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1. Liban v. Gordon - ABUZO
FACTS:
Petitioners, officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, alleged that by accepting the
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate
pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office
or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited
the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a
GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when
he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is
NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the
President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a
privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a
Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit
his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court, however, held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void
insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states
that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision claiming that it was
improper for the court to decide on the constitutionality of the PNRC Chapter since such was not the lis mota of
the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it was proper for the court to decide on the constitutionality of the PNRC chapter.

HELD:
No. The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues
defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. In the case of Alvarez v. PICOP
Resources, Inc., this Court stated that it will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota.
It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record
also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable.

Furthermore, although the respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman
thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a
“private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, which must be organized under
the Corporation Code. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private
corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s sui generis character and special status under
international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations
under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in
accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize
its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the
parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is
widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would
not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also

have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC
Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.

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2. Boy Scouts of the Phil. v. COA - BELTEJAR

FACTS: The BSP is a public corporation created under Commonwealth Act No. 111 dated October 31, 1936,and
whose functions relate to the fostering of public virtues of citizenship and patriotism and the general improvement
of the moral spirit and fiber of the youth.-On Aug 19, 1999, COA issued Resolution No. 99-011"Defining the
Commission's policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines" which provides for the
conduction of an annual financial audit of the Boy Scouts of the Phil. and the expression of an opinion on the
fairness of their financial statements. The BSP shall also be classified among the government corporations
belonging to the Educational, Social,Scientific, Civic and Research Sector.- The COA resolution stated that the
BSP was created as a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No.111 and is a government-controlled
corporation. The COA Resolution also cited its constitutional mandate under Section 2 (1), Article IX (D).-On Nov.
26, 1999, the BSP National President Jejomar Binay sought reconsideration of the resolution stating that the BSP
is not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction because it is not a unit of the government.Moreover, RA 7278
virtually eliminated the "substantial government participation" in the National Executive Board and that the BSP is
not as a government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code which provides that instrumentality refers
to "any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law.-On July 3, 2000, Director Sunico, Corporate Audit Officer of the COA, furnished
the BSP with a copy of the
Memorandum that opined that the substantial government participation is only one (1) of the three (3)grounds
relied upon by the Court in the resolution of the case. Other considerations include the character of the BSP's
purposes and functions which has a public aspect and the statutory designation of the BSP as a "public
corporation". On the argument that BSP is not "a government instrumentality" and "agency" of the government,
the Supreme Court has elucidated this matter in the BSP vs NLRC case when it declared that BSP is both a
"government-controlled corporation with an original charter" and as an "instrumentality" of the Government.-Upon
the BSP's request, the audit was deferred for thirty (30) days. The BSP then filed a Petition for Prohibition with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before the COA.

ISSUE: W/N the BSP is a public corporation and is subject to COA’s audit jurisdiction.

HELD: Yes. BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA's audit jurisdiction.The BSP is a
public corporation whose functions relate to the fostering of public virtues of citizenship and patriotism and the
general improvement of the moral spirit and fiber of the youth. The functions of the BSP include, among others,
the teaching to the youth of patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues,are undeniably sovereign
functions enshrined under the Constitution. Any attempt to classify the BSP as a private corporation would be
incomprehensible since noless than the law which created it had designated it as a public corporation and its
statutory mandate embraces performance of sovereign functions. The manner of creation and the purpose for
which the BSP was created indubitably prove that it is a government agency.Moreover, there are three classes of
juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, as presently constituted under Republic Act No.
7278, falls under the second classification.The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it
was created in order to implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution.Evidently, the
BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes
within the class of "public corporations"defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code and governed by the
law which creates it.

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3. Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Commission on Audit, et al. - BONIFACIO
FACTS: Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (PSPCA), herein petitioner, is a juridical entity
which was incorporatd by virtue of Act No. 1285 by the Philippine Commission in 1905. Primarily composed of
animal aficionados, the objective of the group was to enforce laws for the protection of animals in the country and

for the promotion of their welfare, as stated in their charter. Act No. 1285 was enacted ahead of both the
Corporation Law and the constitution of the Securities and Exchange Commission. In line with their objectives, the
petitioner was granted by its charter to apprehend violators of animal welfare laws and to share one-half (½) of the
fines imposed and collected through its efforts for violations of laws related thereto. But this power of the petitioner
was recalled by virtue of the enactment of C.A. 148.

An audit team of the COA, herein respondents, visited the petitioner’s office to conduct an audit survey.
The petitioner contested that being a private entity, it was beyond the general jurisdiction of COA as provided for
by Sec .2(1), Art. IX of the Constitution. They argue that PSPCA was created by special legislation when there
was no other general law under which it may be organized and incorporated, nor SEC which would have passed
upon the same. Also, they aver that Executive Order No. 63, which enacted C.A. 148, underscore the fact that
PSPCA exercises no governmental function. Thus, the government by itself and its overt acts confirmed
petitioner’s status as a private entity.

COA asserted that PSPA was subject to its authority to which petitioner responded by filing a request for
re-evaluation on COA’s finding of their jurisdiction over PSPA and insisting that it was a private domestic
corportaion. Acting on the said request, the General Councel of COA affirmed its earlier findings and informed
PSPCA the results of the re-evaluation which was similar to the initial evaluation. Thereafter, it was forwarded to
COA Assistant Commissioner that the audit survey was not conducted because the petitioner refused to submit to
the same, insisting that it was a private entity.

PSPCA received the questioned correspondence which ordered that the COA audit team shall conduct the
necessary audit survey on the petitioner which prompted them to file a special civil action for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 2 of Rule 64.

ISSUE: Whether or not PSPCA is within the general jurisdiction of COA

HELD: NO. The charter test cannot be applied in the case at bar. It is predicated on the legal regime established
by the 1935 Constitution, Sec.7, Art. XIII. Since the underpinnings of the charter test had been introduced by the
1935 Constitution and not earlier, the test cannot be applied to PSPCA which was incorporated on January 19,
1905. Laws, generally, have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. There are a few exceptions: (1)
when expressly provided; (2) remedial statutes; (3) curative statutes; and (4) laws interpreting others. None of the
exceptions apply in the instant case.

The mere fact that a corporation has been created by a special law doesn’t necessarily qualify it as a public
corporation. At the time PSPCA was formed, the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the applicable law and no proscription
similar to the charter test can be found therein. There was no restriction on the legislature to create private
corporations in 1903. The amendments introduced by CA 148 made it clear that PSPCA was a private
corporation, not a government agency.

PSPCA’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any agency of the State. Like all private
corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner, and may
exercise powers generally accorded to private corporations.

PSPCA’s employees are registered and covered by the SSS at the latter’s initiative and not through the GSIS.

