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10.71 Parada vs.

Veneracion

Facts: Complainant herein is the accused for 4 counts of estafa; he is also duly bonded
with the Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation. On October 23, 1993 complainant
notified said court formally thru counsel of his change of address from 219 Cityland
Condominium, Buendia Extension, Makati, Metro Manila to 2412 Nobel St., Bo. San
Isidro, Makati, Metro Manila; he also notified the manager of the bonding company of his
change of address. Judge Ortile inhibited himself from trying the said case and thus, the
case was re-raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Veneracion, and the hearing of the
case was set for June 1994. Apparently, the notice of hearing was sent to complainants
former address and that for failure of accused-complainant to appear on June 3, 1994,
respondent ordered the arrest of herein accused-complainant, ordering the confiscation
of the bond and a trial in absentia was conducted. Respondent Judge likewise assigned a
counsel de officio, Atty. Tiburan of the Public Attorneys Office as counsel for the
accused.

Issue: Whether the trial in absentia is valid.

Ruling: No. Section 14 (2), Article 3 of the Constitution provides that trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustifiable. The requisites then of a valid trial in
absentia are: (1) the accused has already been arraigned; (2) he has been duly notified
of the trial; and (3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

In the subject criminal cases, requisite numbers two (2) and three (3) of a valid trial in
absentia are clearly wanting. Parada had not been duly notified of the trial because the
notice of hearing dated April 27, 1994 was sent to the former address of Paradas
counsel despite the fact that the latter formally notified the court of his change of
address. His failure to appear therefore in the June 3, 6, 7 and 8, 1994 hearings is
justified by the absence of a valid service of notice of hearing to him.

10.72 People vs. Morial

Facts: On January 6, 1996, Paula and Albert Bandibas were killed and robbed. As a part
of the investigation and as a result of a witness testimony, Edwin and Leandro Morial
were asked several questions by the policemen and were invited to the police station for
continuing investigation. They were turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez and later
interrogated again after they woke up at past 6 in the morning.
That investigation conducted by SPO4 Fernandez resulted into the admission by Leandro
that he was one of those who participated in the robbery with homicide. With the latters
consent, his statements were reduced into writing. SPO4 Fernandez then advised him of
his right to remain silent and to have a counsel, whatever will be his answer will be used
as evidence in court. SPO4 Fernandez volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to
which Leandro consented. Atty. Aguilar was contacted by the former and he first met the
latter at January 9, 1996. After Leandro agreed to answer voluntarily knowing that the
same can be used against him as evidence in court, the investigation was conducted by
SPO4 Fernandez with the presence of the counsel. After all the material points were
asked, Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator if he can leave due to very important
engagement. The latter agreed to the lawyers request. But before leaving, Atty. Aguilar
asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer questions in his absence, the latter agreed.
During and despite Atty. Aguilars absence, SPO4 Fernandez continued with
the investigation and propounded several more questions to Leonardo, which the latter
answered.

Issue: Whether Leonardo Morials confession is admissible.

Ruling: No. Leonardo was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the
custodial investigation; therefore his quasi-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence
against him and his other co-accused. The Court stressed out that an accused under
custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very
start thereof.

Under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless the
same is made in writing and in the presence of the counsel. In the case at bar, no such
written and counseled waiver of these rights was presented as evidence.

10. 73 People vs. Tulin

Facts: MT Tabangao is a cargo vessel owned by PNOC. It was sailing near the coast of
Mindoro loaded with barrels of kerosene, gasoline, and diesel oil with a total value of
40.4 million pesos. The vessel was suddenly boarded by 7 fully-armed pirates which are
the herein accused. They detained and took control of the vessel; the name MT
Tabangao and the PNOC logo were painted over with black. Then it was painted with the
name Galilee. The ship crew was forced to sail to Singapore and days after, another
vessel called the Navi Pride anchored beside it. Another accused, Cheong San Hiong,
supervised the Navis crew and received the cargo on board MT Tabangao. After the
transfer of goods was completed, MT Tabangao went back to the Philippines and the
original crew members were released by the pirates in batches. The chief engineer of
the crew, however, reported the incident to the coast guard. Afterwards, a series of
arrests were effected in different places. An information charging the accused with
qualified piracy or violation of the PD 532 was filed against them. The trial court, ruled
that the accused were all guilty.

Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial
court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were
being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of their
constitutional right to procedural due process.

In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance
as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, the trial court
discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr.
Posadas had presented and examined 7 witnesses for the accused.

Issue: What are the legal effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer
represented accused-appellants during the trial?

Ruling: The record reveals that a manifestation was executed by accused-appellants


Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. stating that they were adopting the evidence
adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to
sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only
be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-
appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that
said accused-appellants were appraised of the nature and legal consequences of the
subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same.
They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court. It is true
that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person
and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of
judgment. This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of
trial. However, it is also provided by law that "rights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a
third person with right recognized by law," stating Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "upon motion, the accused may be
allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can
properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without
prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply
shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by
the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he
knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of
the right to sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it was
unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona
fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully
invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made.

10.74 People vs. Sesbreno

Facts: Appellant Raul H. Sesbreno was found guilty the crime of murder
and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, for the death of one Luciano Amparado.

Appellant has been a practicing lawyer for over 30 years. Admitted to the Bar on March
17, 1966, he has achieved prominence in Cebu. The victim, Luciano Amparado, was a
porter of William Lines, Inc., a shipping company also based in Cebu.

No bail was recommended. On September 2, 1993, appellant was arrested.

On September 3, 1993, the very day that the case was raffled to the trial court,
appellant filed a Motion To Quash Warrant of Arrest And/Or to Grant Bail. The motion was
treated as urgent and immediately set for hearing the next day. But the hearing did not
push through due to the fact that it was Saturday, and there was no prosecutor
available. The hearing on the bail application was then reset to September 6, 1993.

Subsequently, the prosecution filed an Opposition to the Urgent Application for Bail. It
prayed the accuseds application for bail be denied after a summary hearing; or,
alternatively, the application be considered during the regular trial, after the
arraignment of the accused. The prosecution presented both testimonial and
documentary evidence in connection with the said Opposition. Later, the trial court
denied the application for bail in a Resolution dated December 28, 1993.

Appellant alleges that his right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated. He
claims that the trial judge gave preference to a civil case, as against his right as a
detention prisoner to have his case given preference pursuant to R.A. 6033. This is
unfounded, to say the least. The hearing of the civil case ahead of his case happened
only once.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying the accused-appellant his right to speedy
trial and speedy disposition of his case.

Ruling: Appellants assertion that the trial court erred in refusing to agree to re-raffle the
case is, in our view, baseless. There is no showing that appellant raised the issue of lack
of notice of raffle at the earliest opportunity. The appellant first filed his Motion for Re-
Raffle of Case or Transfer of Case to Another Branch of the RTC of Cebu City only on
January 25, 1994. It was filed after appellant was already arraigned, and after the
prosecution had presented its first witness. In fact, the trial court already issued a
Resolution denying his application for bail. Appellant had willingly and actively
participated in these proceedings before the trial court. By actively participating
thereon, appellant is now deemed estopped from complaining that the proceedings were
technically defective for want of a notice of the raffle of his case. To say the least,
appellants claim comes too late to be of any merit.

The records of this case reveal that bail hearings started on September 27, 1993, and
terminated on November 8, 1993. He was arraigned on January 11, 1994. The
prosecution presented its first post-bail hearings witness on the same day. The defense
presented its first witness on June 7, 1994. The decision of the lower court was
promulgated on August 15, 1995. With this chronology, in our view, no undue delay
could be imputed, much less persuasively shown, against appellee and the trial court.

Whether intentional or not, appellants conduct of his own trial contributed to time-
consuming tussles in the lower court. How could the accused complain of delays, where
he himself caused them?

10.75 Binay vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan against Mayor Binay
of Makati for Illegal Use of Public Funds and Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act on September 1994. The information filed constituted crimes which were committed
by the petitioner during his incumbency in the year 1987.The petitioner filed a motion to
quash alleging that the delay of more than 6 years constituted a violation of his
constitutional right of due process. His arraignment therefore was held in abeyance
pending the resolution of the motions. Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying petitioners motion to quash and further the latters motion for
reconsideration. In the meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend the accused
pendente lite(benefits) which was later granted and ordered for a 90-day suspension. A
petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration be set aside and claims that he was denied of his
rights when the suspension was ordered even before he could file his reply to the
petitioners opposition. SC then directed the Sandiganbayan to permit petitioner to file
said reply. The Sandiganbayan nonetheless reiterated its previous resolutions and order
after the submission of the reply. Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan took effect on May 1995 that the petitioner filed before Sandiganbayan
a motion to refer his cases to the RTC of Makati alleging that the SB has no jurisdiction
over said cases when it issued its resolutions and suspension order on June 1995. The
Sandiganbayan in a follow-up resolution denied the petitioners motion. Hence this
present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan over the criminal cases.

Issue: Whether the petitioners right to a speedy disposition of his case has been
violated.

Ruling: No. The Court finds that there was no undue delay in the disposition of the
subject cases. The prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission on Audit;
it must rely on its own independent judgment in the determination of probable cause.
Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct its own review of the COA findings. Judging
from said findings, we find that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus justifying the
length of time for their resolution. Whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the
filing of the subject cases is a question best left to the discretion of the Ombudsman.
Absent any grave abuse of such discretion, the Court will not interfere in the exercise
thereof. Petitioner in this case has failed to establish any such abuse on the part of the
Ombudsman.

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to
determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for
such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved,
therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of
the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case.

10.76 Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Petitioner Felix R. Gonzales is the former Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources, while private respondent Antonio B. Baltazar is the former Chief of
the Deep Sea Fishing Demonstration Division of the BFAR. Criminal Case No. 13563,
subject of this petition, arose from an agreement entered into between BFAR,
represented by then Director Gonzales, and Roberto F. Palanca for the use of the
Otoshi-Ami Net, also known as Lambaklad, for experimental test fishing. This net
was subsequently installed by Palanca through the assistance of the BFAR.

On November 11, 1975, an affidavit-complaint was filed with the City Fiscal of Manila by
Baltazar against Gonzales for malversation of public funds and property involving the
alleged illegal use of M/V Albacora. This case was docketed therein as I.S. No. 75-29334.

On December 16, 1976, the said City Fiscals Office issued a resolution finding a prima
facie case. However, Gonzales filed a petition for review with the Ministry of Justice
which issued on December 16, 1976 a resolution dismissing the complaint.

Another Complaint Affidavit was filed by Baltazar charging Gonzales with illegal use of
the M/V Albacora and loss of the OtoshiAmi net, with the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman)
where it was docketed as TBP Case No. 83-01547. This was the percursor of and later
became Criminal Case No. 13563. Gonzales filed his counteraffidavit denying the
accusations made against him.

On March 16, 1984, Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) Special Prosecutor Carlos D.


Montemayor issued a resolution recommending that the first charge (for illegal use of
the M/V Albacora) be dismissed for lack of merit and that a preliminary investigation be
conducted for the second charge (for loss of Lambaklad). This resolution was approved
by then Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez.

Pursuant to the resolution mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, Special


Prosecutor Reynaldo L. Mendoza conducted a preliminary investigation against Gonzales
and some other personnel of the BFAR for the loss of the Otoshi-Ami net.

On October 8, 1984, Special Prosecutor Mendoza issued a resolution recommending the


dismissal of TBP Case No. 8301547 for insufficiency of evidence. This was approved by
Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez. On October 24, 1984, Baltazar filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of said resolution.

On February 28, 1985, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Andres B. Reyes, Jr., acting on
said motion for reconsideration, issued a resolution ordering the conduct of a
preliminary investigation with respect to the charge for the illegal use of the government
vessel (in effect modifying the March 16, 1984 resolution of the Tanodbayan), and the
charge that there was negligence in failing to recover the fishing net. This order was
approved by Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales.

Consonant with the above resolution, TBP Case No. 83-01547 was referred to Special
Prosecutor Juan F. Templonuevo who consolidated it with TBP Cases Nos. 84-00787 and
84-02338 for violation of Sections 12 and 3(e), respectively, of Republic Act No. 3019,
involving the same parties. On January 4, 1988, Special Prosecutor Templonuevo issued
a resolution recommending the dismissal of all three cases. This was approved by
Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Raul M. Gonzales.

On February 8, 1988, Baltazar filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation


regarding the above-stated resolution. Acting on said motion for reconsideration, on
March 20, 1989 Special Investigation Officer Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos, recommended a
reversal of the January 4, 1988 resolution and the filing of an information against
Gonzales and Palanca for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.This was
approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.

On the basis of the aforesaid resolution, Special Investigation Officer Diaz-Baldos filed an
information on May 5, 1989 before the Sandiganbayan charging Gonzales and Palanca
with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 13563. However, on September 12, 1989, an amended information was filed,
excluding Palanca from the charge.

On December 12, 1989, Gonzales filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash the information before
the Sandiganbayan on the ground that there has been a long delay on the part of the
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) in the termination of the preliminary investigation of the
case and that there was more than one motion for reconsideration filed by Baltazar in
violation of Rule 13(c) of Administrative Order No. 3 issued by the Tanodbayan on
December 1, 1979.

On March 19, 1990, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution denying the
motion to dismiss/quash. On May 7, 1990, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
granting the prosecutions motion to amend the information and granting the dismissal
of the case against Roberto Palanca.

The petitioner adduces that the long delay of the Tanodbayan Ombudsman in the
termination of the preliminary investigation violates his constitutional rights to due
process and speedy termination of cases that will warrant the dismissal of the instant
case conformably with the doctrine laid down in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether petitioners right to a speedy termination of case was violated.

Ruling: No, It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case,
like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally
applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied
his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as
length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendants assertion or non-assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered.

In the present case, it will be noted that it was only on August 22, 1988 when the
complaint including Roberto Palanca as an accused, together with herein petitioner, was
filed. The original information charging petitioner and Palanca with a violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, was filed on May 5, 1989. After the filing of
said information, petitioner filed several motions before the Office of the Ombudsman
and the Sandiganbayan seeking reconsideration and re-evaluation of the case and
praying for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 13563 during the
pendency of the resolution of these motions. Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
conduct of a preliminary investigation against Palanca and, subsequently, the amended
information was filed. It is, therefore, apparent and irremissible that the delay is equally
chargeable to petitioner. Hence, he cannot now seek the protection of the law to cover
up for his own actuations or benefit from what he now considers the adverse effects of
his own conduct in the case.

10.77 Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Petitioner, who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was first elected governor
of the said province in 1968 and was again re-elected in both the 1971 and 1980
elections, until he was replaced by private complainant Victoriano Rodriguez as Officer-
In-Charge Governor after the EDSA Revolution in February 1986. Subsequently, both
petitioner and Rodriguez ran for governor in the 1988 elections where the latter
emerged victorious. In the 1992 synchronized national and local elections, the two again
contested the gubernatorial post; and this time, it was petitioner who won.

At the time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor of the province, the Provincial
Government of Palawan, as represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial Board Members
of Palawan, filed before the Office of the Tanodbayan 2 complaints. The first complaint
charged petitioner with violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the second charged petitioner,
together with several other provincial officers, with violation of Section 3 (a) and (g) of
the same law.

On December 23, 1994, respondent court, without ruling on petitioners motion to


include co-principals, issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to
suspend pendente lite and ordering the suspension of petitioner as Provincial Governor
of Palawan for a period of 90 days from notice.

Petitioner asserts that there was a violation of his right to a speedy trial by reason of the
unreasonable delay of 6 years between the conduct of the preliminary investigation and
the filing of the information; petitioner invokes the doctrine laid down in the leading
case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan. In said case, all the affidavits and counter-affidavits
had already been filed with the Tanodbayan for final disposition as of October 25, 1982
but it was only 3 years thereafter that the information accusing Tatad of a violation of RA
3019 were filed before the Sandiganbayan. The Court held there that an inordinate
delay of 3 years in the conduct and termination of the preliminary investigation is
violative of the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and speedy
disposition of his case, by reason of which the information filed against the accused
therein were ordered dismissed. It must be emphasized, however, that in the Tatad case,
no explanation or ratiocination was advanced by the prosecution therein as to the cause
of the delay.

Issue: Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of cases.

Ruling: In the case at bar, the record shows that delay in the filing of the Information in
these cases was caused, not by inaction of the prosecution, but by the petitioner
himself. The accused, through counsel, filed a motion to quash/dismiss on December 17,
1991. This pleading was received by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman only
on January 13, 1992. It took some time for the prosecution to resolve the motion and
there never was any intimation on the part of the accused that the accused was
invoking his right to a speedy disposition of the complaint against him. The motion to
quash/dismiss was in fact denied by the prosecution in an order dated January 20, 1990

A speedy trial is one conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules
and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The primordial
purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an accused by
delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. In the cases at bar, while
there may have been some delay, it was petitioner himself who brought about the
situation of which he now complains.

10.78 Bolalin vs. Occiano

Facts: In a sworn letter complaint dated January 15, 1996, complainant Francisco
Bolalin, who was a candidate for the office of Barangay Captain during the 1994
Barangay Elections, charged respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano of the MTC of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, with gross inefficiency and neglect of duty for his failure to
render his decision in Election Protest No. 1 within the prescribed period. Complainant
alleges that the last and final hearing of the election protest was on February 27, 1995
but, until now, it does not appear that a decision has been rendered by respondent.
He further claims that respondent judge was absent from his court for 5 consecutive
months already and many cases have been pending for decision, including that of the
Chief of Police of Balatan which remained unacted upon since August 29, 1995.
Respondent judge filed his comment on wherein he questions the veracity of the
allegations of complainant. Specifically, he denies that Election Protest No. 1 was
submitted for decision on February 27, 1995 which was allegedly the last hearing
conducted in the case, the truth being that the last pleading captioned "Protestee's
Objection to Formal Offer of Exhibits" was submitted on September 5, 1995. He also
denies having been absent for 5 consecutive months which resulted in his nonfeasance
on the cases submitted for decision in his court. He claims that aside from presiding
over the MTC of Balatan, he is also holding office in the MCTC of Nabua-Bato, Camarines
Sur which is some 27 kilometers away from Balatan; that, to date, he is trying 10
criminal and civil cases originally assigned to Judge Mirardo R. Armea but who had
inhibited himself therefrom; that he was also designated by the Executive Judge of the
RTC, Iriga City to try 15 criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed before the MCTC
of Nabua-Bato, but from which he later refused himself by reason of personal affinity
with the private complainant; that he was on vacation leave of absence during the
period from August to December, 1995 for several days, except in November, 1995
when Typhoon "Rosing" hit the Bicol region, especially Nabua where he resides, resulting
in over flooding and impassable road conditions. Said leaves of absence are allegedly
indicated in his certificates of service for August to December, 1995 submitted to the
Leave Section of the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether appellants right to speedy disposition of cases was violated.

Ruling: Yes. The court found merit in the charge of absenteeism. Judge Occiano
maintains that he was on leave of absence from August to December 1995 for several
days and the same is reflected in his Certificates of Service covering said period. A
verification with the Leave Section of this Court, however, reveals that Judge Occiano for
the periods mentioned never did file any application for leave of absence and, worse, he
had stated in his Certificates of Service for December 1995 that all applications,
petitions, motions, resolutions and all civil and criminal cases under submission for
decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on
or before November 30, 1995 when the truth is Election Protest No. 1 has not been
decided by him. His being absent without any application for leave constitutes frequent
unauthorized absences and his filing of a false certificate of service is tantamount to
gross dishonesty which falls within the category of less serious and serious charges
respectively under Sec. 3. Rule 140 Rules of Court.

Thus, because of his unauthorized absences, not only the constitutional and statutory
requirements that cases be decided within the period fixed therefor were flagrantly
violated. In the process, he also contravened Section 16, Article III of the Constitution
which provides that "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." Delay in the disposition
of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it into disrepute. We cannot countenance such undue delay by a
judge, especially now when there is an all-out effort to minimize, if not totally eradicate,
the problems posed by congested dockets which have long plagued the courts.

10.79 Angchangco vs. Ombudsman


Facts: Prior to his retirement, petitioner served as a deputy sheriff and later as Sheriff IV
in the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City.

On August 24, 1989, the Department of Labor and Employment (Region X) rendered a
decision ordering the Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. (NIASSI)
to pay its workers the sum of P1,281,065.505. The decision having attained finality, a
writ of execution was issued directing the Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Norte or his
deputies to satisfy the same. Petitioner, as the assigned sheriff and pursuant to the writ
of execution issued, caused the satisfaction of the decision by garnishing NIASSI's daily
collections from its various clients.

In an attempt to enjoin the further enforcement of the writ of execution, Atty. Tranquilino
O. Calo, Jr., President of NIASSI, filed a complaint for prohibition and damages against
petitioner. The regional trial court initially issued a temporary restraining order but later
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

In addition to the civil case, Atty. Calo likewise filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
a complaint against petitioner for graft, estafa/malversation and misconduct relative to
the enforcement of the writ of execution. Acting on the complaint, the Ombudsman, in a
Memorandum dated July 31, 1992, recommended its dismissal for lack of merit.

