ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 1

1. SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR (SPFL), petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE PURA FERRER CALLEJA, Director, Bureau of Labor Relations,
Department of Labor and Employment, public respondent. MINDANAO
MINERS EMPLOYEE UNION SANDIGAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO
(SANDIGAN), forced intervenor-private respondent. APEX MINING COMPANY,
INC., employer-private respondent.

Proculo P. Fuentes, Jr. for petitioner.

Valeriano F. Pasquil and Ruben V. Abarquez for respondent Apex Mining Co.,
Inc.

Raul C. Nengasca and Antonio G. Jolejole for respondent Sandigan.

G.R. No. 80882 April 24, 1989

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Order issued by
public respondent Director Pura Ferrer Calleja of the Bureau of Labor
Relations dated June 23, 1987 which certified the respondent union,
Mindanao Miners Employees Union-Sandigan ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(MMEU-Sandigan), as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the
rank-and-file employees of respondent Apex Mining Company (Apex) after
the said public respondent denied the motion of herein petitioner to exclude
one hundred ninety-seven (197) employees from voting in the certification
election. The denial is based on the ground that they are rank-and-file
employees.

As summarized by the Solicitor General in his Comment, the facts are as
follows:

On December 29, 1986, petitioner Southern Philippines Federation of Labor
filed a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of
private respondent Apex Mining Company, Incorporated with the Department
of Labor in Region XI, Davao City.

On February 6, 1987, Med-Arbiter Conrado 0. Macasa, Sr. issued an Order
calling for the holding of the certification election on February 23, 1987
among the rank-and-file employees of APEX with the following choices:

l. Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL)

2. Mindanao Miners Employees Union-Sandigan ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(MMEU-Sandigan) and

3. No union.

On February 9, 1987, a pre-election conference was conducted among the
petitioner Union; private respondent Union, MMEU-Sandigan; and APEX to
settle details in the conduct of the election such as the venue of the election

ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 2

and the list of employees qualified to vote in the election.

During the pre-election conference, the parties agreed to delete from the list
of workers prepared and submitted by APEX numbering One Thousand Seven
Hundred Sixteen (1,716), the names of nineteen (1 9) managerial employees
and seventy-three probationary employees who were statutorily disqualified
from voting. Petitioner Union objected to the inclusion in said list of the
following: (1) employees occupying the positions of Supervisor I, II, and III;
(2) employees under confidential/special payrolls; and (3) employees who
were not paying Union dues. The petitioner Union contends that the
aforementioned employees were disqualified from participating in the
certification election since the Supervisors were managerial employees while
the last two were disqualified by virtue of their non-membership in the Union
and their exclusion from the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement.

In view of the lack of agreement among the parties on the list of qualified
voters, Med-Arbiter Macasa issued an Order on February 20, 1987, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

"Wherefore, premises considered it is hereby declared that the following
groups of workers be not included in the list of employees qualified to vote in
the consent election on February 23, 1987, as follows:

1 Nineteen (19) managerial employees;

2 Seventy-three (73) probationary employees; and

3 Nineteen (19) Supervisors 1;

All other workers except the foregoing will be allowed to vote."

On February 23, 1987, the day of the certification election, petitioner Union
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Macasa's Order dated February 20,
1987. The certification election was nonetheless conducted, with the result
as follows:

l. Southern Philippines Federation of Labor............. 614

2. Mindanao Miners Employees union
(MMEU- Sandigan)................................................... 528

3. No Union......................................................................... 9

4. Challenged Ballots......................................................197

5. Spoiled............................................................................25

TOTAL VOTES CAST............................................................1,373

On the basis of the foregoing results, respondent Union filed an Urgent
Motion to Open the Challenged Ballots, with the prayer, to wit:

ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 3

"Wherefore, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this
Honorable office that this instant motion be given due course and that an
order be issued to open and count the challenged ballots in order to
determine, once and for all, the winner in the certification and/or consent
election and thereafter certify the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
representative of all rank-and-file employees and workers of Apex Mining
Company, Incorporated."

xxx xxx xxx

On March 11, 1987, APEX filed a Manifestation and Motion manifesting its
interest in the speedy resolution of the case and primary concern for "the
restoration of normalcy and the preservation of industrial peace in the
already explosive situation in the mining area."

xxx xxx xxx

On March 19, 1987, Med-Arbiter Macasa issued an Order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

"Wherefore, the interest of industrial peace considered, it is hereby directed
that the challenged ballots be opened and inventoried on 26 March 1987 at
3:00 p.m., before the entire records of the case be indorsed to the BLR for
review."

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner Union appealed Macasa's Order dated March 19, 1987 to the
Bureau of Labor Relations. On April 14, 1987, BLR Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja
issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the Appeal of petitioner Southern Philippines Federation of
Labor (SPFL) is hereby dismissed for lack of merit and the Med- Arbiter's
Order dated 19 March 1987 is affirmed with modification that the 197 ballots
should be opened and canvassed by Labor Regional Office XI, Davao City.
Let, therefore, the records of this case be immediately remanded to the said
office, for the immediate implementation of this Resolution."

Petitioner Union moved for a reconsideration of the resolution dated April 14,
1987. Meanwhile, on May 21, 1987, Med-Arbiter Macasa opened and
canvassed the 197 challenged ballots with the result as follows:

SPFL 12 votes
SANDIGAN 178 votes
No Union 2 votes
Spoiled 4 votes
Envelop with
no ballots 1 vote

__________
TOTAL 197 votes

ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 4

As a consequence of the opening and canvass of the challenged ballots, the
outcome of the certification election became:

SPFL 626 votes
SANDIGAN 706 votes
No Union 11 votes

___________
TOTAL 1,343 votes

Based on the aforementioned results, respondent Union filed a Manifestation
with the BLR with prayer for the issuance of Certification Order certifying it
as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file
employees of APEX. On June 23, 1987, Director Calleja issued an Order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the Motion for reconsideration of Petitioner SPFL is hereby
denied for lack of merit. Meanwhile, intervenor Mindanao Employees Union-
Sandigan Ng Manggagawang Pilipino (MMEU- SANDIGAN) is hereby certified
as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file
employees of respondent Apex Mining Company, Inc. Accordingly, the
management of Apex Mining Company, Inc., is directed to negotiate with
(MMEU-SANDIGAN) for the conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA)."

Hence, this petition.

The issue raised in this petition is whether or not the public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the 197 employees to vote
in the certification election when, as alleged by the petitioner, they are
disqualified by express provision of law or under the existing collective
bargaining agreement.

It is maintained by the petitioner that under the Labor Code, managerial
employees are excluded from forming or joining a collective bargaining unit;
and under the collective bargaining agreement executed between Apex and
respondent union, among those who are excluded from the bargaining unit
are: a) managerial employees as defined in paragraph K, Article 212 of the
Labor Code; b) those performing supervisory functions; and c) those holding
confidential positions as determined by the company. Therefore, the
employees holding the positions of Supervisors II and III and those in the
confidential payrolls should be excluded from joining the bargaining unit and
from voting in the certification election. Likewise, those employees who are
not paying union dues should be excluded from the same since the existing
CBA contains a Union shop provision.

The contentions have no merit.

Although we have upheld the validity of the CBA as the law among the
parties, (see Planters Products, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 78524, January
20, 1989), its provisions cannot override what is expressly provided by law
that only managerial employees are ineligible to join, assist or form any labor

Hence. or to effectively recommend such managerial actions. 11 SCRA 766 [1964]). v. Therefore. but requires the use of independent judgment. where such recommendatory powers as in the case at bar. they do not participate in policy making but are given ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe. Furthermore. Corp. Labor Code. Trajano. L-18938. review and final action by the department heads and other higher executives of the company. 137 SCRA [1985]. In the category of Supervisory II. the same. it is important to determine whether the positions of Supervisors II and III are considered "managerial" under the law. discharge. although present. recall. subject employees are not managerial employees because as borne by the records. As defined in the Labor Code and as we have held in the case of Franklin Baker Company of the Phils. transfer. Rollo) while the first duty enumerated in the position of Supervisor III states: . Their right to self-organization must be upheld in the absence of an express provision of law to the contrary. lay-off. Labor Code). assign or discipline employees. NWSA Consolidated. It cannot be curtailed by a collective bargaining agreement. citing Section 212 (K). v. in line with the ruling of this Court. (p.) xxxxxxxxx The test of "supervisory" or "managerial status" depends on whether a person possesses authority to act in the interest of his employer in the matter specified in Article 212 (k) of the Labor Code and Section 1 (m) of its Implementing Rules and whether such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature. thus having little freedom of action (National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. 7 SCRA 602-603 [1963]). Thus. (Reynolds Phil. regardless of the challenged employees' designations. 421-423. 30. the "General Summary" provides: GENERAL SUMMARY: Assists the Foreman in the effective dispatching/distribution of manpower and equipment to carry out approved work.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 5 organization (See Art. Eslava. are subject to evaluation. suspend. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration before the public respondent outlined the job description of Supervisors. are not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law (National Warehousing Corp. 247. CIR. if the nature of their job does not fall under the definition of "managerial" as defined in the Labor Code. [1988]): A managerial employee is defined as one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire. (1 57 SCRA 416. whether they are employed as Supervisors or in the confidential payrolls. v. they are eligible to be members of the bargaining unit and to vote in the certification election.

