[G.R. No. 118127.

April 12, 2005]

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L.
ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of
Manila, HON. ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S. CAILIAN,
HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON. HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON.
FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON. ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR.,
HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA,
HON. MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON.
MANUEL L. QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO, HON. VICTORIANO A.
MELENDEZ, HON. ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON. DANILO V.
ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON,
HON. FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q. BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ,
HON. BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON,
HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S.
RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON. LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B.
DAWIS, in their capacity as councilors of the City of Manila, petitioners, vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S.
LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad after.

Ernest Hermingway
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1

It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed by oneself, is less immoral than if performed by
someone else, who would be well-intentioned in his dishonesty.

J. Christopher Gerald
Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I

The Courts commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental law of the land. It is
foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals. And if it need be, the Court will not hesitate
to make the hammer fall, and heavily in the words of Justice Laurel, and uphold the constitutional guarantees when faced
with laws that, though not lacking in zeal to promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitutionality.
The pivotal issue in this Petition[1] under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure seeking the
reversal of the Decision[2] in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower
court),[3] is the validity of Ordinance No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.[4]
The antecedents are as follows:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of
operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. [5] It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as
a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. [6] On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition
for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order[7] (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S.
Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that
the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.[8]
Enacted by the City Council[9] on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the
said Ordinance is entitled

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.[10]

The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person, partnership,
corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft
Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or
authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services
and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the
inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to:

1. Sauna Parlors
2. Massage Parlors
3. Karaoke Bars
4. Beerhouses
5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
7. Super Clubs
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
10. Dance Halls
11. Motels
12. Inns

SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are prohibited from
issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and accepting payments for the operation of
business enumerated in the preceding section.

SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the businesses enumerated in Section 1
hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind up
business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to
other kinds of business allowable within the area, such as but not limited to:

1. Curio or antique shop
2. Souvenir Shops
3. Handicrafts display centers
4. Art galleries
5. Records and music shops
6. Restaurants
7. Coffee shops
8. Flower shops
9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for wholesome family
entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele.
10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows,
stage and theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.
11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the
zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage depot, dock or yard,
motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery, or funeral establishments.

SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment
of one (1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED,
that in case of juridical person, the President, the General Manager, or person-in-charge of operation shall be liable
thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in case of subsequent violation and conviction, the premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.

Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993.

Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)

In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of
prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDCs Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments
for amusement or entertainment and they were not services or facilities for entertainment, nor did they use women as tools
for entertainment, and neither did they disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants or adversely affect the social and
moral welfare of the community.[11]
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City
Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv) [12] of the Local Government Code of
1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is

The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers: . lodging houses or other similar establishments. buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall: .. public dance halls. including theatrical performances. sauna baths. for a single offense. hotels. (5) The Ordinance violates MTDCs constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiffs property rights. and shall: . (4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land. approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code. 499 [13] which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone with certain restrictions. Section 18.. [24] . regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment. [16] which reads.D. Legislative powers. Duties. (vii) Regulate the establishment. 409. and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment. or both such fine and imprisonment. billiard pools.. circuses. massage parlors. [23] The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila.D. Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. or require the suspension or suppression of the same. and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. Powers.) No. (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it. [18] Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III.. (4) The Ordinanceconstitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment. peace. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod. hence. prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community. Functions and Compensation.[19] otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila) [20] which reads. (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected. (kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety.[17] petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in the above- quoted provision included the power to control. good order.. public dancing schools. the petitioners noted. Citing Kwong Sing v. and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns. or. convenience. Further. thus: Section 458.[21] Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P. particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants.. and the promotion of the morality. thus: ARTICLE III THE MUNICIPAL BOARD . shall enact ordinances. cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in operation... to govern and to restrain places of exhibition and amusement. and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial zone. the petitioners likewise claimed. comfort. City of Manila. [14] In their Answer[15] dated 23 July 1993.. and other places for entertainment or amusement.violative of Presidential Decree (P. and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. as the legislative body of the city. operation. [22] The Ordinance. and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter. private respondent had the burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality.. the furtherance of the prosperity. but not pension houses. petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code. the Ordinance had the presumption of validity.

alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires. as well as powers necessary. or incidental for its efficient and effective governance. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the Constitution. A long-time resident. and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated discretion in the execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions. it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. those necessarily implied therefrom.[28] Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal[29] on 12 December 1994.[30] On 11 January 1995. it does not contravene P. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government units provided for in Art. which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. that it is violative of the equal protection clause. (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P. except those specified therein. viz: SECTION 16. Local government units. The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts at rendering them worthless. On 28 June 1993.[32] In the Petition and in its Memorandum. (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade. among other things. unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power. local government units shall ensure and support. (2) must not be unfair or oppressive. It relished its glory days and endured its days of infamy. 778[3]. confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful business. The Court is of the opinion. that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance. or otherwise. enjoining the petitioners from implementing the Ordinance. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively. Sec. (5) must be general and consistent with public policy. Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance. Series of 1993. It reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power. manifesting that they are elevating the case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law. a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. This is an opportune time to express the Courts deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-Malate area being its home for several decades. the Court witnessed the areas many turn of events. judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. The national legislature is still the principal of the local government units. as agencies of the State. known as the general welfare clause. The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates a constitutional provision. of the City of Manila null and void. [34] They allege that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. respondent Judge Perfecto A.D.D. [40] The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power.S. the preservation and enrichment of culture. General Welfare. and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that had been issued by this Court against the defendant. Jr. No costs. that it is violative of due process. and that it enjoys the presumption of validity. Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:[27] WHEREFORE. ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. 3. [38] The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws.Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted. Much as the Court harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila and yearns to restore its lost grandeur. it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. again in an intrepid gesture.[39] This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC. 499[31] which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments. Laguio. and so holds. as it did. [37] Anent the first criterion.[33] petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the lower court. an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional. [35] In its Memorandum[36] dated 27 May 1996.[25] And on 16 July 1993. petitioners filed the present Petition. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. (3) must not be partial or discriminatory. 499. appropriate. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions. unfair. it believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. SO ORDERED. [41] This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code. and (6) must not be unreasonable. are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. ultra vires and therefore null and void. on 25 November 1994.[26] After trial. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid. promote .

. 9. is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon. substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. improve public morals. liberty and property of individuals. forfeiture. The Ordinance infringes the Due Process Clause The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat (N)o person shall be deprived of life. and property. The relevant constitutional provisions are the following: SEC. substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the governments action.[46] Sec. to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments. however broad and far-reaching. enhance economic prosperity and social justice. . encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities. [54] Case law in the United States (U. liberty. The maintenance of peace and order. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building. be valid. from seizure. [43] In the case at bar. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used. in this case. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.[50] The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life. arbitrarily or . liberty or property without due process of law. [52] This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government. [51] The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to enact ordinances. No person shall be deprived of life. and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. maintain peace and order. [49] and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power. [47] A. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. or property. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action. liberty. or property. liberty. and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure. and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.[48] There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution The police power of the City Council. [53] Substantive due process. [44] SEC. unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice. [55] For example. such as for protecting fundamental rights. in each appropriate case. promote full employment among their residents. usually called procedural due process and substantive due process.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life. and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. as that phrase connotes. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life. In other words. enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. 1. Procedural due process.S. approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code. and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government. asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a persons life.health and safety. .[45] SEC. the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically.[56] The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law.[42] The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power. and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. the protection of life. if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied. obedience to the dictates of justice. the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. 5. liberty or property without due process of law. liberty or property. as the phrase implies. and private corporations and partnerships are persons within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. 14.

