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Road Map: 2 off then case

Trump Politics DA

Trump is really unpopular right now

The Hill 2/3 Brooke Seipel, February 3, 2017.
President Trump has the highest disapproval rating of any new
president ever polled, according to a new survey. A majority of respondents, 53 percent,
disapprove of how Trump is handling his job in the CNN/ORC International poll released Friday, while 44 percent approve.

Trump is the only president to hold a net negative rating this early in
CNN reported that

a presidency. However, the vast majority of respondents, 78 percent, say Trump is handling the presidency as
they would have expected. The network compared Trump's ratings to past presidents, noting that Ronald Reagan's
first approval rating measured at 51 percent from Gallup in 1981 7 points above Trump's rating in the CNN poll
but Reagan's disapproval number was far lower than Trump's at just 13 percent, compared to Trump's 53 percent.
George W. Bush, the last president to be elected without winning the popular vote, also held a more positive
approval rating at 57 percent in February of his first year in office. Trump's first two weeks as president have been
punctuated by national protests over his executive order denying entry to nationals from seven predominantly
Muslims nations for 90 days while suspending the U.S. refugee program for 120 days. A majority of those polled by
CNN, 53 percent, oppose Trump's executive order, while 47 percent say they favor the action. Trump's executive
order to construct a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border also faces opposition, with 60 percent of Americans surveyed by
CNN opposed to the proposal. Trump said last week that construction on the wall could begin in "months." The CNN
poll of 1,002 adults was conducted Jan. 31 to Feb. 2 via landlines and cellphones with an overall margin of error of 3
percentage points.

Engagement with China now key for Trump to achieve everything in

his agendait allows him to be perceived as more rational and
increases his popularity.
Chen 12/14 (Dingding Chen, professor of International Relations at Jinan
University, 4 Tips for US President-Elect Trumps China Policy,
In a little over a month since Donald Trumps stunning victory in the presidential election, the president-elect has
already, as he promised during the campaign, adopted a new thinking on China, most notably with his highly
controversial remarks on the United States one China policy. It all started with a seemingly harmless courtesy
call from Taiwans leader Tsai Ing-wen and developed into a mini-crisis in U.S.-China relations after Trump doubled
down by threatening to change a decades-long U.S. stance in the form of the one China policy. All these
unpredictable moves have seriously worried analysts in both countries as many prominent scholars have come
out criticizing Trumps dangerous gambit. As the two most powerful economies in the world today, such a rocky
it is imperative
start for U.S.-China relations certainly will not benefit anyone, including the world. Therefore,
for Trump to pay serious attention to the following issues if he still hopes for a stable
and mature U.S.-China relationship. First, Trump must focus on the long-term side of U.S.-
China relations. The U.S. democratic system, with its presidential election every four years and other
elections in between, unfortunately pushes its leaders to focus on short-term gains rather than long-term national
benefits. Trump is under tremendous pressures to deliver his campaign promises quickly; to make America great
again. Given his narrow victory in the presidential election (winning the electoral vote, but losing the popular vote),
it is understandable that he might want to score points on the economy first. As a result, China becomes the target.
But this thinking is dangerous, as the United States and China are engaged in long-term
competition and cooperation. In the long run, both powers will benefit so long as they are patient in resolving their
differences while making an effort toward pursuing common interests. Any short term policies by
Trump that antagonize China would only make America worse off and
definitely not great again. Second, Trump must learn more about the history of U.S.-China relations.
Trump is known for regarding himself as a smarter than everyone else and is not very interested in learning or
acquiring knowledge. Despite his bragging about having read many books on China, his recent behavior and
remarks demonstrate the opposite. There are already too many biases and misunderstandings between the United
States and China due to a variety of reasons, with one of them being the complicated history of their relationship. A
new book by veteran journalist John Pomfret, titled The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom, would be a good
Third, Trump must
start as it details the two century love-hate relationship between the two powers.
develop a win-win economic relationship with China. Given Trumps campaign promises
and the dire working class situation in the United States, it is very likely that he will initiate trade and currency wars
against China, with the hope of restoring the U.S. economy and creating additional jobs at home. While such
thinking is tempting, it is imperative for Trump to learn and understand the economic logic behind U.S. economic
engagement with China. The main reason why manufacturing jobs have disappeared in the United States is not
because of globalization, as Trump seems to argue, but because of technological developments such as automation.
China can help the United States create more jobs at home by encouraging more Chinese investment into the U.S.
and reduce the U.S. trade deficit by importing more U.S. goods, but a trade or currency war would only anger China,
with possible economic retaliation to follow.A low-key dialogue with the Chinese
government would produce more effective results, unless Trump is only interested in
appealing to populist voices at home. Finally, to achieve a stable and mature U.S.-China
relationship, Trump needs to be more patient with China though this may prove
especially difficult for a 70-year-old man whose temperament might be a issue (and his Twitter account doesnt help
either). It might be difficult for Trump himself to demonstrate self-control when tensions become high in bilateral
relations, but he could delegate to his closer aides, such as the incoming secretary of state and others, and have
them conduct various dialogues with China. Saving face is important in China culturally and for the United States
as well to some degree. If, unfortunately, a crisis were to break out between the United States and China, Trump
should be very careful not to let his emotions take control, which would only make things worse. Above all, Trump
needs to focus on his domestic agendas and not stir up troubles abroad, especially with an important economic
partner like China.
A stable and mature strategic relationship with China is
one fundamental fact that may help realize Trumps agenda to
make America great again. And for China, good ties with the U.S. will also help make China
great again.

