Michael Curtis
r ' ~ . e lives of Raymond Aron and Charles de Gaulle influential for the general public, were Aron's journal-
! intersected at significant moments in 20th Century ism and editorial writing for Combat (April 1946 to
history, cooperatively in London during World War II, June 1947), for Le Figaro (1947 to 1977), for L'Express
and antagonistically in Paris as a result of the President's (1977 to 1983), and for the m o n t h l y Preuves,
press conference on November 27, 1967. The two Commentaire, and Encolmter. Addressing almost daily
Frenchman formed an incongruous duo. General de both domestic and international issues, Aron in his thou-
Gaulle, the heroic man of June 18, 1940, the symbol of sands of articles was the model of polite but frank dis-
French resistance to Nazi Germany, the founder and course and reasoned argument and analysis.
President of the French Fifth Republic, was the quint- Aron's writings, both scholarly and journalistic,
essential exponent of the grandeur and national sover- spanned an extraordinary range of subjects, including
eignty of France. Aron, the brilliant scholar and jour- international relations, sociology, economics, ethics, lib-
nalist, the intellectually courageous critic of the eralism and the crisis of democracy, intellectual history,
prevailing, fashionable, politically correct attitude of war and peace, the concepts and implications of indus-
sympathy and tolerance among the French intellectual trial society, and current ideologies. Aron concentrated
and cultural elite towards the actions of the Soviet Union, on concrete issues rather than on formal or epistemo-
was the dejudaised Jew who had rallied to the Free French logical problems. Because of his independent, non-par-
movement in London in 1940 but was not an unquali- tisan judgments and objective analysis, people found it
fied admirer of Charles de Gaulle during or after World difficult to place him in any particular political category.
War II. That objective analysis was grounded in a realistic as-
Raymond Aron early showed his brilliance by being sessment of political behavior. In his inaugural lecture
placed first in the agrdgation in 1928, after four years at on December 1, 1970 he explained that his experience
the l~cole Normale Supdrieure, in a class that included in Germany in the early 1930"s had marked him and
Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul Nizan and Georges Canguilhem. inclined him to an active pessimism; "I lost faith and
His experience while studying in Germany, in Cologne held on, not without effort, to hope". His objective as a
and Berlin, from 1930 to 1933, made him acutely aware historian was, by retrospective analysis of possibilities,
of the threat and violence of Nazism. In London during to reveal the articulations of the historical process. He
the war he was the acting editor, together with Andrd was also a committed observer, prepared to take a posi-
Lebarthe as manager, of La France libre, the monthly tion on historical and contemporary events. As active
review of the Free French movement which first ap- citizen, Aron, a man with good connections in French
peared to there in November 1940 and for which Aron society unattached to any political party, participated in
wrote in 57 of the 59 issues. the work of some anti-communist groups in France and
Aron had taught philosophy at Le Havre before the was a member in 1950 of the executive committee of
war, worked at the Centre de Documentation Sociale de the Congress for Cultural Freedom. As advocate of rea-
l'l~cole Normale Sup&ieure, and was to have a distin- soned discussion he was particularly critical of the vio-
guished academic career, at the Sorbonne (1955), at the lence and "'psychodrama" exhibited by Parisian intel-
I~cole practique des Hautes Etudes in 1960, at the College lectuals and students in the university riots in 1968.
de France, as professor of European civilization, from Aron's writings, like his life, was lacking in ostenta-
1970 to 1979. During that career, as philosopher, histo- tion. They were clear, precise, sober and moderate in
rian, sociologist, and political scientist, he published over tone, critical of ideologies he considered false or em-
40 books. Important as was his scholarship, and more bodying fanaticism. They had the cool, urbane tone of


classical French expression. family ties. keeping distance from those rity or turgidity. and his ancestors. did not perceive anti-Semitism as tual or more organic? Perhaps some of both but that a general. The Opium of the Intellectuals. Merleau-Ponty and their dis. discussed by Pierre Birnbaum in his book. the unfashionable intellectual charged in this fashion were Ldon Blum. panion Simone de Beauvoir. both ignore reality or the desirable European values. or social prominence were sometimes accused a "different society. judges. Others were part of larly applicable to Sartre. But this was too abstract. supposedly proper doctrines? His criticism was particu. en. efficient. of double loyalty. In a striking cri. Aron in his article on "Alexander Solzhenitsyn Jewish values constituted only a small part of what and European "Leftism'" (1976) contrasted Sartre. Jewish origin or tradition". Aron sought to reduce the "poetry of ideol. with the Russian writer hounded by the Jewishness and rarely expressed himself strongly or Soviet system. who continued to ob- literateurs. patriotic and politically integrated. never for. Among the best known individuals By contrast. bourgeois Jewish families in the world or with Israelis. served the Republic in public offi- crimes as long as they are committed in the name of the cial positions. Aron was particularly critical of those Jews. boundless. he la Rdpublique: histoire politique des juifs d'Etat de asked. emotionally on Jewish questions until de Gaulle's press cept and uphold the myth of the Revolution. In a conversation in 1983 lar. free. such as the ~'state Jews". emphasized that political reflection could not of his political career. conference of November 27. roots. the hands of totalitarianism and terror. such as his former classmate Sartre and com. but not as part of a "Jewish people". and Pierre Mendbs-France. framed his person and outlook. culture to be French. and ideological affinities. In his most well The assimilated Jews played a considerable role in known work. em. had separate organizational ties. viduals. Yet those Isradlites who gained political. or for his advocacy of NATO and an Atlantic 1951. Aron. eman. as prefects. linked by A similar ambiguity related to his support for the social relations. Was his solidarity." of the actions of the Soviet Union and Communist be. he the French patriot. through most loner. counselors of state. state of Israel. deputies and generals. free from Teutonic obscu. and that tique. such as Emile ciples with their abstract theories of "the left" and "the Durkheim. 