MACALINTAL vs. COMELEC
9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to issue the
G.R. No. 157013
July 10, 2003
FACTS
Romulo Macalintal is a lawyer seeking a declaration to annul certain provisions of RA 9189
(The Overseas Absentee Voting Act). Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in
the subject matter in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and
appropriated, petitioner filed the petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
Arguments of Petitioner on the Violation of COMELECs constitutional independence:
COMELEC is not under the control of either the Executive or Legislative; the rules and
regulations of COMELEC can only be modified by the majority of its members
ISSUE
WON Sec. 5(d) of RA 9189 which allows the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent
residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return
to the Philippines violates the residency requirement of Sec. 1 Article 5 of Constitution
WON Sec. 18.5 (RA 9189) which empowers the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for
national offices and party list representatives including the President & Vice President violate the
constitutional mandate that winning candidates for President and Vice President shall be proclaimed as
winners by Congress
WON Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (Sec. 25, RA 9189) can exercise
the power to review, revise, amend & approve the IRR that COMELEC promulgates without violating the
constitutional independence of COMELEC (MAIN ISSUE)
RULING
MAIN ISSUE: WON Joint Congressional Committee can review, revise, amend & approve the IRR
promulgated by COMELEC NO, such provision violates the independence of COMELEC
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It should be allowed considerable latitude in
devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was
created free, orderly and honest elections.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body except
those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the
same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to
enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by
exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No.
necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty
days from the effectivity of this Act. Once a law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is
deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress
relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law,
but certainly not to approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.
Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in
declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that [t]he Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this
Act for prior approval, and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that [i]t
shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission, whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically
vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity.
Similarly, the phrase, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee in the first
sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than
three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, only upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee found in the second paragraph of the same section are
unconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004
elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries
wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions
provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189
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OTHER ISSUES:
1. WON Sec. 5 (d) of RA 9189 which allows the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent
residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return
to the Philippines violates the residency requirement of Sec. 1 Article 5 of Constitution - NO
There is no violation of the residency requirement under Sec. 1, Article 5 of the Constitution. As
the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it behooves the Court to
take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic
rule in constitutional construction that the Constitution should be construed as a whole.
R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of the
exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is
presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The Legislative Department) of the
Constitution.
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The method of absentee voting has been said to be completely separable and distinct from the regular
system of voting, and to be a new and different manner of voting from that previously known, and an
exception to the customary and usual manner of voting. The right of absentee and disabled voters to
cast their ballots at an election is purely statutory; absentee voting was unknown to, and not
recognized at, the common law.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a
resident and an absentee.[30] However, under our election laws and the countless
pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his
residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. Aware of the
domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence in this country, the framers of the
Constitution considered the circumstances that impelled them to require Congress to establish a system
for overseas absentee voting.
The intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust to Congress the responsibility of
devising a system of absentee voting. The qualifications of voters as stated in Section 1 shall
remain except for the residency requirement. This is in fact the reason why the Constitutional
Commission opted for the term qualified Filipinos abroad with respect to the system of absentee
voting that Congress should draw up. As stressed by Commissioner Monsod, by the use of the
adjective qualified with respect to Filipinos abroad, the assumption is that they have the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications to vote.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or
enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the
immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more
significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile
of origin. The affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad because by their
status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to return to this
country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
It wanted the affiant to exercise the option to return or to express his intention to return to his domicile of
origin and not to preempt that choice by legislation.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to resume
actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval
of his/her registration, the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied for
citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to
return shall be cause for the removal of their names from the National Registry of Absentee Voters
and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
2. WON Sec. 18.5 (RA 9189) which empowers the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for
national offices and party list representatives including the President & Vice President violate the
constitutional mandate that winning candidates for President and Vice President shall be proclaimed as
winners by Congress - YES
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too
sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and
the vice-presidency. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to
Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president
and vice-president.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or,
as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president
and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions. The provisions of the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning
candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
Macquiling v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship as a
consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of United States of America.
On July 10, 2008, Arnado applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Philippine
Consulate General in San Francisco, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. On the same day, an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor.
On April 3, 2009, he again took his Oath of Allegiance to RP and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his American Citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte.
On April 28, 2010, his rival, respondent Linog Balua, filed a petition to disqualify him or cancel
his COC in connection with the May 10, 2010 local and national elections.
o Balua contended that Arnado is NOT a resident of Kauswagan and that he is a
FOREIGNER, attaching thereto a certification issued by Bureau of Immigration dated
April 23, 2010, indicating Arnados nationality as USA-American.
o Balua also presented computer-generated travel record indicating that Arnado has
been using his US PASSPORT in entering and departing the Philippines on the
following dates:
April 14, 2009
June 25, 2009
July 29, 2009
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 November 24, 2009
January 1, 2010
March 23, 2010
Arnado failed to file his answer so Balua filed a motion to declare him in default.
Neither of the petition nor the motion was acted upon having been overtaken by the 2010
elections.
Arnado won and was subsequently proclaimed as winning candidate.
Only then did Arnado filed his Verified Answer.
The First Division of COMELEC DISAGREED with Arnados claim that he is a Filipino citizen,
holding that:
o Arnados act of CONSISTENTLY USING his US Passport AFTER RENOUNCING his
US citizenship NEGATED his Affidavit of Renunciation;
o Such continued use is a STRONG INDICATION that he had NO REAL INTENTION of
renouncing his US citizenship
o As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, a passport is an OFFICIAL document
of IDENTITY and NATIONALITY issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries
o The order of succession under Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code (LGC) be put
into effect.
Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, contending that:
o The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is NOT SUPPORTED by the evidence
consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he
substantially complied with the requirements under RA 9225;
o The use of his US Passport is NOT TANTAMOUNT to a repudiation of his Filipino
citizenship as he DID NOT perform any act of swearing allegiance to another country;
o He used his US Passport only because he was NOT INFORMED of the issuance of
his Philippine Passport and that he used his Philippine Passport after he obtained it;
and,
o He is UNDOUBTEDLY the PEOPLES CHOICE.
Petitioner Casan Maquiling, who garnered the second highest number of votes, filed a Motion
for Intervention, claiming that the order of succession under Sec. 44 of the LGC is NOT
APPLICABLE in this case; therefore, he should be proclaimed as the winner.
The COMELEC En Banc REVERSED the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnados MR,
holding that:
o By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by RA 9225, Arnado embraced his
Philippine citizenship is if he never became a citizen of another country. He then
became a pure Filipino citizen again;
o The use of a US passport DOES NOT operate to REVERT BACK his status as a dual
citizen as there is NO LAW saying such;
o The First Divisions reliance in the case of Yu v. Defensor-Santiago is MISPLACED.
The petitioner therein is a NATURALIZED citizen who, after taking his oath as a
naturalized Filipino, APPLIED for the renewal of his PORTUGESE passport. The
Philippines expects STRICT CONDUCT of allegiance to those NATURALIZED
citizens. In the present case, on the other hand, Arnado is a NATURAL-BORN Filipino
citizen and DID NOT apply for a US passport after his renunciation of his American
citizenship;
o Arnado presented a plausible explanation backed-up with evidence on the use of his
US passport: it was only in June 2009 that his Philippine passport was issued BUT he
WAS NOT NOTIFIED thereof. He was only able to get it about THREE MONTHS
later. Nonetheless, in his SUBSEQUENT TRAVELS in 2010, he has already been
using his Philippine passport.
COMELEC Chair Sixto Brillantes in his Separate Concurring Opinion
o Use of foreign passports is NOT one of the GROUNDS provided for under Sec. 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship is LOST;
o What is more applicable in this case is the ASSIMILATIVE PRINCIPLE of
CONTINUITY of CITIZENSHIP: once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or
naturalization, it is ASSUMED that he DESIRES to CONTINUE to be as such, and
this assumption stands UNTIL he VOLUNTARILY DENATIONALIZES or
EXPATRIATES himself;
o In this case, after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado should be
PRESUMED to have REMAINED a Filipino DESPITE use of American passport IN
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 THE ABSENCE of CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL and COMPETENT PROOF of
EXPATRIATION;
o All DOUBTS should be RESOLVED in FAVOR of CITIZENSHIP.
Commissioner Rene Sarmientos DISSENT:
o Arnado FAILED to PROVE that he TRULY and WHOLEHEARTEDLY ABANDON his
allegiance to US. His CONTINUED USE of his US passport and ENJOYMENT of all
PRIVILEGES as a US citizen, despite previous renunciation of such, RUNS
CONTRARY to his DECLARATION that he CHOSE to RETAIN his Filipino citizenship;
o Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are CONTINUING
REQUIREMENTS; ONCE any of them is LOST during incumbency, title to office itself
is DEEMED FORFEITED. More so if he is NOT a CITIZEN at the time he ran for
OFFICE in which he is DISQUALIFIED to RUN as such;
o NEITHER does the fact that he obtained the PLURALITY of VOTES for the mayoralty
post CURE his FAILURE to comply with the citizenship requirement since a
DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATE is NOT a CANDIDATE at all in the eyes of the law.
