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Assurance DA


**Regional commitment trending up now but a credibility gap

would cause cascading prolif and miscalc
Evidence is talking about abandoning Japan and South Korea why is that the aff?
(no link argument)

Thomas Berger 14, Professor of International Relations at Boston Universitys

Pardee School of Global Studies, PhD from MIT, Re: Richard Samuel's NY Times
quote, 3 Jul 2014,
At this point in time, however, it would be premature to base policy on the
expectation of inevitable American decline. The military balance continues to favor
the US and its allies, and if they work together they should be able to avoid a too
dramatic shift for a considerable time to come. Taiwan is not eager to reunify with
China - data provided by Shelly Rigger and others show large majorities would
prefer to remain independant, and while the Koreans feel they have to work with
China, they remain deeply suspicious of China as well. A recent ASAN poll shows
that 66% of South Koreans view China as a threat (down from 73% last year.) See
figure 5 in the survey available at
china/. A recent CSIS elite opinion survey shows likewise large majority of Korean
elites would prefer a US led order. See And the
United States continues to have considerable sources of strength that may endure
over time. Since the end of the Second World war there have been periodic waves
of predictions that the United States is in a state of inevitable decline - the current
wave is probably the 4th - and it is far from clear that the current pessimists are
more likely to be correct now than they were in the past. At the same time, it
should be remembered that there are real risks to leaving balancing to regional
powers. Japan, for instance, would be forced into taking much more aggressive
actions than it is now if it were forced to rely on its resources . South Korea might be
as well. Both countries would have to reopen the nuclear option, as might Taiwan,
Australia and others. Perhaps not a bad thing, if you believe like Kenneth Waltz that
the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the prospect of national incineration makes
for more sober decision making - "more nukes less Kooks." China, in response might
become more assertive as well, and the risk would go up of disastrous
miscalculations leading to conflicts that inevitably would drag the United States
back in. To paraphrase Lenin, the United States may not be interested in
international politics, but international politics is definitely interested in the United
States. The US experience in Europe in the 1990s was not very encouraging in this
regard. When the Yugoslav crisis broke out, the United States tried to sit back and
let the Europeans handle the problem . They failed - miserably. The conflict
threatened to spread, cracks appeared within NATO and between NATO and Russia,
and the US was pulled back in. Leaving it to the Europeans was, as Richard Haas
warned at the time, a recipe for disaster. Would the Asians do much better? (And
lets not even talk about the Middle East!)

**Relations with China and Japan are zero sum plan collapses
credibility with Japan
Pickering 14 Will Japan Become a Nuclear Weapons Power? HEATH PICKERING is
a writer for the E International Relations online database, JUN 29 2014 http://www.e-
US china relations blossomed lots of other relations link uniqueness
The American nuclear security umbrella has influenced Japans decision to continue
its anti-nuclear stance(Hughes 2007, p. 75). The security guarantee is underpinned
by the United States-Japan Security Treaty, which marked its 50th anniversary on 19
January 2010.[4] The benefits of the pact were mutually beneficial: Japan provided
America with the worlds largest unsinkable aircraft carrier for which America could
execute its strategic objectives in East Asia, while America guaranteed Japans
security, allowing Japan to rebuild its economy, access American markets, and keep
defence spending minimal (Packard 2010, p. 96). There are several conceptual
scenarios where Japan might consider establishing their own nuclear weapons
program. While tensions always exist in any bilateral relationship, the alliance is
being bolstered, in part, due to the US pivot to Asia. If the US were to significantly
withdraw from the region, Japan would be inclined to bolster its defence capabilities
and review its overall strategic position. Also, if the US were to heavily reduce its
stockpile, it might put into question Americas ability to effectively protect Japan,
tempting Japan to establish its own weapons program (Deutch 2005, p. 51). In
addition, Hugh White (2011) has suggested that Japans reliance on US security
could become a liability if the US-China relationship blossomed, causing Japans
interests to be sidelined and encouraging Tokyo to increase its strategic position.

**That spills over to South Korea and Taiwan - causes

regional arms race and china war turns the case
Goh 8 [Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and
International Relations at the Univ of Oxford (Evelyn, International Relations of the
Asia-Pacific, Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security
order, 2008 8(3):353-377, Oxford Journals Database]

The centrality of these mutual processes of assurance and deference means that
the stability of a hierarchical order is fundamentally related to a collective sense of
certainty about the leadership and order of the hierarchy. This certainty is rooted in
a combination of material calculations smaller states' assurance that the expected
costs of the dominant state conquering them would be higher than the benefits
and ideational convictions the sense of legitimacy, derived from shared values and
norms that accompanies the super-ordinate state's authority in the social order. The
empirical analysis in the next section shows that regional stability in East Asia in the
post-Second World War years can be correlated to the degree of collective certainty
about the US-led regional hierarchy. East Asian stability and instability has been
determined by U.S. assurances, self-confidence, and commitment to maintaining its
primary position in the regional hierarchy; the perceptions and confidence of
regional states about US commitment; and the reactions of subordinate states in
the region to the varied challengers to the regional hierarchical order. 4. Hierarchy
and the East Asian security order Currently, the regional hierarchy in East Asia is
still dominated by the United States. Since the 1970s, China has increasingly
claimed the position of second-ranked great power, a claim that is today legitimized
by the hierarchical deference shown by smaller subordinate powers such as South
Korea and Southeast Asia. Japan and South Korea can, by virtue of their alliance
with the United States, be seen to occupy positions in a third layer of regional major
powers, while India is ranked next on the strength of its new strategic relationship
with Washington. North Korea sits outside the hierarchic order but affects it due to
its military prowess and nuclear weapons capability. Apart from making greater
sense of recent history, conceiving of the US' role in East Asia as the dominant state
in the regional hierarchy helps to clarify three critical puzzles in the contemporary
international and East Asian security landscape. First, it contributes to explaining
the lack of sustained challenges to American global preponderance after the end of
the Cold War. Three of the key potential global challengers to US unipolarity
originate in Asia (China, India, and Japan), and their support for or acquiescence to,
US dominance have helped to stabilize its global leadership. Through its dominance
of the Asian regional hierarchy, the United States has been able to neutralize the
potential threats to its position from Japan via an alliance, from India by gradually
identifying and pursuing mutual commercial and strategic interests, and from China
by encircling and deterring it with allied and friendly states that support American
preponderance. Secondly, recognizing US hierarchical preponderance further
explains contemporary under-balancing in Asia, both against a rising China, and
against incumbent American power. I have argued that one defining characteristic
of a hierarchical system is voluntary subordination of lesser states to the dominant
state, and that this goes beyond rationalistic bandwagoning because it is
manifested in a social contract that comprises the related processes of hierarchical
assurance and hierarchical deference. Critically, successful and sustainable
hierarchical assurance and deference helps to explain why Japan is not yet a
normal country. Japan has experienced significant impetus to revise and expand
the remit of its security forces in the last 15 years. Yet, these pressures continue to
be insufficient to prompt a wholesale revision of its constitution and its
remilitarization. The reason is that the United States extends its security umbrella
over Japan through their alliance, which has led Tokyo not only to perceive no threat
from US dominance, but has in fact helped to forge a security community between
them (Nau, 2003). Adjustments in burden sharing in this alliance since the 1990s have arisen not from greater independent Japanese
strategic activism, but rather from periods of strategic uncertainty and crises for Japan when it appeared that American hierarchical assurance, along with
US' position at the top of the regional hierarchy, was in question. Thus, the Japanese priority in taking on more responsibility for regional security has been
to improve its ability to facilitate the US' central position, rather than to challenge it.13 In the face of the security threats from North Korea and China,
Tokyo's continued reliance on the security pact with the United States is rational. While there remains debate about Japan's re-militarization and the
growing clout of nationalist hawks in Tokyo, for regional and domestic political reasons, a sustained normalization process cannot take place outside of
the restraining framework of the United StatesJapan alliance (Samuels, 2007; Pyle, 2007). Abandoning the alliance will entail Japan making a conscience
choice not only to remove itself from the US-led hierarchy, but also to challenge the United States dominance directly. The United StatesROK alliance may
be understood in a similar way, although South Korea faces different sets of constraints because of its strategic priorities related to North Korea. As J.J. Suh
argues, in spite of diminishing North Korean capabilities, which render the US security umbrella less critical, the alliance endures because of mutual
identification in South Korea, the image of the US as the only conceivable protector against aggression from the North, and in the United States, an
image of itself as protector of an allied nation now vulnerable to an evil state suspected of transferring weapons of mass destruction to terrorist networks
(Suh, 2004). Kang, in contrast, emphasizes how South Korea has become less enthusiastic about its ties with the United States as indicated by domestic
protests and the rejection of TMD and points out that Seoul is not arming against a potential land invasion from China but rather maritime threats (Kang,
2003, pp.7980). These observations are valid, but they can be explained by hierarchical deference toward the United States, rather than China. The
ROK's military orientation reflects its identification with and dependence on the United States and its adoption of US' strategic aims. In spite of its primary
concern with the North Korean threat, Seoul's formal strategic orientation is toward maritime threats, in line with Washington's regional strategy.
Furthermore, recent South Korean Defense White Papers habitually cited a remilitarized Japan as a key threat. The best means of coping with such a threat
would be continued reliance on the US security umbrella and on Washington's ability to restrain Japanese remilitarization (Eberstadt et al., 2007). Thus,
while the United StatesROK bilateral relationship is not always easy, its durability is based on South Korea's fundamental acceptance of the United States
as the region's primary state and reliance on it to defend and keep regional order. It also does not rule out Seoul and other US allies conducting business
and engaging diplomatically with China. India has increasingly adopted a similar strategy vis--vis China in recent years. Given its history of territorial and
political disputes with China and its contemporary economic resurgence, India is seen as the key potential power balancer to a growing China. Yet, India
has sought to negotiate settlements about border disputes with China, and has moved significantly toward developing closer strategic relations with the
United States. Apart from invigorated defense cooperation in the form of military exchange programs and joint exercises, the key breakthrough was the
agreement signed in July 2005 which facilitates renewed bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation (Mohan, 2007). Once again, this is a key regional power that
could have balanced more directly and independently against China, but has rather chosen to align itself or bandwagon with the primary power, the
United States, partly because of significant bilateral gains, but fundamentally in order to support the latter's regional order-managing function.
Recognizing a regional hierarchy and seeing that the lower layers of this hierarchy have become more active since the mid-1970s also allows us to
understand why there has been no outright balancing of China by regional states since the 1990s. On the one hand, the US position at the top of the
hierarchy has been revived since the mid-1990s, meaning that deterrence against potential Chinese aggression is reliable and in place.14 On the other
hand, the aim of regional states is to try to consolidate China's inclusion in the regional hierarchy at the level below that of the United States, not to keep
it down or to exclude it. East Asian states recognize that they cannot, without great cost to themselves, contain Chinese growth. But they hope to socialize
China by enmeshing it in peaceful regional norms and economic and security institutions. They also know that they can also help to ensure that the
capabilities gap between China and the United States remains wide enough to deter a power transition. Because this strategy requires persuading China
about the appropriateness of its position in the hierarchy and of the legitimacy of the US position, all East Asian states engage significantly with China,
with the small Southeast Asian states refusing openly to choose sides between the United States and China. Yet, hierarchical deference continues to
explain why regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN + 3, and East Asian Summit have made limited progress. While the United
State has made room for regional multilateral institutions after the end of the Cold War, its hierarchical preponderance also constitutes the regional order
to the extent that it cannot comfortably be excluded from any substantive strategic developments. On the part of some lesser states (particularly Japan
and Singapore), hierarchical deference is manifested in inclusionary impulses (or at least impulses not to exclude the United States or US proxies) in
regional institutions, such as the East Asia Summit in December 2005. Disagreement on this issue with others, including China and Malaysia, has stymied
potential progress in these regional institutions (Malik, 2006). Finally, conceiving of a US-led East Asian hierarchy amplifies our understanding of how and
why the United StatesChina relationship is now the key to regional order. The vital nature of the Sino-American relationship stems from these two states'
structural positions. As discussed earlier, China is the primary second-tier power in the regional hierarchy. However, as Chinese power grows and Chinese
activism spreads beyond Asia, the United States is less and less able to see China as merely a regional power witness the growing concerns about

Chinese investment and aid in certain African countries. This causes a disjuncture between US global interests and US regional interests.

