C H A PTER -5

ATHEISM IN SANKHYA AND M IM lM SA

 ATHEISM IN SANKHYA AND MlMAMSA

We have discussed and analysed atheistic elements that prevailed in all

the three heterodox schools of Indian Philosophy. We can at a glance

summarise the CSrvakas or the Lokayatas as materialists, the Buddhism as a

school of realism and naturalism while the Jainism as a relativistic pluralism

But the common feature of all of them is that none of these schools has faith n

God or Supreme Being or adores such Being.

In Brahmanical philosophy, two main traditions appear to have been

established by the time of the flourishing of the Sramana schools, 500 B.(

the Sahkhya and the Mfmamsa.

Among the orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy, the Sankhya and the

Mfiiiamstr schools do not adhere to the view of the intervention of am

Supreme Being or God in creation or dissolution of the world process. I he

Sahkhya system is sometimes described as the atheistic Sankhya' (nirisva a

sahkhya) since it does not uphold God as the creator, and therebx it is

distinguished from the Yoga which is called the 'Theistic Sankhya' (Sesutr.i-

Sahkhya).

As we come across that the Vedas are the fountainhead of all forms <>i

Hinduism and they are mostly God-oriented. The Vedas regard Him as I'm.

(Agni), the Majestic (Indra). the terrible (Rudra) and the just (Varunai

Hinduism as such being a Vedic religion, consists essentially of rapport with

 ( 116)

the transcendent Being, ever free and ever the Lord ' 1 and this consciousness

has never left it at any stage o f history.

Contrary to this stand, however in the Vedic hymns itself, we find sonu

passages which refer to heretics and unbelievers. They evidently were tin

pioneers o f the revolt against the natural religion and as such fore fathers o'

Indian Philosophy. The origin o f naturalist and skeptic thought can be found ti.

the Rg Veda itself, for instance the creation hymn" which concludes the

dialogue between the parents o f mankingjt- the twin brother and sister. Yam.i

and Yami. This thought was also developed in some o f the major IJpanisads.

e.g. Chandogya, Katha Upanisads etc.

The Sankhya represents a relatively free development o f speculation

among the Brahmanas, independent o f the Vedic revelation. It can be said

quasi-materialists where as the Vaisesikas are materialists.

Kapila, the founder o f this school while fighting against the nihilistic

tendencies came very close to materialism. He had to prove the reality o f some

existences,because the existence o f thought by itself or that o f disembodied

spirits could not be proved to the satisfaction of the s k e p tic s .

I God the Self and Nothingness 2. Materialism

Reflection & Western M.N Roy
God Language & the language of nothing P. 78
K. Sivaraman
P. 156
 ( 117)

and as a result Kapila had to fall back upon the material world. But the late

Sankhyas e.g. Vijnlnviksu, in the Sixteenth century tried to revive the earlier

theism in Sankhya. The first available work of the Sankhya school is the

Sankhya-Sutra' of Kapila.

Next to Kapila, his disciple Asuri and Asuri's disciple Paffca&kha

wrote some books which aimed at a clear and elaborate exposition of the

Sankhya system. As these works were lost in course of time, only available

book was Nvarakrsna's Sankhya-Karika which was the authoritative text

book of the Sankhya. Gauda padas Sankhya-Karrika-bhasya. VdcaspatiN

"Tattva Kaumudi. Vijnanaviksus and Sankhya-sara' and Aniruddha'.

Sankhya Pravacana-sutra Vrtti are some other important works of the

Sankhya System.

The Sankhya Philosophy, provides a basis. Theoretical exposition of

human nature enumerating and defining its elements analyzing their manner of

co-operation in the state of bondage (baddha) and describing their state ol

disentanglement or separation in release (moksa). As we read in the

Bhagvadgita - Purile and unlearned people speak of 'enumerating

knowledge (Sankhya) and the "practice of introvert concentration (yoga)

distinct from each other, yet anyone firmly established in either gains the fruit

of both.
 (118)

The state attained by the followers of the path of enumerating

knowledge is attained also through the exercises of introvert-concentration. He

truly sees who regards as one the intellectual attitude of enumerating

knowledge and the practice of concentration .3

As Zimmer points out, the main conceptions of the Sankhya system

are (1) that the universe is founded on an irresoluble dichotomy of Life

monads (purusa) and matter (Prakrti). (2) that matter (Prakrti) though

fundamentally simple and uncompounded nevertheless exfoliates or manifests

itself, under three distinctly differentiated aspects (the so called gunas) which

are comparable to the three stands of a rope and (3) that every one of the life

monads (Purusa) associated with matter (Prakrti) is involved in the bondage

of an endless round of transmigration (Samsara).4

The Sankhya upholds the theory of Sat Karyavada. Prakrti being the,

primal cause, though unintelligent and Purusa, being the self conscious the

teleological evolution starts, the different gross and subtle evolutes arise in the

process.