Thus, Macquiling filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the use of foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones
qualifications to run for public office?
RULING:
YES, it AFFECTS.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a POSITIVE
and VOLUNTARY ACT of REPRESENTATION as to ONEs NATIONALITY and CITIZENSHIP.
Although it DOES NOT divest Filipino citizenship regained, it RECANTS the Oath of Renunciation
REQUIRED to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 or The Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003
provides that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship who are seeking elective public office
shall, at the time of the filing of Certificate of Candidacy, make a PERSONAL and SWORN
RENUNCIATION of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
Here, there is no question that after performing the TWIN REQUIREMENTS OF TAKING
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE REPUBLIC AND RENOUNCING HIS FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
under RA 9225, he became eligible to run for public office. By executing an Affidavit of Renunciation of
his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.
However, this legal presumption DOES NOT OPERATE PERMANENTLY and is OPEN to
ATTACK when, after renouncing foreign citizenship, the citizen PERFORMS POSITIVE ACTS
showing CONTINUED POSSESSION of a FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP. This happened in this case when
Arnado, after renouncing, CONTINUED to USE his US passport to TRAVEL IN and OUT of the
country BEFORE FILING his Certificate of Candidacy on November 3, 2009. Between the date he
renounced his foreign citizenship (April 3, 2009) and the date of his filing of COC, he used his US
passport FOUR TIMES.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is NOT a HOLLOW OATH; it REQUIRES an
ABSOLUTE and PERPETUAL RENUNCIATION of foreign citizenship and FULL DIVESTMENT of all
CIVIL and POLITICAL RIGHTS granted by the foreign country which granted such citizenship.
The Supreme Court agrees with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign
passport DOES NOT DIVEST Arnado of his re-acquired Filipino citizenship. However, by
REPRESENTING himself as an AMERICAN, Arnado VOLUNTARILY and EFFECTIVELY
REVERTED to his EARLIER STATUS as DUAL CITIZEN. This act is FATAL to Arnados bid for public
office, as it effectively imposed on him a DISQUALIFICATION to run for an elective local position.
The act of using a foreign passport is an act which REPUDIATES the very Oath of
Renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position. Thus, by the time he filed his COC, Arnado was a DUAL
CITIZEN enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was solely and
exclusively Filipino ONLY for ELEVEN DAYS from April 3, 2009 until April 14, 2009 on which date he
first used his US passport after his renunciation.
Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a
positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of
birth who are NOT REQUIRED by law to take the Oath of Renunciation as the MERE FILING of COC
carries with it an IMPLIED RENUNCIATION of foreign citizenship.
Qualifications for public office are CONTINUING REQUIRMENTS and must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office bud DURING the officers
ENTIRE TENURE. Once any of them is lost, his title may be seasonally challenged. Holding public
office DEMANDS FULL and UNDIVIDED ALLEGIANCE to the Republic and to no other.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, found that he used his Phil passport THREE
MONTHS after June 18, 2009 the date on which his Philippine passport was issued. But, three
months from June is SEPTEMBER. If, indeed, he used his Philippine passport as SOON as he
was in possession of it, he WOULD HAVE NOT used his US Passport on November 24, 2009.
Justice Carpios Concurring Opinion
Philippine courts have no power to declare whether a person possesses citizenship
other than that of the Philippines. In Mercado v. Manzano, Constitutional Commissioner
Joaquin G. Bernas was quoted as saying, [D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on
us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries.
Whether or not one is considered a citizen of another country is something completely
beyond our control. In the present case, we have no authority to declare that Arnado is an
American citizen. Only the courts of the USA, using American law, have the conclusive
authority to make an assertion regarding Arnados American citizenship.
Arnado, as a naturalized American citizen and a repatriated Filipino, is required by
RA9225 to: (1) swear to an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
(2) execute a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before he may seek elective
Philippine public office.
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 Arnados use of his American passport after his execution of an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his American Citizenship IS A RETRACTION OF HIS RENUNCIATION.
When Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 30 November 2009, there was NO
LONGER AN EFFECTIVE RENUNCIATION of his American citizenship. It is as if he
never renounced his American citizenship at all. Arnado, therefore, failed to comply
with the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship as found in Republic Act No. 9225.
Justice Brions Dissenting Opinion
Hence, Arnados failure to comply with the twin requirements of R.A. No. 9225 is clearly a
failure to qualify as a candidate for Philippine elective public office. He is STILL
DEEMED, UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW, HOLDING ALLEGIANCE TO A FOREIGN
COUNTRY, which disqualifies him from running for an elective public office. Such failure
to comply with the twin requirements of R.A. No. 9225 is included AMONG THE
GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code:
Disqualifications. x x x. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in election laws.
Arnado used his USA passport after his Renunciation of American Citizenship and before
he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. This positive act of retraction of his renunciation
before the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy renders Arnados Certificate of Candidacy
void ab initio. Therefore, Arnado was NEVER A CANDIDATE at any time, and all the
votes for him are stray votes.
Justice Abads Separate and Concurring Opinion
The majority opinion amply states that by his acts, Amado showed that he did not
etlectively renounce his U.S. citizenship. To this I add that he also FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE U.S. REQUIREMENTS for citizens wishing to renounce their citizenships.
Section 349 (a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) sets the procedure
that those who have moved their residence to other countries must observe when
renouncing their U.S. citizenship. It provides that "(a) A person who is a national of the
United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall LOSE HIS NATIONALITY by
VOLUNTARILY PERFORMING ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ACTS with the intention of
relinquishing United States nationality-x x x (5) making a FORMAL RENUNCIATION
OF NATIONALITY BEFORE A DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR OFFICER OF THE
UNITED STATES IN A FOREIGN STATE, in such form as may be prescribed by the
Secretary of State." He does not effectively renounce his citizenship who does not comply
with what his country requires of him.
Here, there is NO SHOWING that Amado, a U.S. citizen, fulfilled the above
requirement. To the eyes of the U.S. government, Amado remains its citizen, owing
obligations of loyalty to it and subject to its laws wherever he may be. Indeed, the U.S.
government had not cancelled his passport, permitting him to use the same a number
of times after he reacquired his Philippine citizenship. lf the U.S. continues to regard
Amado as its citizen, THEN HE HAS TWO CITIZENSHIPS, A GROUND FOR
CANCELLING HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY FOR A PUBLIC OFFICE IN THE
PHILIPPINES.
Arnado PERFORMED ALL ACTS REQUIRED by Section 5(2) of RA 9225 TO REACQUIRE
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE; in fact, he actively followed up
his re-affirmed citizenship by running for public office
o RA 9225 requires the twin requirements of taking an Oath of Allegiance and the
execution of a similarly sworn Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
o Under the given facts, Arnado indisputably re-acquired Philippine citizenship
AFTER TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE not only once but twice on July
10, 2008 and April 3, 2009
o On April 3, 2009, he personally executed an AFFIDAVIT OF RENUNCIATION
before notary public Thomas Dean M. Quijano.
o Therefore, when he filed his CoC for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte on November 30, 2009, he had already effectively
renounced his American citizenship, solely retaining his Philippine citizenship
as the law requires. In this way, Arnado qualified for the position of Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and filed a valid CoC.
The evidence on record shows that ARNADOS USE OF HIS US PASSPORT AFTER HIS
COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF RA 9225, WAS AN ISOLATED ACT that was
sufficiently explained and justified.
o Arnados Philippine passport was issued on June 18, 2009, but HE WAS NOT
IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED of the issuance so that he only received his passport
three months after or sometime in September 2009.
o Clearly, when Arnado travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009,
HE HAD NO PHILIPPINE PASSPORT that he could have used to travel to the
United States to attend to the winding up of his business and other affairs in
America.
o Although Arnado received his Philippine passport by the time he returned to the
Philippines on November 24, 2009, HE COULD NOT USE THIS WITHOUT RISK OF
COMPLICATIONS with the US immigration authorities for using a travel
document different from what he used in his entry into the US on July 29, 2009.
5
 Plain practicality then demanded that the travel document that he used to enter the
US on July 29, 2009 be the same travel document he should use in leaving the
country on November 24, 2009.