Keeping Trump unpopular is essential to having a chance at fighting

back against his agenda and restoring trust in democracy.
Sargent 1/26 Washington Post, Why Trumps bad poll numbers could
matter, January 26, 2017.

A new Quinnipiac poll finds that Donald Trumps approval rating has soared all the way up to 36 percent, while 44
percent of American voters disapprove of his handling of the presidency so far. Now, youll be forgiven for thinking
that these numbers dont matter. After all, Trump won the presidency even though he was deeply unpopular and
heres why Trumps approval
majorities saw him as unfit for the presidency, right? Yes. But
numbers are still worth keeping an eye on: If theres anything that
can possibly get congressional Republicans to exercise meaningful
oversight on Trump or act as a check on him in other ways, its
horrifically awful poll numbers. Of course, not even that might be enough to get them to do
that, but theres at least a chance that they could. Along these lines, one thing that is notable about the new
Quinnipiac poll is that it shows Trump may be on very thin ethical ice with the public. For instance: Only 39
percent of Americans say Trump is honest, vs. 56 percent who say hes not. Seventy percent support a review of
Trumps finances to identify possible conflicts of interest that may interfere with his job as president. Fifty-four
percent say Trump has more conflicts of interest than most politicians. A total of 60 percent are either very (41)
or somewhat (19) concerned that Trump would veto a law that would be good for the country because it would hurt
his business interests. Only 33 percent are very satisfied with Trumps plan to allow his sons to run his
businesses to prevent conflicts of interest. Another 20 percent are only somewhat satisfied, while a total of 44
percent are either not so satisfied (12) or not satisfied at all (32) with that. In one sense, these last numbers are
good for Trump a total of 53 percent are either very or somewhat satisfied. On the other hand, those in the
somewhat camp might get a lot shakier and slide into the not-satisfied camp if new information about
conflicts emerges. Thin ice. And remember, the very fact that Trump has chosen to do nothing meaningful with his
business arrangement to prevent conflicts makes it more likely that such conflicts and possibly full-blown
corruption will indeed take place and will ultimately get uncovered by dogged investigative reporting. By the
way: Republicans seem to be just fine with Trumps conflicts. Fifty-three percent of Republicans oppose a review of
his finances. And 70 percent are satisfied with his arrangement for his businesses. Those numbers among
A whole lot is riding on getting
Republicans are reason for real pessimism.
congressional Republicans to stop relentlessly protecting Trump
not just on the ethics front, but also in other areas where he is
undermining our democracy.
Republicans are likely to continue to do nothing to prod Trump to show more transparency about his business
holdings, let alone exercise real oversight. They are likely to hew to Trumps general unwillingness to countenance a
full, independent probe into possible Russian meddling in the election, which makes it less likely that serious steps
will be done to prevent it from happening again. And they are likely to continue saying little to rebut Trumps lies
about voter fraud. This isnt just a problem because those lies undermine public faith in our
democracy. Its also disconcerting because Trump is vowing an investigation into that nonexistent fraud,
potentially laying the groundwork for a likely escalation in GOP efforts to restrict voting rights. It may be that
nothing, ever, will get congressional Republicans to exercise meaningful ethical oversight with regard to Trumps
conflicts; or to support a full, independent probe into Russian meddling; or to declare unequivocally and in a
concerted way that, no, millions of people did not vote illegally in our election; and no, voter fraud is not rampant,
as Trump says it is. As I keep shouting at you, there is no denying that the situation right now is really quite bleak.
But perhaps if enough new revelations come out about Trump conflicts or corruption, and if Democrats can find new
and innovative ways of bringing them to the attention of the public, creating real and sustained
blowback well, maybe this might change.

Keeping Trump on check is key to preventing nuclear warour

evidence is best.

The New York Times, 01/26

Jonah Engel Bromwich, Doomsday Clock Moves Closer to Midnight, Signaling Concern Among Scientists, The
New York Times,

It is getting closer to midnight. On Thursday, the group of scientists who orchestrate the
Doomsday Clock, a symbolic instrument informing the public when the
earth is facing imminent disaster, moved its minute hand from three to two
and a half minutes before the final hour. It was the closest the clock had
been to midnight since 1953, the year after the United States and the
Soviet Union conducted competing tests of the hydrogen bomb. Though
scientists decide on the clocks position, it is not a scientific instrument, or even a physical one. The movement
of its symbolic hands is decided upon by the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
The organization introduced the clock on the cover of its June 1947 edition, placing it at seven minutes to
midnight. Since then, it has moved closer to midnight and farther away, depending on the boards conclusions.
Thursdays announcement was made by Rachel Bronson, the executive director and
publisher of the bulletin. She was assisted by the theoretical physicist Lawrence Krauss, the climate
scientist and meteorologist David Titley, and the former United States ambassador Thomas Pickering. Ms.
explained why the board had included the
Bronson, in a post-announcement interview,