The fact that a private corporation is impressed with public interest does not make the entity a public corporation.
They may be considered quasi-public corporations which are private corporations that render public service,
supply public wants and pursue other exemplary objectives. The true criterion to determine whether a corporation
is public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporate to the State. It is public if it is created by
the latter’s own agency or instrumentality, otherwise, it is private.

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4. The Province of North Cotabato v. the Gov. of the Republic of the Phils. Peace Panel - BRINAS

On July 23. authority and management over all natural resources. Category A and Category B. · BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its "internal waters. city. . And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive. the BJE and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction. · The core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM . by the Pat a Pangampongku Ranaw. and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact. the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Pinol filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the insurance of writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern. much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF. and that within these territorial waters. years apart from each other.FACTS: On Aug. because it contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and other pertinent laws. a confederation of independent principalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans. are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a separate agreement . Thus. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. pending the disclosure of the contents and the holding of a public consultation. · Provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments. legislative. protect and respect human rights. none of whom was supreme over the others. and Marawi City. municipalities and barangays. the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations. · Mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro. Malaysia. ISSUE: Whether or not the MOA-AD is constitutional? DOCTRINE: The Constitution does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State. cities. among others. Tawi-Tawi. Basilan. the MOA-AD is not constitutional. Sulu." defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area. were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur. · Describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative. through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels (Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal). 5. The territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and. is recognized under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the national government. Significantly. which are grouped into two categories. Features/Stipulations of the MOA-AD · Grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain authority of the sultanates. negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict. or municipality. Maguindanao." which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao. Category B areas. Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD. the BJE is to cover other provinces." on the other hand. not even the ARMM.thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur. and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going. HELD: NO. 2008. with due regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. · Outside of this core. · BJE shall also have "territorial waters. No province. also called "Special Intervention Areas. specifically in the case of the Maranao.the Comprehensive Compact. 2008." characterized by shared authority and responsibility. This concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implied that the same is on its way to independence. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different dates. The MOA-AD contained. this core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. judicial. the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing.

asking for the enjoining therein defendants from enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg 508. 2. 1. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. however. NO. repealed or revoked”. Mayor of San Pedro. RTC ruled in favor of Calvento hence this present petition. 1995. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to . Therefore. PD 1869. Besides. Whether the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. Otherwise. The ordinance. being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. public policy and order. Respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. HELD: The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.” It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an “imperium in imperio. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. its operation might be burdened. Since PD 1869 remains an operative law until “amended. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling.” ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. 508. because it is allegedly contrary to morals. T. ISSUE: Whether PD 1869 is valid? 1. has long been revoked. PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. public policy and order. 1995. ISSUE: Whether Kapasiyahan Blg 508 is Valid DOCTRINE: Freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Lina v. the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz. respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. only the National Government has the power to issue “licenses or permits” for the operation of gambling. It should be stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress” which has the power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. and (b) For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph. 2. Whether the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violative by PD 1869. its exemption clause remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. which is not self-executing. merely states the objection of the council to the said game. which is recognized by law. HELD: NO. The Court held that the contention of the petitioner is without merit. and because it constitutes: (a) A waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. 1995 which was issued on September 18.DEIPARINE FACTS: On December 29. 1996. The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. Basco v. PAGCOR is a GOCC with an original charter. It waived the Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license fees. the law has intruded into the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees. impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government. in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.CABANGBANG FACTS: Petitioners filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter – PD 1869. and because it is allegedly contrary to morals. Laguna. Being an instrumentality of the Government. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. The power of local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. This. Pano . The ordinance prohibits any form of gambling in Laguna. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council. PAGCOR . This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19. The City of Manila.

an autonomous government of the former class is. its acts are. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. we hold that the November 2 and 5. Given this premise. Limbona v. Sultan Alimbusar Limbona. An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7. one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy. involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case. we assume jurisdiction. It is true that under . However. it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. On October 21. 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam. (1987). say. mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions. the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. Sec. of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction." Hence. Even petitioners admit as much. the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice. but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." On the other hand. as we noted. Mangelin . such resolution is valid. Where a law is capable of two interpretations. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII? HELD: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. At the same time. X. But if it is autonomous in the former category only. Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives. on November 2. the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII). the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto. The President exercises "general supervision" over them. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. 1987. that of local autonomy. ISSUE: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. 15. under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). 1618. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question. on the other hand. where he was unseated from his position. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". However. is autonomous in the latter sense. Upon the facts presented. it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly. invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). then. Art. in the first place. Pending further proceedings of the case. Decentralization of power. PD No. 1987 sessions were invalid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national governments. debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts.DESUASIDO FACTS: Petitioner." for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy.prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly).

cannot rise higher than its source of power—the Executive.Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules. Also.A. which placed the control and supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional Government.O.A. 8999. Further. in effect.A. A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization.A. The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. Is. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8. 9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts. 119 runs counter to the provisions of E. it called for the holding of a plebiscite in various provinces. Datumanong .A. At the time of the inauguration. R. 6734 was enacted and the same contains elaborate provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and the areas of jurisdiction which are reserved for the National Government and also. 1990. In pursuant to the latter law. Nine years later. Article X limits the power of the President over autonomous regions. President Aquino issued E. To this end. 9054. 119. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own. is a duplication of the DPWH- ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.A. assuming that a valid recess could not be called.A.O. which created the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office that had jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur. 8999 valid? HELD: NO.A." it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. 119. Sections 1 and 15. the ARMM was formally organized on November 06. The office created under D. it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate.O. 119 and the non- implementation of R. R. thus this petition. Congress enacted R. like spring water. since at the time the petitioner called the "recess.O.A. 6734 and R. No action was taken. Congress . 119 valid? 2. R. The latter law advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARMM which covers among others Lanao del Sur. Is D. we still invalidate the twin sessions in question. In the second place. and it destroys the latter law's objective of devolution of the functions of DPWH in line with the policy of the Constitution to grant LGUs meaningful and authentic regional autonomy. 426. However. the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. the powers of seven cabinet departments were already devolved to ARMM.A. The Supreme Court held that R. 119 violates the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM and that tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions that have already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. The department order. R. 8999 is patently inconsistent with R. Petitioners contend that D. The DPWH's order.O.O. In light of the results of the plebiscite. R.O. It is therefore inconsistent with R. Eventually. However. What appears is that instead. 8999 contravenes true decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy. we find equity on his side.O. 426. 8999 ventures to reestablish the National Government's jurisdiction over the infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. 9054 which was an act to strengthen and expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. the Philippines ordained the establishment of regional autonomy with the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. a plebiscite was again held and the results saw both the cities of Marawi and Basilan join the ARMM. Consequently. Article X mandate the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. In essence. the provision also curtails the power of Congress over autonomous regions. we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith. 8999 was enacted which created an engineering district in Marawi. NO. "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". Under the circumstances. petitioners now sought for the revocation of D. takes back powers which have been previously devolved under the said executive order. 9054 which is a later law.A.A. For this reason. the Solicitor General contends that the powers of the autonomous regions did not diminish the legislative power of Congress ISSUE: 1. Section 16. 426. then DPWH Secretary issued D. Two years later.DIMACULANGAN FACTS: For the first time in its history after three Constitutions. Republic Act No. having essentially the same powers. D. In accordance with R. 6734.O. Disomangcop v. and an office therefor. in its response.