Rollo) for direct certification election with the Regional Office No. 1989 MEDIALDEA. private respondent Manggagawang Nagkakaisa ng SAJELCO-Association of Democratic Labor Organization (MAGKAISA-ADLO) filed a petition (pp. it is clear from the above provisions that the functions of the questioned positions are not managerial in nature because they only execute approved and established policies leaving little or no discretion at all whether to implement the said policies or not. (SAJELCO). INC. therefore. vs. Petitioner San Jose City Electric Service Cooperative. did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioner's appeal from the Med-Arbiter's Order to open and count the challenged ballots in denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in certifying the respondent Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of respondent Apex . SAN JOSE CITY ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE. the petitioner has not shown that the nature of their jobs is classified as managerial except for its allegation that they are considered by management as occupying managerial positions and highly confidential. Pampanga. Neither can payment or non- payment of union dues be the determining factor of whether the challenged employees should be excluded from the bargaining unit since the union shop provision in the CBA applies only to newly hired employees but not to members of the bargaining unit who were not members of the union at the time of the signing of the CBA. respondents. G. Rollo) of Pura Ferrer-Calleja. 2. 111 of the Department of Labor and Employment in San Fernando. The antecedent facts of the instant case are as follows: On July 29. Inc.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 6 1. Director of Bureau of Labor Relations in BLR Case No. 38-40. Costs against the petitioner. MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and MAGKAISA-ADLO. not impossible for employees to be members of the bargaining unit even though they are non-union members or not paying union dues. Cortez to conduct a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of SAJELCO. It is. Executes and coordinates work plans emanating from his supervisors. J. A-10-259-86 which affirmed the Order of Med-Arbiter Antonio R. petitioner. (p. SO ORDERED. The petition alleged that MAGKAISA-ADLO is a . (SAJELCO. The respondent Director. As regards the employees in the confidential payroll. No.R. 16-18. for brevity) seeks the reversal of the Order (pp.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. WHEREFORE. 32. 1986. Rollo) Thus. the petition is hereby DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT. therefore. 77231 May 31.

in conscience. Rollo) granting the petition for direct certification election on the basis of the pleadings filed. if not most. without doing injustice. it cannot be denied that they are also employees within the contemplation of the Labor Code and are therefore entitled to enjoy all the benefits of employees. under the By-laws. Rollo). and therefore cannot fairly and prudently represent such opposing personalities that merge into one juridical or natural person. By-laws of the respondent Cooperative and pertinent Decrees and laws. in equity and unfair status or advantage to those member- consumers who have not that destiny or status of becoming employees. that almost 62% of the employees sought to be represented have supported the filing of the petition. that are bound by the Article of Incorporation. 19-21. 7. pursuant to the By-laws is also the final arbiter of any dispute arising in the Cooperative. and no reasonable or valid scale of justice could be invoked to divide a person who. and that such "some"of said alleged supporters. SAJELCO opposed the petition for direct certification election contending. are member-consumers. 6 No valid and lawful representation can be obtained by petitioner in behalf of the supposed supporters. That some. in their capacity as member- consumers. who are. from their status as consumer-members. . who are also member-consumer. the Med-Arbiter who was assigned to the case issued an Order (pp. There is no possible legal way by which to dismantle the personalities of some of the supporters of the petitioner. Thus: xxx 5. is also the other fellow against whom a remedy is sought for in allowing this to happen is tantamount to slaughtering a man to his own ends. that there are more or less fifty-four (54) rank and file employees in SAJELCO. xxx On September 5. part and parcels of the General or Special Assembly that finally decides any dispute. 24-26. 1986. of the employees who sought to be represented by the petitioner. inter alia. that the employees who sought to be represented by private respondent are members-consumers of the Cooperative itself and at the same time composed the General Assembly which. and these special and unique status or personalities of the supposed supporters cannot qualify to be represented by the petitioner. to support and defend the basic policies of the Government on Electric Cooperatives. enjoy two personalities in that as employees and/or members of the General Assembly. and as such are members of the General or Special Assembly which is the final arbiter on any dispute which a member and/or the Board.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 7 legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment. as employees. that there has been no valid certification election held in SAJELCO during the twelve (12) month period prior to the filing of the petition and that there is no other union in the bargaining unit. or the Cooperative may have. The Order said that while some of the members of petitioner union are members of the cooperative. In its answer (pp.

A labor union is formed for purposes of collective bargaining. it will be inconsistent for the union members to bargain with themselves. counsel for private respondent union.. 1987. The duty to bargain exists only between employer and employees and not between an employer and his co-owners. Thirdly. In its appeal. participate in its management. the Solicitor General argued firstly. In the latter aspect. Jr. 25. . (pp. besides contributing financially to its establishments and maintenance. they possess the powers and prerogatives of managerial employees who are not eligible to join. respondents were required to comment on the petition. . there being no restraining order from this Court enjoining the holding thereof Likewise. requires that before one can form. 1987 wherein it took a stand contrary to that of respondent Director. he said that article 243 of the Labor Code. Soto was of the opinion that in view of the direct certification election conducted. The Solicitor General filed its comment dated October 30. On February 19. Rollo). Rollo). 1987. thereby resulting in a fusion of two personalities." In the resolution of this court (First Division) dated September 29. 1987. he must first be employed and to be an employee one must be under hire and must have no involvement in the ownership of the firm. Secondly. Atty. he also said that under the National Electrification Decree (P. August 6. 27-36. 269. thirty (30) voted for respondent union and thirteen (13) voted for "no union. Rollo). This Order was appealed by SAJELCO to the Bureau of Labor Relations. assist or form any labor organization (pp. 1987 showing that of forty three (43) employees who voted. there is a merger of the consumer-members that composed of the assembly and that of the rank-and-file members of the petitioners-into one person or juridical status thus rendering the proposed collective bargaining agent ineffective and/or uncalled for — considering that a grievance machinery for employees and/or member-consumers of the cooperative-has been provided for by the By-laws as a built-in over-all arbiter involving disputes affecting said cooperative. . Thus. that the union members who seek to be represented by the union are the very members of the cooperative. the petition brought before this Court by SAJELCO has become moot and academic (p. join or assist a labor union. manifested that a direct certification election was conducted in SAJELCO. To support its stand. Ricardo Soto.D. 1987. pp 43-45. Attached to his letter is a copy of the minutes of the certification election held on April 13. In a letter dated June 20. Respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dismissed the appeal and sustained the ruling of the Med-Arbiter in an order dated January 5.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 8 including the right to self-organization (pp. No. Atty. upon the principle that in electric cooperative — as in the case of respondent. 1973) members of an electric cooperative such as petitioner. 4-6 of Comment. SAJELCO filed the instant petition for certiorari praying that the order of respondent Director be set aside and another one rendered denying the holding or conduct of a certification election among the rank and file employees of SAJELCO. 48. Rollo) SAJELCO reiterated its position that: .

. Hon. San Jose City Electric Service Cooperative. Crescencio B.1988.. In the opinion of August 14. al. G. No. he corectly opined that employees of cooperatives who are themselves members of the cooperative have no right to form or join labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining for being themselves co-owners of the cooperative. No. in so far as it involves cooperatives with employees who are not members or co-owners thereof. G. Pura Ferrer-Calleja. et al. Thus. Its owners and/or members are the ones who run and operate the business while the others are its employees. vs. partnerships or corporations. collective bargaining.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 9 On November 25. 62386. G. Inc. Their share capital earn limited interests. We required Atty. It cited Section 17(18) of its By-laws which declares that: . 74560 (November 9.R. where it was held that: A cooperative. An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. (SAJELCO) claims that its employees are also members of the cooperative.R. preferential right to supply their products to State agencies and even exemption from minimum wage laws. No. Romeo Young. Rollo). 79. citing the case of Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City. Penaflor." But respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations filed a comment on the aforesaid comment of the Solicitor General reiterating his stand that members of private respondent union fall under the general provision of Article 244 of the Code on who are qualified to form... Soto. join or assist in the formation of unions as they are neither managerial employees nor persons belonging to subversive organizations. 77951. The only issue presented for resolution in this petition is whether or not the employees-members of an electric cooperative can organize themselves for purposes of collective bargaining. 1988. certainly such employees are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to organization. negotiations and others as are enshrined in the Constitution and existing laws of the country. 1981 of the Solicitor General. by persons. vs. 70880 and Albay Electric Cooperative vs. on May 25.R. No. et al. Rollo). the notices sent to him were returned and stamped "moved to an unknown address. However. we gave due course to the petition (p. irrespective of the name of shares owned by its members they are entitled to cast one vote each in deciding upon the affair of the cooperative. In this petition. They enjoy special privileges as — exemption from income tax and sales taxes. This Court had the occasion to rule on this issue in the consolidated cases of Batangas I-Electric Cooperative Labor Union vs. September 26. 1987. Eliseo A. Trajano et. G. 1988). Bulacan II. However. Jr. 47. therefore.R. is by its nature different from an ordinary business concern being run either. Inc. As above stated.Electric Cooperative. Inc. to comment on the comment of the Solicitor General (p.

As regards employees of SAJELCO who are members-consumers. No. collective bargaining. however.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 10 The Board shall also create positions for subordinate employees and fix their duties and remunerations. The Regional Office III of the Department of Labor and Employment in San Fernando. However. supra. join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. 10). No. 1987 is hereby set aside. they are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to organization. petitioner vs HON. join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining notwithstanding the fact that employees of SAJELCO who are not members- consumers were employed ONLY because they are members of the immediate family of members-consumers. The fact remains that they are not themselves members-consumers. The above-cited provision. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations is hereby MODIFIED to the effect that only the rank-and-file employees of petitioner who are not its members-consumers are entitled to self-organization.R. PURA CALLEJA IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS AND TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS) WFTU respondents. Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. 1990 KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA AT TAC SA IRRI-ORGANIZED LABOR . G. collective bargaining. p. Labor Code of the Philippines and other related laws (Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City.R. and as such. SO ORDERED.. ACCORDINGLY. negotiations and others as are enshrined in Section 8. the petition is GRANTED. and (c) in the affirmative. Pampanga is hereby directed: (a) to determine the number of rank and file employees of SAJELCO who are not themselves members-consumers. (b) to resolve whether or not there is compliance with the requirements set forth in Article 257 of the Labor Code. International Catholic vs Calleja (1990) G. 85750 September 28. Article III and Section 3. Only member-consumers or members of their immediate family shall be employed by the cooperative (Emphasis supplied). while other employees who are members-consumers thereof cannot enjoy such right. to immediately conduct a direct certification election among the rank and file employees of SAJELCO who are not members-consumers. the rule is settled that they are not qualified to form. namely: the members-consumers and the members of their immediate families. 3. mentions two types of employees. 1990 INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION COMMISSION. The assailed Order of respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja. The direct certification election conducted on April 13. 89331 September 28. employees who are not members-consumers may form. and negotiations. Inc. The reason for withholding from employees of a cooperative who are members-co-owners the right to collective bargaining is clear: an owner cannot bargain with himself.

89331. Inc. (IRRI) from the application of Philippine labor laws. Araullo. No. G. In response to this crisis. USA. It was incorporated in New York. Bentulan for private respondent in 85750. these two cases involve the validity of the claim of immunity by the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) and the International Rice Research Institute. On 14 July 1986. 1]. 85750 — the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) Case. INC. Dominguez.: Consolidated on 11 December 1989. I Facts and Issues A.. pp. J. Category II. on 23 February 1981. Bataan. Gruba. Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by ICMC The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international . its activities are parallel to those of the International Committee for Migration (ICM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) [DOLE Records of BLR Case No. Jimenez & Associates for IRRI. respondents. 22-32). at the request of the Holy See. A-2-62-87.R.R.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 11 ASSOCIATION IN LINE INDUSTRIES AND AGRICULTURE. Armamento. petitioner. ICMC v. the plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's communist rule confronted the international community. Calleja. Vol. an Agreement was forged between the Philippine Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating center for processing Indo- Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan (Annex "A". ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center in Morong. No. Chua Law Firm for petitioner in 85750. as a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. MELENCIO-HERRERA. As an aftermath of the Vietnam War. vs SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE. As an international organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the Philippines. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status. Zambrano. Alfredo L. Cabana & Associates for petitioner in G. Rollo.

