Democratizing Organized Religion Journal

Democratizing Organized Religion
Chiara Cordelli, University of Chicago
Where organized religion begins, democratic rights end. Or so it is often assumed. Traditionally, most political
philosophers have agreed that democratic norms should not directly regulate the internal governance of nonpolitical
organizations. And while a growing number of scholars have recently argued in favor of democratizing some non-
political organizations, most notably business rms, religious associations continue to be regarded as paradigmatic
cases of democracy-free zones. Contrary to this view, I defend a pro tanto right to democracy within large and hi-
erarchical churches. I then explain that, once appropriately qualied, this right is not overruled by claims to freedom of
religious association and church autonomy. Testing the extension of democratic rights to churches provides an op-
portunity to tackle, at once, a series of broader normative issues, including the scope of democracy below the state,
the limits of freedom of association, and the putatively special status of religion.
The principles of political justice do not apply directly to the internal life of a church, nor is it desirable, or consistent with liberty of
conscience or freedom of association that they should.
John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001, 163)
W here organized religion begins, democratic rights

end. Or so it is often assumed. Traditionally, most
political philosophers, whether liberals (Rawls
2001), neo-republicans (Pettit 2012), or social egalitarians
(Kolodny 2014) have agreed that democratic norms should
autonomy and its members freedom of association. To clarify:
by a right to democracy I refer to a claim right, held by a
group of agents, to an equal share of power to inuence
certain decisions, whether through participation, delibera-
tion, or representation. The questions I address are thus
not directly regulate the internal governance of nonpolitical (1) whether and, if so, which agents (e.g., members, religious
associations like churches.1 And while a growing number of employees, laic employees, etc.) should be, at least pro tanto,
political philosophers have recently argued in favor of de- entitled to an equal share of power to inuence the making
mocratizing some nonpolitical associations, such as business of what decisions within a church and (2) whether this en-
rms and enterprises (e.g., Cohen 1989; Dahl 1985; Gosseries titlement is overruled by competing claims. There are many
and Ponthire 2008; Hsieh 2008; McMahon 1997; ONeill different types of churches. Here I mainly focus on orga-
2008; Walzer 1983), religious organizations are generally nized, hierarchical, and traditional ones such as the Roman
regarded as inappropriate sites of democratic decision mak- Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church.
ing, even by those who would otherwise democratize the rm The question of whether churches should be democra-
(e.g., Walzer 1983; see also Heath, Moriarty, and Norman tized matters for several reasons. First, it matters politically.
2010). Organized religion remains a paradigmatic democracy- Religious institutions profoundly affect the lives of many
free zone. people around the world. For example, even without count-
Contrary to this view, my aim is to defend a right to de- ing its laic employees, the Catholic Church is one of the
mocracy within (at least some) churches and to show that largest private employers in the world, second only to Wal-
this right, when appropriately qualied, is not overruled by mart and McDonalds (Alexander 2012). However, due to the
competing claims and rights, including a churchs claim to special legal status accorded to religious organizations, in vir-
Chiara Cordelli (cordelli@uchicago.edu) is an assistant professor in the political science department at the University of Chicago and the College, Chicago,
IL 60637.
1. Nico Kolodny (2014) has recently argued that a right to democracy is justied whenever necessary to prevent relations of social hierarchy. However,
he contends that in the case of hierarchical yet nonpolitical associations (including churches), this right may not be justied because these associations,
unlike the state, are voluntary and lack nal authority.
The Journal of Politics, volume 79, number 2. Published online January 6, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/689284
q 2017 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved. 0022-3816/2017/7902-0015$10.00 000
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000 / Democratizing Organized Religion Chiara Cordelli
tue of the separation between church and state, in many coun- competing sovereigns, claiming nal authority within their
tries churches employees are covered by a much softer form respective, and often overlapping, communities. This his-
of labor law compared with the regulations that apply to tory is reected in the special autonomous status and special
secular employers. In Germany, for instance, labor law does protections that religious organizations enjoy within many
not cover holders of ecclesiastical ofces at all (Eurofound legal systems.
2013). Similarly, in the United States, courts have routinely Finally, assessing whether churches can be regarded as
granted to religious organizations exemptions from the Fair appropriate sites of democracy allows me to question the
Labor Standards Act, the Equal Pay Act, and the Civil Right limits of dominant accounts of the normative status of vol-
Act of 1994 (Laycock 1981; Lupu 1987). They have shielded untary associations. According to one such account, these
religious employers from laws providing employment ben- associations, including churches, are just a nexus of private,
ets and protecting pensions (Henriques 2006). Courts have consensual agreements through which individuals sponta-
also prevented holders of religious ofces from unionizing, neously unite to share mutual interests and, as such, should
as the recent Sindicatul Pstorul Cel Bun v. Romania (2013) be free to govern themselves as their members see t, within
case illustrates. The case involves a group of Orthodox priests some basic constraints set by political institutions (see Kateb
who, in 2008, decided to form a trade union to protect the 1998). This liberal view, I hope to show, puts excessive weight
professional, economic, social, and cultural rights and inter- on free consent as sufcient to legitimize associational power
ests of its members, both clergy and laity, in their dealings and relies on a far too idealized account of the power of the
with the Church hierarchy (2013, sec. 10). The Archdiocese state to regulate associations. It also presents an excessively
declared the union incompatible with the statute of the Church, unrealistic picture of voluntary associations. Not all associ-
and the Romanian Court denied registration to the trade union. ations are equally voluntary, and some of them, including
The European Court of Human Rights ultimately agreed, hold- many churches, are not stricto sensu associations but rather
ing that the Churchs right of religious autonomy trumped powerful corporations, more akin, in some relevant respects,
priests right to unionize. Against this background, showing to states than, say, to clubs. According to the opposite view,
that those subject to churches rules should have a say over associations are political entities the internal governance of
decisions that profoundly affect their interests would support which should be made fully congruent with democratic norms,
signicant changes in current legal systems. Yet in order for so as to support democracy at the broader societal level (see
a liberal state to be at least pro tanto justied in constitu- Shapiro 1999). This instrumental view goes too far in the
tionally protecting the exercise of democratic rights within opposite direction. For one thing, a fully congruent civil so-
churches, it must be shown that there is a strong case for these ciety may threaten rather than support the overall democratic
rights and that this case is not outweighed by competing con- character of a political society (Rosenblum 2000). Further,
siderations. even if we assume that a society whose voluntary associations
Tackling the question of democracy within churches also are internally democratic is likely to be, overall, more dem-
provides a unique opportunity to reect, at once, on a series ocratic than a society that contains undemocratic associa-
of broader normative issues, including the scope of demo- tions, this may not sufce to prove that the members of these
cratic rights, the limits of freedom of association, and the associations have a right to a democratic say within their
putatively special status of religion in liberal-democratic so- respective associations, for the demands of democracy may
cieties. Because of their spiritual conception of the good, the be overruled by competing values. In brief, both approaches
kind of subjection to authority this conception often entails, share the limit of treating voluntary associations as a mono-
and their voluntary character, churches are regarded as being lithic category and to support an all or nothing approach
different in kind from other organizations, including rms to their democratization. By individuating the distinctive
and, more obviously, states in a way that shields the former, features of churches that trigger democratic principles, I
yet not the latter, from democratic demands. Churches are hope to create space for a more complex way of thinking
thus good limiting cases for testing the very boundaries about the normative status of associations. Some associa-
of democratic norms. Contrary to the dominant view, I will tions, depending on their peculiar organizational features, as
argue that a case for a right to democracy within churches well as their historical legacies, exhibit properties that trigger
is, in some important respects, stronger than a case for a democratic principles, while others do not. Further, democ-
right to democracy within rms, and almost as strong as the racy comes in degreesan association can be partially de-
case for democracy within states. This conclusion, although mocratized in a way that, at the same time, leaves space for
radical, should not be too surprising. After all, historically, nondemocratic norms. No theory of pure freedom or pure
churches (more so than rms) and states have often been congruence can thus do justice to the diversity of associa-