1967 when "a burst of gave Aron for his accurate analysis and condemnation Jewishness exploded within my French consciousness. eco- geoisie". he used the usual formula: "I am a Frenchman of Community in which the United States would be a pil. ministers. Aron too always insisted he was French. with full political and civil rights ish people. major problem. Ldon Brunschvieg and Aron Revolution". pluralistic and democratic society. their existentialist theory of pure freedom in nomic. serve religious rituals. Les Fous de ogy" to the level of the "prose of reading". ever ready to ac. their hatred of "the bour. their moralizing. Why. the universalistic values of the Republic embodying with the Jewish people and with Israel more intellec- freedom and justice. into the usual categories of social or historical analysis. solidarity did not suggest a "sacred history" of the Jew- cipated since 1791. These Jewish citizens. old Certainly he was not determined by his Jewish origins established French Jews who were non-believers and but was the product of the French language and litera- non-practicing and who as citizens considered their ture to which he was attached. As French Aron could not easily define a people scattered in citizens of the Jewish faith or "mosaic" persuasion they diasporas in the world but who nevertheless maintained were sometimes designated and self-styled as "Isradlites" some kind of unity or solidarity. secu. which could be traced to break links. and bodied if imperfectly in a liberal. the definition of whose identity did not fall and ability to practice religion had these rights as indi. he commented "I am incapable of defining the speci- ficity of what is Jewish for me. Some. Those assimilated Jews. I am a French citizen Aron. whose writings he viewed and who were more apt to lean towards socialism or as justifying deprivation of liberty of other people at Zionism. Judaism. Aron an intellectual justification for an existential choice. havior. are some intellectuals ready to accept the worst Gambetm ~ Vichy. In his speech to the French B'nai Brith on February 21." Aron pondered his refusal Eastern and Northern France. both acknowledging they were Jews. published French life and culture. in 1955. and Israel but I do not want to break links with the other Jews in Descended from solid. Marcel Mauss. Jews for Aron were 14 SOCIETY 9 MAY/JUNE 2004 . and was rather which had been successful in the textile business. universal". was a characteristic member of those secularized. barmitzved. both insistent on and proud of their French culture and lar. joying privileges and fame and able to travel the world Aron never entered into a full discussion of his unhindered. himself. Perhaps it was fidelity to his roots or to back to Lorraine at least since the 18th century. rather than termed "Jews". their disregard of con. Parisian intellectuals. the intellectual contribution of Jews. particularly non-natives. culture. to French temporary political reality.

practices. using referred to his Jewish origins. Judaism included both nationalism and univer. Near the end of his life he wrote that the Dreyfus ity of Jews have shaped their character. a lack of emotional involve- eyes of others. a secularized which he did not regard at the time as a world-histori- Jew who rejects all ties with other Jews is not repudiat. universalism and nationalism. The Diaspora Affair provided evidence of the resistance of French communities had none of the characteristics that ordi. in L'Arche. rarely wrote on tember-October 1983. conscious of the allegation that Jews were culpable of norities who profess the same religion. Each person. while religion and faith were absent. Aron acknowledged in his held his interest throughout his life. The fact was that Aron. was simply a mat. the restraint of salism. or symbols did he write on the discrimination and persecution of were present. the Holocaust. Yet. Their unity was based on Two interrelated aspects of his remarks on Jews and their Book. he never events of World War II. that in his family upbringing only the Jewish question. After his first visit to Israel in believed in the idea of a "covenant" between Jews and 1956 he wrote of his admiration for its army and fight- God. their faith. he held. in London during the war years. Sep. Mdmoires he should have discussed anti-Semitism in ter of truth and falsehood. Lecturing at the l~cole Normale he wrote a monthly article "'Chronique de France". who wrote on such He explained at the end of his life. Embracing the universal values of liberty to emphasize that the war was being fought to end to- and equality. Nazi anti-Semitism led the pseudonym ~Rend Avord". He had not experienced any great several generations. though and the rights implied by the fact of belonging to a his fatherland was France. the notorious Vel d'Hiv roundup when 13. and it was the latter which was the genuine vo. talitarianism and free France from the Nazis not to lib- cal activities. but one could not have two countries (patries). However. an extraordinary variety of subjects. nor a political organization. Jews of the state of Israel are worth noting. reader. a Jew. Aron also regretted. as well as to the virulence of narily make up a people: neither a land. his outlook was Later in life Aron tried to explain why La France modified by Hitler. who expounded an anti. people. cerned with pro or anti-German feelings of people in garding things and men" and whose factual errors about France than with their opinions on domestic politics. Moreover. French culture and universal values. who continue double loyalty and discussed it on a number of occa- to have a certain feeling of solidarity toward each other. nor did he identify with the pioneers prepar- ing any part of himself. imbued with French culture. though he remains a Jew in the ing and building the state. Semitism. Imbued as he was with and what some Frenchmen were doing to the Jews. biological descendants of the to reality and left an equivocal impression on the French Semitic tribes of the Bible. all the rights allowed citizens in their state of residence. yet the historical singular. could have a country and a Aron saw the dilemma that Jews simultaneously claim religion. arrested in Paris by the Vichy police and soon deported Dreyfus position. For Aron the Dreyfus Affair. which to their deaths in Auschwitz. ment he later regretted as he became aware of the tragic ing it with neither pride nor shame. He has a free choice. nor in that of the "chosenness'" of an elect Jewish ing pioneers.not. the evil. even in the face of Nazism. view. Nor a small number of Jewish rites. Loyalty to Israel entailed emigration to it. and interpretation of the Affair he felt did not conform He was also conscious of antisemites among the CHARLES DE GAULLE AND RAYMOND ARON 15 . and certain practices. Aron was always the Diaspora for Aron are not a people: they are mi. He Jews by Vichy France while in London where the Free had no religious education and though he was conscious French group around de Gaulle by convention men- as a youngster of antisemitic remarks they had no ef. tioned Jews as little as possible. is not required to consider himself emotion on the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.000 Jews were herent of Action Fran~aise. late in his life. Aron confessed he exercised a kind of posed upon him by Hitler and Nazi Germany in 1933. Awareness of his Jewish identity was im. tached to Israel for which he had a "particuli~re Aron held that a Jew. "'who affects a tone of haughty superiority re. cal event. nor a language. and finally de Gaulle's libre. Aron confessed he was at- group distinct from that of the state. dilection" (special affection). Aron accepted his destiny as a Jew. barely mentioned the him to assert those Jewish origins without ostentation or plight of the Jews in Europe. Only three paragraphs in humility or compensatory pride. He was critical of Hannah his "Chroniques. for which he press conference. The given reason was fect on him." commenting that he was more con- Arendt. erate the Jews. society to anti-Semitism. ~'emotional precaution" or self-restraint in thinking as Aron could never tully resolve the antinomy between little as possible about the fate of Jews during the war. Aron was a friend of Is- coming from a family that had been French citizens for rael but not a Zionist. for the most part. four years were devoted to the status of the Jews or to Aron in his youth had challenged his teacher. an ad. Aron took no active part in Jewish politi. his articles in 1933 on Nazi Germany and its anti- cation of Judaism. sions.