Meanwhile, from June 25 to 28, 1990, several workers of NIASSI filed letters-complaints
with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao alleging, among others things, that
petitioner illegally deducted an amount equivalent to 25% from their differential pay.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao endorsed to the Court the administrative
aspect of the complaints which was docketed hereat as A.M. No. 93-10-385-OMB. The
Court in an En Banc Resolution dated November 25, 1993 dismissed the case for lack of
interest on the part of complainants to pursue their case.

Although the administrative aspect of the complaints had already been dismissed, the
criminal complaints remained pending and unresolved, prompting petitioner to file
several omnibus motions for early resolution.

When petitioner retired in September 1994, the criminal complaints still remained
unresolved, as a consequence of which petitioner's request for clearance in order that
he may qualify to receive his retirement benefits was denied.

With the criminal complaints remaining unresolved for more than 6 years, petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss, invoking Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan. Even this motion to
dismiss, however, has not been acted upon. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether the petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of cases.

Ruling: After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
Court finds the inordinate delay of more than 6 years by the Ombudsman in resolving
the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally
guaranteed right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him,
thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases pursuant to the pronouncement of
the Court in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan.

Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges
against petitioner for more than 6 years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of
petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well as
the Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it.
For all these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a cloud, and since his
retirement in September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after
serving the government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent
Ombudsman. If we wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his
retirement benefits, not to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice
which calls for the issuance of the writ prayed for.

10.80 Lambino vs. De Vera

Facts: In an anonymous letter-complaint sent to the Office of the Chief Justice,


respondent Judge was accused of gross inefficiency in the performance of his duties,
delay in the resolution of pending cases in his sala and allowing lawyers to prepare his
decisions or resolutions; Judge de Vera denied all these charges. He asserted that the
charges levelled against him were concocted by losing litigants who could not accept his
decisions.

Meanwhile, a second letter-complaint was sent by Mayor Oscar Lambino to Court


Administrator Pao, requesting the immediate transfer or retirement of Judge de Vera
from the service due to conduct prejudicial to the judicial system, reiterating the
allegations in the complaint of June 6, 1994, in addition to the fact that Judge de Vera
fraternizes with known criminals within the Municipality.

Under this Courts resolution, the complaint of Mayor Lambino was referred to Judge
Victor Llamas, Jr., Executive Judge, RTC, San Carlos City, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Judge Llamas submitted his report recommending, inter alia, Judge de
Veras dismissal from the service.

In a resolution, the report embodying the recommendation of the investigating Judge


was referred to the Court Administrator for evaluation. Consequently, Deputy Court
Administrator Reynaldo Suarez submitted his report, adopting the findings and
recommendations of the investigating Judge, which were reiterated in his report.

Issue: Whether the respondent judge should be dismissed for delaying the disposition of
cases.

Ruling: Yes. A lower court judge is mandated to render a decision within 3 months from
date of submission. Glaringly unjustifiable delay in resolving criminal cases, not even to
determine whether there was indeed probable cause to try the cases on the merits,
cannot be overlooked. Within the period 1993-1994, there were 26 criminal cases filed
before Judge de Veras sala, but none of them was resolved, not even to determine
whether there was indeed probable cause to try the cases on the merits. In those
instances where respondent Judge did find probable cause, the decision was not
forthcoming until approximately five years later. To aggravate matters, there were 4 civil
cases submitted for decision in 1989, 1991, 1992 and 1993, all of which remained
unresolved. Again, we cannot countenance such undue delay.

This Court has consistently held that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the
required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency, and non-observance
of said rule is a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge.

10.81 Duterte vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Petitioners were charged before the Sandiganbayan for violating Sec. 3 (g) of RA
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for allegedly entering
into an anomalous contract for the purchase of computer hardware and accessories with
the Systems Plus, Incorporated.

It appears that 4 years prior to filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan,
petitioners were merely directed to submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the
allegations in a civil case filed against them before the RTC and on the allegations in an
unverified complaint filed before the Ombudsman by the Anti-Graft League. Petitioners
had no inkling that they were being subjected to a preliminary investigation as in fact
there was no indication in the order that a preliminary investigation was being
conducted.

Petitioners filed a motion a motion for reconsideration alleging among others that they
were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation, due process, and the speedy
disposition of their case, which the Sandiganbayan denied. They filed a motion to quash
but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether the petitioners right to speedy trial was violated by the inordinate delay
in the conduct of the preliminary investigation?

Ruling: Yes. The preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioners has been
conducted not in the manner laid down in AO 07. The inordinate delay in the conduct of
the preliminary investigation infringed upon their constitutionally guaranteed right to a
speedy disposition of their case. In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, we held that an undue
delay of close to 3 years in the termination of the preliminary investigation in the light of
the circumstances obtaining in that case warranted the dismissal of the case.

Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of their
case because they were completely unaware that the investigation against them was
still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely
asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is the procedure to follow in a
preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after 4 long years of being
in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against them
had already been dismissed.

Finally, under the facts of the case, there is no basis in the law or in fact to charge
petitioners for violation of Sec. 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019. To establish probable cause
against the offender for violation of Sec. 3 (g), the following elements must be present:
(1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he entered into a contract or transaction in behalf
of the government; (3) the contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.

10.82 Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan


Facts: Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious
transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light
Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1 st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The
division was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J. Balajadia and J. Atienza as associate
justices. No decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienzas dissent in favor
of Imeldas innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to
include JJ Amores and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena
to be given 15 days to send in his manifestation. On the date of Amores request,
Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees with J
Rosario who further agrees with J Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to
immediately dissolve the special division and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc
for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores manifestation granted that a
majority has already decided on Imeldas favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.

Issue: Whether petitioners right to a speedy disposition of her cases was violated.

Ruling: Yes. Prescinding from those premises, it is indisputable that the decision of the
First Division of the respondent Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner is void for
violating her right to substantive and procedural due process of law.

As a general rule, a void decision will not result in the acquittal of an accused. The case
ought to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings for a void judgment
does not expose an accused to double jeopardy. But the present case deserves a
different treatment considering the great length of time it has been pending with our
courts. Records reveal that petitioner was first indicted in Criminal Case No. 17450 in
January 1992. More than 6 years passed but petitioner's prosecution is far from over. To
remand the case to the Sandiganbayan will not sit well with her constitutional right to its
speedy disposition. Section 16, Article III of the Constitution assures "all persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies." This right expands the right of an accused "to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial . . ." in criminal case guaranteed by Section 14 (2) of Article III
of the Constitution. It has a broadening effect because Section 16 covers the periods
before, during and after trial whereas Section 14 (2) covers only the trial
period. Heretofore, we have held that an accused should be acquitted when his right to
speedy trial has been violated.

10.83 Roque vs. Ombudsman

Facts: Petitioner Felicidad M. Roque was a Schools Division Superintendent of the DECS
assigned in Koronadal, South Cotabato, until her compulsory retirement on May 17,
1991.

Petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo was likewise a Schools Division Superintendent of the


DECS, assigned in Tagum, Davao Province, until his compulsory retirement on May 8,
1997.
On January 14, 1991, Laura S. Soriano and Carmencita Eden T. Enriquez of the COA, by
virtue of COA Regional Office Assignment Order No. 91-174 conducted an audit on the
P9.36 million allotment released by the DECS Regional Office No. XI to its division
offices.

As a result of the audit, auditors Soriano and Enriquez found some major deficiencies
and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, violations of COA Circular Nos.
78-84 and 85-55A, DECS Order No. 100 and Section 88 of Presidential Decree No. 1445.

Consequently, affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao against several persons, including petitioner Mabanglo on May 7, 1991, and
against petitioner Roque on May 16, 1991.

In an Order dated June 11, 1991, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found the
complaints proper for a preliminary investigation. Thereafter, petitioners filed their
respective counter-affidavits.

On March 18, 1997, OMB-MIN-91-0201, which involved petitioner Mabanglo, was


resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, finding that all the respondents
were probably guilty of violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The same was approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on
September 19, 1997.

An Information dated March 18, 1997, for Violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019,
as amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan, Manila, against several respondents,
among them, petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo. The same was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 24229.

On April 30, 1997, OMB-MIN-91-0203, which involved petitioner Roque, was resolved by
the Office of the Ombudsman-MIndanao, recommending the filing [of cases] and
prosecution of all the respondents for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act
3019. The same was approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on August 22, 1997.

Two Informations similarly dated April 30, 1997, for violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic
Act 3019, as amended, and for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic 3019, as amended,
were filed before the Sandiganbayan, Manila. The Informations charged several
respondents, among whom was petitioner Roque. The cases were docketed as Criminal
Case No. 24105 and Criminal Case No. 24106, respectively.

On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the instant petition for mandamus premised
on the allegation that after the initial Orders finding the cases proper for preliminary
investigation were issued on June, 1991 and the subsequent submission of their counter-
affidavits, until the present, or more than 6 years, no resolution has been issued by the
Public Respondent and no case has been filed with the appropriate court against the
herein Petitioner.

On November 24, 1997, this Honorable Court issued a temporary restraining order
directing respondents to cease and desist from further proceeding with the cases filed
against petitioners.
On August 21, 1998, petitioners asked the Court to cite respondents in contempt,
contending that a criminal information was filed in violation of the TRO. In compliance
with this Courts Resolution, the respondents filed their Comment to the Petition for
Contempt.

Issue: Whether the petitioners right to speedy disposition of his case was violated.

Ruling: Yes. The delay of almost 6 years disregarded the ombudsmans duty, as
mandated by the Constitution and RA 6770, to act promptly on complaints before
him. More important, it violated the petitioners rights to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases filed against them. Although respondents attempted to justify
the 6 months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy
Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost 6 years for the
latter to resolve the Complaints. Thus, in Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, this Court
dismissed a Complaint that had been pending before the Office of the Ombudsman for
more than six years, ruling as follows:

After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
Court finds the inordinate delay of more than 6 years by the Ombudsman in
resolving the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and a speedy disposition of the
cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases.

10.84 Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: On March 6, 1986, private respondent Pedro Almendras filed a sworn complaint
with the Office of the Tanodbayan against a certain Alejandro Tapang for falsification of
Almendra's salaysay alleging that Tapang made him sign a piece of paper in blank on
which paper a salaysay was later inscribed stating that Almendras had been paid his
claim in the amount of P17,594.00, which was not true. Almendras mentioned in the
complaint that he sought the help of petitioner Elpidio C. Cervantes who worked as
analyst in the office of labor arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz. Tapang, in a counter-affidavit
denied the accusation of Almendras. Cervantes also denied the accusation against him.

On May 18, 1992, more than 6 years after the filing of the initiatory complaint, the
Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan an information charging Cervantes, together
with Ruiz and Tapang, for violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019.

On October 2, 1992, petitioner filed a motion to quash and motion to recall warrant of
arrest on the ground that the case against him had already prescribed due to
unreasonable delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation.

The Sandiganbayan in a minute resolution dated December 24, 1992 denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether there was a violation of the accused's right to a speedy trial.

Ruling: Yes. It took the Special Prosecutor six (6) years from the filing of the initiatory
complaint before he decided to file an information for the offense with the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan and the Special Prosecutor try to justify the
inordinate delay in the resolution of the complaint by stating that no political
motivation appears to have tainted the prosecution of the case in apparent reference
to the case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan where the Court ruled that the long delay of 3
years in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan was
violative of the Constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases because political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in
this case. The Special Prosecutor also cited Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan alleging that, as
in Alvizo, the petitioner herein was insensitive to the implications and contingencies
thereof by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter. It
is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the
Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the
delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly
attributable to him. The SC granted the petition and annulled the minute resolution of
the Sandiganbayan denying petitioners motion to quash.

10.85 Dansal vs. Fernandez

Facts: Petitioners, who were officers of the National Food Authority, were charged with
estafa thru falsification of a public document in the office of the Ombudsman. An
additional charge for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed
against the petitioners. More than 1 year and 4 months after the cases were submitted
for resolution, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution recommending the filing
of a case for estafa thru falsification and a case for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act against the petitioners. Petitioners argued that the delay in the
termination of the preliminary investigation violated their right to a speedy disposition of

Issue: Whether the petitioners right to a speedy disposition of their cases was violated.

Ruling: The concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative and flexible concept. It is
consistent with reasonable delay. The protection under the speedy disposition of cases
should not operate as to deprive the government of the inherent prerogative to
prosecute criminal cases or in seeing to it that all who approach the bar of justice be
afforded a fair opportunity to present their side. It cannot be said that petitioners found
themselves in a situation oppressive to their rights simply by reason of delay.
10.86 Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Petitioner Panfilo O. Domingo seeks to nullify the resolution of the Second Division
of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to quash the information against him for
violation of Section 3 (e) in relation to Section 4 (a) of RA 3019 otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The records show that on May 26, 1987, the Philippine National Bank filed a complaint
with the Tanodbayan against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos; Rodolfo M. Cuenca,
then president of the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines; and
Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., former Deputy Presidential Assistant.

In an Order dated September 1, 1987, Special Prosecutor Juan T. Templonuevo dropped


from the complaint Ferdinand Marcos, who was out of the country and therefore outside
the criminal jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan, so as not to delay the preliminary
investigation against the other respondents. In the same order, it was also directed that
a subpoena be issued to Domingo, the President of PNB at the time of the questioned
transactions, it appearing from the evidence on record that he was involved in the
case. However, the subpoena addressed to DOMINGO at PNB, Escolta, Manila, his last
known address, was returned "unserved," since he was no longer connected with the
said bank at the time it was served.

On June 8, 1988, in line with the ruling in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, then Ombudsman
Conrado M. Vasquez issued AO 1 addressed to the Office of the Special Prosecutor and
Deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutors authorizing them to continue the preliminary
investigation of cases pending as of April 27, 1988 until the same are terminated.

On February 6, 1992, after a finding of probable cause to implead Domingo in the case,
SPO III Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos issued an order directing him to submit a counter-
affidavit; Domingo submitted his counter-affidavit with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.

On July 9, 1992, SPO III Diaz-Baldos issued a resolution recommending that Domingo and
Rodolfo M. Cuenca be prosecuted for violation of Section 3 (e) in relation to Section 4 (a)
of RA 3019, but that the complaint be dismissed as against Ferdinand E. Marcos for
being moot and academic by reason of his death, and as against Joaquin T. Venus for
lack of merit. This was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, and the
corresponding information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on July 30, 1992.

Domingo avers that the long and inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation and the filing of the information violated his right to speedy trial, invoking
the ruling enunciated in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether Domingos right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated.

Ruling: No. The records show that accused Domingo filed his counter affidavit on March
3, 1992, and the case was resolved on July 9, 1992. There was no undue delay in the
resolution of this case despite the gargantuan volume of cases filed with the Office of
the Special Prosecutor.

The concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that
right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are the length
of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The right of an accused to a speedy
trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution, but the same shall not be utilized to
deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It secures
rights to an accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice.

10.87 Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan


Facts: On August 25, 1986, a complaint was filed against petitioners with the
Tanodbayan.

On October 30, 1987, the Tanodbayan recommended filing a case for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioners filed motion for reinvestigation.

The Ombudsman filed an information against petitioners on November 5, 1990 without


first resolving the motion for reinvestigation.

Petitioners argued that the case should be dismissed for unjustified delay in the filing of
the information.

Issue: Whether there is a violation against the constitutional right of the petitioner to a
speedy trial?

Ruling: There was no violation of the right to a speedy trial. The delay was neither
capricious nor oppressive but was brought about by frequent amendments of procedural
laws in the initial stages of the case.

10.88 Raro vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: The complaint against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act was referred by the Deputy Ombudsman to the NBI for investigation. The
NBI recommended the prosecution of the petitioners. However, the petitioners argue
that the 4-year delay in the completion of the preliminary investigation violated their
right to speedy disposition of cases.

Issue: Whether their rights under Sec. 16 of the Bill of Rights are violated.

Ruling: No. It took the NBI 2 years to complete its report. The resolution recommending
the filing of the case against petitioner has to be reviewed. The length of time it took
before the conclusion of the preliminary investigation may only be attributed to the
adherence of the Ombudsman and NBI to the rudiments of fair play.

10.89 Dela Pena vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: COA created a Special Audit Team, which conducted an audit of the operations of
a fishing vessel under the management of the Davao del Norte School of Fisheries. The
result of the audit was referred to the Ombudsman.

Graft Investigation Officer Marie Dinah Tolentino issued an order requiring herein
petitioners and 3 other respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits. After
seeking for an extension of time to file their counter affidavits, petitioners and their co-
respondents filed their respective counter affidavits, the last of which was filed on
December 3, 1992. They never filed or sent any further pleadings, letters or queries to
the Ombudsman.

Placia and Hermoso of the Davao del Norte School of Fisheries, who were not parties to
the case, sent letters regarding the same. Mr. Placia sent a letter to the Deputy
Ombudsman dated March 9, 1993 to ask for clearance to move to its homeport or
dockyard the boat subject of the case in order to repair and use it. On April 7, 1993,
Tolentino sent a reply saying that her office had no objection to the transfer provided
that sufficient safeguards be taken to protect the boat. Again, on March 15, 1994, Mr.
Placia sent a letter to the Deputy Ombudsman asking for a copy of the clearance to the
said transfer, as the original copy had been misplaced.

Mr. Hermoso, in his letter of March 18, 1994, inquired from the Ombudsman about the
status of the case in his capacity as the administrator of the school using the fishing
vessel. On May 4, 1994, he wrote GIO Tolentino another letter requesting that the case
be given preferential attention. In his letter of April 3, 1996, GIO Coresis, informed Mr.
Hermoso that he was reviewing the voluminous records of the case with a view to
resolving the same.

An information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on May 6, 1997 charging petitioners
with the violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019.

In December 1999, when the case was set for arraignment, petitioners, through counsel,
manifested that they would file a Motion to Quash; a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the
Present Case was indeed filed by them on December 21, 1999. They averred that after
the filing of their respective counter-affidavits, the last of which was filed on November
14, 1992, petitioners did not file any motion for postponement or other dilatory motions.
It was only on April 28, 1997, or after the lapse of 4 years and 6 months, that the Office
of the Ombudsman for Mindanao came out with its resolution and information.

Issue: Whether the case may be dismissed since their right to the speedy disposition of
case was violated.

Ruling: No. The right to a speedy disposition of cases is guaranteed by the


Constitution. Section 16 of Article III thereof provides: All persons shall have the right to
a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
bodies. This right, however, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when
the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.

The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning


of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the
determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the
delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay.

In the case at bar, the investigatory process was set in motion on August 14, 1992, and
the last counter-affidavit was filed on December 3, 1992. The GIO came up with a
resolution on October 10, 1996, or after 4 years, 1 month and 26 days from the start of
the investigation proceedings or 3 years, 10 months and 7 days from the time the last
counter-affidavit was filed. The resolution thereafter underwent the hierarchy of review
and was finally approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto on April 28, 1997.

10.90 Lopez, Jr. vs. Ombudsman


Facts: Jose P. Lopez Jr. was an Administrative Officer V of DECS-Region XII, Cotabato City.
Among Lopez' tasks as Administrative Officer V is to determine whether certain
expenses are necessary in the attainment of the objectives of the DECS-Region XII and
to pass upon, review and evaluate documents and other supporting papers submitted to
him in relation to his duties. Between 1992 and 1993, DECS-Region XII ordered several
pieces of laboratory equipment and apparati requested by different school divisions of
the region. The concerned officers of DECS-Region XII submitted to Lopez the
documents covering the transactions. After careful scrutiny of the documents submitted
to him, Lopez affixed his signature on the disbursements vouchers that were
accompanied by Purchase Orders, Sales Invoices, Delivery/Memorandum Receipts and
proof that the transactions were post audited by the COA Resident Auditor who found
them in order. Disregarding the findings of the COA Resident Auditor - DECS Region XII,
Cotabato City, who post audited the transactions and found them in order, for reasons of
his own, the COA Regional Director formed a Special Audit Team to investigate and audit
the transactions. Without seeking the presence of the concerned officials and employees
of DECS Region XII, the COA Special Audit Team conducted an audit of the
transactions. On December 20, 1993, the members of the COA Special Audit Team
submitted to the COA Regional Director-Region XII, their Joint Affidavit claiming alleged
deficiencies in the transactions of DECS Region XII implicating thereto Lopez and some
concerned officials and employees of DECS-Region XII.

