POBLETE VS ASIAIN
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM; COMPULSORY COVERAGE;
EMPLOYEE'S
UNWILLINGNESS TO GIVE HIS SHARE OF THE CONTRIBUTION;
EFFECT THEREOF.
There is no question that the deceased Miguel Asiain was
subject to compulsory coverage in the Social Security System,
although the deceased's SSS Form E-1 (Employees' Date
Record) was never filed with the Social Security System for
the reason, according to the company, that he refused to have
his share of the corresponding monthly contributions
deducted from his salary. It was the duty of the employer to
"report immediately to the System" his name, age, civil
status, occupation, salary and dependents Compliance with
this duty did not depend upon the employee's willingness to
give his share of the contribution. Section 24 is mandatory, to
such an extent that if the employee should die or become sick
or disabled without the report having been made by the
employer, the latter is liable for an amount equivalent to the
benefits to which the employee would have been entitled had
such report been made.
Section 5(a) of the Social Security Act provides that "the filing,
determination and settlement of claims shall be governed by
the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission;"
and the rules and regulations thus promulgated state that
"the effectivity of membership in the System, as well as the
final determination and settlement of claims,
shall be vested in the Commission." The term 'claims" is broad
enough to include a claim for damages under Section 24.
Otherwise am employer could nullify the jurisdiction of the
Commission by the simple expedient of not making a report
as required by said Section.
CHUA VS CA
regardless of the nature of their employment, whether it is
regular or project, private respondents are subject of the
compulsory coverage under the SSS Law, their employment
not falling under the exceptions provided by the law. 41 This
rule is in accord with the Court's ruling in Luzon Stevedoring
Corp. v. SSS 42 to the effect that all employees, regardless of
tenure, would qualify for compulsory membership in the SSS,
except those
classes of employees contemplated in Section 8(j) of the
Social Security Act.
Anent the issue of prescription, this Court rules that private
respondents' right to file their claim had not yet prescribed at
the time of the filing of their petition, considering that a mere
eight (8) years had passed from the time delinquency was
discovered or the proper assessment was made. Republic Act
No. 1161, as amended, prescribes a period of twenty (20)
years, from the time the delinquency is known or assessment
is made by the SSS, within which to file a claim for non-
remittance against employers.
STA RITA VS CA
the Standard Contract of Employment to be entered into
between foreign shipowners and Filipino seafarers is the
instrument by which the former express their assent to the
inclusion of the latter in the coverage of the Social Security
Act. In other words, the extension of the coverage of the
Social Security System to Filipino seafarers arises by virtue of
the assent given in the contract of employment signed by
employer and seafarer; that same contract binds petitioner
Sta. Rita or B. Sta. Rita Company, who is solidarily liable with
the foreign shipowners/employers. It may be noted
that foreign shipowners and manning agencies had generally
expressed their conformity to the inclusion of Filipino
seafarers within the coverage of the Social Security Act even
prior to the signing of the DOLE-SSS Memorandum of
Agreement.
SSS VS AGUAS
a wife who abandoned the family for more than 17 years until
her husband died, and lived with other men, was not
dependent on her husband for support, financial or otherwise,
during that entire period.
a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband
cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the
husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it
is proved that the husband and wife were still
living together at the time of his death, it would be safe to
presume that she was dependent on the husband for support,
unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.
DYCAICO VS SSS
classifying dependent spouses and determining their
entitlement to survivor's pension based on whether the
marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the
other spouse, regardless of the duration of
the said marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the
policy objective of the law, i.e., "provide meaningful protection
to members and their beneciaries against the hazard of
disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other
contingencies resulting in loss of income or nancial burden."
14 The nexus of the classication to the policy objective is
vague and imsy. Put differently, such classication of
dependent spouses is not germane to the aforesaid policy
objective.
The proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-
B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul of the due process clause
as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose
respective marriages to the retired SSS members were
contracted after the latter's retirement of their survivor's
benets. There is outright conscation of benets due such
surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be
heard
FILSTAR MARITIME VS ROSETE
There is no quibble that respondent is entitled to disability
benets. The Standard Employment Contract (SEC) for
seafarers was created by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) pursuant to its
mandate under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 247 24 dated July
21, 1987 to "secure the best terms and conditions of
employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure
compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-
being of Filipino workers overseas."
(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the
injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any
gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120
days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these
Rules.
MENDOZA VS PEOPLE
GARCIA VS SSS
SSS VS CA
GR L-26341, Nov 27, 1968
ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO VS. WCC
GR: GOING AND COMING RULE: in the absence of special
circumstances, an employee injured in going to or coming
from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of WCA.
EXN:
1. Where the EE is proceeding to or from his work on the
premises of his ER
2. Where the EE is about to enter or about to leave the
premises of his ER by way of the exclusive or customary
means of ingress and egress
3. Where the EE is charged, while on his way to or from his
place of employment or at his home, or during his
 employment, with some duty or special errand
connected with his employment; and
4. Where the ER, as an incident of the employment,
provides the means of transportation to and from the
place of employment.
IDECO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSAULT AGAINST PABLO.
Although IDECO did not own the private road, the main
gate was the principal means of ingress and egress
leading directly to its main gate. The spot where Pablo was
shot was immediately proximate to IDECOs premises.
The Ampil ruling was applied here: the place where the
employee was injured being immediately proximate to
his place of work, the accident in question must be
deemed to have occurred within the zone of this
employment and therefore arose out of and in the
course thereof. Workmens Compensation Act must be
liberally construed to attain the purpose for which it was
enacted. Liberally construed, Sec. 2 of the Act comprehends
Pablos death.
GR 90204, May 11, 1990
BELARMINO VS. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION AND GSIS
Rule III, Sec. 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation enumerates the grounds for compensability of
injury resulting in disability or death of an employee:
Sec. 1. Grounds (a) For the injury and the resulting disability
or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of
an employment accident satisfying all of the following
conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place
where his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his
official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee
must have been executing an order for the
employer.
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex A of these Rules
with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must
be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased
by the working conditions.
(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1,
1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be
compensable under these Rules.
OANIAS DEATH FROM THE AILMENT IS COMPENSABLE
BECAUSE AN EMPLOYMENT ACCIDENT AND THE CONDITIONS
OF HER EMPLOYMENT CONTRIBUTED TO ITS DEVELOPMENT.
The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to
slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated
the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in
the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic
consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought
about her premature delivery which caused the development
of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall
therefore was the proximate or responsible cause that
set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to
her demise.
Mrs. Belarminos fall was the primary injury that arose in the
course of her employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all
the medical consequences owing from it: her recurrent
abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her
septicemia post partum, and death, are compensable.
GR 84307, April 17, 1989
HINOGUIN VS. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION AND GSIS
ART. 167(G) OF THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED AND SEC.
49(B) (1) OF RULE 1 OF THE AMENDED IRR ON EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION, THE TERM EMPLOYEE INCLUDES A MEMBER
OF THE AFP.
SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. (a) The beneficiaries
of a deceased employee shall be entitled to an income benefit
if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) The employee had been duly reported to the System;
(2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and
(3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as well
as the injury or sickness which caused his death.
His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death
occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage of
the System.
ART. 167 OF THE LABOR CODE, DEFINES COMPENSABLE
INJURY AS ANY HARMFUL CHANGE IN THE HUMAN ORGANISM
FROM ANY ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE
OF THE EMPLOYMENT. Rule III, Sec. 1(a) reads:
SECTION 1. Grounds (a) For the injury and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the
result of an employment accident satisfying all of the
following grounds:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where
his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official
functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must
have been executing an order for the employer.
THE DEATH OF HINOGUIN THAT RESULTED FROM HIS BEING
HIT BY AN ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGE OF THE RIFLE OF DFT.
ALIBUYOG, AROSE OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF HIS
EMPLOYMENT AS A SOLDIER OF ACTIVE DUTY STATUS IN THE
AFP AND HENCE COMPENSABLE.
the work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguins injury and
death was not effectively precluded by the simple
circumstance that he was on an overnight pass to go to the
home of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under his own command. He
did not cease performing official functions because he was
granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldier's home for a
few hours for a meal and some drinks was not a specific
military duty, he was nonetheless in the course of
performance of official functions. Indeed, it appears to us that
a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he
is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that
status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an approved
vacation leave. Even vacation leave may, it should be
remembered, be preterminated by superior orders.
- A soldiers employment has risks which he has
to assume hazards or risks inherent in his
employment as a soldier.
GR 128524, April 20, 1999
GSIS VS. CA AND ALEGRE
Facts
SPO2 Alegre was a police officer assigned to the PNP station in
Vigan, Ilocos Sur. He was driving his tricycle and ferrying
passengers within the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex
when SPO4 Tenorio, Jr. confronted him regarding his tour of
duty. SPO2 Alegre and SPO4 Tenorio fought which led to the
fatal shooting of SPO2 Alegre.
Issue: Is the death of SPO2 Alegre compensable?
Ruling:
FOR THE INJURY/DISABILITY/DEATH TO BE COMPENSABLE, THE
INJURY MUST BE THE RESULT OF AN EMPLOYMENT ACCIDENT
SATISFYING ALL OF THE FF. CONDITIONS: P O E
DEATH BENEFITS FOR SOLDIERS OR POLICEMEN WERE
AWARDED FOR THOSE WHO WERE VIRTUALLY WORKING
ROUND-THE-CLOCK. In such cases where death benefits were
awarded, the SC attempted in each case to find a reasonable
nexus between the absence of the deceased from his
assigned place of work and the incident that led to his death.
1. Hinoguin deceased was permitted by his superior to go
to Atilan
2. Nitura deceased had to go outside of his station on
permission and directive by his superior to check on
several personnel of his command who were then
attending a dance party
3. ECC case involving P/Sgt. Alvaran even if not directed
any directive or permission by a superior officer to be at
the Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence there was
justified by the peacekeeping nature of the matter he was
attending to which was bringing his son to the police
station to answer for a crime
DEATH OF SPO2 ALEGRE IS NOT COMPENSABLE. The matter
SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death,
was that of ferrying passengers for a fee He was not
authorized nor he had the permission of a superior officer;
neither was the matter of a peacekeeping nature
The 24-hour doctrine, as applied to soldiers and policemen,
serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to
place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a
blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give
rise to their deaths. It should not be applied to all acts
and circumstances causing the death of a police officer
but only to those which, although not an official line of
duty, are nonetheless basically police service in
character.