Gaullists in London. de Gaulle. The implied reference to Charles de Gaulle was the 1967 war. standing of changing events in 1967 and of the threat Later. that of May 28 that while de Gaulle had attributed to himself an inalien- Nasser's actions posed a challenge to both the United able legitimacy. he had differed from Ben Gurion's government and the French Nazi collaborators in Paris. of the people. and strong authority. and 1958. the rallying of the bourgeois classes to that out illusions. In the latter brilliantly issue was that the state of Israel had a right to exist but a r g u e d article. lary. Concerning policies he was critical of Marshal Pdtain as a traitor. He expressed and occupation as being unacceptable to those states. Already in February 1962 in Le between the attitude and responsibility of the Vichy Figaro littdraire. In the first. mented independently on Middle East events. He refused to regard de Gaulle as the cized the idea of a Greater Israel based on annexations incarnation of French national legitimacy. Israel were both engaged in hostilities with countries in In the post-war period Aron differed from de Gaulle the Arab world. and embraced the adoption of a left-wing vocabu- tion and the joining of the two countries and Britain. 1967 suggests that no and had persuaded the nation that Algerian indepen- party wanted war. had detested political parties and fac- 16 SOCIETY 9 MAY/JUNE 2004 . criticized the Algerian policy. October 1961. height- He even warned of the new myth of Israel as the Prussia ened patriotism. paid a verbal tribute to the national 1950s. He differed from de Gaulle on some the latter should feel free to criticize the policies and significant issues during the war. the Suez adventure in 1956 and the British-French-Is. Aron called Zone which was located too far from the Israeli mili. Aron. use of plebiscites and referendums. the Israeli defense position in the Canal Bonaparte" in August 1943. Boulangism with fascism: he saw French Bonapartism. man. Aron criti. who had supported de Gaulle Aron's method of analysis and his growing under. In an article Algerian war ended. Aron argued that or a trusty vassal. The French ver- of the Middle East. In an article "Le opinions of the Israeli leaders just as he might criticize Gouvernment des Notables" in 1941 he differentiated the policies of France. not one The main thrust of Aron's argument on this general based on personal adventure. though aware of States and Israel: and then on June 4 the realization that the cruel Nazi concentration camps. He confessed. 1947. he acknowledged that the President had trans- to Israel are well illustrated by many articles he formed abandonment and defeat in Algeria into victory wrote. One article on May 21. but not its military victories. including Algeria. Discussing in January 1980 the relationship be. and the Jews Aron tried to explain his "particulibre dilection" for Raymond Aron rallied to the Free French cause in Israel. and for a liberal. imagine the gas-chambers or the program of genocide. that of May 25 realizes a dangerous dence was good for France. He correctly recognized that when the on a number of issues. criticiz. ment. he c o m p a r e d B o n a p a r t i s m and that its creation had offended the Arab world. disparagement of parliament and politi- about which he became more concerned as time passed. Aron expressed his concern about raeli attack. blaming Egypt for causing cism. He com. More important. Aron also had reservations about sion of fascism inevitably referred back to the great the Franco-Israeli alliance that had developed in the French Revolution. and thus could not write about it in La France libre. gen. or a name. as well as about a number Arab states which denied it the right to exist. of his policies. the result of political instability. was characterized by the popularity of one man. understanding the reason for the patriotic humiliation and concern for social improve- Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel in October 1973. and ~%'Ombre des Bar Lev line. democratic French system. Bonapartism. Aron. and was especially troubled by the Suez expedi. from 1967 to 1973. in Preuves. son. his concern in two important articles in La France libre: He also spoke of the political and military error of the "Vive la Rdpublique" in June 1943. criticizing Israel for occupation policies clear. contention that to be a Jew today meant to live in the unlike de Gaulle who regarded anyone who obeyed state of Israel. exemplified by Louis Napoleon's ascent to power as ing the French and the British more harshly than Israel both the anticipation and the French version of fas- in the Suez 1956 adventure. the myth of a national hero~ appeal to all sections Aron celebrated Israel. which bound to change. he later regretted. London in 1940 but he was never an uncritical Gaullist tween Israel and the Jewish Diaspora. the Franco-Israeli relationship was "Adieu au Gaullism". in 1940. that he could not Nasser wanted to destroy the state of Israel. for a duumvirate to head the Free French movement tary bases. erally supporting the Camp David peace process with. He also acknowledged that diplomatic game is being played. the result of the historical accident that France and over the heads of political parties. cal parties. passionate groups crystallizing around one per- Aron regarded the alliance as precarious and incongru. will. to a leader who tries to address the whole people ous. While aware that Israel was surrounded by the personality of de Gaulle.