30-second mark in the measurement. She said that it was an attention-

catching signal that was meant to acknowledge what a dangerous
moment were in, and how important it is for people to take note.
Were so concerned about the rhetoric, and the lack of respect
for expertise, that we moved it 30 seconds, she said. Rather
than create panic, were hoping that this drives action. In an op-ed
for The New York Times, Dr. Titley and Dr. Krauss elaborated on their
concerns, citing the increasing threats of nuclear weapons and climate
change, as well as President Trumps pledges to impede what they see as
progress on both fronts, as reasons for moving the clock closer to midnight.
Never before has the Bulletin decided to advance the clock
largely because of the statements of a single person, they wrote.
But when that person is the new president of the United States,
his words matter. The board has held the responsibility for the clocks movements since 1973,
when the bulletins editor, Eugene Rabinowitch, died. Composed of scientists, and nuclear and climate experts,
the board meets biannually to discuss where the clocks hands should fall in light of world events. In the 1950s,
the scientists feared nuclear annihilation, and since then, the board has begun to consider other existential
threats, including climate change, compromised biosecurity and artificial intelligence. There were crises that the
clock was not quick enough to take into account. The Cuban Missile Crisis, for instance, in 1962, did not change
the hands of the clock, which at the time stood at seven minutes to midnight. An explanation on the Bulletins
website accounts for this seeming lapse in timekeeping: The Cuban Missile Crisis, for all its potential and
ultimate destruction, only lasted a few weeks, it says. However, the lessons were quickly apparent when the
United States and the Soviet Union installed the first hotline between the two capitals to improve
communications, and, of course, negotiated the 1963 test ban treaty, ending all atmospheric nuclear testing.
The end of the Cold War came as a relief to those who had lived in fear of
nuclear annihilation for decades, and the minute hand slowly moved away
from danger. In 1990, it was at 10 minutes to midnight. The next year, it
was a full 17 minutes away, at the relatively undisturbing time of 11:43. The illusion that tens of
thousands of nuclear weapons are a guarantor of national security has been stripped away, the Bulletin said at
Conflict between India and
the time. But over the next two decades the clock slowly ticked back.

Pakistan, both of whom staged nuclear weapons tests three weeks apart,
had the clock at nine minutes to midnight in 1998. By 2007, fears about
Iranian and North Korean nuclear capacity had pushed it to 11:55. By 2015,
the scientists were back in a state of unmitigated concern, with the clock
at three minutes to midnight, the closest it had been since 1984.
Unchecked climate change, global nuclear weapons
modernizations, and outsized nuclear weapons arsenals pose
extraordinary and undeniable threats to the continued existence
of humanity, the bulletin said. World leaders have failed to act with the
speed or on the scale required to protect citizens from potential
catastrophe. These failures of political leadership endanger every person
on Earth, it added.
Keep trust in democracy alive is key to prevent many scenarios for
war and extinction
Diamond 95
Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting
Democracy in the 1990s,
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the
coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of
Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful
international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have
utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on
Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of
these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or
aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy , with its
provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and
openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this
century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a
truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not
aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their
leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own
populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency.
Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not
build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another.
Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading
partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for
investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they
must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the
destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor
international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their
openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret.
Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil
liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only
reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security
and prosperity can be built.

Next Off
Allied Proliferation DA
Withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea pushes both South
Korea and Japan to get nuclear weapons.
Brands, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and History at
Duke University, 15
(Hal, Fools Rush Out? The Flawed Logic of Offshore Balancing,
The fundamental reason is that both U.S. influence and international stability are thoroughly
interwoven with a robust U.S. forward presence. Regarding influence, the protection that
Washington has afforded its allies has equally afforded the United States great sway over those allies policies.43 During the Cold
War and after, for instance, the United States has used the influence provided by its security
posture to veto allies pursuit of nuclear weapons, to obtain more advantageous terms in
financial and trade agreements, and even to affect the composition of allied nations governments.44 More broadly, it has
used its alliances as vehicles for shaping political, security, and economic agendas in
key regions and bilateral relationships, thus giving the United States an outsized voice on a range of important issues. To be clear,
this influence has never been as pervasive as U.S. officials might like, or as some observers might imagine. But by any reasonable
standard of comparison, it has nonetheless been remarkable. One can tell a similar story about the relative stability of the post-war
order. As even some leading offshore balancers have acknowledged, the lack of conflict in regions like Europe in recent decades is
not something that has occurred naturally. It has occurred because the American pacifier has suppressed precisely the dynamics
that previously fostered geopolitical turmoil. That pacifier has limited arms races and security competitions by providing the
It has soothed historical rivalries by
protection that allows other countries to under-build their militaries.

affording a climate of security in which powerful countries like Germany and

Japan could be revived economically and reintegrated into thriving and fairly
cooperative regional orders. It has induced caution in the behavior of allies
and adversaries alike, deterring aggression and dissuading other
destabilizing behavior. As John Mearsheimer has noted, the United States effectively acts as a night
watchman, lending order to an otherwise disorderly and anarchical environment.45 What would happen if

Washington backed away from this role? The most logical answer is that both U.S. influence
and global stability would suffer. With respect to influence, the United States would effectively
be surrendering the most powerful bargaining chip it has traditionally wielded
in dealing with friends and allies, and jeopardizing the position of leadership it has
used to shape bilateral and regional agendas for decades. The consequences would seem no less
damaging where stability is concerned. As offshore balancers have argued, it may be that U.S. retrenchment would force local
powers to spend more on defense, while perhaps assuaging certain points of friction with countries that feel threatened or encircled
removing the American pacifier would
by U.S. presence. But it equally stands to reason that