Batangas CATV filed with the Batangas City RTC a petition for injuction alleging that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had no authority to regulate the subscriber rates because under Executive Order No. the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic. 1986. Also.00 to 180. And second. Inc." ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9. however. "provided. it does not authorize them to regulate the CATV operation. Resolution No. the underlying spirit which should guide its resolution is the Constitution's desire for genuine local autonomy. there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law. it being a grant to the former of a franchise to operate a CATV system.GAMO FACTS: On July 28. The RTC decided in favor of Batangas CATV as (1) Resolution No. Hence. 205. 210 is in the nature of a contract between petitioner and respondents. The CA reversed and set aside the decision. The term "businesses" necessarily includes the CATV industry. Batangas CATV. the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 205. the Local Government Code of 1983. No. Pursuant to E. 210 violates the deregulation policy passed by the NTC in August 25. 205 amended its terms would violate the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts. In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality. To hold that E. 1989. Respondents counter that Resolution No. 210 was enacted pursuant to Section 177(c) and (d) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337. And in case of conflicts.will have to re-examine national laws and make sure that they reflect the Constitution's adherence to local autonomy. as it can be installed only "within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. The CA held that while the NTC is grants the Certificate of Authority. .O. cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state. which authorizes LGUs to regulate businesses. and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. only the NTC has the authority to regulate the CATV operation. 1989 and that (2) LGUs cannot exercise regulatory power over CATV operations without appropriate legislation. that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. v. However. install. The Batangas Mayor wrote to Batangas CATV a letter threatening to cancel the permit unless it secures the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. The trial court held that the enactment of Resolution No. Batangas CATV increased its subscriber rates from P88. the National Telecommunications Commission has the sole authority to regulate CATVs.00 per month.O. Alcuaz in his Memorandum dated August 25.” In November 1993. No. Batangas CATV filed an instant petition for review on certiorari contending that while the Local Government Code of 1991 extends to the LGUs the general power to perform any act that will benefit their constituents. including the fixing of subscriber rates. The respondents elevated the case to the CA. nonetheless. under a general grant of power. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein. The principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities. 210 by respondent violates the State’s deregulation policy as set forth by then NTC Commissioner Jose Luis A. this does not preclude the Sangguniang Panlungsod from regulating CATVs under the general welfare clause of the local Government Code. it pointed out that the sole agency of the government which can regulate CATV operation is the NTC. and that the LGUs cannot exercise regulatory power over it without appropriate legislation. 210 which granted Batangas CATV a permit to construct. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. Court of Appeals . ISSUE: Whether or not a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction? Doctrine: It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state.

This is primarily because the CATV system crosses public properties to reach its subscribers. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national legislature.O.D. President Marcos and President Aquino. its act must reflect and conform to the will of its principal. No. such as "to fix. Like any other enterprise. 436 insofar as it permits respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod to usurp a power exclusively vested in the NTC. (2) issuance of "certificates of authority”. No. 6758 shall have been fully provided in the budget. has been empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions under the general welfare clause of R. created not only as local units of local self-government. Municipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate. 1512. No.a power comprising varied acts. 1994. it was never their intention to create an imperium in imperio and install an intra- sovereign political subdivision independent of a single sovereign state. 205. No. the LGUs are bound to follow. When the State declared a policy of deregulation.LIM FACTS: In 1986. eg. E.O. The RTC Decision is affirmed. by establishing a municipal corporation. No. establish. or to subject to governing principles or laws. a general law. No. When the Drafters of the 1987 Constitution enunciated the policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments. Since E. No. to direct by rule or restriction. In 1991. It must be emphasized that when E. Judge Dadole v. Resolution No. 436 decrees that the "regulatory power" shall be vested "solely" in the NTC. does not divest the State of any of its sovereignty. issued P. Hence. LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.A. 210 also violated the State’s deregulation policy. the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. 205 and E. No. . However.A. 205. they have the force and effect of statutes or laws passed by Congress. or control. 24 That the regulatory power stays with the NTC is also clear from President Ramos’ E. No. to adjust by rule. absolve itself from its right and duty to administer the public affairs of the entire state. (1) determination of rates. 546 and E.O. it pertains to the "regulatory power" over those matters which are peculiarly within the NTC’s competence.000. an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said law.A. The apparent defect in Resolution No. the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. Within these areas.O. 436 mandating that the regulation and supervision of the CATV industry shall remain vested "solely" in the NTC. Resolution No. in the exercise of their legislative power.O. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that such additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates shall be granted but it shall not exceed P1. 210 is that it contravenes E." There is no dispute that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991). mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised by the NTC. method or established mode. or divest itself of any power over the inhabitants of the district which it possesses before the charter was granted.00 in municipalities subject to the following conditions: a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs. and d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of functions/personnel in accordance with R. 7160 should be satisfied and/or complied with. 210 violates the mandate existing laws and the State’s deregulation policy.HELD: No. Necessarily. like other local legislative bodies.Mandaue City increased the amount to P1. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10.O.A.O. Commission on Audit . To say that LGUs exercise the same regulatory power over matters which are peculiarly within the NTC’s competence is to promote a scenario of LGUs and the NTC locked in constant clash over the appropriate regulatory measure on the same subject matter. c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325 of R. b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the implementation of R.7160. The legislature. Resolution No. the NTC reigns supreme as it possesses the exclusive power to regulate -. CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. On March 15.00 in provinces and cities and P700.500 for each judge. but as governmental agencies of the state.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Local Budget Circular No. Respondents also claim that is does not violate local fiscal autonomy as it merely directs local governments to identify measures that will reduce their total expenditures. the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to petitioners. respondents claim that the provision withholding the 10% of LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien on their revenue shares because such withholding is temporary in nature pending the assessment by the Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation. But the City Auditor treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the same to the COA Regional Office No. this petition. the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. 55 (LBC 55) is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the president. On November 27. Petitioner contends that the President. 7. . not control. The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. Respondent COA.Beginning October. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1. As such.1996. Petitioner further argues that by withholding the 10% of their IRA is in contravention of the provisions of the Local Government Code and of the Constitution which provides for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue. they are subject to the power of control of the President. or their actions and decisions changed. Sec. Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. 1994. They are subject to the President's supervision only. for and in behalf of the petitioner judges. . The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. the COA denied the motion. They also maintain that said circular is not supported by any law and therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the President. the additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1. on the other hand.000 from April to September. so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest against the notices of disallowance. Lastly. at whose will and behest they can be removed from office. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. et al. insists that the constitutional and statutory authority of a city government to provide allowances to judges stationed therein is not absolute. he will see to it that the local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by statutes. In turn. Pimentel v.000 each. It is for the President. suspended or reversed. 1994. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs. In a resolution dated May 28. in issuing AO 372 was exercising power of control over LGUs. through the DBM. the COA Regional Office referred the motion to the head office with a recommendation that the same be denied. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units. HELD: Yes. The respondents on the other hand claims that AO 372 was issued to alleviate the economic difficulties and constituted merely an exercise of the President’s power of supervision over LGUs. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11. Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole. filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COA.MANGILA FACTS: The President issued AO 327 Sec 1 wherein it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services. 4 AO 327 also withheld internal revenue allotment (IRA) to local government units to amount equivalent to 10%. to check whether these legislative limitations are being followed by the local government units.Acting on the DBM directive. Hence. 1995. Aguirre. Congress may set limitations on the exercise of autonomy.