[G.R. No. 136200. June 8, 2000]
CELERINO VALERIANO vs. ECC and GSIS
Facts
Celestino Valeriano was employed as a firetruck driver. On the
evening of July 3, 1985, after having dinner with a friend,
Valeriano met an accident and was severely injured when the
vehicle he was on collided with another.
Issue: whether petitioner fireman, like soldiers, can be
presumed to be on 24-hour duty.
Ruling
For injury to be compensable, the standard of "work
connection" must be substantially satisfied. The injury
and the resulting disability sustained by reason of
employment are compensable regardless of the place where
the injured occurred, if it can be proven that at the time of the
injury, the employee was acting within the purview of his or
her employment and performing an act reasonably necessary
or incidental thereto.
Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how
his job as a firetruck driver was related to the injuries he had
suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely
personal and social function -- having dinner with some
friends -- is clear from the records of the case.
In Hinoguin and Nitura, the Court granted death compensation
benefits to the heirs of Sgt. Limec Hinoguin and Pfc. Regino
Nitura, both members of the Philippine Army. After having
gone elsewhere on an overnight pass, Sgt. Hinoguin was
accidentally shot by a fellow soldier. Pfc. Nitura, on the other
hand, died after falling from a bridge during his trip back to
his camp. At the time of his death, he had just accomplished
his commanders instruction to check on several personnel of
his command post who were then at a dance party. Both cases
espoused the position that the concept of "work place"
cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active
duty status who, to all intents and purposes, is on a
24-hour official duty status, subject to military
discipline and law and at the beck and call of his
superior officers at all times, except when he is on
vacation leave status
The circumstances in the present case do not call for the
application of Hinoguin and Nitura. Following the
rationalization in GSIS, the 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot
be applied to petitioner's case, because he was neither
at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the orders
of his superiors when he met an accident. But the more
important justification for the Courts stance is that he
was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a
firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the
time he sustained his injuries. We cannot find any
reasonable connection between his injuries and his work as a
firetruck driver.
G.R. No. 78617 June 18, 1990
SALVADOR LAZO, vs. ECC & GSIS
Facts
Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the
Phils. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 -10:00pm. On 18
June 1986, he rendered duty from 2:00 - 10:00 o'clock in the
evening. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him
failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to
5:00 am of 19 June 1986. On his way home, the passenger
jeepney he was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As
a result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the Hospital
for treatment
Issue
Whether or not petitioner's injury comes within the meaning
of and intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in the
course of employment.'(Section 2, Workmen's Compensation
Act).
Ruling
There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from
his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions
occurred in the journey.
While the presumption of compensability and theory of
aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act (under
which the Baldebrin case was decided) may have been
abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that
the liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman
still subsists. As agent charged by the law to implement social
justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the
Employees Compensation Commission should adopt a liberal
attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability, especially where there is some basis in the
facts for inferring a work connection to the accident.
The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (PD
626) to as many employees who can avail of the benefits
thereunder. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of
the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.
There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be
protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after
working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching
or after leaving the employer's premises.
If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who
was on his way from home to his work station one day before
an official working day, there is no reason to deny
compensation for accidental injury occurring while he is on his
way home one hour after he had left his work station.
We are constrained not to consider the defense of the street
peril doctrine and instead interpret the law liberally in favor
of the employee because the Employees Compensation Act,
like the Workmen's Compensation Act, is basically a social
legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and
women in our society.

G.R. No. L-27588 April 28, 1969
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, vs. WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and ROSARIO VDA. DE
ROSANO
Facts
Stevedore Rosano had a heated verbal argument with Valdez,
another stevedore engaged by petitioner corporation, over
the possession of a platform used in the loading and
unloading of cargoes taken into or out of the watercraft. Later,
informed that the barge they were waiting for definitely was
not arriving, Rosano, with two companions, boarded a
passenger jeep bound for Tondo. When he got off from the
jeep near his house, he was met by Valdez, who whipped out
a knife and stabbed him. Rosano died on the same day after
being brought to the hospital.
Issue
Whether or not the death of Rosano is compensable
considering that it came after he was outside the company
premises and not at work.
Ruling
it is evident that the cause of his fatal stabbing by Benjamin
Valdez (who was thereafter accused and convicted) can be
traced to their disagreement over the possession of a platform
that was to be used in their work for petitioner that although
the altercation started in the morning the same was resumed
when they returned in the afternoon and carried on when
Valdez left, lay in wait near Rosario's house, and there met
and stabbed the latter when he alighted from the jeep.
Neither can it be said that the employer is exempt from
liability under the Workmen's Compensation law because the
cause of death arose outside of the company
premises, whereas the quarrel happened at the waterfront at
Pier 9.
For an injury to be compensable, it is not necessary
that the cause therefor shall take place within the
place of employment. If a workman is acting within the
scope of his employment, his protection "in the course
of" the employment usually continues, regard of the
place of injury.
the ultimate test was whether "the quarrel from origin to
ending must be taken to be one" it should make no difference
how widely separated the assault was from the employment
in time and space if it remained an inherent part of an
employment incident.
G.R. No. L-14827. October 31, 1960
CHUA YENG vs MICHAELA ROMA
FACTS: Santos Romeo was working as a kargador in Cebu City
for Chua Yeng. He went to Yengs house just across the street
from the warehouse to get a drink of water. Reaching the
kitchen while he was drinking, he saw a puppy eating some
fried fish inside. Santos made a motion with his hand to drive
it away, in the course of which his right hand was bitten by
said puppy.Santos Romeo died of hydrophobia from the dog
bite. It appears that the puppy was not owned by Yeng.
ISSUE: WON, under the circumstances narrated, the death of
the laborer is considered to arise "out of and in the course" of
his employment.
HELD: YES.
The rule is well established that "Such acts as are
reasonably necessary to the health and comfort of an
employee while at work, such as satisfaction of his thirst,
hunger, or other physical demands, or protecting himself from
excessive cold, are nevertheless incidental to the
employment, and injuries sustained in the performance of
such act are generally held to be compensable as arising out
of and in the course of the employment."
Santos Romeo was in the kitchen of appellant's house and not
at his usual place of work for the reason that the laborer
was practically driven to that place through the
appellant's fault in not providing an adequate supply
of drinking water at the warehouse. SC did not regard the
act of driving away the puppy as a voluntary deviation from
his duties, considering that the act of the deceased was
practically an instinctive one, that would naturally be
expected from any person in his position. Moreover, it was
motivated by a sense of loyalty to his employer, a desire to
protect the latter's property, that can not be deemed wholly
foreign to the duties of the laborer as such
Compensation has been granted, even if the injury
occurred while the worker was not performing acts
strictly within the scope of his duties, but engaged in
an activity either related or incidental to his duties, or
doing an act in the interest of his employer.
G.R. No. L-22135. December 27, 1963
VISAYAN STEVEDORE-TRANSPORTATION CO. VS.
WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION (WCC)
Facts: VST undertook the loading of sugar on the Japanese
ship "Hiyeharu Maru" and Gutana was one of the more than
70 of its laborers assigned to do the loading. Gutana and
some of the laborers had to answer the call of nature by the
left side of a barge tied along the right side of the Japanese
ship, in view of the insufficiency of the sanitary facilities on
board. After relieving himself, and as he was standing and
buttoning up his pants, the raft "Narwhal" came along the
right side of the barge and bumped it, causing it to hit the
right side of the Japanese vessel. Gutana was pinned by the
end of the hatch cover of the barge against the side of the
vessel, thereby suffering physical injuries which resulted in his
death.
Issue1: WON the claim for compensation had prescribed
having been filed more than three months after Gutana's
death.
Held1: NO. The case is covered by the provisions of Section
24, Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, as amended,
which dispenses with the requirement of filing a claim
for compensation if the employer had voluntarily made
compensation payments. Under Section 8 of the same act,
burial expenses are considered as part of the death benefits
due to the heirs of a deceased laborer. It appears in this case
that petitioner had voluntarily paid the burial expenses in
connection with the burial of Gutana. Consequently, the late
filing of the claim for compensation is not fatal.
Issue2: WON death of Gutana was due to his notorious
negligence.
Held2: NO. The deceased Gutana was among those who was
forced to resort to this uncomfortable way of relieving himself.
Moreover, in the circumstances of this case, it is but logical to
consider the barge as an extension of the premises where the
laborers were working.
G.R. No. L-18438. March 30, 1963
PAEZ VS WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(WCC)
The activities performed were incidental to his duties not only
as driver but as purchaser of the respondent who was
engaged in the business of buying and selling palay. It is
reasonable to expect an employee, as in the case of Barawid,
to help a co-employee in the performance of his duties. And
even granting, only for the sake of argument, hat the acts
performed by the deceased were not strictly within the
bounds of his duties still he was, in the fullest sense of the
term, in the course of the employment. Simply stated, 'if the
act is one for the benefit of the employer or for the
mutual benefit of both, an injury arising out of it will
usually be compensable."
There is no showing at all that Barawid had
deliberately disregarded his safety; no intention was
attributed to him to end his life or that he wantonly
courted death. He wanted to return home as it was getting
late, and even helped in the loading and unloading of the
palay to the banca and truck, to finish the work that day. SC
also noted that the disregard of the warning by the deceased
cannot be considered as a notorious negligence.
Disobedience to rules, orders, and/or prohibition, does
not in itself constitute notorious negligence, if no
intention can be attributed to the injured to end his
life. The deceased did not act with the full knowledge of the
existence of a danger that ordinary prudence would counsel
him to avoid such a case. That a banca loaded with palay and
3 persons, at night time, would sink if one person more was
added to its weight, constituted merely a miscalculation on
the part of such person, if he thought it would be safe for him
to embark, the alleged overloading notwithstanding Barawid's
promptness in accomplishing his duties, to enable him to
attend his personal interest thereafter, cannot be a valid
reason to deny him the right to be compensated.
ENAO V EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Facts: Petitioner is a teacher ambushed while traveling to buy
school supplies
Ruling
Section 1, Rule 11, of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation, which provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds.(a) For the injury and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the
result of an employment accident satisfying all of the
following conditions: The employee must have sustained the
injury
(1) during his working hours;
(2) at the place where his work requires him to be; and
(3) performing his official function.