liberate the more destabilizing influences that U.S. policy had previously stifled. Long-
dormant security competitions might reawaken as countries armed themselves more vigorously;
historical antagonisms between old rivals might reemerge in the absence of a robust
U.S. presence and the reassurance it provides. Moreover, countries that seek to revise
existing regional orders in their favorthink Russia in Europe, or China in Asiamight indeed applaud U.S. retrenchment, but they
might just as plausibly feel empowered to more assertively press their interests. If the United States has been a kind of Leviathan in
key regions, Mearsheimer acknowledges, then take away that Leviathan and there is likely to be big trouble.46 Scanning the
global horizon today, one can easily see where such trouble might arise. In Europe, a revisionist Russia is already destabilizing its
neighbors and contesting the post-Cold War settlement in the region. In the Gulf and broader Middle East, the threat of Iranian
ascendancy has stoked region-wide tensions manifesting in proxy wars and hints of an incipient arms race, even as that region also
In East Asia, a rising China is
contends with a severe threat to its stability in the form of the Islamic State.
challenging the regional status quo in numerous ways, sounding alarms among its
neighborsmany of whom also have historical grievances against each other. In these circumstances, removing the
American pacifier would likely yield not low-cost stability, but increased conflict
and upheaval. That conflict and upheaval, in turn, would be quite damaging to U.S.
interests even if it did not result in the nightmare scenario of a hostile power dominating a key region. It is hard to
imagine, for instance, that increased instability and acrimony would produce the robust
multilateral cooperation necessary to deal with transnational
threats from pandemics to piracy. More problematic still might be the
economic consequences. As scholars like Michael Mandelbaum have argued, the enormous progress
toward global prosperity and integration that has occurred since World War II (and now the Cold
War) has come in the climate of relative stability and security provided largely by the
United States.47 One simply cannot confidently predict that this progress would endure amid escalating geopolitical
competition in regions of enormous importance to the world economy. Perhaps the greatest risk that a strategy of
offshore balancing would run, of course, is that a key region might not be able to maintain its own
balance following U.S. retrenchment. That prospect might have seemed far-fetched in the early post-Cold War era, and it
remains unlikely in the immediate future. But in East Asia particularly, the rise and growing assertiveness of China has
highlighted the medium-to long-term danger that a hostile power could in fact gain regional
primacy. If Chinas economy continues to grow rapidly, and if Beijing continues to increase military spending by 10 percent or
more each year, then its neighbors will ultimately face grave challenges in containing Chinese
power even if they join forces in that endeavor. This possibility, ironically, is one to which leading advocates of retrenchment
have been attuned. The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, Mearshimer writes, because its Asian
neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.48 If this is true, however, then offshore balancing becomes a dangerous
it could lead countries like Japan and
and potentially self-defeating strategy. As mentioned above,

South Korea to seek nuclear weapons, thereby stoking arms races and
elevating regional tensions. Alternatively, and perhaps more worryingly, it might encourage the scenario that
offshore balancers seek to avoid, by easing Chinas ascent to regional hegemony. As Robert Gilpin has written, Retrenchment by its
very nature is an indication of relative weakness and declining power, and thus retrenchment can have a deteriorating effect on
In East Asia today, U.S. allies rely on U.S. reassurance to
relations with allies and rivals.49
navigate increasingly fraught relationships with a more assertive China precisely
because they understand that they will have great trouble balancing Beijing on their
own. A significant U.S. retrenchment might therefore tempt these countries to
acquiesce to, or bandwagon with, a rising China if they felt that prospects for
successful resistance were diminishing as the United States retreated.50 In the same vein, retrenchment would compromise alliance
relationships, basing agreements, and other assets that might help Washington check Chinese power in the first placeand that
would allow the United States to surge additional forces into theater in a crisis. In sum, if one expects that Asian
countries will be unable to counter China themselves , then reducing U.S.
influence and leverage in the region is a curious policy. Offshore balancing might
promise to preserve a stable and advantageous environment while reducing U.S. burdens. But upon closer analysis, the

probable outcomes of the strategy seem more perilous and

destabilizing than its proponents acknowledge.
And US military withdrawal signals abandonment towards
Lee 14, (Christopher, is an active duty Major in the U.S. Army. A graduate of West
Point, he has served for eight years as an intelligence officer. He is currently a
Foreign Area Officer for the Northeast Asia region and a graduate student at
Columbia University. The views expressed are his own and not those of the United
States Army or the Department of Defense, TIME FOR U.S. FORCES TO LEAVE
7/24/14, //VZ)
American foreign policy towards the Republic of Korea (hereafter, South Korea) has focused on a
substantial amount of military and economic support and is primarily based on the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
United States and the Republic of Korea (1953). The mutual defense treaty continues to be the cornerstone of

the security relationship between the two, which guarantees peace and stability by extended
deterrence28,500 United States Forces Korea (USFK) troops on ground and the U.S. nuclear umbrella .
The combined threats of North Koreas nuclear weapons and conventional forces, as well as the specter of the collapse of the Kim Jong-Un family regime, compel the United States

The need to protect South Korea

government to continue its strong military defense of, and economic devotion to, South Korea.

against its neighbor to the north also drivesin partAmericas ongoing

rebalance or pivot towards Asia. President Barack Obama recently reaffirmed Americas dedication to Seoul and the mutual
defense treaty during his official visit to South Korea in April 2014. During that visit, the president promoted his pivot and

pledged a continuing U.S. commitment to a strong alliance with South Korea . Obama
reminded South Korean President Park Geun-hye that recent developments in North Korea, such as significant increased activity at Punggye-ri nuclear test site coupled with multiple
long-range missile tests, beckoned for fiercer efforts toward denuclearization.