The petitioner. a local government unit. orders withholding 10% of the LGUs IRA. He may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the law. and 2001. and does not constitute mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. represented by Governor Mandanas. 1 of AO 327 as the order is merely advisory in character. 2) NO. however. Sec. cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. he cannot prevent them from performing their tasks and using available resources to achieve their goals. mandating the automatic release to the LGUs of their share in the national taxes. The petitioner. This interest pertains to the LGUs share in the national taxes or the IRA. 4. that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999. Estrada on October 6. seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own. While he may issue advisories and seek their cooperation in solving economic difficulties. insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof. Romulo . 2000 and 2001. ISSUE: Procedural Issues 1) Whether or not petitioner has locus standi to file the suit 2) Whether or not the issue had been rendered moot and academic Substantive Issue 1) Whether or not the assailed provisos are unconstitutional HELD: Procedural Issues 1) YES. the withholding of a portion of internal revenue allotments legally due them cannot be directed by administrative fiat. 1 of AO 372 that directs LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% and Sec 4 of the same which withholds 10% of their IRA are valid exercises of the President’s power of general supervision over local governments. The Supreme Court held that there is compelling reason for this Court to resolve the substantive issue raised by the instant petition. not control. . Province of Batangas v. Another reason justifying the resolution by this Court of the substantive issue now before it is the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition. yet evading review. it is equivalent to a holdback. such withholding contravenes the Constitution. the Court ruled that Sec 4 of AO 327 is not a valid exercise of President’s power of general supervision over local governments. 2000. in substance. Thus. then President Joseph Estrada issued EO No. 48 entitled “Establishing a Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the capacities of local government units in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them by the National Government Agencies concerned pursuant to the Local Government Code. As mandated by the Constitution. Article X of the Constitution. petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999. 1998. the basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. However. DOCTRINE: The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision. The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99- 005. over local government units (LGUs). and the OCD resolutions contravene Section 6. and of the other LGUs. 1999.ISSUE: WON the provisions Sec. Although temporary. The petitioners constitutional claim is. HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Sec. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding funds. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12. whether intended or accidental. The provision encroaches the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Supervening events. The Supreme Court held that petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain the present suit.MARCILLA FACTS: On December 7.

in addition to the aforesaid amount. the allocations for the Local Government Units shall amount to P111. it RESTRICTS the Legislature to create/pass laws that will prevent the executive branch from performing its duty of automatic release of funds.6.MUNGCAL FACTS: Pres. Doing so will make the Executive disregard this constitutional provision because of a subsequent legislative enactment. ACORD v. and not its automatic release. Sec 6 amendable by a statute.X of the Constitution mandates that the “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs.” Since only the just share is qualified by as determined by law.778. Section 1. Section 1. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13. HELD: . The Constitution mandates the Executive branch to automatically release the just share of the taxes to the local governments. X. Estrada submitted the National Expenditures program for fiscal year 2000. Under such law. the implication is that the Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to bar or impede the automatic release of the IRA. the LGUs aren’t required to perform any act to receive the “just share” – it shall be released to them “without need of further action“. Sec. Zamora . which has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Section 6: Local government units shall have a just share. or decide to do it himself.000. Since the release is automatic. Sec 6.778. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate. as determined by law. “the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local governments“. and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4. The controversy lies in the Unprogrammed Fund part of the GAA which states that 10 Billion Pesos. and the assailed OCD resolutions are unconstitutional.000. He proposed an IRA of P121. Sec. ISSUE: WoN XXXVII (A). The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible.Substantive Issue YES. DOCTRINE: (Power of the President over LGUs) The automatic release of the IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment) is mandated by the 1987 Constitution in Article X. The Supreme Court held that the provisos assailed in the General Appropriations Acts of 1999. The release of the 10 Billion Pesos for the IRA is conditional. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the doing of an act – the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act. the Constitution confines the President’s power over the LGUs to one of general supervision. According to Art. and based upon the accomplishment of the abovementioned task. and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 violated the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs stated under Article X.000 and became the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for 2000. namely. Petitioners then assail the constitutionality of these provisions of the 2000 GAA. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. XXXVII (A). shall be used to fund the IRA.25 of the Constitution. when it should be released immediately and automatically by the Executive as mandated by Art. II. which amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain committees. 2000 and 2001. “virtually making Art. supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them. which is patently absurd. Drilon v.000. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy. in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. Art. They contend that the said provisions violate the LGUs fiscal autonomy because it reduced the IRA and placed it under Unprogrammed Fund. X. and as such.

