EN

BANC

DIANA RAMOS, A. C. No. 6788
Complainant, (Formerly, CBD 382)
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,*
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA and
REYES, JJ.

ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG,
Respondent. Promulgated:

August 23, 2007

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R E S O L U T I O N


PER CURIAM:


This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension[1] against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

THE COMPLAINT

In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil
and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.[2] She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's
fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.[3]

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent
never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several
hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled.[4] This happened six times and for each
appearance in court, respondent charged her P350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired about the status
of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed
any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).[5]


RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very start. In fact,
he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor
of PAO) of Bian, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter.[6]

In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the Jovellanoses.[7] Because he
was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he declined.[8] Nevertheless, he advised the
complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private practitioner.[9] Atty. Ungson, however, did not
accept the complainant's case as she was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon.[10] Notwithstanding
Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid
that she might spend the cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while she raised the
balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.[11]

A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of her daughters asked
her to account for the P5,000 she had previously given the respondent for safekeeping.[12] Because the complainant
was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.[13]

On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.[14] A few months later or in September 1994, the complainant
again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses.Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner,
respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the
complainant.[15]


RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where
the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report
and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.[16]

The CBD noted that the receipt[17] was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the PAO.[18] It also
noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned
trial lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent
have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's
request.[19] It found respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private
cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their salaries.[20] The CBD concluded that respondent violated the
following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a client.

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is
not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can
obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.


Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered him to
immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt.[21]

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rules 1.01,
16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's recommendation with
regard to the restitution of P5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of
respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional suspension of six months.[22]


THE COURT'S RULING


We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.[23] More specifically, lawyers in government
service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not
only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.[24]

Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the private
practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.[25]


Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-
time to the work of their respective offices.

In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he
was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship.[26] Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed
the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that
he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the
prohibition on private practice of profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of
providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.[27] Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised
Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 14. xxx

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to
indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.[28]



As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent
with the office's mission.[29] Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.[30] This undertaking includes the observance of the above-mentioned
prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees
in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule
18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession
disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees, respondent
also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which
in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an
action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant
to pay his appearance fees for hearings that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the
lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.[31]

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers, specially
one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission
which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of
public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private
practice.[32]

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's
fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in
satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client)[33] nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as
amounts given for filing fees and bail bond).[34] Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a
government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.[35]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyers oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18,
Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law
and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the
amount of P5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.





























































 EN BANC


GISELA HUYSSEN, A.C. No. 6707
Complainant,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.


Promulgated:
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ,
Respondent. March 24, 2006

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D E C I S I O N


PER CURIAM:


This treats of a Complaint[1] for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez.
Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas under Section
13[g] of the Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa applications will be
favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one year which could
be withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit was indeed required by law, complainant deposited with
respondent on six different occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of US$20,000. Respondent
prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the amounts deposited by the complainant but refused to
give her copies of official receipts despite her demands.After one year, complainant demanded from respondent the
return of US$20,000 who assured her that said amount would be returned. When respondent failed to return the
sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to
respondent for the immediate return of the money. In a letter dated 1 March 1999, respondent promised to release
the amount not later than 9 March 1999.Failing to comply with his promise, the World Mission for Jesus sent another
demand letter. In response thereto, respondent sent complainant a letter dated 19 March 1999explaining the alleged
reasons for the delay in the release of deposited amount. He enclosed two blank checks postdated to 6 April and 20
April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in the amounts. When complainant deposited the postdated checks on
their due dates, the same were dishonored because respondent had stopped payment on the same. Thereafter,
respondent, in his letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999, explained the reasons for stopping payment on the
checks, and gave complainant five postdated checks with the assurance that said checks would be
honored. Complainant deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates but they were all dishonored for having
been drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered stopped by respondent. After respondent
made several unfulfilled promises to return the deposited amount, complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who
sent two demand letters to respondent. The demand letters remained unheeded.

Thus, a complaint[2] for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline, required[3]respondent to submit his answer
within 15 days from receipt thereof.
In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,[4] respondent denied the allegations in the complaint claiming that having
never physically received the money mentioned in the complaint, he could not have appropriated or pocketed the
same. He said the amount was used as payment for services rendered for obtaining the permanent visas in the
Philippines. Respondent explained thus:

a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of the
complainant, the latter was introduced to me at my office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big
problem concerning their stay in the Philippines, herself and three sons, one of which is already of
major age while the two others were still minors then. Their problem was the fact that since they
have been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years as holders of missionary visas (9G)
they could no longer extend their said status as under the law and related polic[i]es of the
government, missionary visa holders could only remain as such for ten (10) years after which they
could no longer extend their said status and have to leave the country.

b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they better
secure a permanent visa under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as
Quota Visa and thereafter, provided them with list of the requirements in obtaining the said visa, one
of which is that the applicant must have a $40,000 deposited in the bank. I also inform that her son
Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age, has to have the same amount of show money
separate of her money as he would be issued separate visa, while her two minor children would be
included as her dependents in her said visa application. I advised them to get a lawyer (sic),
complainant further requested me to refer to her to a lawyer to work for their application, which I
did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the complainant
and her family.

c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza
until the same was finished and the corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the complainant
and her family. Her son Marcus Huyssen was given an independent permanent visa while the other
two were made as dependents of the complainant. In between the processing of the papers and
becoming very close to the complainant, I became the intermediary between complainant and their
counsel so much that every amount that the latter would request for whatever purpose was coursed
through me which request were then transmitted to the complainant and every amount of money
given by the complainant to their counsel were coursed thru me which is the very reason why my
signature appears in the vouchers attached in the complaint-affidavit;

d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to be huge for services
of a lawyer that I myself began to wonder why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and
inquired from him regarding the matter and the following facts were revealed to me:

1) That what was used by the complainant as her show money
from the bank is not really her money but money of World Mission for Jesus, which
therefore is a serious violation of the Immigration Law as there was a
misrepresentation. This fact was confirmed later when the said entity sent their
demand letter to the undersigned affiant and which is attached to the complaint-
affidavit;

2) That worst, the same amount used by the complainant, was the
very same amount used by her son Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining
his separate permanent visa. These acts of the complainant and her son could have
been a ground for deportation and likewise constitute criminal offense under the
Immigration Law and the Revised Penal Code. These could have been the possible
reason why complainant was made to pay for quite huge amount.

e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her family became very
close to undersigned and my family that I was even invited to their residence several times;

f) However after three years, complainant demanded the return of their money
given and surprisingly they want to recover the same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no
longer around, he died sometime 1997;

 g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now being hidden and that
the amount of money is now being sought to be recovered from me;

h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I know the consequences
of having signed the same and therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund
needed but up to the present my standby loan application has not been released and was informed
that the same would only be forthcoming second week of August. The same should have been
released last March but was aborted due to prevalent condition. The amount to be paid, according to
the complainant has now become doubled plus attorneys fees of P200,000.00.


Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her Formal Offer of Evidence
on 25 August 2003.