Dispensing conducting an exit conference and inviting Lopez to clarify the allegations of
the COA Special Audit Team in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint, in post-haste the COA
Regional Directors indorsed it to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao for preliminary
investigation for Falsification of Documents by Public Officers. In her Order, GIO Marie
Dinah Tolentino directed the petitioner to submit a Counter-Affidavit without informing
him of his constitutional right to counsel. Without the assistance of counsel, Lopez wrote
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao requesting for an extension of 10 days to
submit his Counter-Affidavit. Atty. Edgardo A. Camello, counsel for Makil Pundaodaya
and the other respondents in Case OMB-3-93-8791 filed a Motion for Extension of Time
to submit their Counter-Affidavits. On April 22, 1994, without the assistance of counsel,
Lopez submitted to the Office of Ombudsman-Mindanao his Counter-Affidavit he
personally prepared denying specifically each and every criminal act attributed to him
by the Commission on Audit.

The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao erroneously assumed or deliberately made to


appear that the latter was represented by an attorney. As a consequence thereof, the
Office of Ombudsman-Mindanao did not notify him of the progress of the preliminary
investigation. More than 4 years after he submitted his Counter-Affidavit, Lopez was
surprised that, without preliminary investigation and clarificatory question asked, the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao terminated the preliminary investigation
recommending that he, together with the other respondents in Case OMB 3-93-9791, be
prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3 (e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Within the reglementary period, without the assistance of counsel, Lopez sent a letter to
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao seeking the reconsideration of the Resolution in
Case OMB 33-93-2791 wherein he stressed that he was deprived of due process and
that there was inordinate delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation; and
there was no exit conference wherein he could have explained to the Graft Investigation
Officer his exculpatory participation in the transactions investigated.

Issue: Whether the cases against Lopez should be dismissed in light of his constitutional
right to speedy trial.
Ruling: Yes. The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to
the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil
and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. However, the
right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;
or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or even
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried.

Herein, the preliminary investigation was resolved close to 4 years from the time all the
counter and reply affidavits were submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. After the
last reply-affidavit was filed on February 28, 1995, it was only on July 17, 1998 that a
resolution was issued recommending the filing of the corresponding criminal
informations against Lopez and the others. It took 8 months for Deputy Ombudsman
Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. to approve the same and close to another year for Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto to approve the recommendation. During this interval, no incidents
presented themselves for resolution and the delay could only be attributed to the
inaction on the part of the investigating officials. Indeed, without cause or justifiable
motive, a long period of time was allowed to elapse at the preliminary investigation
stage before the informations were filed.

The cases are not sufficiently complex to justify the length of time for their resolution.
Neither can the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation be
justified on the basis of the number of informations filed before the Sandiganbayan nor
of the transactions involved.

The failure of said office to resolve the complaints that have been pending for almost
four years is clearly violative of this mandate and the rights of petitioner as a public
official. In such event, Lopez is entitled to the dismissal of the cases filed against him.

10.91 Lee vs. People

Facts: Petitioners Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno were charged by Neugene Marketing,
Inc., through its designated trustee, Atty. Roger Z. Reyes, with the crime of estafa with
abuse of confidence before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bacolod City. The City
Prosecutor issued a resolution absolving the petitioners from criminal liability due to lack
of malice on the part of the petitioners in retaining the money of NMI. The appeal by NMI
to the DOJ was denied on the ground that the petitioners did not misappropriate
corporate funds.

NMI then filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. The DOJ, through then
Undersecretary Silvestre Bello III, ordered the reinvestigation of the case. Upon
recommendation of City Prosecutor Augusto C. Rallos to charge the petitioners with
estafa, Criminal Case Nos. 10010 and 10011 were filed.

The petitioners filed at the DOJ petitions for reinvestigation of the cases but the same
were denied on the ground that the trial courts permission should first be secured
before reinvestigation can be conducted. Petitioners then filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings before the trial court on the ground that there was a need for
reinvestigation and there was a prejudicial question in a SEC case pending before this
Court; the SEC case questions the validity of the dissolution of NMI and the designation
of Atty. Reyes as trustee.

Initially, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the DOJ to conduct a
reinvestigation. But, on motion for reconsideration by the prosecutor, the trial court
reversed itself, set aside the previous order and scheduled the arraignment of the
petitioners. The petitioners filed another motion to suspend the proceedings, based on
the same ground that the prejudicial question in the SEC case would determine the
petitioners guilt in the criminal cases, thereby necessitating the suspension of the
same.

The trial court rendered the first assailed order denying petitioners motion to suspend
the proceedings. Arraignment was scheduled; but on the day of the arraignment,
petitioner Lee failed to appear. The trial court then issued the second assailed order,
directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest and fixing an additional bond in the amount
of P30,000 by petitioner Lee.

The petitioners filed before the CA a petition for certiorari questioning the said orders of
the trial court. The appellate court rendered a decision wherein the petition was denied.

They contend that the long delay in the resolution of the proceedings at the DOJ and the
trial court violated their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases.

Issue: Whether the accuseds right to a speedy disposition of cases is violated.

Ruling: It was the petitioners themselves who principally dragged and hindered the
resolution of the criminal investigation and trial for estafa. They thus have no reason to
complain against the delay in the disposition of their cases.

There is no prejudicial question that would call for the suspension (or even dismissal) of
the case. The appellate court correctly held that:

The fact that petitioners are the President and Secretary of the Nuegene
Corporation does not mean that they could not be held liable for Estafa with Abuse
of Confidence, if they did in fact misappropriate the corporate fund for personal
use. The crime of Estafa is committed when a person shall defraud another by any
means mentioned in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. This is true whether or
not such person is an officer of the corporation defrauded.

10.92 People vs. Monje

Facts: Fernando Monje, together with Lordino Maglaya, Christopher Bautista and Michael
Castro were charged with rape with homicide for the brutal rape and killing of 15-year
old Imee Paulino. On November 13, 2000, after trial, the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
acquitted Maglaya, Bautista and Castro but convicted Monje of the crime charged
and sentenced him to death, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim.
Under the facts of the present case, the prosecution witness Michael Cordero alone was
responsible for his failure to appear on 4 scheduled hearings for his cross-examination.
He was absent from the hearings without valid cause on record. In Seneris, the
prosecution witness Mario Nemenio was not responsible for his failure to appear and
complete his cross-examination owing to his untimely death. Hence, it was impossible
for him to return to court for his cross-examination. On the other hand, Cordero was
directed by the trial court to complete his cross-examination in 4 scheduled hearings but
which he failed to attend without giving any justifiable reason.

In the instant case, it is beyond cavil that the accused was not
afforded adequate opportunity to cross-examine, not of his own design but because of
the unexplained failure of the witness to appear on the succeeding 4 scheduled hearings
despite repeated warnings from the court. As may be noted, the defense counsel was
barely through with his preliminary questions at the initial stage of his cross-
examination. In fact, the defense counsel repeatedly manifested his desire to further
cross-examine witness Cordero as counsel still had "important matters" to clear up with
the witness regarding some "conflicting testimonies."

In the case before us, no less than the presiding judge himself recognized the need for
further cross-examination when he warned that witness Cordero should return otherwise
his testimony "not touched upon by the cross-examination would be stricken off the
record." And the cross-examiner was insisting on the constitutional right of the accused
to confront the witnesses against him and to cross-examine them. Even the other
witness, Jojit Vasquez, failed to appear on October 8, 1998 when required as may be
gathered from the order of the trial court issued on that date. In the instant case,
prosecution witness Cordero failed to appear 4 times for his cross-examination without
justifiable reason, thus depriving the cross-examiner of the right to confront him and
test his credibility and shed light on matters vital to the defense.

Issue: Whether appellants right to speedy disposition of cases is violated.

Ruling: A proposal has been expressed for the remand of this case to the trial court for
further proceedings, apparently to enable the prosecution to prove again what it failed
to prove in the first instance. We cannot agree because it will set a dangerous
precedent. Aside from its being unprocedural, it would open the floodgates to endless
litigations because whenever an accused is on the brink of acquittal after trial, and
realizing its inadequacy, the prosecution would insist to be allowed to augment its
evidence which should have been presented much earlier. This is a criminal prosecution,
and to order the remand of this case to the court a quo to enable the prosecution to
present additional evidence would violate the constitutional right of the accused to due
process, and to speedy determination of his case. The lamentable failure of the
prosecution to fill the vital gaps in its evidence, while prejudicial to the State and the
private offended party, should not be treated by this Court with indulgence, to the
extent of affording the prosecution a fresh opportunity to refurbish its evidence.

10.93 Ty-Dazo vs. Sandiganbayan


Facts: On February 19, 1993, the 362nd PNP Mobile Force Company received a report
about the illegal cutting of logs near the Salcedo Watershed. In response to said report,
several police officers were sent to the watershed to investigate. Along the highway
near the watershed, the police saw a mini-truck, then driven by petitioner Quiminales,
being loaded with sawed logs. The logs, allegedly owned by petitioner Ty-Dazo, were
without the proper permit or license. Hence, the logs were immediately
confiscated. Upon recommendation of the local officers of the DENR, criminal charges
were filed against petitioners for the illegal cutting, gathering and transporting of
lumber.

Since petitioner Ty-Dazo was a public official, then the municipal mayor
of Salcedo, Eastern Samar, the charges against petitioners were referred by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Eastern Samar to the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. The
complaint in Criminal Case No. 22021 (OMB-VIS-CRIM-93-0632) for violation of Sec. 3 (e)
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was received by the said office of the
Ombudsman. The information against petitioner was filed with
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner then moved for a reinvestigation; the motion for
reinvestigation was denied.

On the other hand, the complaint in Criminal Case No. 23656 (OMB-VIS-CRIM-03-0347)
was received by the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. The corresponding information
against petitioners for violation of PD 705 or the Forestry Code was filed with
the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, petitioners moved for reinvestigation. Resolving said
motion, the special prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case against
petitioners for lack of probable cause. The Ombudsman, however, denied the special
prosecutors recommendation. Instead, he directed the special prosecutor to proceed to
trial. The special prosecutor filed his manifestation with the Sandiganbayan informing
the latter of the Ombudsmans directive.

In Criminal Case No. 23656, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to dismiss
alleging that the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman violated their rights to due process and speedy disposition
of their case. In the assailed Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion to
dismiss.

Similarly, in Criminal Case No. 22021, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss likewise
alleging violation of her rights to due process and speedy disposition of the
case. The Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying petitioners motion to
dismiss for lack of merit.

The Office of the Ombudsman allegedly already received the complaints in Criminal
Cases Nos. 23656 and 22021 sometime in 1994. However, it was only on April 28, 1997,
or 3 years after the receipt of the complaint, that the corresponding information in
Criminal Case No. 23656 was filed with the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, while the
information in Criminal Case No. 22021 was filed with the Sandiganbayan on January 18,
1995, it took the Office of the Ombudsman more than 4 years to resolve petitioners
motion for reinvestigation.

Issue: Whether the accuseds right to a speedy disposition of cases is violated.


Ruling: The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his case tried. In the determination of whether or not
that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are: the
length of the delay the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such
right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.

A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be


sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.

10.94 Guiani vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: The Commission on Audit-Special Audit Office conducted a physical inspection of


the impact projects of DPWH-ARMM and found several irregularities therein. More
specifically, the COA-SAO found that in relation to the concreting of the Cotabato-Lanao
Road, the contractors bloated the accomplishment reports.

The Office of the President then, through then Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante,
asked the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus, the COA-ARMM
instituted a complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against
regional officials of Cotabato City and DPWH-ARMM.

Petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Motion to quash the information, to
defer the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer their arraignment. At the hearing of
petitioners motion to quash, petitioners argued that the delay in the resolution of the
complaint against them by the Ombudsman violated their constitutional right to speedy
trial; hence, the criminal cases against them should be dismissed. The Sandiganbayan
denied petitioners motion to dismiss the cases and on the same day, denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether the delay of almost 6 years to resolve the preliminary investigation
disregarded the Ombudsmans duty, as mandated by the Constitution and RA 6770, to
act promptly on complaints before him violated the petitioners rights to due process
and to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against them.

Ruling: No. The Ombudsman explained that the period of time that elapsed during the
conduct of the preliminary investigation in this case was warranted by the sequence of
events. Because of the complexity of the transactions complained of which were
contained in a 2-page report from the COA, the Graft Investigation Officer sought further
substantiation of the allegations therein and requested for the complete report of the
COA Special Audit Office.

In the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of


cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case. Well-settled is the rule that the right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right
to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delay. In the determination of whether or not that right has
been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are: the length of delay,
the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and the prejudice caused by the delay.

The right to a speedy trial as well as other rights conferred by the Constitution or
statute, except when otherwise expressly so provided by law, may be waived. It must
therefore be asserted. Thus, if there was a delay in the trial of the case, petitioners are
not entirely without blame.

10.95 Avilla vs. Reyes

Facts: In a verified complaint filed before this Court, complainants charge respondent of
violating Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for failing to resolve their
petition with dispatch.

This complaint is an offshoot of a case filed with the Court of Appeals, for Mandamus
with Damages and Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction by complainants and 452 others against Hon.
Alfredo Lim, in his capacity as Secretary of the DILG, Philippine Public Safety College, Dr.
Ernesto B. Gimenez, in his capacity as President of PPSC, PNPA and Dr. Dionisio B.
Coloma, Jr. in his capacity as Director of the PNPA.

Complainants, in the case for Mandamus before the CA, questioned the various orders
suspending, dismissing and imposing various other disciplinary actions against the
members of Class 2001 and Class 2002 of the PNPA, resulting from the death of Cadet
Dominante Tunac allegedly caused by the hazing activities of some members of both
classes, despite explicit prohibition of such activities by the school. It was alleged in the
petition for mandamus that if the acts complained of are not restrained it will prevent
complainants from continuing with their studies and, therefore, jeopardize their
graduation.

A similar case was earlier filed before Branch 23 of the RTC of Trece Martires City, but it
was dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

Complainants claim that respondent, CA Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., delayed
the resolution of the petition despite the extreme urgency of the matter to their
prejudice and damage.

Hence, complainants conclude that in light of the foregoing considerations, the failure on
the part of respondent herein to act with dispatch, despite knowledge of the extreme
urgency of the reliefs prayed for in the petition, constitutes a violation of Rule 1.02 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that a judge should administer
justice impartially and without delay.

Issue: Whether complainants right to a speedy disposition of cases is violated.

Ruling: Just as complainants claim that the allegations of respondent that a draft
decision had been prepared is self-serving, their allegations that such is non-existent is
also self-serving as there is nothing on record to show that this is not so. What appears
on record as part of the annexes of respondent is a copy of the draft decision and the
marginal note of Justice Garcia. This Court is inclined to believe the existence of the
document.

Thus this Court finds that the period of 1 and month within which to study and
prepare a decision does not constitute the delay stated in the Canons of Judicial
Conduct.

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays. The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether or not
that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are the
length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right
by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.

This Court does not find that respondent in this case has thus delayed the disposition of
the case. Furthermore, what is beneficial speed or delay for one side could be harmful
speed or delay for the other, and vice-versa. For in the effort to accord complainants
their demands, greater injury may be caused to the responsible officers of the PNPA
whose duty it is to maintain the integrity of the school. Some balancing had to be
considered.

Some of the cases are mahaba pero I think its beneficial naman and some
cases are literally mahaba talaga and such info naman I feel useful yata for
recits most esp sa Right against Self Incrimination. If have kayo concern g
lang. Xoxo

11.71Enriquez v. Office of OMB, 545 SCRA 618

Facts: The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), Office of the Ombudsman, filed
with the Administrative Adjudication Bureau, same Office, separate Complaints-
Affidavits of even date, charging, among others, herein petitioners with administrative
and criminal offenses. Finding sufficient basis to proceed with the investigation of the
complaints, respondent required petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence. Petitioners then waited for respondents resolution on the
parties respective formal offers of evidence, but there was none. Respondent, however,
did not act on petitioners motion. Despite all these and petitioners repeated personal
follow-ups, still, respondent failed to resolve the cases. Six (6) years from the filing of
the complaints- affidavits and more than four (4) years after the parties formally offered
their evidence petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. Significantly, complainant FFIB,
despite notice, did not interpose any objection to petitioners motion to dismiss. Yet, the
cases have remained unresolved. Owing to respondents stubborn inaction, petitioners
filed the present petition invoking their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
their cases. They alleged therein that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not resolving expeditiously the cases
without any justification, thereby causing them to suffer grave injustice and agony.

Issue: Whether respondent violated petitioners constitutional right to a speedy


disposition of their cases.

Ruling: Yes. In the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that
may be considered and balanced are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay,
the aggrieved partys assertion or failure to assert such right, and the prejudice caused
by the delay.All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies, so the Constitution declares in
no uncertain terms. This right, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated when
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In a
number of cases, this Court ruled that the right to a speedy disposition of a case is a
relative or flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not
sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right
has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are the length of
the delay, the reasons for the delay, the aggrieved partys assertion or failure to assert
such right, and the prejudice caused by the delay. Under the undisputed facts before us,
we hold that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by failing to resolve the administrative and criminal cases against
petitioners even to this day, or a period of almost eight (8) years from the filing of their
complaints- affidavits. The peoples respect and confidence in the Office of the
Ombudsman are measured not only by its impartiality, fairness, and correctness of its
acts, but also by its capacity to resolve cases speedily.

11.72OMB v. Jurado, 561 SCRA 135

Facts: Maglei Enterprises Co. a partnership owned by Rose Cuyos and John Elvin C.
Medina, filed an application before the Bureau of Customs for the operation of a
Customs Bonded Warehouse (CBW)-Manufacturing Warehouse. As part of the evaluation
of Magleis application, CBW Supervisor Juanito A. Baliwag conducted an inspection of
Magleis compliance with structural requirements. Baliwag submitted a report
recommending approval of the application. Respondent Jurado, who was then the Chief
of the Warehouse Inspection Division, adopted the recommendation of Baliwag. Then he
indorsed the papers of Maglei to the Chief of the Miscellaneous Manufacturing Bonded
Warehouse Division (MMBWD) and later on was approved.Tthe Bureau of Customs
initiated a complaint against George P. Dizon, Rose Cuyos and John Elvin C. Medina for
prosecution under the Tariff and Customs Code. After receiving a copy of the resolution,
the Ombudsman conducted the investigation on the complaint. Later on FFIB submitted
report and were charged with a criminal offense for the violation of RA 3019 and
Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs. The OMB dismissed the criminal complaint on
the ground of lack of prima facie evidence to charge respondent of the crime.
On the other hand, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the OMB rendered
judgment finding respondent administratively liable, penalizing him with suspension for
six (6) months without pay. Respondents motion for reconsideration of his suspension
was likewise denied by the Ombudsman.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA. In his appeal, respondent argued, among
others, that his right to a speedy disposition of his case had been violated; that the
administrative case against him should have been dismissed following the dismissal of
the criminal charges against him; and that there is no substantial evidence on record to
make him administratively liable.

Issue: Whether or not respondents right to speedy trial was violated.

Ruling: No. The Constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to
the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil
and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings.Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution provides that, all persons shall have
the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
In making a determination of what constitutes a violation of the right to the speedy
disposition of cases, this Court has time and again employed the balancing test. The
Court went on to adopt a middle ground: the balancing test, in which the conduct of
both the prosecution and defendant are weighed. There is a violation of the right to
speedy disposition of cases when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried. In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70
(1998), this Court found the delay of almost three (3) years in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation violative of the rights of the accused to due process and
speedy disposition of cases.

11.73Perez v. People, 544 SCRA 532

Facts: Zenon Perez is the Municipal Treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol on 1988. In a recent
audit made on his office, it was found that the public funds that he was entrusted to is
short of Php72,784.57. When he was asked regarding the shortage of funds, he
confessed that he used them to pay for the loan of his brother, and that he also spent it
for his family's food and his medicine. When the case is filed to the Sandiganbayan,
petitioner retracted his previous statement as he claimed that he was mentally and
physically weak at that time, as he was suffering from Diabetes Miletus. He was found
guilty of Malversation of Funds by the Sandiganbayan, and is imposed a penalty of 10
years and one day for prision mayor (min), up to 14 years 8 months of reclusion
temporal (max). Upon appeal at the SC level, petitioner claims that he was violated the
right to a speedy trial and due process, as over 13 years had passed, before the case
had been filed against him. He claims that the sentenced imposed upon him is cruel and
violates section 19 of Article III of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not his right to a speedy trial was violated

Ruling: No. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.

Note: In the determination of whether said right has been violated, particular regard
must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. The conduct of both
the prosecution and defendant, the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay are the factors to consider and balance. More important than the absence of
serious prejudice, petitioner himself did not want a speedy disposition of his case.
Petitioner was duly represented by counsel de parte in all stages of the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan. From the moment his case was deemed submitted for
decision up to the time he was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan, however, petitioner
has not filed a single motion or manifestation which could be construed even remotely
as an indication that he wanted his case to be dispatched without delay. Petitioner has
clearly slept on his right. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all
those twelve years, petitioner had shown signs of asserting his right to a speedy
disposition of his case or at least made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early
resolution, to show that he was not waiving that right
11.74Gaas v. Mitmug, 553 SCRA 335

Facts: the State Auditors and Technical Audit Specialist of the Provincial Auditor's Office
and the City Auditor's Office conducted a cash examination as part of a comprehensive
audit on the cash and accounts of Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Assistant Municipal Treasurer
Saturnino L. Burgos of Bacolod, Lanao del Norte. They discovered that there was a
shortage of cash in the possession of petitioners. The Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao rendered a Decision finding petitioners and Gonzales guilty of gross neglect of
duty and ordered their dismissal. Petitioners argue that there was a misapprehension of
facts by the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals since the shortage happened when
the funds were still in the possession of the collectors and not petitioners. They also
lament that although the complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao as early as November 18, 1991, the order for them to file their counter-
affidavits was made only on June 16, 1995 or more than three years after and the case
was resolved only on October 23, 1997. According to them, the delay violated their
constitutional rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the case.

