1. Bradwell v.

Illinois Chinese applicant was ever granted a permit, despite the fact that Chinese operated
Brief Fact Summary. Mrs. Myra Bradwell brought suit challenging Illinois denial of her Laundromats constituted nearly 90% of the city’s laundry business at the time. The
right to practice law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Plaintiffs were held in violation of the ordinance and issued a fine. Plaintiffs then sued
Constitution.
under the 14th amendment, citing a violation of equal protection.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Separate spheres ideology allowed Illinois to prohibit women
from practicing law. Women’s admission to the bar is not protected by the Fourteenth ISSUE
Amendment is a matter reserved to the states.

Facts. Mrs. Myra Bradwell was denied an application to practice law in the Illinois Does an ordinance that gives absolute discretion to a permit board that discriminates
Supreme Court. Her petition included the requisite certificate attesting to her good on the basis of race in their eventual decision making violate the equal protection
character and qualifications. The United States Supreme Court affirmed. clause of the United States?

Issue. Does the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provide that
one of the privileges and immunities of women as citizens is to engage in any HOLDING/ANALYSIS
profession?
Yes, the ordinance is invalidated and the appeal ruling is overturned. The court noted
Held. The admission to the bar is a matter reserved to the states and Bradwell’s right that the ordinance did not have any discrimination detectable within its text. However,
to practice law is not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. its enforcement did violate the equal protection clause because its execution was
racially unequal. The court held that the new rule should be that the Supreme Court
Concurrence. Justice Bradley. The Illinois Supreme Court requires a certificate from may shoot down state or local laws that are neutral in their text, but discriminatory in
the court of some county of his good moral character, and is otherwise left to the their execution.
discretion of the court. The court found itself bound by two limitations: to promote the
proper administration of justice not to admit any class of persons not intended by the The court wrote that the enforcement of the law was “a practical denial by the state of
legislature to be admitted, even though not expressly excluded by statute. that equal protection of the law,” and, as such, was a violation of the constitution.
Historically the right to engage in every profession has not been one of the established Moreover, the court also noted that equal protection is afforded to non-citizens within
fundamental privilege and immunities of the sex. The law has always recognized a US borders, as many of the Chinese Laundromat operators were non-citizens.
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. The
harmony of interests and views that belong to the family institution is repugnant to the
idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from her husband. 3. Plessy v. Ferguson

Historically women had no legal existence, and were incapable of making binding Brief Fact Summary. A Louisiana statute required railroad companies to provide
contracts without her husband’s consent. This played heavily in the Supreme Court of separate, but equal accommodations for its Black and White passengers. The Plaintiff,
Illinois’ decision. The paramount destiny of women is to fulfill the noble and benign Plessy (Plaintiff), was prosecuted under the statute after he refused to leave the
offices of wife and mother. section of a train reserved for whites.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A law, which authorizes or requires the separation of the two
Discussion. The purpose of this concurring opinion is to demonstrate a classic
races on public conveyances, is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment of the
statement of separate spheres ideology.
United States Constitution (Constitution) unless the law is unreasonable.
2. Yick Wo v. Hopkins
FACTS Facts. A Louisiana statute required railroad companies to provide separate, but equal
accommodations for its Black and White passengers. An exception was made for
The city of San Francisco passed an ordinance that required Laundromats located in nurses attending to the children of the other race. Plaintiff, who was seven-eighths
wooden buildings to have a permit. The ordinance established a board which would white, was prosecuted under the statute after he refused to leave the section of a train
decide who would and would not get the permit. The facts suggest that not a single reserved for whites. The alleged purpose of the statute was to preserve public peace
and good order and to promote the comfort of the people. Petitioner, a United States citizen of unchallenged loyalty, but of Japanese descent,
was convicted under a federal law making it an offense to fail to comply with such
Issue. Was the statute requiring separate, but equal accommodations on railroad military orders.
transportation consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution? Issue. Was it within the power of Congress and the Executive to exclude persons of
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast at the time that they were excluded?
Held. Yes. The State Supreme Court is affirmed.
Justice Henry Brown (J. Brown) stated that although the Fourteenth Amendment of the Held. Yes. At the time the exclusion was ordered, it was justified.
Constitution was designed to enforce the equality between the races, it was not Justice Hugo Black stated that although the exclusion order imposed hardships upon
intended to abolish distinctions based on color, or to enforce a commingling of the a large number of American citizens, hardships are part of war. When, under
races in a way unsatisfactory to either. Laws requiring the separation of the races do conditions of warfare, our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect
not imply the inferiority of either. If the law “stamps the colored race with a badge of them must be commensurate with the threatened danger.
inferiority,” it is because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.
Therefore, the statute constitutes a valid exercise of the States’ police powers. Dissent.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution does, however, require that the Justice Frank Murphy (J. Murphy) argued that the exclusion at issue here goes over
exercise of a State’s police powers be reasonable. Laws enacted in good faith, for the the brink of constitutional power and falls into the abyss of racism. Although we must
promotion of the public good and not for the annoyance or oppression of another race extend great deference to the judgments of the military, it is essential that there be
are reasonable. As such, the statute was reasonable. definite limits to military discretion. Moreover, the military order is not reasonably
related to the dangers it seeks to prevent.
Dissent. Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) said that everyone knows that the purpose of Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) stated he would not distort the United States
the statute was to exclude the colored people from coaches occupied by whites. The Constitution (Constitution) to approve everything the military may deem expedient.
Constitution is color-blind. It neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.