Arnados use of his US passport WAS NOT AN EXPRESS RENUNCIATION of his
Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of CA 63.
o Under RA 9225, natural-born citizens who were deemed to have lost their
Philippine citizenship because of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
and who SUBSEQUENTLY COMPLIED with the requirements of RA 9225 ARE
DEEMED NOT TO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. RA 9225
CURED AND NEGATED the presumption made under CA 63.
o Hence, as in Japzon v. Commission on Elections,4 Arnado assumed "pure"
Philippine citizenship again after taking the Oath of Allegiance and executing
an Oath of Renunciation of his American citizenship under RA 9225.
o In this light, the proper framing of the main issue in this case should be whether
Arnados use of his U.S. passport affected his status as a "pure" Philippine
citizen. In question form did Arnados use of a U.S. passport amount to a
ground under the law for the loss of his Filipino citizenship under CA 63 or his
rights thereunder or, alternatively, the retention of his dual citizenship status?
The law requires EXPRESS RENUNCIATION in order to lose Philippine
citizenship. The term means a renunciation that is made distinctly and
explicitly and is NOT LEFT TO INFERENCE OR IMPLICATION; it is a
renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language, as
distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct.5 The
appreciation of Arnados use of his U.S. passport should not depart from this
norm, particularly in a situation of doubt.
o The Aznar case presents a clear and vivid example, taken from jurisprudence,
of what "express renunciation" is not. The Court ruled that the mere fact that
Osmea was a holder of a certificate that he is an American did not mean that he is
no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration did
not amount to a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
o In the present case, other than the use of his U.S. passport in two trips to and
from the U.S., THE RECORD DOES NOT BEAR OUT ANY INDICATION,
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, OF ARNADOS INTENTION TO RE-ACQUIRE U.S.
CITIZENSHIP.
o In the absence of clear and affirmative acts of re-acquisition of u.s. Citizenship
either by naturalization or by express acts (such as the re-establishment of
permanent residency in the U.S.), Arnados use of his U.S. passport is JUST AN
ISOLATED ACT that did not undo his renunciation of his U.S. citizenship. What he
might in fact have done was to violate American law on the use of passports, but this
is a matter irrelevant to the present case. Thus, Arnado remains to be a "pure"
Filipino citizen and the loss of his Philippine citizenship or of citizenship rights
CANNOT BE PRESUMED OR INFERRED FROM HIS ISOLATED ACT of using his
U.S. passport for travel purposes.
Arnado DID NOT VIOLATE his Oath of Renunciation; at any rate, ALL DOUBTS should be
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF ARNADOS ELIGIBILITY considering that he received the popular
mandate of the people of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte as their duly elected mayor.
o Arnado SUFFICIENTLY JUSTIFIED THE USE OF HIS U.S. PASSPORT despite his
renunciation of his U.S. citizenship: when he travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25,
2009 and July 29, 2009, he had no Philippine passport that he could have used to
travel to the U.S. to attend to the business and other affairs that he was leaving. If at
all, he could be faulted for using his U.S. passport by the time he returned to the
Philippines on November 24, 2009 because at that time, he had presumably received
his Philippine passport. However, given the circumstances of Arnado's use and
that he consistently used his Philippine passport for travel AFTER November
24, 2009, the true character of his use of his U.S. passport stands out as AN
ISOLATED AND CONVENIENT ACT that DID NOT NEGATE HIS OATH OF
RENUNCIATION.
o In a situation of doubt, DOUBTS SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF FULL
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP since the thrust of RA 9225 is TO ENCOURAGE THE
RETURN TO FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP of natural-born Filipinos who lost their
Philippine citizenship through their acquisition of another citizenship.
o From the perspective of our election laws, DOUBTS SHOULD ALSO BE
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF Arnado since HIS ELECTION TO THE OFFICE of
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte WAS NEVER IN DOUBT. The present
voters of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte have eloquently spoken and approved
Arnados offer of service not only once but twice in 2010 and now in 2013. Note that
the present case was very much alive in the minds of the Kauswagan voters in the
immediately past May 13, 2013 elections, yet they again voted Arnado into office.
o The people of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, therefore, made their own ruling
when they elected Arnado as their mayor despite the foreigner label sought to be
pinned on him.
G.R. No. L-61586 May 30, 1983
Milllare v. Hon. Gironella
Petitioner Isidro Millare ran for the position of Barangay Captain of Barangay Budac,
Tayum Abra, against Alfredo Elvea. Elvena filed an action (Election Case No. 48) for
exclusion and disqualification of Millare. The said petition sought to strike out Millare's name
6
 from the voters' list, and to disqualify him as a candidate for the position of barangay captain of
barangay Budac on the ground that he was not an actual resident of the said barangay for
at least six months prior to the elections, as required by Section 7 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
222.
At the hearing of the said petition, Millare failed to appear and, after receiving the evidence of
Elvea the judge issued an order striking out Millare's name from the voters' list and
declaring him disqualified to run as barangay captain of barangay Budac.
Millare filed a motion for a reconsideration of the said order. The motion was set for hearing,
and in an order dated May 16, 1982, Judge Bernardino denied the, same, with the modification
that Millare's name was allowed to remain in the voters' list. Millare received a copy of the
order denying his motion for reconsideration at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 16, 1982,
which was a Sunday, the eve of Election Day.
Despite the declaration as to his disqualification, Millare ran just the same in the
election held on May 17, 1982. It appears undisputed that he garnered more votes than
Elvea. His votes, however, were not considered by the barangay board of tellers, they having
been declared as stray. The barangay board of canvassers proclaimed Elvea as the duly
elected Barangay Captain of barangay Budac. He took his oath of office as such.
Millare did not appeal the orders in Election Case No. 48 which declared him
disqualified to run as barangay captain of barangay Budac. On May 20, 1982, Millare filed
with the MTC an election protest against Elvea praying for the annulment of the
proclamation of Elvea and for a declaration that he (Millare) was the duly elected Barangay
Captain of barangay Budac.
Judge Gironella dismissed the action. He reasoned out that the election protest may not be
availed of as a means of appealing the decision which declared Millare as disqualified as a
candidate and which had already become final and executory, there having been no appeal
taken from the same.
The respondents are pinning down Millare on his failure to appeal the order of Judge
Bernardino in Election Case No. 48 declaring him disqualified to run for the position of
barangay captain of barangay Budac on the ground of non-residence. Such failure, it was
reasoned out, resulted in the said order becoming final and executory, and that by virtue
thereof, Millare lacked the requisite personality to file Election Protest No. -49.
Issue:
WON Millare can file an election protest instead of appealing the judgment in Election Case
No. 48
Held:
Yes.
From a strict legal standpoint, the view that the order disqualifying Millare had become final
and executory due to his failure to appeal the same may be said to be technically correct. The
law governing barangay elections is contained in Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known
as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.
The pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court which have been made applicable to "all
disputes over barangay elections" require that the decision of a municipal court be appealed to
the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) "within fifteen days after notification
of the judgment complained of." (Sec. 2, Rule 40, Rules of Court.) It is a fact that Millare did
not take an appeal from the orders issued by Judge Bernardino in Election Case No. 48.
However, we find ourselves unable to go along with the stoically legalistic stance taken by the
respondents which not only disregards the equities involved, but also contravenes the
unquestioned policy in the interpretation of election laws and the disposition of election cases.
We have repeatedly ruled that "the purpose of election laws is to give effect to rather than
frustrate, the will of the voters."
Under the undisputed facts, MILLARE COULD NOT HAVE APPEALED THE ORDER
DISQUALIFYING HIM AS A CANDIDATE BEFORE THE ELECTION. The order denying his
motion for reconsideration or the order dated May 13, 1982 in Election Case No. 48 was
received by Millare only at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 16, 1982, a Sunday, or only a
few hours before the opening of the polling places.
However, as to whether Millare should have appealed the said order of disqualification after
Election Day, more particularly when his votes, which were more than those of his opponents,
were not credited to him, they having been considered stray due to the aforementioned
disqualification, was not plain nor certain enough as the proper course of action to take. The
barangay board of tellers had considered the order of his disqualification as already final and
executory, for which reason they considered his votes stray. If the order of disqualification was
still appealable, as contended by the respondents, such action on the part of the barangay
board of tellers was legally unjustified and erroneous. The quandary in the mind of Millare as to
what course of action to take after Elvea was proclaimed the winner despite his having
received less votes than Millare was not helped any by the state of the law and of the
applicable decisions on the matter. As aforesaid, there is no express legal provision or
pertinent jurisprudence which indicates whether, under such a situation, Millare should have
appealed the order of his disqualification, or file an election protest.