1914. 1967. de first Commissioner for Jewish Questions in Vichy. an action which fostered Jewish immigration als to be. Former Prime Minister David Ben read Le Grand Ddbat.tions. He reminded Ben Gurion that he would CHARLES DE GAULLE AND RAYMOND ARON 17 . Aron did criticize de Gaulle for condemning Israel but rather as a "paternal monarch. French and Jews. the first Jewish agricultural of Israel and that of French Jews. Again. Justice. felt that for the first time in post-war Europe." took excep- must be France." Gaulle as a tyrant or as an advocate of unlimited rule. the question of Is. on the press conference wrote "why should I hide that had limited his power in advance out of democratic the passage on the Middle East gave me the greatest conviction. disturbing. vinced by the argument of Aron who "rarely approves De Gaulle's remarks about Jews were offensive to of what I do". satisfaction. whom de Gaulle had welcomed on a number written on the same s u b j e c t . Aron never thought of de the possible dominance of that race. He was not alone in finding de had no expansionist ambitions and that "the chosen Gaulle's cryptic remarks of a Jewish people which pro. and used the device of a plebiscite as had Louis the wandering Jew" in the weekly. and the Soviet Union. Though Aron did not make the point. the President. self-assured and 19t~ century towards establishing a Jewish state was the domineering. and 1964 as leader incessantly. Perhaps he glimpses In spite of their differences. Gaulle dealt with Israeli policy. For de Gaulle France as "one of the great men of the century. Charles Maurras." but was not con. Universelle under Adolphe Cr6mieux." no one suggested con- leader used language and ideas that lent respectability quering additional territory. 1962. and thinks it his duty to work towards of the world that Aron considered contrary to reality. Reflecting on the char- Quebec independence. Gide wrote of the threat from the Soviet Union. on his return to power in 1958. de Gaulle complimented and admired allegiance to the French state with sympathy for and "Paix et guerre entre les nations. and Xavier Vallat. "de Gaulle and question as such. and of Blum's considering the Jewish race France was threatened equally by the two super pow. whereas Aron kept examining the ques. y o u return to it of occasions in 1958. Edouard Drumont.. that Israel ing those in Israel. The language not broken out as a result of Israel's expansionist ambi- and style was reminiscent of former French antisemites. on France as a language also resembled that of Andr~ Gide in his di- third force between the U. 1967." Aron also differed on other issues: on nuclear policy. .. In a sweeping state. He informed de countries and at certain times. ence for the Jews. . by the French Jews of the Alliance Isra61ite raeli policy in 1967 and other times and that of a Jew. in an immediate comment.S. at the same time. a major that "'Our mandate is the Bible. support of Israel's right to defend itself. of Blum's "apparent resolve always to show a prefer- ment Aron accused de Gaulle of having legitimated anti. not with the Jewish deed. French diplomacy was thus paralyzed by a vision long dominated. Conflict with the Arabs had to anti-Semitism and made it legitimate. lowed his advice and that Jews in France had demon- ences with Aron as he politely indicated in letters to strated their joy at Israel's victory in the Six Day War." that Israel had a message to the Jews in the Diaspora not simply attack. "as superior. In. NATO and arms. Aron raised and settlement in Palestine." alone and for his anger both that Israel had not fol- For his part de Gaulle was conscious of his differ. On December 9. The strongest direct criticism by Aron of de Gaulle's The Israeli leader provided the French President a con- language and policy resulted from the famous press cise version of the 2500 year history of the Jews in the conference of November 27. de Gaulle's on NATO and the Atlantic community. on ary entry of January 24. Aron stressed the right of individu. school. A~wects de la France. 1963 he wrote he had others besides Aron. Napoleon." Aron saw de Gaulle confusing the issue founding of Mikveh Israel. then Minister of ish people. Aron who sent him copies of some of his books. its triumph with all his strength. In his much shorter reply of December 30. tion to the unjust remarks in the press conference and tions of the Atlantic Community. strong desire for peace with its neighbors. as called on to dominate after having been ers. Gaulle of his statement before the 1936 Peel Commis- Aron did not accuse de Gaulle of anti-Semitism. tions. and on the real cause and nature acter of L6on Blum whom he had not met. 1961. 1967 and the President's Middle East and reminded him that the first step in the reference to Jews as "an elite people. 1960. Vallat. "our friend and ally. "as I often read what you have Gurion.maybe because the line you have adopted of Israel. but sion on the future of the British Mandate of Palestine." and who flattered him does not fully satisfy even you". Ben Gurion explained that the questions of whether de Gaulle wanted to deliver a Jews were not a "'dominating people. On Aron claimed the right as a French citizen to combine August 7. people" to which de Gaulle had referred did not con- voked or rather aroused waves of ill feeling in certain sider itself superior to other people." who is particularly sensitive to Jew- Americanism and for having sometimes suggested that ish virtues. wrote de Gaulle a long letter on December 6.

influenced de Gaulle's thinking territories by force of arms. member of the Constitutional restore to Algerian Jews the French citizenship that Council and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1968.. Gaston a compliment to Jews. the per- life was marked by indifference or lack of attention to son who drafted all the legal texts of the Free French. on strategies and new styles of expulsion which were the consequences of an occupa. who deliv- their obligations as French people. and now it is for a French Algeria. in real head. It was for him a "lamentable trial. Moreover. a Jewish graduate of the number of ways. grandson of a rabbi." In a separate exchange in his friend Paul Reynaud in 1934 who sponsored the January 1968 at the Elysde with Chief Rabbi Jacob idea of a professional mechanized army in the French Kaplan. but also the lawyer and writer Jean Auburtin and in unimaginable conditions. and the He was almost silent on the Holocaust in general and man who after the war was to be vice president. erature. he argued. was accompanied by talented and prestigious Jews in- late to his policies on the Middle East and on interna. Court of Arbitration. It was against Dreyfus. his friends to read de Gaulle's Vers l'Armde de M~tier. Other Jews were available for other tasks. the granddaughter of Captain Dreyfus. Georges Boris. The De Gaulle himself rarely referred to the Dreyfus Af. Israel to an Arab state. weapons and mechanized warfare. He argued that Israel had taken possession of on the needed administrative reforms of the army. it has been said was the France of De Gaulle's lack of attention to Nazi atrocities or to the metro and the synagogue. United States. of the Conseil d'Etat. Israel. he admitted that the Palewski. Was de Gaulle antisemitic. It was also rumored that Jewish issues did not prevent him from friendship with de Gaulle offered the position of advisor on foreign individual Jews or understanding of those issues. and how did they re. in a sense. and 1967. teacher of philosophy and lit. Mayer. who himself had been discrimi- De Gaulle told Ben Gurion and others that Israel nated against largely because of his articles on the false- had disregarded his warning not to start hostilities in hoods of some generals during the Dreyfus Affair. Israel was quite natural and was not incompatible with Edmond Ldvy-Solal." His interesting comment at the time of De Gaulle was no such servant but he maintained the general coup in Algeria in 1961 was that "the French cordial relations with Jewish leaders and was conscious army has always been wrong. the on the plight of Jews under Vichy. Jerusalem and many Jordanian. suggests antisemitic prejudices. cluding Raymond Aron. In typical divided the vant of the Jews." How. Ldo Hamon. issues concerning Jews to which he gave little thought. ered de Gaulle's children in 1921 and 1924." In a single reference de Gaulle defended his Mayer also introduced de Gaulle into a group that remarks about the "elite" Jewish people and stressed its met weekly in the apartment of his son-in-law between qualities "thanks to which this strong people was able 1932 and 1937 and where de Gaulle met not only Ldon to survive and remain itself after nineteen centuries spent Blum. what were his real atti. practiced repression and on military matters. de it by the powers. Paris in London.have been opposed to the annihilation of Israel which for Pdtain. The most important of this tional affairs? Nothing in de Gaulle's career. realities. lar fashion he warned Ben Gurion that Israel's policy and helped in the 1938 revision and expansion of de "is valid only on condition of being adapted to the Gaulle's La France et son Armge. Pierre Mend~s-France." An he had publicly called a "friendly state and ally. Vichy authorities even called de Gaulle "the docile ser- fair. Vichy had taken away in 1940. de Gaulle argued that his words were. In London as leader of the Free French. ish Emile Herzog) who declined it and left for the a Catholic monarchist. Mayer encouraged tion which was tending to annexation." ship with the Arab countries." French people. president of the Higher 1943 after the Allied forces had liberated North Africa. his leave Bordeaux to join de Gaulle in London. to work on it with de Gaulle. l~cole Polytechnique. de Gaulle tudes and policies towards Israel. who conducted negotiations with the British. officer. equally telling incident occurred when de Gaulle was ever. and Syrian his senior by 30 years. however. Reminded that the individual had a must remember that the "lands initially recognized" to Jewish wife. Egyptian. his words group was probably Rend Cassin. Rather. was convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus. Israel must show strict moderation in its relations considering the appointment of a person as ambassador with its neighbors and in its territorial ambitions. He did. He affairs to the popular novelist Andrd Maurois (the Jew- had after all grown up in a household where his father. of the help given by the Jews to the Free French in 18 S O C I E T Y 9 M A Y / J U N E 2004 . Parliament and who told the head of his cabinet. Among other sympathy of French Jews for the people and the land of Jews with whom de Gaulle was friendly was Dr. and that France has had old and natural friend. are considered by the Arabs as their Gaulle replied "she is the granddaughter of a French property. had In his early career he was influenced and encour- exceeded the limits of the requisite moderation in a aged by Colonel Emile Mayer. the first civilian to or actions.