Article X of the Constitution. the Regional Vice-Governor.[74] . Article VII of the Constitution. and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed. and XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for setting apart a portion (10 Billion Pesos) of the IRA as Unprogrammed Fund. and Fourth. they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM. as well as the failure to adhere to the elective and representative character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. the bills that became RA No. 9094 in order to become effective. from the rank of colonel or naval captain. Kida v. other public ministers and consuls. 10153 already spawned petitions against their validity. The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor. in complete violation of Section 16. Senate of the Philippines . entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011. Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM. 9140. the heads of the executive departments. who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. Lastly. RA No. This decision mentions The Province of Batangas v. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14. 9333 and RA No. Article XVII of RA No. ISSUE: Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates the Constitution HELD: NO. 10153 was passed. to coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. Third. officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. the just share shall be automatically released to the LGUs” A basic feature of the local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. ambassadors. to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter. these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 4146 and Senate Bill No.The petition is GRANTED. the just share shall be determined by law 3.NOBLE FACTS: On June 30. all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. Article VI of the Constitution. and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution. the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. By withholding the release of funds in the 2000 GAA upon the fulfillment of a condition would render the automatic release and the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs nugatory. which classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint: First. and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3. House Bill No. Romulo: “It would be readily seen that the provision mandates that: 1. Second. Republic Act (RA) No. Corrolarily. The petitioners assailing RA No. the LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes 2. 10153. 9054 and thus. officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. 2011. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2). These petitions multiplied after RA No. Even before its formal passage. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.

Reyes and Department of Budget and Management Secretary Romulo L. 2005. in his capacity as DILG Secretary. The examination yielded an official report. the respondent issued MC No. 2010.11 reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall be utilized for desirable social. the Constitution confines the power of the President over LGUs to mere supervision.’ He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Of Camsur v.Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. Villafuerte. the DILG issued MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15. 1995. enumerating the policies and guidelines on the utilization of the development fund component of the IRA. but only to ‘ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. Thus.” A reading of MC No. The Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the autonomy of LGUs. Article VII of the Constitution. 95-216.’ He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. the Commission on Audit conducted an examination and audit on the manner the local government units utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment for the calendar years 1993-1994. 2010-138. filed the instant petition for certiorari. showing that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses properly chargeable against the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses. On August 31. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% . It is also pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution of enhancing local autonomy that the LGC was enacted. the Constitution confines the power of the President over LGUs to mere supervision. 7160. No. but only to ‘ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. Hence this petition. in violation of Section 287 of R.A.” FACTS: In 1995. 2011. entitled “Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances. Petitioners filed their Reply (With Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order). Gov. HELD: NO. On December 2. “shall be spent judiciously and only for the very purpose or purposes for which such funds are intended. the respondent. On February 21. 10153. It likewise carried a reminder to LGUs of the strict mandate to ensure that public funds. the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis. joined by the Provincial Government of Camarines Sur. “The President exercises ‘general supervision’ over them. economic and environmental outcomes essential to the attainment of the constitutional objective of a quality of life for all. Jr. otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Villafuerte. Neri issued Joint MC No. and Prov. “The President exercises ‘general supervision’ over them. Thus. ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC. and Bids and Public Offerings. To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy. series of 2005. 2010-83. 1.RUBIO Doctrine: To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy. pertaining to the guidelines on the appropriation and utilization of the 20% of the IRA for development projects. like the 20% development fund.” which aims to promote good governance through enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs.” On September 20. it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16. issued the assailed MC No. . then DILG Secretary Angelo T. on December 14. Robredo. 2010. seeking to nullify the assailed issuances of the respondent for being unconstitutional and having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. then Governor of Camarines Sur.

a province or a city with a population of 250k or more requires the power to create a legislative district. (RA 6734). It forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which was created under its Organic Act. Thus. 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. ISSUE: (1) whether Section 19. since the power to increase the allowable membership in the HOR and to reapportion legislative districts. HOWEVER. Later. Congress cannot validly delegate the power to create legislative districts for the House of Reps. individual cityhood bills containing a common provision that exempts them from the income requirement. During the 12th Congress. an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if they have been complying with the law. On 28 August 2006 .portion of the IRA for development projects. the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No.the ARMMs legislature. Cotabato City. or each province. at best. During the 13th Congress. League of Cities of the Philippines v. There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies the power to create municipalities and barangays. through their respective sponsors in Congress. three new municipalities were added to the original 8 municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan. 29. the delegation granted by the Congress through RA 9054 to the ARMM to create provinces and cities is unconstitutional. a total of 57 municipalities had Cityhood bills pending in Congress. par 3. Article VI of RA 9054. exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19. creation of PROVINCES AND CITIES is another matter. 29. bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. As stated earlier. HELD: (1) and (2) No. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. Prior to its enactment. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16. having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989. and (2) if in the affirmative. delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces. 29 filed between November and December of 2006. PROVIDED Sec 10. as amended by (RA 9054). shall have at least 1 representative. Art X of the Constitution is followed. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. the ARMM Regional Assembly. 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20M to P100M to restrain the ‘mad rush’ of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. Article VI of RA 9054. Pursuant to this provision. No. each city with at least 250k. is VESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN CONGRESS. Comelec . Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Sec. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17. although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district. what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No.SANGALANG FACTS: During the 12th Congress. It was. whether a province created under Section 19. Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province.SALONGA FACTS: Maguindanao has 2 legislative districts. However. is constitutional. THEREFORE. Art VI of the Constitution. it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII. Comelec . This Resolution reached the Senate. . Sema v. Notwithstanding that Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first legislative district. According to Sec 5. is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.

) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250. Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC which provides that a province may be created if it has 1. Navarro v.000. the land area. In other words. the act of amending laws comprises an integral part of the Legislature’s law-making power. X of the Constitution. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18. HELD: *PLEASE TAKE NOTE OF THIS. thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. formerly part of Surigao Del Norte. Ermita . Petitioner contends that when the law was passed. X of the Constitution for providing an exemption to the income requirement laid down by the Local Government Code. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that the Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express provision of the Constitution that “no city shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code”. 10. which substantiate the real intent of the lawmakers of the Local Government Code for its efficient and effective implementation. as what Congress did by enacting RA 9009 (which was actually prior to the Cityhood Laws).000) square kilometers. Article X of the Constitution. taking into account its average annual income of P82. is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province. the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional for it violates Sec. IBA RULING NA SINASABI NI NACHURA. as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. Article 9(2) of the Local Government Code - Implementing Rules and Regulations. Indisputably. 461. Congress is not prohibited from amending the Local Government Code itself. The Supreme Court held that RA 9355 is constitutional.Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10. or 2. Art. provided for an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under Sec.450 of the Local Government Code.CHECK PAGE 706 OF HIS BOOK :)* Yes. 10. Art X of the Constitution DOCTRINE: The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. failing to comply with Section 10.000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office: ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9355 is constitutional? HELD: Yes..00 for the . which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20. as well as for violation of the equal protection clause ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional for it violates Sec.10. while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit.23 at the time of its creation.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106.951. rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution. Art. provides that “The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.696.) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2.433. Dinagat had a land area of 802. as amended by RA 9009.” Such provision is to promote development in the previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas such as Dinagat.000. It is important to remember that there is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution is clear that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. which are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code. 9355 created the province of Dinagat Islands. In this case. It was questioned for constitutionality for not being in compliance with the population or the land area requirements of the Local Government Code under Sec. the Cityhood Laws. The Cityhood Laws contravene the letter intent of Sec. as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. the Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power.SIMEON FACTS: Republic Act No. The Supreme Court also added that what is more.