it is in the hearts of men. not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally. but the deplorable human activity that may occur within its premises. [58] Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life. street or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. motels and inns. However. dance halls. night clubs. being a human frailty. [60] It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. super clubs. which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry. Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association. liberty and property. If the flawed logic of the Ordinance were to be followed. [65] it is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors. discotheques. [61] Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments. Individual rights. require an interference with private rights. it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution. it bears emphasis. for even under the guise of protecting the public interest. day clubs. the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the communitys social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity. [64] The object of the Ordinance was. it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to existence of motels. is not the establishment. it needs to be pointed out. It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable regulations looking to the promotion of the moral and social values of the community. the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Councils police powers. Otherwise stated. presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers. as distinguished from those of a particular class. Simply because there are no pure places where there are impure men. the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive. cabarets.[59] Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance. it would be extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity. a building or establishment. premiums and blessings of democracy. Inc. even the Scripture and the Tradition of Christians churches continually recall the presence and universality of sin in mans history. karaoke bars. cocktail lounges. karaoke bars. fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila. The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing. massage parlors. particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. then the Ermita-Malate area would not only be purged of its supposed social ills.despotically[57] as its exercise is subject to a qualification. curb. v. but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants. adultery. and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity. we would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila ordering the closure of the church or court concerned. girlie houses. may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal prostitution is of no moment. If that were so and if that were allowed. it cannot for that reason alone be punished. but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. in the remote instance that an immoral sexual act transpires in a church cloister or a court chamber. park. may take place in the most innocent of places that it may even take place in the substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance. Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and establishments of the like which the City Council may lawfully prohibit. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. accordingly. The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate. limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law. bars. reprehensible or not. This is not warranted under the accepted definitions of these terms. personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.[66] The problem. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality. in its every nook and cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities. building. the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights[62] a violation of the due process clause. the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. hotels and motels. Indeed. licensed and tax-paying nightclubs. . City Mayor of Manila [63] had already taken judicial notice of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution. which by its nature cannot be said to be injurious to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral. Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality. Every house. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.

[72] Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. [71] Persons desirous to own. . innocent establishments. they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. Supreme Court explained: These matters. He cannot abandon the . [67] and it may even impose increased license fees. of universe. Further. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception. [73] Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. to acquire useful knowledge. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. While petitioners earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable. day clubs. In other words. [74] The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.S. it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes personal decisions relating to marriage. there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights. discotheques. super clubs. there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end. to engage in any of the common occupations of life. involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedomit is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling. and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.S. if it is to be a repository of freedom. it must include privacy as well. operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of the Ordinance may seek autonomy for these purposes. cabarets. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution. beerhouses. they unwittingly punish even the proprietors and operators of wholesome. the U. His separateness. personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning. It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes. guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments]. Board of Regents.[70] sought to clarify the meaning of liberty. In another case. the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways. It said: While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty. night clubs. as long as they do not run afoul of the law. In the instant case. [69] The U. it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits. Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motels premisesbe it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution. choices central to personal dignity and autonomy. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood where they formed under compulsion of the State. . [68] In accordance with this case. subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare. motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these choices. indeed. Mutuc. the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently. to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. At the heart of liberty is the right to define ones own concept of existence. fornication and other social ills. it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations. so very aptly stated: Man is one among many. infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty and property. of meaning. karaoke bars. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen. establish a home and bring up children. it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance. child rearing. but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator. As the case of Morfe v. procreation. Means employed are constitutionally infirm The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors.[75] borrowing the words of Laski. and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognizedas essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. contraception. there can be no doubt that the meaning of liberty must be broad indeed. to live and work where he will. to marry. In a Constitution for a free people. obstinately refusing reduction to unity. In Section 3 thereof. and education. the governmental interference itself. and of the mystery of human life. family relationships. Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint. massage parlors. his isolation. owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area. dance halls. the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract. are indefeasible. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude.

