuse of authority. received a similar complaint against Rodriguez. 23. The rule against forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . not to administrative cases. arguing that the SB had acquired jurisdiction on Sep. MTD is a prohibited pleading under AO 17. [no statement as to who the complainants were] • Sep.Doctrine of Condonation DOCTRINE: Under LGC 60. citing pendency of his MTD. • Jan. through Vice-Mayor Jose G.

other bodies are excluded from exercising jurisdiction over the same complaint. • Rodriguez filed a petition for review with the CA. The Court held therein that the 19 of 35 . 124 provides that an elective official may be removed by the proper court or by disciplining authority whichever acquires jurisdiction first to the exclusion of the other. Complainants committed forum shopping when they filed two identical complaints in two disciplining authorities exercising concurrent jurisdiction. w/ forfeiture of all benefits and civil service eligibilites. 2004 – OMBUDSMAN DECISION o Found Rodriguez GUILTY of dishonesty and oppression o Rodriguez dismissed from service. and disqualification from public office. Sr. Summons or notices do not vest jurisdiction over the person in an administrative case. SB was the first to serve notice on Rodriguez. SB acquired jurisdiction first. OMB exercise of jurisdiction must be to the exclusion of the SB. o Rodriguez filed MR. which likewise involved identical administrative complaints filed in both the Ombudsman and the sangguniang panlungsod against a punong barangay for grave misconduct.Doctrine of Condonation o Complainants: There was no more complaint in the SB because Vice-Mayor Yulo granted their motion to withdraw. o BASIS: RoC 46. Jurisdiction in administrative cases is acquired by service of summons or other compulsory processes. • Sep.the sangguniang bayan or the Ombudsman? (Ombudsman) RATIO 1) FORUM SHOPPING NOT APPLICABLE IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES “The facts in this case are analogous to those in Laxina. v. • May 8.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . 21. 2006 – CA DECISION o OMB decision set aside for lack of jurisdiction o Directed SB to continue hearing the case. Consistent with the rule on concurrent jurisdiction. to the exclusion of the OMB. • Jan 12. o OMB filed the present petition • OMB: Jurisdiction over the person is acquired once a body vested with jurisdiction takes cognizance of the complaint. 2005 – OMB directed the Mayor of Binalbagan to dismiss Rodriguez. OMB was first to take cognizance of the complaint because the SB complaint was filed later. 4. ISSUES (HELD) 1) W/N the complainants violated the rule against forum shopping when they filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against Rodriguez (NO) 2) Who acquired jurisdiction first . Sec. Art. Ombudsman. as it acquired primary jurisdiction over Rodriguez. • Rodriguez: When a competent body has acquired jurisdiction over a complaint and over the person of the respondent. LGC IRR. o Rodriguez’ rejoinder: Dismissal not valid because only the Vice-Mayor signed it.

Sec. or inefficient. Once acquired. . any act or omission of any public official. • Jurisdiction is a matter of law. any act or omission of any public officer or employee. it is clear that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases against elective barangay officials with salary grade below 27. in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction. or inefficient. even if complainants filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against [Rodriguez]. functions. they did not violate the rule against forum shopping because their complaint was in the nature of an administrative case.” 2) OMBUDSMAN HAS CONCURRENT JURISDICTION WITH SB BUT COMPLAINT WAS FIRST FILED WITH OMBUDSMAN • Constitution. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and. and duties: (1) Investigate on its own. it may take over. office or agency. Punong barangay is salary grade 14.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . improper. • CAB: Since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman. • In cases cognizable by the regular courts. Art. such as Rodriguez. • In administrative cases involving concurrent jurisdiction of 2 or more disciplining authorities. acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. or on complaint by any person.A verified complaint against any erring elective official shall be prepared as follows: (c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory. when such act or omission appears to be illegal. it is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.Doctrine of Condonation rule against forum shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings. unjust. at any stage. Thus. Sec. functions. • From the applicable laws. improper. the investigations of such cases. • LGC 61(c): Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. not to administrative cases. office. CAB: When complainants filed their case 20 of 35 . • RA 8749 limits cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to public officials with positions salary grade 27 and higher. and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person. 15: The Ombudsman shall have the following powers. • Ombudsman Act. from any investigatory agency of Government. employee. 13(1): The Ombudsman shall have the following powers. and which opts to take cognizance of the case. the Ombudsman’s exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan. • Primary jurisdiction of Ombudsman applies only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. when such act or omission appears to be illegal. unjust. or agency. so no jurisdiction. and it opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint. Ombudsman’s jurisdiction is concurrent with other investigative agencies. XI. the body in w/c the complaint is filed first.

