Ricardo de Sampaio Dagnino Licensing and construction of three hydroelectric plants on the Rio das Antas (B asin Jacuí

-Guaíba, State of Rio Grande do Sul): notes Slideshow Part of the final work for the course "Environmental liability and licensing of hydroelectric and thermal power plants" (Special Topics in Energy Planning - PE 180), taught by Prof.. Oswaldo Sevá in PPG - Energy Planning of Campinas. August - 2006 ABSTRACT ................................................. ..................... ............................. .................. 1. INTRODUCTION ............... .................................. ............................................. ..... .... 2. SUBMISSION ................................................ ...... ......................................... 3. The LICENSING ..................... ........................... ........................................... 4. PROBL EMS AND RISKS ............................................... .................. ..................... 5. DROWNING IN NUMBERS ................................... ............ ................................ 6. SOURCES ....................... .......................... .................................................. .. .............. Abstract During the first half of 2006 I was a pupil of Oswaldo Sevá Son, Mechan ical Engineering and Ph.D. in geography in France. During the course was guided to several lectures on the topic Liabilities and environmental permitting of lar ge projects, especially hydropower. In the end, was asked to undertake a work of closing the course by presenting a case study of my choice. The first desire wa s to address the issue of human alteration of the environment, the formation and destruction of terrain and landscapes, the mobilization of populations and chan ges in habits and ways of life not only of the affected populations, but of all mankind. But Sevá proposed that the flight was lower and that I concentrate on t he case and more in accord with my reading into the topic of discipline. It was agreed that it would make a presentation on where the environmental licensing an d construction of three hydropower plants (Monte Claro, Castro Alves and July 14 ) in Rio das Antas, JacuíGuaíba Basin, northeastern state of Rio Grande do Sul T he three projects built by the Companhia Energetica Rio das Antas (CERAN), passe d through a single permitting process with the state environmental agency, a fac t unprecedented in the history of Gaucho environmental licensing. What we bring here, and that should be examined in conjunction with the presentation made in c lass the day July 5, 2006 for the teacher and other colleagues, are some notes f rom that presentation session. Without intending to exhaust the theme, we intend to fill some gaps left in the presentation, especially those of the characteris tics of each plant, the construction milestones, risks related to construction a nd operation and the relevance or possible problems of a mega-hydroelectric proj ect in Sierra Gaucho, both for the scenery, and for the people and their way of life. 1. Introduction The theme of hydroelectricity has no direct relation to my disse rtation (Mapping Environmental Risk in River Basin Anhumas, Campinas / SP), nor the licensing issue and liabilities of the mills. What drew me to study this dis cipline of Postgraduate in Energy Planning was able to live with and learn from the experience of Professor. Oswaldo Sevá. Not restricted to the parameters orth odox curriculum or compartmentalization of knowledge so widespread in academia, the experience of Sevá is an invitation to the art of researching and disseminat ing knowledge. His critical analysis of the human condition, about the uses and abuses of economic nature, on the degradation of the environment around us and t he landscape so well photographed and presented in each class. This all brought me to this discipline. Had already completed the required number of credits in t

he PPG-disciplinary geography that allowed me to attend the course without the c ustomary character of "obligation" but rather as something pleasant, which could add quality to my academic background. After these brief remarks more generally , I have noted the difficulties encountered since the beginning of this work and the limits that made it, they are: (1) because it is a beginner in the subject, of course, many things appear as naive for the watchful eye of the familiar, (2 ) did not have access to the information contained in the material submitted to the environmental agency that issues the license and the arguments at the public meetings, and (3) with the exception of the valuable material provided by Profe ssor. Seva€that oscillated between the theoretical and methodological práticogen eralista, all the data used on the three plants of the Rio das Antas was achieve d on extensive research on the Internet. On the use of the Internet in search of my habit, I would explain that has never been exercised as of that time. Being spatially distant shores of my output was used for the virtual. In this sense