Volume 79 Number 2 April 2017 / 000
tional forms and their internally pluralistic character (see what properties trigger a right to democracy in the case of
also Cordelli 2015). states, and states alone. States are often said to be sui generis
The structure of the article is as follows. In the rst part, I associations because their rules affect their members basic
provide an analogical argument in support of a pro tanto interests in a way that the rules of other associations do not
right to democracy within churches. In the second part, I (Arneson 1993, 141). They do so pervasively, continuously,
turn to assess whether this pro tanto right is overruled by and to a roughly equal extent (Christiano 2008). Further,
competing rights and claims, including freedom of associa- states subordinate their subjects to binding rules and com-
tion and the autonomy of churches that this freedom en- mands, backed by force or sanctions, thereby making the
tails. I will argue that, at least insofar as certain decisions latter perform actions that they would not otherwise per-
are at stake, a right to democracy within churches is not form, in a way other associations do not (Kolodny 2014;
outweighed by these competing claims, properly under- Narveson 1992, 53). States are nonvoluntary associations,
stood. By contrast, a qualied form of democracy should both in the sense that one is born into them and that they
itself be understood as a precondition of freedom of asso- cannot be exited without incurring unbearable costs, in a
ciation. Finally, I discuss whether the right to democracy way that other associations are not (Arneson 1993; Kolodny
within churches should be enforced or simply encouraged. 2014). Their power can neither be consented to at entrance
nor escaped. Finally, states are the only associations that
A PRO TANTO RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY have nal authority (see Kolodny 2014), as well as monopoly
WITHIN CHURCHES over coercive force.
Although it may be possible to support the democratization Given these features, it is argued that individuals fun-
of churches on instrumental grounds, in my view, the damental interestswhether dened in republican terms
stronger argument for a pro tanto right to church democ- of not being subject to arbitrary power (Pettit 2012), in
racy is grounded on noninstrumental, analogical grounds.2 instrumental terms of having ones basic interests appro-
I say that this argument is stronger not merely or primarily priately protected (Arneson 1993), in relational terms of
by reference to its logical cogency but rather or also because not being treated as an inferior (Kolodny 2014), or in dis-
it underscores the distinctive, sovereign-like features of some tributive terms of having a fair share of power over deci-
existing forms of organized religionfeatures that have sur- sions that profoundly affect ones life (Christiano 2008)
vived the secularization of contemporary liberal societies. I will trigger a demand for democratic decision making within
try to show that (1) the same fundamental properties that trig- states. These same fundamental interests do not trigger sim-
ger, and are sufcient to justify, a right to democracy within the ilar demands within nonpolitical associations. This is be-
nation-state also arise within (some) nonpolitical associations, cause the power of these associations can be legitimized and
especially churches, and that (2) relevant differences between checked through means other than democracy such as di-
states and churches are not sufcient to block a case for de- rect consent and external regulation; the effects of these as-
mocracy within the latter.3 sociations on individuals interests are neither basic nor per-
The crucial question can be put as follows: Why are cit- vasive and can, in any case, be avoided through exit; their
izens entitled to democratic rights within their states, while hierarchy can also be avoided through exit, thereby making
members of, say, a club have no such rights within their club? a requirement for voice unnecessary at best, or redundant at
Different normative theories provide different accounts of worst; nally, private associations rules tend to impact their
members differently rather than equally. Yet on grounds of
fairness, it is argued, only those who have roughly an equal
2. It could be argued that some degree of democratic participation
within churches should be protected as a basic liberty, insofar as it is gen- stake in an associations decisions should be entitled to an
erally necessary, instrumentally, to support the sense of justice and dem- equal say in it (Christiano 2008).
ocratic skills of those citizens who work and reside within a church. For a The above claims, taken jointly, support the restrictive
similar argument in support of democracy within business rms, see ONeill
view that, in order for an association (A) to count as an
(2008). In my view, the instrumental argument is stronger in the case of
churches than rms, for members of religious orders, unlike workers, often
appropriate site of democratic rights, A must possess one
are prohibited from forming alternative venues (e.g., families or nonreli- or more of the following properties (to make the argument
gious associations) where they could exercise their democratic powers. At more challenging, I will take these properties as being in-
the same time, qua spiritual guides, they can exercise higher inuence than dividually necessary and jointly sufcient to trigger dem-
other citizens on public opinion.
3. For analogical arguments in support of a right to democracy within
ocratic rights within A; I also assume that for a right to
business rms, see, e.g., Dahl (1985), Ferreras and Landemore (2016), democracy to be justied, those entitled to this right must
Gonzalez-Ricoy (2014), and Walzer (1983). qualify as minimally competent decision makers):

1. The rules of A must affect the basic interests of those have reasons to perform (like the action, as illustrated in the
subject to A in a profound and continuous way. Sindicatul case, of forming an association or taking part in
2. They must affect these basic interests to a roughly proceedings in civil courts without the archbishops per-
equal extent. mission).
3. As rules must be binding and must consist in au- However, churches rules and decisions often inuence
thoritative commands backed by sanctions (Dahl the interests of those subject to them in a much more pro-
1985). found and pervasive way than business rms doin a way
4. Binding and authoritative rules must not be easily that more closely resembles sovereign states. For one thing,
avoidable, whether through exit or through the im- since many of those subject to a churchs rules (e.g., members
position of alternative checks (Kolodny 2014). One of religious orders) reside within their church and often
reason for this qualication is that, if I have the spend their entire life within it, the effects of their churchs
option to easily escape a certain rule, or if the rule rules on their interests are as ongoing as the effects of states
can be constrained or amended through external rules on their citizens interests. Further, churches often do
regulation, this would be sufcient to ensure that exercise a kind of all-encompassing power over its em-
my fundamental interests, however exactly dened, ployees. While a rms employees must yield to their boss
remain protected through other means, or at least to with regard to only some, albeit important, aspects of their
ensure that I have myself ultimately legitimized that lives, Catholic nuns must yield to authorities within the
rule by not exercising my exit option or by demo- Catholic Church with regard to every (or almost every) as-
cratically authorizing the external authority (the pect of their lives. Churches often prohibit the members of
state) that, in turn, constrains As authority. There- their religious orders from forming a family and from par-
fore, an entitlement to democratic decision making ticipating in other associations.4 Given their ongoing and all-
would become somehow unnecessary. encompassing nature, the way in which many churches can
inuence the basic interests and constrain the freedom of
Assuming, for the sake of the argument, all the above con- those subject to them closely resembles the way in which
ditions must be met by an association in order for it to states both inuence the basic interests and constrain the
qualify as an appropriate site of democratic rights, sover- freedom of their citizens.
eign states would seem to be the only associations to so
qualify. Yet I argue that, even within this very restrictive Rules bindingness
account of the scope of democracy, traditional and hierar- Are churches rules authoritative and binding? They cer-
chical churches (even more so than rms) meet the con- tainly are authoritative. From the perspective of a nun sub-
ditions necessary to qualify, at least pro tanto, as appro- ject to the Catholic Church authority, the Churchs direc-
priate sites of democratic rights. tives to do X preempts whatever reasons or belief the nun
may have about what she ought to do.5 Further, churches
Rules effects directives are binding. Through the ultimate sanction of
Churches decisions and rules have pervasive and profound expulsion, they can punish noncompliance with the duties
effects on individuals basic interests. As employers, the they themselves impose. In addition, they have at their
power that many churches exercise over their employees disposal extra means of sanction. For example, in the Sin-
is at least as threatening to individuals basic interests as dicatul case, the Synod decided that if the unions members
the power exercised through businesses corporate power. were to ll an application with the Court, they would be
Churches make, with regards to their employees, very much punished and referred to the disciplinary bodies. As a result,
the same kind of life-affecting decisions businesses make some of its members immediately withdrew from pursuing
that is, decisions governing the place of work and reloca- the application (2013, sec. 23).
tion, promotion and compensation, the allocation of re- There are, however, important differences between the
sponsibility and the rescheduling of working hours, the power and authority exercised by political representatives
availability of training, minimally acceptable rates of work,
and so forth. The decisions that churches make do not
simply affect the basic interests of those subject to them. 4. For example, the Statute of the Romanian Orthodox Church prohibits
priests from setting up associations, foundations, or organizations of any kind
They often constrain and seriously interfere with their without the archbishops approval.
freedom. By interfere I mean that they prevent individ- 5. This feature of authority is emphasized by McMahon (1997) with
uals from performing actions that they would otherwise regards to business rms.