Three informations were filed against Talaga Jr. The complaints "alleged that petitioner.A. 169888. under which petitioner is charged.A.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . gave "unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang by approving an ordinance granting to Sy Bang a local franchise to operate bingo games in the city". 3019. Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly remove an erring public official other than members of Congress and the Judiciary who may be removed only by impeachment." ISSUE: Whether or not the information filed against the petitioner is complete and constitutes the offense to which he is being charged of. No. Section 3(e) of R. had unlawfully granted favors to a third party with respect to the operation of bingo games in the city.R. the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. Apart from the Ombudsman. G. • Under LGC 60.A. the information must allege that the acts in question "caused injury to any party.A. the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an elective barangay official. the law which he allegedly violated. No. Later. v. filed the present Petition for Certiorari with an urgent application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. filed criminal and administrative complaints against Mayor Ramon Talaga Jr. whether the government or private party. Nov. 3019.Doctrine of Condonation before the Ombudsman. DISPOSITION: Petition granted. provides: 21 of 35 . jurisdiction was already vested. 3019. only one of the informations was retained which alleges that Talaga Jr. The petitioner. to the damage and prejudice of the complainants". The prosecution moved for the petitioner's preventive suspension for ninety (90) days in accordance with Section 13 of R. then. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion. 3019. et al. Petitioner contends. He claims that under R. Jurisdiction could no longer be transferred to the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a subsequent complaint filed by the same complainants. among other things. that the information do not constitute an offense. in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or R. The administrative case was dismissed but the criminal charges were retained and filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. 9) Talaga Jr. Ombudsman decision upheld. 11. Unlike the sangguniang bayan. HELD: Yes. only a proper court may do so. Inc. No. No. in his capacity as mayor of the City of Lucena. 2008 FACTS: Elan Recreation.

Doctrine of Condonation Section 3. granting unto the said Jose Sy Bang a local franchise to operate a bingo business in Lucena City in violation of existing laws. These allegations are clear enough for a layman to understand. Rule 110. whether the government or private party. or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party. advantages or preference. Section 9. administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality. The raison d'etre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. causing any undue injury to any party. Moreover. advantage or preference to such parties. The Information charged the petitioner of evident bad faith and manifest partiality when as Mayor of Lucena City.A. of the offense charged.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law. . Second. it states the specific act which constituted the giving of unwarranted benefits. gave unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang. Rules of Court provides the guideline for the determination of the validity or sufficiency of allegations in an information. including the Government. 3019 requires proof of the following facts: 1. The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to appraise the accused. the Information sufficiently apprises petitioner of the charges against him. giving any private party any unwarranted benefits.The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. in conspiracy with the City Council. in Quibal v. Cause of the Accusation. or gave any party any unwarranted benefit. Sandiganbayan. and. His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private party. petitioner. namely. No. advantage or preference in the discharge of his official. to wit: SECTION 9. Based on the foregoing test. Corrupt practices of public officers. . 22 of 35 . the law does not require that the information must allege that the acts in question "caused injury to any party. including the government. Moreover.30 the Court ruled that violation of Section 3 (e) of R. with reasonable certainty. Contrary to the argument of petitioner. This provision shall apply to officers and employees charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession ." The presence of the word "or" clearly shows that there are two acts which can be prosecuted under Section 3: First.

R. Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep. having been elected to said position during the local elections held on January 17. Aguinaldo assails the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March 19. Thereafter. SANTOS. respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. 1992 elections. all in Cagayan. which motion was denied. FACTS: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. complainants presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the charges. 23 of 35 . the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan. petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11. 1988. 94115. One of the three grounds petitioner relies on for this petition is that: the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner was required to file a verified answer to the complaint. petitioner Rodolfo E. respondent Secretary suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from notice. Tuao and Lasam. Petitioner neither presented evidence nor even cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as his answer to the complaint of Mayor Veronico Agatep and others.1990 in Adm.In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order. choosing instead to move that respondent Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case. pending the outcome of the formal investigation into the charges against him. As petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections. In his letter. No. because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be removed from office on the ground of disloyalty to the Republic. P-10437-89 dismissing him as Governor of Cagayan. On December 7. G. During the hearing conducted on the charges against petitioner. against petitioner for acts the latter committed during the coup. On the basis thereof. a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico Agatep. and not be a mere preponderance of evidence. petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution. 1989. respectively the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran. While this case was pending before this Court.Doctrine of Condonation Doctrine of Condonation 1) AGUINALDO vs. though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. August 21.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . 1992 Pertinent provision of the Local Government Code: Section 60 – Grounds for Disciplinary Actions . to serve a term of four (4) years therefrom. Case No.

Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The Office of the Ombudsman approved the September 9. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. VICENTE E. 24 of 35 . 2005 Memorandumabsolving Jason and Aquino. RAMON VILLASANTA. The rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term. filed withthe Office of the Ombudsman a complaintagainst Salumbides and Glenda (hereafter petitioners). Jr. On May 13. 1990 in Adm. RICARDO AGON. FACTS: Salumbides and Glenda were appointed as Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator and Municipal Budget Officer. herein respondentsRicardo Agon. The foregoing rule. however. & Ara v. approved onApril 11. the mayor. Jason and Aquino. By Order datedFebruary 1.Doctrine of Condonation HELD: NO.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . Office of the Ombudsman. 2005. it denied the motion for reconsideration butdropped the mayor and Coleta. proof beyond reasonable doubt is required inasmuch as he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is defined and penalized under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code. No. v. and finding petitioners guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty. the 2004 elections having mooted the case.R.all members of theSangguniang Bayanof Tagkawayan.SALVADORADUL. Gross Neglect of Duty. 2005. Coleta. 180917 : April 23. Petitioners. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN. The administrative aspect of the case charged petitionerset al. Respondents. dismissing petitioner as Governor of Cagayan. JR. P-10437-89. Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that before he could be suspended or removed from office.. under preventive suspension pending investigation. SALUMBIDES. petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. Grave Misconduct. WHEREFORE. Ramon Villasanta. et al. ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of condonation is applicable in this case. 2010 ATTY. finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup. both elective officials. Quezon. G. Salvador Adul and Agnes Fabian. ELMER DIZON. It appears that after the canvassing of votes. with Dishonesty. is hereby REVERSED. but administratively with the end in view of removing petitioner as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. and GLENDA ARA. respectively. Case No. 2002. Salumbides. Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration case pending before the Court moot and academic. as respondents in the administrative case. and violation of the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and the Local Government Code. of Tagkawayan. petitioner is hereby GRANTED and the decision of public respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March 19. 2) Atty. The Office of the Ombudsman denied the prayer to place petitionerset al. and AGNES FABIAN. Elmer Dizon.

In other words. Indeed. it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character. a legal officer who renders a legal opinion on a course of action without any legal basis becomes no different from a lay person who may approve the same because it appears justified. that could extinguish an administrative liability. petitioner Salumbides failed to uphold the law and provide a sound legal assistance and support to the mayor in carrying out the delivery of basic services and provisions of adequate facilities when he advised the mayor to proceed with the construction of the subject projects without prior competitive bidding.It is the will of the populace. for if they conspired to act negligently. to absolve Salumbides is tantamount to allowing with impunity the giving of erroneous or illegal advice. for failing to exercise due care and prudence in ascertaining the legal requirements and fiscal soundness of the projects before stamping their imprimatur and giving their advice to their superior. Petitioners fell short of the reasonable diligence required of them. the lack of conspiracy cannot be appreciated in favor of petitioners who were found guilty of simple neglect of duty. the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed through the ballot. by reason of such faults or misconduct.When the people elected a man to office. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer.Contrary to petitioners asseveration. the appellate court held that the improper use of government funds upon the direction of the mayor and prior advice by the municipal legal officer did not relieve her of liability for willingly cooperating rather than registering her written objection as municipal budget officer. in the case of reappointed coterminous employees. the appellate court.The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. when by law he is precisely tasked to advise the mayor on matters related to upholding the rule of law. pointing to the improper itemization of the expense. Moreover. Aside from the lack of competitive bidding. if he had been guilty of any. and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct.Doctrine of Condonation HELD: Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.The people cannot be charged with the presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable appointee of the elective official ahead of the latters actual reelection.It is not for the court. to practically overrule the will of the people. POLITICAL LAW: doctrine of condonation The reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. held that the funding for the projects should have been taken from the 25 of 35 . As regards petitioner Glenda. There can hardly be conspiracy to commit negligence. their infraction becomes intentional. the non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to equal protection of the law. as correctly observed by respondents. there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of.To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate.The electorates condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that of the reappointed coterminous employees. not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing authority.Since petitioners hold appointive positions.