I got a lot of information on websites of government organizations (Government of Rio Grande do Sul, ANEEL, CEEE) and NGOs (Friends of the Earth, AGAPAN), the reg ional press (People's Post, Zero Hour and I Journal) tourism companies, and wate r sports and radical (Radical South Rio das Antas Tourism) and on Companhia Energetica Rio das Antas (CERAN) that pr ovides all of the quarterly monitoring reports (over 300 MegaBytes updated infor mation). Make it clear beforehand that many of these sources, especially governm ent and mainstream media (Mail and Zero), devote large space to play entrepreneu r releases, texts aimed at spreading propaganda and prepared by officials or jou rnalists hired. This is a reproduction of the discourse of enterprise, in which the arguments are highlighted pros and cons are omitted. We note that this has b een a practice widely used and is consciously absorbed by those who advocate the development (governments and mainstream media) but also unconsciously by those who fight (NGOs and tourism companies and sports). Thus the problem of access to information is a key which explains the discrepancies between the data and the difficulty in studying topics not only related to energy planning, but also to e nvironmental planning and the planning itself. The planners, self-centered and s ecured behind reinforced force fields do not allow us to access certain informat ion vital to understanding the human condition and the solution of environmental problems exacerbated by the day. This work aims to collaborate on a larger data base, which speaks to organize dispersed information or unmet. 2. The presentation slides using 21 and lasting about 30 minutes, the presentati on was divided into 9 parts. Following individualized each party, indicating the correspondence in the sequence of slides (in brackets the number of the slide) and we'll talk briefly how the data that made up were obtained. Location (3-5) w as obtained by comparing sketches with approximate location available on the CER AN and maps that made up the technical reports to accompany the works, compared with the map of SIPOT (2005) and then plotted on Google Earth software . The dia gram came from the National System Operator (ONS, 2006). History (6) was obtaine d from the technical reports provided by CERAN and confronted with newspaper rep orts and regulatory agency ANEEL. Important to note that the three plants receiv ed a single environmental permit prior to October 2001, but thereafter, the lice nsing steps for installation and operation, each was analyzed separately. Entrep reneur (7): The information of the three large companies (CPFL, CEEE and Desenvi x) answering to the name CERAN fantasy can be found on their Web site (tab "Comp any"), information about employees and how Vedacit ABCP were achieved in Google search. General features of HPPs (8): adaptation of infographic Fernando Gonda, Editor of Art Journal of Zero Hour, available on the CERAN (tab "plants"). The t hree hydropower plants (9-15): The technical data were acquired on the page of t he entrepreneur as well as diagrams showing the design of power plants and pipel ines. Satellite images, some in perspective, were the result of step location an d plot points on Google Earth. Information on the progress of works (Last Update d on Dec/2005) was released on the website of Department of Planning, RS (2006). With the exception of the following photos: bottom left of slide 10 and top rig

ht of slide 11, all drawn from within the quarterly reports, always prioritizing the latest images of each work. The weekly data generation UHE Monte Claro are available in Data Generation National System Operator (ONS). Achieved (16): The chart was made from raw data compensation found in the report anthropic 2004. The term used Affected by me sh ould actually be suffering from, because it affected areas and not humans. What do you want to show is how the last plant to get the license installation was no t just coincidence,€that interfered with economic activity more and more require d to make further compensation (for families "not affected") and remobilization of most families. Precisely, the three colors used in the graph represent the in tensity with which the families were affected (the highest intensity of hue corr esponds to higher intensity with which the families were affected). Not surprisi ngly, the category that contained the largest number of families was "not affect ed" (shade of course). This is due to the fact that the entrepreneur, a play on words, considered the families who owned land without any use (economic, hue int ermediate) or occupation (which would necessitate the relocation, dark hue) and only sold or rented land negotiated. The x-axis shows the three plants, and y sh ows the number of families. The graph was appointed by Prof.. Sevá as being conf used. We hope that the explanatory note may be enlightening. Megawatts per area (17): This slide show some arguments used by the entrepreneur who argue that the trickle of water plants may require carbon credits, and for being