Fear of abandonment leads Taiwan to get its hands on a

nuclear weapon.
Fitzpatrick 16 (Mark; ten years heading the IISS Non-Proliferation and Nuclear
Policy Programme, 26-year career in the US Department of State, where for the
previous ten years he focused on non-proliferation issues, 2/2/16, Asias Latent
Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, accessed through UMich Library,
As noted earlier,fear of abandonment by the US is the other factor that, in
conjunction with fear of the mainland, could possibly again push Taiwan down the
nuclear path as an option to replace US protection. Indeed, there could be reasons
to question Washington's Willingness to come to Taiwan's assis-tance in
the future. One reason is Beijing's growing importance to the US in almost every area of economic and
transnational policy, from non-proliferation to climate change. Washington insists that the China relationship will not
lead to abandoning allies. Yetsome American commentators have called for stop-ping- arms
sales to Taiwan in exchange for Beijing's cooperation on other issues of greater
geopolitical importance.89 In fact, Taiwan today does not have a formal US defence
guarantee. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which replaced the 1954 defence treaty following the
termination of diplomatic relations, is ambiguous. It declares it is the policy of the US to 'consider any effort to
determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means ... a threat to the peace and security of the Western
Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States', to provide Taiwan with 'arms of a defensive character', and
to 'maintain the capacity of the US to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan'. This falls far short of the previous commitment
for military assistance under the 1954 defence treaty, even though commitments under the latter were not airtight,
either.% US president Bill Clinton in 2004 acknowledged that the US 'had never said whether we would or wouldn't
come to the defence of Taiwan if it were attacked'.91 When the US in 2001 designated Taiwan as the equivalent of a
major non-NATO ally, it allowed Taiwan to submit mili-tary equipment requests at any time, rather than annually,
but it did not otherwise change the nature of the relationship. And there has been no follow-through on a 2001
commitment to help Taiwan acquire modern submarines, of import partly because the US no longer manufactures
diesel submarines and because other states that do so are unwilling to suffer Beijing's ire.' Although the TRA has
sometimes been interpreted to mean that the US will defend Taiwan in the case of an attack, this is not necessarily
the case.To the extent that US deterrence covers Taiwan it is a de facto, not de jure,
commitment, and therefore more amenable to change . There is nothing close to a Taiwan
equivalent of the extended deterrence consultations the US holds with Japan and South Korea. Taiwan is
hardly even mentioned in many American analytical discussions of extended
deterrence. As a 2010 Policy paper explained, extended deterrence is a latent issue in the Taiwan, case,
'subsumed by the larger question of whether the United States would come to the island's defence at all." Think
tanks find it difficult to obtain funding from US governmental and philanthropic foundations for research or Track H
One last factor that
events on extended deterrence for Taiwan. The topic is considered too sensitive.
could also contribute to a Taiwan nuclear push would be a breakdown in
the global non-prolif-eration regime. If Japan or South Korea were to go nuclear
in response to Chinese and North Korean threats, there would be fewer inhibitions
on Taiwan doing so as well. In such a circum-stance, the NPT would be a dead letter .
The causation for such a domino effect would not be direct: Japanese or South Korean nuclear weapons would pose
since these allies would only seek nuclear weapons in the event of
no threat to Taiwan. But
no longer being able to rely on US protection, there would also be a loss of
credibility regarding lingering US commitments to not-quite-ally Taiwan.

East Asian nuclear proliferation substantially increases the likelihood

multiple scenarios for global nuclear war--this is the biggest impact in the
Kroenig, 16Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of
Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft
Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council (Matthew, Approaching
Critical Mass: Asias Multipolar Nuclear Future, National Bureau of Asian Research
Special Report #58, June 2016)

The most important reason to be concerned about nuclear weapons in Asia , of course,
is the threat that nuclear weapons might be used. To be sure, the use of nuclear
weapons remains remote, but the probability is not zero and the consequences
could be catastrophic. The subject, therefore, deserves careful scrutiny. Nuclear use would
overturn a 70-year tradition of nonuse, could result in large-scale death and
destruction, and might set a precedent that shapes how nuclear weapons are
viewed, proliferated, and postured decades hence. The dangers of escalation may
be magnified in a multipolar nuclear order in which small skirmishes present
the potential to quickly draw in multiple powers, each with a finger on the
nuclear trigger. The following discussion will explore the logic of crisis escalation and strategic stability in a
multipolar nuclear order.14
the existence of multipolar nuclear powers means that crises may pit
First and foremost,
multiple nuclear-armed states against one another. This may be the result of formal
planning if a states strategy calls for fighting multiple nuclear-armed adversaries simultaneously. A state may
choose such a strategy if it believes that a war with one of these states would inevitably mean war with both.
Alternatively, in a war between state A and state B, state A may decide to conduct a preventive strike on state C for
fear that it would otherwise seek to exploit the aftermath of the war between states A and B. Given U.S. nuclear
strategy in the early Cold War, for example, it is likely that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet
Union would have also resulted in U.S. nuclear attacks against China, even if China had not been a direct participant
conflicts of interest between nuclear powers may
in the precipitating dispute. In addition,
inadvertently impinge on the interests of other nuclear-armed states, drawing
them into conflict. There is always a danger that one nuclear power could take
action against a nuclear rival and that this action would unintentionally cross a
red line for a third nuclear power, triggering a tripartite nuclear crisis . Linton Brooks and
Mira Rapp-Hooper have dubbed this category of phenomena the security trilemma.15 For example, if the United
States were to engage in a show of force in an effort to signal resolve to Russia, such as the flushing of nuclear
There is also the issue of
submarines, this action could inadvertently trigger a crisis for China.
catalytic war. This may be the first mechanism by which Cold War strategists feared that multiple nuclear
players could increase the motivations for a nuclear exchange. They worried that a third nuclear power,
such as China, might conduct a nuclear strike on one of the superpowers, leading the
wounded superpower to conclude wrongly that the other superpower was responsible
and thereby retaliate against an innocent state presumed to be the aggressor . This
outcome was seen as potentially attractive to the third state as a way of destroying the superpowers and promoting
itself within the global power hierarchy. Fortunately, this scenario never came to pass during the Cold War. With
modern intelligence, reconnaissance, and early warning capabilities among the major powers, it is more difficult to
imagine such a scenario today, although this risk is still conceivable among less
technologically developed states. In addition to acting directly against one another, nuclear
powers could be drawn into smaller conflicts between their allies and brought
face to face in peak crises. International relations theorists discuss the concept of
chain ganging within alliance relationships, the dangers of which are more
severe when the possibility of nuclear escalation is present .16 Although this was a potential
problem even in a bipolar nuclear order, the more nuclear weapons states present, the
greater the likelihood of multiple nuclear powers entering a crisis. A similar logic
suggests that the more fingers on the nuclear trigger, the more likely it is that
nuclear weapons will be used. Multipolar nuclear crises are not without
historical precedent.17 Several Cold War crises featured the Soviet Union against the United States and
its European nuclear-armed allies, Britain and later France. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War involved the United States,
the Soviet Union, and a nuclear-armed Israel. The United States has been an interested party in regional nuclear
disputes, including the Sino-Soviet border war of 1969 and several crises in the past two decades on the Indian
many of these crises stand out as among the most dangerous of
subcontinent. Indeed,
the nuclear era.
accelerating our own downfall.