attempts to engage and socialize China are aimed at mediating its intentions. This
process, however, cannot stem Chinese growth, which forms the material basis of
US threat perceptions. Apprehensions about the growth of China's power culminates
in US fears about the region being lost to China, echoing Cold War concerns that
transcribed regional defeats into systemic setbacks.15 On the other hand, the US security
strategy post-Cold War and post-9/11 have regional manifestations that disadvantage China. The
strengthening of US alliances with Japan and Australia; and the deployment of US troops to Central,
South, and Southeast Asia all cause China to fear a consolidation of US global hegemony that will first
threaten Chinese national security in the regional context and then stymie China's global reach. Thus,
the key determinants of the East Asian security order relate to two core questions: (i) Can the US be
persuaded that China can act as a reliable regional stakeholder that will help to buttress regional
stability and US global security aims;16 and (ii) can China be convinced that the United States has
neither territorial ambitions in Asia nor the desire to encircle China, but will help to promote Chinese
development and stability as part of its global security strategy? (Wang, 2005). But, these questions
cannot be asked in the abstract, outside the context of negotiation about their relative positions in the
regional and global hierarchies. One urgent question for further investigation is how the process of
assurance and deference operate at the topmost levels of a hierarchy? When we have two great
powers of unequal strength but contesting claims and a closing capabilities gap in the same regional
hierarchy, how much scope for negotiation is there, before a reversion to balancing dynamics? This is
the main structural dilemma: as long as the United States does not give up its
primary position in the Asian regional hierarchy, China is very unlikely to act in a
way that will provide comforting answers to the two questions. Yet, the East Asian
regional order has been and still is constituted by US hegemony, and to change that
could be extremely disruptive and may lead to regional actors acting in highly
destabilizing ways. Rapid Japanese remilitarization, armed conflict across the Taiwan
Straits, Indian nuclear brinksmanship directed toward Pakistan, or a highly
destabilized Korean peninsula are all illustrative of potential regional disruptions. 5.
Conclusion To construct a coherent account of East Asia's evolving security order, I
have suggested that the United States is the central force in constituting regional
stability and order. The major patterns of equilibrium and turbulence in the region
since 1945 can be explained by the relative stability of the US position at the top of
the regional hierarchy, with periods of greatest insecurity being correlated with
greatest uncertainty over the American commitment to managing regional order.
Furthermore, relationships of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference
explain the unusual character of regional order in the post-Cold War era. However,
the greatest contemporary challenge to East Asian order is the potential conflict
between China and the United States over rank ordering in the regional hierarchy, a
contest made more potent because of the inter-twining of regional and global
security concerns. Ultimately, though, investigating such questions of positionality
requires conceptual lenses that go beyond basic material factors because it entails
social and normative questions. How can China be brought more into a leadership
position, while being persuaded to buy into shared strategic interests and constrain
its own in ways that its vision of regional and global security may eventually be
reconciled with that of the United States and other regional players? How can
Washington be persuaded that its central position in the hierarchy must be
ultimately shared in ways yet to be determined? The future of the East Asian
security order is tightly bound up with the durability of the United States' global
leadership and regional domination. At the regional level, the main scenarios of
disruption are an outright Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of
key US allies, particularly Japan. Recent history suggests, and the preceding
analysis has shown, that challenges to or defections from US leadership will come at
junctures where it appears that the US commitment to the region is in doubt, which
in turn destabilizes the hierarchical order. At the global level, American
geopolitical over-extension will be the key cause of change. This is the one
factor that could lead to both greater regional and global turbulence, if
only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional
challenges or defections. However, it is notoriously difficult to gauge thresholds
of over-extension. More positively, East Asia is a region that has adjusted to
previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional consensus
over the United States as primary state in a system of benign hierarchy could
accommodate a shifting of the strategic burden to US allies like Japan and Australia
as a means of systemic preservation. The alternatives that could surface as a result
of not doing so would appear to be much worse.

Both arms racing and china war are extinction risks dyadic
escalation is extremely unstable
Friedberg 15 Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at
Princeton University, P.H.D. Harvard University, member of the editorial boards of
Joint Forces Quarterly and The Journal of Strategic Studies and a member of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations,
The Debate Over US China Strategy, Survival, June 2015, Vol. 57 Issue 3, p89-110.
An explicit American shift towards offshore balancing would greatly exacerbate
these risks. While it is possible that the prospect of being forced to provide for their
own security would shock at least some current US allies into more vigorous
defence programmes, it would likely demoralise others, creating new opportunities
for Beijing to pursue divide-and-conquer strategems. The advocates of this
approach assume that, even if they cannot balance China alone, in the absence of
full US support other Asian countries will be impelled to cooperate more closely with
one another. Again, this may be easier in theory than it turns out to be in practice.
Some of the states that would have to join in a countervailing coalition (most
notably Japan and South Korea) have long histories of suspicion and animosity.
Others (such as Japan and India) do not, but they also have little experience of close
strategic cooperation of the kind that would be needed to counter a fast-growing
challenge. If it were to happen overnight, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by
current US security partners in East Asia (perhaps including Taiwan, as well as Japan
and South Korea) might improve their prospects for balancing against Chinese
power. But here again, there is likely to be a significant gap between theory and
reality. Assuming that Washington did not actively assist them, and that they could
not produce weapons overnight or in total secrecy, the interval during which its
former allies lost the protection of the American nuclear umbrella and the point at
which they acquired their own would be one in which they would be exposed to
coercive threats and possibly pre-emptive attack. Because it contains a large
number of tense and mistrustful dyads (including North Korea and South Korea,
Japan and China, China and Taiwan, Japan and North Korea and possibly South Korea
and Japan), a multipolar nuclear order in East Asia might be especially prone to
*Japan alliance Strong
U.S. Japan relations are on the brink Anti-China agenda is key
to holding alliance together
Why is BMD key if we have these joint exercises going on?

Jesse Johnson, 6-18-2016, "Top U.S. diplomat to visit Tokyo for talks with Japan,
India; China likely to be focus of discussions," Japan Times, STAFF WRITER,
A top U.S. diplomat will make a three-day trip to Tokyo starting Sunday for trilateral
talks with India and Japan a meeting likely to touch on maritime security and
cooperation amid Beijings growing assertiveness in the S outh China Sea. Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel will visit the capital
through Tuesday, where he will co-host a U.S. delegation with Assistant Secretary of
State for South and Central Asian Affairs Nisha Biswal, the U.S. State Department
said in a statement Friday. He will meet both Japanese and Indian government
officials to discuss trilateral cooperation and region-specific issues, the statement
added. These discussions will likely include the disputed South China Sea, where
Beijing has embarked on a massive land-reclamation program that has stoked
concern in the region. On Wednesday, Russel will travel to Osaka for meetings with
Japanese business leaders. Maritime Self-Defense vessels joined a U.S. Navy
aircraft-carrier strike group along with warships from India to jointly practice anti-
submarine warfare, air defense and search-and-rescue drills in the Malabar
exercises one of the largest and most complex drills held by the three countries
in waters east of Okinawa. Defense Ministry officials said Thursday that a Chinese
reconnaissance vessel entered Japanese territorial waters in the East China Sea
west of Kuchinoerabu Island in Kagoshima Prefecture around 3:30 a.m. Wednesday.
The incursion was just the second time a Chinese military vessel had entered
Japanese waters since the end of World War II.

Asian alliances have never been strongerthe pivots credible

Shambaugh 14, Director China Policy Program, George Washington University
Nonresident Senior Fellow Center for East Asian Policy Studies, The Brookings
Institution, America Reengages Asia,
In late April 2014, President Barack Obama paid his fifth official visit to Asiaa tour
of four nations intended to reassure nervous allies of Americas commitment
to them, to send signals to China that the United States was standing fast in
its regional presence and commitments, and to provide tangible proof of
Washingtons pivot (or rebalancing) policy towards the region. On all three
scores, the trip must be considered a success. Obama himself described the
purpose of the trip clearly on his final stop in Manila: Ive made clear throughout
this trip that the United States is renewing our leadership in the Asia-Pacific, and our
engagement is rooted in our alliances. Here is, I think, the general takeaway from
this trip: Our alliances in the Asia-Pacific have never been stronger. I can say
that unequivocally. Our relationships with ASEAN countries in Southeast Asia
have never been stronger. I dont think thats subject to dispute. There are
real reasons to share Obamas optimism about the outcome of the trip. Much was
accomplishedboth substantively and symbolically. Yet, inevitably, the future
will require constant further attention and efforts by Washington.

No ambiguityObamas made crystal clear commitments to

defend against Chinese aggression
Shambaugh 14, Director China Policy Program, George Washington University
Nonresident Senior Fellow Center for East Asian Policy Studies, The Brookings
Institution, America Reengages Asia,
I include these quotes concerning China because it is the most Obama has publicly
said about China during his entire presidency (including during his November 2009
visit to China). The messages he sought to convey were clear and consistent ; he
stayed on message. They were messages carefully crafted to reassure Beijing that
American policy and presence in the Asia-Pacific were welcoming and not ill-
disposed against it. At the same time, Obama was crystal clear that the United
States would not tolerate any coercive measures taken by China (or any
other nation) in the contested maritime disputes in the East and South
China Seas, and he explicitly stated that the US-Japan and US-Philippines alliances
applied to those nations maritime disputes with China, thus conveying a clear
deterrent signal to Beijing. He said this specifically with respect to supporting
Japans administrative control of the Senkaku Islands, but more generally with
respect to the Philippines: Through our treaty alliance, the United States has an
ironclad commitment to defend you, your security and your independence
(Manila, April 28). If Chinas government and military previously had any doubt
that that they would potentially be fighting the United States military if the Peoples
Liberation Army took armed action to enforce its maritime claims, there should be
no such illusion now.

U.S. assurances to Japan are ironcladofficial guidelines codify

commitmentthats key to stability
Wong 15, writer at The Hill, US, Japan boost military ties with eye on China, April,
Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Secretary Ashton Carter unveiled new
guidelines for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation on Monday that will see the East
Asian country adopt a greater military role as a counterweight to a rising China . The
new cooperation will enhance Japan's security, deter threats, and contribute to
international peace and stability , Kerry said at a press briefing in New York. In
remarks aimed at China, Kerry said the U.S. rejected any suggestion that air and sea
travel through international waters were subject to the whim and fancy of a big
state. He also said the U.S.'s security commitment to Japan remains ironclad and
covers all territories under Japans administration, including the Senkaku Islands,
which are claimed by China, Japan and Taiwan.
NK/BMD deal Aff
BMD is key to allied assurance absent domestic nuclear
Hersman 1/6 Rebecca Hersman, director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and
senior adviser for the International Security Program, North Korea's Nuclear
Provocation, CSIS, January 6th, 2016,
in the near term the test makes negotiations harder not easier. North Korea
A2: First,
cannot appear to be rewarded for such provocative behavior. The international
community, through the United Nations, will have no choice but to respond with
sticks such as additional sanctions before turning to carrots. The international communitys
ability to communicate consensus and resolve on the threat to international peace and security posed by
North Koreas nuclear adventurism is an essential precondition to any diplomatic path . Also, further
comparisons to the situation in Iran that allowed for a nuclear deal are probably best left in the past. This latest test just drives
home the tremendous differences between the two countries and their nuclear programs. The differences between the two cases are
profound. As compared to Kim Jong-uns high tolerance for risk and brinkmanship, Iranian leadership proved to be more cautious
and was influenced by international sanctions. In military terms, Iran did not have 75,000+ U.S. forces (in South Korea and Japan)
deployed within 800 miles of its border. While well on its way, Iran did not possess an existing nuclear weapons capability. In
contrast, North Korea possesses an extant and expanding nuclear weapons arsenal, having completed four nuclear tests that
demonstrate capacity, resolve, and support of technical advancement for its nuclear program. Finally, North Korea has also
established a complex range of other weapons of mass destruction (WMD)related programs, including intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), cyber capabilities, and biological and chemical weaponscapabilities far in excess of those associated with Iran.
So in the case of North Korea, the stakes, the risks, and the size of the task are all exponentially more challenging. Negotiated
denuclearization may represent the ultimate victory, but in the meantime the United States and the rest of the international
community are going to have to up their game with regard to deterring, containing, and responding to the North Korean nuclear
threat.A3: Japan and South Koreatwo critical allies in Asia, each with their own defense treaties with the United States
are undoubtedly looking to us for assurances that we would intervene with military aid should
they be attacked by North Korea. Both nations rely upon the United States nuclear
extended deterrence commitment to respond to the threat posed by North Koreas nuclear program. It is, indeed, at least
partially the credibility of this commitment that keeps each security alliance intact and
dissuades Japan and South Koreanations with significant advanced technical capabilities and economic
resourcesfrom considering the nuclear option themselves . These alliances have come
under strain in recent years, with some in all three countries questioning whether these
guarantees continue to have value. North Koreas persistent provocations, most
visibly through nuclear tests, have only further chipped away at the desire to
remain reliant on the United States promises. The U nited States must now respond
in tandem with Japan and South Korea: failing to do so in the face of this newest test
would not only erode security conditions in East Asia, it would also threaten to
weaken the international nonproliferation regime. The United States might look to
this latest provocation as an opening for promoting recent positive trends in
bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea in order to improve trilateral
cooperation. Q4: What are some recommendations and next steps for the United States? A4: For now the world is focused on
further sanctions. However, North Korea is already a pariah state with a devastated economy. Additional sanctions may have
political value as a statement of resolve, but it is hard to see how they can generate impacts that are meaningful and coercive.
Given North Koreas erratic and risk-tolerant behavior, U.S. and regional responses must be
accompanied by more effective counter-provocation and counter-escalation
strategies and redoubled efforts to improve our deterrence posture and messaging toward
North Korea. There are some concrete steps the United States can take. First, continue to
pursue strong action through the UN Security Council, focusing consequences not
only on North Korea itself but increasingly on any other member of the international
community that fails to fully implement all relevant resolutions and/or supports or
enables the North Korean nuclear program in any way. Second , consider enhanced
detection technologies that can support transparency and confidence-building
measures and reduce chances of miscalculation. Perhaps such efforts could include the
overt emplacement and monitoring of enhanced detection and sample collection
platforms along the demilitarized zone, the Chinese border, or nearby international
waters. Additionally, we should diversify the means and mechanisms by which the
United States can signal and message to both assure allies and deter escalation.
This can include demonstrations of capability, joint exercises, enhanced
military support in areas like missile defense, as well as clear, straightforward
statements of our commitment to security in the region. Finally, the United States
should improve capabilities to locate, secure, disable, or remove nuclear weapons in
the face of instability or conflict. Kim Jong-un should not feel that his nuclear weapons
and supporting delivery systems are off-limits or beyond reach.