Jr. submit an investigation report. placing Binay. Jr..54 finding that: 26 of 35 .. and file the necessary complaint. Jr. and six (6) criminal cases18 for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Jr." in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building). 3) CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES. Jr. IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN.Doctrine of Condonation capital outlays that refer to the appropriations for the purchase of goods and services. 12 otherwise known as "The Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay.24 and approved the release of funds therefor. (MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building. and o Approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the contract 48 with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. DENIED.. if warranted (1st Special Panel). Serious Dishonesty. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S.. Jr. JR. the benefits of which extend beyond the fiscal year and which add to the assets of the local government unit.. et al. accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of Republic Act No. and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. (RA) 3019. Renato L. Respondents. v.It added that current operating expenditures like MOOE/RMF refer to appropriations for the purchase of goods and services for the conduct of normal local government operations within the fiscal year. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project. the Ombudsman.'s filing of their counter-affidavits. Petitioner. issued the Notice of Award 21 for Phase III. • Before Binay. 53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are present. the subject preventive suspension order. during the pendency of the OMB Cases. executed the corresponding contract without the required publication and the lack of architectural design. • Binay’s Second Term: o Binay.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . et al). • The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators 14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation. et al. IV and V of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's). • Binay’s First Term: o Binay. BINAY. the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint 16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay. Malversation of Public Funds. and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases). et al. charging them with six (6) administrative cases 17 for Grave Misconduct. Facts: • A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. and consequently. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay. Jr.

in view of the condonation doctrine. Serious Dishonesty.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. and official receipts showed the release of funds.Doctrine of Condonation o (a) the evidence of Binay.. warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS). argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office. Jr.. his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office. there was no longer any act to restrain • Proceedings before the SC: o In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6. if any. hence. Jr.'s prayer for a TRO. Binay. Jr. maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities. if proven to be true.. o (2) said charges. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct. • Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals: o Binay contends: that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010. and o (b) (1) Binay. and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day. o The OMB manifested71 that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that since the preventive suspension order had already been served and implemented. and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor.'s guilt was strong given that ▪ (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project. et al.'s respective positions give them access to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses. • At noon of the same day. 27 of 35 . checks. 2015). 62 In support of his prayer for injunctive relief. the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition 99 before this Court. and that. 61In any event. Binay. Jr. granting Binay. Jr. having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections. Jr. Jr. ▪ (2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids. as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges against him. et al. and o (3) Binay. their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them. the CA issued a Resolution 65 (dated March 16. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong. 2015 Resolution. and ▪ (3) the disbursement vouchers. et al. 66 notwithstanding Pena.

As basis. before it during the administrative proceedings. which should have been raised by Binay. nor 28 of 35 . composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan.R. YES o OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. SP No. and that. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay. Visayas[. the concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things: First: creation by the Constitution. there is no condonation because Binay.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence. Jr. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually. Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman: o Section 5. based on the condonation doctrine Held: 1. at any rate. Office of the President is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other constitutional bodies. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013." particularly. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense. • Section 5. she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14. The concept of Ombudsman independence. Jr.Doctrine of Condonation arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. which means that the office cannot be abolished. Issues: 1. the WPI in CA-G. 2.] and Mindanao. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman." A. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed. RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. • Gonzales III v. one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon."158 claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would. [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial 157 intervention. "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts. Jr.

• Despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle. altered.that is. Courts are apolitical bodies. Despite the usage of the general phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court. the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. or modified by law. which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions. 29 of 35 . Hence.Doctrine of Condonation its constitutionally specified functions and privileges. its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to impair said functions. which means that those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority. pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same. RA 6770." • That being the case. unless the Constitution itself allows. which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor. be removed. the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power . • The first paragraph of Section 14. the Court. 168hence.cralawlawlibrary Second: fiscal autonomy." the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court. The first paragraph of Section 14. a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order . RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. the Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14. all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman frompolitical harassment and pressure. under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure. Thus. RA 6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the Court under the 1987 Constitution. as well as other statutory provisions of similar import. Evidently. and Third: insulation from executive supervision and control. deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession .clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure. B. so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics. or an amendment thereto is made.

139453 would. Its purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him • The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation. and which it had already acquired over the main CA-G. Jr. B. show that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the requisites provided in Section 24. oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty. these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1). Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.R. a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. 139453 case.R. or (c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto. however. At the risk of belaboring the point. • By nature. with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14. and (2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement: (a) The charge involves dishonesty. Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G. Chapter I of BP 129. The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of defense which should have been raised and passed 30 of 35 .LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay.cralawlawlibrary (b) The charge would warrant removal from the service.Doctrine of Condonation Hence. SP No. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine. RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs. 1 A. namely: (1) The evidence of guilt is strong. as amended. SP No.