Discussion. This case marks the beginning of the “separate but equal” doctrine. It is Discussion. Ironically, this case establishes the “strict scrutiny” standard of review,
later overturned by Brown v. Board of Education. thereby leading to the invalidation of much race-based discrimination in the future.

4. Korematsu v. United States

Brief Fact Summary. During World War II, a military commander ordered all persons of 5. Goesaert v. Cleary
Japanese descent to evacuate the West Coast. The Petitioner, Korematsu (Petitioner),
a United States citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted for failing to comply with Facts: A Michigan state law provided that no women could obtain a bartender’s
the order. license unless she was the wife or daughter of the male owner.
Procedural Posture: Challenged under equal protection.
Issue: Whether the law violates equal protection; i.e. whether women have a
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Legal restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a single racial
constitutionally protected right to choose to be a bartender.
group are subject to the most rigid scrutiny. But, pressing public necessity may Holding: No.
sometimes justify such restrictions. Reasoning: [Frankfurter] Michigan could ban all women from being bartenders if it
wished. The Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or
Facts. President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt (President Roosevelt) issued shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest
scientific standards. Since there may be a reasonable and valid desire in the
an executive order authorizing military commanders to prescribe military areas from
legislature to protect female bartenders, the court can not second-guess the
which any or all persons may be excluded. Thereupon, a military commander ordered legislature and decide that the real purpose here was for male bartenders to
all persons of Japanese descent, whether or not they were United States citizens, to monopolize the industry.
leave their homes on the West Coast and to report to “Assembly Centers.” The
6. Brown v. Board of Education based classification.
Brief Fact Summary. Black children were denied admission to schools attended by
white children under laws that permitted or required segregation by race. The children Issue. Does the exclusion of the pregnancy-related conditions violate the Fourteenth
sued.
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause?
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Separate but equal educational facilities are inherently
unequal. Held. No. Appeals Court ruling affirmed.
Facts. The Plaintiffs, various black children (Plaintiffs), were denied admission to The list of conditions covered by the disability insurance system is not exclusive.
schools attended by white children under laws that permitted or required segregation Furthermore, there are conditions not covered by the system that affect both men and
by race. Plaintiffs sued, seeking admission to public schools in their communities on a
women. The excluded conditions do not affect women alone.
nonsegregated basis.
The savings given the program by the exclusion of such conditions benefit both men
Issue. Do separate but equal laws in the area of public education deprive black and women. That is, inclusion of the excluded conditions would result in lesser
children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment amounts of funding for all other conditions.
of the United States Constitution (Constitution)?
Held. Yes.
Chief Justice Earl Warren (J. Warren) stated that even if the “tangible” factors of Dissent. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) argues that by disallowing payments
segregated schools are equal, to separate black children from others of similar age related to pregnancy, the State inevitably discriminates against women.
and qualifications solely on the basis of race, generates a feeling of inferiority with
respect to their status in the community and may affect their hearts and minds in a
Discussion. The majority reaches its conclusions through viewing the problem as one
way unlikely to ever be undone.
Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is relying on the of underinclusive legislation, while the dissent focuses on the inevitable connection of
same rationale to invalidate the segregation laws here that it did in Sweatt v. Painter the unfunded conditions with a single sex.
(ordering the admission of a black student to the University of Texas Law School,
despite the fact that a parallel black facility was available). The rationale is that it’s the
intangible factors that make segregation laws in the area of public education 8. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
“inherently unequal.” Whether stigma or the perception of stigma alone is sufficient
injury to invalidate a law supported by a valid, neutral purpose is an open question. Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Bakke (Respondent), a white applicant to the
University of California, Davis Medical School, sued the University, alleging his denial
of admission on racial grounds was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
7. Geduldig v. Aiello Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).