Issue: Whether or not the ombudsman violated its rules of procedure, constituting
deprivation of appellants/ petitioners' rights to speedy trial and due process.

Ruling: No. There was no violation of petitioners' rights to a speedy trial and to a speedy
disposition of the case. The right to speedy disposition of cases, like the right to speedy
trial, is violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. In the determination of whether said right has been violated,
particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
The conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant, the length of the delay, the
reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and
the prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance. A mere
mathematical reckoning of time involved would not be sufficient.
In this case, although it is true that the Complaint was filed on November 18, 1991 and
petitioners received an Order15 directing them to submit their counter-affidavits only
three years after or on June 16, 1995, they failed to raise the issue of speedy disposition
of the case at that time. Instead, they submitted their counter-affidavits. It was only in
this petition that they first raised the issue. Neither have they moved for a speedy
resolution of the case. It was only when they lost and pursued their appeal that they first
raised the issue. It cannot therefore be said that the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. Petitioners cannot now seek the protection
of the law to benefit from the adverse effects of their failure to raise the issue at the first
instance. In effect, they are deemed to have waived their rights when they filed their
counter-affidavits after they received the Order dated June 16, 1995 without
immediately questioning the alleged violations of their rights to a speedy trial and to a
speedy disposition of the case.

11.75Roquera v. Chancellor 614 SCRA 723

Facts: Private respondent Abutal filed a complaint with then Chancellor of UP-Manila
Perla D. Santos-Ocampo for Grave Misconduct against petitioner Capt. Roquero. The
Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) composed was organized to hear the instant
case.The Prosecution presented its only witness, private respondent Abutal. After the
completion of the cross-examination on the prosecutions only witness, the prosecution
agreed to submit its Formal Offer of Evidence. The prosecution, however, failed to
submit its formal offer of evidence within the period agreed upon. Thereafter, when the
case was called, only petitioner and his counsel appeared. The prosecution repeatedly
failed to appear.

Petitioner filed a Motion through counsel praying that complainant (private respondent
herein) be declared to have waived her rights to formally offer her exhibits since
complainant was not able to file her Formal Offer within the given period of fifteen (15)
days. The ADT was not able to act on the said Motion for almost five (5) years. Due to
the unreasonable delay, petitioner filed another Motion asking for the dismissal of the
administrative case against him based on the following reasons: that the prosecution
had not formally offered its evidence; that the ADT had failed to act on the motion filed;
that the unfounded charges in the administrative complaint were filed just to harass
him; and that he is entitled to a just and speedy disposition of the case. The prosecution
alleged that a Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits had been filed of which a copy
thereof was received by Atty. Lee, petitioners counsel, per registry return receipt.
However, petitioner has not filed his comment to the said Formal Offer. In its petition for
certiorari, the CA denied the petition with prayer for TRO of Roquero reasoning that the
ADT did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders. Roquero
moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the same was likewise denied by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the ADT to resolve Roquero's Motion which he
seasonably filed and order of the ADT admitting the Formal Offer of Exhibit of
complainant Imelda Abutal despite having filed after almost five years violated the
constitutional right of the petitioner to a speedy disposition of cases?

RULING: Yes. Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all person
shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies. The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in
all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case
may demand expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the administration of
justice.

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test
used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay,
the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been
violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows:

(1) the length of delay;


(2) the reasons for the delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
Applying the doctrinal rulings in the case at bar, the violation of the right to a speedy
disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for the following reasons: (1) the delay
of almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in resolving the motion of petitioner, which
resolution petitioner reasonably found necessary before he could present his defense;
(2) the unreasonableness of the delay; and (3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the
right to an early disposition which he did through a motion to dismiss.Over and above
this, the delay was prejudicial to petitioners cause as he was under preventive
suspension for ninety (90) days, and during the interregnum of almost five years, the
trial of the accusation against him remained stagnant at the prosecution stage.

11.76Lumanog v. People 630 SCRA 42

FACTS: Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the ambush-slay of former Chief of
the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine
Constabulary (now the Philippine National Police), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla. The
principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a security guard employed
assigned at 211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where the ambush-slay
happened. As a purported eyewitness, he testified on what he saw during the fateful
day, including the faces of the accused. All the accused raised the defense of alibi,
highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and fingerprint examinations, and further
alleged torture in the hands of police officers and denial of constitutional rights during
custodial investigation. The trial court however convicted the accused-appellants. The
CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. The CA upheld the
conviction of the accused-appellants based on the credible eyewitness testimony of
Alejo, who vividly recounted before the trial court their respective positions and
participation in the fatal shooting of Abadilla, having been able to witness closely how
they committed the crime.

ISSUE: W/N the right to speedy disposition of cases of the accused violated?

RULING No, the right to speedy disposition of cases of the accused was NOT violated.
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all persons shall have the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies. This protection extends to all citizens and covers the periods
before, during and after trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2), which
guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. However, just like the constitutional
guarantee of speedy trial, speedy disposition of cases is a flexible concept. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution
prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays, which render rights
nugatory. It must be stressed that in the determination of whether the right to speedy
disposition of cases has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved would not be sufficient. Under the circumstances, we hold that the delay of
(4) four years during which the case remained pending with the CA and this
Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive. In several cases where it
was manifest that due process of law or other rights guaranteed by the
Constitution or statutes have been denied, this Court has not faltered to
accord the so-called radical relief to keep accused from enduring the rigors
and expense of a full-blown trial. In this case, however, appellants are not
entitled to the same relief in the absence of clear and convincing showing that
the delay in the resolution of their appeal was unreasonable or arbitrary.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Right Against Self-Incrimination

11.77*United States v. Navarro - 3 PHIL. 143 (rationale)

FACTS: The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Fidel Feliciano are
convicted of the crime of illegal detention under Article 481 and of 483 of the Penal
Code. They were sentenced to life imprisonment. Article 481 of the Penal Code provides
that a private person who shall lock up or detain another, or in any way deprive him of
his liberty shall be punished with the penalty of prision mayor. The second paragraph of
article 483 provides that one who illegally detains another and fails to give information
concerning his whereabouts, or does not prove that he set him at liberty, shall be
punished with cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life imprisonment.

The punishment for the crime mentioned in article 483 of the Penal Code is the penalty
of cadena temporal in its maximum degree to cadena perpetua, or in other words one
convicted of simply depriving a person of his liberty may be imprisoned for a term of
from six to twelve years and one convicted of depriving a person of his liberty and who
shall not state his whereabouts or prove that he had set said person at liberty may be
punished by imprisonment for a term of seventeen years four months and one day, to
life, as in this case. In other words, for failure on the part of the defendant to testify
regarding the whereabouts of the person deprived of his liberty, or to prove that he was
set at liberty, the punishment may be increased from imprisonment for a term of six
years to life imprisonment.

On appeal, counsel for the defendants argued that the provisions of the law has the
effect of forcing a defendant to become a witness in his own behalf or to take a much
severer punishment. The burden is put upon him of giving evidence if he desires to
lessen the penalty, or, in other words, of incriminating himself, for the very statement of
the whereabouts of the victim or the proof that the defendant set him at liberty amounts
to a confession that the defendant unlawfully detained the person. So the evidence
necessary to clear the defendant, under article 483 of the Penal Code, would have the
effect of convincing him under article 481. It is claimed that such practice is illegal, since
section 5 of the Philippine Bill provides that ". . . no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants' rights against self-incrimination were violated.

HELD: Yes. The right against self-incrimination was established on the grounds of public
policy and humanity - of policy, because if the party were required to testify, it would
place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the crime of perjury, and of
humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress.

Under the present system, the information must charge the accused with acts
committed by him prior to the filing of the information and which of themselves
constitute an offense against the law. The Government cannot charge a man with one of
the necessary elements of an offense and trust to his making out the rest by availing
himself of his right to leave the entire burden of prosecuting on the prosecution from
beginning to end. If the disclosure thus made would be capable of being used against
him as a confession of crime, or an admission of facts tending to prove the commission
of an offense, such disclosure would be an accusation against himself. In the present
case, if the defendant disclosed the whereabouts of the person taken, or shows that he
was given his liberty, this disclosure may be used to obtain a conviction under article
481 of the Penal Code.

It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce evidence
showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused can not be called upon either
by express words or acts to assist in the production of such evidence; nor should his
silence be taken as proof against him. He has a right to rely on the presumption of
innocence until the prosecution proves him guilty of every element of the crime with
which he is charged.

11.78*United States v. Tan Teng - 23 PHIL.145


Facts: Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age, was, on 15 September 1910, staying in the
house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city of Manila. On said day, a
number of Chinamen were gambling in or near the said house. Some of said Chinamen
had been in the habit of visiting the house of Oliva's sister. Oliva Pacomio, on said day,
after having taken a bath, returned to her room. Tan Teng followed her into her room
and asked her for some face powder, which she gave him. After using some of the face
powder upon his private parts, he threw Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts
upon hers, and remained in the position for some little time. Several days later, perhaps
a week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that the latter was suffering from
a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery that Oliva
related to her sister what had happened upon the morning of September 15. The sister
at once put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were
collected together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The
defendant was not present at first. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as
the one who had attempted to violate her. Upon this information, Tan Teng was arrested
and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and examined. The
policeman who examined Tan Teng swore that his body bore every sign of the fact that
he was suffering from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a
portion of the substance emitting from the body of Tan Teng and turned it over to the
Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same. The
result of the examination showed that Tan Teng was suffering from gonorrhea. Tan Teng
was charged with the crime of rape. During trial, Tan Teng contended, among others,
that the result of the scientific examination made by the Bureau of Science of the
substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not admissible
in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea; as that to admit
such evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself. After hearing the
evidence, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, found Tan Teng guilty of the offense
of abusos deshonestos, as defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal Code,
and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months and 11 days of
prison correccional, and to pay the costs. Tan Teng appealed.

Issue: Whether the substance taken from Tan Teng, which indicates that he has
gonorrhea, cannot be used as evidence against Tan Teng on the ground that it is
violative of the constitutional injunction against self-incrimination.

Held: As held in Holt vs. US (218 US 245), the prohibition of compelling a man in a
criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in principle, would forbid a court to
look at a person and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover the
Court is not considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself,
for when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far,
the evidence if material, is competent. Verily, the prohibition contained in section 5 of
the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is
simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips,
against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main purpose of the provision of the
Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial, or
upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating
them in the commission of a crime. Herein, the substance was taken from the body of
Tan Teng without his objection, the examination was made by competent medical
authority and the result showed that Tan Teng was suffering from said disease. As was
suggested by Judge Lobingier, had Tan Teng been found with stolen property upon his
person, there certainly could have been no question had the stolen property been taken
for the purpose of using the same as evidence against him. So also if the clothing which
he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of the
commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no objection to taking such for
the purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think of even suggesting that
stolen property and the clothing in the case indicated, taken from Tan Teng, could not be
used against him as evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall not be
required to give testimony against himself.

11.79*United States v. Ong Siu Hong - 36 PHIL. 73 (discharge)

Facts: Ong Siu Hong was forced to discharge the morphine from his mouth. Ong Siu
Hong appears to have been convicted by the lower court, based on the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, who were members of the Secret Service. Ong Siu Hong's
counsel raised the constitutional question that the accused was compelled to be a
witness against himself.

Issue: Whether Ong Siu Hong was compelled to be a witness against himself when the
morphine was forced from his mouth.

Held: By analogy, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in U. S. vs.
Tan Teng (23 Phil. 145[1912]), following leading authorities, and the persuasive
decisions of other courts of last resort, are conclusive. To force a prohibited drug from
the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring him to exhibit himself
before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of
an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a substance from the body
of the accused to be used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced construction of the
paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article, substance,
or thing taken from a person accused of crime could not be given in evidence. The main
purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral
examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in
the commission of a crime.

11.80*Villaflor v. Summers - 41 PHIL. 62 (pregnancy test) !30

Facts: In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila,
Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco were charged with the crime of adultery. On
trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petition of the
assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered Emeteria Villaflor to submit her
body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was
pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination
of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision in contempt of court and was
ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical
examination required by the court. Villaflor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by


physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of our Code of Criminal
Procedure, providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.

Ruling: Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of
law clause of the Constitution every person has a natural and inherent right to the
possession and control of his own body. It is extremely abhorrent to one's sense of
decency and propriety to have to decide that such inviolability of the person, particularly
of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's gaze. To compel any one, and
especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger,
without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass. However, between a
sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard
of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate. Fully
conscious that the Court is resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first
impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, it must nevertheless enforce the
constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof,
undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once again the Court lays down the rule
that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial
self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing and
under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible. The proviso is that torture or force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall
within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as
cases arise. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and
disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarrass
the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical
examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same
sex can be seen.

11.81*Beltran v. Samson - 53 PHIL. 570 (writing)

Facts: Felix Samson, Judge of the Second Judicial District ordered Francisco Beltran to
appear before the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, Francisco Jose, to take dictations in his
own handwriting from the latter. The purpose for such was for the fiscal to compare
Beltran's handwriting and to determine if it is he who wrote certain documents supposed
to be falsified. Beltran filed a petition for a writ of prohibition.

Issue: Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by Beltran for the purpose of
comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the
scope and meaning of the constitutional provision (i.e. "Nor shall he be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.").

Ruling: The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge,
upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of
any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the
constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The privilege is found in the Jones Law,
which provides that "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." As to
its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or
furnishing of evidence. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or
the fingers. Writing is not a purely mechanical and attention. Herein, writing means that
Beltran is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the
provincial fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, the present case is similar
to that of producing documents of chattels in one's possession. And as to such
production of documents or chattels, which is not so serious as present, the same
eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864): "2264,
Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. 1. It follows that the production
of documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in
response to a subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other form of process
treating him as a witness (i. e. as a person appearing before the tribunal to furnish
testimony on his moral responsibility for truth- telling), may be refused under the
protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded." Thus, for the purposes of
the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to
produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his
handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against
himself. The present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of
documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by
means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him
as the falsifier. It cannot be contended that if permission to obtain a specimen of
Beltran's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the
circumstance that Beltran is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for
the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is
impossible to obtain a specimen or specimens without resorting to the means
complained of, that is not reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the
hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d'etre of
the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
Hence, the Court ordered the judge and the fiscal and those under their orders desist
and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling Beltran to take down dictation in his
handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.

11.82Bermudez v. Castillo - 64 PHIL. 483

Facts: In the course of the investigation which was being conducted by the office of the
Solicitor- General against Leodegario D. Castillo, in connection with this administrative
case, Castillo filed, in addition to other evidence in support of his defense, the six letters.
He contended that said six letters are Maria Bermudez's. Bermudez denied that the
letters were hers. Bermudez, however, admitted that three others were in her own
handwriting. As Castillo believed that the three letters admitted by Bermudez to be hers
were insufficient for purposes of comparison with the six letters questioned in the case
and as he was determined to show that the letters were Bermudez's, he required her to
copy them in her own handwriting in the presence of the investigator. Bermudez, upon
advice of her attorney, refused to submit to the trial to which it was desired to subject
her, invoking her right not to incriminate herself and alleging that the three other letters
and the other letters already in Castillos's possession, were more than sufficient for what
he proposed to do. The investigator, upholding Bermudez, did not compel her to submit
to the trial required, thereby denying Castillo's petition. As Castillo did not agree to the
decision of the investigator, he instituted these proceedings praying that the
investigator and the Solicitor-General in whose representation he acted, be ordered to
require and compel Bermudez to furnish new specimens of her handwriting by copying
the 6 letters for that purpose.

Issue: Whether Bermudez can refuse not to duplicate the letters in Castillos possession
which were allegedly in her handwriting.

Ruling: The reason for the privilege is evident. The purpose thereof is positively to
avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman
procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing
evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its purpose, then the evidence must be
sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in the person himself, then he
must be promised and assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so
legally, or he should be asked, once for all, to furnish such evidence voluntarily without
any condition. This court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision
under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be
given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it. Thus,
Bermudez is perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her.

11.83Chavez v. CA L- 29169, Aug.19, 1968


Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle(thunderbird car
together with accessories). An information was filed against the accused together with
other accused,that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without
theconsent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.All the accused plead not guilty. During the
trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be thefirst witness. Counsel of
the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an
ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only
incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal.
Petitioner was convicted.
ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had
been violated to warrant writ of Habeas Corpus?

RULING: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his
constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right.
He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself
as a witness; Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to,
make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant
proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is
a rampart that gives protection even to the guilty
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an
exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained
such as when the accuseds constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect
results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the
consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void
judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely
is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which
is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to
perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ.
The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs.
Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given
effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ
was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of another constitutional right, in
this wise:
A courts jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost in the course of
the proceedings due to failure to complete the court as the Sixth Amendment
requires by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel,
who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or
liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied
with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder
may obtain release of habeas corpus.

Under the Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez
whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is
absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise
expressly provided by law, to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
11.84*Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr. - L-19052

Facts: Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a letter-
complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the AFP, with "graft,
corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, and other equally reprehensible acts". The
President of the Philippines created a committee to investigate the charge of
unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand
in the administrative proceeding and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of
his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Petitioner objected to the order of the
Committee, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee
insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to
refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding,
petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand. The
Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem
proper. The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" of
contempt for failing to obey the order of the Committee to take the witness stand. The
"charge" was assigned to the sala of respondent judge Kapunan. Petitioner filed with
respondent Judge a motion to quash, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari
and prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness
stand violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

RULING: Yes. Although the said Committee was created to investigate the
administrative charge of unexplained wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge
against petitioner is to apply the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the
forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out
of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income
and the income from legitimately acquired property. However, such forfeiture has been
held to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture
of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in
criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable
thereto. No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness
against himself applies to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a
proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an
offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in
nature. The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely
asking the witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an
option of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely
because the answer may tend to incriminate but, where a witness exercises his
constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason for
refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is
improper.

The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of
requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However,
where the position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear
that he may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all
questions.

Note: It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to
answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.
11.85**Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners - L-25018

Facts: Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case


against Arsenio Pascual Jr. for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof,
Gatbontons counsel announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness.
Thereupon, Pascual, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board of
Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled
hearing, on 12 February 1965, Pascual would be called upon to testify as such witness,
unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority.
Arsenio Pascual, Jr., filed on 1 February 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an
action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical
Examiners. On 9 February 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary
injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further
proceeding with such an administrative case, to await the judicial disposition of the
matter upon Pascual posting a bond in the amount of P500.00. There was a motion for
intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, asking that they be
allowed to file an answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in
intervention was duly filed by them on 23 March 1965 sustaining the power of Board,
which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to be distinguished
from the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself. A decision was rendered by
the lower court on 2 August 1965, finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and
prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for
the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence,
the Board and the Gatbontons appealed.

Issue: Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case


can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself.

Ruling: The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is not limited to allowing


a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability
being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the
language of another American decision, is the protection against "any disclosures which
the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which
could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that were all there is then it
becomes diluted. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As
far back as 1905, the Court had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to
remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." Recently, in
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine anew that is the right of a
defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness
standwith undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." The
constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief
that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods
offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more
in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice
Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
government must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." Thus, in an
administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, the Board
of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the
person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent

11.86People v. Gamboa - 194 SCRA 372 (paraffin test)


FACTS: Petitioner herein, John Gabriel Gamboa, with Miguel Celdran were charged of
murder and were sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua. However, Celdran was
discharged of the charges. While one of the witnesses, Cristina Soledad was talking with
the deceased, and his common law husband of Rene Impas, the petitioner with Celdran
kicked open the door and shot the victim hitting the latter on his shoulder. The accused,
then shot another hitting the latter into his abdomen that made him fall face down on
bed that immediately caused his death. Soledad, shouted for help and then, one of the
tenants, Rico Acre responded. Upon seeing the victim on bed with difficulty on
breathing, he shouted for help and then their neighbor, Gascon came together with Acre
to lift the victim and loaded him in the car of police Maj. Impas, the father of the victim.
The victim, was then subjected to paraffin test without the presence of a counsel, and
he invoked his right to self-incrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the paraffin testing conducted is violative of the Constitutional
Right of the accused and is equivalent to self-incrimination.