The Petitioner intended to procure supplies and other
training aids which are needed facilities in connection
with her services as a school teacher at the Wilbon
Primary School, cannot be at all disputed. It is rather
obvious that in proceeding to purchase school
materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner would necessarily
have to leave the school premises and her travel need
not be during her usual working hours. What is
significant and controlling is that the injuries she sustained
are work-connected, which the Court finds to be so.
MURILLO V MENDOZA
Issue 1: whether or not the Workmens Compensation Act
covers maritime accidents occurring in the Philippine waters
YES "SEC. 38. Interisland trade. This Act shall cover the
liability of the employers towards employees engaged
in the coastwise and interisland trade, and also in the
foreign trade when such is permissible under the laws of the
United States and the Philippine Islands."
The applicability of the Workmens Compensation Act to
accidents occurring in the Philippine seas has been discussed
for the first time in the case of Enciso v. Dy-Liacco , where the
question was decided affirmatively
Issue 2 whether or not Act No. 3428, as amended by Act No.
3812, includes responsibilities for damages arising from
unforeseen acts wherein no fault or negligence not punishable
by law has intervened
The workmens compensation acts are based on a new theory
of compensation distinct from the theories of damages,
payments under the acts being made as compensation, not
as indemnity
The intention of the Legislature in enacting the Workmens
Compensation Act was to secure workmen and their
dependents against becoming objects of charity, by
making a reasonable compensation for such accidental
calamities as are incidental to the employment. Under
such Act injuries to workmen and employees are to be
considered no longer as results of fault or negligence, but as
the products of the industry in which the employee is
concerned.
MUST ARISE OUT IN THE COURSE OF THE EMPLOYMENT
Compensation for such injuries is, under the theory of such
statute, like any other item in the cost of production or
transportation, and ultimately charged to the consumer. The
law substitutes for liability for negligence an entirely new
conception; that is, that if the injury arises out of and in the
course of the employment, under the doctrine of mans
humanity to man, the cost of compensation must be one of
the elements to be liquidated and balanced in the course of
consumption. In other words, the theory of the law is that, if
the industry produces an injury, that cost of that injury
shall be included in the cost of the product of the
industry. Hence the provision that the injury must arise
out of and in the course of the employment
Under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act No. 3812, accidents
are compensated independently of whether or not the
employer has incurred fault or negligence, and the only
exceptions thereto are the accidents arising from the
voluntary act of the injured person, those resulting from the
drunkenness of the employee who had the accident, and
those caused by the notorious negligence thereof (section 4,
Act No. 3428).
Issue 3 WON the death of Petitioner arose out of his
employment? YES
Taking into consideration all of these circumstances, it is
clear that his death is compensable under the law on
the ground that a causal relation existed between such
death and the conditions under which he had to
perform his employment. It is obvious that the typhoon
was the immediate cause of the sinking of the vessel
and that there existed no causal relation between it and the
employment of the deceased. It is evident, however, that
between the conditions and circumstances under which the
deceased discharged his employment and his death, there
existed the causal connection which makes the accident
compensable.
The doctrine is generally accepted that the employer is not
responsible for accidents arising from force majeure or an act
of God, as it is usually called, when the employee has not
been exposed to a greater danger than usual. However, in the
case of the deceased and in that of a sailor, it cannot
be denied that upon contracting their services to
navigate in the waters of the archipelago, having to
render extraordinary services in cases of typhoon, they
are exposed to greater risk than usual, in comparison
with other employees working on land.
TALLER V INCHAUSTI
Issue whether the death of Valentin Nava occurred in the
course of his employment, or was the result of the nature of
such employment
Legal basis: section 2 of Act No. 3428, which runs as follows:
SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. When any employee
receives a personal injury from any accident due to and in the
pursuance of the employment, or contracts any illness directly
caused by such employment or the result of the nature of
such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the
sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.
This provision was amended by section 1 of Act No. 3812 so
as to read as follows:
SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. When any employee
receives a personal injury from any accident arising out of and
in the course of the employment, or contracts any illness
directly caused by such employment, or the result of the
nature of such employment, his employer shall pay
compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter
specified.
Fixing our attention then more particularly upon section 2 of
Act No. 3428, it is quite clear that the death of Valentin Nava
was NOT due to any illness directly caused by his
employment or the result of the nature of such
employment. We are of the opinion, however, that it
occurred in the course of his employment and "in pursuance
of the employment", as this expression is used in the
provision cited.
Contention of Respondents
inasmuch as he was employed as helmsman, he was acting
within the scope of his duties only when his hand was on
the helm of the vessel and he was engaged in actually
guiding its motions.
Case at Bar
We are of the opinion that his duties should be considered as
having greater latitude. It is true that the term indicative of
his employment was that of helmsman, but we think that
his duties should be considered as comprehending acts
done by him in helping to guide the ship.
In maneuvering a vessel, in entering and leaving ports, it is
necessary for the ship's officers in charge of the motions of
the vessel to avail themselves of cables; and the taking in of a
cable and the coiling of it upon the deck are acts properly
incident to controlling the motion of the vessel. It results that,
when Nava found that one of the third-class passengers had
placed his bed on the deck in a position where it was in his
way, he acted within the scope of his duty when he
pushed the bed back; and when the fatal assault was
made upon him because of that act, it must be
considered that his death resulted from an act done in
the line of his duty.
BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION COMPANY vs. GALICANO
A. RIVERA and THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION
FACTS:
The Batangas Transportation Co. appeals by certiorari from
the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission
dated June 27, 1958, holding said company liable for
compensation to its employee Galicano Rivera for the loss of
his left leg. The loss of Galicano Riveras leg was due to the
collision of petitioners bus and a jeepney.
ISSUE: WON the injury is compensable
RULING: YES.
Since the injury was received while the claimant was driving
the bus; i. e., while performing the very duty he was
employed to perform, the injury clearly arose "out of and in
the course" of employment and is compensable. As to the
affirmative defense of "notorious negligence", petitioner had
the burden to establish by substantial evidence the facts
constituting such kind of negligence, a task in which the
record shows he failed, since even the alleged excessive
speed at which claimant allegedly drove the bus is not proved.
DAVAO GULF LUMBER CORPORATION vs. HON. N.
BAENS DEL ROSARIO, ET AL.
FACTS: Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation carrying some lumber
from its sawmill to Davao City, accidentally overturned on the
road. Vicente Soriano, its driver, was killed instantly together
with his son, Vicente Soriano Jr.
ISSUE: WON Vicentes death is compensable
RULING: YES. Accidents which are caused by the worn-out
condition of the motor vehicles, are compensable. In our
opinion, the truck was running fast just before overturning
because it was then on a slope, and (as declared by the
Commission) the "gear of the truck went out of order
rendering the gear shift useless," and that the brake "would
not function." As to the fourth and fifth circumstances, the
Commissioner's decision says the Company consented to or
authorized the trip.
Concerning the non-registration of the truck in the Motor
Vehicle Office, and its defective condition there is no nding
that the driver knew this at the time of driving. Registration of
the vehicle was not his concern.
As to the presence of members of his family in the vehicle,
supposing it was in violation of company regulations, it is not
certain that it caused the accident. Indeed, as his wife and
children were present, this driver must have been extremely
careful not reckless. What happened must have been
unforeseen, it may only be blamed upon the worn-out
condition of the motor transport, or to "accident," for which
the employer is responsible, it having arisen out of and in the
course of the deceased's regular duties as driver. (Sec. 2, Act
No. 3428 as amended by Republic Act 772.)
The death was, consequently, compensable.
ISSUE: When is the 15-day period for appeal applicable?
RULING: The period of fifteen days for appeal provided in
Section 50 of Republic Act No. 772 refers to appeals from the
decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission to the
Supreme Court, and not to appeals from the decision of one
Commissioner to the Commission en banc.
ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO. vs. WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO
ISSUE: Is assault compensable?
RULING: YES.
An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the
slayer, is considered an "accident" within the meaning of Sec.
2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since the word
"accident" is intended to indicate that "the act causing the
injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the
injured party is not legally responsible."
In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work-
connected, compensation was awarded. In Nava, supra, the
helmsman of a boat was engaged in hauling the ship's cable
and in coiling it on the deck of the boat preparatory to passing
it down a hatchway. He found the space necessary for coiling
the cable party occupied by a folding bed of one of the
passengers. This passenger, upon being asked, declared his
ownership of the bed. Nava expressed his intention of pushing
it out of the way and proceeded to do so. Angered by this, the
passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and then, with a
piece of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach. At this
point, the passenger's brother ran up to Nava and stabbed
him to death. The death was adjudged compensable.
It has been said that an employment may either increase risk
of assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a
dispute leading to the assault. The first kind of employment,
the so-called "increased risk" jobs comprehend
(1) jobs involving dangerous duties
 guarding the employer's property,
carrying or keeping money, that where the employee
is exposed to lawless or irresponsible members of
the public,
subjects him to increased or indiscriminate contact
with the public, such as the job of a street car
conductor or taxi-driver;
(2) jobs where the employee is placed in a dangerous
environment;
(3) jobs of employees whose work takes them on the
highway. On the other hand, the employment itself may
be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault
as where a supervisor is assaulted by a workmen he has
fired, or where the argument was over the performance
of work or possession of tools or the like, or where the
violence was due to labor disputes.
ISSUE: WON an injury sustained in an access area may be
treated as employers premises and is legally compensable
RULING: YES. That part of the road where Pablo was killed is
in very close proximity to the employer's premises. It is an
"access area" "so clearly related to the employee's premises
as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises."
NFD INTERNATIONAL vs. ESMERALDO C. ILLESCAS
FACTS: Respondent employee while carrying a heavy
basketful of re hydrant caps, felt a sudden snap on his back,
with pain that radiated down to the left side of his hips. After a
few days, the pain became severe, and respondent had
difficulty walking. Dr. Almeda declared that respondent was
unfit to work at sea in any capacity as a seaman.