Brief Fact Summary. California operated a disability insurance system that paid Synopsis of Rule of Law. Although race may be a factor in determining admission to
benefits to employees of private employers when workers compensation did not cover public educational institutions, it may not be a sole determining factor.
certain disabilities that prevented those employees from working. However, many
pregnancy related disabilities were excluded from coverage because of expenses to
the program. Facts. The University of California, Davis Medical School reserved 16 spots out of the
100 in any given class for “disadvantaged minorities.” The Respondent, when
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Underinclusive legislation is appropriate under the Equal compared to students admitted under the special admissions program, had more
Protection Clause, so long as the line drawn by the State is “rationally supportable.” favorable objective indicia of performance, while his race was the only distinguishing
characteristic. The Respondent sued, alleging that the special admissions program
Facts. California operated a disability insurance system that supplemented workers denied him equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
compensation, in that it provided for payments for disabilities not covered by workers Constitution.
compensation. The list of disabilities paid for by the State of California was not
exhaustive. Among those disabilities not paid for were certain pregnancy related Issue.
conditions. Suit was brought challenging the system as an unconstitutional gender- Is the special admissions program of the University of California constitutional?
Can race be considered as a factor in the admissions process?
Held. The special admissions program is unconstitutional, but race may be considered three other Justices joining his opinion do not reach the constitutional issue because
as a factor in the admissions process. of the federal statute.
Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell), writing for the court, says that the Supreme Court of
the United States (Supreme Court) should not pay attention to past discrimination in
9. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney
reviewing the policies of the University, as this is tantamount to allowing political trends
to dictate constitutional principles.
J. Powell determines that accepting a minimum number of minorities simply to reduce Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Feeney (Respondent), challenges the
the traditional deficit of such individuals in the medical profession is facially Petitioner, Personnel Administration of Massachusetts’s (Petitioner), rule that provides
unconstitutional, as it gives preference to an individual on the basis of race alone. a hiring preference to military veterans.
The major determination of the Supreme Court is whether or not racial preference may
be used to promote diversity of the student body. J. Powell argues that setting aside a Synopsis of Rule of Law. A gender neutral statute that adversely impacts one gender
specified number of minority slots is not congruent to the purported goal – minority does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
students in themselves do not guarantee a diversity of viewpoints in the educational (Constitution) if it does not have a discriminatory purpose and it does not actually
environment. classify one gender.