3 Bhagvad Gita 5.4.5. 4 Ibid

Qtd in Philosophies of India P 281
H. Zimmer
P 280
 ( 119)

These ideas do not belong to the original stock of the Vedic Brahman k

tradition. We do not find any mention of pantheon or divinity, beyond tlu

vicissitudes of earthly bondage, as that of the Vedic gods in the has a

teachings of the Sankhya. The Sankhya system along with its allied system tin

yoga related to the mechanical system of the Jainas. The Sankhya System is

therefore, traced back its origin in the Upanisads and in the Bhagvad-Gita.

In the SEnkhya Sutras' written by Kapila and Isvarakrsna's Sankhya

Knrika' we get an exposition of the Sankhya doctrine excluding the refutation-

of the doctrines of other people, and excluding the parables attached to the

original Sankhya works - Sastitantras'astra. Sankhya Sutras contain along with

its refutations of other doctrines a number of parables.

Kapila, was regarded as semi-mythical holy man who stands outside the

traditional assembly of the Vedic saints and sages, as an Enlightened One on

his own right. His miraculous power is recognized in a celebrated episode ot

the Mahabharata.5

Kapila and others also maintain a clear cut dualism between Purusa and

Prakrti. Purusa like Aristotle's God is the "sour, "self, 'the spirit', the

subject', the knower'.

5. Mahabharata 3.107
Qtd. in Philosophies of India Zimmer P. 282
 ( 120)

It is neither body nor senses nor brain, nor mind (manas) nor ego

(ahaihkara) nor intellect (buddhi). It is not a substance which possesses

consciousness. Consciousness is its essence as Vedantas Maya' is the sakii

of Brahman. On the otherhand. Prakrti is the root cause of the world of

*

objects. All worldly effects are latent in this uncaused cause, it is the first

principle of this universe, it is called Pradhana, as the unmanifested state of all

effects, it is known as Avyakta, as the extremely subtle and imperceptible

thing, it is called Anumana, as the unintelligent and unconscious principle it U

called Jada. In the Sankhya philosophy, the world process is described b\ the

purusa - Prakrti (soul and Nature) instead of God. In Zoroastrianism, like the

dualism of Purusa-Prakrti, we find Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu. These

two warring principles struggle and in their struggle is grounded the drama of

cosmic life and human history. Here, one is the principle of light, justice and

good, and the other is the principle of darkness, injustice and evil. The battle

between these two is decided by the victory of the good. Before the triumph of

light over darkness is complete, the universe and mankind must pass through

endless cycles of exhausting torment and untiring strife.6

6. Religion 7 Culture
Radhakrishnan
P.P. 35, 36
 ( 121)

In Sankhya philosophy also, the life monad also known as Purusa, man,

atman, self is the living entity concealed behind and within all the

metamorphoses of our life in bondage.

Just in the Jainism, here also the number of life monads (JTvas) in the

universe is supposed to be infinite and their proper nature (Svarupa) is

regarded as totally different from that of the life less matter (Prakrti) in

which they are engulfed. They are termed Spiritual (cit. citi, cetana, caitanya)

and are said to be of the nature of sheer, self effulgent light (prahhasa) . *7

Within each individual, the self luminous purusa, atman or pums illuminates

all the processes of gross and subtle matter - the processes that is to say of

both life and consciousness - as these develop within organism, yet this life

monad itself is without form or content. In its indifference to the supremacy of

an absolute spirit as well as its doctrine of the relation of avidya and the souls

entanglement in samsSra, the SSnkhya reminds us of Buddhism. Under the

influence of the Svabhava-Vada, the capacity to unfold the universe was

transferred completely to Prakrti rendering the idea of Godas superfluous.

Nilakantha8 categorically declared that the doctrine o f Svabhava was that o f

the Sahkhyas; SvabMva iti parinam vadinam Sankhyariam.

7 Philosophies of India '

Zimmer
P. 285
8. Nilkantha on Mahabharata Santiparva 232.21 (ed) Poona
Qtd in Indian Atheism
D P. Chottapadhyaya
P 67
 ( 122)

Devatnia, in a parallel with the SSnkhya is anxious to abide within the

strict limits of knowledge. He holds that the reality of God cannot be

established by logical proofs. For example, God is said to be all powerful. It

means that there is no other powerful man than God and it limits Gods power

and his power becomes finite. So if God exists, Nature has dependent and

created existence, for if it exists in its right, it limits Gods power. Therefore,

the Sankhya maintains that there is no sensible evidence or inferential

knowledge or scriptural testimony of Isvara or God, Devatma also felt it in the

interest of truth to reject the equivalence of Nature and God and proceeded to

show that Gods existence cannot be established.