On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of respondents evidence but the scheduled hearings (11
settings) were all reset at the instance of the respondent who was allegedly out of the country to attend to his clients
needs. Reception of respondents evidence was scheduled for the last time on 28 September 2004 and again
respondent failed to appear, despite due notice and without just cause.

On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her report[5] recommending the
disbarment of respondent. She justified her recommendation in this manner:
At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that respondent received the amount of
US$20,000 from complainant, as respondent himself admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes
A to F of complainant) showing his receipt of said amount from complainant. Respondent however
claims that he did not appropriate the same for himself but that he delivered the said amount to a
certain Atty. Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is untenable considering the documentary
evidence submitted by complainant. On record is the 1 March 1999 letter of respondent addressed
to the World Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint) where he stated thus:

I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of the deposit but I
repeat, nobody really intended that the thing would happen that way. Many events
were the causes of the said delay particularly the death of then Commissioner
L. Verceles, whose sudden death prevented us the needed papers for the immediate
release. It was only from compiling all on the first week of January this year, that all
the said papers were recovered, hence, the process of the release just started though
some important papers were already finished as early as the last quarter of last year.
We are just going through the normal standard operating procedure and there is no
day since January that I do not make any follow ups on the progress of the same.

and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where he stated thus:

I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by
your good self in connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that
of your family. It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the
refund as some other pertinent papers are being still compiled are being looked at
the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and who died of
heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the
documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay.

From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash
Vouchers were issued by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official
receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his
personal checks to cover the return of the money to complainant if said amount was really officially
deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable
conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and appropriated the same for his
personal use. It should also be noted that respondent has failed to establish that the late Atty.
Mendoza referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really exists. There is not one correspondence from Atty.
Mendoza regarding the visa application of complainant and his family, and complainant has also
testified that she never met this Atty. Mendoza referred to by respondent.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position
with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more
reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted
that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
reads:

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.


On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved[6] the Investigating Commissioners report with
modification, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondents violation of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return the
amount with legal interest from receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be
referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative
action.


We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be severely sanctioned.

We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more
restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer
who holds a responsible public office.[7]

It is undisputed that respondent admitted[8] having received the US$20,000 from complainant as shown by his
signatures in the petty cash vouchers[9] and receipts[10]he prepared, on the false representation that that it was
needed in complainants application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated the said amount
and interposed the defense that he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in
their application for visa in the BID.[11] Such defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit evidence on the
matter. While he claims that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did not present the death certificate of said Atty.
Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the blame to someone who has been naturally silenced
by fate, is not only impudent but downright ignominious. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it
is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against
him.[12] He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected
of him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records show that even though he was given the
opportunity to answer the charges and controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation, he failed,
without any plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case was set for reception of his evidence despite
due notice.

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is inherently
a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial
is purely self-serving and is with nil evidentiary value.

When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the
charge. Such admissions were also apparent in the following letters of respondent to complainant:

1) Letter[13] dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:

Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said deposit is forthcoming, the
latest of which is 09 March 1999. Should it not be released on said date, I understand to pay the same
to you out of my personal money on said date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send somebody
here at the office on that day and the amount would be given to you wether (sic) from the Bureau or
from my own personal money.


2) Letter[14] dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:

I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by
your goodself in connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family.

It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other
pertinent papers are still being compiled and are being looked at the files of the late
Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure
 that everything would be fine later as all the documents needed are already intact. This is just a
bureaucratic delay.

x x x x

As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2 checks, one dated April 6,
1999 and the other one dated April 20, 1999. I leave the amount vacant because I would want you to
fill them up on their due dates the peso equivalent to $10,000 respectively. This is to be sure that the
peso equivalent of your P20,000 would be well exchanged. I have postdated them to enable me to
raise some more pesos to cover the whole amount but dont worry as the Lord had already provided
me the means.


3) Letter[15] dated 25 April 1999 provides:

Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware that I have done my very best
for the early return of your money but the return is becoming bleak as I was informed that there are
still papers lacking. When I stopped the payment of the checks I issued, I was of the impression that
everything is fine, but it is not. I guess it is time for me to accept the fact that I really have to personally
return the money out of my own. The issue should stop at my end. This is the truth that I must face.
It may hurt me financially but it would set me free from worries and anxieties.

I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to secure one last Saturday the
releases of which are on the following:

May 4, 1999- 200,000
May 11, 1999 -200,000
May 20, 1999-200,000
June 4, 1999-200,000

I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my collateral.

I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four checks which I assure you will
be sufficiently funded on their due dates by reason of my aforestatedloans. Just bear with me for the
last time, if any of these checks, is returned, dont call me anymore. Just file the necessary action
against me, I just had to put an end to this matter and look forward. x x x


4) Letter[16] dated 12 May 1999, which reads:

The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to cover the first check I issued.
In fact I stopped all payments to all other checks that are becoming due to some of my creditors to
give preference to the check I issued to you.

This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank instead of returning the other
checks I requested for stop payment - instead honored them and mistakenly returned your check.
This was a very big surprise to me and discouragement for I know it would really upset you.

In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000 in cash which I initially plan
to withdraw from the Bank. However, I could not entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I
bring the same to your place considering that its quite a big amount. I am just sending a check for you
to immediately deposit today and I was assured by the bank that it would be honored this time.


Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another. As
correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not have issued his personal checks if said
amount were officially deposited with the BID. This is an admission of misconduct.

Respondents act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latters pending application for
visas is violative of Rule 1.01[17] of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule
6.02[18] of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interest. Promotion of
private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of
his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office.[19] Respondents conduct in office betrays the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high public office. A
lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust
and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper
of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in
private practice.
In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing another by
issuing several worthless checks, thereby compounding his case.

In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct,[20] as the effect
transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public
since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure
the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Blacks
definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men
or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.[21]
Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or
she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude.[22]
Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had the
gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does
not deserve to continue, being a member of the bar.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed
only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct
himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A
violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes
suspension and disbarment.[23] More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege.[24]

Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring
individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from
the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyers
oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.[25] These
pronouncement gain practical significance in the case at bar considering that respondent was a former member of
the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing also that government lawyers who are public servants owe
fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their
professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.[26]

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high
standards of the legal profession.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this
Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral
conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude ; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority to do so.[27]
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,[28] we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer who, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services,
Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and
requests awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona,[29] we also disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor
Relations Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in the act of receiving and counting
money extorted from a certain person.
Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the
Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of
expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.[30]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return the
amount he received from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the money until payment. This case
shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action. Let copies of this Decision be
furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout
the country.

SO ORDERED.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government
prosecutor.

The Facts

Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate. 1Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2

Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4

Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from
the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its
operations ceased in 1997. 6

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus
Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees
alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father,
withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8

Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. 9 He
resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in
relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 13

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former
Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should
have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore,
complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat
employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint. 15

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainers
fee for the months of January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April and May
1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government
prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainants allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the
resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19

Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for more
than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues
that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation. 22 Respondent contends that
complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that
complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead
complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. 25

Respondent states that complainants reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent
would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainants statement during the hearing conducted
on 12 February 1999:

x x x

Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didnt think he would do it, Madam Witness?