BMD is specifically key for Japan security plan would trigger

immediate Japanese prolif
Weitz 13 [04/05/13, Richard Weitz is the director of the Center for Political-
Military Analysis and a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, "The Geopolitics of
Missile Defense",
One of the interesting effects of ballistic missile defense is how it has affected relations between states. The decades of tension that
U.S. ballistic missile defenses
have arisen between Moscow and Washington over strategic defense issue are well known. Now
(BMD) are driving China and Russia closer together. But missile defenses can also strengthen relations between
countries. For example, missile defense has become an important dimension of the
revitalized Japan-U.S. security alliance. BMD has strengthened cooperation between
both countries directly through their joint BMD programs, discouraged Japan from
developing its own nuclear deterrent , and induced Tokyo to broaden its defense
collaboration with other countries by relaxing its arms export rules . The same pattern may
arise in the Middle East, where Irans neighbors are pondering whether missile defenses can obviate their need to acquire nuclear
weapons if Iran does. In other cases, the BMD issue has had diverse effects. South Korea, for example, has sought to benefit from
U.S. technologies without alarming China by joining the Pentagons wider regional efforts. The United States finds
itself at the heart of the international politics of missile defense. Its leading global
role in developing and deploying BMD technologies and its worldwide network of
alliances both empower and oblige the United States to defend much of the world
from missile attack. These same alignments also provide the ties the Pentagon needs to
construct a globally linked network of BMD sensors and facilities. For this reason,
Washington has lobbied its friends and allies to cooperate with U.S. regional BMD
initiatives as a means to strengthen mutual defense capabilities and to supplement
traditional U.S. nuclear and conventional deterrence guarantees with missile
defenses. The Obama administration has also used its strong investments in missile defense to reassure countries concerned
by the administrations desire to downplay the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy. U.S. officials have
persuaded most allied governments that missile defenses complement deterrence
by causing potential aggressors to doubt that any attack could succeed as well as
providing a hedge should deterrence fail . More than 30 countries already have, or
are acquiring, short- and medium-range missiles able to deliver conventional
payloads at great speed and distance. Some are trying to develop longer-range missiles that can carry
warheads armed with various weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological). The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
Review (BMDR) predicts that the missile threats to the United States and its allies will grow in quantity and quality as antagonistic
ballistic missile systems
states increase the size and capabilities of their ballistic missiles. With respect to the latter,
are becoming more flexible, mobile, reliable, survivable, accurate, and able to fly
longer and farther. In principle, U.S. BMD systems make several critical contributions to
U.S. security. They can: defend the American homeland, U.S. forces and citizens located overseas, and U.S. friends
and allies deter such attacks by enhancing both the capacity and the perceived will of the defender to thwart any aggression
dissuade potential aggressors from seeking to acquire and deploy ballistic missiles or nuclear warheads by reducing their perceived
reassure U.S. friends and allies about the U.S. will and commitment to defend
them, which contributes to other U.S. goals such as dissuading them from obtaining
nuclear or other destabilizing retaliatory weapons overcome anti-access/area-denial
(A2AD) and other asymmetric tactics that use missiles to try to negate U.S.
conventional advantages Under both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, the United States has
employed a variety of tools to address these missile threats. U.S. officials have engaged in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in an
effort to persuade North Korea and Iran to end their nuclear weapons programs and refrain from the further testing of ballistic
missiles. They have also used declaratory policy by repeatedly warning these countries against developing, testing, or using these
the United States has provided security assistance to help U.S.
capabilities. Additionally,
allies enhance their own defense capabilities . The Pentagon also bases or deploys large numbers of U.S.
troops in each region, with an impressive range of conventional and unconventional capabilities, reinforced by U.S.-based assets
with global reach, such as long-range strategic bombers. The United States has offered many of these countries diverse security
guarantees, including implicit and sometimes explicit pledges to potentially employ U.S. nuclear capabilities to protect them. Finally,
the United States has been constructing missile defense architectures in each
region as well as globally to counter Iranian and North Korean missile threats. These include short-range missile defense systems
such as PAC-3 batteries, theater defenses such as THAAD and Aegis-equipped naval vessels, and the ground-based midcourse
during the past decade, the United States has
interceptors based in Alaska and California. Indeed,
made considerable progress in addressing these missile threats through
augmenting U.S. and allied missile defenses. In Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, the United
States has been working to establish the foundation for a regional missile defense
system made up of U.S. forward deployed BMD systems combined with those of U.S.
friends and allies. The United States has been pursuing BMD cooperation (joint research and development programs as
well as selling BMD systems) with various countries in Europe (bilaterally and through NATO), the Asia-Pacific (Japan, Australia, and
These allies and friends can
South Korea), and the Middle East (Israel and Gulf Cooperation Council members).
host forward-based BMD sensors and missile interceptors, share the costs of building and
maintaining the BMD architecture, and network their data with other actors to
provide a superior operational picture . In each region, the administration has been pursuing a phased,
adaptive approach that adjusts U.S. BDM policies in a flexible manner as the missile threats evolve. Its approach to missile defense
in each region has differed based on the specific threats that region faces as well as the level of regional cooperation mechanisms
that are in place. In Europe, for instance, the Obama administration has worked more closely with NATO as a collective alliance as
well as individual NATO countries such as Romania and Turkey to develop its European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The EPAA
has redirected U.S. BMD efforts closer toward Iran to address that countrys limited-range missiles. As Irans missile capabilities
improve, the EPAA will deploy increasingly more advanced SM-3 interceptors that can protect more NATO territory. Under the EPAA,
the United States is deploying Aegis BMD and Aegis Ashore capabilities throughout Europe to protect countries against Irans short-,
medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The first phase of the EPAA has already been deployed with the guided missile
cruiser USS Monterey (carrying SM-3 interceptors) deployed in the Mediterranean Sea, while Turkey hosts a BMD radar system. The
U.S. Air Operations Centers BMD command and control capabilities at Ramstein Air Base in Germany have become operational,
which will support the upcoming phase two development of land-based SM-3s in Romania. The Romanian system is scheduled to
become operational in 2015, just after U.S. Aegis destroyers arrive at their new homeports in Spain. In Phase 3, a land SM-3 site will
be established in Poland, though the planned Phase 4 deployments of even more advanced interceptors for Poland are being
Japan is one of the United States closest
reworked given the March 2013 cancellation of the SM-3 IIB.
BMD partners. The country has acquired its own layered missile defense system
that includes Aegis BMD ships with SM-3 interceptors, Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) fire units, early warning radars,
and a command and control system, as well as a forward-based X-band radar. Japan deploys two classes of Aegis
configured destroyers: the KONGO Class and the ATAGO Class. In 2003, the KONGO class was upgraded with BMD capabilities. Japan
is the only other country besides the United States that has the capacity to intercept ballistic missiles well above the upper
atmosphere, confirmed by several sea-based intercept tests (the Japan Flight Test Mission, or JFTM, series). Together with the U.S.
Missile Defense Agency, Japan is helping develop the next-generation SM Block 2A system that will enable defense of larger areas
The United States and Japan recently agreed to construct
and against more sophisticated threats.
a new early warning radar in southern Japan to augment the already functioning X-
band radar in northern Japan, at the Shariki base. The two countries are particularly concerned about North Koreas
potential development of a long-range missile and Chinas development of anti-ship missiles.

Missile defense is a key symbol of US commitmentintegral to

US alliance relationship with Japan.
Jones 09 [2009, Chris Jones is a Research Assistant at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Managing the Goldilocks Dilemma: Missile Defense and
Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia,]
The last major Chinese concern about missile defense is the cooperation between
the United States and key allies in Northeast Asia, principally Japan, South Korea,
and Taiwan. In June 2007, General Zhang Qinsheng brushed off an offer from
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to cooperate on missile defense by expressing
concern about missile defense cooperation in the region. He warned, If Japan and
the United States extend the missile defense system to cover Taiwan, the Peoples
Republic of China will oppose such a move very strongly.42 Yet missile defense
cooperation is a top priority for the BMDR and remains an integral part of U.S. alliance
relationships in the region. In addition to military defense against ballistic missiles,
BMD also serves as an important symbol of U.S. commitment to allies in the region.
For these allies, missile defense provides a capability relevant to regional missile threats
from North Korea and possibly China, thought each country has unique circumstances .
Evaluating the current missile defense capabilities and strategic outlook of U.S.
allies in the region can help reveal the degree to which China may feel threatened
by missile defense cooperation efforts. Within Northeast Asia, Japan has long been the
most ardent supporter of missile defense cooperation. Hailed by the BMDR as one of our
most significant international BMD partners, Japan and the United States share a long
history of cooperation on missile defense. 43 44 Currently, Japan has 3 BMD-capable
KONGO Class destroyers and plans to add a fourth.45 It will also 16 PAC-3 fire units
in place by 2011.46 U.S. and Japanese missile defense capabilities also share a high
degree of interoperability. For example, the Japanese have invested $1 billion in the
joint development of SM-3 Block IIA missile, now at the heart of the U.S. missile
defense policy. For Japan, missile defense provides two important defense objectives.
First, it provides a capability by which to counter the ballistic missile threat from North
Korea. As recently as 2009, North Korea launched a Taepo Dong 2 missile that flew
over Japanese territory before falling into the Pacific Ocean.47 According to the
Congressional Research Service, North Korea has 200-300 intermediate-range Nodong
missiles capable of reaching most of Japan in minutes.48 Second, Japanese missile defense
assets could also play a valuable role in a future conflict scenario with China, even if that
currently seems improbable. From Chinas perspective, concern about Japanese
missile defense is not just about a possible military conflict between the two
countries, who share a great deal of historical animosity, but also the prospect that
Japanese assets could be brought to bear in other regional contingencies in
Northeast Asia. For example, some argue that Japan would not be able to stand on
the sidelines in a Taiwan conflict where Japanese missile defense assets could play
a critical function.49 While the new DPJ leadership in Japan has been less
enthusiastic about missile defense than its predecessor,50 missile defense is likely
to continue playing a prominent role in Japanese security due to the serious
investment that has already been made.
Cyber Sec coop
Cyber security is key to the future of the alliance
James Andrew Lewis Nov 2015, Senior Fellow and Program Director at the Center
for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS). His primary background is military
strategy and intelligence related technology, U.S. and Japan cooperation in
Cybersecurity, Report of the CSIS Strategic Technologies Program,
States manage their international relations using a variety of tools for persuasion,
coercion, and influence. Cyber capabilities are a new tool for state power. China,
Russia, and North Korea have been quick to adopt cyber tools for use against the
United States and Japan. Cybersecurity involves the policies and programs needed
to defend against and mitigate the consequences from the use of this new tool of
state power. Cybersecurity is an increasingly important problem for collective self-
defense. Both parties in the alliance have work to do to address it. Japan has made
significant strides to improve its cybersecurity posture in the last few years, but
cybersecurity remains an area of vulnerability for Japan and the bilateral security
alliance. The most important improvements have been the Japanese Diet's passage
of the Basic Law for Cybersecurity and the Act on the Protection of Specially
Designated Secrets. The most important weaknesses remain a startling lack of
resources, complicated interagency coordination processes, and an approach to
cybersecurity that is overly cautious in some areas while underestimating risk in
others. For both the safety of its own public and strengthened cooperation under
the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, Japan needs to build on recent policy
and legislative successes to expand and improve its cyber defense capabilities.
Moving forward, the bilateral relationship will require both greater cooperation and
greater effort in cybersecurity. There is a decidedly defensive orientation in alliance
thinking about cybersecurity (although the United States has very advanced
offensive capabilities), and Japan will confront problems where the best defense
may require an ability to use some offensive cyber capabilities to guide and inform
defensive purposes. This issue is linked in part to the larger constitutional debate in
Japan over the role of the armed forces and redefining the scope of self-defense.
However, Japan could acquire cyber-attack capabilities under the current
interpretation of the constitution, since attack capabilities play an increasingly
important role in cyber defense and can be limited to defensive purposes. In the last
few years, the United States has worked with its allies, including Japan, to create
structures and capabilities for collective cyber defense . The defense activities are
integrated into a larger international strategy to build stability and security in
cyberspace. The transfer of capabilities has been uneven and mutual defense is
only weakly linked to the larger strategy, which itself is not seriously pursued by
senior administration officialsberating China over cyber espionage is not the same
thing as constructing a global approach to cybersecurity. Given its unique
relationship with Japan, the United States needs a more active approach
to mutual cyber defense and to ensuring that this active approach is a
component of a larger international strategy. Attention to international aspects of
cybersecurity is essential for a successful defense strategy. A domestic approach, or
an approach limited to private-sector actions, will fail because the primary
opponents are well-resourced and determined state actors. Existing mechanisms for
international stabilitytreaties, common understandings, institutions, and law
developed since the 1940s were always somewhat weak (especially in regard to
international security) and are becoming weaker in the face of a declining Europe
and the rise of new economic powers. Agreement among nations on responsible
state behavior is the foundation for cybersecurity.