The propriety of Millare's filing a separate election contest in lieu of appealing the order of
disqualification in Election Case No. 48 could have been induced also by the need to raise
issues in the election contest other than the sole question of the alleged non-residence of
Millare in Barangay Budac; such as, the denial of due process consisting in the lack of
opportunity to present evidence in his behalf, the propriety of declaring the votes cast in
his favor as stray, and the refusal of Judge Bernardino to allow the reopening of the ballot
boxes for a recanvassing of the votes. At any rate, if appeal is indeed the proper remedy, the
filing of Election Protest No. 49 on May 20, 1982, or well within the period of appeal, may be
considered as in the same nature of that remedy. Whatever procedural mis-step may have
been committed in this regard may not override the paramount consideration of
upholding the sovereign will of the people expressed through the democratic process
of suffrage. Millare may not be faulted for sleeping on his rights. He had insisted on his
qualification for the position he ran for, and took determined and seasonable steps to assert
the same.
So, the cases were consolidated and remanded to the RTC to be tried on the merits. RTC was
also instructed to allow Millare to present his evidence.
Ysip v. Municipality of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija
G.R. No. L-18947 April 29, 1922
Malcom
FACTS:
7
 At the last general election in 1919, two parties, the Partido Democrata and the Partido
Nacionalista, contested for supremacy in the municipality of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. The
highest number of votes was cast for the Partido Nacionalista, and the second highest
number for the Partido Democrata.
Partido Nacionalista was however divided into two parties, the Partido Nacionalista,
commonly known as Unipersonalista, and the Partido Nacionalista Colectivista.
The Partido Nacionalista Colectivista was inaugurated in the municipality of Cabiao, Nueva
Ecija, on February 28, 1922.
portion of section 11 of Act No. 3030 of the Philippine Legislature, reads:
Should there be in such municipality one or more political parties or branches or fractions
thereof, or political groups, then two of said inspectors and two substitutes for the same shall
belong to the party which polled the largest number of votes in said municipality at such
preceding election and the other inspector and his substitute shall belong to the party, branch or
fraction thereof, or political group which polled the next largest number of votes at said election;
and the inspectors so appointed shall be persons proposed by the legitimate representative or
representatives of such political parties, branches or fractions thereof, or political group.
Violago, Sr. v COMELEC
GR No 194143
Oct 04, 11
CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTION LAWS: LIBERALLY CONSTRUED
Facts:
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: set aside Order of the
2nd Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), dismissing the election protest
filed by herein petitioner against herein private respondent, and the Order of the
COMELEC en banc, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the mayoralty race during the May 10,
2010 elections in the City of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Private respondent was proclaimed the
winner.

ISSUE: Whether or not Partido Nacionalista Colectivista will be entitled to an election inspector
in the approaching elections petitioner filed a Petition with the COMELEC questioning the proclamation of private
respondent on the following grounds: (1) massive vote-buying; (2) intimidation and
RULING: YES harassment; (3) election fraud; (4) non-appreciation by the Precinct Count Optical Scan
(PCOS) machines of valid votes cast during the said election; and, (5) irregularities due to non-
A strict construction of the law would necessarily result in the Nacionalista Party being granted two observance of the guidelines set by the COMELEC.
inspectors in many municipalities, since no one can deny that this is "the party which polled the largest
number of votes," in such municipalities at the preceding election. Nor can it be denied that the law
contemplates bi-partisan elections and only takes into account the successful party, and the party which
polled the next largest number of votes. The COMELEC 2nd Division issued an Order setting the preliminary conference on August
12, 2010 and directing the parties to file their Preliminary Conference Briefs at least one (1)
A liberal construction of the law will, on the other hand, permit the Nacionalista Colectivista day before the scheduled conference.
Party to have representation on election boards in all municipalities in which the old
Nacionalista Party polled the largest number of votes at the last election.
On August 11, 2010, private respondent filed her Preliminary Conference Brief
Such interpretation and application of the law will not do violence to it, in view of the notorious fact that
the party which won the election in many municipalities, such as Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, the Nacionalista Petitioner filed his Brief on the day of the scheduled preliminary conference.
Party has now split its forces between the old party and a new party. Such interpretation and
application of the law would, moreover, be in accord with the underlying purpose of the Election
Law, which is TO PROVIDE AS COMPLETE A METHOD AS POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN A CLEAN Petitioner and his counsel failed to appear during the actual conference on August 12, 2010.
ELECTION.
On even date, private respondents counsel moved for the dismissal of the case.
If we must choose between a strict and literal interpretation of the law and a liberal and reasonable
interpretation of the law, if we must choose between the letter of the law which "killeth" and the spirit of
the law which "giveth life", can anyone doubt what our decision will be? We adopt that construction The COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed petitioners protest on the ground that the latter
which will produce the most beneficial results.
belatedly filed his Brief in violation of the COMELEC rule on the filing of briefs.
Where in such municipalities, in addition to the Partido Nacionalista there has been duly organized a
new party known as the Partido Nacionalista Colectivista, one election inspector and one substitute
shall belong each to the Partido Nacionalista, the Partido Nacionalista Colectivista and the
Partido Democrata.
8
 The COMELEC en banc contending that it was only on August 16, 2010 that he received a
copy of the Order of the COMELEC which set the preliminary conference on August 12,
2010.
the COMELEC en banc denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration on the ground
that petitioner failed to file a verified motion in violation of Section 3, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Issue: WON the dismissal on the ground that the brief was unverified is valid
Held: NO
A perusal of the records of the instant case would show that petitioner was able to present a
copy of the Certification issued by the Postmaster of Meycauayan City, Bulacan, attesting to the fact
that the Order sent by the COMELEC to petitioners counsel informing the latter of the
scheduled hearing set on August 12, 2010 and directing him to file his Preliminary Conference
Brief was received only on August 16, 2010.
Petitioner likewise submitted an advisory issued by the Chief of the Operations Division of the
TELECOM Office in Meycauayan that the telegraph service in the said City, through which the
COMELEC also supposedly sent petitioner a notice through telegram, has been terminated and the
office permanently closed and transferred to Sta. Maria, Bulacan as of April 1, 2009. Respondent
did not question the authenticity of these documents.
The Court finds no justifiable reason why the COMELEC 2nd Division hastily dismissed
petitioners election protest. There is no indication that the COMELEC 2nd Division made prior
verification from the proper or concerned COMELEC department or official of petitioners allegation that
he did not receive a copy of the subject Order. In fact, it was only on the day following such dismissal
that the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department, through the 2nd Division Clerk, sent a letter to the
Postmaster of Meycauayan City, Bulacan requesting for a certification as to the date of receipt of the
said Order stating therein that the certification is urgently needed for the proper and appropriate
disposition of petitioners election protest. Fairness and prudence dictate that the COMELEC 2nd
Division should have first waited for the requested certification before deciding whether or not
to dismiss petitioners protest on technical grounds.
Petitioner should not be penalized for belatedly filing his Preliminary Conference Brief. While it
may be argued that petitioner acquired actual knowledge of the scheduled conference a day prior to the
date set through means other than the official notice sent by the COMELEC, the fact remains that,
unlike his opponent, he was not given sufficient time to thoroughly prepare for the said
conference. A one-day delay, as in this case, does not justify the outright dismissal of the
protest based on technical grounds where there is no indication of intent to violate the rules on
the part of petitioner and the reason for the violation is justifiable. Thus, the COMELEC 2ndDivision
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners protest.
With respect to the COMELEC en bancs denial of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, it is
true that Section 3, Rule 20 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Disputes in an Automated
Election System, as well as Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, clearly
require that a motion for reconsideration should be verified. However, the settled rule is that the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction.
In Quintos v. Commission on Elections, this Court held that the alleged lack of verification
of private respondents Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration is merely a
technicality that should not defeat the will of the electorate. The COMELEC may liberally
construe or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a
speedy disposition of all matters pending before the COMELEC.
In the case of Panlilio v. Commission on Elections, restated the prevailing principle that the
COMELECs rules of procedure for the verification of protests and certifications of non-forum
shopping should be liberally construed.
In Pacanan v. Commission on Elections:
x x x An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public
interest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate
proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is
sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation
of the winning candidate. An election contest therefore involves not only the
adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates but paramount to
their claims is the deep public concern involved and the need of dispelling the
uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. And the court has the
corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, who is the
real candidate elected by the people.
Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal construction. This
liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the
objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and
for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action
and proceeding brought before the Comelec. Thus, we have declared:
It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general
rule recognized by all courts, that statutes providing for election
contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated
by mere technical objections. An election contest, unlike an
ordinary action, is imbued with public interest since it involves not
only the adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates but
also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which
beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall
discharge the prerogatives of the office within their gift. Moreover, it
is neither fair nor just to keep in office for an uncertain period one
whos right to it is under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim
be immediately cleared not only for the benefit of the winner
but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved
by brushing aside technicalities of procedure which protract
and delay the trial of an ordinary action.
Tolentino v. Commission on Elections,20 and De Castro v. Commission on
Elections,21 where the Court held that in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as
defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC
must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes.