and those exercised by a churchs hierarchy. First, churches, by constitutional constraints, and within rms it is con-
unlike states, lack a monopoly on the legitimate use of phys- strained by employment contracts enforced and regulated
ical force and cannot coercively enforce their directives. by the state, the power of churches is often, and to a large
Second, the authority of churches, unlike that of states, is extent, left unconstrained, and for principled reasons. The
not nal. Finally, subjection to a churchs rules, unlike sub- doctrine of separation between church and state is repeatedly
jection to a state, can be escaped and is voluntary in the rst invoked to constrain the ability of governments to impose on
place. The question is whether these differences sufce to religious institutions the same demands for procedural fair-
undermine a prima facie case for a pro tanto right to de- ness and labor regulations that apply to secular organi-
mocracy within churches. I will set aside the rst difference, zations. This entails, somehow paradoxically, that the more
since coercion, I believe, is not necessary to trigger demo- churches are granted autonomy over their own affairs, the
cratic rights (although it might be crucial for determining closer to sovereign bodies they become, and the stronger the
the scope of other political principles). This is demonstrated normative case for their internal democratization is. Second,
by the fact that some noncoercive associations, for example, even if we were to hold the view that a state ought to impose
political parties, are generally regarded as appropriate sites severe constraints on the contractual terms between the church
of democracy.6 It is further proved by the fact that citizens and those subject to its rules, these contracts would never-
are, and should be, entitled to a democratic say over many theless be insufcient to eliminate the exercise of discretional
political decisions that cannot be coercively enforced. For authority. Contracts are likely to be incomplete, since it is
example, a decision to make a public apology in the name of not possible to anticipate, ex ante, all possible contingencies
a political community does not issue any command backed (see Cordelli 2015; Gonzlez-Ricoy 2014). They are also sub-
by physical force, and yet it should be democratically autho- ject to discordant interpretations.7 Due to the unavoidably
rized. Or, imagine a society where the civic ethos is so pro- underdetermined nature of contracts, state regulation is al-
nounced that a functioning system of taxation can be main- ways insufcient to secure the nonarbitrary exercise of power
tained without the threat of coercive sanctions. Decisions by local associations.
concerning fair taxation would still need to be authorized
through democratic procedures in order to count as legitimate, Voluntariness: Exit
since they are nally binding on all citizens (Kolodny 2014). Yet it may be argued that, as long as the members of an as-
What constitutes the relevant difference between states and sociation are free to leave without loss of access to the basic
churches as democratic sites would then seem to be the ex- conditions of autonomy, a requirement for democratic par-
clusive ability of the former to issue directives having nal ticipation is unnecessary to protect peoples basic interests
authority, not monopoly over coercion. and thus should be regarded as superuous. Richard Arneson
(1993, 139), for instance, holds that a right to democracy
Lack of nal authority within business rms is unjustied because even after the
Final authority is the distinguishing feature of sovereigns. individual has committed herself to a particular line of work,
The fact that churches lack nal authority, it could be argued, there are normally many choices of jobs within that line of
implies that their decisions and directives can be more work (139). He concludes that the most signicant dis-
heavily constrained than those of states. This in turn means analogy between states and rms [a disanalogy sufcient to
that arbitrary interferences with the fundamental interests of block the case for workplace democracy] is voluntariness.
those subject to churches rules can be easily avoided through Arnesons argument is overrestrictive. There are many
means other than democratic participationthat is, regula- institutional settings, which individuals can easily exit with
tion and the specication of contracts at entrance. This fact no threat to their basic interests, and within which never-
the argument goesmakes the democratization of churches theless we think participants ought to be entitled to a dem-
unnecessary (see, e.g., Kolodny 2014). There are two prob- ocratic say. Municipalities are a clear example. However,
lems with this argument. First, at least in some respects, the suppose that Arneson is right to conne a right to democ-
discretional power and authority exercised by churches is less racy to associations that cannot be easily exited. The ques-
constrained, rather than more constrained, than those exer- tion is then how churches fare, with regard to costs of exit,
cised by states and rms. Whereas within states power is
constrained by various mechanisms of accountability and
7. In the Sindicatul case, the court observed that, in the priests con-
tractual agreement with the church, there was no precise indication that the
6. In the United States, direct primaries are required in the selection of members of the applicant union agreed to waive their right to form a trade
party candidates. union. Yet the churchs leadership interpreted the agreement differently.