China is Japans Primary Cyber threat U.S. moves to divest in

mutual cyber security in favor of Chinese cooperation alienates
James Andrew Lewis Nov 2015, Senior Fellow and Program Director at the Center
for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS). His primary background is military
strategy and intelligence related technology, U.S. and Japan cooperation in
Cybersecurity, Report of the CSIS Strategic Technologies Program,
The primary issues for cybersecurity are state-sponsored espionage and crime, the
growth of offensive military cyber capabilities, and the use of cyber capabilities as a
new tool of political coercion. While it is easy to overstate cyber risk, it is also easy
to ignore it, and all of these threats require governments to address cybersecurity
as part of their larger national security strategies. Cybersecurity is particularly
important for Japan and the United States, as North Asia is a "flashpoint" for
cybersecurity. Three of the most active cyber adversaries are Japan's neighbors
china, North Korea, and Russia.2 Russia and China spend significantly more than
Japan on cyber activities; and North Korea, while its cyber capabilities are easy to
overstate, has larger cyber forces than Japan. China and Russia are world leaders in
cyber capabilities for both espionage and attack. Their activities challenge all
nations. Against them, Japanese capabilities can only be judged to need
considerable improvement for there to be a full defense partnership with the United
States in the future. Cybersecurity strategy only makes sense when embedded in a
larger geopolitical context. Cyber techniques provide countries with new
instruments for espionage, coercion, and attack, but all evidence to date shows that
nations will use these new instruments in a manner consistent with their larger
strategic goals. In this, Japan is at a remarkable disadvantage. The Internet
shrinks distances, making Tokyo only a few seconds away from Beijing, and while
there are borders in cyberspace, they are poorly defendedthe equivalent of a
country with an excellent cavalry but no airplanes to protect its airspace. Japan lives
in one of the worst neighborhoods in the world for cybersecurity. Two neighboring
countriesRussia and Chinaare very active in cyber espionage and have well-
developed military cyber-attack capabilities, while the thirdNorth Koreahas used
cyber-attacks four times in the last three years against South Korea for political
purposes and was responsible for the embarrassing attacks against Sony
Corporation's American headquarters. There are three categories of risk to consider
in thinking about these potential adversaries: espionage, coercion, and attack. The
most damaging cyber-attacksthose that cause physical damage, such as
Stuxnet's destruction of many of the Iranian nuclear program's centrifugesare still
a high art of which only a few nations are capable, but it is likely that Russia has this
capability, that China may already possess it, and Iran and North Korea are striving
to acquire it and already have some capability to disrupt critical services. China is
the most active of the four nations when it comes to economic espionage, with
Japanese companies a frequent target for cyber espionage. China uses cyber
espionage to acquire both military and commercial technology to expand its
technological base and to strengthen its economy. Russia is the most skilled
opponent and given this, assertions by Japanese officials that they have not seen
Russian activity on their networks are not entirely reassuringit may reflect a
failure of detection rather than an absence of activity. If there were Russian
espionage activity, it would focus on military information including planning, air and
naval activities, air defenses, and acquisitions, as well as on political information
including changes in Japan's defense posturecategories already well-known to
Japanese and U .S. analysts. Russia is a leader in using cyber technique for coercive
political purposes, building on KGB precedents and as part of its larger efforts to
develop capabilities for what is sometimes called "hybrid warfare." North Korea,
beginning under the previous leader Kim Jong-il, began investing in cyber
capabilities. South Korean sources say these capabilities, while not yet very
advanced, have been used perhaps four times by the North against South Korean
targets for political purposes.
Space coop
Bilateral space cooperation is key to the future of the U.S.
Japan alliance
Frank A. Rose, 7-15-2015, "Outer Space Security and the Future of the U.S.-Japan
Alliance, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Keio University, Japan" U.S. Department of State,
Todays conversation on outer space security and the future of the U.S.-Japan
Alliance is particularly well timed given the historic meetings that have taken place
between our countries just over two months ago. Since taking office, President
Obama has worked to rebalance American foreign policy to ensure that the United
States is playing a larger and lasting role in the Asia Pacifica policy grounded in
our treaty alliances, including our treaty with Japan. Recent developments have
demonstrated tangible proof of our shared commitment to the alliance. On April 27,
Secretary of State Kerry, Secretary of Defense Carter, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Kishida, and Minister of Defense Nakatani, convened the U.S.-Japan Security
Consultative Committee (SCC) in New York to announce the approval and release of
new, revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. The Guidelines,
which were first approved on November 27, 1978, and revised on September 23,
1997, provide a general framework for the roles and responsibilities of both of our
countries. They guide our policy direction and our mission, and facilitate
cooperation and coordination. The one unshakable truth is that the U.S.-Japanese
Alliance not only endures, it grows stronger from decade to decade. But a lot has
changed since 1997, and the security environment has evolved in unexpected and
unpredictable ways. Longstanding threats to Japan such as North Koreas nuclear
and ballistic missile programs remain a concern, while emerging threats in areas
such as cyber security, space security, and freedom of navigation present new
challenges. These new Guidelines promote a more balanced and effective Alliance
to meet the emerging security challenges of the 21st century. At their core is a
steadfast commitment to Japans peace and security. The new Guidelines outline the
mechanisms by which our two governments fulfill that commitment. They do this
through seamless, robust, flexible, and effective Alliance responses while expanding
bilateral cooperation on strategic areas. A dynamic world requires a modern
Alliance, and the new Guidelines lay the foundation for the two countries to
cooperate in both space and cyberspace, as well as in conducting operations with
impact across domains. The day following agreement on the Guidelines, President
Obama and Prime Minister Abe met in Washington for a state visit. There too they
recognized the transformation of our partnership into a robust alliance that has,
over the past 70 years, successfully grown and adapted to significant changes in
the geopolitical climate. They issued a Joint Vision Statement highlighting that the
meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Abe mark[ed] a historic step
forward in transforming the U.S.-Japan partnership. The President and the Prime
Minister also recognized that the United States and Japan are building a mutually
beneficial partnership that addresses global challenges, including climate change,
energy, cyber space, and even outer space. The U.S.-Japan Alliance, strengthened
by the updated Guidelines and the two countries respective security and defense
policies, continues to serve as the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-
Pacific, as well as a platform for promoting a more peaceful and stable international
security environment. Our partnership with Asia-Pacific nations not only enhances
the national security of our respective countries, but also reinforces strategic
stability in the region as well as internationally. Ultimately, strengthening the U.S.-
Japan Alliance will allow our countries to more effectively contribute to peace and
stability both here in the Asia-Pacific and around the world.

Both sides say bilateral space cooperation coordinated against

Chinese ASATs is a key development point for the alliance
Frank A. Rose, 7-15-2015, "Outer Space Security and the Future of the U.S.-Japan
Alliance, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Many of you may be wondering what role space plays in our alliance and
partnership, and why space security matters in that larger context. As I said before,
the security environment surrounding the alliance has changed significantly since
the 1990s, and even more dramatically since the founding of the alliance. This is
especially true with regards to space. Nearly six decades have passed since Sputnik
was launched, and much has changed both in the range of space capabilities and in
the growing challenges we face. Today, the world relies on satellites for
communications, for disaster management and relief, for treaty monitoring, and for
sustainable development, among many other things. This reliance is especially true
of the governments and people of the United States and Japan. Given the advanced
technological development of our countries, space has permeated almost every
aspect of our daily lives. However, increasing use of space by many actors
coupled with space debris resulting from past launches, space operations, orbital
accidents, and testing of destructive anti-satellites (ASATs) which generated long-
lived debris has resulted in increased orbital congestion, complicating space
operations for all those that seek to benefit from space. The threat to outer space is
real and growing. As Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said in his
Congressional testimony last February, threats to U.S. space systems and services
will increase during 2015 and beyond as potential adversaries pursue disruptive and
destructive counterspace capabilities. Chinese and Russian military leaders
understand the unique information advantages afforded by space systems and
services and are developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict. Chinas
continued development of anti-satellite weapons remains a major challenge to the
outer space environment. Chinas 2007 anti-satellite test left over three thousand
tractable pieces of debris in orbit that continue to threaten the space systems of all
nations including that of China. It is not in the international communitys interest to
engage in a space weapons arms race. Such a race would not bode well for the
long-term sustainability of the space environment. Protecting U.S. national security
by preventing conflict from extending into space in the first place is a major goal of
our diplomatic engagements. In that regard, we work to prevent conflict from
extending into space via two diplomatic tracks: strengthening our deterrent posture,
and encouraging responsible behavior to prevent mishaps and misperceptions, and
to diminish the chances of miscalculation. First, we use diplomacy to gain the
support of our allies and friends. We have established numerous space security
dialogues with our Allies and space partners. Diplomacy also prepares the way for
closer military-to-military cooperation and allied investment in capabilities
compatible with U.S. systems. Second, we use diplomacy to promote the
responsible use of outer space and especially strategic restraint in the development
of anti-satellite weapons. Diplomacy has an important role in reducing the chances
for conflict extending into space through the promotion of international norms of
responsible behavior, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Norms matter because they
help define boundaries and distinguish good behavior from bad behavior. Given the
dependence that both of our countries have on space for our civil societies,
economies, and security, as well as our mutual commitment to ensuring the long-
term sustainability and security of the outer space environment, it is no surprise
that space has become an essential part of our Alliance . Recognizing the need to
enhance our Alliance with Japan in wide-ranging areas of common interest in order
to address the changing security environment, part of our effort to strengthen and
modernize our Alliance is through enhanced space cooperation.
Taiwan/ SCS package
They have it backwards no one china policy in Taiwan and
strong claims by japan makes allied backlash inevitable
Robert D. Eldridge, 6-10-2016, "A U.S.-Japan-Taiwan grand bargain for
Senkakus, Robert D. Eldridge, who currently resides in Okinawa, served as the
political adviser to the U.S. Marine Corps in Japan from 2009 to 2015, and is the
author of The Origins of U.S. Policy in the East China Sea Islands Dispute and The
Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem (both from Routledge) , " Japan Times,
Over the past 45 years, in addition to the issue of American and Japanese
abandonment of Taiwan in favor of China in the early 1970s, one problem that has
prevented closer ties between Japan and Taiwan, and has worried U.S. policymakers
and diplomats over the years, has been that of the disputed Senkaku Islands, which
have historically been a part of Japan (1895-1945; 1972-) and are under Japanese
administration today. (From 1945 to 1972, the islands were under U.S. military
occupation and administrative control.) Following the completion of a study in 1968
by the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East which found possible oil
and other mineral reserves in the area and the signing of the Okinawa Reversion
Agreement in June 1971 (just as the Nixon administration was coordinating then-
National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissingers surprise visit to Beijing), Taiwan and
China competitively both began to announce, quite belatedly, their claims over the
islands, none of which is particularly valid or relevant. Awkwardly, however, the
Nixon administration failed to publicly recognize Japanese sovereignty over the
Senkaku Islands at the time of reversion, even though the oral explanation by John
Foster Dulles at the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference stated that Japan
had residual sovereignty over the Nansei Shoto islands, including Okinawa (which
includes the Senkakus). Americas abrupt nonrecognition of Japanese sovereignty
over the Senkakus in 1971 went against its own policies, deeply disappointed its
more vital ally (Japan) while not appeasing its other then-ally, Taiwan, and directly
contributed to the tensions in the East China Sea through a strategically ambiguous
and laissez-faire approach. While Taiwanese officials have been considerably
moderate and mature over the decades on this issue, China has been vocal and
aggressive, particularly as its military might grows. A real clash is highly likely,
sooner or later, between China and Japan , which, depending on how the scenario
develops, might invoke Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. security treaty and lead to
American forces assisting Japan. The situation with Taiwan is nowhere near as
serious, but it still struggles politically, internally, on the islands it calls Tiaoyutai, as
its government, since the days of Chiang Kai-shek to today has long had to show
domestically and internationally that it can best represent the Chinese people on
this territorial problems. Regardless of the lack of contemporary Taiwanese interest
in a one China policy, like any country, it cannot appear weak on matters of
sovereignty, even though its case is. It is here that I would like to suggest a grand
bargain. The U.S. government should correct its mistaken policies of the past,
beginning by recognizing that Japan does indeed have sovereign rights over the
Senkakus, while seeking to convince Taiwan and China to go along . The latter of
course wont. However, with Taiwan, the U.S. government could privately explain
ahead of time that it would get something in return, such as much closer relations
including an agreement to recognize it as an independent nation, which it in fact
already is a normal democratic country in the words of Schmitt. Assuming
Taiwan agrees, the latest democratically elected president, Tsai Ing-wen of the
Democratic Progressive Party, could use her current influence to seek domestic
consensus. China might threaten war, but in doing so, it would be done on weak
claims and go against the norms of international society, including Taiwans right of
self-determination. In recognition of Taiwans support of Japans position on the
Senkakus once and for all, Japan should also at the same time recognize Taiwan, as
its relations have historically been even closer than those between Taiwan and the
United States. The unnatural state of relations between Taiwan and the U.S., and
Japan and Taiwan, would thus immediately be improved , and the issue of the
Senkakus would largely be resolved. Hold-out Chinas claims on the Senkakus do not
stand up to historical scrutiny, and any use of military force would be met by the
Japan-U.S. alliance, strengthened now with U.S. reaffirmation of its original policy. Its
bully-like methods in the South China Seas is uniting the region against it in a way
never seen before, not only in the South China Sea but the East China Sea as well.
The situation is not only increasingly unstable, but also unsustainable. The U.S.
government has an ideal chance, now, to bring real, long-lasting peace to the East
China Seas with this move. The timing under a strongly pro-U.S. leader, Prime
Minister Abe Shinzo, in Japan, and a new, international and popular president in
Taiwan who has already moderated her nationalist predecessors stance on another
territorial issue (Okinotori Island), has never been better. During his recent visit to
Asia, U.S. President Barack Obama had the chance to hear first-hand from countries
concerned with Chinese expansionism. The Shangri-La security meetings just
finished, and bilateral discussions continue . Lets hope that the first move can be
diplomatic, along the lines above, rather than military. Lets hope, too, as well that
China expresses its national aspirations in more peaceful ways than it has displayed
in recent years.