the CA deemed it unnecessary to determine if the evidence of guilt against him was strong. In other words. With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein laid down. SP No.R. in his petition in CA-G. or acts done. an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct. the Court agrees with the CA that it was not precluded from considering the same given that it was material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia. SP No. as an exculpatory affirmative defense at the onset. which was the subsisting jurisprudence at that time.R. thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor.Doctrine of Condonation upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary proceedings. there is nothing aberrant with this since. during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office. at least for the purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x. who are assumed to have known the life and 31 of 35 . Jr. courts may not deprive the electorate. 243 However. since condonation was duly raised by Binay. as remarked in the same case of Governor Garcia. Second. if it was established that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during Binay.. Jr. Again. Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts: First. 244 the CA did not err in passing upon the same. he can no longer be administratively charged. Jr..'s prior term. Note that although Binay. the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct: Offenses committed.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . following the condonation doctrine. Thus. D. the Court now proceeds to determine if the CA gravely abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine. 245 it appears that the CA found that the application of the condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Jr. with condonation having been invoked by Binay. 139453. Jr. and [T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. Third. 139453. secondarily argued that the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-G. and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. Testing the Condonation Doctrine. Jr. then.

When the people have elected a man to office.296 the absence of a provision against the re-election of an officer removed . Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place. Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service. In similar regard. liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19. as mandated under the 1987 Constitution. There 32 of 35 . 295 In one case. the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . Grogan. 294 or that the disqualification to hold the office does not extend beyond the term in which the official's delinquency occurred. In fact. is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office. In this jurisdiction. the Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office.Doctrine of Condonation character of candidates. and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct. that an officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous term. Orbos293 to apply to administrative offenses: Also. if he had been guilty of any. of their right to elect officers: As held in Conant vs. It is not for the court.unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the justification behind condonation. 297 it was deemed that condonation through re-election was a policy under their constitution . or even another elective post. To compare. To begin with. an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense. in effect. it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character. by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases. it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. In another case. some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of administrative liability was supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating.which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's requirements on public accountability.

LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and character. and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. or to act at all in contemplation of law. shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. as a general rule. Thus. it is contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. E. Consequence of ruling. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule. which was not reported in full in the official series. owing to either their variance or inapplicability. 305 Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means. Consequently. and concealed from the public. as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.Doctrine of Condonation was even one case where the doctrine of condonation was not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party as a ground. and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election. At best. It should. when re-electing a local official. the issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs. 302 Besides. if he had been guilty of any. As for this section of the Decision. and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct. while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error. 311 It has also been held that "grave abuse of 33 of 35 . 299Hence. and is almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes. Hence.Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up. the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. until reversed. it should be. Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate. there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown. be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should beprospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution. none of these cases can be used as basis for the continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy. however. was deemed to be incompetent. Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local official's prior term. It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.298 while in another case. the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue and therefore. 303 At a conceptual level. condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned.

To recount. the said CA petition appears to have been mooted. records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. However. for the present administrative charges against him. '"the moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. dissolves ." 314 All of these scenarios obtain in this case: First. the March 16. It therefore has no more purpose . 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on the cases of Aguinaldo. As extensively discussed. SP No. otherwise moot. and fourth. if: first. third. The Court will decide cases. As explained in Belgica. on October 9. Exceptions to the mootness principle. the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved. at its core. the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Salalima. serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. unwittingly remained "good law. and again. which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office. the bar. and the public. Governor Garcia. this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations. Mayor Garcia. With this. F. This notwithstanding. when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench.Doctrine of Condonation discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution. the continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times. it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent. the preventive suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that. by merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine. 139453 on the merits. the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition forcertiorari in CA-G. considering that the Ombudsman. had already found Binay. the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued." it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above.upon the termination of the office's process of investigation in the instant administrative case.313 As initially intimated. Jr. 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia.R.and perforce. Jr.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . second. 34 of 35 ."312 As earlier established. the law or existing jurisprudence. Accordingly. Jr. which at that time.. its abandonment of the condonation doctrine. administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal. 2015. while the April 6. there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Thus. particularly.

it is indubitable that paramount public interest is involved. Third. As mentioned. And fourth. and now. and the public to explain how this controversial doctrine came about. but also puts to the forefront of legal discourse the potency of the accountability provisions of the 1987 Constitution."315 Evidently. the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local officials against the administrative charges filed against them. Thus. thus. 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of condonation.LOCAL OFFICIALS Pub Corp Rules on Succession . The Court owes it to the bench. the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape administrative liability. this is a situation of exceptional character which this Court must ultimately resolve. In any event. over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty. The issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative law principles. it is its own jurisprudential creation and may therefore. its reasons for abandoning the same in view of its relevance on the parameters of public office. oppression. the bar. since the doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the multitude of elective local officials throughout the years. the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench.Doctrine of Condonation Second. It is the first time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light. To provide a sample size. the bar. Further. in just one and a half years. this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore. the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone. pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution. and the public. 35 of 35 . gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct - were placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers. the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of discussion moot. not evade review.