Respondent prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him
disability benefit in the amount of US$90,000.00, among
others.Petitioner countered that it is the POEA Standard
Contract for Seafarers, and not the CBA, that governs this
case. They stated that Black's Law Dictionary defined
"accident" as an unusual, fortuitous, unexpected, unforeseen
or unlooked for event. They argued that respondent's
disability was not the result of an accident, as respondent was
merely performing his normal duty of transporting re hydrant
caps from the deck to the engine workshop, then back to the
deck to refit the caps.
ISSUE: WON the disability suffered by respondent was caused
by an accident
RULING: NO.
the snap on the back of respondent was not an accident, but
an injury sustained by respondent from carrying the heavy
basketful of re hydrant caps, which injury resulted in his
disability. The injury cannot be said to be the result of an
accident, that is, an unlooked for mishap, occurrence, or
fortuitous event, because the injury resulted from the
performance of a duty. Although respondent may not have
expected the injury, yet, it is common knowledge that
carrying heavy objects can cause back injury, as what
happened in this case. Hence, the injury cannot be viewed as
unusual under the circumstances, and is not synonymous with
the term "accident" as defined above.
ISSUE: Is the accident compensable?
RULING: YES.
Although the disability of respondent was not caused by an
accident, his disability is still compensable under Article 13 of
the CBA under the following provision:
A seafarer/of cer who is disabled as a result of any injury, and
who is assessed as less than 50% permanently disabled, but
permanently unfit for further service at sea in any capacity,
shall also be entitled to a 100% compensation.
The Court finds merit in the reasons stated by Dr. Almeda in
his Medical Report for declaring respondent unfit to work in
any capacity as a seaman. Respondent is, therefore, entitled
to disability bene t in the amount of US$90,000.00 under the
CBA.
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES VS WCC (1956)
FACTS:
Deceased Mamador together with other laborers of MIMA
boarded a truck belonging to the latter driven by its employee
Macunat on their way to their place of work at the mine camp.
The truck met an accident resulting in the death of said
Mamador and injury to the others. Driver Macunat was
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. He has paid
nothing however, to the latter.
MIMA is now denying its liability under the Workmens
Compensation Act, maintaining that this claim is barred by
section 6 of the Workmens Compensation Law, because
Macunat was prosecuted and required to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased and an amicable settlement was concluded
between said heirs and Macunat.
ISSUE: w/n the criminal case and its outcome constituted an
election by the employee (or his heirs) to sue the third person,
such election having the effect of releasing the employer?
HELD: NO
Section 6 provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Liability of third parties. In case an employee
suffers an injury for which compensation is due under this Act
by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional
with such injured employee either to claim compensation from
his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for
damages, in accordance with law; and in case
compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance
with this Act, the employer who paid such
compensation or was found liable to pay the same,
shall succeed the injured employee to the right of
recovering from such person what he paid: Provided,
That in case the employer recovers from such third person
damages in excess of those paid or allowed under this Act,
such excess shall be delivered to the injured employee or any
other person entitled thereto, after deduction of the expenses
of the employer and the costs of the proceedings. The sum
paid by the employer for compensation or the amount of
compensation to which the employee or his dependents are
entitled, shall not be admissible as evidence in any damage
suit or action.
Criminal Case No. 1491 was not a suit for damages against
the third person, it being alleged, without contradiction that
the heirs did not intervene therein and have not so far
received the indemnity ordered by the court. At any rate, we
have already decided in Nava vs. Inchausti Co. 1 that the
indemnity granted the heirs in a criminal prosecution
of the other person does not affect the liability of
the employer to pay compensation.
CHAVEZ VS AMMEN TRANSCO (1955)
FACTS:
A.L. Ammen Transportation Co is a bus company. It had a
subsidiary station in the municipality of Tigaon, Albay,
provided with a shop for the repair of the company's buses.
Felipe Chavez, by occupation a mechanic, was employed as
such in this subsidiary station, which was under management
of Emilio Esperida. Mechanic Chavez was examining an
automobile placed in the grease-rack and the car fell off the
grease-rack and caught Chavez under it causing his death.
Company argues that it had express ban to repair in the shop
any machine not belonging to the company. And conformably
thereto, it is further contended, Esperida, who was in the shop
when the car was brought, had it removed therefrom. But,
despite his express prohibition, Chavez brought the car again
to the shop, placed it in the grease rack and started repairing
it until it fell off and caught him under it.

ISSUE: responsibility of an employer for an act committed by
its agent supposedly in violation of rules and regulations
promulgated and enforced by the employer, which act
resulted in the death of another agent of laborer whose heirs
now claim compensation against the employer under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. (whether Chavez died in line of
duty?)
HELD: YES
While, according to the testimony of Emilio Esperida
defendant's shop in Tigaon does not accept outside jobs, this
is immaterial in-so-far as Felipe Chavez was concerned. Felipe
Chavez was an auto mechanic and was under the immediate
control and supervision and orders of defendant's
managing agent Emilio Esperida.
As such auto mechanic he had no choice but to obey the
orders of its managing agent. Any work performed by Felipe
Chavez in pursuance to the orders of defendant's managing
agent, necessarily arise out of and in the course of the
employment of the defendant. Felipe Chavez had no
discretion to choose the work which he must perform for the
company. His duty was to perform such work as was required
of him by defendant's managing agent. To refuse the order of
the managing agent may result in the loss of his employment.
If defendant's managing agent had violated any company rule
prohibiting the performance of outside jobs, then he alone
must be held responsible to the company.
But certainly the defendant company relieve itself of its
obligation under the Workmen's Compensation Act on
the theory that its agent had violated the company
regulation. Defendant, as a corporation, necessarily must
rely on its agents, and it is from these agents that the
employees receive their orders. To accept defendant's theory
would enable it to evade its responsibility in many cases
under the Workmen's Compensation Law on the ground that
its agents had exceeded, or acted beyond their authority.
Such certainly could not have been the intention of the law.
In conclusion, we hold that although the repair attempted to
be made on the Governor's car was in technical violation of
the rules of Company, such violation was committed not by
Chavez but by Esperida himself, who from the standpoint of
Chavez acted for the company in ordering the repair, which
order Chavez could not well ignore. We, therefore, agree with
the trial court and hold that the heirs of Chavez may recover
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Whether the
company may recover the amount to be paid by it from
Esperida, we do not now attempt to determine.
HAWAIIAN-PHILIPPINE COMPANY vs.
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER
FACTS:
Benigno Duazo shot Romeo Suataron, while both under the
employment of the Hawaiian- Philippine Company, as security
guards or special policemen thereof. Investigations lead to the
conclusion that the killer acted without criminal intent and the
death of Suataron was purely accidental and was ruled to be a
result of horseplay or larking.
ISSUE: Are the widow and children of the deceased, Romeo
Suataron, entitled to the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Act
RULING: YES. If the death of the deceased was the result of
horseplay or larking among employees the courts have also
declared the same as a compensable accident.
The law provides that xxxThe right to compensation as
provided in this Act shall not be defeated or impaired
on the ground that the death, injury or disease was
due to the negligence of a fellow servant or employee,
without prejudice to the right of the employer to
proceed against the negligent party."
"SEC. 4. Injuries not covered. Compensation shall not be
allowed for injuries caused: DIN
(1) by the voluntary intent of the employee to inflict such
injury upon himself or another person;
(2) by drunkenness on the part of the laborer who had the
accident; and
(3) by notorious negligence of the same."
It is not denied that the death of Romeo Suataron occurred in
the course of his employment and it was ruled that the
deceased was not guilty of notorious negligence simply
because a co-employee was able to take hold of and play with
his gun. If at all, he was merely guilty of simple negligence as
he was supposed to keep the gun in his possession at all
times whenever he was on duty. But this should not in any
way deprive him of his compensation under the law.
MEEZ vs. ECC, GSIS
FACTS: Meez was employed by the DECS as a school
teacher. She retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability
retirement plan at the age of 54 years after 32 years of
teaching, due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Before
her retirement, she was assigned at Raja Soliman High School
in Tondo- Binondo, Manila near a dirty creek. ECC and GSIS
denied her claim for disability benefits and contended that
petitioner's ailments are not among the compensable
occupational diseases under PD 626
ISSUE: WON Meez is entitled to disability benefits under PD
626?
RULING: Yes.
Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation
clearly establish that for an illness to be compensable, it must
either be:
1. An illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease;
or
2. An illness caused by employment subject to proof by the
employee that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by working conditions.
An occupational disease is one "which results from the
nature of the employment, and by nature is meant
conditions to which all employees of a class are
subject and which produce the disease as a natural
incident of a particular occupation, and attach to that
occupation a hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run
of occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending the
employment in general"
From the foregoing definition of occupational diseases or
ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis can be
considered as such occupational diseases. Being exposed to
emotional strains, stresses, and unhealthy environment, these
unwholesome conditions are "normal and consistently present
in" or are the "hazards peculiar to" the occupation of a public
high school teacher. It is therefore evident that rheumatoid
arthritis and pneumonitis are the "natural incidents" of
petitioner's occupation as such public high school
teacher. The Court thus found petitioner to have substantially
shown that the risk of contracting her ailments had been
increased by unfavorable working conditions.
VDA. DE INGUILLO vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and GSIS
FACTS:
Inguillo, worked as an Elementary Schoo janitor and has been
in the government service for thirty-one (31) years. From 24
February to 5 June 1978, he was confined at the Veteran's
Memorial Hospital on "complaints of difficulty in swallowing of
food, solid and liquid, accompanied by chest pains, difficulty
of breathing, fever and productive cough." He died on 20 June
1978, at the age of 52, the cause of death being attributed to
"Terminal malignancy, Poorly differentiated Esophageal
Edenocarcinoma with Bone and Cervical Metastasis,
Pneumonia"
GSIS denied death benefits on the ground that the cause of
death, cancer of the esophagus, is not an occupational
disease. This position is anchored on the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, particularly, on the rule on
controversion, the presumption of compensability, and the
principle of aggravation.
Considering, however, that the deceased was confined in the
hospital from 24 February 1978 to 5 June 1978, and that he
later died on 20 June 1978, and absent any evidence as to
when his ailment was contracted, it is the new Labor Code
that becomes the governing law. As specifically provided in
Article 208 of said Code, its provisions cover "injury, sickness,
disability or death occurring on or after January 1, 1975." The
recent case of Rosales vs. ECC (G.R. No. 46443, June 28,
1988) implemented that provision when it held that "in
workmen's compensation cases, the governing law is
determined by the date on which the claimant
contracted his illness."