Abe reprioritized aggressive collective self-defense in japan

Joint deterrence of Chinese territorial claims is key to the
James L. Schoff, 7-16-2015, "Strengthening U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia,Schoff
is a senior associate in the Carnegie Asia Program. His research focuses on U.S.-
Japanese relations and regional engagement, Japanese politics and security, and the
private sectors role in Japanese policymaking., " Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace,
In contrast to this incremental approach, current Prime Minster Shinzo Abe is
pursuing a more substantive overhaul of the nations security laws, driven more
directly and urgently by the rise of China, as well as North Koreas nuclear and
missile development. In 2013, he pushed through a law to strengthen the national
protection of classified information, established a new National Security Council to
enhance crisis management and oversee the countrys first National Security
Strategy, and his administration revised the National Defense Program Guidelines
(NDPG) and Midterm Defense Plan (MTDP), which governs Japans future defense
procurement. In this area, Japan will boost the defense budget slightly (about 1-2
percent per year) and extend the life of existing submarines and destroyers as a
way to expand its military power affordably. At the operational level, Tokyos focus is
on: strengthening intelligence gathering, maritime domain awareness in the East
China Sea, and information security (e.g., with plans to buy unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), enhancing the use of space with new X-band communications and
reconnaissance satellites, and bolstering cyber security capabilities); strengthening
outer island defense and rapid deployment capability (by acquiring amphibious
vehicles, conducting joint training with U.S. Marines, and planning to buy Osprey
tilt-rotor aircraft); improved defense against nuclear/missile attack (with continued
investments in missile defense and possibly developing a retaliatory strike
capability, either via aircraft or cruise missiles);11 and expanding weapons export
and defense industry development opportunities by loosening legal restrictions and
allowing a wider range of companies to get involved in the global supply chain for
defense or dual-use articles. Connected to this is the Abe administrations push to
normalize the countrys defense posture in the near term by allowing Japan to
exercise collective self-defense in certain situations, and longer term by revising the
militarys legal status with a new Fundamental Law on National Security or even
revising the nations Constitution. This could expand further Japans ability to utilize
its military in a flexible manner, but significant political hurdles exist and will limit
any further reforms beyond a package of legislation currently being debated in
Tokyo. The key issue for Japan (and what is most noticeable about the new NDPG) is
that it is thinking beyond deterrence as the only role for the military and
understanding that it might actually become necessary to use force for self-defense
(either around the Senkaku Islands or vis--vis North Korea). Previously, Tokyo
tended to believe that the mere existence (and later, presence) of Japans SDF
combined with the U.S. alliance was enough to satisfy its deterrence needs. It now
realizes that lower thresholds of conflict might only be deterred if it shows
willingness and ability to fight, and the object of this deterrence is China in the East
China Sea. Moreover, Japan needs to be able to project force in a flexible manner to
adapt to unpredictable situations in case deterrence fails, as well as to give Japans
leaders different options for controlling escalation. Of course, Japan is not just
looking to increase its own military capability as a means to thwart Chinese
intimidation and so-called gray zone conflict (i.e. a state of neither peace nor war,
such as skirmishes between Coast Guard vessels). Boosting the military is also seen
as responding to U.S. requests for more proactive Japanese contributions to regional
security, and strengthening the Japans alliance with the United States is another
way for Tokyo to bolster deterrence by signaling to Beijing that conflict with Japan
ensures U.S. involvement. This is the backdrop for the bilateral initiative to revise
Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, completed in April 2015.
Especially true in the SCS Japanese defense priorities are tied
to U.S. Support plan collapses that alliance structure
Maria Ortuoste, 4-4-2016, "Partners in peril in the South China Sea,Dr Maria
Ortuoste is currently an associate professor of political science at California State
University East Bay. She has 20 years of research experience in both government
and academic settings. She has around 10 years of policy experience with the
Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies, the research arm of the
Philippines Foreign Service Institute. In that capacity, she wrote strategic studies
and policy papers on Philippine foreign policy in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations and the United Nations, as well as papers on specific issues such as the
South China Sea, peacekeeping, proliferation of conventional arms and nuclear
weapons, the US alliance system and human rights, " Policy Forum,
As the power relationships evolve in the South China Sea, new alliances emerge and
new scenarios become possible in a tense and uneasy region, Maria Ortuoste writes.
On April 4, 2016, two Japanese destroyers and a submarine docked in Subic Bay in
the Philippines for a three-day goodwill visit, just one consequence of the recently-
announced Strengthened Strategic Partnership between Japan and the Philippines .
The two countries expect to derive strategic benefits from this but, as with any
diplomatic endeavor, there are possible perils for the region and the two partners.
For the Philippines, its enhanced partnership with Japan fulfills many of its foreign
policy goals and its strategic objectives in the South China Sea . First, it promises to
enhance the Philippines strategic position vis--vis China. In March this year the
Philippines became the first Southeast Asian country to sign an agreement with
Japan on the transfer of defence equipment and technology. Last year, Japan
announced it would provide the Philippines with 10 high-speed patrol vessels to
enhance the countrys domain awareness over the West Philippine Sea. Even if
China had not changed its charm offensive into an armed offensive, this
archipelagic country would have had to improve its coast guard, naval and air force
capabilities as its 36,000-km coastline is the sixth longest in the world. The country
has committed to upgrade the navys capabilities and Japans soft loans for defence
equipment will help boost these efforts. Second, the Japan-Philippines agreements
could potentially wean the Philippines off its historic dependence on the United
States. Since 1946, the US was solely responsible for patrolling the Philippines
maritime area, while the government tried to battle internal instability. Philippine
President Benigno Aquino III vowed to modernise the military so that it can
undertake territorial defence and maritime. Part of the plan is to diversify sources of
defence equipment and build relationships with other Asia-Pacific actors, such as
Australia and Japan, that might be able to help the Philippines should more
contingencies arise in the South China Sea. This could deter China from denying
access to maritime routes and islands, and from intimidating the Philippines. Japan
has one of the regions most technologically-advanced military one which can
stand up to Chinas naval capability. Moreover, Japan has removed, or at least
softened legal barriers, to defending itself by effectively reinterpreting Article 9 of
its constitution with the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security (LPS). This law
allows Japan to respond to an infringement even if the other partys action does
not amount to an armed attack; moreover, Japan can defend itself when an armed
attack is made against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan.
It is not farfetched to infer that a strengthened strategic partnership falls under
this purview. Should Chinese ships attack Japanese ships responding to Philippine
ships in distress, the next hope is that the US will come to the aid of Japan . But the
US has been vague about what it considers to be the metropolitan territory of the
Philippines and has publicly declared that it does not take sides in the South China
Sea dispute. The best hope for US involvement is for Japanese ships to act as
tripwire. SOUTH CHINA SEA (May 30, 2008) The Tarawa-class amphibious assault
ship USS Peleliu (LHA 5) steams through the South China Sea. Peleliu is the flaghsip
of the Peleliu Expeditionary Strike Group and is on a scheduled deployment. U.S.
Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Scott Webb (Released)
Maritime muscle in the South China Sea | Sarah Kirchberger This is not impossible.
From the late 1990s, various iterations of the Japan-US Mutual Defense Guidelines
have slowly widened the Self-Defense Forces area of operations. And although
the Japan-US Security Treaty states that any action in response to a common
danger will be in accordance with their respective constitutional provisions and
processes, some analysts believe that the US is more likely to come to Japans aid
than to the Philippines. Japans 2014 security legislation gives it some autonomy to
deal with security threats in its immediate area, and in securing sea lanes from the
Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Aden and then through the Straits of Malacca to the South
China Sea. The Malacca Straits is a strategic chokepoint 25 per cent of world trade
passes through, and 80 per cent of Japans imported oil from the Middle East.
Whoever blocks those areas could strangle regional and international trade as well
as limit Japans energy supplies. Under its new National Security Strategy, Japan will
build a comprehensive defense architecture to firmly defend Japan and it will
cooperate with other countries to maintain and develop Open and Stable Seas
based on the rule of law, including freedom and safety of navigation and
overflight. Japans strategic partnership with the Philippines helps realise some of
these goals. Port calls and joint exercises will guarantee access for Japans ships and
aircraft. More important is the Permanent Court of Arbitrations decision in October
2015 that it has jurisdiction over the Philippines case, and that the Philippines and
China are bound by UNCLOS provisions on dispute settlement. If the Court finds that
Chinas nine-dash line is contrary to UNCLOS, then Japan would already be
strategically positioned to protect international sea lanes. By cooperating with other
US allies, Japan also demonstrates that it is a credible partner, or even surrogate,
for the US in the Asia-Pacific. Helping develop the capabilities of Southeast Asian
states could prove less taxing on Americas dime, and it could help ensure that
Southeast Asian countries remain under the US ambit. Finally, Japans partnership
with the Philippines legitimises its return to normal status and demonstrates that
Japan is less of a security concern than China. However, the Philippines-Japan
strategic partnership will complicate the dynamics in the South China Sea. The
agreement will mean the spread of defence equipment and technology, and the
entry of a formidable power into the fray. Can the potential pitfalls and perils
diminish the positive impacts of this partnership? Japans provision of 10 vessels is
still far short of what the Philippines needs to achieve credible minimum
deterrence. The Center for New American Security estimates it would need several
corvettes and frigates, at least 4-6 midget submarines, and several F-16 fighters, to
effectively patrol its maritime area. These are beyond the plans and the budget of
the Philippines. The Strategic Partnership will not necessarily lessen Philippine
dependence on the US. Japan is also tied to the US and follows its agenda, and
Japanese aid or assistance will most probably be tied to US policies . It is also
possible that the Philippines might be trading one dependence for another as some
experts argue that this partnership gives an opportunity for the Japanese defence
industry to internationalise.

Anti-China Alliance Key to Japanese Relations plan fragments

SCS strategy and alienates Japan
*very good SCS Link as well

Richard Javad, 6-13-2015, "Made in Beijing: An Anti-China Alliance Emerges,"

National Interest, Richard Javad Heydarian is an Assistant Professor in international
affairs and political science at De La Salle University, and previously served as a
policy advisor at the Philippine House of Representatives. As a specialist on Asian
geopolitics and economic affairs,
Over the past eighteen months alone, China has reclaimed 810 hectares on a whole
host of dispute reefs and rocks, which, in the words of U.S. Secretary of Defense
Ashton Carter, is "more than all other claimants [construction activities]
combined...and more than in the entire history of the region. Just a few months
ago, Americas leading European allies broke the siege on and joined as founding
members of Chinas Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), leaving the Obama
administration in embarrassing isolation. But the profound strategic implications of
Chinas mind-boggling construction activities across disputed waters, which may
eventually impact freedom of navigation in one of the worlds most important
waterways, is beginning to dawn on the horizons of geographically distant Western
powers. For long, European powerhouse Germany, which has enjoyed robust trade
and investment relations with China, adopted a pragmatic position of neutrality on
Beijings destabilizing actions in adjacent waters. China, after all, is among a select
number of countries that has a strategic partnership with Germany. And it was
exports to China that primarily kept Germany out of the recessionary whirlpool
during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in
the Eurozone. Since Russias annexation of Crimea, and its increasingly overt
interference in the civil war in eastern Ukraine, Germany has been compelled to
adopt progressively more forceful language on international security issues.
Germany is gradually joining the rank of Gestaltungsmchte (shaping powers) to
bring about a semblance of Ordnung (orderliness) in the global hotspots. Among the
G7 powers, it is Japan, however, that is most directly affected by Chinas maritime
assertiveness. Tokyo is not only locked in a bitter territorial dispute with Beijing in
the East China Sea, but is also deeply alarmed by the prospects of de facto Chinese
domination of the South China Sea, where the bulk of Japans energy imports pass
through. Eager to seize the strategic initiative, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japans
most charismatic leader since Junichiro Koizumi, has directly reached out to like-
minded claimant states such the Philippines , which is in the midst of taking the
unprecedented decision to grant Japanese Self Defense Forces access to its military
bases. Japans prospective entry into the South China Sea theatre represents a
potentially game-changing development, overhauling the whole architecture of
Tokyos postwar foreign policy. The United States and its allies are concerned over
the prospects of a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which may allow
Beijing to dominate the seascape and airspace in the South China Sea and
gradually drive other claimant states out of the area . The Chinese Foreign Ministry
as well as the deputy chief of the General Staff Department of the People's
Liberation Army (PLA), Admiral Sun Jianguo, have openly expressed Chinas
openness to imposing an ADIZ in the South China Sea. Chinas latest white paper,
which underlines the PLAs commitment to offshore waters defense and open seas
protection, has only deepened the sense of alarm in the region. In fact, as early as
2004, the PLAs navy and air force were tasked to achieve necessary capabilities
for winning both command of the sea and command of the air, while in 2006 the
PLA Air force declared its aim at speeding up its transition from territorial air
defense to both offensive and defensive operations. Chinas latest white paper
places a premium on winning informationized local wars, highlighting maritime
military struggle and maritime PMS [preparation for military struggles], with the
PLA making the following threat: we will surely counterattack if attacked. (See
James Holmes excellent analysis of Chinas active defense doctrine here). So far,
the United States has confined its freedom of navigation operations to the outer
limits of the twelve nautical mile radius around Chinas artificially-built islands in the
Spratlys. Any attempt at pushing the envelope and breaking into the twelve nautical
miles territorial sea of Chinese-controlled features could trigger a forceful response
by Beijing, which has begun deploying mobile artillery pieces and other advanced
assets into its sprawling facilities in the South China Sea. With little signs of
compromise on the horizon, the Philippines and Japan, two of Americas closest
allies, have stepped up their security cooperation. Shortly after the conclusion of
the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, which saw spirited exchanges between
Washington and China, Philippine President Benigno Aquino embarked on a four-day
state visit to Tokyo, hoping to rally greater international support against China.
Aquinos visit to Japan was of great strategic importance to both countries. Aquino
needs Japans military muscle, while Abe needs the Philippines diplomatic support.
Japan Prolif
Yes Prolif - Cred is key
U.S. assurance guarantees prevent Japanese prolif
Keith Payne, Thomas Scheber and Kurt Guthe, March 20 10 * President and co-
founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, Ph.D., International Relations,
University of Southern California ** Vice President, National Institute for Public Policy
*** Director of Strategic Studies at the National Institute for Public Policy, "U.S.
Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia",
Japan is one of several allies that have recently been explicit that the U.S. extended
nuclear deterrent is a key to their assurance and that they link their own willingness to
remain nonnuclear to the continuation of a credible U.S. nuclear guarantee. Senior Japanese
officials have recently made the following points:176 Some Japanese officials are seriously
concerned about the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent; If the U.S.
extended nuclear deterrent loses credibility, some in Japan believe that other security
options will have to be examined; Some in Japan see specific characteristics of U.S. nuclear forces as
particularly beneficial for extended deterrence. Valued force characteristics include a range of
nuclear capabilities: flexibility, promptness, and precision to allow U.S. deterrent threats that do not lack
credibility because of excessive collateral damage; U.S. superiority in nuclear weapons may be helpful for U.S.
extended deterrence responsibilities; The overall quantity of U.S. nuclear weapons is important to the credibility of
the extended deterrent, and any further U.S. reductions should come only as part of a multilateral agreement for
reductions among all nuclear weapons states.
Yes Prolif - Hawks
Hawks theyll gain power after withdrawal and will cause
Gerald Curtis 13, Burgess Professor of Political Science @ Columbia, Japans
Cautious Hawks, Foreign Affairs, March/April,
Furthermore, the Japanese public and Japan's political leaders are keenly aware that the country's
security still hinges on the United States' dominant military position in East Asia. Some on the far right would like to see
Japan develop the full range of armaments, including nuclear weapons, in a push to regain its autonomy and
return the country to the ranks of the world's great powers. But the conservative mainstream still believes that a strong alliance with

the United States is the best guarantor of Japan's security. ISLANDS IN THE SUN Given Japan's pragmatic approach to foreign
policy, it should come as no surprise that the country has reacted cautiously to a changing international environment defined by China's rise. Tokyo has doubled down on its strategy of
deepening its alliance with the United States; sought to strengthen its relations with countries on China's periphery; and pursued closer economic, political, and cultural ties with China