In the Sankhya Sutras, it is also mentioned that there is no inferential

proof (of God), because of the want of (universal) relation.9

If there be an inferential proof of God there must be a suitable probans

for it and the invariable precondition for the inference would be the perception

of an invariable relation between that probans and God. But since God is never

perceived, the perception of such an invariable relation between Him and the

probans for His inference is not possible at all. Therefore, it is useless to

imagine that there can be ^ inferential proof for the existence of God.

9
Qtd. In Ind. Atheism
D P C
P - ^ '3
 ( 123)

The Sankhya philosophers who repudiate the existence of God give the

following arguments - If God is affected by selfish motives, He is not free; if

He is free, He will not create this world of pain and misery. Either God is

unjust and cruel or He is not free and all-powerful. If He is determined by the

Law of Karma, He is not free; if not He is a tyrant. Again, God being pure

knowledge, this material world cannot spring from Him. The effects are

implicitly contained in their cause and the material world, which is subject to

change, requires an unintelligent dd ever-changing cause and not a spiritual

and immutable God. Again, the eternal existence of the Purusas is inconsistent

with God. If they are the parts of God, they must have some divine power. If

they are created by God, they are subject to destruction. Hence there is no

God .10

The external existence of the purusas is inconsistent with the infinity

and creatorship of God. Nevertheless, physical principles of materialism were

elaborated philosophically by Kapila. He is known as an atheist and

maintained that Gods existence cannot be proved by logical evidence. But the

real merit of his philosophy is the recognition of the objective reality of the

physical world.

10 A Critical S urvey of Indian Phil

C D. Sharma
P. 165
 ( 124)

Kapila retorted - The world is not unreal; because there is no fact

contradictory (to its reality), and because it is not the (false) result of dcpra\cd

senses (leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed)*.11

Kapila, visualized existence of a heirarchy, so to say. composed ol

twenty-five realities. In addition to the soul, nature, mind and sel -

consciousness, there are subtle, elements, sense organs and 'gross clement',

He like Hegel conceived Idea expressing itself. Although the process oi

evolution is set on its head, the realities however are derived inducti\el\

from the immediately perceptible gross elements. The existence of the subtle

elements' (Sound, colour, touch, taste and small) is inferred from the gross

elements' which are directly perceptible. The process is traced to the primal

state of nature in which everything lies in a state of inaction.12

Together with the Vaisesika system the SSnkhya philosopln also

reduces the gross elements' to atoms, but Kapila traces a simpler, all

pervading substance the severally existing atoms down to a still simpler all

pervading substance. However, by seeking the ultimate substance beyond the

atoms, Kapila anticipated the most modern conception of substance instead ol

rejecting materialism.

II M ate rialism 12 Ibid

M .N R o v l>. 89
P. 88
 ( 125)

To some extent the Slftkhya Philosophy is akin to the Vaisesika philosophy.

Both these schools of thought adhere to the mechanistic view. According to

Slnkhya, nature is not only eternal, but self operative. Thus, Nature is the

Final Cause. Since mind and self-consciousness are placed within the scheme

o f nature, they are included in the materialistic system. Only the soul stands

outside, but like Newtons deux-ex-machina, it is completely unnecessary

for explaining the being and becoming of the world. The existence of nature is

inferred from its perceptible phenomena, these are real, they must have a real

cause. Those ultimate elements are called in the Vaisesika. and Nyaya systems,

atoms.

According to Devatma, the Sahkhya philosophy holds soul or purusa to

be transcendental in character. But the facts that it gives to prove plurality of

souls are purely empirical. They do no have the least tendency to prove the

plurality of souls as transcendental beings. To Devatma, ofcourse souls are

parts of the natural order i.e. empirical in original, character and content.

The fundamental principles of ancient Indian materialism were stated

originally in the Vaisesika system. The dominating position in the intellectual

life o f that period was occupied by the Sahkhya system of Kapila. He being

deviated from the strictly materialistic ground, developed rather a rational-

naturalist system of metaphysics.

 ( 126)

The SSnkhya as a rational naturalist philosophy developed certain

positive principles which made the admission of god absolutely unnecessary.

Madhava and Vsfcaspati Misra clearly explain this position.

Madhava, in his Sarvadars'ana samgraha1- explained the Sahklna

position of purusa-prakrti in matters of creation. It may be argued I be

unintelligent pradhana, without being guided by a conscious being, cannot

engage itself in producing effects like mahat (i.e. the first evolute o f the

primeral matter) etc. Therefore, there must be a conscious Being to guide it In

this way, the Omniscient supreme God must be assumed.'