The concepts relied on by petitioner under the former
Workmen's Compensation Act, therefore, have ceased to
apply, having been expressly discarded under the
compensation scheme in the new Labor Code.
ISSUE: WON the death of Inguillo is compensable under the
Labor Code
RULING:
Under the Labor Code, the ECC is empowered to determine
and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses
that may be considered compensable based on peculiar
hazards of employment.
Section 1(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation states:
"(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these Rules
with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must
be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased
by the working conditions."
In the recent case of Raro vs. ECC, it was held that cancer
ailments, except for a specified few, are not compensable. It is
a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a
person's employment appears to have no relevance. In
Navalta vs. GSIS, the Court further elucidated that unless it be
shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific
working conditions (e.g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation,
asbestos dust, etc.) it cannot be concluded that it was the
employment which increased the risk of contracting the
disease.
However, ECC failed to adequately take into consideration
that there was another cause of death, which was
"pneumonia." Under the same Annex "A" of the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensation, pneumonia is a
qualifiedly occupational disease "under all the following
conditions:"
(a) There must be an honest and definite history of wetting
and chilling during the course of employment, also
industrial injury to the chest wall with or without rib
fracture, or inhalation of noxious gases, fumes and other
deleterious substances in the place of work.
(b) There must be a direct connection between the
offending agent or event and the worker's illness.
(c) The signs of consolidation should appear soon (within a
few hours) and the symptoms of initial chilling and fever
should at least be twenty-four (24) hours after the injury.
(d) The patient must present one of the following findings
within a few days of the accident:
. (1) Severe chill and fever.
. (2) Headache and pain, agonizing in character in the
side.
. (3) Short, dry painful cough with blood-tinged
expectoration.
. (4) Physical signs of consolidation with fine rales"
A review of the deceased's work activities, as janitor, will
show that they included the regular use of "deleterious
substances" such as muriatic acid, the fumes from which are
inhaled when used in cleaning and clearing of toilet bowls and
unclogging of toilet pipes and plumbing connectionsThe risk
of contracting the said disease, therefore, was
increased by his working conditions, thereby satisfying
an additional condition for compensability.
EULALIO GALANIDA vs. ECC and GSIS
Facts:
The petitioner's ailments were diagnosed to be the following:
"(1) Bells Palsy is an acute lower Motor Neuron Palsy of the
facial nerve, characterized by pain, weakness or paralysis of
the affected side of the face
(2) Anxiety Neurosis is a progressive disintegration of
personal instability arising in the course of the intercurrent
illness.
(3) Peripheral Neuritis is a syndrome of sensory motor,
reflect and basomotor reflex symptoms produced by lesion of
nerve root on peripheral nerves.
The above-mentioned diseases are not among those
listed as occupational diseases under Annex "A" of P.D.
626 nor has the petitioner shown proofs that the risk
of contracting the diseases was increased by his
employment's working conditions as Administrative
Officer II of the Ministry of Agriculture in Manila as
provided by Section 1(b), Rule III, Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation. As we have repeatedly held, the
doctrines of aggravation and presumption of compensability
under the former Workmen's Compensation Act are no longer
provided by law under the present social insurance scheme.
The records show that the symptoms of the petitioner's
ailments upon which he could base his claim for compensation
under the Corales doctrine became manifest in 1955. His right
to claim for compensation, therefore, accrued as early as that
date. Hence, the law to be applied under his contention would
be the Workmen's Compensation Act following the principle
that in workmen's compensation commission cases, the
governing law is to be determined by the date on which the
claimant contracted his illness. The right founded on statute
prescribes in ten (10) years which are counted from the date
of disability. In the instant case, the petitioner alleged that in
the years 1954-1955, he was treated by several doctors and
confined twice in the hospital for the ailments earlier
mentioned. He, therefore, had until 1964-1965 within which to
file his claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act. And
even if we counted the ten-year period from the date of his
hospitalization for hemorrhoidectomy on May 15 to 29, 1972,
the claim filed only in January 18, 1983 is obviously beyond
the prescriptive period. Moreover, hemorrhoidectomy has
never been mentioned as the basis of his claim. The
petitioner, therefore, failed to seasonably raise his claim for
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
assuming its applicability.
CAROLINA CLEMENTE vs. GSIS and EEC
In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission we
held that:
"Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for
compensation. There are no stringent criteria to follow. The
degree of proof required under P.D. 626; is merely substantial
evidence, which means, 'such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion'. The claimant must show, at least, by substantial
evidence that the development of the disease is brought
largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job.
What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and
not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis
on which the workmen's claim is based is probable
As janitor of the Skin Clinic, Mr. Clemente was exposed to
different carriers of viral and bacterial diseases. He had to
clean the clinic itself where patients with different illnesses
come and go. He had to put in order the hospital equipments
that had been used. He had to dispose of garbage and wastes
that accumulated in the course of each working day. He was
the employee most exposed to the dangerous concentration
of infected materials, and not being a medical practitioner,
least likely to know how to avoid infection. It is, therefore, not
unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Clemente's working
conditions definitely increased the risk of his
contracting the aforementioned ailments.
NARAZO VS. ECC, GR. 80157
the cause of death of petitioners husband is work-
connected
The nature of the work of the deceased as Budget Examiner in
the Office of the Governor dealt with the detailed preparation
of the budget, financial reports and review and/or examination
of the budget of other provincial and municipal offices. Full
concentration and thorough study of the entries of accounts in
the budget and/or financial reports were necessary, such that
the deceased had to sit for hours, and more often that not,
delay and even forego urination in order not to interrupt the
flow of concentration. In addition, tension and pressure must
have aggravated the situation.
LIMBO VS ECC AND GSIS, GR. 146891
Under the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, "for
the sickness and the resulting disability to be compensable,
the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease;
otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions." Concededly, "end-stage renal disease
secondary to uric acid nephropathy" is not among the
Occupational Diseases. This, however, would not
automatically bar petitioners claim for as long as he could
prove that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by
his working conditions.
Considering the workload and areas of responsibility of
petitioner in this case, it is reasonable for him to develop
hypertension, which in turn led to uremia. It should be
stressed that in determining whether a disease is
compensable, it is enough that there exists a reasonable
work connection. Petitioner here also submitted his medical
certificate.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, a physicians report is
the best evidence of work-connection of workmens ailments
and can be the basis of an award even if the physician was
not presented as a witness. There is no reason to doubt the
findings of Dr. Mejia who is an expert in her field of work.
RINO VS ECC AND SSS, GR. 132558
Death benefits under the Labor Code, are awarded only when
(a) the cause of death is listed as an occupational disease by
the ECC, OR
(b) the claimant presents proof that the working conditions
increased the risk of contracting the fatal disease.
Rio Sr. was employed as stevedore since July, 1982. In 1992,
Virgilio collapsed while working. The cause of death was
"uremia [secondary] to chronic renal failure. Petitioner did not
adduce any proof of a reasonable connection between the
work of the deceased and the cause of his death. There was
no showing that the progression of the disease was brought
about largely by the conditions in Virgilio's job. Indeed,
petitioner presented no medical history, records or physician's
report in order to substantiate her claim that the working
conditions at the Port Area increased the risk of uremia, renal
failure or glomerulonephritis.
SARMIENTO VS. ECC, GR. 65680
parotid carcinoma or cancer of the salivary glands is not an
occupational disease considering the deceased's employment
as accounting clerk and later as manager of the budget
division. The petitioner must, therefore, prove that his wife's
ailment was caused by her employment or that her working
conditions increased the risk of her contracting the fatal
illness. As with other kinds of cancer, the cause and nature of
parotid carcinoma is still not known. Petition is denied.
HILARIA DABATIAN vs. GSIS
Facts:
At the time of his death, Dabatian was employed as Garbage
Truck Driver assigned mostly in the night shift. In fact, at the
time of his death his time of duty started from 10:00 o'clock
at night to 6:00 o'clock in the morning the next day. It was
gathered from the evidence on record that the deceased was
a heavy coffee drinker which was his way of warding off
sleepiness.
Ruling:
Old law, Workmens Compensation Act
1) presumption of compensability
2) rule on aggravation of illness caused by nature of
employment
New Law, Labor Code: Jan. 1, 1975
must have resulted from either
a) any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease
listed by the Commission, or
b) any illness caused by employment subject to proof that
the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions.
The records show that petitioner died on July 3, 1976 when
the old compensation law had already been abrogated. No
competent evidence whatsoever was submitted to prove that
Dabatian's ailment was contracted prior to January 1,1975 in
order to bring it under the protective mantle of the old
compensation law.
The present Labor Code, P.D. 442 aimed "to restore a
sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation
to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's
right to receive reparation for work connected death or
disability . . . ." It was found, and rightly so, that the old law,
the Workmen's Compensation Act, destroyed the parity or
balance between the competing interests of employer and
employee with respect to workmen's compensation. The
balance was tilted unduly in favor of the workmen since it was
possible to stretch the work-related nature of an ailment
beyond seemingly rational limits.
Since peptic ulcer is not included in the list of occupational
diseases as drawn up by the Commission, then petitioner has
the burden of proving that the nature of her husband's work
increased the risk of contracting the disease. Aside from the
undisputed fact that the deceased is a heavy coffee drinker,
which was his way of warding off sleepiness, no evidence was
ever adduced by petitioner to bolster the theory that her
husband's work increased the risk of contracting the ailment.
Being a heavy coffee drinker may have aggravated his peptic
ulcer, but, aggravation of an illness is no longer a ground for
compensation under the present law.
CASUMPANG VS. ECC
Issue: Whether or not cancer of the stomach is an
occupational disease and hence, compensable under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended?
Held:
There is no dispute that prior to his demise Jose Casumpang
had ruptured duodenal ulcer with generalized peritonitis. 'This
condition according to medical findings on record, worsened
into cancer of the stomach which disease finally caused his
death. The former ailment was officially diagnosed in June 28,
1976. In his medical history, this was traced to hematemesis
and melena which began in November 1975. In other words,
all of his ailments were after January 1, 1975. It is Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended, therefore, which is applicable in
this case and not the Workmen's Compensation Act.
It is important to determine which law is applicable. Under the
former
Workmen's Compensation However, under the new
Act or Act No. 3428 as law
amended.