A. Because he is supposed to be my fathers friend and he was working with my Dad and he was supposed to be
trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat employees or
complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor. 27Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that respondents act was tainted with
personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28

Respondent denies complainants allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed
Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention
the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination. 29

Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees from
complainant but claims that it

was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his
consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as
representation and that rendering consultancy services is not prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-
Memorandum, states:

x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the respondents
asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments
do not at all show or translate as a specie of conflict of interest. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to,
or connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32

Respondent insists that complainants evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant. 33

While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations
against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4
January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. 35

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP
Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 37 Due to
IBP Commissioner Abbas resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP
Commissioner Funa"). 38

After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP
Commissioner Funas Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests,
failure to safeguard a former clients interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while
being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three
years suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of whether the matter in
I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B"
of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and
control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).

Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the
personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of
Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues,
therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to
the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.

A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to
"maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any
matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)

Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any interest except
justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect
to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor
policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No.
97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S.
No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal
Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.

x x x x

While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240
were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very personalities he dealt
with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary
relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part of its management.

x x x x

As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being an
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private
practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice
of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers
any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and
calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).

Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal
complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.

Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former clients
interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. 40

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 41 of
the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he
violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or
Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting
interests." 44However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests
does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full
disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 46

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful
conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private
practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47

Complainants evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of
inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 49 In essence, what a lawyer owes his
former client is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him. 50

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the
criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-
payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected
with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that
respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his previous
employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he
was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that
respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat in
resolving the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he
resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for
representing conflicting interests. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that
occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the
duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for
matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not
guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51

"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
ones self to the public as a lawyer. 52

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained
counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not
distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that
are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term
"practice of law."

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a
government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainers
fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility
unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Here, respondents violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that
"[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondents admission that he
received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct,
which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his
Demurrer to Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended or
disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the
following grounds:

x x x x

d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with
the public. 54

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts. 55

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private
practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for
respondents violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law
for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal
record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991

FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.

PER CURIAM:p

This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney Fernando T.
Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C.
Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application
of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The
present complaint charges the respondent with the following offenses:

1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act
within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the
eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS,
for the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons
interested therein.

2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.

3. Dishonesty.

4. Extortion.

5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official
transaction before him.

6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)

As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register some 163 deeds of
sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no
action from the respondent.

Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the uniform deeds of
absolute sale with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment and
to clarify certain details about the transactions.

Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron suspended the registration of the
documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement" between them, which was that V & G
should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per
trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.

On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163 registrable
documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket
for him.

The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to respondent through his niece.

Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent imposed additional
registration requirements. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on
May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24)
hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on
the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject
matter. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial, stressing that:

... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15) years or
for a sum total of more than 2,000 same set of documents which have been repeatedly and
uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto
Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, that
the very same documents of the same tenor have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15,
Rollo.)

On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution dated July
27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable. Heedless of the
NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment.

Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4, 1987 administrative
charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds.

Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed respondent to explain in writing
why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him. Respondent was further asked whether he
would submit his case on the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal investigation.

In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or
material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action.

Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes' charges
against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. Both parties submitted the case for
resolution based on the pleadings.

The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty; (2) causing
undue injury to a party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross
ignorance of the law and procedure. He opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated requests
and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on the registration of the documents involved,
in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit from the interested party, absorbed the charges of conduct
unbecoming of a public official, extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for himself in
connection with pending official transactions before him.

Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on February 22,
1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple
neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration; and (3)
be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct.

Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence supports the
Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave misconduct.

The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for registration
and, notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for expeditious action on the said
documents, he continued with his inaction.

The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the
documents involved; that he himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said
documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration thereof, that the
Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in question; and
that, such resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the
registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional
requirements not adverted to in his previous denial.

xxx xxx xxx

In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that he neither
touched nor received the money sent to him, on record remains uncontroverted the circumstance
that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane
 fare, not in the original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The respondent had
ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 September
1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so.

... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate his
liability. His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws, rules and
regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18,
Rollo.)

Secretary Ordoez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from the service,
with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government
service, effective immediately.

As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165 dated May 3,
1990, dismissed the respondent from the government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).

Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes also filed in
this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against said respondent.

The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be
disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public
official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.

The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every
lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its
violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983
Edition, pp. 66-67).

As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:

A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his
responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave
responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient administration of
justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every
exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the law
profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix
Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout
the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character.

Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. A lawyer
is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of
law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for
which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789-
790; emphasis supplied.)

The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and
employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from
directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office,
and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which
may be affected by the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility
forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)

This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of
law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of
his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have
demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA
632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in the
Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys

SO ORDERED.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 46371 February 7, 1940

FORTUNATO N. SUAREZ, petitioner,

vs.
SERVILLANO PLATON, Judge of Court of First Instance of Tayabas, The PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF TAYABAS,
VIVENCIO ORAIS and DAMIAN JIMENEZ, respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas Hermogenes Caluag for respondents.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original petition for the peremptory writ of mandamus filed by Fortunato N. Suarez with this court, to
compel the respondent judge to reinstate criminal case No. 6426 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas so that
the case may proceed to trial in the ordinary course.

It appears on May 9, 1935, Lieutenant Vivencio Orais, of the Philippine Constabulary, one of the respondents in this
case, filed a complaint under oath with the justice of the peace of Calauag, Province of Tayabas, charging the
petitioner herein, Fortunato N. Suarez, and one Tomas Ruedas, with sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal
Code. The complaint, upon preliminary examination, was docketed and given due course. While the said case was
pending preliminary investigation, Lieutenant Orais, in obedience to an order of the Provincial Commander of
Tayabas, moved for the temporary dismissal of the case. This motion was granted by the justice of the peace of
Calauag on May 20, 1935, and the case thus dismissed.

At the instance of the petitioner herein, Fortunato N. Suarez, the deputy provincial fiscal of Tayabas, Perfecto R.
Palacio, in turn charged Lieutenant Vivencio Orais and Damian Jimenez in the justice of the peace court of Calauag
with the crime of arbitrary detention committed, according to the information under date of July 8, 1935, as
follows:

That on or about the 9th day of May, 1935, in the municipality of Calauag, Province of Tayabas, P.I., and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused Vivencio Orais being then a public officer to wit: a second
lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary duly appointed and qualified as such and detailed in the Province
of Tayabas, without warrant of arrest and without any legal ground whatsoever, moved by personal grudge
and ill-feeling which he entertained against Attorney Fortunato Suarez, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously arrest and detain said Attorney Fortunato Suarez in the train while the latter
was going to Calauag, and with the purpose of concealing the illegality of said arrest and detention of said
Fortunato Suarez said accused Vivencio Orais conniving with the other accused, Damian Jimenez, justice of
the peace of the said municipality, prepared and subscribed under oath before said Fortunato Suarez with
the commission of the crime of sedition; that the said justice of the peace Damian Jimenez, conniving with
the other accused Vivencio Orais with the same purpose of concealing the illegality of the arrest and
detention of said Fortunato Suarez, without legal grounds whatsoever willfully and unlawfully issued an
order declaring that there were merits in the complaint thereby sanctioning the illegal and unjust arrest
and detention of Fortunato Suarez who was kept in the municipal jail of Calauag for eight hours.