such plants t hey are at less risk than other types. Furthermore, we present a comparison hars hly criticized by Prof.. Sevá. The comparison was calculated between the install ed power and energy generated. Interconnection to the national grid (18): The le ft figure was taken from the page of the entrepreneur and the right was obtained on the website of the ONS, in a 2004 document that has since been replaced. Wha t we show is how confusing the issue of interconnection of power plants to the N ational Interconnected Electric System. The data are from a report of January 10 , 2005, extracted from the site CERAN. Drowning by Numbers (19): this is an exer cise in discourse analysis by means of news releases prepared and Entrepreneur ( available from the CERAN, tabs Benefits and Press). I compared it with the infor mation disseminated by newspapers, regulatory agency, state government sites, am ong others. I dedicate these notes an item only to the topic of the presentation . Curiosities of technical reports (20-21) commented on this topic were some cur iosities and unusual things to appear on a technical report. Among these curiosi ties (20): detailed charts on body composition contract employees, besides the q uantity, other interesting tidbits as educational level and origin, (21) maps wi th the locations of archaeological sites and cemeteries, they show a high concen tration of traces of kind in the area proposed for UHE 14 July, inferring that fact (besides the fact the number of affected live, as seen in slide 16) why she was the last to get the license to install (only two years after the license to install the first plant, UHE Monte Claro, while the second

, UHE Castro Alves, got the license after the first five months, in a very short time), furthermore, draws attention to the wealth of scenic detailed data showi ng the oscillations and the epicenters on a map Annex. 3. Licensing In general, the environmental licenses have been disfigured by the correlation of forces and interests unequal (often antagonistic) that come into play during the process. According Sevá (2004), the function of licensing is, on one hand, the problems t hat hinder the eyes jump, data hiding and manipulating assemblies, giving preced ence to the interests of entrepreneurs in line with the governments and their ag encies governamentais1. As in the case of hydroelectric plants of the Rio das An tas to licensing by the state agency is the natural way for a government identif ied as an economic power and decision-making centralized in southeastern Brazil Companhia Energetica Rio das Antas (CERAN) is self-titled as "an independent pow er producer, a privately held corporation" (Website CERAN) formed by the followi ng companies: 65% Companhia Paulista de Força e Luz (CPFL, a former state of São Paulo), 30% of the State Company for Electric Energy ( CEEE, the former state o f Rio Grande do Sul) and 5% Desenvix, ENGEVIX investment holding company with he adquarters in Sao Paulo, who takes care of Porjeto and Engineering. In addition, there are other well known suppliers of personnel in the industry: Camargo Corr êa (Contractor Works), Alstom (turbine and other equipment), Vedacit (waterproof ing) and Brazilian Association of Portland Cement. As noted, are big companies t hat make it that he decided to call CERAN, says he decided, because when it rece ived its name in January 2001€had passed nearly two months since the bid won by CPFL from ANEEL (see schedule for permitting and construction). And those who st and against them may be 1 The last item of these Explanatory Notes is dedicated to show how much of the financial investment placed in the three plants is public money, money from bank s and government development agencies. It also seeks to show that the amount pai d in compensation measures in case of CERAN of less than 1% of the value suppose dly invested, you can leave that state money injected into the work. considered against progress and against the development of regional cities of th e region and perhaps the country and hence the world. Really, what is at stake i s not the energy planning, for example, the prediction that increased demand fro m industry or region's population could lead to shortages of energy and that thi s could create a "blackout." This is not what is at stake! Even the creation of jobs, the regularization of river flow, the creation of artificial lakes for rec reation, among other rumors. What is at stake when an environmental agency gives permission (like, "okay, I give you license to destroy and abuse at will") is d etermined as elected or appointed public official, or alderman, mayor, secretary , governor, minister or president, can benefit in "streamlining" of an enterpris e. In Brazil and Leeches Mensaleiros politicians, businessmen and freaks Megawat ts by Pau-Brazil, the manufacturers of chains and manufacturers of firearms, the order's progress! But it has to stay out of licensing, not enter into discussio n the economic viability of a project of this size, its need for the entire popu lation of poor, the need for