But in reply it can be said that there is instance in which we can sec

that something unintelligent without being guided by any conscious being

may engage itself to serve some purpose e.g. the unconscious milk How s lor

the nourishment of the calf, also the unconscious water flows lor the benefit

of the world. Similarly, prakrti, though unconscious, will act for the liberation

of the purusa.

MSdhava fully agreed on two points about Sankhya atheism with

Vataspati Misra. 14

13. Madhava, Sarvadarsana Samgraha (Anand) (ed) 14. Ibid

P. 120 P 81
Qtd. in Indian Atheism
D.P.C
P. 80
 ( 127)

First, the assumption of God was ontologicaliy irrelevant.

Secondly, it was also logically repulsive.

The Sankhya as a philosophy based on logic and reason developed that

the admission of God in matters of creation is absolutely unnecessary. Both

Madhava and Vaeaspati Misra agreed that the primeval matter, moved by the

laws of motion inherent in it (svabhlva) adequately accounted for the origin of

and development of the world. The self sufficiency of the principle of Prakrit

is followed from the implicit acceptance of the doctrine of Svabhava. Grass

and water taken by the cow, naturally got themselves transformed into milk

that nourishes the calf. So, was the process of the transformation of primeval

matter into the world or the evolution of the world from the primeval matter.

There was no question of any supernatural principle guiding either of the

processes. There was no need of assuming God as the nimitta-Karana of the

world. 15 .

The theists claim that Gods existence was proved by His being the

dispenser of the fruits of actions (Karma-phala - datrtayatat-Siddheh)16.

15. Ibid
P 81
16. V ijn a n a v ik s u
O n S a n k h y a -S u t r a , V . 1
Q td . in Ib id
P .8 9
 ( 128) -

VijnSnaviksu was more inclined to theistic Sahkhya than to atheistic

Sffnkhya. But in reply, the author of SShkhya-Sntra said The attainment of

the fruits of actions is not due to the superintendence of God, because that is

attained from the action itself. 17

The Sahkhya Philosophers further ask the theists how far the idea of

God could have an inherent logical legitimacy. As D.P. Chottapadhyaya

maintains that they came to the reasoned conclusion that it had none in as

much as the concept was infested with an internal inconsistency.

The theists maintain that on the one hand God had to create the pre

condition for pain and suffering and on the other God is also moved by the

desire to remove pain and suffering. It is the logical in consistency on which

Madhava and Vacaspati Misra agree. But significantly they both were not

sympathetic atheists. Midhava was a devout vedantist, while Vacaspati,

commenting on the Nyaya showed his extraordinary philosophical competence

in defending theism.

Likewise Gaudapada showed in his exposition of Sahkhya Karika that

the Sankhya philosophy without its atheism was necessarily incomplete. He

choose the verse number 61 of Sahkhya Karika for this purpose.

17 Sankhya Sfflrav II
Ibid
P.89
 ( 129)

He commented against those who viewed the first cause as (iod 01

Isvara- The Sankhya teachers have said - "How can things endowed wi l l

gunas proceed from God, who is supposed to be devoid o f the Guna-s?

Therefore, it will be an inconsistency to conceive the origin o f the three worlds

endowed with three gunas from Him.

In Indian atheism, the aphorism namely, "Because God is unproved s

one o f the most famous proclamations.

The Nyaya Vaisesika and the Sankhya held that perception is a means

o f knowledge, which is due to the contract o f senses and therefore essentialK

temporal. The Sankhya Sutra on this point felt obliged to deny God but the

later Naiyayikas never saw any antagonism between those points and then

firm conviction in the existence o f God.

Madhava concludes his account o f the Sankhya with the words,

nirisvara-sahkhya Sas'tra-pravartaka - Kapila etc. (Kapila is the founder of

the atheistic Scfnkhya). 19

18. Gaudapada on SSnkhya Karika 61

As Qtd. in Ind. Atheism
D.P.C.
P 77
19. Sarva dar^ana samgraha 121
Qtd. n Ibid

P. 84

v
 ( 130)

In the fifth chapter of the Sankhya Stltra we find the polemic and

logical refutation of the theistic assumption. In first, third and the sixth

chapters also some kind of refutations are there.

But, Vijhanaviksu, the commentator with a personal theistic bias raised

some doubt about the atheistics aphorism Because God is not

proved,(isvarasiddheh) and not because God does not exist, (isvarabhavat).

He argued that the denial of God was not to be confused with the denial of

the possibility of the theoretical proof for His existence. He in the same spirit

argued that by a careful understanding to the actual wordings of the sutra

showed that it was designed simply to deny the possibility of proving God and

not of proving his non-existence.20

But modem scholars bluntly reject such interpretations and they

maintain that both these expression Because God is unproved and Because

God is not existent are same.