assisted some members of the Irgun and where he benefited from information from Jewish Stern gangs who had escaped British prisons in Pales- CHARLES DE GAULLEAND RAYMOND ARON 19 . On one side were supporters of a lar objectives. at- February 20. 27. that it should link up with Arabs. Palestinian Jews encouraged the teaching of position of the Arabs who were on the other side. commenting that anti-Semitism resulted from Politically. when France regained its liberty. aiding the Germans in Lebanon and Syria. in a letter of August 22. since they shared simi. 1940 under Colonel Collet against Vichy France which was to Stephen Wise. French painting in Tel Aviv in May 1942. the Jewish press supported de Gaulle in the Jews being made the scapegoats for economic and so. to abolish that shameful legislation after liberation. quarters in Cairo. Frangois Coulet and protected guing that Free France should limit its relations with by the Haganah. The and void and as an injustice with regards to Jewish citi. future politician in Israel. On the other side were those ar- by de Gaulle's advisor. the Jewish Agency was French in the Levant. he was rude but which held the League of Na. and being careful in his delicate wartime 1929 and 1931. Jacques Soustelle. especially Jacques businessman. president of the World Jewish Con. would enjoy equal Allied Forces including the Free French contingent rights. and in early 1942 a Jewish Association for the tenance of the French mandate in Syria and Lebanon. Radio Levant France Libre. Though General Georges Catroux. On Outside of Palestine. French contingent but gave up the idea because of Brit- tions between the Jews in Palestine and Free French ish opposition and concern of Catroux who argued that forces and officials during the war were cordial and such a unit and Jewish mobilization would be a danger cooperative in a number of ways.000 women. de Gaulle considered the Vichy legislation as null action Moshe Dayan lost his left eye in June 1941. head of the Free thy and admiration. After on July 5. In its turn. all French nevertheless Jewish Palestinians fought together with citizens. L'Islam.000. He recognized that rela. He also spoke of Zionism with sympa. Early on. objected and spurned the Jewish offer to help. Paul Repitom was appointed in August Soustelle. wrote. preserving options for France in Syria De Gaulle. even spoke with exaggeration of 150. antisemitic decrees were annulled there on our side while the Arabs were on the other side. de Gaulle recalled that "the young the defeat of the Vichy forces in Syria and Lebanon by Jews in Palestine in 1941 were marvelous. whatever their religion. they fought the Free French. cial position.000 Jew- no clear answers to his views in conversations with ish volunteers. gress. and that it David Hacohen. In French in high schools and organized an exhibition of London he met in August 1940 with Albert Cohen. he was also aware of A Free French consulate was set up in Tel Aviv in the problem of pan-Arabism and interested in the main- 1941.Palestine during the war. He took no offi. lo.-Malo. and in a letter to Stephen Wise of September ished in the fight against Rommel's tanks and planes. An energetic engineer and cause. in his 1968 book. 1940 that. and others such as the antisemitic cial recognition to Free France. Writing from Brazzaville on November 11. Captain Jean-Louis Montezer. Free French was established providing for daily con. author of ka France et De Gaulle promised Cohen. sources. Jewish contribution to his cause. was aware of the complex political fac- relationship with Britain to which. conflict with General Giraud at the end of 1942. a Jewish unit of 500 men. If de Gaulle appreciated the value of the station in Beirut. while the cal representative of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem Free French provided a subsidy for a chair in the French and of the American branch of the World Jewish Con. who had been stationed in Beirut between and Lebanon. he proposed a Jewish military unit as part of the Free tions mandate for Palestine. victor of Bir Hakeim: almost all per- in Africa. headed and General Koenig. fought in Flanders and St. After the war France did not openly aid the Zionist tact between the two sides. 1941. helped leaders of Jewish Palestinian resis- 1941 as representative of the Free French in Jerusalem tance groups. 1968. some of whom Chaim Weizmann in 1942 and 1943. language and civilization at the Hebrew University. were transported from zens. such as Colonel Collet in Palestine 1941 a radio station. about 6. to peace in the area. de Gaulle gave d'Israel. With its should reduce tension with Britain over the future of strong signals the station challenged the Vichy radio the Levant. and some officers in his head- one of the first international organizations to give offi. Free French forces. On a number of occasions he stated his intention Palestine to the Syrian border in Haganah trucks. La longue marche On the general question of Zionism. 1943 wrote of the need for reparations in Algeria In his conversation with Jean-Claude Servan-Schreiber and the restoration of nationality for Jews there. In one such gress. linked up with the French Republic must be immediately reestablished General Koenig. cial problems. functioned in Haifa at the home of the Jews. though some French people. 1943 de Gaulle declared that the laws of tached to the King's West African Rifles. including 50. as Winston Churchill tions in the Middle East. At one point. from September 1940 to June Jewish active role. contrasting that with the op." on August 2. in March 1941.