The one development that could unhinge this strategy would be a loss of

confidence in the U.S. commitment to Japan's defense. It is not difficult to imagine scenarios that would test the U.S.-
Japanese alliance; what is difficult to imagine are realistic ones. The exception is the very real danger that the dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands (known as the
Diaoyu Islands in China), in the East China Sea, might get out of hand, leading to nationalist outbursts in both countries. Beijing and Tokyo would find this tension difficult to contain, and
political leaders on both sides could seek to exploit it to shore up their own popularity. Depending on how events unfolded, the United States could well become caught in the middle,
torn between its obligation to defend Japan and its opposition to actions, both Chinese and Japanese, that could increase the dangers of a military clash. The Japanese government,
which took control of the uninhabited islands in 1895, maintains that its sovereignty over them is incontestable; as a matter of policy, it has refused to acknowledge that there is even a
dispute about the matter. The United States, for its part, recognizes the islands to be under Japanese administrative control but regards the issue of sovereignty as a matter to be
resolved through bilateral negotiations between China and Japan. Article 5 of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, however, commits the United States to "act to meet the common danger"
in the event of "an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan." Washington, in other words, would be obligated to support Tokyo in a conflict
over the islands -- even though it does not recognize Japanese sovereignty there. The distinction between sovereignty and administrative control would matter little so long as a conflict
over the islands were the result of aggression on the part of China. But the most recent flare-up was precipitated not by Chinese but by Japanese actions. In April 2012, Tokyo's
nationalist governor, Shintaro Ishihara (who resigned six months later to form a new political party), announced plans to purchase three of the Senkaku Islands that were privately owned
and on lease to the central government. He promised to build a harbor and place personnel on the islands, moves he knew would provoke China. Well known for his right-wing views and
anti-China rhetoric, Ishihara hoped to shake the Japanese out of what he saw as their dangerous lethargy regarding the threat from China and challenge their lackadaisical attitude about
developing the necessary military power to contain it. Ishihara never got the islands, but the ploy did work to the extent that it triggered a crisis with China, at great cost to Japan's
national interests. Well aware of the dangers that Ishihara's purchase would have caused, then Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda decided to have the central government buy the
islands itself. Since the government already had full control over the islands, ownership represented no substantive change in Tokyo's authority over their use. Purchasing them was the
way to sustain the status quo, or so Noda hoped to convince China. But Beijing responded furiously, denouncing Japan's action as the "nationalization of sacred Chinese land." Across
China, citizens called for the boycott of Japanese goods and took to the streets in often-violent demonstrations. Chinese-Japanese relations hit their lowest point since they were
normalized 40 years ago. Noda, to his credit, looked for ways to defuse the crisis and restore calm between the two countries, but the Chinese would have none of it. Instead, China has
ratcheted up its pressure on Japan, sending patrol ships into the waters around the islands almost every day since the crisis erupted. The United States needs to do two things with

Any indication that Washington might hesitate to

regard to this controversy. First, it must stand firm with its Japanese ally.

support Japan in a conflict would cause enormous consternation in Tokyo. The Japanese
right would have a field day, exclaiming that the country's reliance on the United States for its security had left it unable to defend its interests. The
Obama administration has wisely reiterated Washington's position that the islands fall within the territory administered by Tokyo and
has reassured the Japanese -- and warned the Chinese -- of its obligation to support Japan under the security treaty.
Yes prolif - Tech
Japan has the plutonium to prolif now
TABUCHIAPRIL 14 Japan Pushes Plan to Stockpile Plutonium, Despite
Proliferation Risks By HIROKO TABUCHIAPRIL 9, 2014
TOKYO Just weeks after Japan agreed to give up a cache of weapons-grade
plutonium, the country is set to push ahead with a program that would produce new
stockpiles of the material, creating a proliferation risk for decades to come . Though
that additional plutonium would not be the grade that is most desirable for bombs,
and is therefore less of a threat, it could in knowledgeable hands and with some
work and time be used to make a weapon. The newly created stockpiles would
add to tons of other plutonium already being stored in Japan.
A2 No Prolif - outdated
Anti-prolif args are culturally outdated and ignore internal
politics Japan is shifting towards militarization, has the
capacity, and are bypassing legal restraints
Hunt 15 [Jonathan Hunt (Post-Doctoral Fellow @ Stanton Nuclear Security
Program, fellow @ Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford
University, Visiting Professor @ Emory University), Out of the Mushroom Clouds
Shadow, Foreign Policy, 8/5/15,
With the average age of the hibakusha now over 80, and Japanese society gradually leaving
its pacifist and anti-nuclear roots behind, however, the security alliance with the United States
and the nuclear umbrella that it affords are increasingly crucial backstops for Japans commitments
to nonproliferation and disarmament. Without them, a nuclear arms race could ensue in East
Asia. If Japan pursued nuclear weapons, it would upend efforts to restrict their spread ,
especially in East Asia. With the largest nuclear program of any state outside the 9-member nuclear club, Japan
has long been a poster child for nonproliferation. Besides its NPT membership, it accepts the
safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency the global nuclear watchdog on activities ranging from
uranium imports to plutonium reprocessing. In 1998, it was the first to sign up for the IAEAs voluntary Additional
Protocol, which mandated even more comprehensive and onerous inspections after the first Gulf War. The Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs touts nuclear disarmament, and officials of its Arms Control and Disarmament Division toil
abroad in support of international efforts to manage and eventually eliminate weapons of mass destruction. These
attitudes and behaviors are often ascribed to the bombs enduring impact on Japanese culture
and politics. An estimated 66,000 people were killed and 69,000 injured in Hiroshima, and another 39,000 and
25,000 in Nagasaki in all, 250,000 to 300,000 died within 13 years. During the 7-year U.S. occupation of Japan,
U.S. authorities censored accounts of the bombings and its radioactive aftereffects on the cities populations. Anti-
nuclear sentiment flared again after an American H-bomb test went awry in 1954, contaminating 7000 square miles
of the South Pacific and irradiating 23 crew members of a Japanese fishing vessel the Lucky Dragon one of
whom later died from radiation poisoning. The incident gave rise to public outcry and anti-nuclear protests in Japan
and was featured in the godfather of all monster movies Godzilla. One year later, Japans parliament, the Diet,
restricted domestic nuclear activities to those with civilian uses, a norm which Prime Minister Eisaku Sato further
reinforced in 1967, when he introduced his Three Non-Nuclear Principles: non-possession, non-manufacture, and
non-introduction of nuclear weapons. Yet Japanese leaders renunciation of nuclear weapons has
never been absolute. In private remarks, many of Japans prime ministers in the 1950s and 1960s
asserted that the weapons would enhance their countrys national security and international
standing. (This was partly a mark of the era, when President Dwight Eisenhower insisted that he saw no reason
why [nuclear weapons] shouldnt be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.) After Chinas
first nuclear test in 1964, Sato informed U.S. President Lyndon Johnson that if the [Chinese] had nuclear
weapons, the Japanese also should have them. He later confided to the U.S. ambassador to Japan U. Alexis
Johnson that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were nonsense. Why then did Japan not build atomic
bombs in the 1960s? Mainly because the United States offered to share its own. Security treaties signed in 1952
and 1960 granted the U.S. military basing rights in exchange for protecting Japan. Those treaties were silent on
nuclear threats, however, so after Chinas nuclear test, Johnson and his foreign-policy team devised various
schemes to make U.S. atom and hydrogen bombs available to Japan amid a crisis. In January 1965, Johnson
inaugurated a tradition of American presidents vowing to Japanese prime ministers, if Japan needs our nuclear
deterrent for its defense, the United States would stand by its commitments and provide that defense. These
reassurances seemed to have their intended effect. In 1967, Sato acknowledged the importance of extended
nuclear deterrence in a meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara:
The Japanese were well-protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and Japan had no intention to make nuclear
weapons, he told them. Afterward, Sato announced that extended nuclear deterrence also formed a pillar of
Japans nuclear posture. When Satos former Foreign Minister Takeo Miki became prime minister in 1974, he
convinced the Diet to ratify Japans acceptance of the NPT, thanks to President Gerald Fords reaffirmation that the
U.S.-Japan security treaty encompassed nuclear threats and the establishment of the Subcommittee on U.S.-Japan
Defense Cooperation, where the two countries foreign and defense ministers would thereafter meet to coordinate
their common defense. Optimists claim that nuclear aversion, political checks, and international
commitments will prevent a Japanese nuclear breakout in the future. After all, Foreign Minister
Fumio Kishida who hails from Hiroshima renewed calls to accelerate nuclear disarmament at the NPT Review
Conference this April, inviting world leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to witness with their own eyes
the reality of atomic bombings. And yet, Japan is becoming increasingly ambivalent about its
military restraint. Before his speech in New York, Kishida finalized new arrangements with the United States
that encourage Japan to function more proactively in East Asia. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is brushing aside
widespread public resistance to a Diet resolution that would authorize the Japanese Self-
Defense Forces to operate overseas for the first time since World War II. During his first administration, in
the wake of the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, Abe declared that a limited nuclear arsenal
would not necessarily violate the pacifist constitution. Tokyo affirmed its non-nuclear status in 2006,
but with North Korea testing medium-range ballistic missiles, and China enhancing its
conventional and nuclear forces amid the contest of wills over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,
another review seems inevitable. In 2011, Shintaro Ishihara, the then powerful governor of
Tokyo, even called for Japan to build its own nuclear arsenal. A key variable will be how Seoul reacts
to Pyongyangs provocations. South Korea is even more exposed to North Korean threats, and possesses an
advanced civilian nuclear program of its own. If it took the radical step of nuclearizing, Japan would likely follow. And
if Tokyo invoked North Koreas nuclear arsenal to withdraw from the NPT, which has a 90-day
it could build its own in short order. It has a growing defense industry recently
waiting period,
freed from export restrictions, mastery over missile tech nology thanks to its space program,
and a reprocessing facility capable of producing enough weapons-useable plutonium to fuel
more than 1000 bombs like the one that leveled Nagasaki. Indeed, if Japan wanted to, it could
probably develop basic explosives in less than a year and a sophisticated arsenal in three to
five years. Faced with an existential crisis, however, those numbers would plummet, as Tokyo
fast-tracked a national undertaking. For all of these reasons, Washington needs Tokyo to play a more active
role in regional security. The bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue formalized mid-level consultations in 2010; the
meetings should expand to include South Korea trilateral coordination is overdue. The United States should
continue urging Japan to invest more on conventional forces. For decades, Japanese military spending has hovered
around 1 percent of gross domestic product. Even a half-percent increase would help offset smaller U.S. defense
budgets, reducing scenarios where U.S. nuclear forces would have to be called on and increasing the credibility of
U.S. deterrent threats in East Asia as a result. Hibakusha have educated Japan and humanity about
the lifelong harm that nuclear weapons can inflict. Their advancing age is representative of
the generational changes facing Japan, however, with profound implications for its foreign
policies. As Japan assumes a more active security role in East Asia, it may be tempted to
rethink its nuclear options. With some experts promoting tailored proliferation to U.S. allies to counter
Chinas rise, U.S.-Japanese efforts to reduce nuclear risks regionally and worldwide appear
increasingly in jeopardy. The shadow of American power still looms over Japan 70 years after two artificial
suns rose over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The nuclear partnership with Washington has afforded Tokyo the security
necessary to renounce nuclear weapons and champion a world without them. With Japans nuclear restraint
no longer the article of faith it once was, the significance of the nuclear pacts struck decades
ago will become ever more consequential.
A2 Prolif Impact Defense
The reason proliferation is stable is because of alliance
agreements allied proliferation is intrinsically unstable
because it invites preemptive attacks and asymmetrical
escalation ladders
Lanoszka 12 Alexander, Ph.D. in IR, Postdoctoral Fellow Dickey Center for
International Understanding, Dartmouth College, Protection States Trust?:
Superpower Patronage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics
As doubts over the superpowers commitment
4.3 Nuclear Behavior as Insurance and Bargaining
increase, the secondary state will be more apt to explore military policies that insure against the
effects of patron abandonment. They are more likely to adopt ambiguous nuclear postures or even begin pursuing
their own nuclear weapons program. Having a nuclear weapons arsenal offers a robust insurance policy for
the secondary state. Goldstein (2000) notes that the secondary state is not required to develop
such an extensive and technologically advanced arsenal as those possessed by the US and the
Soviet Union. Rather, it needs to have a sufficient number of weapons that are capable of second-
strike delivery to deter the adversary from launching a direct attack. Indeed, the philosophy guiding the
secondary states approach to deterrence is different from that of their patrons.
Superpowers rely on the threat of controlled escalation in which they proceed 21
through limited but gradually more intense exchanges to communicate their resolve in
inflicting damage. Engaging in controlled escalation requires advanced command and control
systems as well as the ability to absorb nuclear damage . These requirements are especially
demanding for smaller states that are less able to meet them.16 Consequently, such
states opt for a poison pill strategy in which their deterrence policy rests on the
threat of uncontrolled escalation. The high likelihood of both parties losing
control of a nuclear exchange characterizes this form of confrontation. For such an exchange
to occur there needs to be an element of risk that neither side could attenuate (Powell 1987, 719). A states
technological capacity for managing its nuclear weapons poses such a risk if it is involuntarily
underdeveloped and thus prone to accidents and other organizational failures.
These concerns gain significance when it comes to secondary states . Their national
command structures are likely to be small and more concentrated than is the case for
superpowers. In the event of a nuclear exchange, they face a much higher probability of being thrown into
disarray during the conflicts initial stages. Nuclear retaliation, therefore, becomes less inhibited
and results in the infliction of massive damage on the adversary (Goldstein 2000, 47-
51). Backwards inducing from this possibility leads the adversary to refrain from direct military attack on the
secondary states have to
secondary state.17 Such are the advantages of acquiring nuclear weapons, but
pass through various stages of nuclear development first . Indeed, there is a paradox
underlining nuclear weapons acquisition . As much as having a nuclear arsenal
might engender international stability, the process by which states finally acquire
nuclear weapons generates instability (Sagan and Waltz 1995). Adopting an
ambiguous nuclear posture or pursuing a nuclear weapons program provokes
alarm amongst neighboring states, regardless of whether they are allies. Those
states might be unsettled by the uncertainty of the potential proliferators intentions
and the fear of being vulnerable to nuclear blackmail (coercion) in the future. Moreover, though the
secondary state acts to hedge against superpower abandonment in their effort to obtain greater foreign
policy autonomy, they also risk punishment from the superpower for threatening to
undermine its alliance structures.