construction of the work is analyzed in itself. Com panies need to sell their products, no matter to whom, to which plant. Just havi ng a plant in mind that they already appear to participate: Alstom is selling it s turbines, Engevix makes the projects that will build after Camargo Correia, me anwhile CPFL (great big shot of negócio2) calls for the CEEE forehead regional r ailways, negotiating with government and local oligarchies. Undoubtedly, strengt hening the idea (or was sham) of progress and development which materialized in our case, is building a plant, needs powerful economic groups and well mobilized , according Sevá (2004, pp. 12), this is a deep conflict and as such should be r egarded not as easy. Instead, the game is hard because not everyone believes thi s talk of progress. Also, what is at stake are fundamental issues: ownership and land tenure and access to rivers, natural resources, and means of extraction and subsistence. Thus, the steps appear in this fight "t ype supported by administrative decisions to grant or not Business 2 = Deny idleness! This is precisely what companies want, like turning the economy. But it has to be quick and with enough money in the middle. It does

not matter so much to where it will go, which direction the economy will take m uch better the higher future earnings. So the tendency is to stand behind it's o wn tail, repelling any attempt to swerve to avoid taking sides attitudes that be nefit more people. permit and license, may have the appearance that they are having more - or less - or not given the local and regional interests, but it is a question of substan ce is really at stake. " Now highlight some specific aspects of environmental licensing of the three plan ts (the first time in the history of licensing in New South Wales who served a s ingle license for more than one project) and the submission of Environmental Imp act Studies (not only the Environmental Impact Study is secret but also to the I mpact Report is not given the slightest pellet). By showing the disfigurement of the environmental licensing of large investments in Brazil, Sevá (2004, p. 9.) Once said: "The EIA is not disclosed, the RIMA is truncated and weak." The probl em is that neither the RIMA they have to show courage. What we would like to emp hasize, again according Sevá (2004), is that plants with investments of great ma gnitude and it has environmental problems, technical and similar territorial dim ensions must be analyzed at the same time, in local, regional and international levels. For that we need to know the project well (the technical arrangement, si ze, prediction of operation) and location. The site should be understood by the superposition of two spaces: an absolute space, as the site is between geographi c coordinates x, y and z, and another, the relative space, which corresponds to the landscape that is there and the ways of life,€the cultural and economic acti vities engaged in those who live there. And in other scales, how other landscape s and other distant populations may be affected by project activities. Depending on the suggestion of Professor. Sevá, many members of the Basin Committees of R S officials FEPAM (which gives the state environmental agency licenses), and oth ers cheered when they learned that the river would be analyzed jointly, and that the Preliminary License would be given according to criteria conjunctive . In o ther words, the joint analysis of the three plants in the same watershed that ma ny employees, researchers and environmentalists proposed to be held in Rio das A ntas. The question is whether this was done to give an example of how a subject like this deserves a complex analysis, or, on the other hand, if it only served to distract and move the project down our throats. But, starting from the Heisen berg uncertainty, we can be positive or negative, and in any event to be mistaki ng. As I said Sevá (2005) live in a world 0 parameterized by uncertainty, and we have available analytical methods such as E uler (mark control points in space and analyze the amount, on-site and downstrea m, and also the time before, during and after work) and Lagrange (monitor dynami cs along the process, following the river, feeling with it). According to modern physics, the closer've Come a realistic and objective conclusion about the degr ee of problems and quality of impacts, our conclusion is more relative and uncer tain. The solution to this dilemma is to recognize the likelihood of being alway s more or less wrong in our certainties. Thus, there is always the likelihood th at, regardless of licensing based on Lagrange (method conjunctive / synthetic, a nalyzing three plants in one shot) or Euler (conventional method), the process r esults in disaster (both financial and environmentally ), not because of the met hods employed, but due to political and economic issues underlying the theme. 4. Risks and Issues Of all the risks and problems which can be identified by that start at the basis of many others. According Sevá (1988 pág.81), the approach on technological risks - unlike terrestrial risks that relate to events considered natural - should take into account three factors forming: the process of produc tion (resources, techniques, equipment, machinery); the work process (relations between business and government directions and employees) and the human conditio n (individual and collective existence, environment). Roughly, where these facto