Dissent. Facts. Respondent claims that by having a hiring preference for veterans over non-
Justices William Brennan (J. Brennan), Byron White (J. Brennan), Thurgood Marshall veterans for civil service positions, the Petitioner is discriminating against women.
(J. Marshall), and Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun) dissent, believing the special The District Court found that this practice has a severe impact on job opportunities for
admissions program to be constitutional. In particular, the Justices argue that the women, since most of the veterans are men.
racial classification in the present case is remedial, serves an important government
objective and also substantially related to that objective and thus insulated from the Issue. Does the hiring practice that favors veterans violate the Equal Protection
Fourteenth Amendment’s general prohibition of such classifications. Clause of the United States Constitution?
J. Marshall writes separately in support of J. Brennan, J. White, J. Marshall, and J.
Blackmun.
Held. No. The benefit of this act was offered to any person who was a veteran. The
Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) dissents, citing that Title VI of the Civil Rights
law is a preference for veterans of either sex over non-veterans of either sex. It was
Act of 1964 prohibits the denial of any individual on the basis of race from participation
not designed to favor men over women.
in any program receiving federal funding. J. Stevens argues that prohibiting white
students from participation in the special admissions program is a direct violation of
Title VI.
Concurrence. Discussion. This statute was designed to reward and help veterans reenter society
J. Brennan, J. White, J. Marshall, and J. Blackmun concur so much as the Supreme after their service. At the time only 1% of the veterans were women. So, it appeared
Court’s opinion allows race to be considered as a factor in the admissions process. that this legislation was meant for men only. But, in its application and by definition a
However, the Justices believe that in this particular example, race should be allowed veteran is gender neutral.
as a single determining factor.
J. Stevens concurs to the extent that the special admissions program is impermissible.
10. Michael M. v. Superior Court
However, J. Stevens holds that the constitutional issue is not reached, because the
federal statutory ground (Title VI) prohibits the activity directly
Brief Fact Summary. California’s statutory rape law holds only males, not females,
criminally liable for having sexual intercourse with females under the age of 18.
Discussion. J. Powell’s basic problem with the special admissions program is this:
there are 84 places open for white applicants and 100 positions open for minority
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A statute’s gender-based classification is constitutionally
applicants. This differential treatment solely on racial grounds is unconstitutional,
permissible if the classification bears a substantial relationship to an important
according to J. Powell. It is important to note that in Bakke, the Court did not
governmental interest.
technically hold the special admissions program unconstitutional. J. Stevens and the
Facts. The Petitioner, Michael M. (Petitioner), a seventeen and a half year-old male, it helps to curtail the problem of teenage pregnancy and supports a substantial
sought to have California’s statutory rape law declared unconstitutional, on state and relationship to an important governmental objective.
federal grounds, because the law defines statutory rape as “an act of sexual
intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the Discussion. When men and women are situated differently, a statute creating gender-
female is under the age of 18 years,” and thus, unlawfully discriminates on the basis of based classifications can withstand a constitutional challenge if the purpose of the
gender. The California trial and appellate courts denied the Petitioner’s request for statute can pass the intermediate level of scrutiny.
relief. The Supreme Court of California upheld the judgments of the lower courts. The
ruling of the Supreme Court of California was affirmed.
11. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan
Issue. Whether California’s “statutory rape” law violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) because it Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Hogan (Respondent), was denied admission to
only holds males criminally liable for sexual intercourse as defined under the statute. Mississippi University for Women’s (MUW) nursing program solely on the basis of
gender. He now alleges this is a denial of equal protection.
Held. (J. Rehnquist) No. The California’s statutory rape law bears a substantial
relationship to important governmental objectives, and thus, the statute passes Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state may not preclude one gender or the other from
constitutional muster. The judgment of the California Supreme Court is affirmed. participating in a unique educational environment solely on the basis of gender.
The California statute withstands a constitutional challenge because it supports the
state’s effort to prevent illegitimate pregnancies, to prevent “significant social, medical, Facts. MUW is the only single-sex collegiate institution maintained by the State of
and economic consequences for both the mother and her child, to prevent abortions, Mississippi. The Respondent was otherwise qualified for admission to the school’s
and to prevent children born, as a result of illegitimate pregnancies, to become wards nursing program, but he was denied admission on the basis of being male.
of the State.”
The California statute protects young women from sexual intercourse that can cause Issue. Does the operation of a female only nursing school by a State violate Equal
consequences that are “profound[ly] physical, emotional, and psychological.” Because Protection?
only women can become pregnant, “the consequences of sexual intercourse and