9
 Notwithstanding the fact that petitioners motion for reconsideration was not verified, the
COMELEC en banc should have considered the merits of the said motion in light of petitioners
meritorious claim that he was not given timely notice of the date set for the preliminary conference. The
essence of due process is to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit
any evidence in support of ones claim or defense.22 It is the denial of this opportunity that
constitutes violation of due process of law.23 More particularly, procedural due process demands prior
notice and hearing.24 As discussed above, the fact that petitioner somehow acquired knowledge or
information of the date set for the preliminary conference by means other than the official notice
sent by the COMELEC is not an excuse to dismiss his protest, because it cannot be denied that
he was not afforded reasonable notice and time to adequately prepare for and submit his brief.
This is precisely the reason why petitioner was only able to file his Preliminary Conference Brief on the
day of the conference itself. Petitioners counsel may not likewise be blamed for failing to appear during
the scheduled conference because of prior commitments and for, instead, filing an Urgent Motion to
Reset Preliminary Conference.
US vs Cueto
G.R. No. 13626
October 29, 1918
In the general election held on June 6, 1916, Elias Cueto was an election inspector for an election
precinct in the municipality of Tiaong, Province of Tayabas.
For the position of municipal president of this municipality, Mayo and Magbiray were candidates.
Toribio Briones, a qualified elector, belonged to the Mayo party. He was given a slip containing the slate
of candidates of the Mayo faction for the different offices and with this in his possession, entered the
polling place. Being a disabled person, because of failing sight and rheumatism in his hand, although
still able when necessary to read and write, Briones secured the assistance of Cueto to prepare his
ballot. Instead, however, of copying the name of Mayo, the candidate for municipal president found
on the slip of paper, for whom Briones desired to vote, Cueto inserted the name of Magbiray. When
once outside the dark booth, Briones noticed that his ballot contained the name of Magbiray and, on his
objecting, a new ballot with the name of Mayo was prepared for him by the election inspector.
History:
The Philippine Bill and subsequent Acts of Congress conceded to qualified persons the high prerogative
of suffrage. To carry out this purpose, the Election Law was carefully drafted and enacted, and then
revised by the Philippine Legislature. Its primal feature was to allow the citizen to vote secretly for whom
he pleased, free from improper influences.
The purity of elections is one of the most important and fundamental requisites of a popular
government.
Main feature of election laws: topic sa syllabus (ABSOLUTE SECRECY OF THE BALLOTS)
Act No. 1582 (First Election Law) was enacted to accomplish the objective of insuring purity of
elections. This law requires that only qualified electors shall be admitted to the polls; that they shall
vote in absolute secrecy, and that the returns shall be justly compiled and announced. In its essential
details, this law is a counterpart of the ballot laws almost universally adopted within comparatively
recent times in the United States, and is generically called by text writers the Australian ballot law. The
central idea of the Australian ballot law, as so often expressed in the cases, is to shroud the marking of
the ballots in absolute secrecy. All the efforts to secure a free and untrammeled expression of the
electors will lead up to and depart from that point. It is intended to allow the citizen to vote secretly
for whom he pleases, free from improper influences.
Purpose of election laws:
To secure a fair and honest count of the ballots cast.
On Cuetos liability:
WON Cueto violated the Election law
Held:
Yes. Cueto violated the Election Law
The accused, as already remarked, was an election inspector. To hold this office it was necessary for
him to have certain qualifications.
He had to be a qualified elector of his precinct, of good character, not convicted of an offense involving
moral turpitude, and able to read, write, and speak either English, Spanish, or the local dialect
understandingly. The accused took an oath, honestly and justly to administer his duties
according to the Election Law without prejudice or favor toward any persons candidate, party,
society, or religious sect. One of his functions was, in conjunction with another inspector (the
accused, however, violated this provision of the law by acting alone), to prepare ballots for
disabled persons. The law made it his duty, and his duty only, with another inspector, to
ascertain the wishes of the disabled voter and to prepare the ballot of the voter in proper form
according to his wishes. (See sections 417-424, 453, Administrative Code of 1917.)
The election inspector in giving assistance to a disabled voter has but one function to perform, namely,
the mechanical act of preparing the ballot. The exercise of any discretion as to the selection of
candidates for the voter assisted is prohibited to the marker, and the substitution of his own for the
voters choice in such selection is a flagrant violation of an official trust.
An inspector who fails to write upon the ballot the name or names expressly indicated by the voter is
guilty of a fraud practiced against the voter and thus of a violation of the penal provisions of the
Election Law.
Of course, an election officer is not responsible for a mere mistake in judgment but only for a willful
disregard of duty. All that the law requires of an election officer is the exercise of prudence, of intelligent
deliberation leading him to judgment; and when he does that, although he does not live up to the law
there is no crime, because there is no criminal intent.
The defendant is not only guilty of an attempt to defeat the will of the people of his district in
their effort to choose their representatives in the legislative branch of the government, but also violated
his oath of office in which he asked God to help him honestly and justly to administer his duties as an
inspector of elections without prejudice or favor toward any person, candidate, party, society, or
religious sect, which oath must have been taken freely or without evasion or mental reservation
whatsoever. In addition to convicting himself of an attempt to violate the rights of the people, together
with the violation of a solemn oath, he also convicts himself of the falsification of a public
10
document, and might be punished for the latter offense in a manner very much more severe than for
the crime for which he is being tried.
RULLADO VS COMELEC
(DEFINITION, BASIS AND NATURE OF ELECTIONS)
FACTS:
In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido were the
contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. On June 22,
2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center.
His widow, petitioner Petronila Betty Rulloda, wrote a letter to the Commission on Elections on June
25, 2002 seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her
late husband. Petitioners request was supported by the Appeal-Petition containing several signatures
of people purporting to be members of the electorate of the Barangay.
On July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to the Chairman and
Members of the Barangay Board of Canvassers of Sto. Tomas as follows:
Just in case the names BETTY or PETRONILA or the surname RULLODA is written on the ballot,
read the same as it is written but add the words NOT COUNTED like BETTY NOT COUNTED or
RULLODA NOT COUNTED.
Based on the tally of petitioners watchers who were allowed to witness the canvass of votes during the
July 15, 2002 elections, petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent Remegio Placido received
290 votes. Despite this, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the Barangay Chairman of Sto.
Tomas.
After the elections, petitioner learned that the COMELEC, acting on the separate requests of Andres
Perez Manalaysay and Petronila Rulloda to be substituted as candidates for Barangay Chairman of
Barangay La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan,
respectively, issued Resolution No. 5217 dated July 13, 2002 which states:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to ADOPT the
recommendation of the Law Department as follows:
1. 2.
To deny due course the Certificates of Candidacy of ANDRES PEREZ MANALAYSAY and
PETRONILA S. RULLODA (COMELEC denied the substitution of parties); and
To direct the Election Officer of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and San Jacinto, Pangasinan to delete the
name of ANDRES PEREZ MANALAYSAY, candidate for Barangay Chairman in Barangay La Fuente,
Sta.
Rosa, Nueva Ecija; and the name of PETRONILA S. RULLODA, candidate for Barangay Captain in
Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
The above-quoted Resolution cited as authority the COMELECs Resolution No. 4801 dated May 23,
2002, setting forth the guidelines on the filing of certificates of candidacy in connection with the July 15,
2002 synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections, more particularly Section 9 thereof
which reads:
Sec. 9. Substitution of candidates. There shall be no substitution of candidates for barangay
and sangguniang kabataan officials.[8]
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul Section 9 of Resolution No.
4801 and Resolution No. 5217, both of the COMELEC, insofar as they prohibited petitioner from
running as substitute candidate in lieu of her deceased husband; to nullify the proclamation of
respondent; and to proclaim her as the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,
Pangasinan.
Private respondent Remegio Placido filed his Comment, arguing that since the barangay election is
non-partisan, substitution of candidates is not allowed. Moreover, petitioner did not file any certificate of
candidacy; hence, there was only one candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, namely,
respondent Placido.
Public respondent COMELEC also filed its Comment. It contends that its Resolution No. 4801 was
issued not pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but as an incident of its inherent administrative
functions over the conduct of the barangay elections. Therefore, the same may not be the subject of
review in a petition for certiorari. Further, the COMELEC alleges that it did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to petitioners certificate of candidacy and in proclaiming respondent
considering that he was the only candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN COMELEC
DENIED PETITIONERS REQUEST THAT SHE BE ALLOWED TO RUN FOR ELECTIONS
HELD:
At the outset, there is no dispute that petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent got only 290
votes. Respondents did not deny this in their respective Comments.