The justice of the peace of Calauag, being one of the accused, the preliminary examination was conducted by the
justice of the peace of Lopez, Tayabas, who thereafter bound the defendants over to the Court of First Instance,
where the case was docketed as criminal case No. 6426. While the case was pending in the latter court, on petition,
of the accused, the provincial fiscal of Tayabas, Ramon Valdez y Nieto, reinvestigated the case. After such
reinvestigation, he filed on April 23, 1936, a motion for the dismissal of the case. Fortunato N. Suarez, the
petitioner herein, on May 5, 1936, asked the court to appoint Attorney Godofredo Reyes as acting provincial fiscal
to handle the prosecution, alleging, among other things, that the provincial fiscal had no courage to prosecute the
accused. On May 11, 1936, Attorney Godofredo Reyes entered his appearance as private prosecutor, and vigorously
objected to the motion of dismissal filed by the provincial fiscal. The Bar Association of Tayabas, through its
president, Emiliano A. Gala, entered its appearance as amicus curiae and likewise objected to the dismissal of the
case. On August 14, 1936, the then presiding judge of Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, Hon. Ed.
Gutierrez David, after hearing, denied the motion, ruling that there was prima facie case against the accused. The
court, upon petitioner of the provincial fiscal, designated Deputy Provincial Fiscal Perfecto R. Palacio to handle the
prosecution. But Fiscal Palacio, being apparently of the same opinion as the provincial fiscal, declined to proceed,
and moved that a practicing attorney or a competent attorney in the Bureau of Justice be designated in his stead.
Accordingly, the provincial fiscal of Sorsogon, Jacinto Yamson, at the request of the judge a quo was assigned by the
Department of Justice to handle the prosecution of the case. Fiscal Yamson after going over the case likewise
entered a nolle prosequi. So, on September 23 1936, he moved for reconsideration of the court's order of August 14,
1936, denying the motion for dismissal presented by the provincial fiscal. Attorney Godofredo Reyes again
vigorously objected to this motion on the ground that there was sufficient proof to warrant the prosecution of the
accused. The case in this state when Judge Emilio Pena was appointed to the place of Judge Gutierres David. Later,
Judge Serviliano Platon, one of the respondents herein, was appointed to preside over case No. 6426 corresponded,
and the case was thus transferred to that sala for action. Judge Platon, after consideration of all the facts and proofs
submitted in the case, considered the court's order of August 14, 1936, and dismissed the case, holding that the
evidence was insufficient to convict the accused of the crime charged. From this order, the petitioner herein
appealed to this Court and the case was here docketed as G.R. No. 45431. On June 30, by a closely divided court, the
appeal was dismissed.

The petitioner has now filed with this Court the present petition, in which, as stated in the opening paragraph of
this decision, we are asked to issue the peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to reinstate
the criminal case which had been ordered dismissed by the said judge. The petitioner gives the following grounds
for the issuance of said writ:

Que el mencionado Juez Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso manifiesto de discrecion al sobreseer
la mencionada causa contra los otros dos recurridos Vivencio Orais y Damian Jimenez, despues de que el
Juzgado de Paz de Lopez habia declarado que existen meritos para proseguirse contra los mismos y
despues de que un Juez de Primera Instancia de la misma categoria que el Juez Platon habia rehusado
sobreseer la causa por creer que existian meritos para proceder contra los acusados.

Que el mencionado Juez Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso grave de discrecion por cuanto que las
pruebas existentes en la causa, en las cuales se fundo el fiscal provincial al presentar la querella en el
Juzgado de Paz, demuestran de un modo claro y concluyente el delito cometido y la responsibilidad de los
acusados. [Las expresadas pruebas constan a paginas 65 al 106 del adjunto alegato anexo ("A").]

Que el Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un grave abuso de discrecion al juzgar dichas pruebas con un
criterio de un Tribunal "sentenciador" cuando que su unica mision era considerarlas bajo el criterio de un
tribunal meramente "investigador". (E.U. vs. Barredo, 32 Jur. Fil., 462, 482.)

Should the writ of mandamus prayed for be issued? We observe that after the filing of the information by the
provincial fiscal of Tayabas for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the justice of the peace of Lopez,
the same fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case, because 'despues' de una reinvestigacion de los hechos que
dieron margen a la presente causa, y examinada la misma con la debida atencion que su importancia require asi
como las circunstancias del caso, ha llegado a la conclusion de que no hay base justificativa para la prosecucion de
esta causa." The grounds for this action of the provincial fiscal are stated in his said motion for dismissal of April
23, 1936:

En sintesis, los hechos son: que el dia 9 de mayo de 1935, en ocasion en que el abogado Fortunato N. Suarez
y el teniente Vivencio Orais de la constabularia, se encontraron en el tren que iba a Calauag, aquel para
defender a los sakdalistas acusados en este municipio, y este para atender a sus deberes officiales en
relacion con el orden publico algo anormal, por causa de los mismos sakdalistas en dicho municipio de
Calauag, ambos tuvieron un cambio de palabras con motivo del mismo asunto que les llevaba alli, y por
haber el abogado Suarez proferido en tono acalorado, de que los sakdalistas estaban perseguidos en
Calauag por las autoridades municipales y la constabularia, y que era un abuso de las autoridades dicha
persecusion, trayendo al propio tiempo a colacion lo ocurrido en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta Rosa de
la Provincia de Laguna, que se levantaron contra el gobierno por los abusosy matanzas de sakdalistas en
dichos pueblos, y que lo mismo podia tenerlugar en esta Provincia de Tayabas, y que el podia incitar a
lossakdalistas, teniendo en cuenta que con anterioridad el teniente Oraishabia recibido informes de que los
sakdalistas en Calauag habian sido entrevistados por Tomas Ruedas, uno de los acusados en el municipiode
Sariaya por el delito de conspiracion para cometer sedicion, que el abogado ayudaria a los sakdalistas
incintandoles a la sedicion,fue el motivo por el cual el arresto al abogado Suarez, conduciendoleal
municipio como asi lo hizo con respecto a Tomas Ruedas, quien salio al encuentro de Suarez cuando llego a
la estacion del tren en Calauag, diciendo a este que ya tenia arreglado a los sakdalistas en Calauag. Que
despues de haberles arrestado, presento una denuncia contra estos por el delito de sedicion, en el juzgado
de paz de Calauag, aunque por instrucciones de sus superiores, dicho Teniente Vivencio Orais pidio el
sobreseimiento provisional de su denuncia.