ICMC's request for recognition as a specialized agency was still pending with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEFORAF). Subsequently. granted ICMC the status of a specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and immunities.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 12 organization registered with the United Nations and. pp. again. as the highest executive department with the competence and authority to act on matters involving diplomatic immunity and privileges. ICMC's two Motions for Reconsideration were denied despite an opinion rendered by DEFORAF on 17 October 1988 that said BLR Order violated ICMC's diplomatic immunity. Rollo. the Court allowed DEFORAF intervention. the Philippine Government. which has been complied with. the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the holding of the certification election. retired Justice Jorge C. ordered the immediate conduct of a pre-election conference. filed a Motion for Intervention alleging that. On 10 January 1989. Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. enjoys diplomatic immunity. At that time. however. as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement between the Government and ICMC (Annex "E". the issue is whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunites to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws. Petition. the Second Division gave due course to the ICMC Petition and required the submittal of memoranda by the parties. through its Legal Adviser. ICMC sustains the affirmative of the proposition citing (1) its Memorandum of Agreement with the Philippine Government giving it the status of a . On 5 February 1987. on 15 July 1988. Coquia of the Court of Appeals. On 12 July 1989. On appeal by TUPAS. it has a legal interest in the outcome of this case. Bactin sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Over the opposition of the Solicitor General. ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS Petition for Certification Election invoking the immunity expressly granted but the same was denied by respondent BLR Director who. and tasked with the conduct of Philippine diplomatic and consular relations with foreign governments and UN organizations. through the DEFORAF. Thus. hence. reversed the Med-Arbiter's Decision and ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. the DEFORAF. On 28 November 1988. ICMC filed the present Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction assailing the BLR Order. As initially stated. on 24 November 1988. Director Pura Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). 41-43). infra.

Section 18 and Article III." Initially. The facts disclose that on 9 December 1959. No. and Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code. non-profit. funds or assets. on 11 December 1989. cites State policy and Philippine labor laws to justify its assailed Order. 89331 pending before it with G. distribution and utilization with a view to attaining nutritive and economic advantage or benefit for the people of Asia and other major rice-growing areas through improvement in quality and quantity of rice. IRRI was organized and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a private corporation subject to all laws and regulations. G. 85750. as amended. adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 November 1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate through Resolution No. the Philippine Government and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations signed a Memorandum of Understanding establishing the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) at Los Baños. management. on all phases of rice production. 91 on 17 May 1949 (the Philippine Instrument of Ratification was signed by the President on 30 August 1949 and deposited with the UN on 20 March 1950) infra. 89331 — (The International Rice Research Institute [IRRI] Case). ibid. which declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. Before a Decision could be rendered in the ICMC Case. No. on the other hand. No. In addition. fact-finding character.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 13 specialized agency.R. and (3) Article II. Intervenor DEFORAF upholds ICMC'S claim of diplomatic immunity and seeks an affirmance of the DEFORAF determination that the BLR Order for a certification election among the ICMC employees is violative of the diplomatic immunity of said organization. IRRI was granted the status. with whom the Solicitor General agrees. for short) in respondent IRRI. non-stock organization designed to carry out the principal objective of conducting "basic research on the rice plant. Article II. Respondent BLR Director. the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI (Kapisanan. the lower-numbered case pending with the Second Division. infra. by virtue of Pres. particularly.R. Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution. prerogatives. Decree No. It was intended to be an autonomous. privileges and immunities of an international organization. B. The Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (OLALIA). but is the sole concern of the workers themselves. the Third Division. 1620. she contends that a certification election is not a litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary.R. (infra). (2) the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies. upon manifestation by the Solicitor General that both cases involve similar issues. Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. However. It is not a suit against ICMC its property. Laguna. . promulgated on 19 April 1979. is a legitimate labor organization with an existing local union. resolved to consolidate G. philanthropic. tax- free.

The last pleading was filed by . IRRI opposed the petition invoking Pres. 1620 which grants to the IRRI the status. prerogatives. Indeed." Reconsideration sought by IRRI was denied. privileges and immunities of an international organization is clear and explicit. 3 — The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal. Hence. set aside the BLR Director's Order. civil and administrative proceedings. the BLR Director. infra and Article XIII. at the very first opportunity already vehemently questioned the jurisdiction of this Department by filing an ex-parte motion to dismiss the case. In the case at bar there was no such waiver made by the Director- General of the Institute. 1620 conferring upon it the status of an international organization and granting it immunity from all civil. Decree No. Med-Arbiter Leonardo M. who is the public respondent in the ICMC Case. criminal and administrative proceedings under Philippine laws. set aside the Med-Arbiter's Order and authorized the calling of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of IRRI. Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 14 On 20 April 1987. as amended. orders. except insofar as immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institution or his authorized representative. the Secretary of Labor. On appeal. In a Manifestation filed on 4 August 1990. 1 and held that "the immunities and privileges granted to IRRI do not include exemption from coverage of our Labor Laws. Said Director relied on Article 243 of the Labor Code. required the respondents to comment on the petition. unless and until the Institute expressly waives its immunity. Verily. subpoena. the present Petition for Certiorari filed by Kapisanan alleging grave abuse of discretion by respondent Secretary of Labor in upholding IRRI's diplomatic immunity. no summons. Decree No. dismissed the Petition for Certification Election. Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution. the Kapisanan filed a Petition for Direct Certification Election with Region IV. Garcia. decisions or proceedings ordered by any court or administrative or quasi-judicial agency are enforceable as against the Institute. and held that the grant of specialized agency status by the Philippine Government to the IRRI bars DOLE from assuming and exercising jurisdiction over IRRI Said Resolution reads in part as follows: Presidential Decree No. On 7 July 1987. in a Resolution of 5 July 1989. 1620 and dismissed the Petition for Direct Certification. the Institute. to which the case was originally assigned. It provides in categorical terms that: Art. the Secretary of Labor declared that it was "not adopting as his own" the decision of the BLR Director in the ICMC Case as well as the Comment of the Solicitor General sustaining said Director. upheld the opposition on the basis of Pres. On appeal. The Third Division.

Section 4. G. providing for the direct filing of appeal from the Med-Arbiter to the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment instead of to the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations in cases involving certification election orders. which position has been superseded by respondent Secretary of Labor in G. privileges. adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 November 1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate through Resolution No.R. 6715. their property and assets. the Secretary of Labor relied on Section 25 of Rep. 8. There can be no question that diplomatic immunity has. Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine Government and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have a status "similar to that of a specialized agency. explicitly provides: Art. A procedural issue is also raised. 1620 granting IRRI the status. the Order of the BLR Director had become final and unappeable and that. shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case they have . Sections 4 and 5 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies. 89331. III. Kapisanan faults respondent Secretary of Labor for entertaining IRRI'S appeal from the Order of the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations directing the holding of a certification election. 9 and 10 of Rule V 2 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. is unconstitutional in so far as it deprives the Filipino workers of their fundamental and constitutional right to form trade unions for the purpose of collective bargaining as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Act. No. No. On the other hand. in fact. The Court acceded to the Solicitor General's prayer. the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that he be excused from filing a comment "it appearing that in the earlier case of International Catholic Migration Commission v. Pura Calleja.R. The Court is now asked to rule upon whether or not the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Petition for Certification Election filed by Kapisanan." Article III. The specialized agencies. III Findings in Both Cases. the Office of the Solicitor General had sustained the stand of Director Calleja on the very same issue now before it. Hon. Decree No. Instead of a Comment. No." the present case. Kapisanan contends that pursuant to Sections 7. therefore. been granted ICMC and IRRI. prerogatives and immunities of an international organization. in entertaining the appeal. Kapisanan contends that Article 3 of Pres. 19 on 17 May 1949. which took effect on 21 March 1989. 85750. invoked by the Secretary of Labor. the Secretary of Labor had no more jurisdiction over the said appeal.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 15 IRRI on 14 August 1990. wherever located and by whomsoever held.

through its Legal Adviser. wherever located and by whomsoever held shall be immune from search. (Emphasis supplied). It is. Decree No. Hence. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government. Thus it is that the DEFORAF. dated 17 October 1988. . whether by executive. Immunity from Legal Process. 1620. . civil and administrative proceedings. it expressed the view that "the Order of the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated 21 September 1988 for the conduct of Certification Election within ICMC violates the diplomatic immunity of the organization. 3 A brief look into the nature of international organizations and specialized agencies is in order. it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction. confiscation. Article 3. dated 17 June 1987." Similarly. to the Secretary of Labor. in respect of IRRI. The term "international organization" is generally used to describe an organization set up by agreement between two or more states. . 5. — The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal. understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution. The property and assets of the specialized agencies. . in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . — The premises of the specialized agencies shall be inviolable. the DEFORAF speaking through The Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs. requisition. thus: Art. which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a political department of Government. maintained that "IRRI enjoys immunity from the jurisdiction of DOLE in this particular instance." The foregoing opinions constitute a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that ICMC and IRRI enjoy immunities accorded to international organizations. 4 Under contemporary international law. administrative. or other officer acting under his direction. Sec. as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations. sustained ICMC'S invocation of immunity when in a Memorandum. expropriation and any other form of interference. and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar. Jose D. it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . is explicit in its grant of immunity. 3. Ingles. Pres. except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives. IRRI is similarly situated. however. such organizations are endowed with some degree of international legal personality 5 such that they . judicial or legislative action.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 16 expressly waived their immunity. in a letter.

11 There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international immunities to international organizations. meteorology. canals. There are now many such international agencies having functions in many different fields. 6 They are organized mainly as a means for conducting general international business in which the member states have an interest.g. A series of conventions. The term appears in Articles 57 8 and 63 9 of the Charter of the United Nations: The Charter. contemplates that these tasks will be mainly fulfilled not by organs of the United Nations itself but by autonomous international organizations established by inter-governmental agreements outside the United Nations. some are regional or otherwise limited in their membership. sea transport. trade. 12 The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in character. rivers. and 3) the international organization should. 2) no country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international funds. railways. "It is not concerned with the status. e." 10 The rapid growth of international organizations under contemporary international law has paved the way for the development of the concept of international immunities. is an international organization dedicated to the propagation of world peace. civil aviation. educational and related matters. contained in the ILO Memorandum are stated thus: 1) international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or interference by any one government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented. are then to be known as "specialized agencies. "Specialized agencies" are international organizations having functions in particular fields. duties and powers. The Charter provides that those agencies which have "wide international responsibilities" are to be brought into relationship with the United Nations by agreements entered into between them and the Economic and Social Council. These principles. health and refugees. . finance. cultural. It is now usual for the constitutions of international organizations to contain provisions conferring certain immunities on the organizations themselves. while it invests the United Nations with the general task of promoting progress and international cooperation in economic. 7 The United Nations. . education and culture. as a collectivity of States members.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 17 are capable of exercising specific rights. social. be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States. representatives of their member states and persons acting on behalf of the organizations. dignity or privileges of individuals. health. for instance. telecommunications. . agreements and protocols defining the immunities of various international organizations in relation to their members generally are now widely in force. in posts. atomic energy. Some are virtually world-wide in their membership. but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national .