in comparison to states and rms. Three considerations are shared and conrmed within more than one single asso-
especially worthwhile. ciation, for members of religious orders whose central en-
First, for many of those who hold religious ofces within deavors consist in serving a particular church, it may be im-
churches, exit may be more difcult than for those employed possible to nd other venues where their endeavors are shared
in business rms and potentially even more difcult than for and appreciated by others. This means that, even under fairly
highly skilled citizens who want to exit their state. Many ideal conditions, where political institutions manage to se-
churches have a monopoly over a certain line of worka cure and maintain fair background conditions over time, to
priest of the Roman Catholic Church cannot be reasonably exit a church may come at the price of losing perhaps the
expected to work as a priest within another church. There- most basic of all goodsself-respect. For all of these reasons,
fore, exit from a church would require a radical change in the Arnesons objection may (arguably) block a case for democ-
type of employment. Yet the skills that members of religious racy within rms but not within churches.
orders need to perform their religious functions are not
easily marketable and transferable to other jobs. Further, the Voluntariness: Voice
fact that they reside within the church may prevent them As an alternative view, exit matters for democracy because
from developing other kinds of skills. Because of this, exiting it substitutes voicethreatening to exit an association is like
a church can be much more difcult than exiting a rm and voicing ones interests (Hirschman 1970). For example, a
(for some) even a state. talented marketing assistant can negotiate better employ-
It could be objected that in order for members of a church ment conditions by threatening to leave her rm. In this
to enjoy the freedom to exit, it sufces that they be able to respect, having a democratic say on employment conditions
access certain basic goods that welfare states should provide, for her would be superuous. So the question is whether the
including unemployment benets and health care. I do not ability of members of religious orders to threaten to exit a
nd this objection persuasive. For one thing, in existing church can substitute their claim to voice. I think not. First,
societies, states often refuse, on principled grounds, to guar- the claim that exit decreases entitlements to voice is per se
antee access to these goods to those who reside in, or work problematic. Indeed, if that were the case, highly skilled cit-
for, religious institutions. In the United States, for example, izens (those who have marketable skills that make for them
a series of court decisions has shielded, on grounds of free- easy to nd a job abroad) should have less voice than the un-
dom of religion, religious employers from laws protecting talented within the same state. I take this to be an implication
pensions and providing unemployment benets (Henriques that many would reject. Costs of exit are a matter of degree;
2006). Further, one out of six priests employed by the Cath- democratic voice is not.
olic Church in the United States comes from developing Second, even if we assume that exit can sometimes work
countries (Benton 2005). Within their host country, these as a substitute for voice, whether it can actually perform
members of the church are not generally entitled to the same this function depends on the structure of a particular asso-
welfare benets to which citizens are entitled. Even if we set ciation. Threatening to exit a small group is more risky than
these facts aside, there is a more fundamental problem with threatening to exit a large one, because in small groups
the above objection. While being able to receive welfare members cannot generally voice their claims anonymously
benets may be a sufcient condition for securing the free- (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010). At the same time, threats
dom to exit a church, it is not sufcient to secure that the to exit are generally more effective within intimate associa-
choice not to exit a church is voluntary. Voluntary member- tions than within nonintimate ones because within intimate
ship requires meaningful alternative options (Olsaretti 1998), associations people cannot be easily replaced. In the case
and in capitalist societies where peoples self-esteem is strongly of churches both risk and substitutability are high. Risks are
connected to ones ability to productively contribute to so- high because there is no mechanism within (most) churches
ciety, to spend a long period of time on unemployment to voice complaints anonymously. At the same time, from the
benets does not qualify as a meaningful option. Therefore, perspective of a church hierarchy, there is no reason to think
in order for a church to be voluntary, those subject to its that priests are any less substitutable than other employees.
rules must retain over time the ability to nd alternative, Therefore, exit from churches can hardly be regarded as a
nondemeaning jobs. Yet for reasons illustrated above having substitute for voice.
to do with the peculiar nature of religious occupations, this
is often not the case. Voluntariness: Consent
Finally, while many peoples sense of self is bound to Consent at entrance could be regarded as defeating a case for
interests and endeavors (e.g., professional ones) that can be a right to democracy within churches in two ways. First, it

could be argued that when someone chooses to enter an as- grants entrance conditional on their permanent alienation of
sociation, including a church, she voluntarily consents to its political rights is to create a group of second-class citizens,
terms, thereby accepting whatever authoritarian norms those thereby violating that very ideal. I call this the egalitarian
terms impose upon her. Granting that person a democratic argument for democratic inclusion.
right would violate the terms of the contract she freely signed These arguments suggest that there are certain rights
with the members of a church. Alternatively, one could claim for example, a right to have a say over the kind of rules one
that by subjecting themselves to the rules of a church, people is subject tothat individuals cannot be asked to perma-
alienate whatever preexisting claim to a share of power they nently alienate as a condition of entering certain associa-
might have (see Mayer 2000, 311). tions. The relevant question is thus whether those who volun-
The rst argument begs the question as to what contrac- tarily decide to enter a church, unlike those who voluntarily
tual terms the recipient association can permissibly offer in decide to enter a state, can be reasonably asked, as part of the
the rst place. Consider the case of immigrants who volun- entry agreement, to alienate their right to have a say in au-
tarily decide to move to and to work in a foreign state. Ac- thoritarian rules, in exchange for membership.
cording to the logic of the rst argument, as long as the in- There are two main reasons for why one might think that
coming members consent to whatever authoritarian terms churches, unlike states, can require permanent alienation of
the existing members of the receiving state want to offer, it democratic rights as a condition of entrance. The rst reason
would be wrong for the former to claim political rights. Yet relates to the antidomination argument. One could claim
many, including those who would reject the internal democ- that entering a church is more like a market transaction than
ratization of churches, have plausibly argued against this an ongoing submission to a pervasive and all-encompassing
line of thought. Even those (e.g., Miller 2008; Walzer 1983; power from which exit can be very difcult. Consent, given
Wellman 2008) who claim that states have an almost un- at a single moment in time, may thus be enough to legitimize
constrained right to exclude immigrants agree that, once a churchs rules and to avoid domination. However, I have
foreigners are admitted, they must at some point be offered provided abundant reasons to reject this view. I should add
political rights. This view is also endorsed by several existing that those who enter a church as members of a religious
states. About 45 countries allow foreign residents to vote in order, even more so than those who voluntarily enter a state,
at least some elections (Baubck 2005). are expected, as part of the initial agreement, to remain in the
Several reasons support the claim that, when entering a same church for the rest of their lives and to have a non-
new state, however voluntarily, prospective members cannot negotiable commitment to their religion mission. Because
be reasonably asked to permanently alienate their political of this, regarding exit as a plausible substitute for ongoing
rights (although perhaps they can freely alienate other rights consent is even less appropriate in the case of churches than
that citizens normally have). First, as Michael Walzer (1983, in the case of states. Therefore, if the antidomination argu-
58) has argued, to be subject to a pervasive power that shapes ment succeeds in preventing states from asking prospective
and regulates most aspects of ones life without being able members to permanently alienate their right to a sayas
to give ongoing consent to it is equivalent to be ruled by many of those who reject the democratization of churches
tyrants. While consent, given at a single moment in time would agreeit should also succeed in preventing churches
may be sufcient to legitimize isolated market transactions, from doing the same. The second reason relates to the
it is not sufcient to legitimize continuous rule over others egalitarian argument. It could be objected that churches,
and thus to protect subjects from arbitrary exercises of power unlike modern nation-states, are not themselves dened by
(Carens 2013, 50; Walzer 1983, 5859). The mere possibility an idea of equal membership. Therefore, in the case of
of exit is also not sufcient to substitute ongoing consent churches, there is no preexisting norm of equal membership
to rules (59). This is not only because exit can be psycho- that would be violated by preventing prospective members
logically and materially costly but also because, even when from acquiring equal political rights. But this argument begs
exit is available as a possible option, permanent disenfran- the question as to why only states, unlike other associations,
chisement facilitates the formation of an oppressed and ex- should regard themselves as internally bound by a norm of
ploitable vulnerable class. Call this the antidomination ar- democratic equality, as part of their idea of membership. The
gument for democratic inclusion. Second, the requirement answer to this question will likely end up appealing to some
that every adult member of the political community must objective features (e.g., nal authority and nonvoluntariness)
enjoy equal political rights is constitutive of the very ideal that make the state a putatively unique site of democratic
of equal citizenshipa central commitment of the modern equality. But as I have argued in the previous sections of this
nation-state (Miller 2008; Wellman 2008). To make immi- article, it is doubtful that states are unique in this respect.