The claimant was relieved the principles of
of the duty to prove aggravation and
causation as it was then presumption of
legally presumed that the compensability have been
illness arose out of the stricken off by the lawmaker
employment under the as grounds for
presumption of compensation.
compensability.
Cancer of the stomach and other lymphatic and blood
forming, vessels was considered occupational only among
woodworkers; wood products industry carpenters, loggers and
employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills. The
complained illness is therefore not compensable under the
first group provided in the Labor Code.
Under the second ground for compensability, it should be
shown that an illness is caused by employment and that the
risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions. Petitioner did not demonstrate that the adverse
conditions mentioned above had direct causal connection with
his job which would develop into cancer of the stomach.
must have resulted from either
a) any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease
listed by the Commission, or
b) any illness caused by employment subject to proof that
the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions.
RODRIGUEZ VS. ECC
Facts:
Rodriguez, was a public school teacher. 1975 he went on sick
leave and later diagnosed w/ "Intestinal Lipomatosis of the
Large Colon with Obstruction of the Ascending Colon." His
ailment called for a surgical operation which was performed
on November 27,1975 but this proved unavailing. A few days
thereafter, on December 2, 1975, he expired.
Issue: Whether or not the death of the deceased caused by
Intestinal Lipomatosis of the Large Colon with Obstruction of
the Ascending Colon, is compensable?
Held:
The applicable rule established in law and jurisprudence
concerning claims based on the provisions of the Labor Code
on employees' compensation, particularly on death
benefits under Article 194, is that they must result
from an occupational disease.
A compensable disease means any illness accepted and
listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission or any
illness caused by the employment subject to proof by the
employee that the risk of contracting the same was increased
by the working conditions. If the disease is listed in the Table
of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex A of the Rules on
Employees' Compensation, no proof of causation is required.
However, if it is not so listed, it has been held that the
employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to
prove, a positive proposition, that is, that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions. The fact that the cause of the disease was not
positively identified does not dispense with this burden of
proof.
There is no clear evidence as to when the disease
commenced and supervened; the tumors which developed in
the deceased's colon may have been growing for many years
even before he was employed as a teacher. Neither was there
any indication as to what really caused the disease: in fact,
the nature of the disease as described militates against a
finding of a causal nexus. The "trauma" that was supposed to
have caused or at least contributed to the disease was neither
satisfactorily clarified nor adequately proved. Surely, the
activities relied upon by the petitioner, being outside the
regular or primary functions of a teacher, could not have been
done every working day.
MORA, JR VS. ECC
Facts:
The late Leticia Mora was from 1963 until December 25, 1979
a telegraph operator and later diagnosed with adnocarcinoma
of a part of her small intestine. Issue: Whether or not the
cause of death of the deceased is compensable?
Held: YES
The cause of the decedent's death is not listed in said Annex
"A" as occupational disease. To be compensable thereby the
law requires that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the employment of the deceased. But this
requisite proof can be given only if the cause of the disease
cancer can itself be known. However, despite scientific
advances on the matter, even professional experts have not
as yet determined its cause. However, the requirement that
the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or
work applies only to an illness where the cause can be
determined or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be
ascertained, no duty to prove the link exists. For certainly the
law cannot demand impossibility. Hence, the petition is
granted.
OVENSON VS. ECC
Issue: Whether or not cancer of the rectum was contracted
by Serafin Ovenson by reason of his employment?
Held:
A cursory reading of the law shows that cancer of the rectum
is not listed by the ECC as one of the compensable diseases.
The next question therefore is whether the working conditions
of claimant's deceased husband predisposed him to contract
cancer of the rectum.
The record reveals that the husband of the claimant
contracted the fatal disease only in 1981 or after 16 years
from the time he started to work as laborer in 1955.
Respondent GSIS, relying on its medical evaluation, found that
the fatal illness of the deceased is attributed to genetic
influence. Respondent ECC ruled that although the true cause
of cancer is yet unknown, certain lesions may be considered
pre-malignant in the rectum and may be aggravated
during the course of employment if there is sufficient
proof presented by the claimant. But as ruled by Us, this
duty to prove exists only when the cause of the
disease is known. In a case like the present one, even
medical experts have not determined its cause, and therefore
the duty to prove does not exist for it is absurd for the law to
require impossibility. Thus, petition is granted.
DE CLEMENTE v (WCC)
The deceased was found to have died of acute
cardiorespiratory failure during his sleep, commonly known as
'heart failure" and not of what Rattan claims as
"bangungot." While it is true that the De Clementes failed to
prove the causal link between the cause of the death of the
deceased to the nature of his work, yet, the Court cannot
discount the probability that his work, as a set-up man,
caused or aggravated his illness that led to his death.
Considering the nature of the job of the decedent, it may be
fairly concluded that the strenuous physical activity required
in the performance of his duties caused a heavy strain on his
heart, which ultimately resulted in death.
To be entitled to compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, the illness which resulted in the death
of the employee must be directly caused by his
employment or either aggravated by, or the result of
the nature of his employment. In the interpretation of this
rule, the Court has adopted a liberal stand to give effect to the
compassionate spirit of the law as a social legislation, and has
ruled that what the law merely requires is a reasonable
work connection and not a direct causal relation of the
illness or ailment to the job or working conditions present in
the course of the performance of one's duties. The degree of
proof required to establish work-connection between the
disabling ailment and the working conditions is merely
substantial evidence.
Moreover, when illness supervenes during employment, there
is a disputable presumption that the claim is
compensable. The claimant is relieved of the duty to show
causation as it is then legally presumed that the illness arose
out of the employment. The law presumes, in the absence of
substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim for death
or disability benefits is compensable. The burden to
disconnect, by substantial evidence, the injury or sickness
from the nature of the employment is laid at the employer's
door. So rigid is this rule that, even where the cause of the
employee's death is unknown, the right to compensation
subsists. The reason for this is, that the Workmen's
Compensation Act is a social legislation. It is designed to give
relief to the working man. To give effect to this purpose, the
Act must be liberally construed in favor of the worker.
NAVALTA v GSIS
Facts: Navalta was employed as Port Administration
Checker in Bureau of Customs. while the deceased was
assigned at a warehouse to assist in the inventory of
properties he suddenly complained of extreme abdominal
pain, for which reason, he was confined at the hospital for 19
days. He died in the hospital due to cancer of the
pancreas. Navalta argues that since the deceased's
cancer has spread to the gallbladder, it may be
concluded that papilloma of the bladder, which is listed
in the employee's compensation law as an occupational
disease, was one of the causes of his death.
The deceased's ailment is not an occupational disease listed
by the ECC. It becomes incumbent upon Navalta to prove that
the employee's working conditions increased the risk of his
contracting the fatal illness. This task was not satisfactorily
discharged by Navalta.
As a general rule, cancer is a disease of still unknown origin
which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or
unemployed unless it be shown that a particular form of
cancer is caused by specific working conditions or
environment, it cannot be concluded that it was the
employment which increased the risk of contracting the
disease. hmmmm
CASUMPANG v ECC
Facts: Jose Casumpang, formerly works as Prison Guard of
the Bureau of Prisons died from cancer of the stomach Issue:
Whether cancer of the stomach is an occupational disease
and hence, compensable under PD 626.
Held: Under the Labor Code, cancer of the stomach is not an
occupational disease considering the decedent's
employment as prison guard. Cancer of the stomach and
other lymphatic and blood forming, vessels was considered
occupational only among woodworkers; wood products
industry carpenters, loggers and employees in pulp and paper
mills and plywood mills. The complained illness is therefore
not compensable under the first group provided in the Labor
Code.
Under the second ground for compensability, it should be
shown that an illness is caused by employment and that the
risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions. Petitioner claims that her deceased husband
escorted inmates to work in the hinterlands of San Ramon;
that at times he was overtaken by rain; that he had to work at
night in case of prison escapes, and that he missed his meals
owing to the nature of his duties. It should be noted however,
that said conditions do not bring about cancer of the stomach.
On the ailment of Casumpang, the GSIS found that the
evidence submitted are not sufficient to establish that the
ailment is the direct result of occupation or employment as
Prison Guard
G.R. No. L-62207 December 15, 1986
JUAN BONIFACIO vs. GSIS [Ministry of Education &
Culture] & ECC
Facts: The cancer which affected the deceased not being
occupational in her particular employment, it became
incumbent upon petitioner to prove that the decedent's
working conditions increased the risk of her contracting the
fatal illness. This onus petitioner failed to satisfactorily
discharge.
Under the present Labor Code, the "latitudinarian or
expansive application of the Workmen's Compensation
Law in favor of the employee or worker" no longer
prevails as the burden of showing proof of causation has
shifted back to the employee particularly in cases of sickness
or injuries which are not accepted or listed as occupational by
the Employees Compensation Commission. As stated in Sulit
vs. Employees Compensation Commission [supra] "the Labor
Code abolished the presumption of compensability and the
rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of the
employment.
While we do not dispute petitioner's contention that under the
law, in case of doubt in the implementation and interpretation
of the provisions of the Labor Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, the doubt shall be
resolved in favor of the laborer, we find that the same has no
application in this case since the pertinent provisions of the
Labor Code leave no room for doubt either in their
interpretation or application.
G.R. No. 73867 February 29, 1988
TELEFAST vs. IGNACIO CASTRO
Facts:
On 2 November 1956, Consolacion Bravo-Castro wife of
plaintiff Ignacio Castro, Sr. and mother of the other plaintiffs,
passed away in Lingayen, Pangasinan. On the same day, her
daughter Sofia C. Crouch addressed a telegram to plaintiff
Ignacio Castro, Sr. announcing Consolacion's death. The
telegram was accepted by the defendant in its Dagupan
office, for transmission, after payment of the required fees or
charges.
The telegram never reached its addressee. Consolacion was
interred with only her daughter Sofia in attendance. Neither
the husband nor any of the other children of the deceased,
then all residing in the United States, returned for the burial.
When Sofia returned to the United States, she discovered that
the wire she had caused the defendant to send, had not been
received. She and the other plaintiffs thereupon brought
action for damages arising from defendant's breach of
contract. The case was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan and docketed therein as Civil Case No. 15356. The
only defense of the defendant was that it was unable to
transmit the telegram because of "technical and atmospheric
factors beyond its control." 1 No evidence appears on record
that defendant ever made any attempt to advise the plaintiff
Sofia C. Crouch as to why it could not transmit the telegram.
