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Romario Harris

1) The probability-weighted average of the utility of a person, corresponding to all possible
realizations of a random choice of nature or mixed strategies of the players.
a. Perfect information
b. External Uncertainty
c. Expected Payoff
d. Payoff

2) An extensive-form game summarizes:
a. Players, alternative strategies, order of moves, and payoffs
b. Players, arrangements, situations, and payoffs
c. Players, arrangements, order of moves, and payoffs
d. Players, stages of the game, order of moves, and payoff

3) In game theory, a strategy:
a. Is made up of a series of countermoves.
b. Is a decision rule that identifies a player’s moves
c. Constitutes a multi-stage game.
d. Must be strictly dominant.
e. Must have a Nash equilibrium.

4) A structured and simplified version or reality used to explain real-world behavior.
a. Economic Model
b. Game Theory
c. Dominant strategy
d. Strategic interaction

5) Extensive form game is used to model
a. Credit contracts
b. Contract laws
c. Debit contracts
d. Debt contract

6) Subsequence nodes are shown as
a. Open circles
b. Open squares
c. Filled in circles
d. Filled in squares

7) A Nash equilibrium:
a. Results in a payoff for a player that is no lower than any other payoff, regardless of the
strategy adopted by the other players
b. Results in the largest payoff for both players
c. Occurs when each player adopts a strategy that it believes is the best response to the other
player’s strategy

12) Our solution to the game must take into account the incentives of a. Chess. Pure Coordination d. Cannot exist in the presence of multiple Nash equilibriums. Credible. Non-credible. Results in the best of the worst possible payoffs 8) The organizational tool. the actions available to each player. 10) Incomplete situations where one person knows more than another a. Both a and b 13) Branches leading away from the node represents the a. are not . Imperfect information b. Mutual independence b. Actions that are available to the player 14) The structure of the extensive form game and the idea of a subgame perfection gives us a way to distinguish ________ threats from ones that ________. b. D. Economic Model c. Results when two players follow a secure strategy. C. Payoff Matrix 9) A focal-point equilibrium: a. Credible. Mah Jongg.d. May be a possible solution to a game involving multiple Nash equilibrium. Checkers. are not c. Incomplete information d. Asymmetric information 11) An example of a simultaneous-move game is: A. The parties b. are d. a. B. Applies only to multistage games. Just the decision points d. Rock-scissors.paper. Non-credible. Screening c. Actions that are not available to the player d. Possible points b. a. c. d. the payoffs available to each player for each action that he or she might choose given the action chosen by their rival. Every possible decision point c. are b. Possible payoffs c. a table with numbers that summarizes who the players are.

D 6. C 8. Backward iteration d. D 11. A 5. D 3. Deductive reasoning b. C 7. D 14. D 13. C 12. Simple method 1. Inductive reasoning c.15) A solution to a multistage game may be arrived at through: a. C . B 15. C 2. B 4. A 10. D 9.