However, even if we grant that churches cannot permis- which they bear full responsibility. On the other hand, in
sibly require prospective members to permanently alienate nonideal conditions, people may be compelled to enter a
their democratic rights as a condition of entrance, one can church for material necessity. In some developing countries,
argue that the prospective members may still be at liberty to entering a religious institution is often one of the few
permanently alienate their preexisting rights if they wish to available ways in which those living in poverty can achieve
do so. We then face the question of whether an agent can guaranteed economic security for the rest of their lives, as
freely decide to permanently alienate her democratic rights. well as a residence permit in more afuent countries (see
The reason for why certain rights are thought to be in- Benton 2005). Perhaps people should not join churches for
alienable is that alienating them would compromise the very nonspiritual reasons, and their plight should not be used
conditions of human agency (Mayer 2000, 31516). It is to justify democratizing the internal conduct of churches.
generally agreed that we cannot alienate our right to free- However, as long as churches voluntarily benet from this
dom by voluntarily entering into slavery, even if our master kind of recruitment, given the acute shortage of clergy in
would be benevolent, because this would undermine the postsecular societies, they should not be exempted from the
very conditions of human agency. For similar reasons, many burdens that result from it. But even if we regard the joining
would agree that people cannot permanently alienate their of a church as a purely voluntary act, we still face a problem.
rights to vote within a state (see, e.g., Carens 2013; Walzer The fact that 20 years ago you could have chosen not to
1983), although they may choose not to exercise them. become a slave does not mean that the rules your master
However, it is often thought that a person can freely alienate currently imposes upon you are not arbitrary and should be
her right to freedom and self-rule by deciding to become, left as they are. You are still dominated, despite your initial
say, a cloistered nun. What is then the difference between consent. Similarly, from the fact that one could have vol-
agreeing to enslavement or permanent submission to state untarily chosen twenty years ago not to become a nun, we
rules and agreeing to be a cloistered nun? Again, the pos- cannot infer that she should not have a say in the rules that
sibility of exit seems to be the difference. No matter how bind her now that she continues to be subject to authori-
authoritarian the rules, as long as exit from an association is tarian rules and exit is costly.
possible, the conditions of human agency are likely to be Michael Walzer (1983, 299, emphasis mine) has pre-
preserved, and thus permanent alienation through consent sented a further and perhaps more powerful way of re-
is permissible. But for all the reasons previously mentioned, framing the argument from consent. Walzer points at an
it can be argued that it is often more difcult, and fore- important difference between the act of joining a church
seeably so, for members of religious orders to maintain over versus the act of joining a state or even seeking employment
time the ability to exit the all-encompassing power of the in a rm. He argues:
church and to regard their religious commitments as some-
thing that can be abandoned, than it is for many citizens, if A man who joins a monastic order requiring strict and
skilled and educated, to exit a state. Taking this fact seriously unquestioning obedience, for example, seems to be
defeats the argument that a right to vote within the state (and choosing a way of life rather than a place to live (or a
a right to be free from enslavement) should be inalienable, place to work). . . . Its purpose [the purpose of his
while a right to a say within authoritarian churches should not. choice] and its moral effect are precisely to authorize
But it seems I missed an important difference. Whereas his superiors decisions, and he cant withdraw that
we cannot avoid submitting ourselves to some state, we can authority without himself withdrawing from the
certainly live our entire lives without permanently submit- common life it makes possible. But the same thing
ting ourselves to the rules of any church (see, e.g., Mayer cant be said of a man or a woman who joins a com-
2000). Since one should bear responsibility for the conse- pany or comes to work in a factory. Here the common
quences of ones own voluntary choices, the argument goes, life is not so all-encompassing and it does not require
those who decide to enter the church cannot then claim a the unquestioning acceptance of authority . . . in nei-
right to an equal voice on their churchs matters. I think that ther case would we want to say (what we might say to
the force of this objection is limited. For one thing, it is the novice monk): if you dont like these ofcials and
unclear how voluntary the entering of a church really is. On the orders they give, you can always leave.
the one hand, those who enter a church because of a genuine
religious vocation may experience this vocation as a com- Walzers argument implausibly makes democratic entitle-
pulsiona volitional necessity that makes them de facto ments entirely dependent on peoples subjective motivation
unable to act otherwiserather than as an elective choice for to join an association. In this way it compromises the case

for democracy within states as well. Consider, for example, a roughly equal and for whom costs of exit are high. This
Jewish community who decides to relocate from a European includes members of religious orders (including, of course,
country to Israel because of their religious and cultural iden- women) but (arguably) excludes believers or laic employees,
tity. These people arelike the novice monknot simply whose stakes and costs of exit are lower compared to the
choosing a place to work or to live. They are choosing (or former group. This, however, by no means implies that the
following) a way of lifean identity. Does this mean that latter should not be entitled to other forms of participation or
because of the purpose of their choice, they should not claim collective bargaining. Second, this argument supports a pro
democratic rights within Israel? Walzer himself, I believe, tanto right to participate in all those decisions that have
would regard this as a problematic conclusion. Indeed, he profound effects on individuals basic interests or that in-
has been one of the rst (1983), joined by many others, to terfere with their freedom. Now, I will move on to assess
argue in favor of granting political rights to immigrants and whether this pro tanto right is outweighed by relevant com-
guest workers, regardless of the reasons underpinning their peting claims.
migration. So why should peoples right to have a say within
other associations, including churches, exclusively depend DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS VERSUS FREEDOM
on their subjective motives for joining those associations? OF (RELIGIOUS) ASSOCIATION
Whether the members of an association should have dem- One could agree that a pro tanto right to church democracy
ocratic entitlements or not would seem to depend on some is, in principle, justied and still hold that this right is always
objective features of the association in question, for exam- overruled by churches right to autonomy, that is, their
ple, how pervasively its power affects those subject to it or presumptive right to organize their internal structure and
what kind of social relationship between rules and ruled the procedures as they please, immune from external intrusion.
association generates, not on individuals subjective moti- Were this true, states would lack sufcient justication to
vations for joining the association. Yet in the case of churches encourage the exercise of, let alone, enforce the former right.
the effects can be very profound and all encompassing, costs This view has great initial plausibility. Churches are ex-
of exit can be very high, and social relationships can be pressive associations, the point and purpose of which is to
highly hierarchical. pursue a particular conception of the good and to serve as
Further, Walzer moves too quickly from the purpose of a venues through which their members can freely express their
choice, as understood by the choice maker, to the authoriz- authentic beliefs and exercise their freedom of conscience.
ing power of that same choice. From the fact that the monk Robust protection of a right to freedom of association, which
intends to abide to strictly authoritarian and unquestionable encompasses a churchs right to (decisional and organiza-
rules, it does not follow that she can freely alienate her right tional) autonomy, serves to protect this fundamental indi-
to be free from those rules. Walzer seems to get the order of vidual interest. If granting to members of religious orders
things wrong. It is precisely because churches are generally democratic rights within their organizations compromises
more all encompassing than rms, and exit from the former this interest, then there would seem to be strong prima facie
is more difcult, that expecting those subject to churches reasons to regard a concern for churchs autonomy as trump-
authority to permanently alienate their claims to a say is even ing a concern for internal democratic rights. Yet in order to
less appropriate than expecting those subject to business assess whether a claim to church autonomy outweighs a claim
rms authority to do the same. to democratic rights within churches, the following questions
In sum, given (1) the all-encompassing and ongoing effects must be carefully answered: (1) Would granting a right to
that traditional churches rules have on the basic interests of church democracy necessarily infringe upon a churchs right
those subject to them, (2) the presence of effective sanctions to autonomy, properly understood? (2) Assuming that it
attached to their binding and authoritative rules, (3) the in- does, how should the conict between the two competing
sufciency of regulation and contracts in preempting the ar- rights be resolved? In particular, does a right to church au-
bitrary exercise of church power, and (4) the high costs of exit tonomy, grounded on freedom of religious association, al-
for members of religious orders, the triggering conditions for a ways trump a right to church democracy?
right to democracy, often conned to sovereign bodies and
selected by the analogical argument, arise within (at least some The scope of church autonomy
important) churches. In order to answer the rst question, we need a reasoned
Two clarications are in order. First, the analogical ar- specication of the scope of a churchs right to autonomy.
gument restricts the scope of the democratic demos within For if it turns out that churches should be entitled to un-
churches to those whose stakes in its binding rules are bounded organizational autonomy, then applying demo-