rs are likely there will be a risk or problem. Thus, to illustrate the existence of these factors in almost the entire chain of energy usage reproduce snippets Sevá (2006), using technical knowledge can translate into a simpler language. Th e beginning of the excerpt explains the self-consumption of energy, something li ke a waste of energy inherent in the generation of electricity. The inherent sel f-consumption by at least two factors: technology (in broad terms, techniques, r aw material, labor relations, etc.) and the laws of physics of energy loss. I tr eat here hydroelectric power and, as became clear, I am not an engineer nor have familiarity with it, the example adds to the theme: 1 If the generator is 98% and the turbine is 88%, the group will turbo-generator e fficiency multiplied [.98 x .86 = 84%]. In practice, the self-consumption of ene rgy within the plant may go to 10% of the total, then the actual performance wou ld drop to 74%. If we get past the perimeter of the thermodynamic assessment by all mill-dam, we will have water loss by evaporation and with a latent heat flux , and mainly, the energy dissipated in the spillway, which opens a few times per year, sometimes with higher flow rates of that flows turbocharged. If we add wh at evaporates more what is poured, this may mean for example 50% of the total fl ow of river. Then the overall efficiency would be 37%. After all dams are made t o generate electricity and not to shed! And shed is required ... unless it stops raining, forever, upstream! (P. 16) So they say rightly, that the actual supply chains of fuel and electricity require some amount of home consumption of ENERG Y. This, plus the losses, because the fact is that in all these activities, with more or less modern technology, there will always be some percentage of lost en ergy, dissipated, fallow or not usable. Just give real examples, the reader will find similar (p. 19, italics added, capitals in original) between the electrici ty coming out of the poles of a generator in the powerhouse of a plant ... to sa y that the reader triggers a small motor electric in your house,€lost a part of the very energy transmitted (to raise the voltage at the output of the plant and transmitted by high voltage lines), and is lost along these lines because of th e electromagnetic field created, and the heating cables, loses after it was lowe r voltage substations in cities and then in the transformers of the posts up to take in your home. In total, this shortfall is less than 10%, but is perhaps mor e than 20% depending on the case. And at the tip end of the consumer, your only drive engine will use 40 or 50% of what the network has come for you to vacuum t he furniture or to beat a vitamin in a blender! Finally, after using and abusing the ideas of Professor. Sevá, highlight a key p oint for that tract on this item. The risks and problems that are not specific t o this or that plant, but a system (process of production, labor and human condi tion), which in Brazil is aligned with the American model of capitalism and that other countries take other forms. According Sevá (2006, pp. 20, emphasis added) : Everything that comes to the final consumer, it takes a large share of all energ y in a region, country, and around the world, to sustain economic activity produ ctive / constructive. Of course, another substantial part to ensure all your tra nsport of materials and labor, and all his schemes of communications. But regardless of the specific problems arising from the use of a particular tec hnology, or if it collapses or not, a mega-engineering project, such as the Rio das Antas with three plants, exist only because there is already causing a "chan ge of major Nature and size in a radical transformation in society "(Sevá, 2005, pp. 283). About the natural landscape of the escarpment of the plateau gaucho, popularly known as Serra Gaucha, can occur at least two types of problems: first , can be considered local or even regional scale will depend on the size of the dam and powerhouse, the Another concerns the global scale and may extend for man y years, perhaps millennia, and corresponds to the problems generated by a total change of the landscape and creating something new, that there did not exist. 2 The first problem concerns the quality and quantity of water and the possibility