Yes war
Kroenig 8/16/15 (2015, Matthew Kroenig is an Associate Professor and
International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government at Georgetown
University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security at The Atlantic Council. He is an expert on US national
security policy and strategy, international relations theory, nuclear deterrence, arms
control, nuclear nonproliferation, Iran, and counterterrorism. He is the author or
editor of several books, including A Time to Attack: The Looming Iranian Nuclear
Threat (forthcoming 2014) and Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the
Spread of Nuclear Weapons (2010), which won the International Studies Association
Best Book Award, Honorable Mention. His articles on international politics have
appeared in such publications as American Political Science Review, Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Policy, International Organization, The New York Times, The Wall Street
Journal, and The Washington Post. He regularly provides commentary on BBC, CNN,
C-SPAN, NPR, and many other media outlets. From May 2010 to May 2011, he
served as a Special Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a Council on
Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship, where he worked on defense
policy and strategy for Iran. In 2005, he worked as a strategist in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense where he authored the first-ever, US government strategy for
deterring terrorist networks. For his work, he was awarded the Office of the
Secretary of Defenses Award for Outstanding Achievement. Dr Kroenig regularly
consults with the defense, energy, and intelligence communities. He is a life
member of the Council on Foreign Relations. The History of Proliferation Optimism:
Does It Have a Future?, Taylor and Francis)
proliferation optimists present an oversimplified view of nuclear
First and foremost,

deterrence theory. Optimists argue that since the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), any nuclear
war would mean national suicide and, therefore, no rational leader would ever
choose to start one. Furthermore, they argue that the requirements for rationality are not high. Rather, leaders must value their own
survival and the survival of their nation and understand that intentionally launching a nuclear war would threaten those values. Many analysts and
policymakers attempt to challenge the optimists on their own turf and question whether the leaders of potential proliferant states are fully rational.34 Yet,

these debates overlook the fact that, apart from the optimists, leading nuclear deterrence theorists believe that
nuclear proliferation contributes to a real risk of nuclear war even in a
situation of MAD among rational states.35 Moreover, realizing that nuclear war is possible does not depend on
peculiar beliefs about the possibility of escaping MAD.36 Rather, as we will discuss below, these theorists understand that some risk of

nuclear war is necessary in order for deterrence to function. To be sure, in the 1940s, Viner,
Brodie, and others argued that MAD rendered war among major powers obsolete, but nuclear deterrence theory soon advanced beyond that simple

understanding.37 After all,great power political competition does not end with nuclear weapons .
And nuclear-armed states still seek to threaten nuclear-armed adversaries. States
cannot credibly threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they still want to
coerce their adversaries. This leads to a credibility problem: how can states credibly
threaten a nuclear-armed opponent? Since the 1960s, academic nuclear deterrence theory has been devoted almost
exclusively to answering this question.38 And their answers do not give us reasons to be optimistic. Thomas Schelling was the first to

devise a rational means by which states can threaten nuclear-armed opponents.39 He

argued that leaders cannot credibly threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear
war, but they can make a threat that leaves something to chance. 40 They can engage in a
process, the nuclear crisis, which increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. As states

escalate a nuclear crisis there is an increasing probability that the conflict will
spiral out of control and result in an inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange.
As long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater than the incremental increase
in the risk of nuclear war, however, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherently
credible. In these games of nuclear brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest risk of
nuclear war before backing down will win the crisis , as long as it does not end in catastrophe. It is for this reason
that Thomas Schelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a competition in

risk taking. 41 This does not mean that states eagerly bid up the risk of nuclear war. Rather, they face gut-wrenching decisions at each stage
of the crisis. They can quit the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but only by ceding an important geopolitical issue to an opponent. Or they can the escalate the
crisis in an attempt to prevail, but only at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear exchange. Since 1945 there were have been 20 high stakes nuclear crises

By asking whether states can be

in which rational states like the United States run a frighteningly-real risk of nuclear war.42

deterred, therefore, proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The
right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run
against a particular opponent in a given crisis? Optimists are likely correct when they assert that a nuclear-armed
Iran will not intentionally commit national suicide by launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack on the United States or Israel. This does not mean that
Iran will never use nuclear weapons, however. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to think that a nuclear-armed Iran would not, at some point, find itself in a
crisis with another nuclear-armed power. It is also inconceivable that in those circumstances, Iran would not be willing to run some risk of nuclear war in
order to achieve its objectives. If a nuclear-armed Iran and the United States or Israel were to have a geopolitical conflict in the future, over the internal
politics of Syria, an Israeli conflict with Irans client Hizballah, the US presence in the Persian Gulf, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, or some other
issue, do we believe that Iran would immediately capitulate? Or is it possible that Iran would push back, possibly brandishing nuclear weapons in an
attempt to coerce its adversaries? If the latter, there is a risk that proliferation to Iran could result in nuclear war and proliferation optimists are wrong to

dismiss it out of hand.An optimist might counter that nuclear weapons will never be used,
even in a crisis situation, because states have such a strong incentive , namely national survival,
to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used . But this objection ignores the fact that
leaders operate under competing pressures. Leaders in nuclear-armed states also
have strong incentives to convince their adversaries that nuclear weapons might be
used. Historically we have seen that leaders take actions in crises, such as placing
nuclear weapons on high alert and delegating nuclear launch authority to
low-level commanders, to purposely increase the risk of nuclear war in an
attempt to force less-resolved opponents to back down. Moreover, not even the optimists first principles
about the irrelevance of nuclear posture stand up to scrutiny. Not all nuclear wars would be equally

devastating.43 Any nuclear exchange would have devastating consequences no

doubt, but, if a crisis were to spiral out of control and result in nuclear war, any sane
leader would rather face a country with five nuclear weapons than one with 5,000 .
Similarly, any sane leader would be willing to run a greater risk of nuclear war against the former state than against the latter. Indeed, scholars have
demonstrated that states are willing to run greater risks and are, therefore, more likely to win nuclear crises when they enjoy nuclear superiority over their

opponents.44 Proliferation optimists might be correct that no rational leader would choose
to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but, depending on the context, any sane leader
would almost certainly be willing to risk one. Nuclear deterrence theorists have also proposed a second
scenario under which rational leaders would be willing to instigate a nuclear exchange: limited nuclear

war.45 For example, by launching a single nuclear weapon against a small city, a nuclear-
armed state could signal its willingness to escalate a crisis , while leaving its adversary with enough left to
lose to deter the adversary from launching a full-scale nuclear response. In a future crisis between China and the United States, for example, China could
choose to launch a nuclear strike on a US military base in East Asia to demonstrate its seriousness. In that situation, with the continental United States
intact, would Washington choose to launch a full-scale nuclear war on China that could result in the destruction of many American cities? Or would it back

If launching
down? China might decide to strike after calculating that Washington would prefer a humiliating retreat over a full-scale nuclear war.

a limited nuclear war could be a rational strategic move under certain

circumstances, it then follows that the spread of nuclear weapons increases
the risk of nuclear use. To be sure, some strategic thinkers, including Henry Kissinger, advocated limited nuclear war as a viable
strategy only to recant the position later due to fears of uncontrollable escalation. Yet, this does not change the fact that leading nuclear
deterrence theorists maintain that limited nuclear war is possible among rational
leaders in a MAD world.46
Japan Analysis
Timeframe means we turn their advantage
Keck, Managing Editor of The Diplomat, 14 (Zachary, Japan and Chinas Dispute
Goes Nuclear,)
Many experts believe that Japan could produce nuclear weapons within 6 months of
deciding to do so, and some believe that Tokyo is pursuing a nuclear hedging strategy. Japan has done little to
mollify these concerns. In fact, it has often encouraged them, with a Japanese official recently saying off the record
that Japan already has the technical capability [to build a nuclear bomb], and has had it
since the 1980s.

Even without nukes, causes independent strike capabilities

Samuels 13---Richard J. Samuels and James L. Schoff, 2013. Ford International
Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Studies at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Senior Associate in the Asia Program
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Japans Nuclear Hedge:
Beyond Allergy and Breakout, Strategic Asia 2013-14: Asia in the Second Nuclear
Age. Eds. Tellis, Ashley J., Abraham M. Denmark, and Travis Tanner,
the fourth alternative deterrence strategy, a much discussed non-nuclear
This raises
one that would maintain Japans nuclear hedge but entail a considerable enhancement of its
conventional offensive capabilities. As one defense planner has explained, there is much
more Japan can do to augment its deterrent short of nuclear weapons breakout.103 Although
Japans self-imposed ban on the acquisition of long-range strike capabilities has been
thinned by successive reinterpretations of the constitution, the MOD budget has remained
static, and the military has been slow to acquire the carriers, bombers, strike fighters, and
ballistic or cruise missiles that would expand Japans capacity to punish adversaries at a
distance.104 But some Japanese leaders are seriously considering the need to augment U.S.
capabilities. One senior military officer invoked a common metaphor: we have been at our parents
knee [oya no sune ni kajiru], but U.S. shins have become thin.105 He joins a chorus of defense
planners who advocate changing the extant alliance model in which the United States is the sword
and Japan is the shield to one in which both countries have offensive capabilities sufficient to deter
regional aggression.106 As Narushige Michishita has reported, the most widely debated
military option for Japan going forward is the acquisition of strike capabilities for
preemptive counterforce operations against hostile bases.107 This strike capability
movement reached a climax during the drafting of the National Defense Program Guidelines in 2004,
when the JDA sought funds to develop long-range, surface-to-surface missile technology. 108 But the
LDPs coalition partner, the New Komeito Party, vetoed that proposal and the plan was dropped. The
Abe administration put this issue back on the table for consideration in 2013 after South Koreas
decision in 2012 to extend the range of its ballistic missile forces to eight hundred kilometers provided
diplomatic cover. Such a shift could enhance Japans deterrence posture, whether or not it were
integrated with U.S. military doctrine in ways that would make deterrence more effective and credible;
however, it also risks complicating the regional security dilemma and engendering domestic
political blowback. Washington has long pushed for a more militarily capable Japan but is reluctant to
weigh in publicly on this sensitive issue, lest the United States be viewed as either encouraging or
restraining Japan. On this latter point, in particular, the U.S. side is aware that efforts to
dissuade Tokyo from adding strike capacity could be unsuccessful and
might accelerate the loss of Japanese confidence in its all y, thereby prompting an
even quicker development of independent capabilities.
That collapses deterrence causes Asian war and missile prolif
Roberts 13 Brad Roberts, August 2013. Visiting fellow at the National Institute
for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense of Japan in spring 2013. From 2009 to
early 2013 Dr. Roberts served in the Obama administration as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy. Extended Deterrence
and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia, NIDS Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No.1,
Japan and the United States (and other interested stakeholders) are likely to have
lengthy discussions about the benefits, costs, and risks of any specific proposal
resulting from this study. From a U.S. perspective, there would be a number of
potential benefits, including the following. Japanese strike capabilities would
strengthen deterrence. This would be especially true in gray zone conflicts39 that
might erupt into armed confrontation if the alliance deterrence posture is perceived
as weak or in any case where Japan might be acting alone or in support of alliance
interests in a localized conflict.40 Especially if Japan were to choose ballistic rather
than cruise missiles, its capabilities could help to address the gap in prompt
conventional strike discussed above.41 Depending on the scale of capability,
Japanese strike forces would also play a role in enabling the AirSea battle concept
and thus in maintaining an overall balance of conventional forces in the region.
These capabilities would also add protection if deterrence fails. Additionally, the
United States recognizes that Japan has a sovereign responsibility and right to
defend itself and must prepare for the possibility that in some cases its interests will
not always fully coincide with those of the United States. From a US perspective,
there are also some likely costs. For example, investments in these capabilities
would come at the expense of investments in other capabilities important to the
alliance, perhaps of higher priority. There would also be political costs in terms
of negative reactions from others in the region, who might criticize such a step as
inconsistent with the letter and spirit of Japans constitution. From a U.S. perspective,
there are also a number of potential risks. There is a risk that China might go beyond negative
political reactions to deploy new capabilities targeting Japan, such that the net effect of
Japans decision to field strike capabilities would be an erosion of Japans security
environment. There is a risk that the proposal could be so divisive politically in Japan and elsewhere
as to undermine progress in other areas to strengthen regional deterrence and strategic stability.
There is a risk also that autonomous strike actions by Japan could result in escalation
that is unhelpful in crisis; this would be a function of the degree to which Japan develops the
information, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities necessary for independent strike
operations.42 Further, as Japans acquisition of strike capabilities would follow acquisition by
South Korea, the message might well be taken by allies outside Northeast Asia that allies
inside Northeast Asia are losing confidence in the United States to protect them, resulting
in increased pressure from allies elsewhere to acquire strike capabilities of their own.43
There is also a risk that the further proliferation of regional strike systems would put
renewed pressure on the Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF),
especially if officials and experts in Moscow renew calls for Russian withdrawal so that it
is at liberty to field counter-balancing systems.
SK analysis
DA outweighs - magnitude - destroys US deterrence credibility
across the globe
Nichols 7/31/14 Thomas M., Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval
War College and an adjunct at the Harvard Extension School, WHY A KOREAN
Lees proposal also takes place in a vacuum, as though nothing else is happening in the world. By focusing on costs
and planning in one part of the map, Lee treats foreign policy as a menu from which one may pick and choose
American credibility is under attack on all fronts:
options at will, rather than as a coherent whole.
Russia, Syria, and Iran are but three places where perceptions of resolve matter. (Or
would have mattered, had we cared enough to insist on being more proactive two or three years ago.) What
message would it send, as Ukraine is being dismembered and NATO struggles with
its responses, if the United States leaves behind an ally still in a state of war? If the
only goal is to move 28,000 U.S. troops around a map and save some money, Major
Lees withdrawal looks like a terrific idea . Again, however, this is operational myopia: it
may well be that on the gaming table, the South can defeat the North without U.S. help, but
this is not about operations, it is about strategy . Specifically, it is about politics,
including trying to shape the enemys perceptions and willingness to engage in risk .
The regime in Pyongyang is the same one that attacked in 1950, and is still at war with one of our closest
allies. The consequences of yet one more American disengagement, after a string of foreign
policy disasters, might well end up costing far more than any budget-conscious planner
could envision. Its possible that U.S. strategy is outdated and overstates the risk from North Korea. Its also
possible that much of Pyongyangs rhetoric is meaningless, or a blustery show meant for domestic consumption.
Considering, however, that just yesterday a top North Korean military official
threatened a nuclear strike on the White House , it might be a bit too early to be so
complacent, especially with U.S. foreign policy in so many difficult binds across the