to leave his property economically idle. and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. A regulatory taking occurs when the governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property. On many other occasions as well. or whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the public action. [82] No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty. then society should pay. the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of government action. If the government takes away a persons property to benefit society. is their choice. A possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. which are. That. from the owners point of view. he has suffered a taking. Section 9. he surrenders himself. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require that the economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the government and thus borne by the public as a whole. in all fairness and justice.[77] The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita- Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses.[87] A restriction on use of property may also constitute a taking if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed expectations of the owner. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not diminished. he ceases to be a master of himself. [76] There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the Court chooses to exercise restraint and restrict itself to the issues presented when it should. the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. in all fairness and justice. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent the government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which. in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.[85] When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good. [84] A regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is. [83] What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. If his will is set by the will of others. the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe. [86] A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require compensation under the takings clause. the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each case. that his experience is private. it is about loss spreading. equivalent to a taking unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make the use prohibitable. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.consequences of his isolation. a taking nonetheless may have occurred. Indeed. The Constitution expressly provides in Article III. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. While property may be regulated to a certain extent. In part too. The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free. in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support the act.[79] There are two different types of taking that can be identified. that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. In Mahon. When regulation reaches a certain magnitude. The previous pronouncements of the Court are not to be interpreted as a license for adults to engage in criminal conduct.[81] it was held that a taking also could be found if government regulation of the use of property went too far. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. depending on a complex of factors including the regulations economic effect on the landowner. broadly speaking. If he surrenders his will to others. [88] The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said . Modality employed is unlawful taking In addition. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. should be borne by the public as a whole. ultimately. that is. Justice Holmes recognized that it was a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions. The Court only reaffirms and guarantees their right to make this choice. they should suffer the consequences of the choice they have made. Should they be prosecuted for their illegal conduct. should be borne by the public as a whole.S. if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.[80] In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. The principal purpose of the guarantee is to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use. Mahon. the U.[78] It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.

[91] Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must. although a valid exercise of police power. and theaters as well as escort agencies.[95] the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating sexually oriented businesses. The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions. In FW/PBS. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a taking of private property.[93] as cited in People v.[94] the U. it merely relocates it. INC. otherwise it will be closed permanently after a subsequent violation should be borne by the public as this end benefits them as a whole. the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. [90] Further. City of Cincinnati. The motel owners asserted that the city violated the due process clause by failing to produce . It in no way controls or guides the discretion vested in them. It needs restating that the property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose while the property taken under the power of eminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore wholesome. he will likewise leave the entire establishment idle. [92] Thus. The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. Nazario. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. or of an opportunity for the exercise. which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. cabarets. The proffered solution does not put an end to the problem. How may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop. nay. Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. In this regard. The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a closure of the establishment. video stores. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. A zoning ordinance. the ordinance required that such businesses be licensed. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by. The ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at all because one may never know in advance what annoys some people but does not annoy others. in Coates v. Not only is this impractical. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of prohibition. Ordinances such as this. be destroyed without compensation. the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to disturb the community.S. in order to be valid and constitutional. the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners actions. Among other things. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional burden imposed on the owner to build another establishment solely from his coffers. depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested. onerous and oppressive. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments. specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid. These lawful establishments may be regulated. nude model studio and sexual encounter centers. of a reasonable regulation which is a far cry from the ill- considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council. bookstores. Dallas. The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the Ermita-Malate area. and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The conversion into allowed enterprises is just as ridiculous. Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain. annoy the inhabitants. The police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking. which make possible abuses in its execution. and must not admit of the exercise. The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. and is practically confiscatory. even without compensation. Suppose he transfers it to another area. motels. which are defined to include adult arcades. it is unreasonable. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed business. by zoning. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not. Worthy of note is an example derived from the U. Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause. but not prevented from carrying on their business. then certainly the public should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private property for public use. are unreasonable and invalid. The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the government. of unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions. a permanent deprivation of property. we take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property. art gallery or music lounge without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private property without due process of law. Consideration must be given to the substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices which the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a period of time. v. [89] If it be of public benefit that a wholesome property remain unused or relegated to a particular purpose. In every sense.businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area. The burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business. A group of motel owners were among the three groups of businesses that filed separate suits challenging the ordinance.S. Similarly.