Yet. Cooperation between the defense establishments had not been carried to Cairo. and mobile artillery. Mystbre IVs and then Mystbre IIs. ing to prevent further hostilities. which it felt would alienate Arab states. concern to protect mi. also began supplying it. appreciated the talents and energies of Jews creased. he felt. In response to this trend. in his desire to reduce Brit. 1955 de Gaulle earlier Nasser had made an agreement to receive weap- considered the creation of the Jewish state as a historic ons from the Soviet Union. French pilots were to be sent to Israel. 75 mm guns. and Gaullists such as participation in the Northern Tier agreements. 1956. including that of Jewish immigration into the between 1954 and 1955. A year France. Shortly after. that though Israel must withdraw from Sinai. hop- his silence on the question of Palestine with a declara. and Britain and wanted other European countries to provide arms in signing the 1950 Tripartite Agreement to monitor and tanks. the most 20 SOCIETY 9 MAY/JUNE2004 . Israeli dispute. including Jerusa. 1947 calling for the partition of Palestine. As those boundaries of Israel. Tsur reported his remarks part of the secret S~vres agreement of October 22. The great pow.French attack on According to Jacob Tsur. De Gaulle broke prevent violation of boundaries or armistice lines. tanks. the Diombde Catroux. with this aid. His attitude was influenced by wanted to assist Israel and to increase supply of arms various factors: humanitarian sentiment seeing the cre. the Quai the flow of weapons into the Middle East and to take d'Orsay was virtually excluded from any planning on action "both within and outside the United Nations. egists. and was excluded from The French defense industry. The presence of Israel in the Middle East was with Israel and supported it in international forums but a reality which could not be ignored. France not only en- and was particularly surprised by Israeli success in ag. desire army and administration. 1956 in a conversation on November 16. its international position had completely changed be. because of the fear that Nasser. and the arms supply in- necessity. Canal in 1956 led to the joint British. Menachem Begin in February 1957 remarked that he Some French people. acknowledged that France was Israel's major arms also regretted that the Suez offensive in October 1956 source. talked of a formal alliance: in Begin "'Do not leave Gaza. Ben Gurion. regarded by many as ation of the state of Israel as just reparation for the the undisputed leader of the Arab world not simply as suffering of the Jewish people. tee for an Alliance did emerge headed at first by Jacques ber 29. should be regulated by cooperation of Britain Nasser as the dominant leader in the Arab world and as and France. partly as a result of the activity ers. was not happy Africa and by the uncertain ramifications of the Arab. and some diplomats were transferred. It also became con- tion in The Times in September 1945 that Middle East cerned about the increasing Soviet influence in Egypt issues. who visited him on April 28. advocated sale of arms to create a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and to Israel. attempts Billotte. de Gaulle 1956. in the Air Ministry. the French Commit- De Gaulle approved the UN resolution of Novem. Koenig and Soustelle. Canal. a potential troublemaker in Algeria. though Soustelle and then by General Koenig. and provided some arms supplies. tine. General Pierre Baghdad pact of 1955 and CENTO in 1958." November 1956 an organization. with modern weapons. Concerned about its position in North cially its Africa and Levant Directorate. fighting France which might mean the end of French In the post war period France was not a major player Algeria. where Nazi officers served in the norities in the Middle East against panArabism. and by the rise of Gamal Abdul country. France joined with the U. espe- the Middle East. cause of its brilliant military victory. They included arms. gaged in cooperative projects in science and technology riculture. Differences on he later complained France had not been consulted on French policy between politicians and military person- the borders of the two states: he was out of power at nel in the 4 th Republic and diplomats were evident. It had conceded independence Aid to Israel would help check Nasser's activities. In contrast the French Foreign Office. at a time when France was at war admired the courage of Israeli soldiers and instructed with Algerian rebels. But of Israeli military purchasing agents and defense strat- Israel had to correct its boundaries. the head of Egypt. of Syria and Lebanon in 1946." to Suez. AMX lem. and the Negev to Israel. Israeli Ambassador to Egypt and to the Israeli capture of the Sinai. must assure the existence of the state. would aid the Algerian rebels to see British influence in the region limited. after the Suez planning the joint attack on and occupation of the Suez adventure. Because of the internal friction. and in conversation with and intelligence networks of the two countries was close. especially Maurice Bourg~s-Maunoury. in a speech in the Knesset on April 22. He also approved the UN General Assembly first group. rockets and De Gaulle was not always consistent or clear about rocket-launchers.S. in Middle East affairs. plan of September 1948 which allocated the Galilee Minister of Defense and former resistance fighter. ish influence de Gaulle called for internationalization The nationalization by President Nasser of the Suez of the Palestinian problem. The that time.