abolition. Miranda v. Land Management Bureau. 11(a). Art. and 9 of the Local Government Code involve requirements on income. A plebiscite therefore is needed to validly reclassify the city of Santiago from an independent city to a component city. 7. the Constitution imposes 2 conditions for a city to be altered substantially: it must meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code and it must be approved by the people. which are designed to achieve an economic purpose. 10. 7. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21. 8535 fail to conform to Secs. 11(a).Petitioner argues that R. while a plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose. Finally. 11(a). 10 of the Constitution and Sec. Art.A. or substantial alteration of boundaries that would require a plebiscite.A.9 Million. and Department of Budget Management provided information that the average annual income of the barangays for the years 1995 and 1996 was around Php 26. 11(a). 8535. population and land area.A. Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code. they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. and income of Quezon City. the mayor of Quezon City as its chief executive would be the first to protest any development that might prove detrimental to Quezon City. 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province. R. Petitioner argues that the lack of provision to submit the law for ratification by the residents in a proper plebiscite is a violation of the requirements of Sec. 7. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.A. 8535 creating the city of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City. and the adverse effect by the creation of Novaliches to Quezon City. Respondents on the other hand argue that the petition raises a political issue and that the reclassification of Santiago did not involve any creation. and the population of the barangays were around 347. states that existing government facilities may serve as the seat of government. Secs. The downgrading of Santiago from an independent city to a component city of the Province of Isabela diminishes the independence of the city as a political unit because its reclassification would introduce substantial changes in the political culture and administrative responsibilities of Santiago. ISSUE: Does R. 10. is constitutional. Samson v. With regard to Sec. 12 of the Local Government Code. Aguirre . Aguirre . with regard to the adverse effect of the creation of Novaliches will have on Quezon City.A. 10. division. merger. 8817.Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10. resource persons from different government offices like the National Statistics Office. 8528 is unconstitutional for substantially altering the city of Santiago without requiring a plebiscite.SY FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of R. more than the minimum requirement of 150. 10. Respondent argues that petitioner failed to substantiate the allegations with convincing proof. 10 of the Constitution and Sec. was filed in the House of Representatives. and land area.A. Guingona . The fact he did not raise any adverse issues during the public hearings is indicative of the non-existence of any detriment to the land area. Furthermore. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19. which serves as a complement to Sec. It was subsequently referred . Sec. 8. therefore.creation of a province.SIMEON FACTS: HB No. The official statements by the officers can serve the same purpose contemplated by law requiring certificates. 8528 that will convert the city of Santiago. entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago.SY FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of R. Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code intended for a plebiscite to be held because of the material change in the political and economic rights of the local government unit and its people. over the minimum requirement of Php 20 Million. Isabela from an independent city to a component city of the Province of Isabela.000. 8528 violate the Constitution and the Local Government Code by not requiring a plebiscite? HELD: Sec.A. and 450(a) of the Local Government Code? HELD: During the hearings held by the Senate Committee on Local Government.310. 8535 failed to conform to the requirements of Secs. Alvarez v. and 450(a) of the Local Government Code because of the absence of certifications concerning income. ISSUE: Does R. population. population. R. Bureau of Local Government Finance.

Republic Act No. 290 and 291 of the Code.to the House Committee on Local Government and the House Committee on Appropriations and passed the three readings required for legislation before it was transmitted to the Senate. to classify the same as a special fund or transfer. loan proceeds. An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago. However. That the certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “All appropriation. revenue or tariff bills. Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income which is P20. Such order. Section 24.560. Also. the governing statute. and non-recurring income.47. is entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts. 8817. was filed in the Senate by Senator Sotto. exclusive of special funds. depending on factors like population. too. sales of fixed assets. a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.000. is not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation. bills authorizing increase of the public debt. which indicates Santiagos average annual income to be P20. (II) Yes. land and equal sharing. Department of Finance Order No. 1243.109. financial assistance. a counterpart of HB No. IRAs are a regular. 1243. grants. such as other national aids. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13. or other laws. so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. HELD: (I) Yes. approved the amendments proposed by the Senate. Mariano v. Senate Bill No. COMELEC . 3593 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be revenues and receipts realized by provinces. and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. its own version of HB No. its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives. upon being apprised of the action of the Senate. To reiterate. considering that the Senate passed SB No. petitioners claims that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices is only P13. unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution.SANGALANG . since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from the national government. Petitioners Alvarez et al question the constitutionality of Republic Act 7720 mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24. Hence. 1994. and similar others (Italics ours). but exclusive of non-recurring receipts. increase or decrease. transfers. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund.581. entitled. nil is there a basis. constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of interpreting and applying the same. recurring item of income.974. but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments” simply means that such bills shall come from the initiative of the House of Representatives and does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House. 8817. ISSUE: (I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city (II) Whether or not. The SB No. Thus. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22.97.The House of Representatives. bills of local application. 1234 was then transmitted to the President and was subsequently signed into a law and was known as RA 7720. cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284.000 required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city.

51 of R. and concerned citizen.A No. No. Considering that these events may or may not happen. No. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Sec. (2) Section 51 of R. 7. thus. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. 7854 provides that: “Sec. on the northwest. Art. Article X and Section 7. which shall be determined by law. he can still run for the same position and seek another 3 consecutive term since his 3 year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. the Congress did not intend the laws creating new cities must contain therein technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles. VI of the Constitution (3) Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law HELD: (1) NO because Section 2 of R.e. 7854 on the ground of lack of technical description would defeat the spirit of the Code. by the City of Manila. which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig.” One petition was filed by Juanito Mariano. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided.7854 has been crafted to suit the political ambitions of Binay.A.” Section 8. i. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati. Article VI of the Constitution provide the following: Sec. at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. 7854 as unconstitutional. Certainly. Petitioners argue that under these provisions. a resident of Makati. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. 2 of R. R. The term of office of elective local officials. in violation of Sec. 7 and Sec. by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities. 2. Officials of the City of Makati. .FACTS: 2 petitions assailing cerain provisions of R.A No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the “3 consecutive term” limit of local elective officials.A. No. This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained by the Court as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events. Sec. except barangay officials. 8.A.A. as petitioners seem to imply. invalidating R. it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served. 52 of R. hereinafter referred to as the City. 450 of the Local Government Code (2) Whether or not Sec. and. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin. petitioners conclude that Sec. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Thus. as in this case. taxpayer.A. then.” The Court ruled that so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained. 7854 properly identified the land area. 51. on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati specifying the metes and bounds with technical description in relation with Sec. shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. The City of Makati. unless otherwise provided by law.A. Art. 7. the provision states that: “Sec.7854 is entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati. X and Sec. along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers and the other petition filed by John H.8. on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig. incumbent Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay who has already served 2 consecutive terms may decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati. No. The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. Osmena as senator.