Moving on to Case:
No chance of unification, China will intervene to ensure North Korea exists
Kim 2015 - professor of international finance and the coordinator of finance at the University of
Detroit Mercy
Suk Hi, The Survival of North Korea: A Case for Rethinking the U.S.-North Korea Nuclear
Standoff, North Korean Review11.1 (Spring 2015): 101-113
Since the war prediction and the collapse prediction are not realistic, the most concrete prediction is the continuation of a t wo-state
all, China and South Korea need to maintain North Korea as a buffer
peninsula with limited reforms.20 After
in order to protect their national interests. As a result, North Korea is dependent on China as its greatest
economic benefactor-negotiating economic aid, inward investment, foreign trade, and political support-especially with the Six-Party
Talks at a standstill since 2009 and with U.S. and UN economic sanctions in effect. Basically, Chinese
aid and support are
the economic component, among the cultural-historical and political-ideological factors, preventing a sudden
collapse of North Korea, and China will never allow the U.S. to unite the Korean peninsula on
American terms. As Chinese objectives toward North Korea protect Chinese interests, international efforts to
foment a North Korean crisis or foreign regime change will always face Chinese resistance . And should
circumstances run out of control, China will intervene to restore stability and political order .21

North Korea wont disarmtheyre guaranteed to cheat

Bolton Aug 26, 2015 - senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is a former U.S.
ambassador to the UN
John R, North Korea may seek new nuke deal with weak Obama,
And yet, official Washington is all but asleep on the North Korean threat. President Obama, despite his much-touted pivot from the
Middle East, rarely pays it much attention. Indeed, the pivot itself has faded from view. The 2016 presidential candidates have yet
to address the issue seriously. Even West Coast politicians, whose constituents should worry about Obamas gutting of Americas
missile-defense program, seem uninterested. Worse than U.S. inattention, however, is the risk that in the Obama administrations
waning days the president and Secretary of State John Kerry
may conclude they have one more glorious
negotiation left in them. Fresh from signing the Vienna agreement regarding Irans nuclear-
weapons program, they may try again with North Korea. Although the American public, by increasingly large
margins, rejects the Vienna deal, the administration seems poised to secure the votes it needs to preserve it from congressional
opposition. Pyongyang may have the same negotiation scenario in mind, although for exactly opposite reasons . Kim Jong Un
likely sees Irans diplomatic triumph in Vienna for what it was: a determined, persistent nuclear
weapons aspirant, aided politically by Russia and China, was able to grind down a weak and
credulous American president. Using a sustained campaign of threats, falsehoods and stubbornness, Tehran achieved all
its strategic objectives in the negotiations with the Security Councils five permanent members and Germany. North Korea
could well conclude it can accomplish precisely the same objectiv e. After all, that kind of diplomacy has been its
trademark since the Korean War. Kims biggest problem is that Obamas term would end before Pyongyang could extract all the
concessions it desired. So, if Pyongyang wanted to find a way to initiate negotiations quickly, what better way than to start off with a
military provocation along the DMZ? Neither
presidential candidates nor congressional leaders can stop
Obama from pursuing yet another illusory diplomatic triumph as a second-term legacy . But
sober analysts should do whatever they can to prevent the Obama White House from making still
more concessions to a dictatorial regime that, based on its entire history, has no intention of keeping
its side of any bargain. This is very dangerous terrain, far more serious than merely exchanging
artillery fire.