In order Says Garbe, to bridge over the chasm between the Sankhya

system and his own theism (which he is pleased to style Vedantic),

Vijhanaviksu, resorts to the strongest means to do away with one of the

fundamental doctrines of the genuine Sankhya, which is the denial of God 21.

20 Vijnanavikasu Sankhya Sutra 152

Ibid
P. 87
21. Garbe S P B pref. Xii
Qtd In Ibid
PS7
 ( 131)

-Vijnanaviksu was more inclined to theistic Sankhya than to atheistic

Sankhya. This is proved by his own remarks in his Sahkhya pravacana bhffsya,

Yogavarttika and Vijnanam^ta bhasya (an independents commentary on the

Brahmasutras of Badarayana or theistic Sankhya lines) Vijnanaviksu, agreed

more with the views of the Sankhya doctrine of the Puranas, where both the

diverse purusas and the prakrti are said to be merged in the end in Isvara, by

whose will the creative process again began in the prakrti at the end of each

pralaya. But in SSnkhya-Sntra we get that the Sankhya maintains such a

rational explanation, that it could explain all facts without the intervention of

God or Isvara and Vijnanaviksu could not do away with such atheistic

explanations.

But Vijnanaviksus comments differed a great deal from Vacaspati

Misra. In some grave points Vacaspati remained silent while Vijnanaviksu

gave interpretations. He described the gunas as reals or super subtle

substances, but Vacaspati and Gaudapada (the other commentator) of the

Safikhya Karika remained silent on the point. Before Vijnanviksu, no definite

explanation of the gunas as being of the nature of pleasure, pain and dullness

(sattva, rajas and tamas) was made 22

22 History of Indian Phil. S N Dasgupta,

p.p. 223, 224
 ( 132)

M. N. Roy2 categorically refers to the atheistic and materialistic views

combatted from Samkara's own work,

Religious doctrines are all meaningless words. Their foundation is the

idea of God whose very existence cannot be proved. The God is the creator,

but he has no origin. If it is admitted that there must be a creator and ruler ol

the world, then there arises the question - who created the creator? Whence

did He come? The creator is said to be without beginning and w ithout end.

without any limit. But after all, he is a creator, which implies a personalitx on

his part. The God is indeed, considered to be the creator. But a person cannot

be without beginning and end and other limits. If the God is limited then, is t

not possible that there may exist a power over and above. Him? The God is

believed to be all powerful and all-pervading. But these attributes of the God

cease to be what they are believed to be, as soon as they are imagined by man

Thus, the essence of the God, the creator, disappears. Then, it is taught that

desire is the cause of creation. From this, it follows that God Himself is not

free from desire.

2 3 . M a te r ia lis m M . N R o y 1 0 5
 ( 133)

Further, if the universe is created by the will of God, then God Himself must

have the feeling of want, for wish grows out of want. The feeling of want

destroys omnipotence, Omniscience and all other super human attributes

ascribed to God.

Likewise, in another Vedic school of thought i.e. the Mimaftsa school

or better known as the Purva Mfmamsa school, we do not find any mention of

God or Supreme Being in the process of creation just like the SaAkhya.

This school was the outcome of ritualistic side of the Vedic culture just

as the Vedanta (also known as Uttar&MTmarhsa) is the development of the

speculative side. The mimamsa school helps and support ritualism (a) by

giving methodology of interpretation with the help of which the complicated

Vedic injunction regarding rituals may be understood, harmonized and

followed without difficulty and (b) by supplying a philosophical justification

of the beliefs on which ritualism depends.

The Buddhists, Jainas and the CHrvakas challenge the authority of the

Vedas. The reality of the world and the existence of soul are denied by some

Buddhists. Some Upanisads disparage the idea that heaven is the goal of man

and rituals are the best possible human activities. The Mimamsa tries to meet

all such criticisms and upholds the original faith underlying ritualism.
 ( 134)

Jaimini 24, as the founder of the Mtmamsa school and also author of the

Mfmamsa-Stltra was held high by Badaranya, himself who has his distaste for

the ontology and epistemology of the PtTrva Munamsa.

As a philosophy, the MimamsI' is inconceivable without the Vedas. It

thrives on the Vedas, draws its entire intellectual nourishment from the Vedas

and in its major part, intends to be nothing more than the effort to settle the

principles of textual interpretation for the right understanding of the Vedas.

In Munamsa Philosophy, atheism formed an integral part and many

MTmamsakas energetically argued that any concession to the idea of God

amounted to the surrender of the fundamentals of their philosophy. It became

practically a part of the philosophical commonsense of traditional India to

view atheism as an inseparable feature of the Muriamsaka. Keith in his

Karma Mffnamsa puts it rather mildly, the atheism of the true MfmamSa is

regarded with such unanimity as to render it impossible to explain it away 26.