Definition of Election: choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular votes
through use of ballot
Basis of Election: In all republican governments, no one can be declared elected unless he
received the majority or plurality of legal votes cast
In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by
popular vote through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials which are determined
through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of
the sovereign power of the people. The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality
of valid votes cast in the election. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of
government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
Respondents base their argument that the substitution of candidates is not allowed in barangay
elections on Section 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code, which states:
11
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. If after the last day
of the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate
of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of
the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the
election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors
in the political subdivision where he is a candidate or, in the case of candidates to be voted by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-partisan, there can be no
substitution because there is no political party from which to designate the substitute.
Such an interpretation, aside from being non sequitur, ignores the purpose of election laws which
is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and
unmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so
construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Contrary to respondents claim, the absence of a specific provision governing substitution of
candidates in barangay elections can not be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution .
Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there
is more reason to allow the substitution of candidates where no political parties are involved than when
political considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.
Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in petitioners favor can not be counted because
she did not file any certificate of candidacy. In other words, he was the only candidate for Barangay
Chairman.
His claim is refuted by the Memorandum of the COMELEC Law Department as well as the assailed
Resolution No. 5217, wherein it indubitably appears that petitioners letter-request to be allowed to
run as Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband was treated as a certificate
of candidacy.
To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested election.
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way
of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections.
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they
constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective
officials. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the
free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.
SUBIC BAY METROPILITAN AUTHORITY VS COMELEC and ENRIQUE T. GARCIA and CATALINO
A. CALIMBAS
G.R. NO. 125416 September 26, 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Note: This is an action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner seeks to nullify the respondent
Commission on Elections' Ruling dated April 17, 1996 and Resolution No. 2848 promulgated on June
27, 1996, denying petitioner's plea to stop the holding of a local initiative and referendum on the
proposition to recall Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan.
FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992), which among others, provided for the creation of the Subic Economic
Zone.
Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the Sangguniang
Panlugnsod of the City of Olongapo and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipalities of Subic (Morong
and Hermosa), there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City
of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales.
RA 7227 likewise created petitioner (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority) to implement the declared
national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines
government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the
preservation of the seaports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.
In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang
10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by RA 7227, to join the
Subic Special Economic Zone then submitted it to the Office of the President.
The following month, respondents filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul and
invalidate Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, among other conditions.
Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, herein respondents resorted to
their power initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991, Sec. 122 paragraph (b) of which
provides as follows:
Sec. 122. Procedure in Local Initiative.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned, the
proponents, through their duly authorized and registered representatives, may invoke
their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the sangguniang concerned.
On July 6, 1993, respondent Commission En Banc in Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 denied the
petition for local initiative by herein private respondents on the ground that the subject thereof was
merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance.
On August 15, 1993, private respondents instituted a petition for certiorari and mandamus before this
Court against the Commission on Elections and the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan, to set
aside Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 insofar as it disallowed the conduct of a local initiative to annul
Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, and Comelec Resolution No. 93-1676 insofar as it
12
prevented the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bataan from proceeding with the authentication of the a.1. Initiative on the Constitution, which refers to
required number of signatures in support of the initiative and the gathering of signatures. a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;
On February 1, 1995, pursuant to Sec. 12 of RA 7227, the President of the Philippines issued
Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition
On June 18, 1996, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a "Calendar of proposing to enact a national legislation; and
Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong, Bataan", and which indicated, among others, the scheduled Referendum Day (July a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a
27, 1996, Saturday). A week later, it promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or
repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan". ordinance.

On July 10, 1996, petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting the (b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent
validity of Resolution No. 2848 and alleging, inter alia, that public respondent "is intent on to Congress or the local legislative body for action.
proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.
(c) "REFERENDUM" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation
ISSUES: through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:
(1) WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing Resolution
No. 2848
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a
petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part
(2) WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to thereof, passed by Congress; and
enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law." (Ultra Vires?)
c.2 Referendum on local law which refers to a
HELD: petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or
ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and
1) Sufficiency of Comelec Resolution No. 2848 local legislative bodies.

We answer the question in the affirmative.
To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but
respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of
the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least
27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. To repeat, not once was the word "initiative"
used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an
INITIATIVE.
Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines initiative as the "power of the people to
propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly."
On the other hand, he explains that referendum "is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject
any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would
without action on the part of electors become a law." (Referendum would become a law if there is no
action on the provided by the electors)
The foregoing definitions, which are based on Black's and other leading American authorities, are
echoed in the Local Government Code (RA 7160) substantially as follows:

There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In Sec. 120. Local Initiative Defined. Local initiative is the legal process whereby the
enacting the "Initiative and Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from the other, registered voters of local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any
thus: ordinance.

(a) "INITIATIVE" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Sec. 126. Local Referendum Defined. Local referendum is the legal process
Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend or
purpose. reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Comelec
within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
13
 municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of baranggays. The Comelec shall certify
and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
From these definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people
directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance,
resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify one already
existing.
On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the registered
voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution,
which is duly enacted or approved by such law-making authority. Said referendum shall be
conducted also under the control and direction of the Commission on Elections.
In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun
and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the
people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected
representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what
has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an
initiative are understandably more complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters
will simply write either "Yes" of "No" in the ballot.
[Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer to initiative and referendum as "powers" or
"legal processes", these can be also be "rights", as Justice Cruz terms them, or "concepts", or
"the proposal" itself (in the case of initiative) being referred to in this Decision.]
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of
the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers
belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the
substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should
have done so already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and ruls for the orderly exercise
of these "people-power" features of our Constitution.
2. WON initiative is Ultra Vires
Court said that it shall not pass upon the third issue of ultra vires on the ground of prematurity. The
municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people
reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted
for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced
or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot
issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual
controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.
The initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is REMANDED to the Commission on
Elections for further proceeding consistent with the foregoing discussion.
CLAUDIO vs. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 140560, 140714
May 4, 2000
FACTS
Jovito Claudio is the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1988 elections. He
assumed office on July 1, 1988 (assumption of office).
During the 2nd week of May 1999, several barangays gathered to discuss the possibility of filing
a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence. On May 19, 1999, an ad hoc
committee was made for the purpose of convening the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA).
On May 29, 1999, PRA members adopted a resolution to initiate the recall of Mayor
Claudio for loss of confidence
Petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by an affidavit of service of the
petition on the Office of the City Mayor.
Mayor Claudio filed an opposition on the following grounds:
o The signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at
the PRA meeting
o The convening of the PRA took place within the 1-year prohibited period
o Recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA
COMELEC granted the petition for recall and dismissed the opposition of Mayor Claudio.
The bone of contention in this case is Sec. 74 of the Local Government Code which provides:
Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election. xxx
ISSUES
WON the word recall in paragraph b covers a process which includes the convening of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution
WON the term regular local election in paragraph b includes the election period or the date of the
Election Day
WON the Recall resolution was signed by the majority of PRA and duly verified
RULING
WON the word recall in paragraph b covers a process which includes the convening of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution NO
According to Mayor Claudio, the prohibited 1-year period began from the convening of the PRA on May
29, 1999 when in it resolved to initiate the recall process and since May 29 is less than 1 year from
the date he assumed office (July 1, 1988), the filing of the recall petition was null & void.
14
Comelec contends that recall process starts from the filing of the petition for recall until the conduct
of the recall election and since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999, this was exactly one year from
the date Claudio assumed office.
The word recall in Sec. 74 (b), LGC refers to the election itself by means of which voters decided
whether they shall retain their local official or elect his replacement. IN THIS CASE, SINCE THE
RECALL ELECTION IS SET ON APRIL 15, 2000, IT IS MORE THAN 1 YEAR AFTER PETITIONER
ASSUMED OFFICE THEREFORE THERE IS NO BAR AS TO HOLDING THE RECALL ELECTION
ON THAT DATE.
Recall is a process which involves the following steps:
(1) the convening of the preparatory assembly or gathering of the signatures of at least
25% registered voters in the LGU;
(2) the filing of the recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC;
(3) the verification of the resolution or petition;
(4) fixing of the date of the recall election; and
(5) holding of the election.
What are the limitations under Sec. 74 (b) on the holding of recall?
a) That no recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of assumption of office
b) That no recall shall take place within 1 year immediately preceding a regular local
election
Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the
power to elect an official into office, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) Section 74, LGC refers only to
the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the
COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall.
The holding of the PRA is NOT the recall itself. A recall resolution merely sets the stage for the
official concerned before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to
continue in office.
If the preliminary proceeding (PRA) does not produce a decision by the
electorate as to whether the official continues to enjoy the confidence of the people, the prohibition in
paragraph b shall not apply.