Aunque el abogado Suarez niega que el haya profiredo palabras sediciosas, ni que haya incitado a los
sakdalistas a actos de violenciacontra el gobierno constituido o contra las autoridades y oficiales, sin
embargo, de las declaraciones de los testigos tanto de la acusacioncomo de la defensa en lo que son
consistentes, se desprende claramente que el abogado Suarez ha hecho manifestaciones que pueden
considerarse como sediciosas y subversivas, maxime teniendo en consideracion el estado caotico porque
atravesaba el municipio de Calauag con motivo de la campana ordenada porel gobierno contra los
 sakdalistas, a raiz de los disturbiosy desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los municipios de Cabuyao
y Sta. Rosa.

La presente causa se ha iniciado a denuncia del abogado Sr. Godofredo Reyes contra el teniente Vivencio
Orais de la constabularia y el juez de paz Damian L. Jimenez, por el delito de detencion arbitraria.

El delito de detencion arbitraria esta previsto y castigado en el articulo 124 del Codigo Penal Revisado, que
dice asi:

El funcionario o empleado publico que detuviere a una persona sinmotivo legal alguno sera castigado; etc. .
. .

Sin perder de vista que la base angular de todos los procesoscriminales son los delitos, y que a la acusacion
corresponde determinarexactamente si se ha cometido o no el delito, el que suscribe, haanalizado este
extremo, relacionando los hechos que determinaron laalegada detencion arbitraria de que fue objecto el
abogado FortunatoN. Suarez, con las circunstancias y los antecedentes de la situacion porque atravesaba
entonces la Provincia de Tayabas al igual que la Provincia de Laguna, acondicionandolos con las palabras
proferidas porel abogado Suarez que si en su concepto no son sediciosas y subversivas,por lo menos eran
abusivas para con las autoridades del gobierno, especialmente con las de la Provincia de Tayabas a las
cuales se referian. Asi entendido el aspecto legal de la cuestion, y haciendo aplicacion de lo que nos dice la
misma ley en lo en que consiste la detencion arbitraria, que para que exista este delito, la detencion tenia
que haber sido sin motivo legal alguno, creemos que habia algun motivo legal para la detencion del abogado
Sr. Suarez y su companero Tomas Ruedas, y estaba justificada por haber ellos mismos dado lugar a ello.
(E.U. vs. Vallejo y otro, 11 Jur. Fil., 202; E.U. vs. Santos, 36 Jur. Fil., 909.)

We have not overlooked the fact that this motion for dismissal was denied by Judge Gutierrez David of August 14,
1936. It appears, however, that subsequently Fiscal Yamsom who, as stated above was assigned by the Department
of Justice to conduct the prosecution of the case, moved for reconsideration of the Court's order of August 14, 1936,
denying the motion for dismissal. Judge Servillano Platon granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed
the case. In this motion for reconsideration not only does Fiscal Yamson reiterate the arguments advanced by
Fiscal Valdez y Nieto in the latter's motion for dismissal, but adds:

(a) En lo que respecta al acusado Teniente Orais, no existe prueba alguna en los autos de esta causa que
dicho acusado haya arrestado al abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas, solamente por el mero gusto de
arrestarles. Tampoco existe pruebas de que el teniente Orais haya sido inducido por motivos de venganza o
resentimiento alguno contra dicho abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas al arrestales en el dia de autos. Aunque
es verdad que el Teniente Orais ha sido acusado ante el Juzgado de pazde Sariaya por 'abusos de autoridad',
sin embargo, no consta en los autos de dicha causa que el abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas hayan
intervenido como abogado ni parte ofendida o testigos en la misma, por tanto, no vemos razon alguna para
que el Teniente Orais tenga motivos de vengarse de estos por dicha causa. (Vease pag. 1, Anexo O.) A falta
de prueba sobre estos hechos, en nuestra humilde opinion, existe a favor de Teniente Orais la presuncion
de haber cumplidocon su deber al arrestar al abogado Fortunato N. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas, teniendo en
cuenta las circunstancias extraordinarias reinantes entonces en Calauag a raiz de los disturbios y
desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta. Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna,
dias antes de ocurrir el suceso de autos. Se debe tener en cuenta, ademas, el hecho de que despues de haber
arrestado al abogado Fortunato N. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas, el aqui acusado Teniente Vivencio Orais
presento denuncia inmediatamente ante su coacusado Damian Jimenez, juez de paz de Calauag, por
infraccion del articulo 142 del Codigo Penal Revisado.

We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of prosecuting officers of all cases
handled by them, but whilst this Court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of
public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice,
reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of Mr. Justice
Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two fold
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor
indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one," (69 United States Law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309.)

Considering all the circumstances, we cannot say that Judge Servillano Platon, in granting the motion for the
dismissal of the case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the justice of the peace of Lopez, abused
his discretion so flagrantly as to justify, in the interest of justice, a departure from the well-settled rule that an
inferior tribunal in the performance of a judicial act within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion cannot be
controlled by mandamus. This is especially true in a matter involving the examination of evidence and the decision
of questions of law and fact, since such a duty is not ministerial. (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, sec. 156, pp.
173-175). Upon the other hand, it should be observed that in the case of Lieutenant Orais, in the face of the
circumstances surrounding the arrest as set forth in the two motions for dismissal by the provincial fiscal of
Tayabas, which facts and circumstances must have been investigated and duly weighed and considered by the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, the arrest effected by Lieutenant Orais cannot be said to
have be entirely unjustified. If, "under trying circumstances and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of his
superior officer and to enforce the law, a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith, he should be
exculpated. Otherwise, the courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of
themselves violating the law. See generally Voorhees on Arrest; 5 Corpus Juris, pp. 399, 416; 2 R.C.L., 450. (United
States vs. Santos, 36 Phil., 853, 855.)"

The petition is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement regarding cost. So ordered.

 EN BANC

[A.C. CBD No. 167. March 9, 1999]

ATTY. PRUDENCIO S. PENTICOSTES, complainant, vs. PROSECUTOR DIOSDADO S. IBAEZ, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N
ROMERO, J.:

Sometime in 1989, Encarnacion Pascual, the sister-in-law of Atty. Prudencio S. Penticostes (herein complainant)
was sued for non-remittance of SSS payments. The complaint was docketed as I.S. 89-353 and assigned to Prosecutor
Diosdado S. Ibaez (herein respondent) for preliminary investigation. In the course of the investigation, Encarnacion
Pascual gave P1,804.00 to respondent as payment of her Social Security System (SSS) contribution in
arrears. Respondent, however, did not remit the amount to the system. The fact of non-payment was certified to by
the SSS on October 2, 1989.
On November 16, 1990 or over a year later, complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac a complaint
for professional misconduct against Ibaez due to the latters failure to remit the SSS contributions of his sister-in-
law. The complaint alleged that respondents misappropriation of Encarnacion Pascuals SSS contributions amounted
to a violation of his oath as a lawyer. Seven days later, or on November 23, 1990, respondent paid P1,804.00 to the
SSS on behalf of Encarnacion Pascual.
In the meantime, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Tarlac Chapter, the court
observing that it had no competence to receive evidence on the matter. Upon receipt of the case, the Tarlac Chapter
forwarded the same to IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline.
In his defense, respondent claimed that his act of accommodating Encarnacion Pascuals request to make
payment to the SSS did not amount to professional misconduct but was rather an act of Christian
charity. Furthermore, he claimed that the action was moot and academic, the amount of P1,804.00 having already
been paid by him to the SSS. Lastly, he disclaimed liability on the ground that the acts complained were not done by
him in his capacity as a practicing lawyer but on account of his office as a prosecutor.
On September 3, 1998, the Commission recommended that the respondent be reprimanded, with a warning that
the commission of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely in the future. On November 5, 1998,
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved its Commissions
recommendation.
This Court adopts the recommendation of the IBP and finds respondent guilty of professional misconduct. While
there is no doubt that payment of the contested amount had been effected to the SSS on November 23, 1990, it is
clear however, that the same was made only after a complaint had been filed against respondent. Furthermore, the
duties of a provincial prosecutor do not include receiving money from persons with official transactions with his
office.
This Court has repeatedly admonished lawyers that a high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected
and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
It is glaringly clear that respondents non-remittance for over one year of the funds coming from Encarnacion
Pascual constitutes conduct in gross violation of the above canon. The belated payment of the same to the SSS does
not excuse his misconduct. While Pascual may not strictly be considered a client of respondent, the rules relating to
a lawyers handling of funds of a client is applicable. In Daroy v. Legaspi,[1] this court held that (t)he relation between
an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature...[thus] lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or
property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The
failure of respondent to immediately remit the amount to the SSS gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use. This is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional ethics; it
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.[2]
Respondents claim that he may not be held liable because he committed such acts, not in his capacity as a private
lawyer, but as a prosecutor is unavailing. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.

As stated by the IBP Committee that drafted the Code, a lawyer does not shed his professional obligations upon
assuming public office. In fact, his public office should make him more sensitive to his professional obligations
because a lawyers disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the publics eye.[3] Want of moral integrity
is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.[4]
ACCORDINGLY, this Court REPRIMANDS respondent with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the similar
offense will be dealt with more severely in the future.
LET copies of this decision be spread in his records and copies be furnished the Department of Justice and the
Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

























































 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976

JOSE MISAMIN, complainant,

vs.
ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

FERNANDO, J.:

It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a member of the bar, respondent
Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by
Filipinos of Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose Misamin, to agree to
drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the
Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the
Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a change of
heart on the part of complainant. That could very well be the explanation for the non- appearance of the lawyer
employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things were
thus set at naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be expected. For the law is rather
exacting in its requirement that there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice.
Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed, This is one of those instances then
where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice.

Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as counsel for the New
Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police.
However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends
that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is not among the grounds provided by the
Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the
complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing an
admission that he had been paid his separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to
members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1

Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the resolution of this Honorable
Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office set the case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The
counsel for the complainant failed to appear, and the investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter date,
the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances, the said counsel did not file written motion for
postponement but merely sent the complainant to explain the reason for his absence. When the case was again
called for hearing on October 16, 1975, counsel for complainant failed once more to appear. The complainant who
was present explained that his lawyer was busy "preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila."
When asked if he was willing to proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the complainant declared,
apparently without any prodding, that he wished his complaint withdrawn. He explained that he brought the
present action in an outburst of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active part in the unjust
dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that after reexamining his case, he believed the
respondent to be without fault and a truly good person." 2

The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of his profession
notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney. The respondent's appearance at
the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of Manila may
appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission." 3 As a matter of
fact, separate complaints on this ground have been filed and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of
Manila and the National Police Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired with complainant's
counsel to mislead complainant to admitting having' received his separation pay and for giving illegal protection to
aliens, it is understandable why the Report of the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed for lack of
evidence.

The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in accordance with the
settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice
Malcolm in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a
clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the
charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." 5 The Tionko
doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. 6

This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there might have been of the Civil
Service Law in view of respondent practicing his profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro
Manila police force. That is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be
inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that
the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he
did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume
was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly
compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that
should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from laying
himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for
membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care
that his honor remains unsullied

WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is dismissed for not having
been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 109870 December 1, 1995

EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

FRANCISCO, J.:

After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment 1 affirming his conviction for violation of the "Trust
Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No. 115) was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated February 9,
1994, 2 petitioner filed on July 6, 1994 a pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL" 3 setting forth, in relation to the motion for new trial:

6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly discovered evidence and excusible (sic)
negligence, and shall be supported by affidavits of:

(i) an officer of private complainant corporation who will exculpate petitioner;

(ii) an admission against interest by a former officer of the owner of Ultra

Corporation (the Corporation that employed petitioner), which actually exercised
control over the affairs of Ultra; and

(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert innocence for the first time and explain
why he was unable to do so earlier.

The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution, 4 among other things, granted the substitution but denied the
motion for leave to file motion for new trial, "the petition having been already denied on February 9, 1994."

Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL",5 and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO ADMIT" on August 17, 1994. 6 The Court thereafter
required the Solicitor General to comment on said motion and manifestation within ten (10) days from notice, in a
Resolution dated September 7, 1994. 7

In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time were given by the Court, 8 the Solicitor General himself
recommends that petitioner be entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the same impression that a certain Rodolfo
Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn statement is an admission against interest which may ultimately exonerate
petitioner from criminal liability. The full text of Mr. Rodolfo Cuenca's "Affidavit" 9 reads:

RODOLFO M. CUENCA, Filipino, of legal age, with the residence at Urdaneta Village, Makati, Metro
Manila, after being duly sworn and (sic) state that:

1. During the years 1967 until February 1983, I was the President and Chief Executive Officer of
Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).

2. During that period, I controlled an effective majority of the voting shares of stock of CDCP.

3. Sometime in 1974, upon my initiative, CDCP together with its affiliated companies, organized a
number of wholly-owned service corporations. One of these was Ultra International Trading
Corporation, whose purpose was to serve and supply the needs of CDCP and its other subsidiaries
with lower value goods and using Ultra's financial resources.

4. The directors in Ultra Corporation were nominees of CDCP, and received the instructions directly
from me and or Mr. Pedro Valdez, Chairman of CDCP.
 5. From Ultra's inception, my brother, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca was appointed President and Chief
Executive Officer. On March, 1979, I instructed Ultra through my brother, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca to
purchase for CDCP various steel materials. These materials were received by CDCP and are covered
by the trust receipts which are the subject of this case.

6. In 1980, CDCP suffered cashflow problems, and consciously omitted payment to Ultra for the
delivery of the said steel materials. As a nominee of CDCP, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca merely acted as
agent for CDCP. As such, CDCP provided him with the guarantees needed to persuade China Bank to
issue the said trust receipts. On the basis of such guarantees, along with informal assurances issued
by CDCP to China Bank that the transactions of Ultra were undertaken for and on behalf of CDCP
and CDCP Mining Corporation, Ultra was able to obtain credit facilities, among which included the
trust receipts subject of this case.