cratic norms to churches would most certainly violate their 1993). Granting churches unbounded autonomy, the argu-
autonomy. However, from the uncontroversial claim that ment goes, is necessary to protect these fundamental com-
(1) freedom of (religious) expression and conscience is a mitments. Yet this answer is unsuccessful in singling out
fundamental moral and legal right, and that (2) for many religious organizations. Many members of the American
religions this right can only be exercised through partici- Philosophical Association are also committed to searching
pation in a church, it does not automatically follow that for the ultimate meaning of life and to answer fundamental
(3) churches should have a right to unbounded autonomy, existential questions, and yet few would argue that their or-
that is, a claim, having strong presumptive force, to make all ganization should enjoy a sui generis right to full-blown or-
internal decisions according to whatever procedure or crite- ganizational autonomy. Absent a neutral justication, granting
rion they want and to be exempted from otherwise applicable churches this sui generis right unfairly privileges religious
norms. forms of organization over nonreligious ones.8
Consider the case of other expressive organizations Some (Greene 1993; Laycock 1981) appeal to the principle
through which equally fundamental moral and legal rights of church-state separation to provide such justication. They
are often exercised: publishing houses. No one would doubt argue that, insofar as a liberal state can reasonably impose
that freedom of expression is a fundamental moral and special constraints on churches (e.g., by asking them to refrain
legal right, and that the full exercise of this right often re- from claiming public resources to advance their particularistic
quires the activity of independent publishing houses. Yet missions), then in exchange, churches can reasonably demand,
few would argue that this fact, in and of itself, justies a as a form of fair compensation, special privileges from the
presumptive entitlement to unbounded decisional and or- state, including a sui generis right to autonomy. This com-
ganizational autonomy for these entities (see Lupu 1987) pensatory argument is, I believe, unconvincing. On the one
and exempt them from otherwise applicable norms. Few, hand, the idea of complete church-state separation is very far
for example, would claim that publishing houses should be from the institutional reality of many contemporary liberal
exempted from recognizing their employees right to col- democracies, where churches and religious organizations act
lective bargaining, and this is so even if bargaining may as state contractors, run schools, and deliver public services,
affect their editorial philosophy. So the question is whether while states allow churches to own property and to exist in
religious organizations should be regarded as special. perpetuity (see Cordelli 2015; Eisgruber and Sager 2007). On
It has been argued that religious organizations are indeed the other hand, the idea of separation, as understood, is at odds
special and should thus be entitled to a sui generis, presump- with a liberal commitment to state neutrality.9 Indeed, a liberal
tive right to unbounded autonomy because of the unique na- state should, absent a neutral justication to do otherwise,
ture of the human interest they serve. For example, Douglas demand that religious and nonreligious organizations alike
Laycock (1981, 1373) claims that a constitutionally protected refrain from claiming a right to use tax money just for the sake
right to almost unconstrained church autonomy is needed in of nancing their particularistic missions. But now assume
order to protect peoples unique interest in express[ing] their that a liberal state has good reasons, whatever these might
beliefs and channel[ing] their spiritual lives. He goes as far as be, to impose special constraints on religious organizations
arguing that this autonomy right justies a strong presumption alone. If these constrains were fully justied, then no com-
against imposing any forms of collective bargaining on reli- pensation (e.g., in the form of unbounded autonomy) would
gious institutions, even when these may be needed to protect be needed in the rst place, for a state has no duty to com-
workers from exploitation (1374, 13981400). pensate private actors for justly constraining their actions.
It remains, however, unclear why citizens interest in ex- Some, however, reject a commitment to liberal neutrality
pressing their theological beliefs and channeling their spiritual and argue that religion is a good that the state should promote,
lives should be regarded as unique and as deserving special and that the only way to promote this good, without cor-
protection compared to citizens interest in expressing, equally
comprehensive, nontheological beliefs and channeling their
8. Here I assume that a liberal state should be committed to neu-
nonspiritual conceptions of the good through other organized trality of justication. Neutrality of justication requires that state poli-
activities (see, e.g., Dworkin 2013; Leiter 2012; Schwartzman cies and legal rules be justied independently of any appeal to the sup-
2013). One could respond that religious commitments, unlike posed superiority of any comprehensive conception of the good over
nonreligious ones, consist in searching for the ultimate others. A neutral state is allowed to grant some privileges to those who
pursue a particular conception of the good, if and only if a neutral jus-
meaning of life (Nussbaum 2008, 169) and provide authori- tication for those privileges can be provided.
tative answers to fundamental existential questions, which in 9. Here I side with what Ccile Laborde (2014) has called egalitarian
turn protect individuals against their deepest fears (Marshall theories of religious freedom.

rupting it, is by relegating it to a separate and fully autonomous ment R on an association A may not defeat As mission and
sphere (Koppelman 2009). Even if one accepts the problematic thus may not compromise As members I, imposing R on A1
assumption that religion is a good that a liberal state ought to may compromise A1s members I. It follows that the same
promote, it is unclear why unbounded autonomy would be principle of freedom of association may require granting dif-
necessary to protect religion from corruption. The mere fact ferent scopes of autonomy to different associations.
that religion should be understood by reference to a set of However, as often stated and implemented by courts, this
ultimate questions that the state must not try to answer (881) mission-centered approach tends to take associations as
cannot sufce to support a claim for unbounded organiza- monolithic wholes. Associations, depending on the nature of
tional autonomy. One would further need to prove that it is their mission, can either qualify as commercial, in which case
impossible for a state to restrict the autonomy of churches their claim to organizational autonomy is considered weak or
without having to answer any ultimate question. However, narrow in scope; alternatively, they can qualify as expressive or
restrictions could be tailored in a way that leaves plenty of intimate, in which case their claim to organizational autonomy
space to churches to autonomously answer questions of ulti- is strong and almost unbounded (see Roberts v. Jaycees 1984).
mate signicance. I will return to this point later. Further, if a This approach fails, in my view, to take seriously the fact that
state should suspend all judgments about the content of reli- many, if not all, associations are internally pluralistic and
gious commitments, how can a state know whether religion is a multipurpose. Business rms often have, beyond the purpose
good that should be promoted? Indeed, how can a state pass a of maximizing prot, a social mission that reects some spe-
judgment about what genuinely counts as religion? It could cic conceptions of the good. Conversely, churches beyond
be argued that a state should try to operate with a very ab- pursuing their spiritual mission can have the economic pur-
stract denition of religion that encompasses both theological pose of securing an efcient management of their property.
and nontheological beliefs and practices (2009). The obvi- I thus propose a more pluralistic approach, which focuses
ous worry is that, as understood, the very category of religion on an associations particular decisions, rather than on its
becomes evanescent. Every philosophical, existential, or aes- general character, in order to establish the particular areas in
thetic commitment could then qualify as religious and all which its decision-making autonomy should be protected.
associations dedicated to the pursuit of some such commit- According to this approach, associations should be granted
ments would then be entitled to unbounded autonomy and an autonomy-based claim to be free from the application of
to special exemptions from otherwise applicable norms. This otherwise justied norms, only when these norms would vi-
is a problematic conclusion that many would reject. olate specic commitments central to the particular mission
Because of these reasons, I err on the side of those who of the association in a way that would compromise I, that is,
argue that churches should have no sui generis, presumptive the ability of its members to authentically pursue their shared
right to unbounded autonomy and thus a presumptive im- commitment. In turn, whether protecting a pro tanto right to
munity from otherwise applicable norms. Note that this is democratic decision making within churches would infringe
not to say that there is no relevant difference between a upon a churchs rightful claim to autonomy depends on the
church and other nonreligious organizations, when it comes particular type of decisions and practices the former right is
to the application of otherwise justied requirements. Yet claimed for, and on how direct the connection between these
whatever special protection a church is entitled to will need decisions and the spiritual purpose of the church is.10 Since
to derive from general principles that are not sui generis not all decisions made by a church are connected to its ex-
(Eisgruber and Sager 2007). One general principle is freedom pressive purpose in the same way, freedom of association
of association. At the fundamental level, freedom of associ-
ation protects religious and nonreligious organizations alike 10. Dale Carpenter (2001) similarly argues that, in the case of hybrid
from undue state interference, yet the level of decisional and associations, which mix commercial and expressive aspects, courts should
organizational autonomy this principle grants, all things focus on the activities rather than on the message of the group claiming
associational freedom (1518). Only if the activity in question is expressive,
considered, to different associations need not be the same.
these associations should be exempted from antidiscrimination norms.
Let me expand on this point. The point and purpose of Carpenter, however, regards churches as purely expressive associations
freedom of association is to protect individuals interest (I) in and thus as entitled, unlike hybrid associations, to a general exemption
authentically and jointly pursuing, as members of an associa- from antidiscrimination norms. I believe this view neglects the hybrid
tion, a particular conception of the good or mission, whatever character of many religious organizations. Further, while Carpenters
analysis focuses on antidiscrimination norms, my focus is on democratic
its content. This is an interest that all citizens should be pro- rights. Here I remain agnostic about whether a church should be entitled
vided with an equal opportunity to fulll, compatibly with the to exclude would-be members on the basis of, say, sexual orientation or to
same opportunity for others. Now, while imposing a require- order women as priests.