that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a study which the city considered. City Mayor of Manila. 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.[96] it needs pointing out. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. however. discrimination that finds no support in reason. [98] The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance. [97] The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and personal rights of citizens. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. in other words. Inc. its validity was upheld. far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility. which is the end of law. It imposed reasonable restrictions. By definition. v. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated. They likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour limitation on the rental of motel rooms placed an unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of association. hotels. the U. both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade. both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner. which is of the very essence of the idea of law. it must conform to the following requirements: 1) It must be based on substantial distinctions. To be valid. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned. or at the very least. it cannot. [99] The equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. hotels. those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion. B. The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. [104] In the Courts view. there are no substantial distinctions between motels. should not be treated differently.adequate support for its supposition that renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours resulted in increased crime and other secondary effects. all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. Classification is thus not ruled out. not be arbitrary. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges. The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association. v. so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. as an indispensable requisite. [100] It limits governmental discrimination. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. the conditions not being different. As regards the second point. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses. Similar subjects. even under the guise of exercising police power. are analogous. .S. [101] The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise: What does it signify? To quote from J. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which. lodging houses or other similar establishments. [103] The classification must. Land Tenure Administration: The ideal situation is for the laws benefits to be available to all. lodging houses or other similar establishments. be upheld as valid. Anent the first contention. inns. pension houses. the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed. was adequate to support the citys determination that motels permitting room rentals for fewer than ten (10 ) hours should be included within the licensing scheme. Necessarily. is also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure which regulated the mode in which motels may conduct business in order to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality. Tuason & Co. hence. 2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law. There is recognition. The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. To assure that the general welfare be promoted. If the classification is reasonable. 4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. the Court held that limiting motel room rentals to ten (10) hours will have no discernible effect on personal bonds as those bonds that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than ten (10) hours are not those that have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.[102] Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. if not identical. what does in fact exist. in the opinion that what in fact exists cannot approximate the ideal. whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.M. there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels.

approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code.. which reads as follows: Section 458. Functions and Compensation. Duties. massage parlors. Duties. motels. billiard pools. [107] . Failing the test of constitutionality. but regulate should not be construed as synonymous with suppress or prohibit.. . and shall: . (4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land. with respect to cafes. as used in subsection (l). the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with prevailing laws. operation and maintenance of cafes. Powers. restaurants. Consequently. shall enact ordinances. It is well to recall the rulings of the Court in Kwong Sing v. and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. section 2444 of the Administrative Code. City of Manila[106] that: The word regulate. circuses. inns. The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment.. restaurants. and to restrain. pension houses. including theatrical performances. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod. beerhouses. hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv). lodging houses. public dancing schools. the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. operation.[105] Thus. the municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the employment or business shall be exercised. The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession exclusive to women. sauna baths. While its power to regulate the establishment. regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment. or require the suspension or suppression of the same. to govern.. . C. and shall: . the discrimination is invalid. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws. It is not any less grave a sin when men engage in it. prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community. (4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land. buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall: . shall enact ordinances. (vii) Regulate the establishment.. public dance halls. lodging houses.. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment. Powers. operation. and other similar establishments. including tourist guides and transports . beerhouses. And why would the assumption that there is an ongoing immoral activity apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when men are in harness? This discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to important government objectives. means and includes the power to control. operation and maintenance of such establishments. . particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants. it is ultra vires The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate. hotels. Clearly. and not prohibit. and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities. which provides that: Section 458. inns. Functions and Compensation.. under the power to regulate laundries. as the legislative body of the city. hotels. and other places for entertainment or amusement.. approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code. and maintenance of motels. or. operation and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof. buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall: . as the legislative body of the city. and other similar establishments. (iv) Regulate the establishment. pension houses. motels.

