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Reyes, JBL, J.

-the Tumalads executed a CHATTEL MORTGAGE in favor of the Vicencios over their house of strong
materials (at Quezon Blvd, Quiapo; lots were being rented from Madrigal & Co. Inc) to guarantee loan of
-TUmalads defaulted, mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed; VIcencios were highest bidder and were
issued certificate of sale
-Vicencios filed civil action to have house vacated and its possession surrendered to them and for the
TUmalads to pay monthly rent of P200 from date of foreclosure up to time possession is surrendered (this
was granted but judgment cannot be executed since house had been demolished pursuant to separate case
for ejectment against Vicencios for non-payment of rent)
-Tumalads IMPUGNED the legality of the CM. Accdg to them it was NULL and VOID since subject
matter was a house of strong materials, and being an immovable, can only be subject of a REM, not CM.

ISSUE: WON house is RP, rendering CM invalid. NO

Status of bldgs. as immovable:
-Lopez v. Orosa, cited in AISC v. Iya
>>bldg. by itself is an immovable, irrespective of who owns the land
-allowed deviations:
Manarang and Manarang v. Ofilada
>>parties to a contract may by agreement treat as PP that which by nature would be RP
Standard Oil Co. of NY vs. Jaramillo
>>LH rights and a bldg. were transferred by mortgage as PP
Luna v. Encarnacion
>> house of mixed materials, court held that it was a valid CM because it was so EXPRESSLY
DESIGNSTED as such by parties
Navarro v. Pineda
>>the view that parties to deed of CM may agree to consider house as PP is good only insofar as
contracting parties are concerned. It is based partly on the principle of ESTOPPEL (claim of owner
declaring his house as chattel may estop him from subsequently claiming otherwise)

-Contract of parties was expressly designated as CM; it also specifically provided that the mortgagor
voluntarily CEDES, SELLS and TRANSFERS by way of CM, the property together with its LH rights
over the lot on which it is constructed
-Although there was no specific statement that house was PP, yet by transferring PP by way of CM,
Tumalads could only have meant to convey house as hattel, or at least intended to treat it as such, so that
they should NOT now be allowed to claim otherwise
-moreover, house stood on rented lot to which they only had temporary right as lessee (this does not by
itself mean that house is PP, but when combined with other factors, shows that house was intended as PP)
-Compared to Iya case, Lopez vs. Orosa case, and Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Mahinery and Williamson
Case: in these cases THIRD PERSONS assailed validity of CM; in this case, the debtors-mortgagors
themselves are attacking validity.
-Therefore: doctrine of ESTOPPEL applies