Having troops stationed at the border is the only way to

prevent escalation and minimize the impact of the collapse
Metz 2015- Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute
Steven, "Strategic Insights: Thinking About Catastrophe: The Army in a Nuclear
Armed World," Dec 14,
Nothing is more important to American security than nuclear weapons. Despite all the fretting over terrorism,
hybrid threats, and conventional aggression, only nuclear weapons can threaten the existence of the United States
and destroy the global economy. This is certainly not news to American policymakers and military strategists: they
have recognized the centrality of nuclear weapons at least since the Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb in
1949. But so far, U.S. strategy has focused almost exclusively on deterring attacks from a hostile nuclear state,
preventing unfriendly nations from acquiring nuclear weapons and, after the break up of the Soviet Union, keeping
nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists. These missions remain vitally important, but today there is an
additional, less understood, element of the nuclear threat. As more states join the nuclear club, including some with
brittle or unpredictable regimes ,
a conflict not involving the United States could escalate to the
nuclear level or a government could lose control of nuclear weapons or see them
used during a large scale civil war. A catastrophe of this sort would devastate the
global economy and environment, destroy political stability across entire regions,
and unleash an unprecedented humanitarian disaster. This means that American strategists
and political leaders must expand the way they think about nuclear weapons. In addition to the traditional
the United States must now consider
deterrence and efforts to control what are often called "loose nukes,"
stabilization, relief, and reconstruction operations following a nuclear exchange, and
large scale, protracted operations to deal with loose nukes after the collapse of a
government or during a major internal conflict. The Army would play a leading role in
operations of this sort. Imagine a brittle, corrupt, ineffective or repressive government facing mounting internal
opposition including large-scale public protests and riots; intense criticism from social media; factionalism within
the elite; escalating terrorism and internal violence; economic stagnation, inflation, and widespread unemployment;
and military discontent. If history is a guide, the beleaguered regime would particularly fear its armed forces. To
Americans, it might seem that the logical reaction would be to address the causes of discontent and undertake
serious reform. However, brittle and repressive regimes can read history too. They know that reform can easily
spiral out of the control and lead to the regime's demise. Many dictators who tried to placate intense opposition
with reform ended up dead or in exile. There are other options that might seem appealing. Sometimes crackdowns
and increased repression works. Another time tested response is distraction: by trumpeting an external threat, the
regime inspires its opponents to "rally 'round the flag." Importantly, the armed forces, which are the most proximate
threat to a beleaguered regime, will tend to shift their focus to the external threat rather than the shortcomings of
its government. History is littered with examples of beleaguered regimes attempting strategic distraction.
Sometimes the results were tragicthink the seizure of the Falkland Islands by the Argentinian military dictatorship
in 1982but not catastrophic. In a world of nuclear states, though, distracting the public, elites, and armed forces
from internal problems by external assertiveness could lead neighboring states or adversaries to counter escalate,
thus beginning a slide toward doomsday. After all, that is exactly how World War I began. In the modern era, though,
doomsday might not mean four years of horrific trench warfare, but a nuclear strike or exchange by frightened
the more brittle a regime,
states convinced that lashing out is their only chance of survival. Unfortunately,
the greater the chances it will attempt to distract attention from its flaws. The path
to doomsday could also begin with civil war or regime collapse in a nuclear armed
state. Nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of malfeasant or desperate forces
willing to use them or willing to sell them to buy conventional weapons and pay
fighters. The bigger, more complex, and chaotic the nuclear state, the greater the danger posed by regime
collapse and internal conflict. Of today's nuclear states, North Korea is the most brittle and
unpredictable. If nuclear weapons are used in the next few decades, odds are that
Pyongyang will be the culprit. To deter this as much as possible, official U.S. policy should state that any
use of nuclear weapons by North Korea will result in occupation and regime change. Only the White House can
the U.S. military,
develop such a policy and it should obtain congressional backing as well, but
particularly the Army, can make it more credible by demonstrating its ability to not
only destroy North Korean military targets, but also to occupy and stabilize that
nation if necessary. Deterrence requires capability, communication, and credibility. The better the
U.S. military is at being capable of removing and replacing the North Korean regime,
the less likely North Korea will believe that it can get away with using nuclear
weapons. Admittedly, China would be opposed to such a policy, but that could have benefits, clarifying the risks
of North Korea's behavior and encouraging Beijing to be more active in controlling that dangerous nation.

China says no to the plan

Stanton 2015- an attorney in Washington, D.C., has advised the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on North Korea-related legislation
Josh, "China helps N Korea nuke up & break sanctions, then says sanctions don't
work," Nov 3,
Whether the Chinese actually believe this or are willfully disinforming us, our survey says that four out of five
Chinese experts are dealing in falsehoods. Why does China play these games? Lots of reasons, I
suppose, not all of them mutually exclusive. The fact that well-connected Chinese companies are
making a lot of money from their North Korea trade would be reason enough . After all,
that seems to be why South Korea continues to subsidize trade with North Korea, contrary to its national
interests. Other, more malign motives may also play a part a desire to distract U.S.
power in the region, to gain bargaining leverage over the U.S. on the Taiwan issue,
an institutional hostility to the U.S. and its interests, and as part of a grander
ambition to finlandize both Koreas (which is easier done by keeping them
divided). Its all speculative, of course. Whats beyond denying is that China isnt interested in solving this
problem; China is the problem. And until Chinas support for North Korea draws
consequences in its relations with the U.S. and its allies, it will contin
ue to be.