Interestingly, as mentioned by D.P. Chottapadhyaya, some of the major

logical considerations against the possible existence of God which we come

24 Indian Atheism 26 Keith KM 60

D .P .C Qtd, in I A
P 206 D .P .C .
25. Ibid P .2 0 7
P. 205
 ( 135)

across in the Mimamsa literature are practically the same as found in the

writings of the Buddhists and the Jainas, though as it is well known from the

point o f view o f Vedic Orthodoxy, the Mimamsakas were the most determined

opponents of the Buddhists and the Jainas. Thus, not withstanding all the

mutual differences between the Buddhists, Jainas and the Mimamsakas, there

could have been some kind of free exchange of ideas among these

philosophers is so far as they all belonged to the some fraternity of the Indian

atheists.27

The earliest extant commentary on the Mimamsa-Sutra is the

Sabarabhasya, the name of the commentator is Sahara.

The greatest Mimamsakas after Sahara were Prabhakara and Kumarila.

Both commented on Sabarabhasya. Apart from his major work called the

Brhati, Prabhakara wrote a smaller work called Laghvi. Kumarilas work

consisted of three parts called the Slaka-vartika, Tantra-vartika and the

Tuptika of which the first is philosophically most significant.

Salikanath28, who lived possibly in the 9th century A.D., in his

Prakaranapaftcika gives a standard exposition of Prabhakaras views.

27 ibid 28. Ibid

P.P 208,209 P 215
 ( 136 )

Works expounding kumarilay Bhattas view are numerous, the most

prominent authors of the Mimamsa system are Mandana Misra, Partha Sara!In

Misra and Sucarita Misra.

The Mfmamsakas, like the SSnkhya Philosophers believe in the realrt\

of the external world and of the individual souls. They believe in the l aw <!

Karma, in Unseen Power (Apurba), in heaven and hell, in liberation and in the

ultimate authority of the r- Vectaxs.

Verbal Testimony (Veda) proves that yajna should be held as primary

and the mention of the deity secondary. The performance of the ritual act

generates apurva. Apurva literally means not existing before'. It is taken b\

the Mfmamsakas to mean the resultant of any action (Karma) in invisible

stage which it is supposed to assume before producing visible results.

The Mfmamsakas argue that the performance of vajna direct >

generates the apurva and this apurva ultimately leads to the result designed

Sahara rejected God on the ground that there is no proof of I In

existence. However Sahara shows in Vedic deities and also the Mtmamsa

thesis that these were nothing more than the words used in the V e d a -,

29. Qtd. in M am am sa-Sutra ii 1.5 and Sahara on it

I.A.
DP C
P. 243
 (137)

But later Mimamsakas accepted Saharas views but later on being confronted

with the attack from the theists they could not stand Saharas rejection of God.

Both Prabhakara and Kumarila with all their mutual differences, elaborately

argued why the assumption of God was completely illogical.

The Mimamsakas give priority to ritual performance i.e. yajna, not the
1 *

devas. Those who desire heaven (in the sense of pleasure) should perform the

Dars'a and Purnamasa, Jyotistama rituals. The Vedas speak of the

instrumentality of the yajna itself and not of the devas in producing the fruit.

This fruit or result is the real purusartha or that which is the aim of man and it

is mans endeavour for the sake of Purusartha and not of the deity.30

But the question arises how the performance of the ritual directly

generates the apurva? Sahara answers that this is proved by verbal testimony

i.e. specifically the Vedas. The knowledge that anything gives fruit i.e. any

inducing agent gives a partieularfruit, arises from verbal testimony and not

from direct perception or any other source of knowledge. 31

The Mfmamsaka philosophers atheism was concerned mainly with the

Nyaya Vaisesikas proof for the existence of God. The later Buddhists and

30 Ibid 31. Ibid

P .P . 2 4 4 , 245 P 244
 (138 )

Jainas were also concerned with the refutation of NySya Vaisesikas proof for

the existence of God, theyalleged^creator and moral governor of the world.

Their atheism is extremely technical and scholastic. But the Mimamsakas

were no doubt keen on refuting the Nyya Vais'esikasproof of the existence of

God as their brother atheists were. They felt bothered by a special problem

which was overlooked by other atheist philosophers, particularly Buddhists

and the Jainas. This followed from their attitude to the Vedas. While the

Buddhists and. the Jainas were interested in the Vedas at best negatively i.e.

only in the sense of rejecting their validity - the Mimamsakas were utmost

serious about the authoritativeness of the Vedas. And the Vedas, atleast as

apparently understood, were full of all sorts of gods or devas. They were Agni,

Indra, Mitra, Varuna etc. How then were the Mimamsakas to look at the Vedic

Gods? Were they to reject the ideas of one God in favour of a multitude of

gods? Were they to reject monotheism in favour of polytheism?