18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without merit. the ruling of the Court in People v. city charters.[118] In addition. it is pertinent to emphasize. would be to make the latter superfluous and nugatory. or section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code. thing. it is the latest expression of the legislative will which must prevail and override the earlier. refers to matters not covered by the other provisions of the same Code. power to prohibit is impliedly withheld. the Revised Charter of Manila. the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools. since it is the latest expression of legislative will. or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. motels. Sec. [109] These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners assertion [110] that they were modified by the Code vesting upon City Councils prohibitory powers. that which is passed later prevails. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest expression of the legislative will should prevail. Thus. Esguerra. suppression and prohibition. impose penalties or punishments. sauna baths. includes the power to regulate. suppress or prohibit. or otherwise come under the rule of strict construction. giving away and dispensing thereof is granted specifically by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. On the second point. and therefore it can not be applied to intoxicating liquors. As between two laws on the same subject matter. particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants or certain forms of amusement or entertainment which the City Council may suspend. the selling. hotels. sauna baths. decrees. suppress and suspend such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment. said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council. that portion of the Charter stating such must be . Such repeals have been divided into two general classes: those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of the two can remain in force and those which occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a substitute therefor. Esguerra. The several powers of the City Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. public dance halls. the use of which indicates that the clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to justify being put together in a single enumeration or paragraph. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies. a municipal council may enact the ordinance in question. submitting to petitioners interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit motels. public dance halls. pension houses. This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among other events or activities for amusement or entertainment. massage parlors. inns. respectively of the same Section. On the first point. under the general power granted by section 2238. Similarly. public dancing schools. which cannot be removed by any fair and reasonable method of interpretation. it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person. which are irreconcilably inconsistent.). notwithstanding the provision of section 2242 (g). The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. giving away and dispensing of intoxicating liquors. acts. and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)).[108] wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of the Municipality of Tacloban which prohibited the selling. Section 534(f) of the Code states that All general and special laws. To hold that. for the power to regulate the selling. It held that: The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause.[117] Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions contrary to those of an existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community are stated in the second and third clauses. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the municipality is empowered only to regulate the same and not prohibit.[115] is instructive. both relating to the same subject matter. because the power to prohibit. and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). are separated by semi-colons (. executive orders. Its powers to regulate. [111] These powers. and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. 3. The Court therein declared that: (A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to regulate or to license and regulate the liquor traffic. [112] The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses. commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified power of regulation. it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will must necessarily prevail and override the earlier law. therefore. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. or later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. lodging houses. And in People v. [116] If there is an inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes. By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof. [114] The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause of the Code and of Art. massage parlors. [113] Moreover. proclamations and administrative regulations. should not be confused.

. which are merely local in origin cannot prevail against the decree. avocation. and shall: (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government.. and amusement places to include theaters. shall enact ordinances. maintenance of drug dens. it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law. it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance. sauna. It is well to recall the maxim r eddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection. [123] Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. As delegates of the Congress. the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. it can be inferred that the Code considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. vagrancy. light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute. Powers. That these establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the Code.D. drug pushing. the enactment in question. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot. prostitution. The same Section also defined amusement as a pleasurable diversion and entertainment... [121] As succinctly illustrated in Solicitor General v. mendicancy. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se. or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod. It is a legitimate business. the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and establishments in another section of the Code which is reproduced as follows: Section 458. shall: . [119] Notably. Turkish and Swedish baths. cinemas. drug addiction. gambling and other prohibited games of chance. which has the force and effect of a statute. gasoline service station. While this may be the rule. If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the establishments enumerated in Section 1 of theOrdinance. . As correctly argued by MTDC. approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property. it would have so declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section. It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. concert halls. and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city. suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places. circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances. Metropolitan Manila Authority:[122] The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect.considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latters provisions granting the City Council mere regulatory powers. where words under consideration appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies. pastime or fun. Likewise. fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property. the printing. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. juvenile delinquency. motor repair shop. if possible. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these establishments with houses of ill-repute and expand the City Councils powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications. Duties. the local government units cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. [120] Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code. operation and maintenance. and in this connection. giving to each in its place. motels and lodging houses as among the contractors defined in paragraph (h) thereof. It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance . it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P. 499. In the case before us. synonymous to relaxation. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. rendering none of them useless or superfluous. and. Thus. its proper force and effect. even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. as the legislative body of the city. (v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent. health or comfort of the community. Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of massage clinics. Functions and Compensation. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. It is evident that these establishments may only be regulated in their establishment. hotels. dump or yard.

SO ORDERED. Costs against petitioners. the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires. Local legislative bodies. the City Council. discriminating or in derogation of a common right. it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation. the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. It is constitutionally infirm. . null and void. partial. WHEREFORE. [124] Conclusion All considered. oppressive. in this case. And not to be forgotten. the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land. the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. Concededly. it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws not even under the guise of police power. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our support for it. or an act of the legislature. the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED. But inspite of its virtuous aims.itself or is established by proper evidence. or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable. The Ordinance contravenes statutes.

lodging houses. DECISION Tinga. Short-Time Admission Rates. LIM. inns. Effectivity. MAYOR ALFREDO S. I.G. or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided.- G. as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. 2.000. SEC.A. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. No. health and welfare. Definition of Term[s]. the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled. and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance). short-time admission and rate [sic]. 2009 WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION.R. SEC. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty. SEC. SEC. SEC. Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today. Provided. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval. 4. motels. Pursuant to the above policy. CITY OF MANILA. S. Lodging Houses. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance. Penalty Clause. The facts are as follows: On December 3. 4 The Ordinance is reproduced in full. represented by DE CASTRO. which seeks the reversal of the Decision 3 in C. and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels. SEC. Respondent. This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. Motels. further. 5. the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality. In City of Manila v. TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. 122846 January 20. Title. the president. due process and equal protection of law. 3. No.1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns. among other establishments. challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. vs.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission. City Mayor Alfredo S. the manager. 6. Laguio. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning. within the Ermita-Malate area. and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest. are hereby prohibited in hotels. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed. 7. . motels. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time admission.P. pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. lodging houses. That in case of [a] juridical person. 1992. Pension Houses. pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. J. Petitioners. Declaration of Policy.: With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject. Inns. November 10. The same parameters apply to the present petition. 7774 entitled. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5. hereunder: SECTION 1. wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms. 33316 of the Court of Appeals.. That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense. 1992.R. Jr. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels. Repealing Clause.

Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention 7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.17 The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution. 1994. operation and maintenance of cafes. among other local government units.12 The RTC issued a TRO on January 14. the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate. 10 The RTC also notified the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64. 1992. 1992. 1992. the power: [To] regulate the establishment. be declared invalid and unconstitutional.20 The petition was docketed as G. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours. 1993. TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question. On the same date. 22 The Ordinance. Finally.14 On February 8. 1993. as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. restaurants. the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. SO ORDERED. On December 15. the Mayor on December 3. the RTC granted the motion to intervene. Intermediate Appellate Court. Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter. the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional. in view of all the foregoing. motels. petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC). During the pre-trial conference. the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO) 5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. lodging houses and other similar establishments.8 The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila."18 Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE. thus: . the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent. On December 21. pension houses. 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. it is argued. the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw. 1993.D. No. insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments. is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III. hotels. Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.21 Before the Court of Appeals.11 On December 28. Accordingly.15 A month later.9 On December 23. MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff. inns. 1992. the WLC.16 On October 20. beerhouses. herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim. Branch 9 impleading as defendant. 1992. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and void.) No. the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities. from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay. on March 8. Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Section 4 of the Rules of Court. the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance.Approved by His Honor.R. [O]rdinance No.19 where the legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef. 1993. including tourist guides and transports. the Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorariand referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26. 13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22. The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

especially in the Philippines. comfort. causation. liberty is regulated by law. 23 Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement. the litigant must have a close relation to the third party. the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine. the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general. the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement. and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter. convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. third party standing and. Third. provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact. 24 First.28 In this jurisdiction. taxpayer suits. Finally. the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests. Ohio. their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. TC. More importantly. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit. peace. good order. the doctrine of transcendental importance. In Griswold v. The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution. the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection rights. and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment. II."33 Herein. 29 In a similar vein.35 the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a . the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause. it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. and redressability in Allen v.’ thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute."to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing. 31 For this particular set of facts. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power. 27 The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition. Second. However. and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates. City Mayor of Manila.34 American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. Thus. or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense. it is an invalid exercise of police power. In Powers v. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance. the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury. We must address the threshold issue of petitioners’ standing. the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers.30 Nonetheless. as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays.26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government. Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. Connecticut. 25 In their petition and Memorandum. the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of Appeals.32 the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties. WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari. petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Wright.

37 wherein the United States Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame. In overbreadth analysis. Inc. the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. gender. The Court held that: "The rights of husband and wife. pressed here. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.45 gas stations46 and cockpits. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. Hon. Boren.. the constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court. its use has rarely been denied. has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. nationality. This could be described as the middle case. (3) must not be partial or discriminatory. These range from the regulation of dance halls. age." 36 An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. To students of jurisprudence. 40Ermita- Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such as name. the overbreadth doctrine comes into play.43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens. and (6) must not be unreasonable. v. the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law.41 The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech.reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections available to their patients. (5) must be general and consistent with public policy. inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. 44 movie theaters. (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade. Police power."38 Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter. A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels.47 The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system. City Mayor of Manila. wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition. the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling. The United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function. are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them. (2) must not be unfair or oppressive. challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. However. while incapable of an exact definition. A. address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel. III. the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth. At its core. 39 In this case. hotel or lodging house. .42 Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.