Probability - most likely conflict

Kolotiv 2012 (Vladimir N. Kolotiv, Head of the Far East History Department at St.
Petersburg State University, September 17, 2012, Russias Views of the Security
Situation in East Asia, Brookings Opinion,
The most correct indicator of the established geopolitical balance of forces in the
region is the East Asian Arc of Instability. This is a predominant geopolitical reality and is the basis of
the regional security architecture. The East Asian Arc of Instability is a difficult system of
blocks and counterbalances which goes through divided countries and disputed
territories. Beginning in the Cold War, the East Asian Arc of Instability has gone from the so-
called Northern territories (i.e. Kuril Islands), through the divided Korean peninsula and
divided China (Peoples Republic of China and Republic of China or Taiwan), and down to divided Vietnam
(North Vietnam and South Vietnam). These are only the most important flash points; small disputes along this arc
include Dokdo/Takeshima, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and the Spratly and Paracel islands as well as numerous
other small islands, reefs, and shoals in the South China Sea. During the Cold War only one considerable move took
place in the Southern part of the East Asian Arc of Instability: in 1975 Vietnam was unified, but only on the
continent. Before the end of the war, when the North Vietnamese army was stuck in South Vietnam, South
Vietnamese troops were evacuated from the Paracel Islands by the U.S. Navy and these islands were almost
immediately taken over by China in 1974. These events had far reaching consequences. All the intricate
curves of this Arc of Instability are stipulated by the geopolitical interests and
strategies of main actors of global and regional policy as well as the established
balance of power. Any change in this Arc of Instability, even if it seems insignificant
at first sight, could be considered by competitors as a challenge or even as casus
belli. From the southeast, the Arc of Instability is buttressed by U.S. military bases situated on the territory of U.S.
security partners in East Asia. This system is based on bilateral security agreements. Because of the significant
security dependence of Asian partners on the United States, and the virtually immeasurable military and economic
Russia and China
dominance that it enjoys, Washington has a certain freedom of action. From the northwest,
are hanging over this East Asian Arc of Instability. They coordinate their activities mainly in
Central Asia in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO is the mechanism that in
form looks most like a regional security system. But its impact is minimized because of its limited membership and
limited functions, and because the parties concerned know that it reduces their freedom of action.
disputes along the East Asian Arc of Instability are so complex that actors require
more maneuverability. At the same time that Russia and China coordinate in Central
Asia, therefore, they pursue foreign policy in East Asia without visible cooperation.
The East Asian Arc of Instability reflects historically established fault lines , which are
sources of friction in regional relations. When geopolitical players try to move these
lines, it is usually a cause for immediate reaction by competitors of informational,
diplomatic, economic, financial, and/or military character. These territorial disputes have huge
destructive potential and can turn the whole region into an abyss of long range
destabilization. Therefore the East Asian Arc of Instability plays a very important role in the contemporary
Great Game in East Asia.
Taiwan prolif Module
Independently, Abandoning Taiwan causes them to prolif
sparks regional arms race
Haddick 2014 -an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command
Robert, Fire on the Water, Naval Institute Press, p. 44
Taiwan presents perhaps the least likely, but also the most provocative, case of nuclear weapons potential in the
region. In the 1970s and again in the 1980s, Taiwan launched clandestine nuclear fuel reprocessing programs aimed
at providing it with its own nuclear deterrent against mainland China. Both times, the United States forced Taiwan to
abandon these programs.25 Taiwan has stored spent nuclear fuel at three two-unit nuclear power plants, which
could be reprocessed into bomb-grade plutonium if Taiwan built a facility to do so, as it attempted to do
Taiwan also possesses the industrial and electronics
clandestinely in the 1970s and 1980s.
expertise to assemble a deliverable nuclear weapon . Taiwan is developing an
indigenously produced long-range land-attack cruise missile that in theory could be armed
with a nuclear warhead. The missile, named Cloud Peak, has a range of 1,200 and possibly 2,000 kilometers and
will be mounted on mobile transporters.26The leadership in Beijing would view a decision by
Taiwan to acquire nuclear weapons as highly provocative and quite possibly a casus
belli. Beijing would likely view such a development as tantamount to a declaration
of independence, something that Beijing in the past has stated it would resist with force. Under current
circumstances, Taiwan appears to have no interest in this course. But a withdrawal of the U.S. security
presence would be a different matter, especially if it led to nuclear and missile races
elsewhere in the region. In that event a Taiwanese nuclear program could go from
being a highly remote case to perhaps the most likely path to war in the region .

That increases the likelihood of a nuclear war

Haddick 2014 -an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command
Robert, Fire on the Water, Naval Institute Press, p. 41-2
Of the ten known, suspected, and impending nuclear weapon states (the United States, Russia, United Kingdom,
France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, and Iran), six have military forces in the Asia-Pacific region.
Should the Global Trends Hobbesian scenario occur due to a withdrawal of the U.S. forward
security presence, the number of nuclear weapon states would almost certainly rise.
That outcome would assuredly result in greater instability, as multisided security competitions would
very likely break out. Military planners in the region would have to defend against multiple
and possibly shifting adversary alliance combinations. The addition of more nuclear
players would result in the need for greater preparation and stockpiling by all, because
previously safe levels of nuclear munitions would no longer be safe enough. New
players would mean further reductions in warning time during crises. Some leaders might conclude
that striking first at the hint of crisis is the only way to survive. Under the Hobbesian
pathway, the odds of nuclear disaster would rise substantially .
2NC Asia Prolif ext yes escalation
Asian prolif causes nuclear war
Stephen J. Cimbala 15, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at
Pennsylvania State University Brandywine, The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to
Deterrence and Strategy, 2015, p. 149
Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever
throughout Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile
defenses. A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basin (Russia, China,
Japan, and the two Koreasnot including the United States, with its own Pacific interests) could put
deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear
preemption. Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an
assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy.19 A five-sided nuclear
competition in the Pacific would be linked , in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to
the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear
weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could
place US proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for
more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses and counter-
deterrent special operations. In addition, an unrestricted nuclear arms race in Asia would
increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: (1) some of
these states already have histories of protracted conflict ; (2) states may have politically
unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision
for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical
malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate, but unauthorized, launch
by rogue commanders; and (3) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one
side to misinterpret the others defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive
preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption .
Turns general engagement
US needs to have Japans back in the face of Chinese
aggression- credibility gap weakens negotiation and causes
war Turns the aff
Friedberg and Schoenfeld 2013 (Aaron Friedberg, teaches politics at
Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School, and Gabriel Schoenfeld, senior fellow at the
Hudson Institute, February 22, 2013, America Must Stop China's Bullying of Japan,
The pivot, of course, was the Obama administration's signature first-term foreign
policy initiative. Starting in 2012, in response to signs of increasing Chinese assertiveness, Washington began
a series of steps designed to reassure its friends and allies in the region by bolstering the U.S. presence in Asia.
The pivot was an appropriate and widely-welcomed response to the growth of
Chinese power and the worrisome trends in its behavior. Mr. Abe's visit provides a highly
visible test of the President's resolve to follow through on his initiative. Over the past several years,
Japan has been on the receiving end of much of China's belligerence. The
perpetually insecure Chinese Communist party leadership appears to believe that
confrontation with Japan will stir nationalist sentiment , buttressing its public support and its grip
on power. To that end, Beijing has: escalated a minor incident involving a drunken
Chinese fishing boat captain into a major diplomatic crisis; blocked exports to
Japan of rare earth minerals essential to high-end electronic manufacturing; permitted (and
perhaps encouraged) violent mass demonstrations that resulted in extensive destruction
of Japanese property in China; stepped up provocative movements by air and sea
around disputed islands controlled by Japan; allegedly "painted" Japanese naval vessels with
fire-control radar, risking escalation into a shooting war. It is this brinkmanship that has Prime
Minister Abe in a state of genuine anxiety about Japan's security. North Korea's most recent
nuclear test, under indifferent Chinese eyes, has only exacerbated his fears. He is traveling to Washington in search
of reassurance. Unfortunately, there are reasons to fear that he will not find what he is seeking. There are signs
that President Obama's Asia policy could end up more closely resembling a full pirouette than a pivot. For one
thing, there is a new team in Washington. former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her tough-minded deputy,
Kurt Campbell, have departed the scene, as has Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. Secretary of State John Kerry
and Chuck Hagel (nominated as Panetta's successor at the Pentagon) hold strikingly different views about the
exercise of American power. While the Obama administration, in its first term, stressed the need to strengthen U.S.
military capabilities in Asia, Mr. Kerry has already cast doubt on this commitment, declaiming in his confirmation
hearings that "I'm not convinced that increased military ramp-up is critical yet" and that we already have "a lot
more bases out there [in the Pacific] than any other nation in the world, including China today." In any event,
whatever Mr. Kerry intends, and even if sequestration can be avoided, the administration's planned cuts in defense
spending have already called its promises into question. That is the backdrop. On the foreground are some more
subtle shifts in the Obama administration's disposition that have left Tokyo perplexed and dismayed. After talking
tough over the last two years, the administration has toned down its rhetoric in ways that have not gone unnoticed
in the region. Indeed, the blunt word pivot has been excised from its diplomatic lexicon, replaced by the bland
accounting term of "rebalancing." That rhetorical shift is part of a broader effort to reassure the new Communist
leadership in Beijing that America's highest priority is avoiding confrontation. Specifically, on the hottest-button
current issue, while the administration has reiterated its position that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are covered under
the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty, it has simultaneously displayed nervousness about being forced to take sides in
Tokyo's territorial disputes. Administration officials fended off Mr. Abe's initial request for a visit to the White House
and they have reportedly declined proposals for a joint press conference out of concern for what the Japanese
There is no doubt that it would be foolish to get involved in an
leaders might say in public.
unnecessary confrontation with China. But is attempting to propitiate China by
trying to appear even-handed the best way to reduce the risk of bloodshe d, or
would we be better off maintaining a posture that is unmistakably strong enough to
deter aggressors and reassure friends? The administration appears to be tilting toward the former
American policy should
approach, but the latter is the only reliable pathway to continued peace in Asia.
reflect the fact that Tokyo is not the party primarily responsible for ratcheting up
tension in the region. To be sure, there is a nasty streak of Japanese nationalism and politicians, including
Mr. Abe, have occasionally flirted with it, to the detriment of Japan's reputation and position in the world. But it is
risible to equate a handful of offensive statements about the past with the virulent and violent strain of nationalism
It is China that has been probing, testing the strength
unleashed by the Chinese government.
of the alliance, building up its forces, and seeking to drive a wedge between
Washington and Tokyo. The paramount danger here is that if we seek to put
distance between ourselves and Japan, we will actually encourage more Chinese
aggression. And after too much such encouragement, we might well find ourselves
forced either to come to Japan's defense or watch our alliances in Asia crumble. If this
happens, the Obama administration will have earned the dubious distinction of accomplishing the very outcome it
most seeks to avoid.
Turns China/NK Negotiations
South Korea prolif decks nuclear negotiations.
Park, Associate with the Project on Managing the Atoms at the Belfer Center,
2013 John, Asia in the Second Nuclear Age

a South Korean decision to convert the country latent nuclear

For the United States,
capabilities into a nuclear deterrent would largely undermine Washingtons long-
standing effort to achieve peaceful denuclearization in North Korea. The collapse of this
pillar of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia would also undermine coordination among
member countries of the dormant six-party talks. With two nuclear Koreas, the
United States would be closely scrutinized for how it dealt with both proliferants on the
peninsula. An ad hoc and inconsistent U.S. approac h regarding sanctions relief would adversely
affect U.S. credibility in a rapidly evolving region , thereby complicating delicate
negotiations with Beijing on rolling back North Koreas minimal nuclear deterrent.
The Chinese governments stance would likely be more uniform , expressing clear
and unqualified opposition to both Koreas' nuclear weapons arsenals.

And it kills international efforts

Roehrig 14 Terence, Former Research Fellow, International Security
Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 20122014, "The Case for a Nuclear-free
South Korea would also lose international support and the moral high ground in its
struggle to denuclearize the peninsula. Many have argued Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions along with
its voiding of the 1992 Denuclearization Agreement and 2005 Joint Statement from the Six Party Talks, agreements
that commit Pyongyang and Seoul to denuclearizing the peninsula, have ended any of Seoul's obligations to
this would be a serious abdication of South Korea's leadership
exercise nuclear restraint. But
in international non-proliferation as exemplified by its hosting of the 2012 Nuclear
Security Summit. South Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons would undermine the
NPT's credibility and weaken restraints for others such as Japan and Saudi Arabia .
Moreover, international support, particularly from China and Russia, to keep the
pressure on North Korea to denuclearize, would likely fade.