It cannot be argued that to allow recall proceedings to be initiated before the official concerned has
been in office for one-year would be to allow him to be judged without sufficient basis. As long as the
recall election is not held before the official concerned has completed one year in office, he will not be
judged on his performance prematurely.
That the word recall used in Sec. 74(b), LGC, refers to the recall election itself and not to the
preliminary proceedings to initiate recall is due to the following reasons:
1. Because Sec. 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to Sec. 69, is a power which shall
be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise
such right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited
within the one-year period provided in paragraph (b);
2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient
basis for judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the
election; and
3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall
proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.
--------------
WON the term regular local election in paragraph b includes the election period or the date of the
Election Day ONLY THE DATE OF ELECTION DAY
Petitioner argued that regular local elections does not only mean day of the local election (May 14,
2001) but the election period as well. Therefore he contended that beginning March 30, 2000, no
recall election may be held.
The term regular elections does not include the election period.
To construe the word regular elections as including the election period would emasculate the right of
the people to exercise the power of recall.
Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an
elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period
from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a
period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph
(b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an
interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make
local government units" more responsive and accountable."
In Paras v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court held that the limitations on Sec. 74 (a) and Sec. 74 (b)
would mean that a local elective official may be subject only to recall during the second year of
his/her term (in this case, from 1 July 1999 to mid-May 2000)
If the regular elections mentioned in Sec. 74(b) would include the election period, which commences
90 days from the date of the election and extends to 30 days thereafter, the period during which the
power of recall may be exercised will be reduced even more. (In this case, from 1 July 1999 to mid-
February 2000)
----------
WON the Recall resolution was signed by the majority of PRA and duly verified YES
Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is apparent that it was written by
mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines drawn across it. Apparently, it was mistaken
for the attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd to believe that the 74 members
of the PRA who signed the recall resolution signified their attendance at the meeting twice. It is more
probable to believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution of
which the pages in question are part.
15
Angubong The distinction is further made apparent by the fact that the "election period" under Section
5 of Article XII-C of the Constitution EXTENDS EVEN BEYOND THE DAY OF THE ELECTION
Peralta v. COMELEC ITSELF, while the "campaign period", BY REASON OF ITS NATURE AND PURPOSE, must
G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978 necessarily be BEFORE THE ELECTIONS ARE HELD. There is, therefore, no conflict with the
constitutional provision.
FACTS:
Under Martial Law, President Ferdinand Marcos decreed BP 881 in the exercise of his
legislative power. Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 4 of the 1978 Election Election Period Campaign Period
Code, which provides: Fixed by COMELEC in accordance with Fixed that it shall not be more than 45
SEC. 4. Election and campaign periods. The election period shall be FIXED BY Sec. 6 (Article XII-C) commence 90 days immediately preceding the election
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS in accordance with Section 6, Article XII-C of days before election day and 30 days
the Constitution. The period of campaign shall not be more than forty- five days thereafter
immediately preceding the election, excluding the day before and the day of the
Extends beyond the day of the must necessarily be done before
election: Provided, That for the election of representatives to the interim Batasang
election elections are held
Pambansa, the period of campaign shall commence on February 17, 1978 except
that no election campaign or partisan political activity may be conducted on March 23
and 24, 1978. G.R. No. L-42300 January 31, 1936

They contend that it runs counter to Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution:
SEC. 6. Unless otherwise fixed BY THE COMMISSION in special cases, the
ELECTION PERIOD shall commence ninety days before the day of election and
shall end thirty days thereafter.
For them, Sec. 4 of the 1978 Election Code violates the Constitution because:
(a) it was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided
by Section 6 of Article XII-C; and
(b) the period should cover at least ninety (90) days.
ISSUE:
WON Sec. 4 of the 1978 Election Code is unconstitutional as regards the period it prescribes
for the campaign?
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMADEO CORRAL, defendant-appellant.
Generoso, Pelayo, Castillo, Braganza, Chavez, Doromal, Diaz and Capili for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for appellee.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general elections held on June 5, 1934. After
due trial, he was convicted on the ground that he had voted while laboring under a legal
disqualification. The judgment of conviction was based on section 2642, in connection with section
432. of the Revised Administrative Code.

RULING: Said Section 432 reads as follows:

NO, it is NOT UNconstitutional. (Sec. 4 of 1978 Election Code is constitutional)
It is apparent that there is a distinction between the "election period" and "campaign
period". Thus, Section 4, Article I of the 1978 Election Code provides that the "election period shall be
fixed by the Commission on ELECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 6, ARTICLE XII (C)
OF THE CONSTITUTION (90-30 rule)."
The following persons shall be disqualified from voting:
(a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, has
been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of
imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon.

The "campaign period", however, has been fixed so that "it SHALL NOT BE MORE THAN (b) Any person who has violated an oath of allegiance taken by him to the United States.
FORTY-FIVE DAYS immediately preceding the election: Provided, That for the election of
representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa, the period of campaign shall commence on (c) Insane or feeble-minded persons.
February 17, 1978 except that no election campaign or partisan political activity may be conducted on
March 23 and 24, 1978."
(d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write.

16
 (e) Electors registered under subsection (c) of the next proceeding section who, after failing to
make sworn statement to the satisfaction of the board of inspectors at any of its two meetings
for registration and revision, that they are incapacitated for preparing their ballots due to
permanent physical disability, present themselves at the hour of voting as incapacitated,
irrespective of whether such incapacity be real or feigned.
And section 2642 provides:
Whoever at any election votes or attempts to vote knowing that he is not entitled so to do, ...
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than one year and by
a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, and in all cases
by deprivation of the right of suffrage and disqualification from public office for a period of not
more than four years.
It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final judgment of this court promulgated on March
3, 1910,1 to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor. No evidence was presented to show
that prior to June 5, 1934, he had been granted a plenary pardon. It is likewise undisputed that at the
general elections held on June 5, 1934, he voted in election precinct No. 18 of the municipality of
Davao, Province of Davao.
The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The right to vote is
not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to
such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of
the evolution of the representative system of government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was
limited to a small portion of the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of
the franchise in the modern states has come to embrace the mass of the audit classes of persons are
excluded from the franchise. Among the generally excluded classes are minors idiots, paupers, and
convicts.
The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by reason of their having been
convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this right is
to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of
felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or
to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed
for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a
personal right. (9 R.C.L., 1042.)
Upon the facts established in this case, it seems clear that the appellant was not entitled to vote on
June 5 1934, because of section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code which disqualified from voting
any person who, since the 13th day of August, 1898, had been sentenced by final judgment to offer not
less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon.
As above stated, the appellant had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer eight years and one day
of presidio mayor, and had not been granted a plenary pardon.
Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter voted in 1928 his offense had already
prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at the general election held on June
5, 1934. This contention is clearly without merit. The disqualification for crime imposed under
section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code having once attached on the appellant and not
having been subsequently removed by a plenary pardon, continued and rendered it illegal for
the appellant to vote at the general elections of 1934.
Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for the appellant that the
disqualification imposed on the latter must be considered as having been removed at the
expiration of his sentence. This claim is based upon an erroneous theory of the nature of the
disqualification. It regards it as a punishment when, as already indicated, the correct view is that it is
imposed, "for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a
personal right." Judicial interpretation and long established administrative practice are against such a
view.
NATURE OF DISQUALIFICATION: Imposed for protection and not punishment, withholding of a
privilege and not denial of personal right
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Villa-Real, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AVANCEA, C.J., dissenting:
The appealed judgment affirmed by the majority members of this court sentences the appellant for
having voted in the general election held on June 5, 1934, in the municipality of Davao, Province of
Davao, being disqualified from voting. The appellant, in my opinion, was not disqualified from voting.
The appellant was sentenced to the penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor in the year
1910. This penalty carried with it, as an accessory, disqualification from the right of suffrage during the
term of the sentence. He began to serve his sentence on April 11, 1910. He was granted a conditional
pardon on July 31, 1913. Inasmuch as the accessory penalty of disqualification from the right of
suffrage was not expressly remitted in this pardon, it is understood that he complied with and
extinguished this part of the sentence on April 12, 1918. Therefore, under the penalty imposed upon the
appellant, he was not disqualified from voting in 1934.
The majority, however bases its decision on section 432 of the administrative Code which reads:
The following persons shall be disqualified from voting:
(a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, has
been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment,
such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon.
17
The language of the law is not clear whether the disqualification referred to therein is only for the term of
the sentence or for the entire life time of the convict. The majority however, interprets this provision in
the latter sense to which I do not agree, it being contrary to the spirit thereof.