a component city may be created only by converting a municipality or a cluster of barangays. contending. abolished. an Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon. Section 10. Cawaling. only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.A. And Appropriating Funds Therefor. 8806. (3) NO. No. municipality. Thereafter. not by merging two municipalities. divided. Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsorgon.A. 2000. unless otherwise provided by law.petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. 8806 has done. filed a petition to enjoin the further implementation of R. that: The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10. or barangay may be created. HELD: No. former President Joseph E. Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members. Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code (LGC) states that. Section 450. Art X . v.No province.A. in essence. merged. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city xxx The petitioner assails the RA 8806 because according to him. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is correct? DOCTRINE: The phrase “A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city” is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. COMELEC . Jr. such as the charter of a new city.A. Moreover. Section 5(1). as what R. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23. No. Cawaling Jr. 8806 for being unconstitutional. Article X of the Constitution. Estrada signed into law R.SALONGA FACTS: On August 16. Article X of the Constitution. Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city. Section 10. As thus worded. The phrase “A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city” is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law. quoted earlier and which petitioner cited . reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law. Requisites for Creation. The petitioners constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the LGC is wrong. city. other than a general reapportionment of the law. No. or its boundary substantially altered. except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. No. COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification. Pursuant to Section 10. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R. Benjamin E.

Aquino v. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3).RUBIO FACTS: In this original action. Comelec . petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. 9716. . Following the enactment of Republic Act No. taxpayers and citizens.000) for the creation of a legislative district.The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. allows the merger of local government units to create a province. On 12 October 2009 Republic Act No. Section 8 of the LGC distinctly provides: Section 8. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo. Pamplona. however. Hence.000 minimum population standard. Pasacao. Verily. population. as public officers. the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. and adjacent territory. x x x. 9716. Minalabac. the first district municipalities of Libmanan. Thus. That the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division. provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code. Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. or each province. through the Office of the Solicitor General. as far as practicable. further. the respondents. contiguous. On the other hand. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand. That such division shall not reduce the income. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24.in support of his argument. municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the LGC. and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. 9716. seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. Division and Merger .Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided. or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided. because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250. shall have at least one representative."was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo I n substance. compact. 9716.383. city. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional.000 or only 176. entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.(3) Each legislative district shall comprise. seek the dismissal of the present petition. the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution. runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250. the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province.The provision reads: Article VI Section 5.

As already mentioned.Rather. the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. while Section 5(3). or each province. there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed.000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. shall have at least one representative. succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality. it does not have to increase its population by another 250. The respondents concede the existence of a 250. the 250. of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20. as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. HELD: Yes." The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand. but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation. and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative. Section 461 of the Local Government Code states: Requisites for Creation. The 250. Thus. We start with the basics. Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250. ISSUE: whether or not a population of 250. v.000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province. Jr. To doubt is to sustain. the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano. COMELEC. There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.000 to be entitled to a representative.Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court. by virtue of and upon creation.000. the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3).000) square kilometers.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2.000.000 population condition.000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.The respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3). In other words.000 in order to be similarly entitled. or .The Mariano case limited the application of the 250. in turn. Article VI of the Constitution.000 for each legislative district. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income.000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. as certified by the Department of Finance.000 to be entitled to an additional district. is entitled to at least a legislative district. coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250. with nothing mentioned about population. a city must first meet a population minimum of 250.000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was. The second sentence of Section 5(3).

filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B. Paras . Escalante. 1985. Taboso.MUNGCAL FACTS: The Municipality of Bocaue. Dela Cruz v. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. Whenever a province is created. but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement. city. other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte. Magalona. An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte. Pursuant to and in implementation of this law. Sec. to wit: “…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. Paredes vs. Executive (G. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because: • The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental. 3. divided.R.000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office. 1986. and the revocation of existing licenses. or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code. abolished. cabarets and dance halls. km.” The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. Victorias. Comelec . Bulacan issued a Prohibition and Closure ordinance (Ordinance no.NOBLE FACTS: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. municipality or barrio may be created. 885. divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. (Cities of Silay. “the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained. and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province). Petitioners opposed.R. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. merged. Sagay. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province). 3. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. Rather. were not included in the plebiscite.” SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement. eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners. No. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25.856. 197 of LGC. Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava. Tan v.. which states that — “Sec. ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Constitution. the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable. not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer. No province. 84) to prohibit the issuance and renewal of licenses for night clubs. the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3. Manapla. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26.P. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Notably. which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute. • The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2. E.(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250. and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected”? HELD: NO.56 sq. The prohibition is because it is alleged in the ordinance that such establishments are the “principal cause . effective Dec.

comfort. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. Thereafter. With this class we are not here directly concerned. of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. through its Council. peace.” Petitioners allege that such ordinance is null and void because municipalities have no authority to prohibit a lawful business. regulate them. occupation or calling. then regulation and not absolute prohibition is sufficient to serve such end. an inherent attribute of sovereignty. The police power is a governmental function. consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation. and illimitable of powers. improve the morals. comfort and convenience. 60 and the alleged public safety. of the inhabitants of Makati. good order. 243. ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof. and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. improve the morals. promote the prosperity. etc. comfort." Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare. re-enacted under Resolution No. promote the prosperity. HELD: YES. The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the specific functions of the council which are enumerated by law. ISSUE: Can a LGU absolutely prohibit the operation of night clubs and the employment of hostesses with Ordinance no. however.000. not repugnant to law. education. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety. promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof. general welfare. but they can. Binay v. Resolution No. as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety. and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health.00 a month. good order. the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400.00 for the implementation of the program. 60. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law. and for the protection of property therein. and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. peace. approved Resolution No. and Ordinance no. The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations. It is elastic and must be responsive to . comfort and convenience of the people.000. good order or safety and general welfare of the people. improve public morals. Should the municipality strive to accomplish the end of fostering good public morals. Domingo . safety. The Supreme Court held that there was a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. 60 was referred to COA and the same was disapproved and disallowed the disbursements because there was no connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. morals. The Local Government Code only grants municipalities the power of regulation and not total prohibition of the exercise of a legitimate trade. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution.MARCILLA FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Makati. and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof. which was born with civilized government. peace. HELD: NO.in the decadence of morality and because of their other adverse effects on the community. The petition is GRANTED. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27. 84 is declared NULL AND VOID. 60 which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed P2. It is the most essential. maintain peace and order. and for the protection of property therein. insistent. and insure the protection of property therein. 84? DOCTRINE: (Police Power of LGUs under General Welfare Clause) It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable. The general welfare clause has two branches: One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health. Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs.