those vital interests required a strong. Collaboration on rocket research continued. friendship was recalled from Israel in 1959. not military ends. Yet. pride. In April 1966 he approved the In addition to military aid and political cooperation. rael. observing day-to. and prosperity of scientists and equipment. Jacques independent France. The Hebrew speaking Affair had shut France out of the Arab world: "I natu. Couve ancing if possible the two superpowers. de Gaulle spoke of apart from Lebanon. de eration which increased after the 1956 Suez war. later. More P6trolibres). At a time when the Alge. He explained. and confi- agreement was said to have provided Israel with a large dence in Israel and spoke of his guest as a doughty reactor capable of producing plutonium at Dimona. giving it. 1961. the pro-Arab Pierre defense and participate in Great Power decisions. one of grandeur. the most popular rally intended to reestablish our position in this region. diplomatic relations were re- was unhappy with the presence of Israeli officials in sumed with Egypt while at the UN. Ambassador Pierre-Etienne Gilbert. affection. vital interests of France. were kept low-key. left the would implement and which could provide for its own government in February 1960. 1960 that the Israeli program for must not interfere with 'la politique' of France. more planes were delivered: in 1961 de Gaulle approved the control over energy.conspicuous being Maurice Couve de Murville who sale of 72 Mirage IIIs. the Comte de Paris was sent in spring scientific collaboration with Israel as incompatible with 1961 to Libya to improve relations." development of atomic energy. De Gaulle may not have had similar sentiments but was for exclusively peaceful. especially increased trade. The Gaulle touched on his admiration. Israeli research scientists. a state owned corporation. 6 Super-Frelon heli- France also entered into a nuclear agreement in 1953 copters. Arab leaders. on June 6. Relations with Israel were too close. which de Gaulle Soustelle. Mig 21s sold to Egypt. French cultural the sovereignty and national interest of France. into ERAP (Enterprise de Recherches et d'Activites ply of arms were sent." A year later. covering heavy water and uranium production coop. de Gaulle who had the comment of Manes Sperber that de Gaulle was a not taken any public position on the desirability of a psychologically adroit and convincing flatterer~ an in- Franco. In welcoming Ben Gurion on June 14. French delegates French military headquarters. De Gaulle in 1965 were welcomed. signs of the change in the French attitude to the in his M~moires. diplomatic relations with Arab states. 1960. most of it in El A1 planes. Guillaumat was appointed Minister for Arms. He refused Ben Gurion's became more reserved towards Israel. The warrior and champion." Frenchman in Israel.Israeli alliance reconsidered what he thought dividual of indefatigable cunning. 1961 reminded the Israeli leader they had de Gaulle replied that ~your sentiments towards Israel agreed on June 17. On return to power in 1958. the most ardent defender of Israel. headed the Quai d'Orsay which had already favored rian insurgence and desire for independence was domi. request for French assistance for a building to separate The visits of Ben Gurion and Levi Eshkol to France isotopes. Andr~ Malraux's visit was cancelled though he were sent back to Israel. not only Israel and to increase closer relations with Arab coun. Couve de To forge stronger links with the Arabs and to help Murville made this clear in December 1964 when he assure oil supplies.'" De Gaulle's extravagant rhetoric amply justifies ential. De Gaulle viewed aspects of went to Egypt. Commercial relations between CHARLES DE GAULLEAND RAYMOND ARON 21 . while Pierre Etienne "our solidarity and friendship to Israel. who symbolized "the marvel- nuclear instillation was built with the help of French ous resurrection. of arms begun by the 4 ~h Republic continued: during The French government merged gas and oil interests the last two weeks of May 1967 over $40 million sup. De Gaulle in a letter to Ben Gurion of accelerating construction of an atomic pile near Dimona~ May 16. remained influ. who forwarded Franco-Israeli Politically. cooperating with Egypt who was anxious to renew ties with the Arabs and assisting the Arab world. were limited. commercial exports~ break with de Gaulle over Algeria and who called for and oil supply. bal. French Ambassador to Israel. was in the best. he did not end friendly relations with Israel. de Gaulle meant to end the favored treatment of language in Lebanon and Iran. and play a de Murville former Vichy official and Ambassador to greater role in Middle East affairs. ally. Israel" and was "one of the great statesmen of the cen- After Suez. sale of 50 Mirage Vs and. Jean Chauvel was sent to foster the French nant. To and economic interests in the Middle East were empha- Jacques Soustelle. French ministers rarely visited Is- day operations of the nuclear research center at Saclay. tury. renaissance." The flow between France and lran was signed in August 1966. King Hussein of Jordan but also General Amer of Egypt tries. that the Algerian crisis and the Suez Middle East were unmistakable. our friend and Gilbert. which could counter the Soviet went from Washington to Bonn. a Franco-Algerian agreement on said to King Hussein of Jordan that ~friendship with hydrocarbons was signed in July 1965~ and another Israel is deeply rooted in the French people. which France supported. such renewal. his longtime supporter who would sized.

and imports 9. at the UN in March 1957 had agreed that obstruction of at the United Nations. Egyptian D i s c o u r s et m e s s a g e ." would take "any and all measures" to reopen the Gulf. we shall not let her be de- (United Nations Emergency Force) troops to leave stroyed (nous ne vous laisserons pas d6truire). after emergence of a state of Israel that was warlike and set President Lyndon Johnson declared the United States on expansion. 1967. 1967 was not 1957. Union which in turn would aid France in the Maghreb. This July 5. which in fact 84 million. which demanded that Israeli free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba. by preventing would change the status of the city. France voted in favor of a motion presented by Paki- France was also bound by the Triple Declaration. 5. Israel. vol. 1967. U Thant. was contrary to in. and France of May 25. In the press confer- intelligence of Israel's plans for war and intentions to ence of November 22. de Gaulle did not view the blockade of Aqaba defended the refusal of the Arabs to meet with Israeli as a casus belli. declaring that Israeli the U. on May 29. ordering the troops out of Gaza. de Gaulle abruptly Israeli Ambassador Walter Eytan that the ban would in declared "Do not make war. 1967.S. on a Four-Power French version of the text because of the word "des" consultation and initiative of which the Soviet Union which the French might interpret as total. de Murville regarded Israeli withdrawal from occupied mount interest" as Abba Eban argued. of stan on the issue of Jerusalem. was difficult to imag- the first shot by closing the Straits. 1967 the Soviet Union provided Egypt with false leading. would allow France to De Gaulle's attitude to the 1967 Six Day War was play its due role in significant international affairs. The same day ternational law. de Gaulle repeated what he first to open hostilities. 1950 which actions and votes reunifying the city should be non- sought to guarantee the territorial integrity and sover. drawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied through the Straits. On July Straits. At the UN General Assembly on June through the Straits. your By this de Gaulle was not only ignoring fast moving destruction will not be allowed (on ne vous laissera pas events. In 1966 French exports to those countries totaled East was possible without the approval of the Soviet 4. of hostilities by Israel in the Six-Day war. He also said then. De Gaulle 4. valid and that Israel should refrain from any action that eignty of all states in the Middle East. For him no settlement in the Middle clear. Israel did not 27. The disparity was would be a part. the outcome of policy concerns and personal pique due Exercising that role de Gaulle imposed on June 2 an to Israel's disregarding of his advice. On May ddtruire). foreign minister Couve de Murville virtually Yet. However. but also denying French commitments. de Gaulle approved an in- obtain an unqualified commitment by the international ternational statute for Jerusalem. 1967. nor did he see the ine. did not regard this as an act of aggression though France supported by the Soviet Union and the Arab countries. "If you are attacked. Nasser ordered. The agree- Regatta proposal. 22. Abba Eban. nor did he accept that Egypt had fired leaders: such a dialog. Couve reopening of the Straits as "an unconditional and para. and imports Equally important. to state nature" to the Middle East. regarded as a personal affront. 1968. and repeated in his invade Syria. In its desire for oil.. Britain. de Gaulle territories as a prerequisite for any move towards a was later to say to Jean-Claude Servan Schrieber on peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Again. 1967. in the recent conflict. on May 16. 1967. what community to lift the blockade nor to uphold IsraeFs he did not say in 1956." earlier had said to Eban. France sought to in." As so often de Gaulle's language was mis- 11. at the UN on September 28." but ambiguity remained in the ade. 1967 press conference. which would have broken the block. he held. Cutting short the embargo on the supply of weapons of an "offensive attempt of Israeli foreign minister. rather than 22 SOCIETY 9 MAY/JUNE2004 .503 million francs. On a number of occasions France made clear its criti- de Gaulle reaffirmed the principle of free passage cism of Israel. To the remonstration of the Israeli case on May 24. one from 40 maritime powers. a rejection de Gaulle crease services and equipment in Arab capitals. France condemned the opening and even went further. a violation of international agreement. Nasser announced blockade of the Tiran After the war de Gaulle's policy hardened. ports to Israel totaled 232 million francs. that after Suez "we watched the right to self defense.980 million.France and Arab countries increased. In 1957." issue was heatedly debated in the discussion of UN Se- De Gaulle did not approve the international Red Sea curity Council 242 of November 22. the formula was less indi- forces into the Sinai Peninsula and ordered UNEF rect: "If Israel is attacked. Instead. On May 22. it always exaggerates. an idea put forward by Britain to send ment as stated in the English language text is "With- a convoy of ships. At the November violence to change frontiers. forces withdraw from occupied territory. In any case don't be the reality apply only to Israel. "exaggerated. the UN Secretary-General. he insisted. complied ever the correct formula. Ex. perhaps even deceptive. France voted in favor of a Yugoslav motion. the Four-Power idea. on June 2." What- Sinai. For de Gaulle. was rejected by the Soviet Union. 1967.