Sahara in his commentary on the Mtmamsa-Sutra asks the questions

whether the vedic gods have anything to do with the human lot, with ritual

actions and their results, whether these gods have any real or substantive

existence!
 But he came to the conclusion that these gods could have no existence

in the real sense of the term. Sahara, therefore, answered that in the Vedas

these stood for mere sounds or words i.e. the only existence which the Vedic

gods had was purely verbal. The so called gods Mitra, Varuna.etc. were not

divine beings at all. They were mere words instead.

It followed from this that from the Mimamsa point of view there was no

possibility of any interference by these Vedic gods with human lot. They had

nothing to do with the results of human actions. Hence there was no sense in

offering any sacrifice to them deprived as they were of any substantive

existence, these gods could not accept any offering not could they feel pleased

with these.

Prof. Hari Das Bhattacharyya, writes in his article on Indian Ethics in

die book. The cultural Heritage of India Thus, the Mimamsa, Buddhism and

the Jainism together establish firmly the self-sufficiency of the moral law and

lay the basis for classical doctrine of Karma according to which moral action

produced their own fruits without reference to any kind of divine dispensation.

The great difficulty arose out of the logical impossibility of reconciling self

sufficiency of moral law with omnipotence of God. Once the self sufficiency

o f causal law is fully grasped, Gods existence must stand rejected. 32

32 H.D. Bhattacharyya, Head of the Deptt. of Phil. Decea University

Qtd, in Ethics of Devatma
S.P. Kanal P 61
 (m

As against the Nyaya Vaisesikasclaim that it was necessary to admit

God as the creator of the world, the Prabhakaras along with the Bhattas argued

that the idea of creation itself was a myth. Experience Prabhakara urges show

us the bodies of all animals being produced by purely natural means, we can

argue hence to the facts of the past and the future, and need invoke no

extraneous aid. 33

Devatma maintains the same process p f creation among the different

existents or beings to every new existent comes into being as the result of the

action of some immutable process of Nature, and again when any existent

grows or evolves gradually, it does so in accordance with the immutable laws

of Nature. By the immutable law o f Nature, he means that the same set of

conditions produce the same effect. He, therefore, to put in the words of B.

Russell says - whatever knowledge is attainable must be attained by

scientific methods and what science cannot discover mankingj!cannot know.

All that knowledge is termed science which is detained through experimental

investigation of the various departments of Nature, keeping facts of Nature

'XA
supreme.

33 Qtd. in Indian Atheism - 34. Ethics of Devatma

D.P.C. S. P Kanai
P 216 P. 137
 ( 14.1)

Ganganath Jha also observes that Prabhakara denies a creator of the

universe but he admits that the universe is made of components' parts. But he

rejects the view that the universe has had a beginning at any particular point

of time or that it would come to an end at any particular point of time. But in

everyday experience, we see every constituents individually have their

beginnings one after another.

Prabhakara again argues on the NySya VaiSesikas point of super

mundane or Gods interference in the merit and demerit (dharma and adharma)

of the individual souls resulting from their past actions. According to him

dharma and adharma must belong to the same individual to whom itself the

body belongs, it cannot be supervised by any other being howsoever

intelligent he might be. God could have no knowledge of the dharma and

adharma of the being that is bom as man or animal etc, and without such

knowledge, he could not exercise any effective control over it.

But the Nyaya Vaisesika philosophers themselves come to the

conclusion that the relation between God and the destiny (dharma - adharma)

of the individual and without a consistent relation the question of Gods

supervising the destiny is ruled out.

 ( 142.)

The two relations samyoga and samavaya could not be maintained. Sanm;i

(conjunction) is possible only between the substances but the Nyaya Vaisesika

considers the individual destiny, as a quality hence there could be no relation

of God and the individual destiny. Similarly, samavaya is the relation of

inherence between two substances, hence the inherence of God in the

individual destiny is ruled out.

Like Prabhakara. Kumarila also challenged NyHya Vaisesika,

argument for the existence of God.

He considered that Nyaya Vai/esikas view of God as an efficient

intelligent cause of the world also means Him as the exclusive sole - sufficient

cause of everything or the creator of everything excepting the dharma adharma

of the individuals.

In this sense, the upholder must admit that God existed before the

creation of everything. But what was the time, place and condition of the

universe when God existed before creation, the theists cannot give suitable

reply.

Again, the theists had to admit that the creator either possesses a bod\

or he does not. In both the cases difficulty arises, because if God is without i

body, he cannot have any desire or wish to create the world, and if He is with

a body, he had to face all troublesome questions the answers of w hich are not

satisfactory.
 (14 3 )

If God creates the world with a desire the question arises why he should create

a world M l of evils?