does not support a claim to autonomy, at least not with equal It could be counterargued that this framework puts third
strength, for all the decisions a church makes. What is central parties, more obviously courts, in the dangerous business of
is a distinction between (a) decisions made by a church that drawing a distinction between matters that are essential to a
are essentially connected to the spiritual purpose of the religious practice and those which are not. But I think that
church so that imposing a requirement of democratic deci- this objection proves weak. First, it is disingenuous to think
sion making on them would impose a serious burden on the that states can avoid drawing this kind of distinctions. For
ability of members to jointly worship and express their reli- example, in order for a state to decide whether to publicly
gious faith and thus to live authentically in accordance with fund the construction of a religious building amounts to a
their commitment and (b) decisions that are not essentially requirement of religious expression and thus of justice or,
connected in this way. Call it, for brevity, the distinction be- by contrast, to illegitimately subsidizing a private prefer-
tween essential versus nonessential decisions. ence, the state must unavoidably take a stand about whether
One may object that all decisions made by a churchs that particular kind of building is essential to the practice
hierarchy relate to, and can somehow affect, its spiritual of that particular religion or not (see Miller 2014). Further,
purpose and should therefore be made according to freely states seem to have no problem making these kinds of dis-
endorsed procedures, however authoritarian. Yet if the mere tinctions in the case of nonreligious organizations. For ex-
fact that a decision affects or relates to the purpose of an ample, in Roberts v. Jaycees the US Supreme Court ruled that
association is sufcient to rule out imposing any constraints excluding women as full voting members was not essential
on how that decision should be made, then we would have to to Jaycees ability to pursue its expressive mission (i.e., pro-
conclude that as soon as, say, collective bargaining within a moting the interests of young men). Yet authorizing a state
publishing house may affect matters of editorial philosophy, to make a distinction between essential versus nonessential
those employed by the company must relinquish their right practices or decisions in the case of nonreligious organi-
to bargain. Most people, as well as the law, would reject this zations, while rejecting its authority to make a similar dis-
conclusion (see Lupu 1987). tinction in the case of churches would seem, absent a sound
Similarly, although all decisions made within a church may justication to do otherwise, to violate a principle of equal
(arguably) relate to spiritual matters in some indirect way, not treatment.
all decisions are essentially connected to these matters in a way One can argue that this justication is provided by the fact
that, were they to be decided democratically, would impose a that, while a state is in an epistemic position to judge whether
serious burden on a churchs members interest in worshiping certain practices, if prohibited or subject to democratic
or expressing their religious faith and thus in living authenti- norms, would compromise the mission or philosophy of
cally in accordance with their commitment.11 Nonessential nonreligious organizations, it is not in the same position,
matters of this kind would seem to include, at least, all those because of the epistemic inaccessibility of doctrinal com-
decisions at stake in the Sindicatul case, including a churchs mandments, to judge whether the purpose of a church would
decisions about employee compensation, relocation, working be violated by subjecting its economic decisions to demo-
conditions, opportunities for training, safety at work, rest, cratic procedures. I am not convinced by this objection ei-
social insurance, unemployment benets, pension entitle- ther. For one thing, the dictates of many nonreligious com-
ments, as well as the administration of church property and prehensive doctrines, especially those based on metaphysical
assets. Insofar as these nonessential issues are concerned, a sources of normative authority, are arguably not any more
claim to church autonomy does not outweigh a pro tanto right accessible than the dictates of religious doctrines. But lets
to democratic decision-making within churches, because these assume that they are. This would provide a state with a prima
are not the kind of essential decisions that the autonomy claim, facie justication for deferring the judgment of assessing
grounded on freedom of association, is ultimately meant to which issues are essentially spiritual and which are not to
protect.12 those who speak for the church. Unfortunately, deciding who
11. A serious burden occurs when a person is forced to do some- is only by allowing churches to determine their internal affairs as they
thing that is incompatible with the tenants of her faith and thus burdens wish, the argument goes, that we can preserve their role as sites of dissent
her conscience. It also occurs when members of an association are pre- and contestation (see Bedi 2010). I cannot engage here with this view in all
vented from following a practice, which is mandated by their religious its complexity. I should simply point out that by limiting the exercise of
doctrine or crucial to the religious identity of their church. democratic rights to nonessential issues (rather than imposing substantive
12. One could object that the value of church autonomy is not limited egalitarian norms on churches) my account leaves church members plenty
to protecting individuals interest in living authentically according to their of space to develop and send messages that go against the democratic
conception of the good but rather serves a broader democratic function. It majority.