of dam collapse (Sevá, 2006, pp. 22): The use of fuel and electricity obviously change the position of sources from wh ich are extracted. If the raw material is mineral or fossil fade. If it is of pl ant origin, may be renewed. If the water comes, the cycle is renewed, but the re covery may not be, or may be decreasingly renewable. Many dams emit organic gase s, some collapse and rock. About it is worth remembering that for Sevá (1988 pág.141-142), based on studies of Schaeffer, the history of the plants that collapsed between 1850 and 1979 sh ows that: over 20% of the plants collapse or break before they are ready, even 2 0% of such events occurs in the first years after filling the tank, another 20% between the first and fifth years, and the rest, 40% occurs in dams over six yea rs, half of them with over 20 years of construction. Moreover, critical points a re of no return between the closing gates, filling the dam, and the stops and de partures of turbo-generators (Sevá, 2005). These data allow to have the notion o f how important are the risks and problems faced by plants in their early years and how the newly opened or under completion require much work tracking. This co uld explain, in part, good quality and large quantity of studies commissioned by CERAN: climatological, seismographic, balance of flora and fauna, among others. It is self-protection and caution so as not to repeat what has recently occurre d in Santa Catarina, near the border with Rio Grande do Sul with the brand new U HE Campos Novos dam. The second problem related to the natural landscape is one that will be left behind for the future inhabitants or visitors of this planet. It is change, creation, abolition of relief forms, abnormal rhythm and flow of w ater, accelerated erosion and sedimentation, finally hidrogeomorfológicos risks that affect the river and its catchment area (beyond the waters of sub-surface w ater, for example). Risks are anthropogenic (from anthropos, man, and genetic, g enesis, origin) determined for the human condition and the production process / work. The anthropogenic effects or tecnogenic increasingly widespread approach i n geoscience (I'm more accustomed to it than the technical approach of engineeri ng) support the expression used by Sevá (2005, pp. 287): "new geographical entit y", exemplified 3 the formation of an artificial ecosystem, is a "new focus" or a "unique water sy stem" (ibid.). All this sums up the outcome of a mega-engineering project, namel y, the "total change of the landscape" (p. 291). So to finish this brief comment ary on the risks and possible problems at different scales of space and time, I reproduce an excerpt from Sevá (2004, pp. 18-19) dealing with what could continu e being the Serra Gaucha if the hydroelectric dams planned for there had never l eft the paper: In the same world, another view is possible, and certainly more beneficial than any insanity that self-secures the gift of progress: keep intact fragments of th e planet who still are keeping other portions little disturbed, cared for, guard ed, some beautiful rivers not barred, so [pg. 19] is not torn mountains, river a nd we can live without the sword threatening deterioration of the river and fish ing, permanent flooding, the forced expulsion from home to strangers. 5. Drowning by Numbers This item is intended as an exercise in discourse analysi s, begun in the topic titled the slideshow. Ready and got the news releases Entr epreneur (available from the CERAN, tabs Benefits and Press) and compared with t he data reported by newspapers, regulatory agency, state government sites, among others. Jobs's speech entrepreneur (CERAN, Benefits tab) is to generate 1,500 j obs divided in each plant, totaling something like 4,500 jobs (remembering that the works are not concurrent, the workers who built a mill, so it's ready, they can also working on another). According to Secretary of Energy, Mines and Commun ications, Valdir Andres, increasing slightly the official figures provided by th e company CERAN: "4950 direct jobs and 150 permanent posts. (Site of the State G overnment / RS, 25/08/2004). Unreasonable is information on the website of Vedac it, a maker of sealants used in construction of power plants. She said the const ruction of three plants will generate over 15,000 direct jobs, or three times mo

re than advertised by the entrepreneur. 4 According to Investment Valdir Andres, Secretary of State / RS, repeating the sp eech of the company CERAN: "The total investment for the three plants will be $ 675 million" (Site of the State Government / RS 25/08/2004) Estimated investment CERAN of the UHE Monte Carlo, as shown by the regulatory agency ANEEL (2002), w ould be $ 163,000. This was quite understated (maybe missing a zero) or is that our intelligence was it? "A more recent news on the site the CERAN (10/01/2005) says that investment in the plant was $ 249 million, with $ 160 million of the s tate - BNDES (with support from the Bank of Brazil, BRDE - Regional Development Bank of Southern , Box Banrisul and RS) and U.S. $ 89 million of shareholders CE RAN. But if we add a zero on account of investment in Monte Andrés course would be 163 million, well below the nearly 250 million dollars announced later. And p erhaps Money negotiated with BNDES has served for two or cash to cover overtime ... This is to open our eyes. Make a note to say that after not easily forgotten : the estimated investment for