Kumirila argued that for the production of something the definite

material^required. What is the material for the production of the world by

God? The theists reply just as the spider could create something without any

external material, God also creates out of nothing. But Kumarila argues Even

the production of the spiders net is not to be viewed as being without any

material basis, the net is produced by the saliva which in its turn, is produced

from the bodies of the insects eaten by the spider.

The theists claim that some amounts of pain or evil were indispensable

for the creation of the world. To this kumarila argues, God being viewed as

omnipotent, some amount of evil was indispensable for creation could not be a

binding on Him. If it is a binding on Him, the theists could not claim Gods

omnipotence.

Kumarila further attacks the theists point of God as an all perfect being.

If God creates the world, what is the purpose behind His creation of this

world? But the theists reply of Gods compassion or pity to create the world

could not do away His omnipotence and omniscience.

35. Indian Atheism

D.P.C
P 223
 (m

Badarayana replies that God creates the world out of Sport or Lila. The

kings engage themselves in the act of hunting not to satisfy specific want but

because it is a mere pastime for them. Children fond to play for having the

sheer fun of the game.

Kumarila points - If the activity of the creator were due to a desire for

mere amusement, that would go against His ever contentedness. And (instead

o f affording any amusement) the great amount of work (required for creation)

would be a source of infinite trouble for Him. And His desire to destroy the

world (at the time of Pralaya or Periodic cosmic, dissolution) would be hardly

explicable. 36

Both Kumarila and Prabhakara reject the ideas of creation and

dissolution of the world and accept a constant process of becoming and

passing away. 37

Kumarila, thus pointing to. the internal contradictions involved in the

position of the theists argued that the Vedic passages apparently referring God

and His creation were not to be taken as actual evidences for the existence of

God.

36. ibid 37. Ibid

P .224 P. 234
 (1 4 8 )

He maintained the real implication of celtain passages of the Mahabharata and

the Puranas which only are superficially understood or basically

misunderstood. For the Vedantic theists the strongest proofs for the existence

o f God were the scriptural or Vedic declarations in favour of Him. Thus,

refuting the doctrine o f God, which was perhaps originally advanced by

Badarayana in his Brahmasutra, Kumarila rejected Nyaya Vaisesikas view of

God, He argued that Nyaya Vaisesikas conception of Pralaya or universal

dissolution like its theological counterpart creation hardly made any sense.38

Kumarilas anti-theistic polemic was broader than Santaraksita and

Gunaratna. Their refutation was confined to the Nyaya VWesikas inference

of God. But Kumarilas refutation covered three parts. First, the refutation of

the doctrine of God expounded by Badarayana, in the Brahmasutra.

Secondly, the refutation of the Nyaya-Vai^esika view of God and

thirdly, the refutation of the Advaita VedSntic conception of God . 39

Radhakrishnan referring to the absence of God in the Mfmamsa philosophy,

comments, The Locuna of the Purva Mfmamsa was so unsatisfactory that the

latter writers slowly smuggled in God. 40

38. Ibid 39 ibid 4 0 . Ibid

P .2 2 7 P .2 2 0 P 212
 ( 14 1 )

He mentions in this connection the examples of Vedanta Desika,

Apadeva etc. Of these two, the former produced a strange work called the

Ses'vara MnnamsS-or Mlmamsa with God while latter advanced the thesis -

also strange from the Mimamsa point of view - that during the time of the

universal dissolution (pralaya) the Vedas remained and retained in the memory

of God.

Apadevas theory that God retained the Vedas during the timt, of

pralaya could be advanced only in complete disregard of the older and the

authentic stand point of the MTmamsa philosophy according to which the

conception of pralaya, like that of srsti or creation, was only a figment of the

theists imagination. But Prabhakara and Kumielia totally rejected the

conception of Pralaya and Srsti.

Vivekananda also in his third lecture on Practical Vedanta delivered

in London on 17th November 1896, affirmed that it is better, that mankind

should become atheist by following reason than blindly believing in two

hundred million of gods as the authority of anybody. The glory of man is that

he is a thinking being. Vivekananda so valued reason because he knew that his

people were rolling in superstition due to their ignorant reliance on authority

 ( 14 ?)

Believing in rationalism, Vivekananda necessarily believed in the

identity of. the individual who must not let himself be submerged by any

authority, priestly or royal. 41

Thus, in short the later tendencies of reconciling the Mimamsa

philosophy with theism amounted only to upsetting the fundamentals of this

philosophy.

4 1 . S w a m i V iv e k a n d a s V e d a n t ic S o c ia lis m -
R . K . D a s G u p ta
P 50