and Israeli dispute. Other factors help explain the change in Aron. The fol- Aron. reassuring Jews who were now deur. President Giscard development of Israel's nuclear program. the will to kill those it als like Maxime Rodinson. for which At the same time. of Na- sured criticisms of some of its policies. television. and the Soviet the terrorist attacks. threatened and dealing with those who had committed to act as a neutral between the U. They include Introduction to Comparative Govern- Vichy. historian of Islamic societies. General Commission on Jewish Questions between 1942 could be strengthened. The title of the article reflected Darquier's position: "At Auschwitz only lice were gassed". of hostility to the state of Israel and the disquieting Aron was critical of those such as Bernard-Henri violent antisemitic actions and rhetoric in his country. For Darquier's "'untrue and unacceptable" charge. This blind terrorism had taken Jews as its target. gime. an opportunity for France to exhibit gran. head of the Vichy tries to which French teachers and technicians were sent. and to be an impartial mediator in the Arab. ended. the deliberate extermination of a to join in the condemnations of Jewish-born intellectu. He was particularly disturbed that L'Express. in his editorial "Antis6mitisme et terrorisme. Above all. in rue Copernic in Paris. and street dem. denounc- Israeli position and were more sympathetic to the Ar. influence in the Middle East. and Holocaust Aron commented that Darquier's interview had revealed denial. Jewish institutions and people and deploring the indif- onstrations had supported a foreign country enthusias. statement about the increasing number of attacks on cluding newspapers." France. Aron argued. on Vichy: Power and Prejudice in The Vichy France Re- nor did any elected official.November 4. was providing France the number of antisemitic incidents which were offi- the opportunity to play a major role in the international cially ignored. should be a limit in France to the complaisance towards ply short range ground-to-air Hawk missiles and in oil producers and buyers of French arms: beyond that 1965 to sell Skyhawk light bombers. to counter U. Semitism in France: "with his own hysteria he is only going to feed the hysteria of a small part of the Jewish Michael Curtis is professor emeritus of political science community that is already inclined to wild talk and wild at Rutgers Universi~'. Oil supply could be more as.S. October 11-17. virtually exclusive French military ties to Israel had Aron also confronted the French Holocaust deniers. 1978 denouncing controversy between him and Aron was ended. had not produced an books ol7 the Middle East Europe. right wing authoritarianism. Verdict political party or journal professed antisemitic views. Jews and Gypsies. withdrawal.S. Aron immediately re- With de Gaulle's resignation in 1968. Aron's voice. and that many in France in. in October 28. and 1944 who had escaped punishment and was living sured. the jour- vided the opportunity for more cordial relations with nal for which he wrote. the U. 1978. If France was Israel had paid and which were being built by the not to be seen as the foyer of a new anti-Semitism the French. 1978 an interview with the Third World. with Louis Darquier de Pellepoix. The fact that. the end of the war in Algeria pro. in Spain. attd The Palestinians. and was successful. Aron did become concerned by de Gaulle had expressed contempt. But he refused zism: the Holocaust. nor even. the left-wing distinguished hated and refused to recognize as part of humanity. the lowing week in L'Express of November 11-18. President had to speak. related issues remained: criticism of Israel. who did not support the Twenty years after his death. annoyance d'Estaing had not understood that the Copernic attack that Israel had in April 1967 secretly shipped out from was not simply a news item but a historic event whose Cherbourg two of the twelve missile boats for which echo would reverberate across the world. resurgence of anti-Semitism in France. Western European Government and Politics. For Aron. without consulting Arab countries and for aid in their development. Ldvy in his book for magnifying the dangers of anti. In the 1980s no ment. ing both self righteous and oversimplified expressions abs than he in the Arab-Israeli conflict. To- The Resurgence of Anti-Semitism gether with Jean Francois Revel.'" in policy: irritation that Israel had ignored his advice in L'Express.partial. given this symbolic significance. It is ironic that the UN. radio. not the banality. after the 1962 Soviet. especially the Francophone coun. making mea. Aron continued support of Israel. a genuine concern about to address the issue. Union. After the bombing outside the synagogue scene. is sorely missed. CHARLES DE GAULLEAND RAYMOND ARON 23 . published. Aron argued there Egyptian arms deal. and Comparative Poli- authentic fascism or Nazism. ferent attitude of French officials and their reluctance tically in that success. 1980.S. except under tics. He is author and editor of many actions. Ties him. in 1963 agreed to sup. wrote his strongest 1967. the singularity and specificity. this particular plied in Le Monde of November 1. indicated that the limit France risked losing its soul and also its life. that killed four passers-by. whole people.