7. However, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca had no power to cause the payment of said trust receipts
because the common Treasurer and controller of both CDCP and Ultra, Ms. Nora Vinluan, acted
under my control and I did not allow her to make the appropriate payments.

8. To my knowledge, CDCP has not paid Ultra the amounts corresponding to the materials covered
by the trust receipts subject of this case.

9. By the time final demand to pay on the trust receipts were (sic) served in 1984, Mr. Edilberto
Cuenca was no longer president of Ultra Corporation and could not have possibly cause (sic) Ultra
Corporation to pay.

10. I have executed this affidavit in order to accept personal responsibility for the trust receipts
subject of this case and to exculpate Mr. Edilberto Cuenca of the criminal charges which he has
asked this Honorable Court to review.

11. Accordingly, I also undertake to pay the civil obligations arising from the subject trust receipts.

(Sgd.)

RODOLFO M. CUENCA

Affiant

And the Solicitor General had this to say:

Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial.

However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration against his own interests under
Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts doubt on the culpability of his brother
Edilberto Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence, the alleged confession of guilt should be given a hard look
by the Court.

The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the genuineness and due execution of his
brother's affidavit in the interest of justice and fair play.

Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors who represent
the People of the Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to seek conviction of the accused
but to see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:

Canon 6 These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the

discharge of their official tasks.

Rule 6.01 The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to
convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of
witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied.)

The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors represent a sovereign "whose obligation to govern
impartially is compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done (Time to Rein in the
 Prosecution, by Atty. Bruce Fein, published on p. 11, The Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994). (Emphasis
supplied.) 10

Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled that it is
not authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly
discovered evidence the rationale of which being:

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the latter has no
jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, for only
questions of fact are involved therein.

the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like "Helmuth, Jr. v.
People" 11 and "People v. Amparado". 12

In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition of the Solicitor General,
granted new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of proposed testimonies or affidavits of persons
which the Court considered as newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of
conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why herein petitioner should be denied the
same benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under the circumstances considering that the "People" does not
raise any objection to a new trial, for which reason the Solicitor General ought to be specially commended for
displaying once again such statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest hour, indeed.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion For New Trial is hereby GRANTED. Let the case be RE-OPENED and REMANDED
to the court of origin for reception of petitioner's evidence.

SO ORDERED.

 N BANC

[A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005]

OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.

D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:

This is a verified petition for disbarment[1] filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of
grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant
against respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah,[2] Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu,
Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji
Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali
Datus are relatives of respondent.[3]
The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating officer, Enrique Basa,
absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus:

It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but that he has no case at all
against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the
complaint against respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence.[4]

The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report dated 08 September 1992,
then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in
the custody of documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of
TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji
Serad Bauduli Datu and the latters co-accused. As a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondents
dismissal from service.
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in toto the
conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondents dismissal from government service. Respondent
subsequently questioned said administrative order before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition[5] claiming that the Office of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him
from office. He also insisted that respondents[6] in that petition violated the laws on security of tenure and that
respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when
he abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition for failure on the part of petitioner to
sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned
order.[7] Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Resolution
of 15 November 1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the disbarment of
respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had proven himself unfit to be further
entrusted with the duties of an attorney[8]and that he poses a serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession.[9]
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in
the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law[10]and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his
ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis only
of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they
presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latters co-defendants. Respondent explains
that his participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating
prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved in said dispute. He further claims that the
dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by the parties.
Complainants allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified.
 Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,[11] this Court referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the
investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued the following
order relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The pertinent portion of this order provides:

ORDER

When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.

The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of evidence vis--vis this case
be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed.
Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action.[12]

On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving Commissioner Fernandezs
recommendation for the transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region
governor to designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report, and
recommendation.[13] The IBP Resolution states:

Resolution No. XII-96-153

Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong

RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of
the above-entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local
IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report and recommendation.

Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23
October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to
receive the evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as directed by the IBP
Board of Governors.[14]
In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter[15] informed the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) that the investigating panel[16] had sent notices to both complainant and respondent for a series of
hearings but respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five years.
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the transmittal of the records of this
case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as
Commissioner Fernandezs Order dated 23 February 1996.
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to comment on
respondents motion.[17] Complying with this directive, the panel expressed no opposition to respondents motion for
the transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City.[18] On 25 September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez
ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi City for the reception of respondents evidence.[19] This order of
referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4
December 1998. Said resolution provides:

RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the transmittal of the case records of the
above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate the recommendation submitted by Cotabato
Chapter and report the same to the Board of Governors.[20]

Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a motion praying that
the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the records.[21] Respondent insists that the
investigating panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the investigation of this
case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner Fernandezs Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP
Marawi City with the power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any hearing
by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due process.
Complainant opposed[22] this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches. According to complainant, the
report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified
of the hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did nothing to defend himself. He
also claims that respondent did not even bother to submit his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further,
as respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of
respondent is possible. Finally, complainant contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail
a duplication of the process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter.
In an Order dated 15 October 1999,[23] Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs
that notices for the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as well as for the submission of the position paper
were duly received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter
investigating panel, furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the panels order dated 4 August
1997.[24]Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of
the registry receipt was a handwritten notation reading Atty. Mosib A. Bubong.
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the Commission on Bar
Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This
directive had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June
2001, to wit:

RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the
above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an investigation, re-evaluation, report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice.[25]

Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar P. Ali, complainant in this
case. According to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood,
she was requesting the withdrawal of this case.[26]
Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct the chairman of the
Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter
to conduct an investigation of this case.[27] This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order
dated 19 July 2002.[28]According to Atty. Castillo

After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the report of the IBP Cotabato
City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further
investigation, to be able to make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato
City.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte is hereby denied. The
undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days
from date hereof.

In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and conclusion of IBP Cotabato
Chapter ratiocinating as follows:

The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the President in Administrative
Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in:

a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,

b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.

And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the Comment filed by
respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a
denial of the charge of manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by the
way, was filed against respondents relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office of the President in
Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into account and fully
explained, before the Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of
respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight
in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present case.