CFI ordered TELEFAST to pay for damages. IAC affirmed the
CFI decision.
Issue: W/N TELEFAST is liable for damages
Held: SC said yes.
Art. 1170 of the Civil Code provides that "those who in the
performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for damages." Art. 2176 also
provides that "whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done."
In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent Sofia C.
Crouch entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, petitioner
undertook to send said private respondent's message
overseas by telegram. This, petitioner did not do, despite
performance by said private respondent of her obligation by
paying the required charges. Petitioner was therefore guilty of
contravening its obligation to said private respondent and is
thus liable for damages.
This liability is not limited to actual or quantified damages. To
sustain petitioner's contrary position in this regard would
result in an inequitous situation where petitioner will only be
held liable for the actual cost of a telegram fixed thirty (30)
years ago.
We find Art. 2217 of the Civil Code applicable to the case at
bar. It states: "Moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate results of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission." (Emphasis supplied).
Here, petitioner's act or omission, which amounted to gross
negligence, was precisely the cause of the suffering private
respondents had to undergo.
As the appellate court properly observed:
[Who] can seriously dispute the shock, the mental anguish
and the sorrow that the overseas children must have suffered
upon learning of the death of their mother after she had
already been interred, without being given the opportunity to
even make a choice on whether they wanted to pay her their
last respects? There is no doubt that these emotional
sufferings were proximately caused by appellant's omission
and substantive law provides for the justification for the award
of moral damages.
We also sustain the trial court's award of P16,000.00 as
compensatory damages to Sofia C. Crouch representing the
expenses she incurred when she came to the Philippines from
the United States to testify before the trial court. Had
petitioner not been remiss in performing its obligation, there
would have been no need for this suit or for Mrs. Crouch's
testimony.
The award of exemplary damages by the trial court is likewise
justified and, therefore, sustained in the amount of P1,000.00
for each of the private respondents, as a warning to all
telegram companies to observe due diligence in transmitting
the messages of their customers.
G.R. No. L-62300 September 25, 1987
TAEDO, vs. EEC and GSIS
It being at once apparent that "chronic glomerulonephritis" is
not among the listed compensable illnesses in Annex "A" of
the Amended Rules, it behooved the petitioner to adduce
persuasive proof that her decease husband's death was
caused not only by said disease but also and additionally by
renal hypertension and that Identified by her as "Koch's
pulmonary," as was the theory upon which she had founded
her application for death benefits, and that, additionally, "the
risk of contracting" those diseases was "increased by the
working conditions" attendant upon her husband's duties as
janitor-laborer.
Regrettably, even under the less stringent evidentiary norm
of substantial evidence obtaining in employees 'compensation
proceedings, petitioner has failed to adduce such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support the conclusion that she has urged the GSIS and the
ECC to make. What the evidence does establish, as the ECC
observes, is that the disease and its complications from which
petitioner's husband died bore no causal relation to the nature
of his employment. His hypertension was only a manifestation
of his chronic glomerulonephritis, was in other words "simply
a complication," and was "not brought about by employment
factors." We perceive nothing in the record to warrant
reversal of these findings.
G.R. No. L-46556 May 28, 1988
NAPOLEON O. CARIN, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.
Under the new law on employees' compensation, or
Presidential Decree No. 626, in case the sickness or illness is
not an occupational disease, as in the present case, to be
compensable, proof must be adduced that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.
The evidence presented by Napoleon does not, in any way,
show a reasonable connection between his ailment and the
nature of his employment nor a direct causal relation between
his employment and the illness he suffered.
Although the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in
compensation claims, still, Napoleon failed to show with
substantial evidence that his illness was reasonably work-
connected, to be entitled to compensation.
Further, Napoleons contention that the rule of compensability
under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, is a revival of
the old law on workmen's compensation or Act 3428,
particularly Section 44 thereof, which recognized the
presumption of compensability, is not meritorious.
The principle of presumption of compensability no longer
obtains under the new law on Employees' Compensation.

DE JESUS VS ECC
FACTS:
As to the medical view of Dr. Pineda, his endorsement that the
deceased's working condition "contributed immeasurably to
the insidious development of her lung lesion" and that her 11
unusual and prolonged working hours finally sapped her
strength leading to physical exhaustion" which, together with
diabetes and anemia, provided a "groundwork for pulmonary
metastases" (Rollo, p. 16), implies aggravation of the disease
rather than its direct causation.
Under the old Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended,
which provided for the concepts of "presumption of
compensability" and "aggravation" it was possible to stretch
the work related nature of an ailment beyond seemingly
rational limits.
In this case, however, there is no dispute that the governing
law is the New Labor Code, which according to settled
jurisprudence discarded the aforesaid concepts to restore a
sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay
workmen's compensation and the employee's rights to
receive reparation for workconnected death or disability.
CARVAJAL VS ECC
FACTS:
The late Nenita P. Carbajal was employed as Campaign Clerk
in the Municipal Treasurer's Office of San Julian, Eastern
Samar. While typing tax declarations and making entries in
their books, which were her duties aside from campaigning for
tax collections, she suffered from bleeding per vaginum due
to incomplete abortion.
ISSUE:
WON the death of petitioners wife is compensable. YES.
RULING:
Records reveal that petitioner's wife while working as
Campaign Clerk in the Treasurer's Office of San Julian, Eastern
Samar, suffered "two attacks of vaginal bleeding and
hypogastric pain" attributing said ailment to the lifting of
heavy tax declaration books, due to abortion
incomplete.
It is not considered desirable for pregnant women to be
employed in the following types of occupation and they
should, if possible, be transferred to lighter and more
sedentary works:
(a) occupation that involve heavy lifting or other heavy work;
(b) occupation involving continous standing and moving
about. (One of the Standards for Maternity Case and
Employment of Mothers recommended by the Children's
Bureau of the United States). (Rollo, p. 12,).
BANDILA SHIPPING VS ABALOS
ISSUE:
WON Abalos cholecystolithiasis or gallstone is compensable.
NO.
RULING:
Since cholecystolithiasis or gallstone has been excluded as a
compensable illness under the applicable standard contract
for Filipino seafarers that binds both respondent Abalos and
the vessels foreign owner, it was an error for the CA to treat
Abalos illness as "workrelated" and, therefore, compensable.
The standard contract precisely did not consider gallstone as
compensable illness because the parties agreed, presumably
based on medical science, that such affliction is not caused by
working on board oceangoing vessels.
Nor has respondent Abalos proved by some evidence that the
nature of his work on board a ship aggravated his illness. No
one knew when he boarded the vessel that he was sick of
gallstone. By the nature of this illness, it is highly probable
that Abalos already had it when he boarded his assigned ship
although it went undiagnosed because he had yet to
experience its symptoms.
If respondent Abalos had instead been sick of asthma and the
shipping company knew of it even as it assigned him to do
work that exposed him to allergens, then it can be said that
the company assigned him work that aggravated his illness.
Here, however, he himself was unaware that he had gallstone
until excruciating pains manifested its presence for the first
time when his vessel was sailing the seas.
MIRASOL VS ECC
It is a fact that part of the duties of the petitioner was to make
monthly visits to various schools which are not accessible by
road. To reach these mountainous schools, the petitioner had
to hike through muddy ricefields and climb slippery mountains
during sunny and rainy days. During these monthly visits, the
petitioner fell down many times because of the slippery paths
in the ricefields and trails in the mountains. The ailments of
hypertension and rheumatoid arthritis, both knees, must have
been caused by the exposure to the elements of the petitioner
and his falling down many times while hiking in muddy
ricefields and on slippery mountain trails under all kinds of
weather conditions on his way to the barrio schools not
accessible by road.
There is sufficient substantial evidence of record to show that
the ailments of the petitioner were caused by the duties of his
employment and that the risk of contracting said ailments was
increased by the working conditions. He is entitled to
permanent total disability compensation.
ROSALES vs. ECC, GSIS and DBP
FACTS
The ECC denied the claim because Rheumatoid Arthritis was
not an occupational disease, and that, as required by law,
Rosales failed to show proof that the risk of contracting the
disease was increased by his working conditions. In denying,
petitioner's claim, the ECC properly applied PD No. 626.
In workmen's compensation cases, the governing law is
determined by the date on which the claimant contracted his
illness. Thus, where an ailment supervened before the new
Labor Code took effect, the governing law is the old
Workmen's Compensation Act. On the other hand, where an
ailment occurred after 1 January 1975, the new law on
Employees' Compensation applies.
VILLONES vs. ECC, GSIS
FACTS
Rolando M. Villones was employed as a secondary school
teacher who, On September 2, 1975, died of pulmonary
tuberculosis.
ISSUE: W/N Villones is entitled to the claim for compensation
of his sons death? YES
RULING:
Considering the undisputed nature of the deceased's
employment, it becomes inevitable for him to be in constant
contact with people who may be afflicted with PTB, which is a
highly communicable disease, and it is not surprising that he
should contract tuberculosis so that from December 4 to 20,
1972 he was forced to go on sick leave. When he was able to
resume work, he was again exposed to same working
conditions thus aggravating his illness until he suddenly died
on September 2, 1975 of sever hemoptysis due to PTB.
It must be pointed out that as early as December 4 to 20,
1972, the deceased Villones was already entitled to disability
benefits under Section 14 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended, because his illness
prevented him from reporting to his work for more than three
(3) days; and under such a situation, his employer
(Department of Education and Culture) was obligated under
Section 37 of the same Act to file a notice of illness with
the Workmen's Compensation Commission and to manifest its
intention of whether or not to controvert his right to
compensation.
There is no showing that respondent employer has complied
with its duty under Sections 37 and 45 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended, of filing with the Workmen's
Compensation Commission a notice of the initial illness of its
employee, Rolando Villones, as well as his subsequent death
on September 2, 1975, and of controverting the right to
compensation within the prescribed period of fourteen (14)
days from the occurrence of the disability or death, or within
ten (10) days from knowledge thereof.