In the event that the Government determines that there has been an abuse of the privileges and immunities granted under this Agreement. from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization. facilitate the proper administration of justice and prevent the occurrences of any abuse of the privileges and immunities granted its officials and alien employees in Article III of this Agreement to the Commission. which are guaranteed by Article II. Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management as. in fact. Section 3 (supra). whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC." Moreover. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17 provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party. 13 The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned. rules and regulations. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. in accordance with international practice. ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights. Cooperation with Government Authorities. IV. and implemented by Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code. For. Section 8. which is to shield the affairs of international organizations. 14 Article III. the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. — 1. consultations shall be held between the Government and the Commission to determine whether any such abuse has occurred and. The Commission shall cooperate at all times with the appropriate authorities of the Government to ensure the observance of Philippine laws. and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions. the Government shall withdraw the privileges and immunities granted the Commission and its officials. 16 relied on by the BLR Director and by Kapisanan. 2. Section 18. 15 and Article XIII. Thus: Art. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity. there had been organized a forum for better management-employee relationship as evidenced by the formation of the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM) wherein "both management and employees were and still are represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between IRRI and its . The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 18 control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members. if so. pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine Government. of the 1987 Constitution. ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled.

No. having taken cognizance of that dispute (on the issue of payment of salary for the unexpired portion of a six-month probationary employment). Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are said to be standard provisions in the constitutions of international Organizations. Anent the procedural issue raised in the IRRI Case. dated 15 February 1989." 18 We take note of a Manifestation.. which grants to IRRI the status. The pertinent portion of that law provides: Art. NLRC. Rollo). 30 January 1989. but also because ICMC in that case did not invoke its immunity and." The eventuality of Court litigation is neither remote and from which international organizations are precisely shielded to safeguard them from the disruption of their functions." it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. assuming that during that period (1983-1985) it was tacitly recognized as enjoying such immunity. It is equally applicable to proceedings in personam and proceedings in rem.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 19 employees. therefore. "The immunity covers the organization concerned. dated 28 September 1989. We find no merit to said submission. Act No. — Any party to an election may appeal the order or results of the election as determined by the Med-Arbiter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment on the ground that the rules and regulations or parts thereof established by the Secretary of Labor and Employment for the . 72222. wherein TUPAS calls attention to the case entitled "International Catholic Migration Commission v. A certification election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process. specifically since 21 March 1989. the Court is now estopped from passing upon the question of DOLE jurisdiction petition over ICMC. or before the grant to ICMC on 15 July 1988 of the status of a specialized agency with corresponding immunities. in the ICMC Case (p. may be deemed to have waived it. Hence. (G. et als. 1620. was already in effect. 259. Decree No. deprives its employees of the right to self-organization. contrary to Kapisanan's allegations. The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. civil and administrative proceedings. and claims that. which could inevitably involve ICMC in the "legal process. suffice it to state that the Decision of the BLR Director. which provides for direct appeals from the Orders of the Med-Arbiter to the Secretary of Labor in certification election cases either from the order or the results of the election itself. its property and its assets." The existence of this Union factually and tellingly belies the argument that Pres. 161. 169 SCRA 606).R." which includes "any penal. It could tugger off a series of events in the collective bargaining process together with related incidents and/or concerted activities. Not only did the facts of said controversy occur between 1983-1985. no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to respondent Secretary of Labor in his assumption of appellate jurisdiction. had not become final because of a Motion for Reconsideration filed by IRRI Said Motion was acted upon only on 30 March 1989 when Rep. privileges and immunities of an international organization. 6715.

L-25246 September 12. the Order of the Bureau of Labor Relations for certification election is SET ASIDE. Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-appellant.:p Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. In G. No. No.R. in G. 85750 (the ICMC Case). . Victoriano vs Elizalde Rope (1974) G. effaced.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 20 conduct of the election have been violated. Such appeal shall be decided within 15 calendar days (Emphasis supplied). no grave abuse of discretion having been committed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in dismissing the Petition for Certification Election. 89331 (the IRRI Case). Salonga. 4. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION.R. plaintiff-appellee. J. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY. No. and the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued is made PERMANENT. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958. he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows: Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement. the Court is gratified to note that the heretofore antagonistic positions assumed by two departments of the executive branch of government have been rectified and the resultant embarrassment to the Philippine Government in the eyes of the international community now. No pronouncement as to costs. 1974 BENJAMIN VICTORIANO. a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo". Inc. En passant. Ordonez.R. defendants. Sicat & Associates for plaintiff-appellee. INC. vs. 58894. the Petition is GRANTED. Yap. ZALDIVAR. WHEREFORE. The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow: Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee). SO ORDERED. had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory. hopefully. defendant-appellant.. As such employee. the Petition is Dismissed.

he reiterated his resignation on September 3. "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". from dismissing the plaintiff from his present employment and sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this action. that the Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations. firstly. 875. March 4. the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. docketed as Civil Case No. the Union contented. 2 Upon the facts agreed upon by the parties during the pre-trial conference. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that Republic Act No. 1964. the dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. 3350. and when no action was taken thereon. 1974.. Inc. 875. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee. Republic Act No. Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization. and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case. This prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction. 3350. assigning the following errors: I. II. that "the very phraseology of said Republic Act 3350. however. judgment is rendered enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory. if such labor organization is the representative of the employees. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant herein to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as attorney's fees and the cost thereof. the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement. introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No." On June 18. 875. as follows: . Under Section 4(a).. 1965. the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e). Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union. the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 21 The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3. the Court a quo rendered its decision on August 26. 3350. In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted. pursuant to Republic Act No. 1964 but was renewed the following day. 3 From this decision. the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely questions of law. Thereupon. 1961. of Republic Act No. assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional. 1 In its answer. that membership in a labor organization is banned to all those belonging to such religious sect prohibiting affiliation with any labor . paragraph 4. prior to its amendment by Republic Act No.

12 and that unless Republic Act No. are relieved from the obligation to continue as such members. 9 Fifthly." in that the laborer's exercise of his civil right to join associations for purposes not contrary to law has to be determined under the Act by his affiliation with a religious sect. Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution. 3350. and that said Act. furthermore.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 22 organization" 4 . 3350 is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of contracts in that. 8 Fourthly." the Act relieves the employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the maintenance of union membership as a condition of employment. in violation of Article Ill. benefits and other emoluments that the union might secure from the employer. under the Act. for the right to . 3350 violates the constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social justice. "prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto" 5 . violates the "equal protection of laws" clause of the Constitution. the Union contended that Republic Act No. impairs the Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues from members who. 6 Secondly. 11 Appellant Union. Republic Act No. and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III. it being a discriminately legislation. said Act would violate religious freedom. inasmuch as by exempting from the operation of closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni Cristo". while the Union is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining agreement containing a "closed shop provision. consequently. trade unionism in this country would be wiped out as employers would prefer to hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristo in order to do away with labor organizations. 3350. that conversely. deprives said members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. violates the constitutional provision that "no religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right. asserted the Union. 3350 discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions. and while said Act unduly protects certain religious sects. 13 Appellee. the Union contended that Republic Act No. as to call for the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the right to form lawful associations. it nevertheless entitles them at the same time to the enjoyment of all concessions. it leaves no rights or protection to labor organizations. and. 10 Sixthly. assailing appellant's arguments. if a worker has to sever his religious connection with a sect that prohibits membership in a labor organization in order to be able to join a labor organization. contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is declared unconstitutional. for while the Act exempts them from union obligation and liability. 7 Thirdly. 3350. furthermore. Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution. the Union contended that Republic Act No. the Union contended that Republic Act No. it has granted said members undue advantages over their fellow workers. asserted that a "closed shop provision" in a collective bargaining agreement cannot be considered violative of religious freedom.

19 1. as well as Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1973. alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. 875 recognize freedom of association. is germane to the purpose of the law. 15 that the Act does not violate the establishment of religion clause or separation of Church and State. neither can the same be deduced by necessary implication therefrom. if one's conscience does not allow his membership therein. having thus misread the Act. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. and applies to all the members of a given class. Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935. does not violate the social justice policy of the Constitution. for the classification of workers under the Act depending on their religious tenets is based on substantial distinction. the terms of the closed shop agreement. it will be upheld. that said Act does not violate the constitutional provision of equal protection. justice. that appellant. for said Act was enacted precisely to equalize employment opportunities for all citizens in the midst of the diversities of their religious beliefs. and the Act has given substance to such right by prohibiting the compulsion of workers to join labor organizations. it is necessary to premise that there are some thoroughly established principles which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtains in the instant case are involved. Section 3 of Republic Act No." 18 I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error. 17 that said Act. in enacting said law. and was incorporated into. that the constitutional right to the free exercise of one's religion has primacy and preference over union security measures which are merely contractual 16 . join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom. 875 provides that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form. What the Constitution and the Industrial . 3350 prohibits and bans the members of such religious sects that forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions from joining labor unions appears nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. one who attacks a statute. that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute. for Congress. It is not surprising. 3350. 14 that said Act does not impair the obligation of contracts for said law formed part of. finally. and balanced the collective rights of organized labor with the constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise his chosen religion. and the challenger must negate all possible bases. provide that the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. policy. committed the error of contending that said Act is obnoxious to the constitutional provision on freedom of association. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality. that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional. merely accommodated the religious needs of those workers whose religion prohibits its members from joining labor unions. or expediency of a statute.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 23 join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization. therefore.