RULING: No. What is protected by the constitution is the compulsory exaction of


testimonies from the accused that may be used against himself and not the body
evidence which may be used as evidence if material.

11.87People v. Canceran - 229 SCRA 581 (paraffin test)

FACTS: Accused-appellant Romeo Canceran was charged with murder. At around 10:30
o'clock in the evening, during a drinking session with several of his friends, Canceran,
armed with a short handgun, with intent to kill and with treachery, suddenly shot Pribert
Doroja with the said firearm inflicting a gunshot wound on his head which resulted to his
death. Two of his friends who were present, Arnold Bautista and Edralin Melindez, shortly
thereafter, went to the police headquarters to report the incident. Based on the
statements given by them, the PC Investigating Team proceeded to the residence of
accused-appellant's employer, to invite Romeo Canceran for questioning about the
incident. Bautista and Melindez alleged that it was Romeo Canceran who shot the victim.
On the other hand, Romeo Canceran alleged that Bautista accidentally shot the victim
while playing with a revolver. At the instance of the PC investigators, Canceran and
Bautista voluntarily submitted themselves to a paraffin test to determine who had fired
a gun. The forensic chemist who conducted the test stated that Bautista gave negative
results for both right and left hands while the same tests conducted Canceran indicated
the presence of nitrates on his hand, yielding a positive result. The chemist further
stated that the positive results indicated the possibility that Canceran had recently fired
a gun. The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and after trial the
Regional Trial Court rendered a decision guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder.

In this appeal, accused-appellant averred that the trial court erred in giving undue
evidentiary weight to the results of the paraffin test considering the crude manner by
which it was administered and the extreme likelihood that the paraffin casts of accused
canceran and prosecution witness bautista have been interchanged. He also argued that
the trial court did not give due consideration to the fact that his constitutional right was
denied because of such test.
ISSUE: Whether or not the paraffin tests conducted without the presence of counsel is a
violation of his the right against self-incrimination.

RULING: Yes. This court affirms the decision of the trial court that Canceran committed
Murder qualified by treachery. The allegation of the accused that the results of the
nitrate tests should be disregarded due to the possibility that the results of the tests
conducted on the accused-appellant and Bautista may have been interchanged,
deserves scant consideration. The defense failed to show even the slight possibility that
the paraffin casts were interchanged. The Solicitor General correctly points out that
"there is no possibility of interchange since the casts, when submitted to the NBI Manila
for examination, were embedded or glued to the paper with proper identification."

The issue of violation of the accused-appellant's right to an attorney can be readily


settled by reading the original records of this case. During his arraignment, the accused-
appellant was duly assisted by a counsel de oficio. The Order of the trial court directed
the Citizens Legal Assistance Office to thereafter represent the accused Romeo
Canceran. Clearly, no violation of the right to counsel was committed. The paraffin tests
conducted without the presence of counsel did not violate the right against self-
incrimination nor the right to counsel. Moreover, the 2 witnesses for the prosecution,
Bautista and Melindez, were able to adequately establish that it was the accused-
appellant Romeo Canceran who shot and killed Pribert Doroja. The alleged
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of Bautista and Melindez pertain to
minor matters which instead of damaging their credibility should be considered badges
of truth considering the natural fallibility of human perceptions. The accused-appellant's
lack of motive is immaterial since he was positively identified as the one who shot the
victim. The rule is well settled that the prosecution need not prove motive on the part of
the accused when the latter has been positively identified as the author of the crime.

11.88People v. Tranca - 235 SCRA 455 (x-ray, not a violation)

Facts: On 6 May 1991 at 11:00 p.m., a "confidential agent" or informer went to the
office of the National Capital Region NARCOM Unit (NCRNU) and proceeded to the desk
of their superior, Capt. Jonathan Miano. Sgt. Jose Latumbo, SPO3 Oliver Tugade, SPO2
Albert San Jose, SPO1 Francisco Matundan, and PO3 Lilia Ochia were summoned by
Capt. Miano to a briefing. The latter told them that the informer had revealed that a
certain "Jon-Jon" (later identified as Carlos Tranca y Arellano) was selling shabu along
Kalayaan Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. Capt. Miano then former a buy-bust team with
himself as the team leader, Sgt. Latumbo as the poseur- buyer, and the rest, including
the informer, forming the support group. Capt. Miano gave to Sgt. Latumbo a P100 bill
with serial number SN886097 and which had been dusted with fluorescent powder to be
used in the buy-bust operation. The team, riding in two cars, then proceeded to the
target area. At the corner of Kalayaan Avenue and J.B. Roxas Street, the informer
spotted Tranca, who was standing in front of the house, and pointed him out to the team
members. The team then circled back and alighted from their vehicles. As planned, Sgt.
Latumbo and the informer approached Tranca while the rest of the team took vantage
points so as to observe the operation and close in at the opportune time. The informer
introduced Sgt. Latumbo to Tranca and told the latter that his companion was interested
in buying shabu. The informer then asked Tranca if he had any for sale. Tranca answered
in the affirmative and asked for the quantity to be bought. Sgt. Latumbo replied, "Pare,
tapatan mo na lang itong piso ko." (In illegal drug parlance, "piso" means one hundred
pesos) Tranca emerged, he gave a package to Sgt. Latumbo who in turn handed to
Tranca the P100 marked money. Sgt. Latumbo examined the package he received and
upon ascertaining that it was really shabu, gave the pre-arranged signal by scratching
his head. Capt. Miano and the rest of the police officers then closed in on Tranca. They
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents and arrested Tranca. Upon interrogation by
Capt. Miano, Tranca voluntarily surrendered one plastic bag of shabu and the P100
marked money . Tranca was handcuffed and taken to the NARCOM headquarters. On 7
May 1991, SPO1 Matundan requested Teresita Alberto, the Chief Chemist of the Physical
Identification Division of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, to examine
the person of Tranca and a P100 bill with serial number SN886097. She exposed the
P100 bill to ultraviolet radiation and found the presence of fluorescent powder thereon.
She likewise exposed the person of Tranca to ultraviolet radiation and discovered
flourescent power on his hands, face and on the opening of the left -side pocket of the
white shorts that he was then wearing. In an information filed on 10 May 1991 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Tranca was charged with the violation of Section
15, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 (Criminal Case 2574) . The case was assigned to Branch 136 of the said court.
Tranca pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on 25 October 1991. Tranca denied the
allegations against him and contended that he was framed by the police officers. On 23
March 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision finding Tranca guilty as charged and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P30,000.00. Tranca appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The defense contends
that the rights of Tranca against self-incrimination was violated when he was made to
undergo an ultraviolet ray examination.

Issue: Whether the subjection of Trancas body to ultraviolet powder violates Trancas
right against self-incrimination.

Ruling: What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is


the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the witness, not
an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. Stated otherwise, it is
simply a prohibition against his will, an admission of guilt. Nor can the subjection of
Tranca's body to ultraviolet powder, be considered a custodial investigation so as to
warrant the presence of counsel.

11.89Almonte v. Vasquez 244 SCRA 286

FACTS: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds
yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces
tecum was issued in connection with the investigation of funds representing savings
from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez
denied the anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to
quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena
duces tecum to provide documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of
EIIB employers.

RULING: Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to


state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based
upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the
individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the
plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed
by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the
gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal
activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic
sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently while in cases which
involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case
that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for privilege
resting on other considerations.

11.90People v. Go 237 SCRA 73

Facts: Edwin Go and Alexander Go were charged with violation of Section 15 of Article III,
in relation to Section 21 of Article IV, of R.A. No. 6425 as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The said accused, conniving and confederating together
and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, did then and there sell,
deliver and give away two (2) grams of shabu powder, containing Methamphetamine
HCL, a regulated drug, without authority of law. Penelope Go was also charged with
violation of Section 16 of Article III of the same Act, under an amended information. With
deliberate intent, did then and there have in her possession and control, sixty (60)
grams of shabu powder containing Methamphetamine HCL, a regulated drug, without
authority of law. They claim that they did not receive any search warrant or any
certification. Upon arraignment, the three (3) accused entered a plea of not guilty. In
concluding that a search warrant had been presented to appellants prior to the
commencement of the search, the trial court relied on (1) a document entitled
Certificate of Re-conduct of Search15 which had been prepared by the police
authorities but signed by appellant Edwin Go and Penelope Go; and (2) an admission
during pre-trial by appellants that there had been a valid search warrant. The trial court
quoted the Certification of Re-conduct of Search in its decision.

Issue: W/N the lower court gravely erred in believing the prosecutions assertion that the
search warrant was shown to the accused-appellants before the search and in giving full
faith and credit to the certification of re-conduct of search purportedly signed by them
including as it does an admission that shabu, previously marked money and
paraphernalia were found during the aforesaid search.

Ruling: Yes. The Certification is a brief but complex document and cannot be admitted
in its entirety against Edwin and Penelope Go. The court considered that the second
paragraph of the Certification amounts to an implied admission that shabu, the
marked money, and shabu paraphernalia had been found by the police authorities at the
residence of Edwin and Penelope Go and therefore, subject to the control and custody of
Edwin and Penelope Go and necessarily in their possession. To this extent, the
Certification is a declaration against interest and tacit admission of the crime charged
considering that mere possession of prohibited drugs is a punishable offense. The
second paragraph of the Certification is, in other words, a self-incriminatory
statement made at a time when Edwin and Penelope Go were not assisted by
counsel and under circumstances (i.e., in the course of or immediately after
the search of the residence and seizure of quantities of shabu) which render
intelligent waiver of their right against self-incrimination open to serious
doubt. At the same time, the Court considers that there is nothing to prevent
admission of the Certification to substantiate the fact that a search warrant
issued by Hon. Judge Leonardo B. Canares had been brought to the attention
of Edwin and Penelope in the course of the raid or buy-bust operation carried
out at their residence and that in the course thereof, no force or intimidation
had been exercised upon Edwin and Penelope Go.

11.91Regala v. Sandiganbayan 262 SCRA 122


Facts: The PCGG want to build up their case against Eduardo Coujuanco for the
anomalies in the COCO LEVY FUNDS. PCGG wants petitioners divulge that Cojuangco
indeed was a client of their firm, as well as other information regarding Cojuangco.

Issue: W/N the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its clients name?

Ruling: NO. As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in
mystery. The general is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge
the name or identity of his client.

1) the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought
to be protected is flesh and blood.
2) the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general
rule, know his adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is.
He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces. Except:

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients
name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers
advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by
revealing the clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is
privileged.
That client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that
the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal
activity for which the lawyers legal advice was obtained.

11.92People v. Malimit 264 SCRA 167

Facts: Malimit robbed and stabbed Malaki in his store. There were two witnesses, Batin
and Rondon. The appellant questions the credibility of prosecution witnesses Florencio
Rondon and Edilberto Batin by pointing out their alleged delay in revealing what they
knew about the incident. He posits that while the crime took place on April 15, 1991, it
was only on September 17, 1991 when these witnesses tagged him as the culprit.
Appellant haphazardly concluded that Rondon and Batin implicated the appellant to this
gruesome crime only on September 17, 1991. In his The appellant also asseverates that
the admission as evidence of Malakis wallet together with its contents, viz., (1) Malakis
residence certificate;22 (2) his identification card;23 and (3) bunch of keys, violates his
right against self-incrimination. Likewise, appellant sought for their exclusion because
during the custodial investigation, wherein he pointed to the investigating policemen the
place where he hid Malakis wallet, he was not informed of his constitutional rights.

Issue: W/N the trial court erred in admitting as evidence the wallet and its contents
although the circumstances which led to its production was obtained in violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused.

Ruling: No. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law
finds no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs.
United States,26 x x x is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to
extort communications from him x x x. It is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the [accused]s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not
apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incriminating statement but an object evidence.

11.93Galman v. Pamaran (supra, Custodial Investigation)

Facts: on 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was gunned down to
death inside the premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. To
determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free,
unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, PD 1886 was
promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly
known as the Agrava Board. Pursuant to the powers vested in it by PD 1886, the Board
conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or
produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in
response to an invitation issued by the Board. Among the witnesses who appeared,
testified and produced evidence before the Board were General Fabian C. Ver, Major
General Prospero Olivas, Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo
Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. Upon termination
of the investigation, 2 reports were submitted to President Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by
its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another one, jointly authored
by the other members of the Board namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon,
Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera. The reports were thereafter referred and
turned over to the Tanodbayan for appropriate action. After conducting the necessary
preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 Informations
for murder one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino (Criminal Case 10010) and
another for the killing of Rolando Galman (Criminal Case 10011), who was found dead
on the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same
fateful day. In both criminal cases, Ver, et. al. were charged as accessories, along with
several principals, and one accomplice. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not
guilty. In the course of the joint trial, the prosecution represented by the Office of the
Tanodbayan, marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the individual
testimonies of Ver, et. al. before the Agrava Board. Ver, et. al., through their respective
counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits. Gen. Ver filed a formal "Motion to
Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence
against him in the above-cases" contending that its admission will be in derogation of
his constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted
by PD 1886,a nd thus prayed that his testimony be rejected as evidence for the
prosecution. Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other accused likewise filed separate
motions to exclude their respective individual testimonies invoking the same ground.
The Tanodbayan opposed said motions contending that the immunity relied upon by Ver,
et. al. in support of their motions to exclude their respective testimonies, was not
available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination
before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. On 30 May 1985, The Tanodbayan having no
further witnesses to present and having been required to make its offer of evidence in
writing, the Sandiganbayan, without the pending motions for exclusion being resolved,
issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of the parties, the pending motions for
exclusion and the opposition thereto, together with the memorandum in support
thereof, as well as the legal issues and arguments, raised therein are to be considered
jointly in the Court's Resolution on the prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other
documentary evidences. On 3 June 1985, the prosecution made a written "Formal Offer
of Evidence" which includes, among others, the testimonies of Ver, et. al. and other
evidences produced by them before the Board, all of which have been previously
marked in the course of the trial. Ver, et. al. objected to the prosecution's formal offer of
evidence on the same ground relied upon by them in their respective motion for
exclusion. On 13 June 1985, The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, admitting all the
evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence
produced by Ver, et. al. in view of the immunity granted by PD 1886. The Tanodbayan,
along with Saturnina and Reynaldo Galman moved for the reconsideration of the said
Resolution, but were denied. They filed two separate petitions for certiorari before the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the right against self-incrimination need to be invoked before the board
in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a
subsequent criminal prosecution.

Ruling: Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use
immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The
distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness'
compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal
prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants
immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled
testimony relates. Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically Section 5 thereof, belongs
to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of any
statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on
the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness
immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-
incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement and
nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets
up his right against self-incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of
due process, demands that Ver, et. al. should have been informed of their rights to
remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used
against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it
and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them. Hence, the right against self-
incrimination need not be invoked before the Board in order to prevent use of any given
statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. A literal
interpretation is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, which is the first
test of admissibility. Said provision renders inadmissible any confession obtained in
violation thereof. This exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to
admissions, whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal
proceeding or any person under investigation for the commission of an offense. In fine,
in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions
under Sec. 4 of PD 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized
under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by PD 1886
cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination which
the same law practically strips away from the witness.

11.94People v. Banihit, GR 132045, August 25, 2000 (relate to Tan Teng)

Facts: Accused-appelant Roberto Banihit was charged with the crime of rape of her 8
year old niece (Glaiza). The victim was medically-examined. Her mother filed a
complaint against the accused-appelant and the prosecution moved that accused-
appellant be medically examined to determine whether he was likewise afflicted with
the venereal disease. The trial court ruled that the examination would not violate
accused-appellants right against self-incrimination, and directed the Warden of the
Davao City Jail to cause the examination of accused-appellant at the Davao Medical
Center. The prosecution rested its case. At the hearing scheduled for reception of
defense evidence, defense counsel manifested that accused-appellant refused to testify
and that he had no other witnesses to present. The trial court informed accused-
appellant of the consequences if he failed to present evidence in his defense,
specifically, in the event the prosecution is able to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, he may be sentenced to death. Despite this, accused-appellant insisted that he
does not intend to present evidence on his behalf. The accused-appellant appealed on
the decision rendered by the court.
Issue: W/N the trial court erred in imposing the extreme penalty of death for the crime
charged despite that accused was not properly informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him which is in violation of his constitutional right.
Ruling: No. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and
not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical
acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt,
hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the
right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence
against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that an accused may
be compelled to his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from
gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim

Note: It is not the designation of the offense in the Information that is controlling but the
allegations therein which directly apprise the accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Therefore, accused-appellants constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was also not violated,
notwithstanding that the preamble of the Information stated that he was being charged
with the rape of a woman who was under twelve years of age or who was demented. As
stated above, this was a mere conclusion of law made by the prosecutor who prepared
the Information. It must be stressed that the acts described in the body of the
Information clearly accused him of raping his niece, a relative by consanguinity within
the third civil degree, who was a minor. That was sufficient to apprise him of the specific
charge against him and to enable him to prepare his defense.

11.95People v. Besonia, 422 SCRA 210

Facts: Besonia was charged with murder in two separate informations, Besonia entered
a plea of not guilty in each case.[3] Pre-trial was then held, where the following facts
were admitted by both the prosecution and the defense:

1 The identities of the victims Ernesto Mospa Nie[l]es and Jerry Sampiano as well as
that of the accused Jonathan Besonia;
2 The date and time of the incident, which is June 27, 2000 at 3:30 oclock in the
afternoon;
3 The place of the incident which is at Guzman Street, Mandurriao, Iloilo City;
4 That the weapon used during the incident which resulted to the killing of the
victims Ernesto Mospa Nie[l]es and Jerry Sampiano was an unlicensed firearm; and
5 That Jerry Sampiano was a construction worker of the aunt of the accused at the
time of the incident.[
Besonia, through his counsel Atty. Calixto Perez, manifested that he would enter a plea
of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide after a medical operation on his gall bladder.
Besonia claims that his re-arraignment was notoriously flawed in that despite his
endeavor to plead guilty to the lesser crime of homicide, the trial court paid no attention
to it, thus depriving him of the opportunity to make such plea. Moreover, there is no
basis for the recommendation of the OSG to hold Besonia guilty of the lesser crime of
homicide because of the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of his culpability. The only support for such recommendation is the testimony of
Besonia himself, which was obtained in gross violation of his right not to be compelled to
testify against himself. He then prays that the judgment in these cases be set aside and
that the cases be remanded to the trial court for re-arraignment and further
proceedings.
Besonia argues that the finding of guilt by the trial court was based mainly on his
confession, which is inadmissible for having been obtained in gross violation of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Issue: W/N the finding of guilt by the trial court was a gross violation of his right against
self-incrimination.
Ruling No. The court cannot subscribe to Besonias claim that his confession and
admissions during the searching inquiry were elicited in violation of his constitutional
right not to be compelled to testify against himself. The right against self-incrimination is
intended to prevent the State, with all its coercive powers, from extracting from the
suspect testimony that may convict him and to avoid a person subjected to such
compulsion to perjure himself for his own protection
It must be stressed that a plea of guilty is only a supporting evidence or secondary basis
for a finding of culpability, the main proof being the evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove the accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Once an accused
charged with a capital offense enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial shall be conducted
just the same as if no such plea was entered
Apparently, the trial court and the prosecution unduly relied on Besonias plea of guilty
and his admissions made during the searching inquiry. The prosecution did not
discharge its obligation as seriously as it would have had there been no plea of guilt on
the part of Besonia. Its presentation of its case was lacking in assiduity that is
necessarily expected in a prosecution for a capital offense; it was too meager to be
accepted as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a
human life. It has been held that where the plea of guilt to a capital offense has
adversely influenced or impaired the presentation of the prosecutions case, the remand
of the case to the trial court for further proceedings is imperative.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Right Against Self-Incrimination

12.71 Sabio v. Gordon 504 SCRA 704

Facts: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same
time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: No member or staff of the Commission
shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.

Issue: Whether their right against self-incrimination was violated?

Ruling: No. Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that this
right maybe invoked by the said directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation only when the incriminating question is being asked, since they
have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be
asked of them."55 That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for
denying respondent Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that
when this power is abused, such issue may be presented before the courts. At this
juncture, what is important is that respondent Senate Committees have
sufficient Rules to guide them when the right against self-incrimination is invoked.