pregnancy fall more heavily on the female than on the male.”
Held. Yes. Appeals Court ruling affirmed.
Applying intermediate scrutiny, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (J. O’Connor) notes that
Dissent. The dissenting opinions are as follows:
the State of Mississippi has not advanced an important state interest for operating a
Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) California has not proven its burden that “there
single sex nursing school. In particular, she notes that women did not lack
are fewer teenage pregnancies under its gender-based statutory rape law than there
opportunities to be trained as nurses in Mississippi without the presence of MUW.
would be if the law were gender neutral . . . .”
J. O’Connor also argues that the means to achieving even an important governmental
Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) California’s statute should apply to males as
objective (although she found none) are absent, as MUW allows male auditors in the
well as females because sexual intercourse between a male and a female constitutes
nursing classes. If men are already in the classroom, the state is not technically
“two guilty wrongdoers” not just one. According to the Constitution, state laws must
operating a single-sex nursing program.
“govern impartially.”
Concurrence. The concurring opinions are as follows:
Dissent. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell) argues that the Respondent has not suffered
Justice Potter Steward (J. Stewart). Despite recognizing the significance of the
a cognizable injury, as there were state-operated nursing programs that accepted men
physiological differences between men and women – the fact that only women can
elsewhere in the state and there is no right to attend a state-run university close to
become pregnant – the Supreme Court of the United States’ ruling does not use these
one’s hometown.
differences as merely a “pretext for invidious discrimination,” but instead looks to the
overriding state interest to protect young women who, because of their physiological
differences, are not similarly situated as men and thus, are faced with “substantial Discussion. The majority focuses on whether Mississippi may discriminate against
physical risks” that are not shared by men. men in admission to nursing programs. However, there are two powerful arguments
Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun). The California statute is constitutional because brought up by the dissent. The first is the lack of injury argument – without injury a
case is not ripe, and the constitutional issue may not be reached. There is also the
argument that as there is no unique educational opportunity here (there are nursing and the fact that the clubs encourage the [p538] participation of strangers in, and
programs accepting men in the State college system), the state is not denying welcome media coverage of, many of their central activities. Pp. 544-547.
opportunities to men.
(b) Application of the Act to California Rotary Clubs does not violate the First
12. Board of Directors, Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte (No. 86- Amendment right of expressive association. Although clubs engage in a variety of
421) commendable service activities that are protected by the First Amendment, the
evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting women will affect in any significant way
the existing members' ability to carry out those activities. Moreover, the Act does not
Syllabus
require clubs to abandon or alter their classification and admission systems, but, in
fact, will permit them to have an even more representative membership with a
Rotary International is a nonprofit corporation composed of local Rotary Clubs. Its broadened capacity for service. Even if the Act does work some slight infringement of
purposes are to provide humanitarian service, to encourage high ethical standards in members' rights, that infringement is justified by the State's compelling interests in
all vocations, and to help build world peace and good will. Individuals are admitted to eliminating discrimination against women and in assuring them equal access to public
local club membership according to a "classification system" based on business, accommodations. The latter interest extends to the acquisition of leadership skills and
professional, and institutional activity in the community. Although women are permitted business contacts, as well as tangible goods and services. Pp. 548-549.
to attend meetings, give speeches, receive awards, and form auxiliary organizations,
the Rotary constitution excludes women from membership. Because it had admitted
2. The contentions that the Act is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad were not
women to active membership, the Duarte, California, Rotary Club's membership in the
properly presented to the state courts, and therefore will not be reviewed by this Court.
international organization was terminated. That club and two of its women members
Pp. 549-550.
filed a suit alleging that the termination violated California's Unruh Act (Act), which
entitles all persons, regardless of sex, to full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, and services in all business establishments in the State. The state 178 Cal.App.3d 1035, 224 Cal.Rptr. 213, affirmed.
trial court entered judgment for Rotary International, concluding that neither it nor the
Duarte Club is a "business establishment" within the meaning of the Act. However, the POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and
State Court of Appeal reversed on this point, and rejected the contention that Rotary's BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., concurred
policy of excluding women is protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court in the judgment. BLACKMUN and O'CONNOR, JJ., took no part in the consideration
ordered the Duarte Club's reinstatement, and enjoined the enforcement of the gender or decision of the case. [p539]
requirements against it.