that in spite of any closed shop agreement. and even after he has joined. he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time. a right comprehends at least two broad notions. liberty or freedom.. The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is. in the same breath. if any person. Republic Act No. if such labor organization is the representative of the employees".e. i. and second. and should he choose to join. namely: first. of a closed shop agreement. It is. regardless of his religious beliefs. 3350. however. whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law. therefore. before the enactment of Republic Act No. before its amendment by Republic Act No. therefore. it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes. however. is the "right" to join associations of his choice. not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein. that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. wishes to be employed or to keep his employment. provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization" the employer is. 3350 introduced an exception. 3350. limited. therefore. where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop. he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement. members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment . 20 It is clear. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. power. and guaranteed to the employee. is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers. By virtue. by virtue of which the employer may employ only member of the collective bargaining union. it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to. as he pleases. and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. therefore. whereby an employee may. join or refrain from Joining an association. the absence of legal restraint. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association. Republic Act No. Hence. upon the employee the duty to join associations. What the exception provides. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right". the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association. 21 Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized. he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 24 Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn. when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

specifically. 2. 24 In spite of the constitutional prohibition. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith. therefore. According to Black. 1961. does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association. therefore. therefore. or disaffiliate from the Union. therefore. It is not a question of degree or manner or cause. Appellee. Republic Act No. that the assailed Act. far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association. or its legal construction. upholds and reinforces it. but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation or dispensing with any part of its force. they can do so. The Act. This agreement was already in existence at the time Republic Act No. but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal . affording a broad outline and requiring construction to fill in the details. derogate from substantial contractual rights. introduced a change into the express terms of the union security clause. and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. or the remedy for its enforcement. for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. 3350 was enacted on June 18. with labor unions. But by reason of this amendment. neither does the law prohibit them from joining. by virtue of which "membership in the union was required as a condition for employment for all permanent employees workers". There is an impairment of the contract if either party is absolved by law from its performance. the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. It is clear. any statute which introduces a change into the express terms of the contract. or not to affiliate. the Company was partly absolved by law from the contractual obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union members in permanent positions. The prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 25 or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. the "union security clause" embodied in its Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Company. 22 Impairment has also been predicated on laws which. or its discharge. and it cannot. the law does not coerce them to join. without destroying contracts. impairs the contract. It cannot be denied. 25 For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties. 3350. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of its contract. they refuse to sign up. that there was indeed an impairment of said union security clause. as well as others similarly situated. that the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The extent of the change is not material. The prohibition is general. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. 23 It should not be overlooked. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate. or its validity. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. notwithstanding their religious beliefs. could no longer be dismissed from his job even if he should cease to be a member. If. therefore. and the Company could continue employing him notwithstanding his disaffiliation from the Union. the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union. be deemed to have been incorporated into the agreement. however. they can do so.

28 Thus.e. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. 29 In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract obligations. the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. this Court also held that the Blue Sunday Law was not an infringement of the obligation of a contract that required the employer to furnish work on Sundays to his employees. The contract clause of the Constitution must. 3350? Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion.. i. statutory and constitutional right to work. must yield to the common good. and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions. a legitimate exercise of the police power. 27 In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition against impairing the obligations of contracts has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the state involving public welfare. This has special application to contracts regulating relations between capital and labor which are not merely contractual. All contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under the police power must be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of that power. but every case must be determined upon its own circumstances. and said labor contracts. important and valuable reforms may be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited. furthermore. for being impressed with public interest. has been fashioned. Both the end sought and the means adopted must be legitimate. the reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 26 order. within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed in harmony with the constitutional limitation of that power. 26 Otherwise. at various times in his working . and when the means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. are obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to impairment. be not only in harmony with. 30 What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. the law having been enacted to secure the well-being and happiness of the laboring class. and being. by which the validity of each statute may be measured or determined. applicable at all times and under all circumstances. confirming thereby their natural. although it incidentally destroys existing contract rights. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people. therefore. The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against two aggregates of group strength from which the individual needs protection. It follows that not all legislations. in appropriate instances. and a statute passed in the legitimate exercise of police power. must be upheld by the courts. no unchanging yardstick. but also in subordination to. The individual employee. which have the effect of impairing a contract.

an institution developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect the individual employee from the power of collective capital. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified. The union. Likewise. appellant Union averred that said Act discriminates in favor of members of said religious sects in violation of Section 1 (7) of Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 27 life. This is tantamount to punishing such person for believing in a doctrine he has a right under the law to believe in. shall forever be allowed. which provides: No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion. Moreover. 3350 is unconstitutional. the law would not commend the deprivation of their right to work and pursue a modest means of livelihood. paradoxically. which include freedom of religion. 31 The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in the Explanatory Note to House Bill No. must yield to freedom of religion. 33 Religious freedom. and collective capital. 3. therefore. without discrimination and preference. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. as follows: It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person who. Contractual rights. In case of conflict. The law would not allow discrimination to flourish to the detriment of those whose religion discards membership in any labor organization. directed by management. which later became Republic Act No. . enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional system. it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which the individual also needs protection — the collective bargaining relationship. or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. both the champion of employee rights. therefore. the latter must. 32 It cannot be denied. The Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on several occasions that the rights in the First Amendment. is a fundamental personal right and liberty. It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. that the means adopted by the Act to achieve that purpose — exempting the members of said religious sects from coverage of union security agreements — is reasonable. furthermore. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. 5859. and a new source of their frustration. and which is now Section 8 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. 34 and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. although not unlimited. when the Union interacts with management. and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. cannot accept membership in a labor organization although he possesses all the qualifications for the job. directed by a union. and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. 3350. on account of his religious beliefs and convictions. is confronted by two aggregates of power — collective labor. yield to the former. without in any manner violating their religious faith and/or belief. is.

It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience. the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance. the Act also promotes the well-being of society. 3350 is secular. within its power. a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals. by reason of union security agreements. or be dismissed from work. It has likewise been held that the statute.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 28 The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect. thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood. and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs. or diminish. and by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment. must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. and temporal. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly advance. by averting that certain persons be refused work. 35 but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. 42 The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization. and welfare of the people of the State. Republic Act No. ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex. or to discriminate invidiously between the religions. and regulate the relations between labor and capital and industry. In fact. 40 Assessed by these criteria. morals. to afford protection to labor. which is a serious menace to the health. 37 But if the stage regulates conduct by enacting. in order to withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition. unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. and to live as he believes he ought to live. 36 Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions. The purpose of Republic Act No. 38 In Aglipay v. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. to profess his beliefs. not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. 41 More so now in the 1973 Constitution where it is mandated that "the State shall afford protection to labor. even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. To help its citizens to find gainful employment whereby they can make a living to support themselves and their families is a valid objective of the state. Ruiz 39 . promote full employment and equality in employment. is the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement. is invalid. consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. the . worldly. in the 1935 Constitution. to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs. race or creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers. 3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the Constitution. this Court had occasion to state that the government should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect. the state is enjoined.

or condition. 3350 protects members of certain religious sects. Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions. 44 We believe that in enacting Republic Act No.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 29 interests of any particular religion. As to the lamented silence of the Act regarding the rights and protection of labor unions. exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest" intervenes. 4. 45 In the instant case. The Act does not require as a qualification. and a fortiori to a labor — union assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion — is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. and. It was Congress itself that imposed that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875). Congress. 43 The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious exercise be preferentially aided. 47 It would not be amiss to state. not by its silence 46 . second. that to compel persons to join and remain members of a union to keep their jobs in violation of their religious scrupples. It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land. for joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect. certainly. labor unions. Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious objectors lest their resistance spread to other workers. The purpose of Republic Act No. it leaves no right to. 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. that Republic Act No. by certain persons. Congress acted consistently with the spirit of the constitutional provision. Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. but when general laws conflict with scrupples of conscience. first. regarding this matter. if it so deems advisable. for religious objections have contagious potentialities more than political and philosophic objections. 3350. Furthermore. We see no such compelling state interest to withhold exemption. could take away the same burden. the fact that the law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional. 875 and the new Labor Code. that the validity of a statute is determined by its provisions. and is silent as to the protection of. The rights of labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No. is not well taken. neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion. labor organizations. Republic Act . would hurt. suffice it to say. 3350 violates the constitutional prohibition against requiring a religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a political right. and. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. Appellants' fourth contention. rather than help. of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements. 48 A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country.

in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality. so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 30 No. that every man. A conscientious religious objector need not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor union — he is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part. How then can there be a religious test required for the exercise of a right when no right need be exercised? We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact Republic Act No. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. It is never an illegal evasion of a constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result. a religious objector is not required to do a positive act — to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such. So. a requirement. is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. that it must be germane to the purpose of the law. It guarantees equality. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. 49 5. thus violating Section 1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution which forbids the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences. inasmuch as it grants to the members of certain religious sects undue advantages over other workers. as in the other departments of knowledge or practice. therefore. 55 In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction. by discovering or following a legal way to do it. 50 The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. under this Act. and that its purpose was legal and in consonance with the Constitution. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop agreements. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. 54 This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 3350 is a discriminatory legislation. 52 The very idea of classification is that of inequality. 51 It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. Classification in law. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. which is lawful in itself. It is not. 3350. and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. 53 All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable. that it must not be limited to existing conditions only. the state is recognized as . not identity of rights.

Tile classification rests on real or substantial. join labor unions. 59 for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm. mere ideas existing only in the mind. Employees do not believe in the same religious faith and different religions differ in their dogmas and cannons. the classification is based on real and important differences. 60 Religious sentiment makes a man view things and events in their relation to his God.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 31 enjoying a wide range of discretion. The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. 56 It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. 58 Hence legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions. and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. for they carry with them practical consequences and are the motives of certain rules. the world has witnessed turmoil. Usually. a strong and passionate desire is involved in a religious belief. The classification. and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear. . of human conduct and the justification of certain acts. We believe that Republic Act No. Because of differences in religious belief and sentiments. its happiness or unhappiness its enjoyment or irksomeness. Religious beliefs. differences in religion do exist. There are diverse manners in which beliefs. though they are found in all places. It gives to human life its distinctive character. hatred. no single factor of their experience is more important to them than their religion. Due to their religious beliefs people. not merely imaginary or whimsical. into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union. take so many varied forms as to be almost beyond imagination. introduced by Republic Act No. The Act classifies employees and workers. equally paramount in the lives of their possessors. feelings and sentiments of employees. 3350. rests on substantial distinctions. Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs. and in all times. because of their religious belief. distinctions. from being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from their work because of union shop security agreements. and these differences are important and should not be ignored. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. or their not having any religion. There is such real distinction in the beliefs. its tone. Even from the phychological point of view. became resigned to the inevitable and accepted cheerfully even the most painful and excruciating pains. bloodshed and war. as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements. a very poor person may consider himself better than the rich. civil strife. persecution. Today the country is far more heterogenous in religion than before. generated to a large extent by members of sects who were intolerant of other religious beliefs. There are many views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs among the people. 57 Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. To certain persons. Because of differences in religious beliefs. and the man who even lacks the necessities of life may be more cheerful than the one who has all possible luxuries. The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot. therefore. may be articulated. manifestations and practices. like the martyrs.

Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all component elements of society. it has been said that whenever it is apparent from the scope of the law that its object is for the benefit of the public and the means by which the benefit is to be obtained are of public character. because they are differently situated. 63 Republic Act No. The Act also advances the proper economic and social equilibrium between labor unions and . 3350 violates the constitutional provision on social justice is also baseless. the law will be upheld even though incidental advantage may occur to individuals beyond those enjoyed by the general public. for every classification allowed by the Constitution by its nature involves inequality. and there are employees who are prohibited by their religion from affiliating with labor unions. it is not necessary that the entire state be directly benefited — it is sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited thereby. who are also component elements of society. 62 6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to the members of a religious sect. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. Finally. and puts them in the same plane as the other workers who are not prohibited by their religion from joining labor unions. In determining whether any particular measure is for public advantage. that the other employees. 64 Republic Act No. The law does not provide that it is to be effective for a certain period of time only. It is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions to which the law is applicable exist. for as We have adverted to. like the Iglesia ni Cristo. the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects. is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. 3350. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who. this is evident from its provision. The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection. are not granted the same privilege. because of their religious belief. does not render the law unconstitutional.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 32 Republic Act No. the Act only restores to them their freedom of association which closed shop agreements have taken away. furthermore. As long as there are closed shop agreements between an employer and a labor union. but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. cannot join labor unions. 61 Anent this matter. their exemption from the coverage of said agreements continues. The circumstance. A classification otherwise reasonable does not offend the constitution simply because in practice it results in some inequality. The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said religious sects cannot by itself render the Act unconstitutional. through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the community. for it insures security in their employment. notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union having a closed shop agreement with the employer. for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree.

that. 71 II. As its last ground. and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion. furthermore. is necessarily premised on differentiations based on personal or natural conditions. employers will prefer employing members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 33 employees who cannot join labor unions. because social inequality will always exist as long as social relations depend on personal or subjective proclivities. 70 The essential basis for the exercise of power. for that reason. appellant contends that the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. the validity of a statute is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficacy to accomplish the end desired. in support of which the Union argued that the decision of the trial court ordering the Union to pay P500 for attorney's fees directly contravenes Section 24 of Republic Act No. We do not agree. 65 Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity 66 . that since Appellee was compelled to institute an action to protect his right to work. Appellee claimed that in the instant case there was really no industrial dispute involved in the attempt to compel Appellee to maintain its membership in the union under pain of dismissal. Social justice does not imply social equality. 67 Courts do inquire into the wisdom of laws. being a relative term. in so far as opportunity to work is concerned. and that the Union. At any rate. and this is precisely what Republic Act No. Anent this matter. for the instant action involves an industrial dispute wherein the Union was a party. Appellee was never actually dismissed by the defendant Company and did not therefore suffer any damage at all . by its act. 3350 is not called for — in other words. that in determining the constitutional validity of legislation. legislatures. being chosen by the people. Social justice does not require legal equality because legal equality. those whose religion prohibits membership in labor unions with those whose religion does not prohibit said membership. The threat to unionism will depend on the number of employees who are members of the religious sects that control the demands of the labor market. 875. But there is really no occasion now to go further and anticipate problems We cannot judge with the material now before Us. 7. are presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of the people. that said order also contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil Code. irrespective of their religious scrupples. the Act is not proper. it has been held that a statute which is not necessary is not. 68 Moreover. 3350 proposes to accomplish — it gives laborers. not from its effects on a particular case. and it may change the laws accordingly. We now pass on the second assignment of error. the courts are unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the enactment of the legislation in question. equal opportunity for work. for it exempts the latter from the compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed shop agreements and equalizes. appellant could legally be ordered to pay attorney's fees under Articles . necessary or desirable. is the criterion by which the validity of a statute is to be measured. and thus be a fatal blow to unionism. 72 In refuting appellant Union's arguments. inflicted intentional harm on Appellee. and said Union merely acted in the exercise of its rights under the union shop provision of its existing collective bargaining contract with the Company. unconstitutional. 69 The fear is entertained by appellant that unless the Act is declared unconstitutional.

(Emphasis supplied) That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be disputed for appellant sought the discharge of respondent by virtue of the closed shop agreement and under Section 2 (j) of Republic Act No. therefore. 875 which is relied upon by appellant provides that: No suit. appealed from is affirmed. 875. it cannot be gainsaid that appellant Union's act in demanding Appellee's dismissal caused Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his job. Muñoz Palma and Aquino. of the Court of First Instance of Manila.. business or employment of some other person or with the right of some other person to dispose of his capital or labor. cannot invoke in its favor Section 24 of Republic Act No. Separate Opinions FERNANDO. in its Civil Case No. Castro. with costs against appellant Union. and the decision. It is so ordered. and "in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered".J. concur. on the ground only that such act induces some other person to break a contract of employment or that it is in restraint of trade or interferes with the trade. concurring: The decision arrived at unanimously by this Court that Republic Act No. Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code. shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party... J. The mere fact that appellant is a labor union does not necessarily mean that all its acts are in furtherance of an industrial dispute. This case is not intertwined with any unfair labor practice case existing at the time when Appellee filed his complaint before the lower court. Esguerra. It being the labor dispute itself. Antonio. 73 The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 a question involving tenure of employment is included in the term "labor dispute". dated August 26. 74 The discharge or the act of seeking it is the labor dispute itself. The article provides that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded "when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff . C. to incur expenses to protect his interest". Rule 142. invoked by the Union. Costs according to Section 1. of the Rules of Court. Makasiar. 75 Appellant Union. In the instant case. in furtherance of an industrial dispute". action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in any court against a labor organization or any officer or member thereof for any act done by or on behalf of such organization in furtherance of an industrial dispute to which it is a party. Barredo. JJ. serve as its shield.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 34 1704 and 2208 of the Civil Code.. that very same act of the Union in asking the employer to dismiss Appellee cannot be "an act done . the instant appeal is dismissed. 3350 is free from the constitutional infirmities imputed to it was demonstrated in a . WHEREFORE.. 1965. Makalintal. Teehankee. 58894.

No matter. It suffices that for him such a concept holds undisputed sway. 1. Gerona v. Thus is constitutionally safeguarded." 5 There was this qualification though: "But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief. I deem it proper to submit this brief expression of my views on the transcendent character of religious freedom 1 and its primacy even as against the claims of protection to labor." 6 It was on that basis that the daily compulsory flag ceremony in accordance with a statute 7 was found free from the constitutional objection on the part of a religious sect. even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. Considering moreover. whose members alleged that their participation would be offensive to their religious beliefs. we apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually . In a case not dissimilar. The "fixed star on our constitutional constellation. Thus: "The case is made difficult not because the principles of its decision are obscure but because the flag involved is our own. limitless and without bounds. West Virginia State Board of Education v." to borrow the felicitous phrase of Justice Jackson. 8 the American Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion. it would appear that the last word has been written on this particular subject. It would be to disregard the dignity that attaches to every human being to deprive him of such an attribute. a citadel to which the law is denied entry. That is a domain left untouched. including religious belief. 2 also one of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. highly persuasive. has it in his power to prescribe what shall be orthodox in matters of conscience — or to mundane affairs. One may believe in most anything. Nonetheless. where intrusion is not allowed. bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others. the detailed attention paid to each and every objection raised as to its validity and the clarity and persuasiveness with which it was shown to be devoid of support in authoritative doctrines. devoid of rational foundation. is that no official. then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it." 3 The choice of what a man wishes to believe in is his and his alone. and if a devotee of any sect. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law. to act in accordance with its creed. however strange.. I concur fully. for that matter. Justice Zaldivar.. Like the rest of my brethren. Barnette. there is quite a stretch of road to travel. In that sphere. not excluding the highest. Secretary of Education 4 speaks similarly. according to Justice Laurel. that "profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator . what he wills reigns supreme. That is a recognition of man's freedom.. Justice Montemayor: "The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. Religious freedom is identified with the liberty every individual possesses to worship or not a Supreme Being. In the language of its ponente.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 35 manner wellnigh conclusive in the learned. scholarly. and comprehensive opinion so typical of the efforts of the ponente. for this writer. The doctrine to which he pays fealty may for some be unsupported by evidence. Nevertheless. So is the freedom of belief. That for him is one of the ways of self. the Jehovah's Witnesses. Justice Jackson's eloquent opinion is. There is no requirement as to its conformity to what has found acceptance. whatever be his thoughts or hopes.realization.

But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. the question of whether such an exception possesses an implication that lessens the effectiveness of state efforts to protect labor. With such a cardinal postulate as the basis of our polity. When they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here. it is true. the latter is supreme within its sphere and submission or punishment follows. Undoubtedly that duty to the state exists within the domain of power. and Stone. the price is not too great. it is urged. Court of Industrial Relations. Thought must be given to the freedom of association. as set forth earlier. is wholehearted and entire. as a matter of principle. That is why. But. duty to a moral power higher than the state has always been maintained. it even partakes of the political theory of pluralistic sovereignty. even though it conflicts with convictions of duty to God. That would be a mere shadow of freedom." 10 The American Chief Justice spoke in dissent. a duty to be recognized. So great is the respect for the autonomy accorded voluntary societies. would unquestionably be made by many of our conscientious and law-abiding citizens. as noted." 9 There is moreover this ringing affirmation by Chief Justice Hughes of the primacy of religious freedom in the forum of conscience even as against the command of the State itself: "Much has been said of the paramount duty to the state. The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation. When one's belief collides with the power of the state. Brandeis. It is not for this Court. as I conceive of the judicial function. The reservation of that supreme obligation. an institutional device for promoting the welfare of the working man. 12 it . constitutionally ordained. in the forum of conscience. the latest of which is Guijarno v. but upon closer analysis. it has a message that cannot be misread. 11 Such a right implies at the very least that one can determine for himself whether or not he should join or refrain from joining a labor organization. Such a view. 3. to restrict the scope of a preferred freedom. it cannot stand scrutiny. likewise. is inherently coercive. It is attended by futility. As I view Justice Zaldivar's opinion in that light. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order. We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes. but with him in agreement were three of the foremost jurists who ever sat in that Tribunal. Justices Holmes. on the surface. A closed shop.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 36 diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. for government may enforce obedience to laws regardless of scruples. likewise an aspect of intellectual liberty. There is. to paraphrase Cardozo. may not be lacking in plausibility. on the other hand. 2. The labored effort to cast doubt on the validity of the statutory provision in question is far from persuasive. Thus is intoned with a reverberating clang. For the late Professor Howe a constitutionalist and in his lifetime the biographer of the great Holmes. a fundamental principle that drowns all weaker sounds. my concurrence. however. as is unmistakably reflected in our decisions.