12.72 Benares v. Lim 511 SCRA 100


Facts: Petitioner Oscar Beares was accused of estafa arising from two contracts of sale
executed in 1976 where he sold two parcels of land to respondent Josephine
Lim. Records show that after respondent had fully paid the amortizations and
after the deed of absolute sale was issued, petitioner mortgaged the same parcels of
land to the Bank of Philippine Islands. Thus, when respondent demanded delivery of the
properties, petitioner failed to comply,thus respondent was compelled to file a case for
estafa against petitioner.After the prosecution presented its last witness, it was given 15
days to formally offer its evidence, however the prosecution failed to present. The MTC
issued an Order giving the prosecution another 15 days within which toformally offer its
evidence which petitioner opposed. In view of the oral manifestation of counsel for the
accused,showing that the private prosecutor received the Order of this Court dated
January 28, 2002 on February 7, 2002giving them an extension of another fifteen days
to file their formal offer of evidence, yet failed to do so; the courtfinds reason to deny
the submission of formal offer of evidence. Acting on the Motion of the accused for
thedismissal of this case, for failure of the prosecution to prosecute this case, the motion
is granted. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied; hence a petition for
certiorari was filed with the RTC. Ingranting the petition, the RTC noted that the MTC
Order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute had the effectof an acquittal which is a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. The RTC denied respondent's
motionfor reconsideration.Alleging grave abuse of discretion, respondent filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals arguing thatthere was no failure to prosecute and
that double jeopardy did not attach as a result of the dismissal thereof. TheCourt of
Appeals reversed the RTC's Resolution. It held that contrary to the findings of the RTC,
there was nodouble jeopardy because the order dismissing the case for failure to
prosecute had not become final and executorydue to the timely motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent. The appellate court also held that petitioner's right
to speedy trial was not violated when respondent failed to formally offer her evidence
within the period required bythe trial court. The Court of Appeals thus ordered the MeTC
to set the case for further trial. Petitioner moved forreconsideration but was denied,
hence this petition.

Issue: (no issue) (checked escra and lawphil) (topic: rights against sel-
incrimination)

Ruling: We agree with the OSG's contention that the trial court exceeded its authority
when it dismissed the case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard, hence
there was a violation of due process. Further, the failure of the prosecution to offer
its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case. Even without any documentary
exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its case through the testimonies of
its witnesses. Thus, we find that when the trial court reconsidered its order of
dismissal, it merely corrected itself.29
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals setting
aside the Resolution dated May 5, 2004 and Order dated July 9, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132, as well as its July 7, 2006 Resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

12.73**Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate 541 SCRA 546

Facts: SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in
Metro Manila for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities
Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to
immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a
similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent Committee then set an initial hearing to
investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were cases allegedly
involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the
jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.

Issue: Whether their right against self-incrimination was violated?

Ruling: No. As regards the issue of self-incrimination, the petitioners, officers of SCB-
Philippines, are not being indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding. They were summoned by
respondent merely as resource persons, or as witnesses, in a legislative inquiry. As distinguished
by this Court :[An] accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary
witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the
privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may
altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions .

Concededly, this right of the accused against self-incrimination is extended to


respondents in administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are
analogous to criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to
all proceedings sanctioned by law; and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be
visited upon a witness, whether a party or not

12.74 Dela Cruz v. People of the Phil. GR No. 200748, July 23 2014

Facts: Petitioner Jaime. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by
the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman -
Visayas, in an Information dated 14 February 2006. On the 31st day of January 2006, at
Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, Dela Cruz, a public officer, having been duly appointed and
qualified to such public position as Police Officer 2 of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
assigned in the Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police Office, after having been
arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment
operation, was found positive for use of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE
commonly known as "Shabu", the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted
on said accused.

The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges and
testified that while eating at the said fastfood (Jollibee) branch, he was arrested
allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to
extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was,
however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of
his urine sample, to no avail.

Issue: Whether the drug test was a violation of petitioners right against self-
incrimination.

Ruling: Yes. The drug test was a violation of petitioners right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination. It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine
extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was
adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still
compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear: Section 2.(provision),
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In the face of
these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons
regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. The court express
the commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously track down offenders
in their laudable effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs
on our society, they must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of
their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge society of its
lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the protected
rights of its citizens including even members of its own police force.

Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

12.75 Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014

Facts: Petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute,
they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the
"compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of
religion and the right to free speech.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary
servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled
to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat
of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.

Issue: Whether the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force,
threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion

Ruling:No. Some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the
presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and
compulsion. > A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service
providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth,
no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government
reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of
health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to
provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to
render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made
a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to
be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in
the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any
prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment; Excessive Fines


12.76 *People v. Estoista - 93 PHIL. 647

Facts: Prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for homicide through reckless
imprudence and illegal possession of firearm under one information, the appellant was
acquitted of the first offense and found guilty of the second, for which he was sentenced
to one year imprisonment. This appeal is from that sentence raising factual legal and
constitutional questions. The constitutional question, set up after the submission of the
briefs, has to do with the objection that the penalty from 5 to 10 years of
imprisonment and fines provided by Republic Act No. 4 is cruel and unusual.
As to the facts. The firearms with which the appellant was charged with having in his
possession was a rifle and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who held a legal
permit for it. Father and son lived in the same house, a little distance from a 27-hectare
estate belonging to the family which was partly covered with cogon grass, tall weeds
and second growth trees. From a spot in the plantation 100 to 120 meters from the
house, the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit Diragon Dima a laborer of the
family who was setting a trap for wild chicken and whose presence was not perceived by
the accused.
The evidence is somewhat conflicting on whether the owner of the rifle was with the
accused at the time of the accidental killing.
Issues: (1) Whether the penalty was excessive? (2) When is a penalty cruel,
degrading or inhuman?

Ruling: (1)Yes. The constitutionality if Republic Act No. 4, with reference to the penalty
therein provided, was carefully considered. In branding imprisonment for five years
too harsh and out of proportion in this case, we had in mind that six months
was commensurate and just for the appellant's offense, taking into consideration
his intention and the degree of his malice, rather than that it infringes the constitutional
prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.
(2)(source: Bernas, page 153) It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the
punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual." (24
C.J.S., 1187-1188.) Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the
ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive, " "wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community."

12.77 People v. Dapitan - 197 SCRA 378

Facts: This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Branch
75, San Mateo) 4th Judicial Region, finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to: suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, and to pay the heirs of the victim Rolando Amil in the amount of Thirty
Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Only the accused-appellant was tried. His co-accused, Fred de Guzman, remained at
large and the court ordered the archival of the case as against him, to be revived upon
his arrest.

Issue: Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua cruel, degrading, and inhuman. (No)
Whether the trial court correctly imposed on the accused the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.(Yes)

Ruling: (1) No. Neither is the penalty of reclusion perpetua cruel, degrading, and
inhuman.1wphi1 To make that claim is to assail the constitutionality of Article 294, par.
1 of the Revised Penal Code, or of any other provisions therein and of special laws
imposing the said penalty for specific crimes or offenses. The proposition cannot find
any support. Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code has survived four
Constitutions of the Philippines, namely: the 1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution,
the Freedom Constitution of 1986 and the 1987 Constitution. All of these documents
mention life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua as a penalty which may be imposed in
appropriate cases.As a matter of fact, the same paragraph of the section of Article III
(Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the imposition of cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment expressly recognizes reclusion perpetua. Thus: Sec.
19(l). Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) Yes. The trial court correctly imposed on the accused the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
As to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, We also agree with the Solicitor
General that since robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code is now punishable by the single and indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua in view of the abolition of the death penalty, it follows that the rule prescribed
in the first paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code shall
apply. Consequently, reclusion perpetua must be imposed in this case regardless of the
presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

12.78 Baylosis v. Chavez - 202 SCRA 405 (modified by Robin Padilla)


Facts: The constitutionality of PD1866 is put at issue in the special action of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus at bar. That provision punishes with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, any person who unlawfully manufacturers, deals in, acquires, disposes of, or
possesses any firearm "in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes
of rebellion, insurrection or subversion." This is the second such attack against the
provision. The challenge relies on essentially the same arguments as those put forth in
support of the first, petitioners' insistence to the contrary notwithstanding. Since it does
not seem that the passage of time has infused any validity into those arguments, they
shall again be struck down as specious, and the second constitutional challenge, like the
first, repulsed. The case at bar originated from an information filed in the duced to
reclusion perpetua in view of the proscription (in Sec. 19, ART. III of said Constitution) of
the imposition of the death penalty. The Regional Trial Court at Pasig charged the
petitioners Rafael Baylosis and Benjamin de Vera, together with one Marco Palo, with the
violation of PD 1866.

Issue: Whether the penalty constitute cruel and unusual punishment.


Ruling: No. It was argued that the proviso in question is unconstitutional because it
inflicts on the convicted felon a cruel or unusual punishment, considering that the
Revised Penal Code penalizes rebellion or subversion only by prision mayor. The penalty
fixed in said challenged section is, it is contended, flagrantly and plainly oppressive,
greatly disproportionate to the offense, and shocking to the people's sense of justice.
The result, it is further argued, is that the right to bail is denied under PD 1866 when the
act thereby punished is only an ingredient of simple rebellion or subversion (which are
bailable offenses) under the Revised Penal Code. It is well settled that as far as the
constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the nature of the
punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that
sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if
within statutory limits. Mere severity does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Reiterating the rule first announced in People vs. Estoista, it declared that 'it takes more
than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. To come under the ban, the punishment must be
'flagrantly and plainly oppressive' 'wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense
as to shock the moral sense of the community.

12.79 People v. Munoz - 170 SCRA 107

Facts: The prosecution presented a bizarre case of arbitrary condemnation and instant
punishment meted out by what appear to be the members of a private army. Eleven
persons, most of them bodyguards of the town mayor, went out in a jeep at the behest
of one of them who had complained of having been victimized by cattle rustlers. Having
found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute each one of them in cold blood
without further ado and without mercy. One was shot in the mouth and died instantly as
his son and daughter looked on in horror. The second was forced to lie down on the
ground and then shot twice, also in the head, before his terrified wife and son. The third,
who was only sixteen years old, was kicked in the head until he bled before he too had
his brains blown out. To all appearances, the unfortunate victims were only innocent
farmers and not the dangerous criminals they were pronounced to be.

Bizarre but true, as the trial court agreed. Of the eleven persons who were charged with
murder in three separate informations, the four who stood trial were found guilty. The
other seven have yet to be identified and tried. The sentence of Feliciano Muoz, who
did not appeal, has long become final and executory and is now being served. We deal
here only with the appeals of the other convicts, namely, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba,
and Jose Mislang, who all ask for a reversal. The killings occurred in the morning of June
30, 1972, in Balite Sur, San Carlos City, Pangasinan.

Issue: Whether the penalty is excessive?

Ruling: No. The court held that that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the
medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
which, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion
perpetua. This is the penalty we impose on all the accused-appellants for each of the
three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others. The award of civil
indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is
hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.

12.80 People v. Amigo - 252 SCRA 43


Facts: Accused-Appellant Patricio Amigo was charged and convicted of murder by the
regional trial court, Davao City and was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

(After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing: Wherefore,
finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying
circumstance present, the accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum to death and to pay the cost; to indemnify the offended party the amount of
P93,214.70 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and
P50,000.00 as moral damages. Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant
arguing that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the
penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed.)

Issue: Whether or not that the penalty or reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh and
pleads for sympathy.

Ruling: The accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel
and harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the forum to plead for
sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy
or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The remedy is elsewhere - clemency from
the executive or an amendment of the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point,
this Court can but apply the law.

12.81 *People v. Echegaray 267 SCRA 682 (death penalty)


Facts: The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the
accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having
been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-
appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the
sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged
false accusation of rape against the accused. The motion was dismissed as the SC
found no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb the verdict. On
August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug,
and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal
Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-
appellant aiming for the reversal of the death sentence.

Issue: Whether or not the reimposition of the death penalty is indeed deterrent of the
commission of heinous crime is concerned

Ruling: Considering that the accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of Rodessa's


mother, he falls squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty Law under
the term "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim." The fact that the ten-year old
Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa" is reason enough to conclude that
accused-appellant is either the father or stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual
assault perpetrated by the accused on his young victim has become all the more
repulsive and perverse. The victim's tender age and the accused-appellant's moral
ascendancy and influence over her are factors which forced Rodessa to succumb to the
accused's selfish and bestial craving. The law has made it inevitable under the
circumstances of this case that the accused-appellant face the supreme penalty of
death. Affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104.
12.82 People v. Tongko 290 SCRA 595
Facts: This is an appeal by accused Roberto Tongko from the Decision of the RTC of
Pasig City, Branch 156 finding him guilty of estafa under Article 315(2) of the Revised
Penal Code. He was sentenced to suffer twenty seven (27) years of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify Carmelita V. Santos by way of actual damages in the sum
of P100,000.00 and to pay the cost of suit.

Issue: Whether the penalty is excessive

Ruling: No. The legislature was not thoughtless in imposing severe penalties for
violation of par. 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The history of the law will
show that the severe penalties were intended to stop the upsurge of swindling by
issuance of bouncing checks. It was felt that unless aborted, this kind of estafa "... would
erode the people's confidence in the use of negotiable instruments as a medium of
commercial transaction and consequently result in the retardation of trade and
commerce and the undermining of the banking system of the country."The Court cannot
impugn the wisdom of Congress in setting this policy. In People v. Estoista, ] we further
held:"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for
a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized
by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it
has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and
plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the
moral sense of the community."

12.83 Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice 12 LR 32 N98

Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo
Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed
the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on
finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant
reprieve.

Issue: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality
of judgment has already been rendered

Ruling: No. In criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the
period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court cannot change or alter its
judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated. When in cases of appeal or review the case
has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been
affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow
from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of
the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the
Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included
in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of
the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict
except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.

Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall
not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied) The second and third sentences of the above
provision are new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986
"Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition of the death penalty "unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced
"any death penalty already imposed" to reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a
prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it
reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).
Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera emphasized, it is thus clear that when
Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty,
what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the
death penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the Constitution when they
approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a
premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being
an exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the people. In this light, RA 7659
enjoys no presumption of constitutionality.

12.84 Padilla v. CA (supra, Right to Bail)


Facts: On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in
the possession of petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla. Petitioner was
correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the (RTC) of Angeles City with
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under *P.D. 1866 thru the following
Information: On October, 1992, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1)
short magazines with ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-
32919 with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A35723Y with
clip and eight (8) ammunitions, without having the necessary authority and permit to
carry and possess the same.
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25, 1994
convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate
penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21
years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum" Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April
28, 1994.

Issue: Whether the penalty was excessive


Ruling : Yes. In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been
alleged or proved, In accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws explained
in People v. Simon,]although PD No. 1866 (Illegal possession of firearms) is a special
law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised Penal Code, hence the rules in
said Code for graduating by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied.
Consequently, the penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is the
medium period of the complex penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and
1 day to 20 years.
"This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the rules
therefor and not merely imposable as a general prescription under the law, shall be the
maximum of the range of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum thereof shall be
taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the penalty next lower in degree, which
is, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period.[95]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining


petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty
is MODIFIED to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.

12.85 People v. Alicante, GR 127026-27, May 31, 2000

Facts: We are again faced with the arduous task of determining whether the accused-
appellant is guilty of a crime for which the law mandates the imposition of the extreme
penalty of death. The records reveal that fifteen (15) informations for the crime of rape
were filed against accused-appellant Armando Alicante y David for having carnal
knowledge of his minor daughter Richelle. These cases were filed on 17 July 1995 and
raffled to Branch 273 of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina.The information in Criminal
Case No. as follows:The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor upon prior sworn
statement of the complainant to form part of the Information charges ARMANDO
ALICANTE Y DAVID with the crime of Rape, committed as follows:That on or about the
month of August 1994 in the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
kitchen knife, with lewd designs and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Richelle
C. Alicante, a 13 year old girl, who is his own daughter against the latter's will and
consent.

I n the light of the foregoing, accused ARMANDO ALICANTE Y DAVID is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for seven (7) counts of the crime of rape defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 and is
sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH in each of the case abovementioned.
The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant Richelle Alicante the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,00.00) PESOS as moral damages and the
amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS as exemplary damages and the
costs of the suit.
Issue: Whether the death penalty is excessive in this case

uling: No. Te death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances: 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw spouse of the
parent of the victim. x x x

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity ex delicto for the victim shall be
in the amount of P75,000.00 for each count of rape and moral damages of P50,000.00,
likewise for each count of rape without the need of pleading or proof of the basis
thereof. Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659,
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless, they submit
to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the
death penalty should be accordingly imposed. The Court hereby AFFIRMS the appealed
decision sentencing the accused-appellant ARMANDO ALCANTE y DAVID to the extreme
penalty of death with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant shall be ordered to
indemnify the victim Richelle Alicante, in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00, respectively, as moral damages for each count of the offense proved.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of his pardoning
power.

12.86 Lim v. People, GR 149276, Sept. 27, 2002


Facts: The case is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in
toto that of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City ]Both courts found petitioner Rosa Lim
guilty of twice violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) and imposing
on her two one-year imprisonment for each of the two violations and ordered her to pay
two fines, each amounting to two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). The trial court
also ordered petitioner to return to Maria Antonia Seguan, the jewelry received or its
value with interest, to pay moral damages, attorney's fees and costs.

[On August 25, 1990, petitioner called Maria Antonia Seguan by phone. Petitioner
thereafter went to Seguan's store. She bought various kinds of jewelry -- Singaporean
necklaces, bracelets and rings worth P300,000.00. She wrote out a check dated August
25, 1990, payable to "cash" drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P300,000.00 ]and
gave the check to Seguan. On August 26, 1990, petitioner again went to Seguan's store
and purchased jewelry valued at P241,668.00. Petitioner issued another check payable
to "cash" dated August 16, 1990 drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P241,668.00 ]and
sent the check to Seguan through a certain Aurelia Nadera. Seguan deposited the two
checks with her bank. The checks were returned with a notice of dishonor. Petitioner's
account in the bank from which the checks were drawn was closed. Upon demand,
petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored checks. She
never did.]

Issue: Whether the penalty is excessive


Ruling: Yes. The court affirms with modification the decision of the Court of
Appeals.We find petitioner Rosa Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. We SET ASIDE the sentence of imprisonment and
hereby sentence her only to pay a fine of P200,000.00 in each case, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency or non-payment not to exceed six (6) months.We
DELETE the award of moral damages and attorney's fees. The rest of the judgment of
the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals shall stand. Costs against petitioner.

12.87 People v. Gabiana, GR 123543, August 23, 2000

Facts: For review is the Decisio of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court of Laguna, in Criminal
Case No. S-1797, which imposed the supreme penalty of death on appellant Pedro
Gabiana y Carubas for the crime of rape; disposing thus: "WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused PEDRO GABIANA y CARUBAS
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of 'RAPE' as charged, and hereby
sentences accused to suffer the extreme penalty of 'DEATH'. To pay the offended party
the sum of P50,000.00 for moral damages, and to pay the cost.

Filed on October 18, 1994 by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rodrigo B. Zayenis, the
information indicting appellant, alleges: "That on or about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of
September 12, 1994 at Sitio Quinale, Barangay Burgos, Municipality of Siniloan, Province
of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Rosemarie C. Argosino a ten
(10) year old girl, against her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice.

Issue: Whether the death penalty is excessive

Ruling: Yes. In this case, although it was shown that the appellant is the common-law
husband of the complainants mother, the first special qualifying circumstance within the
contemplation of paragraph 1, above quoted, was not alleged in the Information under
which appellant was arraigned. In People vs. Ambray,[20] the Court held that the failure to
allege the fact of relationship between the appellant and the victim in the information
for rape is fatal and consequently, bars conviction of its qualified form which is
punishable by death. Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
indictment in order not to violate the constitutional right of the accused to be properly
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Accordingly, the death
penalty imposed below on appellant should be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Following
prevailing jurisprudence, private complainant is entitled to civil indemnity ex delicto of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, in addition to the moral damages awarded by the
trial court.[21]

The judgment rendered by Branch 33, Regional Trial Court of Laguna in Criminal Case
No. S-1797 is AFFIRMED but with the modifications that appellant Pedro Gabiana
y Carubas is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to pay private complainant Rosemarie C. Argosino civil indemnity of P50,000.00, and the
additional sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages. Costs against appellant.
12.88 People v. Horio, GR 137842, August 23, 2001

Facts: In an information, dated 29 January 1998, the accused, Danilo Catubig y


Horio, was charged with the crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of
Malolos, Bulacan; viz:

The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor on complaint of the offended party Dannilyn
Catubig y Lazaro accuses Danilo Catubig y Horio of the crime of rape, penalized under
the provisions of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of November, 1997, in the municipality of San Jose del
Monte, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
by means of force, threats and intimidation and with lewd design have carnal knowledge
of the said offended party against her will.

On 11 December 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision holding the
accused guilty of the crime of rape; it adjudged: the Court hereby finds accused DANILO
CATUBIG Y HORIO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to pay private
complainant Dannilyn Catubig the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages

Issue: Whether the death penalty is excessive

Ruling: Yes. in the case at bar, although relationship has not been alleged in the
information, the offense having been committed, however, prior to the effectivity of the
new rules, the civil liability already incurred by appellant remains unaffected thereby.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that appellant Danilo Catubig y Horio is found guilty only of simple rape and not in its
qualified form, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay complainant Dannilyn Catubig P50,000.00 civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 moral damages and P25,000.00 exemplary damages.