It cannot be denied that respondent employer had knowledge
of the illness of the deceased Villones because he applied for
sick leave from December 4 to 20, 1972, as well as knowledge
of the subsequent death of Rolando Villones on September 2,
1975 because he died on a regular working day; hence, the
fact of death could not have escaped the notice or knowledge
of the principal and or supervisor. Such knowledge by the
principal and/or supervisor, being agents of the respondent
employer, is deemed in law as knowledge of the respondent
employer.
Failure to comply with said sections constitutes a renunciation
of the employer's right to controvert the claim, resulting in the
waiver of all its non-jurisdictional defenses, such as the non-
compensability of the claim.
Finally, the grant of compensation benefits to herein petitioner
will not be impaired even if he (petitioner himself) entertains
doubts as to the real cause of the death of his son when he
stated that no autopsy was made nor was there anybody who
actually examined the deceased prior to or after his death. At
any rate, pulmonary tuberculosis is concededly one of the
causes of hemoptysis. Even unexplained deaths, the occasion
and circumstances of which are unknown or undetermined,
are usually deemed compensable, as long as there is some
basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection, a causal
relation between the death and the employment. And, in case
of doubt in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of the Labor Code, including its implementing rules
and regulations, the same shall be resolved in favor of the
laborer (Art. 4, PD No. 442, as amended; Art. 1702, New Civil
Code).
ZOSIMO CAPACIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(Bureau of Public Schools)
FACTS:
Capacio was an elementary grade public school teacher He
started working as a substitute teacher and progressed to that
of a regular teacher. His service covered a span of 33 years.
Since March 19, 1973, he had been suffering from peptic
ulcer, hypertension and schistosomiasis. On August 13, 1974,
he retired at the age of 60.
He sought workmen's compensation after this disabling
sickness. He was awarded the amount of P5,693.57 as
sickness compensation and reimbursement of medical and
hospital expenses on November 24, 1975.
WCC said that the claimant retired not as a result of any
disabling illness, but rather with the sole aim and purpose of
enjoying the benefits afforded him by the Retirement Law
after rendering 33 years of service with the government and
reaching the age of 60."
ISSUE: W/N Capacio is entitled to his claim? YES
RULING:
The records of the case reveal that the petitioner suffered
from peptic ulcer, hypertension and schistosomiasis. Feeling
that he could not withstand the rigors and continuous strain of
his teaching job with his assignment in a remote barrio which
entailed the stamina of walking for one and one-half hours, he
retired on his 60th birthday. All along he could have served
the whole length of a normal civil service tenure of work with
the retirement age of 65. His daily hike from the town proper
passing through rivers, creeks, streams and rough roads, trails
and woodland affected his health.
Regarding the point of presumption of compensability, we had
occasion to rule that the presumption of compensability
shifts the burden of proof on the employer to show the
contrary. Where the illness supervened during the time of
employment, there was rebuttable presumption that the
illness arose out of or at least was aggravated by the
employment.
As to the contention that petitioner's illness was not work
connected as he got sick after his retirement: There is no
proof that the respondent was able to overcome the
presumption under Section 44 of Act No. 3428 that the
illness or injury either arose out of, or was at least aggravated
by his employment. Moreover, the petitioner's ailment
occurred while he was an employee a teacher working
under the hazardous conditions of that far-flung town. There is
a showing that his illness was caused or was aggravated by
his teaching duties. He got his schistosomiasis from his daily
hike to his place of work, the barrio school.
As regards a teacher's ailment, We had occasion to say that:
"Presumption of compensability is rendered conclusive by
reason of employee's employment as barrio school teacher
and working conditions which increased the risk of contracting
her illness and failure of employer to rebut presumption.
"Reasonable work connection, not direct causal relation
between the disease and employment is the only requirement
to establish compensability, and actual proof of causation is
not necessary to justify compensability."
In one of our latest rulings on employment compensation of
teachers, We opined:
"The teachers shall be protected against the consequences of
employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The
effects of the physical and nervous strain in the teacher's
health shall be recognized as compensable occupational
diseases in accordance with existing laws."
ZOZOBRADO vs. ECC and GSIS (Ministry of Public
Works)
Senile cataract is an ailment to which all persons are exposed
regardless of whether they are employed or not, its etiology
being attributed to degenerative changes or aging. While it
may be argued that 'cataract' is listed by the Commission as
an occupational disease, appellant's case cannot fall under
this classification since his occupation did not subject him to
frequent and continued exposure to the glare or rays from
molten glass or redhot metal which is the criterion for
compensability of cataract.
ISSUE: Is Zozobrado entitled to his claim? NO.
RULING:
The doctrine of "presumptive compensability in the old
Workmen's Compensation Law that when an illness
supervenes during the course of employment it is deemed to
have either arisen out of or been aggravated by petitioner's
employment has been abandoned.
Under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the present
law on compensation, the listed occupational diseases are
compensable when the conditions contained therein are met,
and certain diseases are allowed to be compensable
whenever the claimant can prove that the risk of contracting
the disease is increased by the conditions of the employment
of the deceased. As to the degree of proof required, the
claimant must show at least by substantial evidence that the
development of the disease is brought largely by the
conditions present in the nature of the job.
Petitioner's eye ailment is "cataract, senile OS" of the left eye.
Senile cataract is not a listed occupational disease. Neither
does it have any causal connection with his work as District
Engineer in Marawi City. It is due to degenerative changes
accompanying the aging process. It is not generated by strain
on the eyes, as petitioner claims. Nor was the risk of
contracting it aggravated by the nature of his duties or his
working conditions. It is a physiologic process occurring after
the fourth decade of life and to which everyone is exposed
whether employed or not. The claim for disability benefits,
therefore, was correctly denied by public respondents.
EDUARDO LAGINLIN,, vs. WCC
Eduardo Laginlin started his employment as a field worker on
12 December 1955, with specific duties to plant sugarcane
and weed the sugarcane plantation owned by respondents,
working seven (7) days a week.
While working, Eduardo started to suffer an illness which,
according to the diagnosis of Canlubang's physician, Dr.
Bunye, was pulmonary tuberculosis.
Issue:Whether or not the sickness of Eduardo is work related.
Held: YES
Ample jurisprudence has now been established that, where
the illness or disease was contracted by the employee in the
course of his employment, said employee is entitled to
disability compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act. Compensability is presumed where illness supervened
during employment and, with the presumption of
compensability of illness, the burden of proof is shifted to the
employer and the employee is relieved of the duty to show
causation.
An x-ray examination is not even essential to prove the claim
of the petitioner for disability compensation due to illness
which he contracted while under the employ of private
respondents. In fact, it was private respondents' company
physician who examined the petitioner and, finding him to be
suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis, made a Corollary thereto, it is undisputed that the deceased was in
recommendation for petitioner's retirement before he reaches
the retirable age under the law. In view of the approval by
private respondents of the petitioner's early retirement, the
fact of his disability was placed beyond question or doubt.
Furthermore, the disease of tuberculosis is an occupational
disease or work-connected in such occupations, as that of a
teacher, laborer, driver, land inspector and other similar
occupations; hence compensable.
Also, the evidence necessary to destroy the legal presumption
of compensability must do more than create a doubt. It should
be such as a reasonable mind must accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
THE FACT THAT PETITIONER RECEIVED A RETIREMENT
BENEFIT FROM HIS EMPLOYER DOES NOT BAR HIM
FROM BEING ENTITLED TO A DISABILITY
COMPENSATION BENEFIT UNDER THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT, having in mind that the purpose of
the disability benefit is separate and distinct from the
retirement benefit given to an employee upon reaching the
age of retirement. The disability benefit under the Act is to
compensate the worker for his actual loss, for his
disablement to earn wages in the same kind of work
which he is engaged in, or work of similar nature. On
the other hand, the retirement benefit is intended to help the
employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the
burden of worrying for his financial support and as a form of
reward for his loyalty and service to the employer.
GILBERT QUIZORA, vs. DENHOLM
Issue: Whether or not the sickness of Gilbert is work related.
Held: NO
Unfortunately for Gilbert, he failed to prove that his varicose
veins arose out of his employment with respondent company.
Except for his bare allegation that it was work-related, he did
not narrate in detail the nature of his work as a messman
aboard Denklavs vessels. He likewise failed to particularly
describe his working conditions while on sea duty. He also
failed to specifically state how he contracted or developed
varicose veins while on sea duty and how and why his working
conditions aggravated it. Neither did he present any expert
medical opinion regarding the cause of his varicose veins. No
written document whatsoever was presented that would
clearly validate his claim or visibly demonstrate that the
working conditions on board the vessels he served increased
the risk of acquiring varicose veins.
FLAVIANO NEMARIA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Education
and Culture), respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not Flavianos wife's death is compensable under
Presidential Decree No. 626.
The decedent, a public school teacher assigned in a
municipality several kilometers away from the provincial
capital, rendered her services for more or less twenty-nine
(29) years. She started in November 1948 as classroom
teacher assigned in the poblacion of Badian, Cebu and from
thence she was assigned to the Municipality of Ronda, Cebu,
which is a blighted area, where she continued to discharge
her duties as classroom teacher. Under those circumstances,
the possibility would not be remote, that she suffered
impaired nutrition and while working in a farflung rural area
where foodstuffs are not closely examined before being eaten,
it is not too far-fetched to consider that she was exposed to
hepatic carcinogens which reportedly were ingested therein.
good health when she entered the government service,
otherwise, she would not have been accepted for insurance
purposes by the Government Service Insurance System. The
conclusion is therefore inevitable, that the decedent's
ailments developed during her employment while working
under conditions which predisposed her thereto.
The Labor Code is clear that it does not only confine
compensable diseases to those enumerated therein as
occupational. It also contemplates illness caused by
employment where the risk of contracting the same is
increased by the working conditions thereof. The Court
has ruled that cancer of the liver though not an occupational
disease, may be deemed work-connected. Moreover, in the
case of Abana v. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1279, the Court held
that under the law, it is not required that the employment be
the sole factor in the growth development or acceleration of
claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It
is enough that his employment had contributed even in a
small degree.
Also, the measurement that the disease was caused or
aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an
illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where
cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove
the link exists. For certainly, the law cannot demand an
impossibility.
Moreover, cancer being a disease which is often discovered
when it is too late, the possibility that its onset was even
before the effectivity of the New Labor Code cannot be
discounted. As a consequence the presumption of
compensability and the theory of aggravation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act cannot be totally disregarded.