Held:

13. Fragante v. City & County of Honolulu
1. The Unruh Act does not violate the First Amendment by requiring California Rotary 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989)
Clubs to admit women. Pp. 544-549. Facts:
Fragante applied for a clerk’s job with the City and County of Honolulu. Although he
placed high enough on a civil service eligible list to be chosen for the position, he was
(a) Application of the Act to local Rotary Clubs does not interfere unduly with club not selected because of a perceived deficiency in relevant oral communication skills
members' freedom of private association. In determining whether a particular caused by his “heavy Filipino accent.”
association is sufficiently intimate or private to warrant constitutional protection, Fragante brought a Title VII suit, alleging disparate treatment on the basis of national
consideration must be given to factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether origin.
others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship. Here, the relationship History:
among Rotary Club members does not warrant protection, in light of the potentially The district court dismissed Fragante’s complaint.
The oral ability to communicate effectively and clearly was a legitimate occupational
large size of local clubs, the high turnover rate among club members, the inclusive
qualification for the job in question.
nature of each club's membership, the public purposes behind clubs' service activities, There were no proof of a discriminatory intent or motive by the defendant.
Issue: the Petitioner’s freedom of expression.
Was this a case of discrimination on the basis of national origin?
Holding: Dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) dissented, noting that by allowing the
No. Affirmed. Petitioner to revoke the Respondent’s membership, the Supreme Court was allowing
Reasoning: the organization to prevail over the anti-discrimination laws of the state.
Using the McDonnell Douglas Framework: Discussion. An organization cannot be compelled to accept a member whose beliefs
(1) P established a prima facie case. do not align with the tenants upon, which the organization stands. To do so would
The court assumed this was satisfied. violate the First Amendment constitutional rights of the entire organization and its
(2) D articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for P’s nonselection. members, who also align themselves with the principals on which the organization
“There is no doubt from the record that the oral ability to communicate effectively in stands.
English is reasonably related to the normal operation of the clerk’s office.”
(3) The legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was not a mere pretext.
The hiring process involved scores on a variety of categories, and Fragante was given 15. Gratz v. Bollinger
a 3 on a scale of 1-10 for speech.
Furthermore, “the record does not show that the jobs went to persons less qualified
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Admission criteria based on race must be narrowly tailored
than Fragante: to the contrary.”
In sum, the court noted, “Fragante was passed over for employment because of the to achieve a compelling interest. Race may be considered in an individual
deleterious effect of his Filipino accent on his ability to communicate orally, not assessment, but not as a sole or contributing factor for admission.
merely because he had such an accent.”
Rule: An adverse employment decision may be predicated upon individual’s accent Facts. The University of Michigan receives a high volume of applicants each year to its
when – but only when – it interferes materially with job performance.
College of Literature, Science and the Arts (LSA). To help with admission decisions,
the University implements a point system. This point system is out of 100 points. A
student that is from an underrepresented group automatically receives 20 points
towards his or her over all score. The groups of students typically come from African-
14. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale American, Hispanic, and Native American backgrounds. A student with extraordinary
Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Dale (Respondent), was an eagle scout artistic talent only receives 5 points under the admission system. Also every student
whose membership in the boy scouts was revoked when the Petitioners, the Boy that is from an underrepresented group, and is otherwise qualified, is typically
Scouts of America (Petitioner), learned that he was a homosexual. accepted into the school. A group of white student’s, that were determined qualified by
the University, where denied admission.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. While individuals are given a right to freely associate,
associations are not forced to include members whose beliefs may affect its own
ability to express the message it wishes to convey. Issue. Whether a School’s admission policy to automatically grant 20 out of 100 points
Facts. The Respondent, a life-long boy scout, was an assistant scout master in New to students of a minority ethnicity is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Jersey, when the Petitioner learned of his homosexuality and revoked his Constitution.
membership. The Respondent brought suit to enjoin the action and the New Jersey
court, under its public accommodations law, required the Petitioner to admit the
Respondent. Held. Yes. Firstly, the Supreme Court has only upheld racial plans at a school or town
where previous racial discrimination was being remedied. In previous cases, one of
Issue. This case questions whether an organization can be compelled to accept a the Justices of the Supreme Court stated that each applicant should be individually
member whose activities and beliefs may be against the very nature of the assessed. Each student’s admission should be based on the student’s ability to
organization.
contribute to the unique setting of higher education. An admission system that grants
Held. Reversed.
The court found that, while the Petitioner’s laws and oaths do not mention sexuality, points for certain characteristics such as race is not an individual assessment. When
the purpose of the organization to foster “morally straight” and “clean” membership applicants are being chosen for a program and part of the reasoning is based on race,
would be disregarded if the Petitioner was forced to accept the Respondent. Further, any discrimination made is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
the First Amendment Rights of the association would be violated if it were forced, Amendment. Since the White students are being discriminated based on race, they
under the guise of law, to send a message that it accepted homosexual conduct when, are a suspect class which deserves strict scrutiny review. Unless the school can show
on its own assertions, it did not. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme the system is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest of diversity, the
Court) held that to require the Petitioner to accept Respondent was an abridgment of
admission system will be considered unconstitutional. Here the system is not narrowly Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
tailored. Simply protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
Dissent. The previous school admission policies that were struck down made race purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must
sole reasons for denials or admission. Here the point system accounts for many things apply equally to all members of the same class.
such residency, grades, essay, athletic ability, social-economic status. Surely the plan
design is better fit than other plans to ensure diversity.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon
Discussion. The School argues that with the volume of applications, a system with “accident of birth or parentage,” as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the
individual assessment will be impractical. However, this court states that just because degree of civilization and culture. “The term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers, not to
it will be difficult to achieve such standards, it does not render their actions religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and more directly, to natives of
constitutional. the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship
apart from settled communities.” (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindora, supra.) This
distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar
conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.