12.89 Pagdayawon v. Sec. of Justice, GR154569, Sept. 23, 2002

Facts: At bar is the petition filed by thirty (30) [1] death row inmates which seeks (1)
to enjoin the execution of their respective death sentences in view of the possible repeal
of laws authorizing the imposition of the death penalty by Congress and (2) a re-
examination of RA 76592[2] and RA 81773[3] with the end in view of declaring them
unconstitutional.
It is well-settled that the Supreme Court has the power to control the enforcement of
its decisions, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to stay the
execution of a death sentence which is already final. In the case of Echegaray vs.
Secretary of Justice[4] this Court, quoting from an early case [5] held that: This Supreme
Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on
the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the
period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court cannot change or alter its
judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated. When in cases of appeal or review the case
has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been
affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow
from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of
the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the
Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included
in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of
the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict
except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.

Issue: Whether the death penalty is not a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment

Ruling: The death penalty is not a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment.
It is an exercise of the states power to secure society against the threatened and actual
evil. The validity or the constitutionality of a law cannot be made to depend on the
individual opinions of the members who compose the Court. The Supreme Court, as an
institution, has already determined what the law is (e.g. RA 7659 and RA 8177 are
constitutional) in the subject cases and therefore the same remains to be so regardless
of any change in its composition. Otherwise, we shall see the specter of the same or
similar petition every three or four years as new members are appointed to the Court.
In the meantime, perhaps the remedy lies not in the Supreme Court but in
the Office of the President to which any plea for reprieve (or even pardon)
ought to be properly addressed.

12.90 Perez v. People, 544 SCRA 532

Facts: On September 24, 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a judgment of conviction


with a fallo reading: , judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ZENON R.
PEREZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds as
defined in and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being one
mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor as the minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8)
MONTHS of reclusion temporal as the maximum and to suffer perpetual special
disqualification. The accused Zenon R. Perez is likewise ordered to pay a FINE equal to
the total amount of the funds malversed, which is Seventy-Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Eighty-Four Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P72, 784.57).
Issue: Whether the penalty is excessive

Ruling: Yes. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the accuseds conviction was affirmed
but his sentence was modified and reduced to six months. The court, per Mr. Justice
Torres, reasoned thus: For the foregoing reasons the several unfounded errors assigned
to the judgment appealed from have been fully refuted, since in conclusion it is fully
shown that the accused unlawfully disposed of a portion of the municipal funds, putting
the same to his own use, and to that of other persons in violation of Act. No. 1740, and
consequently he has incurred the penalty therein established as principal of the crime of
misappropriation; and even though in imposing it, it is not necessary to adhere to the
rules of the Penal Code, the court in using its discretional powers as authorized by law,
believes that the circumstances present in the commission of crimes should be taken
into consideration, and in the present case the amount misappropriated was refunded at
the time the funds were counted

Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

Imprisonment for Debt


12.91 **Lozano v. Martinez - 146 SCRA 323 (check)
Facts: Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
(Bouncing Check Law). They moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground
that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional.
The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the
trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties
adversely affected thus appealed.

Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-


imprisonment due to debt

Ruling: No. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen
of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or
a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment
of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce
a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

12.92 Caram Resources v. Contreras - 237 SCRA 724 (check).

Facts: In a verified complaint filed on 2 June 1993 by Caram Resources Corporation


(hereinafter CARAM) and Raymund B. Tejada, respondent Judge Maximo C. Contreras,
Presiding Judge of Branch 61 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati, was
charged with gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct allegedly committed in
relation to Criminal Case
Nos. 142359-142362, which involved the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, also
known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

The complainants allege that on 4 February 1991, the accused in the aforesaid cases,
Teresita J. Dizon, applied for and obtained a personal loan from CARAM payable in
installments. She issued a promissory note and postdated Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI) checks for the installments due and payable on specified dates. Four of these
checks, dated 31 July 1991,
31 August 1991, 30 September 1991, and 31 October 1991, each for P1,259.00, were
dishonored when presented to the bank because the account against which they were
drawn had been closed.
CARAM then charged Dizon with the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and in due course the
aforesaid criminal cases were filed against her. After joint trial, the MeTC, per the
respondent Judge, handed down a decision acquitting Dizon on the ground of reasonable
doubt.

Issue: Whether the B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) is not unconstitutional or, more
specifically, that it does not transgress the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment
for non-payment of debt.

Ruling: No. It has long been settled that B.P. Blg. 22 is not unconstitutional or, more
specifically, that it does not transgress the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment
for non-payment of debt.

In the Decision of 18 December 1986 in Lozano vs. Martinez and seven other companion
cases, 4this Court explicitly ruled: The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the
act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.

12.93 Tiomico v. CA GR 122539 March 4, 1999 (trust receipt)

Facts: A petition for review by certiorari under Section 2, Rule 125, in relation to
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to correct, reverse and annul the decision [1] of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting the
petitioner herein for a violation of the Trust Receipts Law.
Petitioner Jesus V. Tiomico, (Tiomico) opened a Letter of Credit with the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) for $5,600 to be used for the importation of two (2) units of
Forklifts, Shovel loader and a truck mounted with crane. On October 29, 1982, the said
machineries were received by the accused, as evidenced by the covering trust
receipt. Upon maturity of the trust receipt, on December 28, 1982, he made a partial
payment of US$855.94, thereby leaving an unpaid obligation of US$4,770.46. As of
December 21, 1989, Tiomico owed BPI US$4,770.46. or P109,386.65, computed
at P22.93 per US dollar, the rate of exchange at the time.Failing to pay the said amount
or to deliver subject machineries and equipments, despite several demands, the
International Operations Department of BPI referred the matter to the Legal Department
of the bank. But the letter of demand sent to him notwithstanding, Tiomico failed to
satisfy his monetary obligation sued upon.
Consequently, he was accused of a violation of PD 115, otherwise known as the
Trust Receipts Law, under an Information

Issue: Whether PD 115 (Trust Receipts law) is a valid exercise of police power and is
not repugnant to the constitutional provision of non-imprisonment for non-payment of
debt

Ruling: Yes. In fine, PD 115 is a valid exercise of police power and is not repugnant to
the constitutional provision of non-imprisonment for non-payment of debt. In a similar
vein, the case of People vs. Nitafan (supra) held:
The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling
of money or goods to the prejudice of another regardless of whether the latter is the
owner or not. The law does not seek to enforce payment of a loan. Thus, there can be no
violation of the right against imprisonment for non-payment of a d

12.94 Recuerdo v. People, GR 133036, Jan. 22, 2003 (Check)


Facts: Before us for review is the July 16, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 20577 affirming that rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 150, Makati City which in turn affirmed that of the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 67 convicting Joy Lee Recuerdo
(petitioner) for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks
Law) on 5 counts.

Sometime in the first week of December 1993, Yolanda Floro (Yolanda) who is
engaged in jewelry business sold a 3-karat loose diamond stone valued at
P420,000.00 to petitioner who gave a downpayment of P40,000.00. In
settlement of the balance of the purchase price, petitioner issued 9 postdated
checks, 8 of which in the amount of P40,000.00, and 1 in the amount of
P20,000.00, all drawn against her account at the Prudential Bank.

When Yolanda deposited 8 of the 10 checks to her depository bank, Liberty


Savings and Loan Association, only 3, those dated December 25, 1993, January
25, 1994, and February 25, 1994, were cleared. The remaining 5 were
dishonored due to the closure of petitioners account.[2]
olanda thus went to petitioners dental clinic and advised her to change the
dishonored checks to cash. Petitioner promised alright but she welshed on it

Issue: Whether the B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) is not unconstitutional or, more
specifically, that it does not transgress the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment
for non-payment of debt.
Ruling: No. It has long been settled that B.P. Blg. 22 is not unconstitutional or, more
specifically, that it does not transgress the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment
for non-payment of debt.

In the Decision of 18 December 1986 in Lozano vs. Martinez and seven other companion
cases, 4this Court explicitly ruled: The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the
act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Dismissal at Preliminary Investigation; No Jeopardy


Attachment of jeopardy
12.95 *People v. Ylagan - 58 PHIL. 851

Facts: Against the appellee, Elisea Ylagan, a complaint for physical injuries in the justice
of the peace court of Batangas, Province of Batangas. After preliminary investigation,
the case forwarded to the Court of First Instance, where the provincial fiscal filed an
information charging her with serious physical injuries. Upon arraignment, the defendant
pleaded not guilty to the information; whereupon the private prosecutor, with the
concurrence of the deputy provincial fiscal, moved for the dismissal of the case, which
motion was granted by the court. The attorney for the defendant said nothing about the
dismissal of the case.

Eleven days later, the acting provincial fiscal filed another information in the same
justice of the peace court, charging the same defendant with the same offense of
serious physical injuries. After another preliminary investigation, the case was again
forwarded to the Court of First Instance, where the information filed in the justice of the
peace court was reproduced. Upon arraignment, the defendant entered a plea of double
jeopardy, based on section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After hearing, the court
sustained the plea and dismissed the case. From this order of dismissal, an appeal was
taken by the Government.

Issue: When does jeopardy of punishment attach?

Ruling: Jeopardy attaches (a) upon a good indictment, before a competent


court, aftere arraignment and after plea.
It seems clear that under the foregoing provisions of law, defendant in a criminal
prosecution is in legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the following conditions: (1)
In a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or information; (3) after
he has been arraigned; and (4) after he has pleaded to the complaint of information.
Tested by this standard, we are of the opinion that the appellee has been once in
jeopardy for the offense for which she is now prosecuted. It is true that in United
States vs. Ballentine (4 Phil., 672; 1 Philippine Decisions 575, and in other subsequent
cases, including People vs. Belisario (G.R. No. 33416), 1 this court had held that there is
no jeopardy until the investigation of the charges has actually been commenced by the
calling of a witness; but we are now convinced that such a view should be abandoned.
There is no provision or principle of law jeopardy. All that the law requires is that the
accused has been brought to trial "in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined." Under our system of criminal
procedure, issue is properly joined after the accused has entered a plea of not guilty.
The mere calling of a witness would not add a particle to the danger, annoyance, and
vexation suffered by the accused, after going through the process of being arrested,
subjected to a preliminary investigation, arraigned, and required to plead and stand
trial.

13.71 People vs. Balisacan, G.R. No. L-26376

Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of IlocosNorte. Upon being
arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y counsel. At his
counsel de officio, he was allowed to present evidence and consequently testified that
he stabbed the deceased in self-defense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered
himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the basis of the testimony of the
accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in doublejeopardy.

Held: The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of pleais an essential
requisite to double jeopardy. The accused had first entered aplea of guilty but however
testified that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of
vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new
charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not
done. Therefore, there has been no standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal, so
there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.

13.72 Cinco vs. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 726


This case is quite procedural, so it was inevitable for me to include lengthy facts. Please
bear reading the facts.

Cirilo Cinco seeks the reversal of a resolution issued by respondent Sandiganbayan


which denied petitioners motion to quash criminal cases. Petitioner avers that they are
put in double jeopardy of being charged with informations of crimes other than the
crime imputed. The following are the antecedent facts:
The preliminary investigation of the charges was assigned to Prosecutor Ricardo A.
Buenviaje, and it was up for resolution when he was appointed to the judiciary in
1986. It was then re-assigned to Prosecutor Gregorio G. Pimentel Jr., who, on July
23, 1987, issued a resolution recommending the prosecution of the accused for
alleged violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Annex C of Rejoinder,
Record, pp. 131-143). The resolution having been approved by Raul M. Gonzales,
the then Tanodbayan, the corresponding informations for the said violations were
filed with the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1987, and docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 12420 and 12421 against Cinco; 12422 against Bantigue, Amaro,
Cinco, and Abalos; 12423 against Cinco; 12424 against Bantigue, Amaro, and
Sabalza; and 12426 against Cinco.
The accused filed a motion to quash on May 17, 1988, praying that the said
informations be dismissed for lack of authority on the part of Tanodbayan
Gonzales or his prosecutor to file them and invoking Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan,
160 SCRA 843, which had held that the Tanodbayan, now called Special
Prosecutor, was... clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations
and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon
orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987.
From that time, he has been divested of such authority.
After hearing the prosecution, this Court promulgated a resolution on July 5, 1988,
granting the motion to quash. In that resolution, it observed... (T)he dismissal of
these cases will be without prejudice to the right of the State, acting through the
Hon. Ombudsman, to conduct a new preliminary investigation and refile the cases
if the evidence warrants the same.
On August 4, 1988, Balana requested the re-filing of the cases, and in view
thereof, the accused, through counsel, in turn requested on December 26, 1988,
that she did so 'under separate and distinct charges in accordance with the new
rules of preliminary investigation' (Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
effective October 1, 1988) so that the respondents can refute her charges and
specific evidences she may present in support of each separate charge (Annex A
of Motion to Quash, Record, pp. 61-61).
In his order of February 16, 1990, Prosecutor Eleuterio F. Guerrero, to whom the
charges of Balana were re-assigned for preliminary investigation, denied the
request of the accused and noting that the parties had already adduced their
respective evidence in the preliminary investigation conducted by the previous
prosecutor, gave her 10 days from receipt to manifest if she elected to adopt the
same charges and evidence already submitted. In the same order, he also granted
the accused an equal period to adduce their controverting evidence.
On June 27, 1989, he issued a resolution finding prima facie cases for alleged
violations of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and recommending the filing of
the corresponding informations. The Hon. Ombudsman approved the resolution.
Accordingly, (Criminal Cases Nos. 13827 to 13832 against the petitioners) were
instituted on August 28, 1989. Each information carries with it the certification of
Prosecutor Guerrero that a preliminary investigation has been conducted in this
case; that there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the
crime charged herein has been committed and that the accused are probably
guilty thereof. (Rollo, pp. 136- 140).

Issue: Whether accuseds right against double jeopardy is violated

Held: No. Petitioners' apprehension that they might be put in jeopardy of being charged
with informations or crimes other than the crime imputed in the dismissed cases is
baseless. There could be no double jeopardy for the simple reason that they have not
year pleaded to the offense. Beside, a preliminary investigation is not a trial for which
double jeopardy attaches. We ruled in Tandoc v. Resultan (G. R. Nos. 59241-44, July 5,
1989, 175 SCRA 37, 43) that: Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is
often that only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a
crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complain or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty therefor, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.

13.73 People vs. Vergara, 221 SCRA 560

Leonardo Salde and others were charged of frustrated murder by the 3 rd Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Luis Estiller. Said accused pleaded not guilty. On 19 September 1988,
when the cases were initially called for trial, the Prosecuting Fiscal together with counsel
for accused jointly moved for the suspension of the hearing pending the outcome of the
motion filed by the accused for reinvestigation of the cases against them, which
Provincial Fiscal Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., later resolved in their favor.
On 12 December 1988, counsel for the offended parties gave, notice to the Provincial
Fiscal of their intention to appeal the latter's resolution to the Department of Justice. On
2 February 1989, pending appeal to the Department of Justice, Provincial Fiscal Gacott,
Jr., moved for the dismissal of the cases on the ground that the reinvestigation disclosed
that petitioner-spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the real aggressors and that the
accused only acted in self-defense. On 9 February 1989, acting on the motion of the
Provincial Fiscal, the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Br. 52, ordered the dismissal of
Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397.
Meanwhile, on 1 March 1990, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Provincial Prosecutor
to refile the Informations. Hence, on 6 April 1990, two (2) new Informations for
frustrated murder against the same accused were filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor
Clarito A. Demaala, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573. On 13 May 1991, after
pleading "not guilty" to the new Informations, the accused moved to quash on the
ground of double jeopardy, which was opposed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
On 10 July 1991, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed Crim. Cases Nos. 8572
and 8573. The motion to reconsider the order of 10 July 1991 filed by Acting Provincial
Prosecutor Demaala was denied on 16 August 1991. Hence, this petition for certiorari
filed by private petitioners Amado and Teresa Rubite, complainants in the court below.
Petitioners contend that the filing of the two (2) new Informations did not place accused-
private respondents in double jeopardy since the dismissal of the previous cases was
made with the latter's express consent, which can be equated with their motion for
reinvestigation of the cases, dismissal of the cases being their ultimate intention in
moving for reinvestigation.

Issue: Were the accused placed in double jeopardy?


Held: Yes. The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of
any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. The
objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the
accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second
charge against him for the same offense. Que v. Cosico enumerates the requisites which
must concur for double jeopardy to attach: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a
court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the
accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without
the express consent of the accused.
The concurrence of all these circumstances constitutes a bar to a second prosecution for
the same offense, an attempt to commit the said offense, a frustration of the said
offense, or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first
offense charged. In the cases before Us, it is undisputed that valid Informations for
frustrated murder, i.e., Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 were filed against private
respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, a court of competent
jurisdiction. It is likewise admitted that private respondents, after being properly
arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty. The only question then remaining is whether the
cases against them were dismissed with their express consent.
Express consent has been defined as that which is directly given either viva voce or in
writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication
to supply its meaning. This is hardly what private respondents gave. What they did was
merely to move for reinvestigation of the case before the prosecutor. To equate this with
express consent of the accused to the dismissal of the case in the lower court is to strain
the meaning of "express consent" too far. Simply, there was no express consent of the
accused when the prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the original Informations.

13. 74 Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 175

Petitioner herein is the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia Naitonal
Vocational School in del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. He was entrusted, as a Collecting
and Disbursement Officer to hold in trust moneys and/ properties of the government of
the Republic of the Philippines. That while being in the said position, he intentionally,
feloniously and without lawful authority appropriate and misappropriate to his own
private benefit, public funds he was holding in trust for the Government of the
Philippines in the total amount to PHP16, 483.62. He as unable to account for the said
amount during the audit. Warrant of arrest was issued to arrest the petitioner but he
was nowhere to be found.

On December 10, 1978, Sandiganbayan was created pursuant to PD No 1606, conferring


to it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers
embraced in Title VII of the RPC

November 1984, when the petitioner herein was finally arrested. He was released on
provisional liberty upon the approval of the bail bond. When arraigned by the RTC, he
pleaded not guilty. Upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and
transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Quiones-Marcos
however opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case was
transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the
case. That matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise.
The information was however docketed in Sandiganbayan. A new order of arrest for the
petitioner was issued by the Sandiganbayan. Navallo filed a motion to quash contending
that since he had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him
before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not double jeopardy sets it when petitioner was arraigned by the RTC.

Held: In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an
arraignment of the accused which by then had already been conferred on the
Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with conviction or
acquittal nor was it dismissed.

13.75 Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 685

On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate
informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting
to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and
Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.

On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor


filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Informations of the original informations. This
motion was granted by Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were
considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-
Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of
frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by
petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the
arraignment of petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying
the motion to quash.

In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge
Pornillos, an order was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of the
original informations, and setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8,
1994. On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with respondent
Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos
which denied petitioners motion to quash filed for the new informations. As earlier
stated, respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February
18, 1994, hence this petition.

Issue: Was the Galvezs right against double jeopardy compromised in this case because
of the introduction/amendment of informations?

Held: No. It has been the rule that under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, the
amendment of the information may also be made even if it may result in altering the
nature of the charge so long as it can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused. Hence, in the case of Dimalibot vs. Salcedo, 30 the accused therein were
originally charged with homicide and were released on bail. However, the then provincial
fiscal, after a review of the affidavits of the witnesses for the prosecution, discovered
that the killing complained of was perpetrated with the qualifying circumstances of
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and employing means to weaken the
defense of the victim. Consequently, an amended information for murder was filed
against the accused who were ordered re-arrested without the amount of bail being
fixed, the new charge being a capital offense.
In any event, we are inclined to uphold the propriety of the withdrawal of the original
informations, there having been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court in
granting the motion and, more importantly, in consideration of the fact that the motion
to withdraw was filed and granted before herein petitioners were arraigned, hence
before they were placed in jeopardy. Thus, even if a substitution was made at such
stage, petitioners cannot validly claim double jeopardy, which is precisely the evil sought
to be prevented under the rule on substitution, for the simple reason that no first
jeopardy had as yet attached. Consequently, we hold that although the offenses charged
under the three new informations necessarily include those charged under the original
informations, the substitution of informations was not a fatal error. A contrary ruling, to
paraphrase from our former pronouncements, would sacrifice substantial justice for
formal nuances on the altar of procedural technicalities. Furthermore, petitioner's right
to speedy trial was never violated since the new informations were filed immediately
after the motion to withdraw the original informations was granted.

13.76 Cunanan vs. Arceo, 242 SCRA 88

An information for murder was filed against Ferdinand Cunanan before the RTC of San
Fernando, Pampanga, presided over by Judge Norberto C. Ponce. The information
alleged that petitioner was a member of the Philippine National Police; it contained no
averment that he had committed the offense charged in relation to his public office.
Cunanan entered a plea of not guilty at arraignment and trial proceeded thereafter.

