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MILO vs SALANGA

On Arbitrary Detention, Article 124 of the RPC

G.R. No. L-37007

July 20, 1987

FACTS

An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein private respondent (accused Barrio Captain
Tuvera, Sr.) and some other private persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez by hitting him with butts of their
guns and fist blows. Immediately thereafter, without legal grounds and with deliberate intent to deprive the latter
of his constitutional liberty, accused respondent and two members of the police force of Mangsat conspired and
helped one another in lodging and locking petitioner inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about
eleven (11) hours.

Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute the elements of said crime and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to
support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst. Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an opposition thereto.
Consequently, averring that accused-respondent was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary
Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.

HELD

Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the
detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary
Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions,
may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are
similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is
smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to
detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with
the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.

Lino Vs Pano

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON.CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,

petitioners, vs

. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONYCALVENTO,

respondents

G.R. No. 129093

FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz,
Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayors permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a
letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result
of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court
of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order
requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and
(3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent
judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing
resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local governments objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is
part of the local governments autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national
governments. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually
enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this
case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our
system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is
merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an
existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Corp

Source: Full Text http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/aug2001/129093.htm

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Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,

vs.

PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.
Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success
in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor
was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before
the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge
succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for
to prohibit their enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD: No

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and
other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but
are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended
or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro
City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No.
3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D.
1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

Viola vs. Alunan III (1997)

Facts:
Cesar G. Viola, filed petition for prohibition challenging the validity of Art. III, 1-2 of the RevisedImplementing Rules
and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mgaBarangay Officers in sofar as they provide for the election of first,
second and third vice presidents and for auditors for theNational Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters.The issue
iswhether or not Section 1-2 of the Implementing Rules are valid?

Held:
The creation of the additional positions is authorized by 493 of LGC which in fact requires and notmerely authorizes
the board of directors to "create such other positions asit may deem necessary forthe management of the chapter" and belies petitioner's claim
that 493limits the officers of a chapter tothe president, VP, 5 members of the board ofdirectors,secretary, and treasurer. Also,
the creation of these positions was actually made in theconstitution and by-laws of the Liga ng mga Barangay
adopted by the 1st BarangayNationalAssembly. Congress can delegate the power to create positions such as these. Section493embo
dies a fairly intelligible standard deemed necessary for the management of the chapters,".There is no
undue delegation of power by Congress. SC decisions have upheld the validity of reorganization statutesauthorizing the
President of the Philippines to create, abolish or mergeoffices in the executivedepartment

LIMBONA vs MANGELIN
GR No. 80391, February 28, 1989
Sarmiento
Facts:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang
Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly).
He was then elected speaker of the regional legislative assembly of central Mindanao, composed of 18
members.
On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a
consultation/dialogue with local government officials.
Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that
there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of
Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's
advice, where he was unseated from his position.
Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the
Speaker of the Assembly.
Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling
petitioner's membership therefrom on the grounds, among other things
o that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying the salaries and emoluments
of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for
Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in
the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever
made . . ."
o that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from
the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly,"
o that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly
resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly
o that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on
question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the
respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic".

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. (depends on
what kind of autonomous government it is)
What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held:
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No.
1618 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" in the
two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines and its Constitution," with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and
responsibilities specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the
respective regions," except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the
National Government
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns.
The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is
subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy."

On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, under the supervision of the national
government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government).

If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably
beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the
Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes
unarguably under our jurisdiction.

An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades
us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD
No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and
control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the
validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

Validity of the expulsion

o Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true
that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or
adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook" but it provides likewise that "the
Speaker may, on his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals."

o The Rules speak of "short intervals."

o The Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on
November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules. Hence, there can be no recess to
speak of that could possibly interrupt any session.

o But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in
question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or
not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs
of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought.

o Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called
petitioners attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions
themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity
on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.
Sessions held after such recess and the resolution issued are invalid. Petitioner reinstated as
Member and Speaker.