51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right. Carolene Products. 48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life.50 The question of substantive due process. "procedural due process" and "substantive due process. governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive .S. We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing. moreso than most other fields of law. or property. judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. the political majorities animated by his cynicism. the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process. has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process. B. C. the due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life." 52 Consequently. Supreme Court in U. are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State.56 While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.58 Under intermediate review. or property. laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. liberty.S. sometimes even. v. and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli. If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects. traditionally awesome as it may be. 49 Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere.S. there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government action.The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions. and. and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation. Supreme Court in Craig. provided the proper formalities are followed.55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed. it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well. is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government.54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U. liberty. yet another form of caution emerges. prostitution. The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U. denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny. 57 Using the rational basis examination. Those means must align with the Constitution. the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their political functions. Article III of the Constitution. by themselves. Instead. after all. as guaranteed under Section 1. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender53 and legitimacy. drug use and alike. Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection questions. Police power. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. A third standard. Due process evades a precise definition. These goals. and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching constitutional questions of the day.S. was later adopted by the U. liberty and property of individuals.

60 Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech. As the case of Morfe v.64 If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar. as it was in the City of Manila case.[ 66] The U. In a Constitution for a free people. borrowing the words of Laski. We expounded on that most primordial of rights. obstinately refusing reduction to unity. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Still. . gender. it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected69 will be curtailed as well.’" 68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate. Hon. . so very aptly stated: Man is one among many. Laguio. thus: Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract. when proscribed. subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare. to acquire useful knowledge. . an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard – the rational basis test. or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed. 67 [Citations omitted] It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances. establish a home and bring up children." It said: While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers. Liberty. Mutuc. Concededly. Viewed cynically. to live and work where he will. governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty. the focus is on the presence of compelling. their society and nature. in a manner innately understood by them as inherent. but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator. indeed.S. without doing harm or injury to others. to engage in any of the common occupations of life. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen. they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. Indeed. is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done. to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling. his isolation. Yet as earlier stated. it is those "trivial" yet fundamental freedoms – which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence – that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments]. as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. 61 The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage. one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution. He cannot abandon the . 62 judicial access63and interstate travel. and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized .measures is considered. would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. D. . Our holding therein retains significance for our purposes: The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. these are not the sort of cherished rights that.59 Applying strict scrutiny. adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry."[ 65] In accordance with this case. and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. rather than substantial. to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. are indefeasible. Jr. His separateness. the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways. we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution. to marry. Board of Regents.

consequences of his isolation. cities revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila. require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. Further. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging. which are. this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life. for even under the guise of protecting the public interest. IV. Mutuc. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. More importantly. . Moreover. and the will built out of that experience personal to himself.75 The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. 70 We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants.73 However. thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition. he surrenders himself. It must appear that the interests of the public generally. its longtime home. Indeed. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila. he ceases to be a master of himself. If his will is set by the will of others. the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities. and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. E. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty. That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. broadly speaking. As held in Morfe v. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.74 Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates. 72 Lacking a concurrence of these requisites. the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. as distinguished from those of a particular class. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free. this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument. 76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city – the Pearl of the Orient – as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. that his experience is private. will have its problems. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area. The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments. the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. If he surrenders his will to others. liberty or property is affected. Rather. it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.

and protected by the State. Ordinance No. the Petition is GRANTED. but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. are founded on age-old moral traditions. No pronouncement as to costs. is REINSTATED. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. SO ORDERED. less drastic means to promote morality. 78 The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law.81 Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance. they will remain so oriented. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. 77 The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle. the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law. and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong. and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong. And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. that prerogative is hardly absolute. Branch 9. especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral.We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. for one. it is possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more judicious. it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. since as explained by Calabresi. by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office. Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction. WHEREFORE. but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate. The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different interests. . Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law. 79 To be candid about it. 80 Our penal laws. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be. even if it may foster wider debate on which particular behavior to penalize.