16. People v. Cayat The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order in and
among non-Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the class evident from
perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-
Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality
of its application.
68 Phil. 12 (1939)

17. G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994
Ishmael Himagan, petitioner
Facts/Issue: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a vs People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Hilario Mapayo, respondents
member of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Ponente: Kapunan
Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an
Facts:
intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it unlawful for any native
Himagan is policeman assigned with the medical company of the PNP Regional
of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act Headquarters as Camp Catitigan, Davao City, and was implicated in the killing of
1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, Benjamin Machitar Jr., and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the
wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and infromations were filed, RTC Davao issued as order suspending petitioner until the
liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the termination of the case.
passage of the law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds
that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due October 11, 1993, Himagan filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension relying on
the Civil service Decree that his suspension should be limited to 90 days. But
process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.
respondent Judge denied the motion pointing out under section 47 of RA 6975, the
accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied also, hence this certiorari and mandamus to
set aside the orders of respondent Judge. FACTS:

Held: Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign
from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the
member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either
one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt
lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except
providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires
does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into
other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
frame within which the trial should be finished. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-
hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.
Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a
clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty
administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. In the instant case. members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and
Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be
that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that his included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the
suspension shall last until the case is terminated. parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB,
The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive the matter reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.
suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty
imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues ISSUE:
until the case against him is terminated. Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of RULING:
persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled
preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of to “humane conditions of work.” These conditions are not restricted to the physical
the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as workplace – the factory, the office or the field – but include as well the manner by
succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. which employers treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard
eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their
demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor full
under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and protection”. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor
liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with
classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must
based on real and substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the law; yield to the common good.
applies to all members of the same However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification may not be A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less
impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer
based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties
such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded. under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such
as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history;
and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
18. ISAE vs. QUISUMBING
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and
be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts
collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The
treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not
tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial
conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to court, it may not be considered in appeal.
local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave 2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
travel allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign- protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde
a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid
respective collective bargaining rights. classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
GRANTED IN PART. germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply
equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
19. Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013 classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be
entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for impugned as violative of the right to due process.
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other 4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention
Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In
financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner. a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.
set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance 5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power
of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.” any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the
TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the
and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is
unwanted product of an invalid law.” consistent with their duty executive function.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court
and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court 20. Dumlao v COMELEC G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980
constituted collateral attack on said law. Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of J. Melencio-Herrera
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law. Facts:
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause. Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30,
due process clause of the Constitution 1980.
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to
protect the family as a basic social institution
He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed for
as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of his disqualification. It was only a hypothetical question.
the Constitution.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has yet been
S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment adversely affected by the operation of the statutes.
of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have
been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving
be elecOted, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that his
he has retired. suit be dismissed.

He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously against him, and that However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest involved and
the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, the imminent elections.
class legislation.
2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional
His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidcay of a person guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification.
who was convicted of a crime given that there was judgment for conviction and the
prima facie nature of the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be
treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while
contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination." Apart form this, hey also attacked the term of office and the election The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a
period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52. reasonable classification. Young blood can be encouraged to come in to politics.

Issue: But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired, there is
reason to disqualify him from running for the same office, as provided for in the
1. Did petitioners have standing challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance.