In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato.[29]

In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with
modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification pertained solely to
the period of suspension from the practice of law which should be imposed on respondent whereas Atty. Castillo
concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of
Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter denied as by
that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.[30]
The issue thus posed for this Courts resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct
committed while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve this question in the affirmative.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers
shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers
misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.[31]Although the general rule is that
a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed
as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his
oath a member of the legal profession.[32]
Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,[33] we ordered the disbarment of respondent on the
ground of his dismissal from government service because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro, we declared

[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities.
He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts
in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid
discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This
discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to
paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full
candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the
centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character.[34]

Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,[35] this Court found sufficient basis to disbar
respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the
Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that case

[A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the
trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a
keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren
in private practice.[36] (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and subsequently
affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of
Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his
relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but
also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter.
It reads:

Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples confidence in the public office he used to occupy and cast
doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls
for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of this
case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or terminated
by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant
to prosecute the same.[37] As we have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A.
Rayos:[38]

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose
of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is
called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in
the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.[39]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar,
and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila


EN BANC


JOVITO S. OLAZO, A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC
Complainant,
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
*VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), MENDOZA, and
Respondent. SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:
December 7, 2010
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N


BRION, J.:

Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga
(respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02,[1] Rule
6.03[2] and Rule 1.01[3] of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.
Factual Background

In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan
in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was
segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476,[4] issued on January 7, 1986, and
Proclamation No. 172,[5] issued on October 16, 1987.

To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on the
applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the
Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman
of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondents district includes the areas covered by the proclamations.


The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02

In the complaint,[6] the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and as
a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainants sales application because
of his personal interest over the subject land. The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure
and influence over the complainants father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainants sales
application and claim the subject land for himself. The complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon
Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment of the latters alleged rights over the subject
land. The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land
between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondents deceased wife.

As a result of the respondents abuse of his official functions, the complainants sales application was denied.
The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently given due course
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo,
the complainants brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to
convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondents promptings, the rights to
the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of
nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the
respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy,
Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an Assurance where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01

The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred that
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus,
the approval of his sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of
Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.

The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of law,
within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
before the Committee on Awards.

In his Comment,[7] the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed against him
by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he was nominated as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for
alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent events.

The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later conveyed
these rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazos rights over the subject land and the transfer of his rights to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of rights over
the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the other
hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application
over the subject land was given due course. The respondent emphasized that the DENR decision is now final and
executory. It was affirmed by the Office of the President, by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.

The respondent also advanced the following defenses:

(1) He denied the complainants allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the respondent had
been orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this allegation was without
corroboration and was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the complainants
sister.

(2) He denied the complainants allegation that he offered the complainant P50,000.00 for the subject land
and that he (the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel Olazo to claim the
rights over the subject land. The respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in the subject
land.

(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazos affidavit where the
latter asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the truth.

(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his rights over the
subject land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his daughter, Francisca
Olazo. The respondent insisted that the money he extended to them was a form of loan.

(5) The respondents participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
involved the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.

(6) Manuels belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000,
regarding what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca
Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his
father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his
agreement to the transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey
 Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his fathers application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs
application.

(7) The complainants allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell the
subject land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and corroboration. The DENR decision was
clear that the complainant had no rights over the subject land.

The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He alleged
that during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the complainant, Miguel
Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on
Awards. Rather, their conflicting claims and their respective supporting documents were before the Office of the
Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling
became the basis of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR.

Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
since the provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law to engage in private law
practice and to those who, though prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, have friends, former associates
and relatives who are in the active practice of law.[8] In this regard, the respondent had already completed his third
term in Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May
24, 1999.

Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications of the complainant and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were not submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was
still a member.

The Courts Ruling

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.[9] He may be disciplined by this Court as a member
of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.[10]

The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondents actions constitute a breach of the
standard ethical conduct first, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the
Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a
client before the office he was previously connected with.

After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of evidence, we resolve to
dismiss the administrative complaint.

Accountability of a government lawyer in public office

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct to be
observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard of conduct laid
down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the government service is obliged to observe the
standard of conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is
more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to
constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put
aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the
discharge of their official functions.[11]

The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes the
following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.


The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private
interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We
previously held that the restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to promote
their private interests.[12]

In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,[13] we defined promotion of private interest to includesoliciting gifts or anything of monetary
value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the functions of his or her
office. In Ali v. Bubong,[14] we recognized that private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to
advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with public duty when the
respondent uses the office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.[15]

In Vitriolo v. Dasig,[16] we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher Education)
of extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious breach of
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[17] We reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found
the respondent (an employee of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the complainant who
had a pending application for visas before his office.[18]
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano[19] we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he demanded and received
money from the complainant who had a pending case before this Court.

Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that the
respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner
defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

 First, the records do not clearly show if the complainants sales application was ever brought before the
Committee on Awards. By the complaints own account, the complainant filed a sales application in March 1990
before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainants sales application was pending before the Office of
the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR
of the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the respondents elective public office and membership to the
Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.

These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his private
interests in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not brought before the
Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used
his position to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the complainants sales application
over the subject land was made by the DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainants allegation that the respondent orchestrated the efforts to get the subject land does
not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the
uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,[20] categorically stating that the
respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither was he a contracting party in the transfer of his rights
over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazos disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on
the respondents alleged participation, and we find it to be in the respondents favor.

Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his claim
that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996,
to the DENR Regional Director-NCR;[21] the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996;[22] and the Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated July 17, 1996[23]), do not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the
respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having
his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also showed that the respondent merely acted as a
witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered
by one relative to another, and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the decision of Miguel Olazo
to contest the complainants sales application. At the same time, we cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang
Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states
on the record. We note that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of the force
allegedly exerted by the respondent against Miguel Olazo.

In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating evidence -
of the nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo in
the year 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25, 2003[24] and July 21, 2010,[25] Francisca Olazo corroborated the
respondents claim that the sums of money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical
treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed
from the respondent was used for his medical treatment and hospitalization expenses.

 The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondents claim that the latters
involvement was limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would be considered as part of the purchase price of the subject
land.[26]

It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates when the
sums of money were extended by the respondent on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and October 17, 1995,
and the date when the Deed of Conveyance[27] over the subject land was executed or on October 25, 1995, showed
that the sums of money were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces of evidence
are consistent with the respondents allegation that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to
pay the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his continuing medical treatment.



Private practice of law after separation from public office

As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from the
government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel and
the document entitled Assurance where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a violation
of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[28] we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private
practice after their separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x x
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:
x x x x

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x

 These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement,
or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the
professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office
he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.


As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during
their incumbency.[29] By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession
under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second,
the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions.[30] The last paragraph of Section 7
provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from the government service who are covered
under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after
leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the
term intervene which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the
proceedings.[31] Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had
previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the sales
application covering Manuels land when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The
complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value,
the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr.
v. Sulyap, Inc.,[32] we specifically described private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the
same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.

In any event, even granting that respondents act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available
pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee on Awards,
or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and
we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the respondents favor.

Violation of Rule 1.01

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above
discussion, we already struck down the complainants allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized
practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on
Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainants claim that the respondent violated
paragraph 4(1)[33] of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs
qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the
affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April 3, 2004,[34] when the DENR gave due course to
his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the Court
of Appeals[35] and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our
Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others,
that no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision.[36]

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise
its disciplinary powers.[37] The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense,[38] until the
burden shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has proven.Where no case has in the first place been
proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.[39]
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the complainants
failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions warranting the
exercise of the Courts disciplinary power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03
and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante
O. Tinga, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.