Leonardo Joven and Felino Bulandus were. LEONARDO JOVEN. 1 government-owned or controlled corporations had the duty to bargain collectively and were otherwise subject to the obligations and duties of employers in the private sector. that all employees who. the Assistant Chief of the Accounting Division (sometimes Acting Chief in the absence of the Chief) and the Assistant Chief of the Field Service and Non-Life Insurance Division (and Acting Division Chief in the absence of the Chief). 2 The Act also prohibited supervisors to become. members of labor organizations composed of rank-and-file employees.R. They refused to do so. petitioners. NARVASA. Januario T. Nos. two (2) criminal cases for violation of the Industrial Peace Act were lodged against them in the City Court of Cebu: one involving Arizala and Maribao 6 and the other. the Chief of the Accounting Division. The agreement contained a "maintenance-of-membership" clause. 43633-34 September 14. vs. in the Central Visayas Regional Office of the GSIS. for short) became bound by a collective bargaining agreement executed between it and the labor organization representing the majority of its employees. in view of their supervisory positions. is the channel to follow. the petitioners occupied supervisory positions in the GSIS. Seno for petitioners. respondents. the GSIS Employees Association. Joven and . and FELINO BULANDUS. That. 5 i. for me.e. 5. The exhaustive and well-researched opinion of Justice Zaldivar thus is in the mainstream of constitutional tradition. SERGIO MARIBAO. J. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.. is precisely to follow the dictates of sound public policy. 1990 PABLO ARIZALA. 3 and prescribed criminal sanctions for breach of the prohibition. 4 It was under the regime of said Industrial Peace Act that the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS.: Under the Industrial Peace Act. There appears to be no dispute that at that time. and the Chief of the Billing Section of said Division. respectively. respectively. Arizala vs CA (1990) G. or continue to be. were obliged to maintain their union membership in good standing for the duration of the agreement as a condition for their continued employment in the GSIS. Pablo Arizala and Sergio Maribao were. at the time of the execution of said agreement. Demands were made on all four of them to resign from the GSIS Employees Association. For a statutory provision then to further curtail its operation. of the same Central Visayas Regional Office of the GSIS.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 37 is far from being a favorite of the law. Consequently. were members of the union or became members thereafter.

They argued that when the so called "1973 Constitution" took effect on January 17... 8 They were each sentenced "to pay a fine of P 500. 1104. no longer subject of collective bargaining." They appealed to the Court of Appeals. the case of Arizala and Maribao was still pending in the Court of Appeals and that of Joven and Bulandus. agency.R.R. 1973 pursuant to Proclamation No.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 38 Bulandus. and provided that the terms and conditions of their employment were to be "governed by the Civil Service Law. 1976 affirming the convictions of all four appellants." would thenceforth no longer be fixed by collective bargaining but "be governed by the Civil Service . rules and regulations" and hence.00 or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The appellants moved for reconsideration. ." The Code did not adopt the provision of the Industrial Peace Act conferring on employees of government-owned or controlled corporations the right of self-organization and collective bargaining. The Appellate Court denied their plea for reconsideration. Article 292 of the Labor Code repealed such parts and provisions of the Industrial Peace Act as were "not adopted as part" of said Code "either directly or by reference. 7 Both criminal actions resulted in the conviction of the accused in separate decisions. the present petition for review on certiorari. as CA-G. the appellants ceased to fall within the coverage of the Industrial Peace Act and should thus no longer continue to be prosecuted and exposed to punishment for a violation thereof. repealing the Industrial Peace Act-placed employees of all categories in government-owned or controlled corporations without distinction within the Civil Service. in fact it made known that the "terms and conditions of employment of all government employees. 14724-CR. They pointed out further that the criminal sanction in the Industrial Peace Act no longer appeared in the Labor Code. Hence. The crucial issue obviously is whether or not the petitioners' criminal liability for a violation of the Industrial Peace Act may be deemed to have been obliterated in virtue of subsequent legislation and the provisions of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. The appeals were consolidated on motion of the appellants. 9 Arizala's and Maribao's appeal was docketed as CA-G. that since the provisions of that constitution and of the Labor Code subsequently promulgated (eff. 1974). Section 1. Article XII-B of the 1973 Constitution does indeed provide that the "Civil Service embraces every branch. The petitioners' contention that their liability had been erased is made to rest upon the following premises: 1. including government-owned or controlled corporations. 14856-CR. and eventuated in a judgment promulgated on January 29. November 1. including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations. that of Joven and Bulandus. administered by an independent Civil Service Commission. No. No. subdivision and instrumentality of the government. pending decision in the City Court of Cebu. 2.

. and to adjust their grievance or effectively to recommend such acts if. Considered "supervisors' were those 'having authority in the interest of an employer to hire. the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. Supervisory employees were forbidden to join labor organizations composed of employees under them. or responsibly to direct them. and high level or managerial employees have undergone alterations through the years. altered or otherwise modified by collective bargaining. or discipline other employees.. either directly or indirectly. 12 persons "employed in proprietary functions of the Government. recommend. "it shall be considered merely as an administrative offense rather than a criminal offense (and that) (u)nfair labor practice complaints shall x x be processed like any ordinary labor disputes. but could form their own unions.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 39 Law. rules and regulations. under RA 875 (the Industry Peace Act). 875 As already intimated." 13 . (its) effectivity ." 10 3.g. by the repeal of the statute under which said judgment has been rendered. The specific penalty for violation of the prohibition on supervisors being members in a labor organization of employees under their supervision has disappeared. But those "employed in governmental functions" were forbidden to "strike for the purpose of securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of employment" or join labor organizations which imposed on their members the duty to strike.. The Code also modified the concept of unfair labor practice. The reason obviously was that the terms and conditions of their employment were "governed by law" and hence could not be fixed. decreeing that thenceforth. e. including the right to engage in concerted activities to attain their objectives. suspend.. The legal principles governing the rights of self-organization and collective bargaining of rank-and-file employees in the government. Republic Act No. recall. discharge. in justification of the Appellate Tribunal's affirmance of the petitioners' convictions of violations of the Industrial Peace Act. transfer. assign.particularly as regards supervisory. in connection with the foregoing. strikes." 11 On the other hand. the People- 1) advert to the fact that said Labor Code also states that "all actions or claims accruing prior to . 4." had the right of self-organization and collective bargaining. shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time of their accrual." and 2) argue that the legislature cannot generally intervene and vacate the judgment of the courts. including but not limited to governmental corporations. lay-off.

442. provisions (of the Act) or rules (thereunder promulgated) . was General Order No. however. and just and humane conditions of work. medical or educational institutions operating for profit" to "self-organization and to form." 21 It incorporated.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 40 Republic Act No. 2260 Similar provisions were found in R." And one of the first issuances of the President after the proclamation of martial law in September. and the qualifications required for. too." as well as 'all rallies. 20 incorporated the proposition that the "terms and conditions of employment of all government employees. While the Code contained provisions acknowledging the right of "all persons employed in commercial. were those "employed in proprietary functions of the Government including. refuses or neglects to comply with any . industrial and agricultural enterprises. by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos or by imprisonment not exceeding six months or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.. security of tenure.. The Labor Code The Labor Code of the Philippines..." 17 The 1973 Constitution The 1973 Constitution laid down the broad principle that "(t)he State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization. Presidential Decree No. including religious.. including those in government-owned or controlled corporations. taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to. enacted within a year from effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. 5 which inter alia banned strikes in vital industries. subdivisions and instrumentalities of the government including government-owned and controlled corporations.. including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations ." 18 and directed that the "National Assembly shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees. 2260. governmental corporations. the Civil Service Act of 1959." The Labor Code. collective bargaining. 1972. the constitutional mandate that the salaries of said employees "shall be standardized by the National Assembly. demonstrations and other forms of group actions. (embraced) all branches." 15 Not so prohibited. the positions concerned.. but not limited to." 16 The Act also penalized any person who "violates. (are) governed by the Civil Service Law." they "exempted from the foregoing provisions: . join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. rules and regulations.A.." 14 It prohibited such civil service employees who were "employed in governmental functions" to belong to any labor organization which imposed on their members "the obligation to strike or to join strikes." 19 PD 442. 22 however "exempted" government employees from the right to self-organization for purposes of collective bargaining. This Act declared that the "Philippine Civil Service . No.

on the other hand. 807 Clarification of the matter seems to have been very shortly attempted by the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. governmental corporations'-not being within "the policy of the Government that the employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes in their terms and conditions of employment"-could legitimately bargain with their respective employers through their labor organizations. such as strikes." without distinction as to function. They could not however do so under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. lay-off." 25 A "managerial employee" was defined as one vested with power or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire. suspend. and corollarily engage in strikes and other concerted activities in an attempt to bring about changes in the conditions of their work. recall. b) government employees. these provided that "government employees. charitable. were pronounced as 'not eligible to join. discharge. rules and regulations or parts thereof ." and by implication. or to effectively recommend such managerial actions. as coercive measures against their employers. Presidential Decree No." 23 The reason for denying to government employees the right to "self- organization and to form. Under the Civil Service Act. join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 41 a) security guards. Some inconsistency appears to have arisen between the Labor Code and the Civil Service Act of 1959. including employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations. assign or discipline employees. c) managerial employees. excluded as well from the right to engage in concerted activities.. medical and educational institutions not operating for profit. provided the latter do not have existing collective agreements or recognized unions at the time of the effectivity of the code or have voluntarily waived their exemption. but not limited to.1975) which superseded the Civil Service Law of 1959 (RA 2260) 27 and repealed or modified "all laws. assist or form any labor organization. and if none exists. and d) employees of religious. join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining" is presumably the same as that under the Industrial Peace Act. i. that the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law and not by collective bargaining." 26 Presidential Decree No. Oct. persons "employed in proprietary functions of the government including. were "exempted" (excluded is the better term) from "the right to self-organization and to form. Members of supervisory unions who were not managerial employees..e. were declared by the Labor Code to be "eligible to join or assist the rank and file labor organization. 807 (eff. transfer. to form or assist in the forming of such rank and file organization " 24 Managerial employees. 6. including employees of government government- owned and/ or controlled corporations.

issued on April 21. To allow otherwise is to undermine . Executive Order No. agency.." and that said workers "shall be entitled to security of tenure. 34 CSC Memorandum Circular No. 1986 in the exercise of legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution. join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. 1987 enjoined strikes by government officials and employees. collective bargaining and negotiations. . they were allowed to do under the Civil Service Act of 1959. Aquino on December 24.. assisting or forming any labor organization." 29 something which. . including every government owned or controlled corporation whether performing governmental or propriety function. as aforestated. 111. demonstrations. walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. issued by President Corazon C. the Commission enjoins." 33 that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization. and a living wage. to wit: 35 . and considering that there are existing laws which prohibit government officials and employees from resorting to strike. They declare that the "right to self organization shall not be denied to government employees. humane conditions of work. 30 Be this as it may it seems clear that PD 807 (the Civil Service Decree) did not modify the declared ineligibility of "managerial employees" from joining.. and instrumentality of the government.. (it granted merely) the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law. 6 of the Civil Service Commission. including the right to strike in accordance with law." 32 not for "purposes of collective bargaining. 111 Executive Order No. subdivision. The Decree categorically described the scope and coverage of the "Civil Service" as embracing 44 every branch. and peaceful concerted activities. mass leaves. 28 The effect was seemingly to prohibit government employees (including those "employed in proprietary functions of the Government") to "strike for the purpose of securing changes of their terms and conditions of employment. (and) also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. all government officers and employees from staging strikes." 31 To all 'other employees in the civil service. 6 Memorandum Circular No. under pain of administrative sanctions. Prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees..' It granted to employees "of government corporations established under the Corporation Code x x the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their respective employers..ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 42 inconsistent with the provisions" thereof. modified the general disqualification above mentioned of 'government employees. including employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations" from "the right to self-organization and to form." The 1987 Constitution The provisions of the present Constitution on the matter appear to be somewhat more extensive.