The Respondents on the other hand defended the validity of the Ordinance as a valid exercise of the Provincial Governments power under the general welfare clause and its specific power to protect the environment. Both ordinances have two principal objectives: 1. City of Manila . and Sta. on the other hand. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters.LIM FACTS: On December 3. White Light Corp. v. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances issued were valid DOCTRINE: Under the general welfare clause of the LGC. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission. filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC). (STDC). The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. inter alia. Lodging Houses. The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. Motels. local government units have the power. Socrates . who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila. SangguniangPanlalawigan issued a resolution which prohibits gathering and selling of live marine coral aquatic organisms.One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. To establish a closed season for species of fish or aquatic animals for period of 5 yrs and 2.” The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day. .various social conditions. 1992. and impose rentals. fees or charges therefor HELD: Yes. The respondents. The realization of the objectives of the ordinances falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment. Inns. contended that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. Mesa Tourist and Development Corp. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29. Tano v. To implement said city ordinance the Mayor issued Office Order which authorize to conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out in order to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayors Permit. respondents maintained that there was no violation of due process because public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance. The Petitioners contend that 1. Futher.This necessarily includes enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. 2. To protect the corals of marine waters of Puerto Princesa from further destruction. Titanium Corporation (TC). and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels. the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit because the Office Order issued contained no regulation nor condition under which Mayors permit could be granted. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No.Further. City Mayor Alfredo S. Short-Time Admission Rates.MANGILA FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an Ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City. the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law. and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance). Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. Pension Houses. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 28.

namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality. lodging houses and other similar establishments. Second. These goals. The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex. it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement. the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. pension houses. comfort. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. Hon. it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. (5) must be general and consistent with public policy. inns. the right to operate economic enterprises. convenience. peace. they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter.The RTC declared Ordinance No. When elevated to CA. prostitution. restaurants. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. Inc. they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety. . 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealousy guarded by the Constitution. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power. Those means must align with the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment. 7774 is an invalid exercise of police power. (2) must not be unfair or oppressive. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. HELD: No. as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. drug use and alike. The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices. Also. but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association. Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement. as well as. in turn. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid. The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and various actions of the State. are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the State’s police power. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate.. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. First. (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code. operation and maintenance of cafes. (3) must not be partial or discriminatory. the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment. Ordinance No. Third. from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. The CA. beerhouses. including tourist guides and transports. it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law. motels. Finally. it is an invalid exercise of police power. and (6) must not be unreasonable. the adverse effect of the establishments is justified by the well- being of its constituents in general. and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances. hotels. City Mayor of Manila. good order. v. by themselves.

Further. subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare. health. 2001. a principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Ordinance No. after its publication. drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. morals and general welfare of the society. 2001 and it it became effective on December 28. it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. Moreover. but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator. More importantly.GAMO FACTS: On November 20. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units. safety. then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. as distinguished from those of a particular class. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Yet. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 30. personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Mayor Atienza approved the ordinance on November 28. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen. It must appear that the interests of the public generally. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. Atienza . . the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. Ordinance No. 8027. Social Justice Society v. 2001.SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar. Petron and Pilipinas Shell. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. within constitutional limits. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. for even under the guise of protecting the public interest. However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be. it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. to promote the order. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants.

Instead. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. among others. the immediate removal/decommissioning process 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. Ordinance 8187 led to the creation of a medium industrial zone (1-2) and heavy industrial zone (1-3) and effectively lifted the prohibition against owners . As the chief executive of the city. s. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. the City Mayor may be compelled to enforce Ordinance 8027. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. which shall be taken from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the surrounding communities. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SJS Officers v Lim/Atienza (2014) Brief: Consolidated petitions questioning the validity of Ordinance No. there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. committed to do the following: (1) The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council the MOU (2) The City Mayor and the DOE shall allow the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements. 97. He has no other choice. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. with the MOU effective only for a period of six months starting July 25.. (4) . It is his ministerial duty to do so. ISSUE: Whether or not the City Mayor can be compelled to enforce Ordinance 8027? HELD: Yes. to enforce Ordinance No. to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No." Under the MOU. 97 to April 30. On January 30. under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). 8027. The City of Manila and the DOE. he has allowed them to stay.However. Jr. The petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4. In Dimaporo v. at present. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty. the oil companies agreed to perform the following: (1) program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall include. The petition is granted and and Mayor Atienza is directed to enforce the said Ordinance.The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other unauthorized parties. (3) The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES’ compliance.” Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 2002. 2003. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions. 2002. Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty.. the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option. Thus. Mitra. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance. the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. on June 26. 8027. he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. on the other hand. as city mayor. 8027. 2003. the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30. 13. The reason for this is obvious. (2) to do so by establishing a separate agreement on joint operations and management. we stated the reason for this: “These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. (3) the development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones mentioned therein. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it." One of these is Ordinance No. 8187. Resolution No.

In short. Allegations of violation of the right to health and the right to a healthful and balanced environment are also included. 8027. the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty. safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view. require its exercise. As a result of the zoning. 8027. as distinguished from those of a particular class. The power to establish zones for industrial. As long as it there is such a target in their midst. the methods or means used to protect public health. It therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. Towards this objective. the continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer be permitted. it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial. Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. There is no showing that the Ordinance is unconstitutional. from operating in the designated commercial zone – an industrial zone prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial. security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights. The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life. there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. (5) must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable.and operators of businesses. public safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila. commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. morals. However. It was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning. In the exercise of police power. lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. prescribes. the right to life . (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade. the enactment of Ordinance No. 8187. and Petron. Ordinance No. property. Clearly. However. including Chevron. For an ordinance to be valid. herein petitioners now seek the nullification of Ordinance No. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges. property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 8027 is unconstitutional. The depot is perceived. local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. (3) must not be partial or discriminatory. the residents of Manila are not safe. (2) must not be unfair or oppressive. which contains provisions contrary to those embodied in Ordinance No. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. As with the State. as a representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. Otherwise stated. ensuring health. it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. And to forestall arbitrariness. the said Ordinance is valid and constitutional. Shell. the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. the Sanggunian was in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust. and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Consequently. Held: No. Highlighting that the Court has so ruled that the Pandacan oil depots should leave. rightly or wrongly. Essentially. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method.

the former should prevail. . property is not.enjoys precedence over the right to property. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable.