RGC, Gervel Vs QUA

The Facts

Petitioners Republic Glass Corporation (RGC) and Gervel, Inc. (Gervel) together with respondent Lawrence C. Qua (Qua) were
stockholders of Ladtek, Inc. (Ladtek). Ladtek obtained loans from Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) [5] and Private
Development Corporation of the Philippines[6] (PDCP) with RGC, Gervel and Qua as sureties. Among themselves, RGC, Gervel and
Qua executed Agreements for Contribution, Indemnity and Pledge of Shares of Stocks (Agreements). [7]
Ladtek defaulted on its loan obligations to Metrobank and PDCP. Hence, Metrobank filed a collection case against Ladtek,
RGC, Gervel and Qua docketed as Civil Case No. 8364 (Collection Case No. 8364) which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 149 (RTC-Branch 149). During the pendency of Collection Case No. 8364, RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank P7 million.
In a letter dated 7 November 1988, RGC and Gervels counsel, Atty. Antonio C. Pastelero, demanded that Qua
pay P3,860,646, or 42.22% of P8,730,543.55,[11] as reimbursement of the total amount RGC and Gervel paid to Metrobank and PDCP.
Qua refused to reimburse the amount to RGC and Gervel. Subsequently, RGC and Gervel furnished Qua with notices of foreclosure of
Quas pledged shares.

HELD

Nothing in the records shows that RGC and Gervel relied on Quas statements in Collection Case No. 8364 such that they
changed their position or status, to their injury, detriment or prejudice. RGC and Gervel repeatedly point out that it was the
presiding judge[25] in Collection Case No. 8364 who relied on Quas statements in Collection Case No. 8364. RGC and Gervel claim
that Qua deliberately led the Presiding Judge to believe that their payment to Metrobank was for the entire obligation. As a result,
the presiding judge ordered the dismissal of Collection Case No. 8364 against Qua.[26]

RGC and Gervel further invoke Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court to support their stance:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in
the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings filed by the parties, (b) during the trial either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. [27]

The elements of judicial admissions are absent in this case. Qua made conflicting statements in Collection Case No. 8364
and in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643, and not in the same case as required in Section 4 of Rule 129. To constitute judicial
admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered. If made in another case or in another court, the fact
of such admission must be proved as in the case of any other fact, although if made in a judicial proceeding it is entitled to greater
weight.[28]

RGC and Gervel introduced Quas Motion to Dismiss and the Order dismissing Collection Case No. 8364 to prove Quas
claim that the payment was for the entire obligation. Qua does not deny making such statement but explained that he honestly
believed and pleaded in the lower court and in CA-G.R. CV No. 58550 that the entire debt was fully extinguished when the
petitioners paid P7 million to Metrobank.[29]

We find Quas explanation substantiated by the evidence on record. As stated in the Agreements, Ladteks original loan from
Metrobank was only P6.2 million. Therefore, Qua reasonably believed that RGC and Gervels P7 million payment to Metrobank
pertained to the entire obligation. However, subsequent facts indisputably show that RGC and Gervels payment was not for the
entire obligation. RTC-Branch 149 reinstated Collection Case No. 8364 against Qua and ruled in Metrobanks favor, ordering Qua to
pay P6.2 million.

REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN

"Sec. 3. Who may issue. A writ of sequestration or a freeze or hold order may be issued by the Commission upon the authority of
at least two Commissioners, based on the affirmation or complaint of an interested party or motu propio (sic) the issuance thereof is
warranted."

In this present case, of all the questioned writs of sequestration issued after the effectivity of the PCGG Rules and Regulations or
after April 11, 1986, only writ no. 87-0218 issued on May 27, 1987 complied with the requirement that it be issued by at least two
Commissioners, the same having been issued by Commissioners Ramon E. Rodrigo and Quintin S. Doromal. However, even if Writ of
Sequestration No. 87-0218 complied with the requirement that the same be issued by at least two Commissioners, the records fail to
show that it was issued with factual basis or with factual foundation as can be seen from the Certification of the Commission
Secretary of the PCGG of the excerpt of the minutes of the meeting of the PCGG held on May 26, 1987, stating therein that:

"The Commission approved the recommendation of Dir. Cruz to sequester all the shares of stock, assets, records, and documents of
Balete Ranch, Inc. and the appointment of the Fiscal Committee with ECI Challenge, Inc./Pepsi-Cola for Balete Ranch, Inc. and the
Aquacor Marketing Corp. vice Atty. S. Occena. The objective is to consolidate the Fiscal Committee activities covering three
associated entities of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco.Upon recommendation of Comm. Rodrigo, the reconstitution of the Board of Directors
of the three companies was deferred for further study."
Nothing in the above-quoted certificate shows that there was a prior determination of a factual basis or factual foundation. It is the
absence of a prima facie basis for the issuance of a writ of sequestration and not the lack of authority of two (2) Commissioners
which renders the said writ void ab initio. Thus, being the case, Writ of Sequestration No. 87-0218 must be automatically lifted.

As declared by the Honorable Supreme Court in two cases it has decided,

"The absence of a prior determination by the PCGG of a prima facie basis for the sequestration order is, unavoidably, a fatal defect
which rendered the sequestration of respondent corporation and its properties void ab initio." And

"The corporation or entity against which such writ is directed will not be able to visually determine its validity, unless the required
signatures of at least two commissioners authorizing its issuance appear on the very document itself. The issuance of sequestration
orders requires the existence of a prima facie case. The two commissioner rule is obviously intended to assure a collegial
determination of such fact. In this light, a writ bearing only one signature is an obvious transgression of the PCGG Rules."

"In the instant case, there was clearly no prior determination made by the PCGG of a prima facie basis for the sequestration of Dio
Island Resort, Inc. x x x

The absence of a prior determination by the PCGG of a prima facie basis for the sequestration order is, unavoidably, a fatal defect
which rendered the sequestration of respondent corporation and its properties void ab initio. Being void ab initio, it is deemed
nonexistent, as though it had never been issued, and therefore is not subject to ratification by the PCGG.

What were obviously lacking in the above case were the basic requisites for the validity of a sequestration order which we laid down
in BASECO vs. PCGG, 150 SCRA 181, 216, May 27, 1987, thus:

"Section (3) of the Commissions Rules and regulations provides that sequestration or freeze (and takeover) orders issue upon the
authority of at least two commissioners, based on the affirmation or complaint of an interested party, or motu propio (sic) when the
Commission has reasonable grounds to believe that the issuance thereof is warranted."

In the case at bar, there is no question as to the presence of prima facie evidence justifying the issuance of the sequestration order
against respondent corporations. But the said order cannot be nullified for lack of the other requisite (authority of at least two
commissioners) since, as explained earlier, such requisite was nonexistent at the time the order was issued."

As to the argument of the Plaintiff Republic that Defendants Cojuangco, et al. have not shown any contrary prima facie proof that
the properties subject matter of the writs of sequestration were legitimate acquisitions, the same is misplaced. It is a basic legal
doctrine, as well as many times enunciated by the Honorable Supreme Court that when a prima facie proof is required in the
issuance of a writ, the party seeking such extraordinary writ must establish that it is entitled to it by complying strictly with the
requirements for its issuance and not the party against whom the writ is being sought for to establish that the writ should not be
issued against it.

Plainly enough, the irregularities infirming the issuance of the several WOS could not be ignored in favor of the Republic and
resolved against the persons whose properties were subject of the WOS. Where the Rules of the PCGG instituted safeguards under
Section 3, supra, by requiring the concurrent signatures of two Commissioners to every WOS issued and the existence of a prima
facie case of ill gotten wealth to support the issuance, the non-compliance with either of the safeguards nullified the WOS thus
issued. It is already settled that sequestration, due to its tendency to impede or limit the exercise of proprietary rights by private
citizens, is construed strictly against the State, conformably with the legal maxim that statutes in derogation of common rights are
generally strictly construed and rigidly confined to the cases clearly within their scope and purpose. 86

4.01. xxx Assuming, however, that plaintiff presents evidence to support its principal contentions, defendants evidence in rebuttal
would include testimonial and documentary evidence showing: a) the ownership of the shares of stock prior to their acquisition by
respondents (listed in Annexes A" and B"); b) the consideration for the acquisition of the shares of stock by the persons or
companies in whose names the shares of stock are now registered; and c) the source of the funds used to pay the purchase price.

We disagree with the Republics posture.

The statements found in the joint Pre-Trial Brief of Cojuangco, et al. were noticeably written beneath the heading of Proposed
Evidence. Such location indicated that the statements were only being proposed, that is, they were not yet intended or offered as
admission of any fact stated therein. In other words, the matters stated or set forth therein might or might not be presented at all.
Also, the text and tenor of the statements expressly conditioned the proposal on the Republic ultimately presenting its evidence in
the action. After the Republic opted not to present its evidence, the condition did not transpire; hence, the proposed admissions,
assuming that they were that, did not materialize.

Obviously, too, the statements found under the heading of Proposed Evidence in the joint Pre-Trial Brief were incomplete and
inadequate on the important details of the supposed transactions (i.e., alleged borrowings and advances). As such, they could not
constitute admissions that the funds had come from borrowings by Cojuangco, et al. from the UCPB or had been credit advances
from the CIIF Oil Companies. Moreover, the purpose for presenting the records of the UCPB and the representatives of the UCPB and
of the still unidentified or unnamed CIIF Oil Mills as declared in the joint Pre-Trial Brief did not at all show whether the UCPB and/or
the unidentified or unnamed CIIF Oil Mills were the only sources of funding, or that such institutions, assuming them to be the
sources of the funding, had been the only sources of funding. Such ambiguousness disqualified the statements from being relied
upon as admissions. It is fundamental that any statement, to be considered as an admission for purposes of judicial proceedings,

should be definite, certain and unequivocal;113 otherwise, the disputed fact will not get settled.

ALFREDO CHING, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS

On 04 February 1992,3 petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC-Makati), Branch 58, with four counts of
estafa punishable under Article 315 par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree 115, otherwise known as
the "Trust Receipts Law".

. . . Civil Case No. 90-60600 pending before the Manila Regional Trial Court seeking (sic) the declaration of nullity of the
trust receipts in question is not a prejudicial question to Criminal Case Nos. 92-0934 to 37 pending before the respondent
court charging the petitioner with four counts of violation of Article 315, par. 1(b), RPC, in relation to PD 115 as to warrant
the suspension of the proceedings in the latter . . . .

The instant petition is bereft of merit.

We agree with the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that no prejudicial question exists in the present
case.

As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before
the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. 18

It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.19 It comes into play generally in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. 20

More simply, for the court to appreciate the pendency of a prejudicial question, the law, 21 in no uncertain terms, requires the
concurrence of two essential requisites, to wit:

a) The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and

b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Verily, under the prevailing circumstances, the alleged prejudicial question in the civil case for declaration of nullity of documents
and for damages, does not juris et de jure determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action for estafa.
Assuming arguendo that the court hearing the civil aspect of the case adjudicates that the transaction entered into between the
parties was not a trust receipt agreement, nonetheless the guilt of the accused could still be established and his culpability under
penal laws determined by other evidence. To put it differently, even on the assumption that the documents are declared of null, it
does not ipso facto follow that such declaration of nullity shall exonerate the accused from criminal prosecution and liability.

Accordingly, the prosecution may adduce evidence to prove the criminal liability of the accused for estafa, specifically under Article
315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code which explicitly provides that said crime is committed:

. . . (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money; goods, or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by
denying having received such money, goods, or other property.

Applying the foregoing principles, the criminal liability of the accused for violation of Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, may
still be shown through the presentation of evidence to the effect that: (a) the accused received the subject goods in trust or under
the obligation to sell the same and to remit the proceeds thereof to Allied Banking Corporation, or to return the goods, if not sold; (b)
that accused Ching misappropriated or converted the goods and/or the proceeds of the sale; (c) that accused Ching performed such
acts with abuse of confidence to the damage and prejudice of Allied Banking Corporation; and (d) that demand was made by the
bank to herein petitioner.

Presidential Decree 115, otherwise known as the "Trust Receipts Law", specifically Section 13 thereof, provides:

The failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, documents or instruments covered by a
trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said goods,
documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall
constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under the provisions of Article Three hundred fifteen, paragraph one (b) of Act
Numbered Three thousand eight hundred and fifteen, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code.

As elucidated in Samo vs. People,27 a trust receipt is considered a security transaction intended to aid in financing importers and
retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of merchandise, and who may not
be able to acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral, of the merchandise imported or purchased.

Further, a trust receipt is a document in which is expressed a security transaction whereunder the lender, having no prior title in the
goods on which the lien is to be given and not having possession which remains in the borrower, lends his money to the borrower on
security of the goods which the borrower is privileged to sell clear of the lien with an agreement to pay all or part of the proceeds of
the sale to the lender.28 It is a security agreement pursuant to which a bank acquires a "security interest" in the goods. It secures an
indebtedness and there can be no such thing as security interest that secures no obligation. 29

Clearly, a trust receipt partakes the nature of a security transaction. It could never be a mere additional or side document as alleged
by petitioner. Otherwise, a party to a trust receipt agreement could easily renege on its obligations thereunder, thus undermining
the importance and defeating with impunity the purpose of such an indispensable tool in commercial transactions.

Of equal importance is the fact that in his complaint in Civil Case No. 92-60600, dated 05 March 1992, petitioner alleged that the
trust receipts were executed and intended as collateral or security. Pursuant to the rules, such particular allegation in the complaint
is tantamount to a judicial admission on the part of petitioner Ching to which he must be bound.

Thus, the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated 28 June 1993, correctly observed:

It was petitioner himself who acknowledged the trust receipts as mere collateral and security for the payment of the loan
but kept on insisting that the real and true transaction was one of pure loan. . . .

In his present motion, the petitioner alleges that the trust receipts are evidence of a pure loan or that the same were
additional or side documents that actually stood as promissory notes and not a collateral or security agreement. He
cannot assume a position inconsistent with his previous allegations in his civil complaint that the trust receipts were
intended as mere collateral or security . . . .

Perhaps, realizing such flaw, petitioner, in a complete turn around, filed a motion to admit amended complaint before the RTC-
Manila. Among others, the amended complaint alleged that the trust receipts stood as additional or side documents, the real
transaction between the parties being that of a pure loan without any trust receipt agreement.

In an order dated 19 November 1993, the RTC-Manila, Branch 53, admitted the amended complaint. Accordingly, with the lower
court's admission of the amended complaint, the judicial admission made in the original complaint was, in effect, superseded.

Under the Rules, pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings and cease to be
judicial admissions. While they may nonetheless be utilized against the pleader as extrajudicial admissions, they must, in order to
have such effect, be formally offered in evidence. If not offered in evidence, the admission contained therein will not be
considered.30

Consequently, the original complaint, having been amended, lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no
proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, required its formal offer. 31

In virtue thereof, the amended complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform
any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of the record. 32

Thus, in the instant case, the original complaint is deemed superseded by the amended complaint. Corollarily, the judicial
admissions in the original complaint are considered abandoned. Nonetheless, we must stress that the actuations of petitioner, as
sanctioned by the RTC-Manila, Branch 53 through its order admitting the amended complaint, demands stern rebuke from this Court.

Certainly, this Court is not unwary of the tactics employed by the petitioner specifically in filing the amended complaint only after
the promulgation of the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals. It bears noting that a lapse of almost eighteen months (from
March 1992 to September 1993), from the filing of the original complaint to the filing of the amended complaint, is too lengthy a
time sufficient to enkindle suspicion and enflame doubts as to the true intentions of petitioner regarding the early disposition of the
pending cases.
Although the granting of leave to file amended pleadings is a matter peculiarly within the sound discretion of the trial court and such
discretion would not normally be disturbed on appeal, it is also well to mention that this rule is relaxed when evident abuse thereof
is apparent. 33

Hence, in certain instances we ruled that amendments are not proper and should be denied when delay would arise, 34 or when the
amendments would result in a change of cause of action or defense or change the theory of the case, 35 or would be inconsistent
with the allegations in the original complaint.36

Applying the foregoing rules, petitioner, by filing the amended complaint, in effect, altered the theory of his case. Likewise, the
allegations embodied in the amended complaint are inconsistent with that of the original complaint inasmuch as in the latter,
petitioner alleged that the trust receipts were intended as mere collateral or security, the principal transaction being one of pure
loan.

DOLORES GRANADA and ESTRELLA GRANADA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, ET AL., respondents.

Petitioners herein seek to review the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, and sentencing petitioners to pay the respondent Philippine National Bank the of P1,982.24 with interest thereon at 5%
per annum from August 20, 1940 and 10% on the principal as attorneys' fees; and the sum of P1,349.90 with interest at 5% per
annum, from September 20, 1941, and 10% on the principal as attorneys' fees, and costs.

There is no dispute as to the amounts involved; that they represent the balances they represent the balances due and unpaid on
sugar crop loans applied from and granted by the PNB to Dolores, Estrella, 1 Feliza, and Corazon, all surnamed Granada; that said
loans were personally received by the petitioners for which the corresponding promissory notes were principally executed and
signed by them, uniformly worded as follows:

On demand after date, for value received, I promise to pay to the order of the Philippine National Bank at its office in
Bacolod or Manila, the sum of (amount in pesos stated), Philippine currency, with interest at the rate of 5% per annum
from date until paid.

As a general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and binding upon it. However,
that is not an absolute and inflexible rule. Every admission is to be taken as an entirety of the fact which makes for the
one side with the qualifications which limit, modify or destroy its effect on the other side. The reason for this is that, where
part of a statement of a party is used against him as an admission, the court should consider and weigh any other
portions connected with the statement which tend to neutralize or explain the portion which is against interest. In other
words, while the admission is admissible in evidence, its probative value is to be determined from the whole statement
and others intimately related or connected therewith as an integrated unit for, as said by the Supreme Court, although
acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted, however, evidence aliunde can be presented to
show that the admission was made through palpable mistake. (Irlanda vs. Pitargue, 22 Phil. 383.)

From the pleadings filed by the parties it clearly appears that the cause of action stated in the original complaint was
against Dolores, Estrella, Felisa and Corazon, surnamed Granada, for the payment of the loans which they obtained from
the bank in their individual and personal capacity, as evidenced by the promissory notes in question.1awphl.nt

The foregoing facts called from the pleadings of the parties have persuaded us to believe, and we so hold, that in filing the
amended complaint containing the allegation which has become the bone of contention on this appeal, the plaintiff had
acted through a mistaken belief that the adverted allegation in the amended complaint did not constitute an amendment
of its cause of action, and this matter was made known to the court and the defendants when in its reply to the motion to
dismiss it stated that it has no document or evidence in its possession to hold the spouses Matias and Cristeta Granada
liable to the payment of the account; and it honestly relied on the belief that the defendants, Dolores and Estrella,
surnamed Granada, had the necessary evidence to establish the fact. At any rate, guided by the provisions of the rules of
court that "These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding"; the amended complaint may be treated as
stating two or more statements of a claim in a single cause of action, which is permitted under Section 9, Rule 15, or it
may be considered as including several defendants in the alternative against any of which plaintiff may be entitled to
relief, a course of action sanctioned by Section 13, Rule 3. There are cases where the facts essential to the party's claim or
defense are within the knowledge of the adverse party, as to be unable to state them with certainty. He may, however,
know that one out of two or more sets of facts is true, without knowing which. In such a case, plaintiff is allowed to make
alternative statements of his claim under Section 9, Rule 15. (Everett vs. Asia Banking Corporation, 59 Phil. 512, 526, cited
in 1 Moran 235, 1957 ed.) On the other hand, Section 13 of Rule 3 "gives the plaintiff the right to include alternatively
several possible defendants when he is uncertain against which of them he is entitled to relief, as ... where a defendant
may have been acting either as an agent or a principal." ... And the above provision is applicable, although the right to
relief alleged to exist against one of the defendants may be inconsistent with the right to relief against the other, as where
A is sued as principal and B is joined in the alternative, if A should be found to have been B's agents. (1 Moran 71, 1957
ed.) The amended complaint in the instant case may not be a model pleading for an alternative statements of the claim or
 against two or more defendants in the alternative; however, judging the said complaint from a liberal standpoint as
ordained by the Rules and considering that in the prayer judgment is asked against all the defendants, Dolores Granada,
Estrella Granada and Cristeta Granada, it is within the jurisdiction of the court to render such judgment as the facts
warrant against all or some of the defendants for the payment of the amount claimed by the plaintiff.

PEOPLE OF THE, PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BIENVENIDO HINLO Y CANALIJA defendant-appellant.

DE CASTRO,* J.:

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, finding Bienvenido Hinlo y Canalija guilty of murder for the killing of
Hilarion Martin and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000.00 and
to pay costs. 1

As proven by the evidence of the prosecution the crime was committed as follows, quoting from the People's brief. 2

Appellant would impute error to the trial court in giving credence to the two eye-witnesses of the prosecution, Benjamin Dayuta and
Saturnina Petilla, alleging that not only are their testimonies inconsistent with each other, but also that each testimony is self-
contradictory and improbable, and in addition, witnesses who could have given more reliable testimony were not presented, thereby
demonstrating further, by this supposed suppression of evidence, the untrustworthiness of the aforementioned state witnesses'
testimony. Appellant has pointed out where the alleged inconsistencies, self-contradictions and improbabilities lie. Going over how
each and every one of them were shown by the Solicitor General not to be such as claimed by the appellant, We find the efforts of
the said counsel to have convincingly achieved his ends, as can best be demonstrated by quoting from appellee's brief 3 the
following:

(a) The fact that Saturnina Petilla testified that only the victim and Benjamin Dayuta were inside the house of
Lolita Manalili when the incident happened does not necessarily contradict the testimony of Dayuta that, aside
from them (Dayuta and victim), they had a third companion (Dayuta's helper). True, there was no barrier
between her (Petilla) and the place of the incident, which was about five arms length away. But the fact,
however, is that she was outside looking through the door which was partly opened. Naturally, she could not
have seen the four corners of the room where the incident happened as the partly opened door reveals only a
portion of the room. And, being a mere helper, it is safe to assume that this third companion was sitting at a
corner a little bit farther from the two (Dayuta and victim). This explains why Petilla only saw Dayuta and the
victim at the time of the incident;

If the foregoing clearly shows how actually non-existent are the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of Dayuta and Petilla
as the principal state witnesses, the absence of self-contradictions and improbabilities in the testimony of each of them which
appellant claims said testimony to be riddled with, is as convincingly demonstrated with the Solicitor General correctly observing as
follows:

(a) There is nothing improbable in the testimony of Dayuta that he did not notice the entry of accused-
appellant. The place where the incident occurred was used as a resting place by some people fetching water
from the artesian well just opposite the street. Hence, people just come and go unnoticed. Besides, there was
no time for Dayuta to observe the entry of accused-appellant because it was so sudden and unexpected.

(b) The testimony of Manalili that prior to the incident she left her (Manalili children listening to the jukebox,
does not render improbable Dayuta's testimony that he and the victim were telling stories before the stabbing.
It could be that, after Manalili left, the victim stopped listening to the jukebox and went near Dayuta to converse
with him. Besides, the victim can converse with Dayuta while the jukebox was playing.

(c) The fact that Dayuta could not tell the kind of weapon used by accused-appellant in stabbing to death the
victim, does not affect the credibility of his (Dayuta) testimony. The incident is a startling occurrence which was
so sudden and unexpected that one witnessing the same, especially if he himself is involved, cannot be
expected to watch it with sobriety as to be able to observe even the kind of weapon used.

(d) We see nothing incredible in the testimony of Dayuta regarding his whereabouts, as well as that of the
victim, after the stabbing incident (pp. 10-11, Appellant's Brief. The fact that he (Dayuta) saw the victim running
towards the alley leading to a house while he was running towards the waiting shed, does not contradict his
other statement that the victim was ahead of him in the waiting shed. It could be that the victim, while running
towards the alley was helped by neighbors who learned of the incident and rushed him to the waiting shed
 where he could be brought to the hospital. That explains why the victim was even ahead of Dayuta at the
waiting shed.

(e) Petilla's testimony regarding the victim's age, as well as the time when she came to know the latter, are
merely based on her estimates and recollection. Consequently, their inaccuracy win not affect the credibility of
her testimony. Besides, these are insignificant and immaterial matters, as the Identity of the victim is not
disputed.

(f) It is not unnatural for petilla to have followed theaccused-appellant to where the crime was committed,
despite the danger to her life. In fact, not a few people died because of curiosity. This is demonstrated time and
again when policemen had to drive away people who unnecessarily expose themselves to dangers, like fires
and quarrels, just to satisfy their curiosity.

(g) Petilla's testimony is not rendered incredible simply because she did not know what the accused-appellant
used in stabbing the victim. As already stated, the incident was a startling occurrence and, therefore, people
watching it, especially a woman cannot be expected to observe such minor details as the kind of weapon used
by the assailant.

(h) The testimony of Reynaldo Martin regarding the position of his brother, the victim when stabbed is hearsay
because he was not an eyewitness to the incident and, therefore, the trial court did not err in not considering it
to discredit the testimonies of Dayuta and Petilla

KOH TIECK HENG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS

That accused Koh Tieck Heng, alias Tomas P. Flores opened Savings Account No. 26580, with the Security Bank and Trust Company,
Escolta St., Manila, hereinafter called SBTC in short, with an initial deposit of P500.00, made on 21 Feb. 1973, for which he was given
a pass book in his name of Tomas P. Flores (see Exh. C). He made a second deposit of P400.00 then a withdrawal of P500.00 then a
deposit of P775.00, and then a withdrawal of P1,000.00 (Entries on Exh. C).

"On 13 March (sic, August) accused went to SBTC and filled up or accomplished and signed a deposit slip (Exh. B) for a deposit of
P18,060.00 in check. With the deposit slip, he submitted to Urbana Ramos de Ferrer, Teller No. 2 of SBTC, his pass book (Exh. C) and
a Philippine Bank of Communications Check No. U-186378, dated August 9, 1973 (Exh. A) for P18,060.00, appearing to have been
signed and issued by `F. Dycaico', who was then maintaining with the Philippine Bank of Communications, hereinafter referred also
as PBC, a checking account No. 13360. This check was signed and indorsed by the accused. Upon deposit of this check for
P18,060.00, the said sum was posted in the pass book (Exh. C), as shown in Exhibit C-1. (T.S.N., pp. 5-15, Oct. 10, 1973, hearing).:-
cralaw

"On 16 August 1973, the accused withdrew from this Savings Account No. 26580, the sum of P10,000.00 upon submission to
Margarita Tiongson, Teller No. 3, of a withdrawal slip (Exh. E) accomplished and signed by him. Such withdrawal was posted in the
pass book (Exh. C), shown by Exhibit C-2. Upon receipt of the amount withdrawn, the teller caused the accused to sign at the back
of the withdrawal slip and which signature is marked Exhibit E-1. On the next day, 17 August 1973, the accused withdrew another
amount of P5,500.00 upon defendant's submission to Teller No. 3 of a withdrawal slip (Exh. F) and the pass book. The withdrawal
was posted in the pass book as shown by Exhibit C-3. Upon receipt of the sum withdrawn, the teller caused the accused to sign at
the back of the withdrawal slip and which signature is marked Exhibit F-1. (T.S.N., pp. 21-30; 32-39, id.).

"On 18 August 1973, the accused went again to the SBTC to deposit another Philippine Bank of Communications Check No. U-
186414 (Exh. H), dated 11 August 1973 for P18,060.00 which appears to be signed by 'F. Dycaico' against Checking Account No.
13360. Accused, therefore, filled up and accomplished a deposit slip (Exh. I) for P18,060.00. After accomplishing Exhibit I, accused
submitted the check (Exh. H), the pass book (Exh. C) and the deposit slip (Exh. I) to Candida Abella Villanueva, Teller No. 5. The
deposit of P18,060.00 was thus posted at the pass book (Exh. C), as shown by Exh. C-4 (T.S.N., pp. 60-70, Id.).

"Sometime in that month of August 1973, Florencio Dycaico, who maintains the Checking Account No. 13360 with the Philippine
Bank of Communications saw his Statement of Account and came upon an amount of P18,060.00 debited against his account. He
complained to the PBC that he never issued a check for that much. With this information PBC informed SBTC that the check, Exh. A,
was a spurious check. So, SBTC officials instructed their bank tellers to watch for Tomas P. Flores. NBI agent Mamerto Espartero was
also assigned to crack down on check forgers or passers in company with an informer, at the premises of SBTC, in coordination with
SBTC officials (T.S.N., pp. 3-7, 12, 16-17, Nov. 12, 1973, hearing).

"Then, came the pay off. The accused appeared in the SBTC premises on 22 August 1973. He filled up, accomplished and signed a
withdrawal slip (Exh. K) for P15,500.00, and after that he submitted his passbook (Exh. C) with the withdrawal slip to Maria Victoria
Soriano, SBTC Teller No. 7. Forewarned to watch for the accused Tomas P. Flores, she asked the accused to sign his name in Exh. K,
and he did sign it as requested. He signed his name of Koh Tieck Heng (See Exh. K-3). After that, Teller No. 7 brought the slip and the
pass book of Tomas P. Flores. Teller No. 7 returned to her cage and then called up for Tomas P. Flores. The accused went to Teller No.
7. Teller No. 7 asked the accused to sign his name at the back, and which signature is marked Exh. K-2. After he signed Exh. K-2, the
NBI agent Espartero swooped down on the accused and apprehended him. The accused was brought inside the Cashier's Office. He
was interviewed and then later brought to the NBI office where he was investigated. In the course of his investigation, he executed a
written statement now marked Exh. M. (T.S.N., pp. 3-20, Oct. 22, 1973, hearing)." 2