the concept of the government employees' right of self- organization differs significantly from that of employees in the private sector. subdivisions. like their counterparts in the private sector. the Rules and Regulations implementing Executive Order No.e. Executive Order No. but to "Civil Service Law and labor laws and procedures whenever applicable. 180 is not regarded as existing or available for "purposes of collective bargaining." it being only those terms and conditions not otherwise fixed by law that "may be subject of negotiation between the duly recognized employees' organizations and appropriate government authorities. instrumentalities and agencies of the Government. was defined and delineated in Executive Order No. that are fixed by law. join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. grievances and cases involving government employees" is not ordinarily left to collective bargaining or other related concerted activities. to engage in concerted activities for the attainment of their objectives.. i." 36 such employees "shall not be discriminated against in respect of their employment by reason of their membership in employees' organizations or participation in the normal activities of their organization x x (and their) employment shall not be subject to the condition that they shall not join or shall relinquish their membership in the employees' organizations. 180 explicitly provide that since the "terms and conditions of employment in the government. the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the (Public Sector Labor- Management) Council for appropriate action." and that in case "any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all available remedies under existing laws and procedures. are subject both to "Civil Service Law and rules" and "any legislation that may be enacted by Congress. such as strikes. including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. But the right of government employees to "form.e. "to form. 180 concedes to government employees. Excluded from negotiation by government employees are the "terms and conditions of employment . the right of self-organization does indeed pertain to all "employees of all branches." 39 And while EO No. join or assist employees organizations of their own choosing" under Executive Order No. boycotts. including the right to strike. the right to engage in concerted activities. 180 The scope of the constitutional right to self-organization of "government employees" above mentioned.." but simply "for the furtherance and protection of their interests.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 43 or prejudice the government system." 38 In other words." 41 What is more. the executive order is quick to add that those activities must be exercised in accordance with law. i. 180 (eff. 1987)." admittedly includes the right to deal and negotiate with their respective employers in order to fix the terms and conditions of employment and also. 37 However. the right of Government employees to deal and negotiate with their respective employers is not quite as extensive as that of private employees. June 1. picketing." 40 that "the resolution of complaints. According to this Executive Order.. The latter's right of self-organization. including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters are .

file bargaining unit. assist or form any labor organization" at all. Now. suspend. 2. according to the Rules implementing RA 6715. it exercises all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law in so far as they are not otherwise inconsistent with other . 6715 shall remain in that unit . transfer. the GSIS performs proprietary functions. assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 44 governed by law. and not to high level employees. assign or discipline employees. To formulate or execute management policies and decisions. suspend. assign or discipline employees. Membership in unions organized "for purposes of negotiation" is open only to rank-and-file employees. 1989. 42 On the matter of limitations on membership in labor unions of government employees. 6715 The rule regarding membership in labor organizations of managerial and supervisory employees just adverted to. "Supervisory employees" are ineligible "for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join. or whose duties are of a highly confidential nature shall not be eligible to join the organization of rank-and-file government employees." i. one organized "for furtherance and protection" of their rights and interests. was clarified and refined by Republic Act No." 49 This is how the law now stands. 48 A managerial employee is defined as "one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute. "managerial employees" or "high level employees" are. further amending the Labor Code." Supervisory employees are "those who. management policies and/or to hire." 50 In other words. particularly with respect to supervisory employees vis a vis labor organizations of employees under them. lay off. discharge.... 6715. lay-off. "supervisory employees who are included in an existing rank-and. recall. Under RA 6715 labor unions are regarded as organized either (a) "for purposes of negotiation. the employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof. 47 Indeed. 43 A "high level employee" is one "whose functions are normally considered policy determining. "not eligible to join. 180 declares that "high level employees whose functions are normally considered as policy making or managerial. effective on March 21. upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. in the interest of the employer. 44 Republic Act No. It is a non-stock corporation. To hire. managed by a Board of Trustees exercising the "usual corporate powers. recall. A managerial function refers to the exercise of powers such as: 1. To effectively recommend such managerial actions. transfer. 46 Membership in employees' organizations formed for purposes of negotiation are open to rank-and-file employees only. as above mentioned. Executive Order No. effectively recommend such managerial actions 45 if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. managerial or one whose duties are highly confidential in nature." or (b) "for furtherance and protection"of the members' rights.e. However. to repeat. or 3. dismiss.

the possibility of the employer's control of the members of the union thru supervisors thus rendering collective bargaining illusory. As thus amended.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 45 applicable law. which is the main reason for the prohibition. The petitioners appear to be correct in their view of the disappearance from the law of the prohibition on supervisors being members of labor organizations composed of employees under their supervision. including those in government-owned or controlled corporations. a business that "is not inherently or exclusively a governmental function. all embraced in civil service. The correctness of the petitioners' theory that unfair labor practices ceased to be crimes and were deemed merely administrative offenses in virtue of the Labor Code. supervisors who were members of existing labor organizations on the effectivity of said RA 6715 were explicitly authorized to "remain therein. they say. both under the Labor Code and PD 807. 1980. approved on May 1. 51 It is engaged essentially in insurance." 3. The petitioners contend that the right of self-organization and collectivebargaining had been withdrawn by the Labor Code from government employees including those in government-owned and controlled corporations. (but) is on the contrary. and apparently RA 6715. 248. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution . Concept of unfair labor practice. were indeed precluded from bargaining as regards terms and conditions of employment because these were set by law and hence could not possibly be altered by negotiation. It is therefore immaterial. . 70." 52 1. it shall be considered merely as an administrative offense rather than a criminal offense. they were prohibited to strike to obtain changes thereof. Unfair labor practice complaints shall. may not be modified by collective bargaining because set by law. Henceforth. cannot be gainsaid. This was true. granted to all government employees the right of collective bargaining or negotiation except as regards those terms of their employment which were fixed by law. for a time." And EO 180. And under the Implementing Rules of RA 6715. As already discussed. and as to said terms fixed by law. But EO 111 restored the right to organize and to negotiate and bargain of employees of "government corporations established under the Corporation Code. in essence and practice. of a private nature and interest. The Labor Code (PD 442) allowed supervisors (if not managerial) to join rank-and-file unions. the Code now pertinently reads as follows: ART. whether supervisors are members of rank-and-file unions or not. be processed like any ordinary labor disputes. 250. therefore.-The concept of unfair labor practice is hereby modified.chiefly for the reason that the terms and conditions of government employment. after all. 2. is no longer of any consequence. too. But unfair labor practices were declared to be crimes again by later amendments of the Labor Code effected by Batas Pambansa Blg.. Article 250 of the Labor Code did provide as follows: ART. government employees..

United States (218 U. pronouncing the effects of the repeal to be as follows: In the leading case of the United States vs. But not a single sentence in either derision indicates that there was any desire to hold that a person could be prosecuted convicted.. Our rule is more in conformity with the Spanish doctrine. 272). 6715. the doctrine was clearly established that in the Philippines repeal of a criminal act by its reenactment. in other words. The repeal here was absolute and not a reenactment and repeal by implication. but even in Spain. Tamayo. is no longer deemed criminal. are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect. even without a saving clause would not destroy criminal liability. where the offense ceased to be criminal. There is no question that at common law and in America a much more favorable attitude towards the accused exists relative to statutes that have been repealed than has been adopted here. and it would be illogical for this court to attempt to sentence appellant for the offense that no longer exists. are authorized to "remain therein. supervisors who were already members of a rank-and-file labor organization at the time of the effectivity of R. under present law.. Nor was there any saving clause. and punished for acts no longer criminal." It seems plain.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 46 thereof. in a case decided as early as 1935. and while their appeal was pending. petition cannot be had (1 Pacheco. finding that an unfair labor practice was committed having been first obtained in the preceding paragraph. and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor management relations. Now. that the maintenance by supervisors of membership in a rank-and-file labor organization even after the enactment of a statute imposing a prohibition on such membership. the ordinance was repealed such that the act complained of ceased to be a criminal act but became legal. 296). formerly denounced. this Court dismissed the criminal proceedings. Commentaries. Cuna (12 Phil. — Unfair labor practices violate the right of workers and employees to self organization.S.A. The legislative intent as shown by the action of the municipal is that such conduct. unfair labor practices are not only violations of the civil rights of both labor and management but are also offenses against the State which shall be subject to prosecution and punishment as herein provided. is not only not a crime. No criminal prosecution under this title may be instituted without a final judgment. 241). The decisive consideration is that at present. but is explicitly allowed. People v. . No. 53 where the appellants had appealed from a judgment convicting them of a violation of a municipal -ordinance. and Wing vs. . Consequently. xxx xxx xxx Recovery of civil liability in the administrative proceedings shall bar recovery under the Civil Code.

1199. had ceased to be an offense under the subsequent law. 10 Phil. the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-threshing. U. The foregoing precedents dictate absolution of the appellants of the offenses imputed to them. Almuete 54 where the defendants-appellees were charged under section 39 of Republic Act No. Binuya. WHEREFORE. as already noted. saying: The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact that. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of Agrarian Reforms is already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landholder. People vs. xxx xxx xxx As held in the Adillo case. 431. Director of Prisons. 252. 254). 1199 had already been superseded by the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 which instituted the leasehold system and abolished share tenancy subject to certain conditions. the judgments of conviction in CA-G. 61 Phil. 57 Phil.ELS: Labor Law 2 Labor Case Batch 4 (Full) Rae Gammad 47 We are therefore of the opinion that the proceedings against appellant must be dismissed. 423.S. the Code of Agrarian Reforms. 4130-R rendered by the Trial Court. 61 Phil. 10 Phil. Case No. . 5275-R and Crim. among others. U. SO ORDERED. Sindiong and Pastor.S. See dissent in Lagrimas vs. vs.R. People vs. Tamayo. No. Academia. They sought and secured a dismissal on the ground. as amended (the Agricultural Land Tenancy Law of 1954) which penalized pre-threshing by either agricultural tenant or his landlord. 1000. vs. To the same effect and in even more unmistakable language is People v. 14856-CR. 55 the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord. 14724-CR and CA- G. subject of the appeal. 225. with costs de officio. xxx xxx xxx The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal (People vs. which is an offense under the Agricultural Tenancy Law. On appeal by the Government. 247. Reyes. that there was no law punishing the act charged-a reference to the fact that Republic Act No.R. 208. are REVERSED and the accused-appellants ACQUITTED of the charges against them. as well as those in Crim. No. 77 Phil. Case No. this Court upheld the dismissal.