South Korea does not want the plan, purposefully ruins the
diplomatic efforts--causes an aggressive response from North
Korea, risking U.S.-Sino conflict.
Schake 14 (Kori Schake, fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 29, 2014. Pushing for Regime Change
aggressively trying to topple the Kim regime
in North Korea Is a Bad Idea - Why
could backfire -- badly.
In the pages of the Wall Street Journal, the Council on Foreign Relations Richard Haass makes an unusually reckless
recommendation for the doyen of establishment thinking: ending North Koreas existence as an independent
entity. I am sympathetic to the advocacy of regime change in North Korea there is no better case, either on
strategic or humanitarian grounds. Intervention in North Korea would liberate 200,000 Koreans trapped in
concentration camps, provide nutritional assistance to the 80 percent of Koreans suffering long-term deprivation,
reunite families separated for more than two generations, negate the nuclear weapons threat currently posed by
the Kim regime, alleviate the need for stationing American forces on the peninsula, remove the threat from 10,000
North Korean artillery pieces trained on Seoul, and end the proliferation pipeline that has assisted nuclear weapons
programs in Pakistan, Syria, and Iran. If it works, that is. And thats the problem with Haasss
recommendation: It assumes that we can turn the screws on Kim Jong Un
without catastrophic responses or the collapse of North Korea burgeoning into chaos.
Which is surprising from someone who wrote so ardently about the mistakes of such wars of choice. Implicit in
Haasss argument is that we are already at war of a tepid kind with North Korea, with the threat of much larger
conflagration looming. But those arguments were likewise made of Iraq, and Iraq had much less manifest means to
damage both the United States and our treaty allies. His argument is premised on confidence that he understands
if only we provided the right incentives, China would
both Chinese and Korean choices that
flip from bolstering Pyongyang. But the United States has been trying for
over a decade to turn that trick, with precious little sign of progress. Haass argues that
Chinas calculus is now changing, that North Korea is becoming a liability: Whereas Beijing previously supported
concern about refugees,
North Korea for reasons of ideology, restraining American influence, and
its overwhelming concern now is for years and more likely decades
of relative stability in the region so that it can continue to address
its many domestic challenges. Stability may be what China needs, but that doesnt appear to
be what China is choosing. Indeed, there appears to be little evidence that Beijing is
willing to back away from Pyongyang. It is similarly plausible that China still sees a scary
North Korea as useful in tying down Washingtons attention. It may well prefer that North Korea continues to
imprison its people rather than China having to police them. And Beijing might well be confident that Japan is
constrained domestically against nuclear weapons development. Moreover, the possibility may even exist for an
agreement with South Korea that worries about the credibility of an American security guarantee. After all, from
Seouls perspective President George W. Bush said the United States would not allow a nuclear North Korea but
he did. At the same time, Washington denuclearized half of the Korean peninsula, removing U.S. nuclear weapons
but two-thirds of South Koreans now favor developing nuclear weapons of their own. President Barack Obamas
record on enforcing red lines (hint: not good) will only have further aggravated South Koreas anxiety. Haass points
out that China appears more interested in relations with Seoul than with Pyongyang; perhaps China hopes to
achieve a peninsular condominium with the South Korean government to slowly shift dependence of North Korea
from China to South Korea. All of which is to say, as Haass himself has persuasively argued, that it is unsound to
premise a regime change strategy on the basis of speculative flights that are likely to be wrong in many respects.
The other major flaw in Haasss argument is lighting a fuse without putting adequate defense preparations in place.
His proposals for undermining it from within and denuding it of Chinese support corner the Kim regime.
These are deeply destabilizing moves against an erratic regime that boasts
of targeting its nuclear weapons at Los Angeles and Colorado Springs. Setting this train of events in motion would
make North Koreas a government with nothing to lose and thats the most
dangerous kind. It is also far beyond what South Korea, the ally most exposed
to North Korean retaliation, is likely to support. Another problem with Haasss Time to End the North
Korean Threat is that it is innocent of the scaffolding that international institutions and regional alliances provide
But getting the
and require. Haass recommends a trilateral U.S.-Chinese-South Korean understanding.
peace right will require much more: assuaging South Korean and Japanese anxiety
about reducing American troops; assuring the Philippines and others that an
agreement between China, the United States, and South Korea as Richard
advocates will not result in abandoning their concerns about Chinese military
provocations; ramping up U.N. involvement to manage the horrors internal to North Korea;
ensuring the Russians see no angle to exploit ; and verifying weapons dont flood out
to other rogue regimes. Haass is right that the United States government should be providing assurances to the
Chinese government that it would not take advantage of the Kim regimes collapse to move American military
forces north of the 38th parallel. Stability forces will surely be needed, but South Koreans would be much better at
the work anyway, as they speak the language and have ties of nationality and family to facilitate interaction. We
ought also to be seeking assurances from the Chinese they also would not move forces into a North Korean vacuum.
While persuading the Chinese to ratchet down their support for Kim Jong Un merits continuing effort, there is only
one lever that has shown any real success in dealing with the North Korean regime: cutting off their money. The
main sources of revenue for the North Korean leadership are evidently counterfeiting and proliferation. The former
Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey created a team of Treasury experts and
masterminded the means of sleuthing the money trail; his offices pressure in 2007 on Banco Delta Asia in Macau
brought North Korea into cooperation. It is an elegant, quiet, and deadly serious means of applying smart power
that hurts the regime without imposing further suffering on its benighted citizens. And its far closer to the
proportionate response President Obama hinted at for North Koreas hacking of Sony Entertainment and threats
against movie theaters showingThe Interview. These sanctions on leading regime figures are still the most practical
means to try and affect the behavior of North Koreas evil government.