each plant was 225 million dollars, totaling 675 million, according to Entrepreneur (Reports CERAN). The ruse seems to end up the re, the news published on December 19, 2005 at the site of the State Government says that the compensatory measure CERAN paid 2.7 million dollars for State to b e invested in conservation and ecological projects in the Department of Environm ent. She said the governor Germano Rigotto and Environment Secretary, Mauro Spar ta, signed a commitment to CERAN it to perform compensatory measure regarding th e "impacts due to the establishment of hydroelectric Monte Claro, Castro Alves a nd July 14. "Even assuming that there will be other" impacts "future, the offset value is very small compared to the total invested, and here the State Governme nt seems has been reached, as reported in the news is that "The value passed by CERAN [would] be 0.6% of investment in projects." Thus, calculating as 0.6% 5 2.7 million dollars, your investment would have fallen from the initial 675 mill ion to 450 million reais. Someone had to be drowned in swimming as well as numbe rs. Benefited Population According to the regulatory agency ANEEL (2002) the energy generated at hydroelectric Monte Claro (and it is understood, in others as well) will serve "790 000 residents of the region." But, according to Census 2000 (IB GE), Urban Agglomeration of the Northeast formed by the cities of Bento Gonçalve s,€Carlos Barbosa, Caxias do Sul, Ragamuffin, Flowers da Cunha, Garibaldi, Belo Monte South, New Padua, St. Teresa and St. Mark, called by ANEEL of "region" has a population of approximately 608 000 inhabitants. Lula there Finally, a note p ublished on January 11, 2005 in Zero Hora says that President Lula "triggers off icially" the first turbine UHE Monte Claro. The curious thing is that this turbi ne, which today is the only plant operating in and around the complex, had its d rive "unofficial" start a month earlier, in late December 2005. Perhaps the anti cipation of a populist policy of "opening up" works that were already running a policy of "smothers-scandal 'practiced by Lula, from mid 2005 until the present (the eve of the election), after the removal of ministers and Secretaries of the government because of corruption. A question remains in the air: what they are expecting to open the second? Do not know! The reality is that there is no way t o know if there really is a second turbine mounted there. 6 6. Prof sources. A. O. Sevá Son (some available online: www.femunicamp.br/ ~ sev a) Sevá F º, A. O. In the limit of risk and domination - the politicization of l arge industrial investments. Free Teaching thesis, Depto. of Science and Technol ogy Policy, Institute of Geosciences, Unicamp, Campinas, nov. 1988. Sevá F º, A. O. Disfigurement of the environmental licensing of large investments (with comm entary on the projected dams on the Xingu River). In: Second Meeting ANPPAS Nati

onal Association for Graduate Studies and Research in Environment and Society, I ndaiatuba, SP, 2004. Sevá F º, A. O. "Critical knowledge of mega-dams: to assess otherwise natural changes, social changes and the destruction of monuments rive r. In: SEVA F º., A. O. (Org) Ténot MO. Warnings about the consequences of hydro electric projects on the Xingu River. São Paulo: IRN - International Rivers Netw ork, 2005. p. 281-295. Sevá F º, A. O. Key Concepts and precautions in the study of sources, and the Uses of Power Converters. EM 972 Course book: "Supply and E nergy Demand." 2006. 22pp. Websites AGAPAN - Gaucho Association for the Protecti on of Natural Environment. Note from the Vice President of Agapan William Dornel les, September 2004. http://www.agirazul.com.br/agapan/mmemani.htm Inema: http:/ /inema.com.br/albuns/0064763/20060511094503.SerraGaucha029.htm Zero Hora, www.zh .clicrbs.com. br Correio do Povo, www.correiodopovo.com.br/ 7 Ceran, www.ceran.com.br Vedacit, www.vedacit.com.br ANEEL - National Agency of E lectrical Energy, Energy Bulletin 21, April 2002. http://www.aneel.gov.br/aplica coes/boletim_energia/documentos/boletim_energia_021.htm State Government of Rio Grande do Sul: http://www.estado.rs.gov.br/ Planning Secretariat of the Governme nt of Rio Grande do Sul: http://www.scp.rs.gov.br/governofaz/showProject.asp?idP rojeto=146, data from December 2005. Visit in June 2006. Data Generation Nationa l System Operator (ONS) (http://www.ons.org.br/conheca_sistema/mapas_sin.aspx, R esults of Operation tab, tab weekly bulletin of operation). MAPS SIPOT - Informa tion System Brazilian Hydroelectric Potential. Atlas of the Brazilian hydroelect ric potential. Eletrobrás. Prepared in July 2005. http://www.eletrobras.gov.br/E M_Atuacao_SIPOT/sipot.asp ONS - National System Operator Electric, http://www.on s.org.br/conheca_sistema/mapas_sin.aspx # ONS - 2006: "Schematic the hydroelectr ic plants of the National Interconnected System. " Drafted in March 2006, availa ble at: http://www.ons.org.br/conheca_sistema/pop/pop_diagrama_esquemat_usinas.a spx ONS - 2004: Map "Horizon 2007" drawn up on October 31, 2004. (No longer avai lable on the site). 8