should speak for a church, or have the last say over that are continuously subject to the churchs rules, trumps a
judgment may itself involve questions of religious doctrine, claim to freedom of association held by its members.
especially when there is internal disagreement about what Many would agree that, if a state fails to secure its citizens
issues are essential to the spiritual purpose of the church and the freedom to exit a particular religious association, then the
which are not, as in the Sindicatul case. By abstaining from state is effectively curtailing their interest in authentically
passing a judgment, the state would simply end up putting pursuing their conception of the good life that, I have ar-
its power at the service of the status quo, behind whatever gued, is the very ground of freedom of association. Exit can
version of a faith is endorsed by those who happen to be in be secured to different degrees. A state could limit itself to
power within an internally divided organization. Therefore, providing health care and unemployment benets. Yet these
empowering the state to draw a distinction between essential conditions would not be sufcient to secure that the decision
versus nonessential decisions is not only unavoidable but not to exit a church remains voluntary in a relevant sense.
sometimes also desirable in order to avoid the repression of Voluntariness requires meaningful alternatives. In a capi-
internal dissent.13 talist society, the ability to participate in nondemeaning,
Once this distinction is drawn, as far as issues of a non- productive activities can be reasonably regarded as one of
essential nature are concerned, the exercise of a right to de- the social bases of self-respect. Therefore, we can say that a
mocracy within a church does not infringe upon (or conict person participates voluntarily within an association, as long
with) the churchs right to autonomy, for these decisions do as she retains both the opportunity and the capacity to nd
not essentially relate to those activities that this right is ulti- alternative, nondemeaning jobs outside of it.
mately meant to protect. The question is what institutions and practices must be
To sum up the argument so far: (1) An associations claim in place in order for this opportunity and capacity to be
to autonomy becomes progressively weaker the further one maintained over time. This is, of course, a matter of con-
moves away from the rationale that legitimizes the autonomy tingency, and answering this question in a satisfactory way
claim. (2) The rationale that legitimizes the autonomy claim would require a more extensive analysis than I am able to
of churches is to protect the freedom and ability of members provide here. I should limit myself to note that, in the case of
to live authentically in accordance with their religious com- secular rms operating in contemporary capitalist societies,
mitment. (3) A churchs claim to autonomy becomes pro- many have pointed out, plausibly in my view, that well-
gressively weaker the less the particular decisions for which functioning trade unions are generally necessary for main-
that autonomy is claimed would impose, if made democrati- taining individuals ability to exit their place of work (see,
cally, a severe burden on the ability of members to live au- e.g., Dahl 1985; Gonzlez-Ricoy 2014; White 1998, 339).
thentically in accordance with their commitment. (4) Many This is because unions perform certain distinctive functions,
nonessential decisions (e.g., the ones at stake in Sindicatul) which are necessary to maintain workers ability to nd al-
within churches, if made democratically, would not impose a ternative jobs, including (a) lobbying for the enactment of
severe burden of the kind specied in (3). (5) A churchs claim legislation, for example, state-sponsored training programs,
to autonomy is very weak, or void, when decisions of a pri- that may be essential to maintaining employees employ-
marily nonessential nature are at stake. (6) A right to de- ability over time; (b) supervising employers compliance with
mocracy within churches, if limited to nonessential decisions, that legislation; and (c) performing educational and training
does not infringe upon a churchs rightful claim to autonomy. functions thereby themselves helping their members acquire
and maintain marketable skills (1998, 339.). The problem is
The priority of economic democracy that unions can hardly perform these functions effectively
over church autonomy without the support of voice mechanisms internal to rms.
I now assume, contrary to what I have argued so far, that This is not only because unions may fail to include all workers
granting a right to democracy, even if limited to certain but also because without a democratic voice-mechanism in-
nonessential issues, to those who work and reside within a ternal to rms, unions may not reliably act to promote
church does infringe upon church members freedom of workers interests (Dahl 1985; Gonzlez-Ricoy 2014).
association. The question still remains: which claim should Now if these considerationsthe necessity of both union-
prevail? Against what we may intuitively think, I believe that ism and internal democracy to secure substantive freedom of
a claim to economic democracy held by those who work and exitapply to rms, there is no reason why they should not
apply to religious organizations as well. Yet if they do, it follows
13. For a detailed discussion of how courts should approach the that the obligation of the state to protect members of reli-
drawing of this distinction see Eisenberg (2009). gious orders right to economic democracy within their own

organizations should itself be regarded as a necessary means to that internal voice mechanisms may (arguably) function
secure their freedom of exit and thus to secure their interest in better when they are voluntarily and progressively endorsed
living authentically in accordance with their conception of the and developed. Another reason concerns the fact that the
good life. Note that the latter is precisely the fundamental legitimacy of a states claim to impose certain requirements
interest that freedom of association aims to protect. Economic upon a church may be weakened if the state shares with that
democracy should thus itself be regarded as a precondition of church a history of marginalization or oppression. Yet even
genuine freedom of association and in turn as prior to an as- in those cases where a state is not, all things considered,
sociations claim to organize its internal affairs as it wishes, justied to coercively enforce respect for democratic rights,
according to its particularistic conception of the goodin the state may still be justied to encourage respect for these
other words, a claim that is itself conditional on the volun- rights, for example, by making tax exemptions for religious
tariness of an association.14 It is thus wrong for churches to groups conditional on their adopting democratic voice
claim that their right to autonomy trumps whatever pro tanto mechanisms (assuming that there is an independent justi-
right to economic democracy those subject to their rules might cation for these exemptions). There is, however, a case in
have. For they can only rightfully claim the former right after which enforcement seems the appropriate solution. This is
they have secured the latter. the case of incorporated churches. Incorporation is a state-
But what if we assume that the ability of some of the granted set of privileges that insulate entities from standard
members of a church to live in accordance with their con- property and liability constraints. A corporation has limited
ception of the good is compromised by the establishment of liability protection, may exist in perpetuity, and may hold
economic democracy within their church (which, I have title to property. Through the act of incorporation, the state
argued, is doubtful)? We would still have to acknowledge creates an articial person that would not otherwise exist
that the same ability of those who work and reside within the state de facto transforms a voluntary association (a
the church would also be compromised by the opposite de- partnership made of separate individuals through a nexus of
cision. This decision would indeed fail to enable them to contracts) into a legal person enabled to speak and act with
live authentically in accordance with their conception of the one unitary voice (see Ciepley 2013). Since the benets of
good, for it would compromise their ability to exit their as- incorporation can only be justied under the assumption
sociation. In this case of genuine conict between equally that the incorporated entity will produce a public benet,
weighing interests, it is reasonable to claim that the right to this entity should not be, a fortiori, allowed to appeal to its
economic democracy should have priority. For while the particularistic ends to escape the reach of otherwise appli-
members of a church, if they dont like the new rule can leave cable public principles.
the church without having their basic opportunities com-
promised, the costs of exit for those who work and perma- CONCLUSION
nently reside within the church are likely to be much higher. In this article I offered a qualied defense of a right to de-
To sum up, economic democracy is a precondition of gen- mocracy within religious organizations. This right is primarily
uine freedom of association, upon which a churchs claim to held by those who reside or work within churches, and it is
autonomy is parasitic. A pro tanto right to economic de- limited to decisions of a nonessential nature. I argued that a
mocracy cannot be, therefore, overruled by a churchs claim commitment to church autonomy, grounded on freedom of
to autonomy. association, does not overrule this right, at least insofar as
The question remains as to whether a liberal state should certain decisions are at stake. I further argued that, even if
enforce respect for democratic rights within churches or granting democratic rights within churches did infringe upon
whether it should leave them to the voluntary endorsement the autonomy of churches, still we would have reasons to
of each and every church. The upshot of my argument is that prioritize a right to democracy, at least insofar as important
the state has strong prima facie reasons to protect these economic decisions are concerned, over a right to church au-
rights at least within some churches. However, there may be tonomy.
countervailing reasons for why a state should refrain from
coercively protecting these rights. One of these reasons is ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A previous version of this article was presented at a con-
ference on religion in liberal political philosophy organized
14. Even Laycock (1981) grants that voluntary afliation with the
group is the premise on which group autonomy depends. I believe this is
by the UCL Religion and Political Theory Centre in 2015,
right. States, for example, cannot claim a right to be free to organize their and at the MIT political theory workshop in 2016. I would
internal affairs according to particularistic conceptions of the good. like to thank all participants for their questions. I also want

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Democratizing Organized Religion

Chiara Cordelli, University of Chicago

W here organized religion begins, democratic rights

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