Based on the facts narrated, appellant Koh Tieck Heng, alias Teddy Koh, alias Tomas P. Flores, was charged in Criminal Case No.
15006 before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XII, with the crime of estafa thru falsification of a commercial
document in an information which reads:

Coming now to the first issue, appellant alleges that there is a variance between the allegations in the information and the evidence
adduced, thereby depriving him of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The rule that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged or included in the information is based upon the right to be
informed of the true nature and cause of the accusation against him. 12 However, respondent court exhaustively discussed this
issue and lucidly explained the facts upon which its judgment of conviction was predicated, thus:

"It is a fact that under the two informations, the mode of falsification attributed to the Accused is that of having erased and altered
the dates and amounts of the checks in question, and superimposing or causing to be superimposed over the original dates and
amount of said checks other dates and amounts, thereby making alterations and changes in genuine documents which changed
their meaning. Clearly, therefore, the offense charged is that penalized under Article 172 in relation to Article 171 (6) of the Revised
Penal Code.

On the second issue, appellant contends that respondent court erred in convicting him of attempted estafa in Criminal Case No.
15007 when it admitted in its decision that appellant was not able to withdraw the value of the second check as he was
apprehended in the act of withdrawing the same. From this, he argues that having failed to withdraw the sum as part value of the
second check, no amount whatsoever was taken by him, hence no damage or prejudice was suffered by the bank. Absent such
damage, he concludes, he cannot be convicted of attempted estafa.: nad

This is specious argumentation.

Basically, the two essential requisites of fraud or deceit and damage or injury must be established by sufficient and competent
evidence in order that the crime of estafa may be established. 14 Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact (whether by
words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed) which deceives or
is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. 15 The fact that appellant was the possessor and
utterer of the checks in question (Exhibits "A" and "H") and having benefited from the subsequent withdrawals, as well as having
attempted to gain by trying to withdraw an amount thereon, the inevitable conclusion would be that he was the one who falsified
said Exhibits "A" and "H". Ineluctably, the use of the spurious checks is by itself fraud or deceit.

Although one of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party, 16 in the absence of proof thereof the
offender would at least be guilty of attempted estafa. Appellant commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but he failed to
perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of his own spontaneous desistance but because of
his apprehension by the authorities before he could obtain the amount. Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage
itself has been shown, respondent court correctly convicted appellant of attempted estafa.

Lastly, appellant insists that there is no evidence whatsoever pointing to him as the person who falsified the two checks in question
(Exhs. "A" and "H"), as the prosecution failed to refute his version regarding the circumstances under which he allegedly took
possession of the said checks. He further posits the view that while the courts may apply the presumptions of law in some cases, the
presumption that the possessor of a falsified document is presumed to be the forger does not constitute proof beyond reasonable
doubt and cannot be applied in his case, allegedly because the provisions not only of the Constitution but also of the Rules of Court
must be the basis of the judgment.

We disagree.

While it may appear that the prosecution failed to directly contradict the claim of appellant as to how he came into possession of the
two checks, it is understandable that the prosecution would not always have the means for obtaining such direct evidence to
confute acts contrived clandestinely. Undoubtedly, too, as a general rule, positive testimony as to a particular fact, uncontradicted
by anyone, should control the decision of the court. Where, however, there is such an inherent improbability in the testimony or
theory of the witness, the court may properly disregard such evidence, even in the absence of any direct conflicting testimony. We
agree with respondent court that the People's version of the facts deserves more credence and it is more in consonance with human
experience.

As repeatedly expounded by this Court, evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a credible source but must, in
addition, be credible in itself. And by this is meant that it shall be natural, reasonable and probable as to make it easy to believe. 17
No better test has yet been found to determine the value of the testimony of a witness than its conformity to the knowledge and
common experience of mankind. 18 As bewailed by the court below, the theory espoused by appellant "is taxing too much the
credulity of this Court, an insult to the humble intelligence and the common sense of this Court." 19

The checks in question (Exhibits "A" and "H") were undeniably spurious, or were forgeries in toto. Prosecution witness Florencio
Dycaico categorically testified that he did not issue said checks but only those checks in the amount of P225.00 and P2,030.00
(Exhibits "O" and "P"). The disclaimer by Dycaico of his alleged signatures on the aforesaid checks is prima facie evidence of
falsification and consequently shifts the burden of evidence to appellant to prove otherwise, but which burden appellant has not
discharged.:-cralaw

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BENITO DE LA CRUZ and CIPRING DE LA

CRUZ, Defendants-Appellants.