If the interpretation of the majority were correct, section 432 of the Administrative Code would not
harmonize with the latter provisions thereof (secs. 2636, 2637, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644,
2645, 2646, 2647, 2649, 2652, 2654, 2656, 2657, 2658 and 2659) on offenses relative to elections and
elective officers, imposing the penalties of imprisonment and disqualification from the right of suffrage
for a period not exceeding five and fourteen years, respectively. Supposing that in one of said cases, for
instance that of an election inspector who willfully signs a false statement of the result of a ballot (sec.
2639), the penalty of imprisonment for more than eighteen months is imposed upon him could be
disqualified from voting during his entire lifetime, in accordance with section 432, if the interpretation of
the majority is correct, and it would be to no purpose still to sentence him to him to the penalty of
disqualification from the right of suffrage for a period not exceeding fourteen years.
It cannot be said to harmonize these provisions, that the disqualification from the right of suffrage
should be imposed only when the penalty of imprisonment imposed therein less than eighteen months
because it is expressly required that both penalties be imposed in all cases.
Neither can it be said that section 432 governs all cases, in general, and sections 2336 et seq. govern
the specific cases referred to therein, because there would be no justice in the law. One may be
sentenced to more than eighteen months of imprisonment for having committed the crime of serious
physical injuries, for instance, through reckless negligence or in self-defense, but without having used
the means reasonably necessary therefor, and according to the majority opinion he will be disqualified
from voting during his entire who, abusing his position, willfully commits a falsehood in connection with
a ballot entrusted to him, after serving his sentence which does not exceed fourteen years, will again be
qualified to vote. This cannot be the result countenanced by the law. If the law in more serious cases
wherein an attempt is made directly against the cleanliness of the election, not disqualifies the guilty
party from the right of suffrage for a period not exceeding fourteen years, it cannot be supposed that its
intention is to forever disqualify therefrom the party guilty of a crime which bears no relation to the
exercise of suffrage and which does not involve the degree of moral turpitude as in the other case.
I am of the opinion that this anomaly can be avoided only by interpreting section 432 in the sense that
the disqualification referred to therein is merely during the term of the sentence.
RECTO, J.:
I concur in this dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Avancea.
I hereby certify that Hon. George A. Malcolm, Associate Justice, participated in this decision and voted
to affirm the judgment. AVANCEA, C.J.
Footnotes
Banaga, Jr. v COMELEC
GR No 134696
July 31, 2000
Facts:
special civil action for certiorari
Petitioner and private respondent were the candidates for vice-mayor of the City of
Paraaque in the May 11, 1998 election
the city board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent, Florencio M. Bernabe, Jr.,
the winner for having garnered a total of 71,977 votes of the total votes cast for the vice-
mayoralty position
petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May 29, 1998, an action denominated as Petition to
Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections alleging that:
o local elections amounts to a denigration of the expression of the true will of the
people, as it was tainted with widespread election anomalies which constitutes
election fraud; with election offenses, specifically vote buying and flying voters being
allowed to vote; during the canvassing of votes before the Board of Canvasser,
numerous Election Returns were discovered to contain glaring discrepancies and are
replete with blatant omissions, not to mention the fact that numerous election returns
appeared to be tampered with
o several Election Returns are found to have glaring discrepancies which may
materially alter the results of the election for the office of Vice-Mayor in the City of
Paraaque.
o the results thereof are statistically improbable. A case in point is precinct number 483
where petitioner shockingly is supposed to have received zero (0) votes. Petitioner is
the incumbent Vice-Mayor of the City of Paraaque. It is, thus, impossible that he will
receive zero (0) votes in any given precinct
the COMELEC dismissed petitioners suit
The grounds relied upon by petitioner do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. The election tribunal concluded that based on the
allegations of the petition, it is clear that an election took place and that it did not result
in a failure to elect
Issue: whether or not public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners
petition
Held: PETITION TO DECLARE FAILURE OF ELECTIONS/ANNULMENT OF ELECTION RESULTS.
Petitioners action is a petition to declare a failure of elections or annul election results. It is
not an election protest.
The COMELECs authority to declare a failure of elections is provided in our election
laws. Section 4 of RA 7166 provides that the COMELEC sitting en banc by a majority vote of its
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members may decide, among others, the declaration of failure of election and the calling of special
election as provided in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code.
There are three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely,
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
In these instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. This is obvious in the first two scenarios,
where the election was not held and where the election was suspended. As to the third scenario, where
the preparation and the transmission of the election returns give rise to the consequence of failure to
elect must as aforesaid, is interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a winner.
Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election two
conditions must concur, namely
TWO ELEMENTS for Failure of Election:
(1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if there
was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and
(2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of the election.[11]
Note that the cause of such failure of election could only be any of the following: force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
Petitioner did not allege at all that elections were either not held or suspended. Neither did he
aver that although there was voting, nobody was elected. On the contrary, he conceded that an election
took place for the office of vice-mayor of Paraaque City, and that private respondent was, in fact,
proclaimed elected to that post.
While petitioner contends that the election was tainted with widespread anomalies, it must be
noted that to warrant a declaration of failure of election the commission of fraud must be such that it
prevented or suspended the holding of an election, or marred fatally the preparation and transmission,
custody and canvass of the election returns. These essential facts ought to have been alleged
clearly by the petitioner below, but he did not.
Petitioner claims that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed his
petition motu propio. However, the fact that a verified petition has been filed does not mean that a
hearing on the case should first be held before COMELEC can act on it. The petition to declare a
failure of election and/or to annul election results must show on its face that the conditions
necessary to declare a failure to elect are present.
In their absence, the petition must be denied outright. [18] Public respondent (COMELEC) had no
recourse but to dismiss petition. Nor may petitioner now complain of denial of due process, on this
score, for his failure to properly file an election protest. The COMELEC can only rule on what was filed
before it. It committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing his petition to declare failure of
elections and/or for annulment of elections for being groundless, hence without merit.
Di ka let go: old cases on the subject: instructive daw:
In Mitmug vs. COMELEC,[12] petitioner instituted with the COMELEC an action to declare failure of
election in forty-nine precincts where less than a quarter of the electorate were able to cast their
votes. He also lodged an election protest with the Regional Trial Court disputing the result of the
election in all precincts in his municipality. The COMELEC denied motu propio and without due notice
and hearing the petition to declare failure of election despite petitioners argument that he has
meritorious grounds in support thereto, that is, massive disenfranchisement of voters due to
terrorism. On review, we ruled that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the
petition. It was not proven that no actual voting took place. Neither was it shown that even if there was
voting, the results thereon would be tantamount to failure to elect. Considering that there is no
concurrence of the conditions seeking to declare failure of election, there is no longer need to receive
evidence on alleged election irregularities.
In Sardea vs. COMELEC,[13] all election materials and paraphernalia with the municipal board of
canvassers were destroyed by the sympathizers of the losing mayoralty candidate. The board then
decided to use the copies of election returns furnished to the municipal trial court. Petitioner therein
filed a petition to stop the proceedings of the board of canvassers on the ground that it had no authority
to use said election returns obtained from the municipal trial court. The petition was denied. Next, he
filed a petition assailing the composition of the board of canvassers. Despite that petition, the board of
canvassers proclaimed the winning candidates. Later on, petitioner filed a petition to declare a failure
of election alleging that the attendant facts would justify declaration of such failure. On review, we ruled
that petitioners first two actions involved pre-proclamation controversies which can no longer be
entertained after the winning candidates have been proclaimed. Regarding the petition to declare a
failure of election, we held that the destruction and loss of copies of election returns intended for the
municipal board of canvassers on account of violence is not one of the causes that would warrant the
declaration of failure of election. The reason is that voting actually took place as scheduled and other
valid election returns still existed. Moreover, the destruction or loss did not affect the result of the
election. We also declared that there is failure of elections only when the will of the electorate has been
muted and cannot be ascertained. If the will of the people is determinable, the same must as far as
possible be respected.
In Loong vs. Comelec,[14] the petition for annulment of election results or to declare failure of
elections in Parang, Sulu, on the ground of statistical improbability and massive fraud was granted by
the COMELEC.[15] Even before the technical examination of election documents was conducted, the
COMELEC already observed badges of fraud just by looking at the election results in
Parang. Nevertheless, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for annulment of election results or to
declare failure of elections in the municipalities of Tapul, Panglima Estino, Pata, Siasi and Kalinggalang
Calauag. The COMELEC dismissed the latter action on ground of untimeliness of the petition, despite a
finding that the same badges of fraud evident from the results of the election based on the certificates of
canvass of votes in Parang, are also evident in the election results of the five mentioned
municipalities. We ruled that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition as there is no law which provides for a reglementary period to file annulment of
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elections when there is yet no proclamation. The election resulted in a failure to elect on account of
fraud. Accordingly, we ordered the COMELEC to reinstate the aforesaid petition. Those
circumstances, however, are not present in this case, so that reliance on Loong by petitioner Banaga is
misplaced.a

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