2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution? The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired an
Held: unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind,
he would like to assume again.
1. No
It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted. challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither
does it permit such denial.
Petition granted
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
Ratio: classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. hat constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging
determine judicial review, three requisites are present: to the same class.

a. actual case and controversy The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local
governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot
b. proper party be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is
marred by theoretical inconsistencies.
c. existence of a constitutional question
Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional provision that, RULING:
in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary 1. (1) Yes. The P50 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among
according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged individual aliens who are required to pay it. The same amount of P50 is
proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or
disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a
been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully highly paid executive.
heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made
between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have 2. (2) Yes. It does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in
been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a
municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been limit the action, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted power, such ordinance is invalid.
of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence.
3. (3) Yes. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from
the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a
therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and
proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against Thus, the ordinance is invalid.
him.

A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be 22. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City [G.R.
substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was meritorious. No. 23794 February 17, 1968]
Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing “on any
21. Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978) and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in
Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA
and other foreign countries.” Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by
Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho GR No L-29646, November 10, 1978 Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of
First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer,
FACTS: Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. The court
employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. Hence, this
assistance programs of the government and another country, and members of appeal.
religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayor’s permit so as to be
employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. Thus, a case was filed with CFI- Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the
Manila to stop enforcement of the ordinance. CFI-Manila declared the ordinance void. equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed?
Thus, the present petition for certiorari.
Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically
ISSUES: situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and
a classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2)
1. (1) Is the ordinance violative of the cardinal rule of uniformity of taxation? these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to those
present; and 4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
2. (2) Does it violate the principle against undue designation of legislative A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them,
power? for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and
3. (3) Does it violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central for the coverage
Constitution? of the tax.
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A.
23. PHIL JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS PRADO ENBANC No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the
Posted by kaye lee on 6:34 PM members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that
the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
227 SCRA 703 G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993 Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department
of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking 3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private
title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the
pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many
its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services it should be prepared to
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary. extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the
franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
24. G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
RULING: LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional. vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof." x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as G.R. No. 193036
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient vs.
compliance with the constitutional requirement.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is
germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD
the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that,
by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly FACTS:
included in the title of the said law.

2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill
No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its
addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
by a conference committee of both chambers. previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court. settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather,
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less 3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from 4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was
performing its functions. They argued that: validly created for laudable purposes.

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress ISSUES:
to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1;
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to 2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was commissions;
hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.” 3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the
“Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of RULING:
the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual
created under the Administrative Code of 1987. case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued 1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to
that: which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,
so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate
in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on
or form such bodies. their prerogatives as legislators.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O.
Congress. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the
private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of
“every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in the laws of the land.
interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” 4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer. and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition authorities.
covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by
the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to
The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this equally to all members of the same class.
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows
from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly
advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent
already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power and manifest.
of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be
earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.
funding. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make
for a valid classification.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers.
If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two
offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners
public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC
stricken down for being unconstitutional. resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or
reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No.
Constitution.
9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal
protection clause

Held: Yes.
25. QUINTO vs COMELEC
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their
G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010 posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil
servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs. class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
RESOLUTION
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act
PUNO, C.J.: may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4)
requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
Facts:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties
in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public
appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences
Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v.
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists
his certificate of candidacy. between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned created equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office a four-wheel vehicle.
or position.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment second requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who
hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the
present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And,
under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in
members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus
obligations imposed. Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential
treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
Facts:
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter
coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the
the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, “Any person holding a public appointive
entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall
campaign rather than to their office work. be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.” RA 9369 provides that
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision
cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly “For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered
sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That
past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of
social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled
the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must
them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President,
retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A.
his office to support his campaign. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the
equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the
functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The Held: No
public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater
impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for. To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by
elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the
third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
the equal protection clause.
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under
the present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in
the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus
satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail.
dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis
elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds
an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the 25. League of Cities v. Comelec
measure remain."
Action:
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is. preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of
the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on
sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites
public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from
the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the
Fact:
sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials
municipalities into cities.
are concerned.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA
9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to
Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity,
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush”
outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the
of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the
intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress
December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million
declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the
9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

============== During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval.
Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the
provincial or national official or employee, or those in the civil or military service, advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision
automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office. exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA
9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of
voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality the Local Government Code.
into a city.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation
Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set of the equal protection clause.
aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are
thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is
a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while
the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they
prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.