On 11 March 1994, the Supreme Court promulgated its En Banc Decision in Republic
v. Hon. Asuncion, et a1., 5 which laid down the rule that the Sandiganbayan has
exclusive and original jurisdiction to take cognizance of offenses committed by public
officers in relation to their office, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years or more or a fine of P6,000.00.
The Supreme Court further held that in the event an Information failed to allege that the
accused-public officer had committed the offense charged in relation to his office, the
RTC hearing the criminal case, pending at the time of the promulgation of
the Asuncion rule, shall conduct a preliminary hearing to determine the existence or
absence of this material fact. If this material fact is found to be present, the RTC shall
order the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan for docketing, and the latter shall
proceed to hear the case as if the same had been originally instituted with it. If it be
determined that that fact is absent, the RTC seized with the case shall proceed with the
trial and render judgment on the case. 6
Judge Arceo proceeded to apply these holdings in Criminal Case No. 5708 by conducting
a hearing solely to ascertain if petitioner had committed the offense charged in relation
to his office. 7 In an Order dated 21 April 1994, Judge Arceo ruled that on the basis of the
evidence adduced during the trial, petitioner had committed the offense charged while
in the performance of his official functions. He then held that the RTC had no jurisdiction
to try this case and that, accordingly, any decision it may render thereon would be null
and void. Judge Arceo dismissed Criminal Case No. 5708 "for refiling with the
Sandiganbayan," pursuant to the Asuncion ruling. 8

Moreover, petitioner continues, the Asuncion ruling is inapplicable to the present case,
since here trial had already ended and the case was already submitted for decision
when the Asuncion ruling was promulgated. A transfer of his case to
the Sandiganbayan at this late stage will, accordingly, expose him (petitioner) to double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. 21 Indeed, petitioner believes Judge
Arceo's Order dated 21 April 1994 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged amounts to an acquittal of petitioner.

Issue: Will there be violation of double jeopardy upon transfer of petitioners case to the
Sandiganbayan?

Held: Finally, the defense of double jeopardy does not become available to petitioner
upon transfer of his case to the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner had not been exposed at all
to legal jeopardy by the commencement and trial of Criminal Case No. 5708 because the
RTC was not a court of competent jurisdiction to try the case in the first
place. 32 Consequently, upon the commencement of this case before
the Sandiganbayan petitioner will for the first time be placed in jeopardy of punishment
for the offense of murder. By the same token, the dismissal of the Information by the
RTC was not equivalent to, and did not operate as an acquittal of petitioner of that
offense. The "dismissal" (later deleted by the RTC) had simply reflected the fact that the
proceedings before the RTC were terminated, the RTC having ascertained that it had no
jurisdiction to try the case at all.
13.77 People vs. Tampal, 244 SCRA 202
Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, SamuelPadumon, Pablito Suco, Dario
Suco and Galvino Cadling were charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious
physical injuries in the RegionalTrial Court of Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo Ochotorena
as presiding judge. However, only private respondents, Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon,
Arsenio Padumon, and Samuel Padumon were arrested, while the others remained at
large.

The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Wilfredo Guantero moved for postponement due to his failure to contact the material
witnesses. The case was reset without any objectionfrom the defense counsel. The case
was called on September 20, 1991 but the prosecutor was not present. The respondent
judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed
the criminal case for failure to prosecute. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsidereation, claiming that his absence was because such date was a Muslim
holiday and the office of the Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day.
The motionwas denied by respondent judge.
Issue: Whether or not there is double jeopardy in the present case.

Held: The Supreme Court held that In dismissing criminal cases based on the right of
the accused to speedy trial, courts should carefully weigh the circumstances attending
each case. They should balance the right of the accused and the right of the State to
punish people who violate its penal laws. Both the State and the accused are entitled to
due process. It is apparent that the public prosecutor's failure to attend the September
20, 1991 hearing was due to his good faith and belief that said date was a Muslin Legal
Holiday. To be sure, the prosecutor could not be faulted for not working on that day since
the Provincial Prosecutor's Office was closed pursuant to the Sections 2 and 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 291 dated September 12, 1973, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 322. In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do
more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case. What offend the right of the accused to speedy trial are
unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. In the
case it was only postponed twice and for a period of less than two months. The first
postponement was without any objection from the private respondents. The second
postponement was due to a valid cause. Private respondents cannot also invoke their
right against double jeopardy. The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy, must be for the same offense as that in
the first. 14 Legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a
competent court, (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5)
when the defendant was acquitted or convicted , or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused. The held that dismissal of cases
on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further
prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that
these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These
cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private
respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private
respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.

13.78 People vs. Montesa, 248 SCRA 641

Apolonio Cruz and Bernarda Cruz were charged with the crime of falsification of public
document in the RTC of Bulacan. They later filed for a petition for reinvestigation with
the said trial court, which was subsequently granted by the Judge Montesa. The case,
therefore, was remanded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for purposes of
reinvestigation, and cancelling the scheduled arraignment on October 19, 1993. At the
reinvestigation conducted by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Edsel M. Rutor, the accused
presented what it considered new material and relevant evidence which consists merely
of an affidavit of Feliza Constantino who declared that she was the one responsible for
the preparation of the questioned public document. In his resolution of 14 December
1993, 8 Rutor recommended the dismissal of the case because: [T]he issue is now moot
with the admission by Feliza Constantino in an affidavit submitted only on November
1993, wherein she made clear that she is the one responsible for the preparation of the
document subject matter of this case, . . . the accused spouses have no participation in
the preparation of the same.
Provincial Prosecutor Liberato Reyes disapproved the recommendation and the made of
the following handwritten note below the signature of Rutor on the last page of the
latter's resolution:
Feliza Constantino did not admit having done the falsification. As vendor she
merely warrants the good title that transferred to the vendee & she assumes
responsibility therefor.
Hence, the Court & not this office is in a better position to resolve the issue
of whether the accused are the perpetrators of the falsification. We should
present our evidence that makes out a prima facie case & let the Court
decide, not this office pre-empting the prerogative of the Court. 9 (emphasis
supplied)
Nonetheless, in obvious disregard of the adverse stand of the Provincial Prosecutor,
Assistan Provincial Prosecutor Rutor submitted his resolution to the trial court. On 22
December 1993, the respondent Judge ordered the arraignment of the private
respondents. They pleaded not guilty.
Issue: Is there violation of the double jeopardy in the case at bar?
Held: No. The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the
discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on
the court. The court is the best and the sole judge on what to do with the case.
Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or after the
arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of
the court. The action of the court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the
accused or the right of the People to due process of law. 15
In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and
directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the
reinvestigation. The former was, therefore, deemed to have deferred to the authority of
the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new relevant and
material evidence and determine whether the information it had filed should stand. The
Rutor resolution was rendered valueless because of the Provincial Prosecutor's approval
thereof. In submitting it nonetheless to the court and moving for the dismissal of the
case, Rutor showed outright disregard of the aforementioned provisions and ruling. So
did the respondent Judge when he dismissed the case on the basis of that resolution.
Their disregard of the said provisions and ruling is condemnable, for it carries with it a
whimsical and capricious bent that taints the exercise of discretion with grave abuse,
thereby rendering the whole act infirmed and void.
It must be observed that, although the respondent Judge was convinced of Rutor's
recommendation to dismiss the case on the ground of want of probable cause because
of the "admission" of Feliza Constantino that the accused spouses had no participation
in the preparation of the questioned document, he still ordered the arraignment of the
private respondents. He seemed to have something in mind for the protection of the
interest of the private respondents. Presumably, he thought that the arraignment which
was immediately followed by the dismissal of the case would forever foreclose, on the
ground of double jeopardy, any reopening of the case.

13.79 De la Rosa vs. CA, 253 SCRA 499

Nine separate informations were filed against Dela Rosa for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (or
the Bouncing Checks Law). During the arraignment, Dela Rosa pleaded not guilty. The
trial court dismissed all the nine cases against the petitioner on the following grounds:
Considering that according to the private prosecutor and without objection or
qualification on the part of the public prosecutor, the prosecution is not ready to present
the complainant who is the second and maybe the last witness for the prosecution, on
the ground that the private complainant is having serious doubts as to the details of the
cases and is not ready to testify; considering the manifestation of counsel for the
accused invoking his clients constitutional right to speedy trial; considering that the
cases had been filed before this Court on October 22, 1991 or more than a year ago and
during this period the complainant should have taken steps to gather all details and
refresh his memory as to all other matters pertaining to these cases, considering that as
stated by the private prosecutor himself that the cases involve a large amount, and the
complainant is not here today; the motion of counsel for the accused is hereby granted,
(and) all these cases are dismissed. Private respondents moved for reconsideration.

Issue: Was there infringement of Dela Rosas right against double jeopardy in this case?

Held: No. It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case,
like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally
applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied
his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as
length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendants assertion or non-assertion of his
right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered. Records
show that the delay in the trial of the case was mainly due to petitioners fault, mainly
because of his non-appearance in his first trial and his failure to secure the services of a
lawyer on the next trial. Hence, the trial courts dismissal of the case on the ground that
the petitioner is entitled to a speedy trial is capricious and unwarranted under the
circumstances obtaining in this case. Moreover, the requisites that must occur for legal
jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent
jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been
convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent
of the accused.[11] The fourth requisite is lacking. The dismissal of the cases was upon
the motion of petitioner as shown by the following:
COURT: You insist (sic) the right to speedy trial. ATTY. LOPEZ: Yes, I do insist.
COURT: So make a (sic) oral motion.
ATTY. LOPEZ: Yes, Your Honor.
Your Honor please, in todays (sic) hearing, the complainant (sic) is not around
and he is scheduled to testify, Your Honor. The accused is present, Your Honor,
together with his counsel and we are ready for trial, but, Your Honor, in as
much as the private prosecutor is not ready, on the ground that his client,
who is the private complainant, has problems or have (sic) doubt about the
details of this case before, Your Honor, then, we respectfully plea (sic) that the
case be dismissed, invoking the constitutional right of the accused for speedy
and an expensive (sic) public trial, Your Honor.
13.80 People vs. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238
Arnulfo C. Talisic was charged for libel in the RTC of Quezon City. Talisic entered a
plea of not guilty. Judge Leviste later dismissed the criminal case because of the
absence of the complaining witness during the scheduled hearing.
Issue: Would the reversal of the trial courts assailed orders place the accused in
double jeopardy?

Held: Anent private respondents claim that a reopening of the case would place him in
double jeopardy, this Court previously ruled in Tampal that:

x x x The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated,
and (3) a second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the first. Legal
jeopardy attached only: (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3)
after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant
was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused. (italics supplied)

In the instant case, the termination of the case was precisely sought by accused
(private respondent) through his motion to dismiss.
In any event, private respondents right to speedy trial not having been violated, he
cannot invoke the right against double jeopardy:

It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on
the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further
prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that
these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These
cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private
respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private
respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.[23] (italics supplied)

In sum, it must be emphasized that the state, like any other litigant, is entitled to its
day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal such
as the one in question, instead of unclogging dockets, has actually increased the
workload of the justice system as a whole and caused uncalled-for delays in the final
resolution of this and other cases. Unwittingly, the precipitate action of the respondent
court, instead of easing the burden of the accused, merely prolonged the litigation and
ironically enough, unnecessarily delayed the case - in the process, causing the very evil
it apparently sought to avoid. Such action does not inspire public confidence in the
administration of justice.

13.81 People vs. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267


Former Mayor Cawaling and others were convicted by the RTC of Romblon for the
crime of murder. Prior to the institution of the criminal case, an administrative case
had been filed before the National Police Commission, in which co-accused and
policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo de los Santos, Hilario Cajilo, and Andres
Fontamillas were respondents. The adjudication board found them guilty of grave
misconduct and ordered their dismissal from the service.
In seeking their acquittal, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo also invoke their right
against double jeopardy. They argue that the first jeopardy attached when a criminal
case for murder was filed before the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO), which
was allegedly dismissed after several hearings had been conducted. [39]
Issue: Did the lower court committed error in not considering double jeopardy?

Held: We are not persuaded.

There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy
has attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and,
(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as that in the first. And the first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was
acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.[40]
For a better appreciation of appellants argument, we must consider PD 39 [41] and its
implementing rules,[42] which prescribe the procedure before a military commission. A
summary preliminary investigation shall be conducted before trial for the purpose of
determining whether there is prima facie evidence to pursue trial before a military
commission. The investigation report shall contain a summary of the evidence, the acts
constituting the offense or offenses committed, and the findings and recommendations
of the investigating officer. Thereafter, the report shall be forwarded to the judge
advocate general, who shall determine for either the defense secretary or for the AFP
chief of staff whether the case shall be referred for trial to a military commission.
[43]
Where a prima facie case is found against the accused, formal charges shall be
signed by a commissioned officer designated by the judge advocate general. [44] The
accused shall then be arraigned, during which the charge and specification shall be read
and the accused shall enter his plea. [45] After hearings, a record of the trial shall be
forwarded to the AFP chief of staff for proper action.[46]
In the present case, the appellants have presented no sufficient and conclusive evidence
to show that they were charged, arraigned and acquitted in a military commission, or
that the case was dismissed therein without their consent. The defense merely offered
as evidence certain disposition forms[47] and a letter,[48] dated March 8, 1983,
recommending that the case against Appellants Tumbagahan, Cajilo and De los Santos
be dropped and considered closed. [49] No charge sheet and record of arraignment and
trial were presented to establish the first jeopardy. As pointed out by the solicitor
general, appellants were never arraigned, they never pleaded before the Judge
Advocate Generals Office, there was no trial, and no judgment on the merits had been
rendered.[50]

13.82 Cudia vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173


Renato Cudia was arrested on June 28, 1989 in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the crime
of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. He was brought to Sto. Domingo,
Angeles City where a preliminary investigation was conducted and as a result, the
City Prosecutor filed an Information against him. The case against him was raffled to
Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. Upon his arraignment, the
court called the attention of the parties and contrary to the information, Renatio
Cudia had committed the offense in Mabalacat and not in Angeles City. Thus the
judge ordered that the case should be assigned to a court involving crimes
committed outside Angeles City. Consequently it was assigned to Branch 56 of the
Angeles City RTC. However, the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga filed an
information charging Renato Cudio with the same crime and it was likewise assigned
to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC which resulted into two Information filed with
the same crime. This prompted the City Prosecutor to file a Motion to Dismiss/
Withdraw the Information which the trial court granted. Renato filed a Motion to
Quash the criminal case filed by the Provincial Prosecutor on the ground that his
continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition for which he had been arraigned in the first criminal case, and which
had been dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

Issue: WON there was violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy

Held: NO. It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority
to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of
Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. It is the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga,
not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses committed within
Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a
public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or presented
by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not
acquire jurisdiction. In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or
information in the former prosecution. As the fiscal had no authority to file the
information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioner's
subsequent prosecution. As the first information was fatally defective for lack of
authority of the officer filing it, the instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all
the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.

13.83 Tecson vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R No. 123045


Demetrio Tecson was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violating R.A. No. 3019
which precludes public officers from directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
gift from any person. The Sandiganbayan also ordered for Tecsons perpetual
disqualification aside from an imprisonment of 6 years and 1 month. petitioner
contends that being tried before the Sandiganbayan violated his constitutional
protection against double jeopardy since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan
del Sur had already cleared him of all charges.
Issue: Whether Tecson can invoke double jeopardy as a defense?
Held: No. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a
competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. [10] None of the
foregoing applies to the hearings conducted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Agusan del Sur in Adm. Case No. SP 90-01. It must be stressed that the said
proceedings were not criminal, but administrative in nature. Hence, double jeopardy
will not lie.
13.84 Dimatulac vs. Villon, G.R. No. 127107
SP03 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Pampanga. A complaint for
murder was filed in the MTC and after preliminary investigation, Judge Designate David
issued warrants of arrest against the accused. Only David, Mandap, Magat, and Yambao
were arrested and it was only Yambao who submitted his counter-affidavit. Judge David
then issued a resolution finding reasonable ground that the crime of murder has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Though it was not clear
whether Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Alfonso-Flores acted motu
proprio, or upon motion of the private respondents, she conducted a reinvestigation and
resolved that the Yabuts and Danny were in conspiracy, along with the other accused,
and committed homicide.

Before the information for homicide was filed, the Petitioner appealed the resolution of
Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of Justice. However, Provincial Proseutor Maranag
ordered for the release of David, Mandap, Magat, and Naguit. An information for
homicide was also filed before the Regional Trial Court. Judge Raura approved the cash
bonds of the Yabuts and recalled the warrants of arrest against them. Private Prosecutor
Amado Valdez then filed a Motion to issue hold departure order and Urgent Motion to
defer proceedings. Judge Roura deferred the resolution of the first Motion and denied
the second. He also set the arraignment of the accused. The petitioners filed a Motion to
inhibit Judge Roura for hastily setting the date for arraignment pending the appeal in the
DOJ and for prejudging the matter. They also filed a Petition for prohibition with the
Court of Appeals. Public Prosecutor Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment with the
trial court and opposed the inhibition of Roura. He also stated that he will no longer
allow the private prosecutor to participate. Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and
was replaced by Judge Villon.

The Petitioners filed with the RTC a Manifestation submitting documentary evidence to
support their contention that the offense committed was murder. Judge Villon ordered
for the resetting of the arraignment. The Yabuts entered a plea of not guilty. The
petitioners then filed a Urgent Motion to set aside arraignment. Secretary Guingona of
the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of the petitioners. He also ruled that treachery was
present. The Yabuts opposed the Manifestation because they have already been
arraigned and they would be put under double jeopardy. The Secretary of Justice then
set aside his order and the appeal was held not and academic due to the previous
arraignment of the accused for homicide. Judge Villon denied the Motion to set aside
arraignment. The motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition for
certiorari/prohibition and mandamus. The YABUTs opposed[44] petitioners Manifestation
and Motion dated 1 July 1996 because they had already been arraigned and, therefore,
would be placed in double jeopardy; and that the public prosecutor -- not the private
prosecutor -- had control of the prosecution of the case.

Issues: May the accused invoke double jeopardy as a defense?

Decision: No. Alfonso-Reyes was guilty of having acted with grave abuse of discretion for
conducting a reinvestigation despite the fact that the Yabuts were still at large. Though
Sec. 5, Rule 112 states that the prosecutor is not bound by the findings of the judge who
conducted the investigation, the resolution should be based on the review of the record
and evidence transmitted. Hence, she should have sustained the recommendation since
all the accused, except Yambao, failed to file their counter-affidavits. It is impossible for
Alfonso-Reyes to not have known the appeal filed with the DOJ. The filing of an appeal is
provided in Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. There is nothing in the law which
prohibits the filing of an appeal once an information is filed.

Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion for deferring the resolution to the
motion for a hold departure order. Since the accused were out on bail, the Motion should
have been granted since they could have easily fled. Though he is not bound to the
resolution of the DOJ, he should have perused the documents submitted.

The DOJ was also in grave abuse of its discretion for setting aside its order. In doing so, it
has relinquished its power of control and supervision of the Public Prosecutor. The state
has been deprived of due process. Hence, the dismissal of the case is null and void and
double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. Finally, the DOJ should have further
inquired into the vicissitudes of the case below to determine the regularity of
arraignment, considering that the appeal was received by the DOJ as early as 23
February 1996. We then rule that the equally hasty motu proprio reconsideration of the
7 June 1996 resolution of the DOJ was attended with grave abuse of discretion.

It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case
by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the
acquittal of the accused[81] or the dismissal of the case [82] is void, hence double
jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. If this is so in those cases, so
must it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in this
case as above discussed.

13.85 People vs. Maquiling, G.R. No. 128986


Casan Maquiling was charged and convicted by the RTC of Lanao del Norte of the
crime of homicide and serious physical injuries. The Court of Appeals reversed the
trial courts decision and accepted the claim of self-defense which acquitted the
accused. The Solicitor General now appeals CAs decision, averring that it is void ab
initio for having been rendered in denial of due process and with grave abuse of
discretion. The accused interposes the defense of double jeopardy.
Issue: Was there double jeopardy?
Held: No. Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is to appeal the trial
court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and thereafter, to the Supreme Court in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In such cases, this tribunal is
limited to the determination of whether the lower court committed reversible
errors[13] or, in other words, mistakes of judgment.[14] A direct review by the Supreme
Court is the normal recourse of the accused, where the penalty imposed by the trial
court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.

The rule on double jeopardy, however, prohibits the state from appealing or filing a
petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of the
case. Thus, Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court reads:
"Sec. 2. Who may appeal. -- Any party may appeal from a final judgment or order,
except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy."
This rule stems from the constitutional mandate stating that no person shall be put
twice in jeopardy for the same offense. xxx"[15] It is rooted in the early case U.S. v.
Kepner,[16] in which the United States Supreme Court, reviewing a Philippine Supreme
Court decision, declared that an appeal by the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal
would place the defendant in double jeopardy. [17] Double jeopardy is present if the
following elements concur: (1) the accused individuals are charged under a complaint or
an information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court
has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they
are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their express consent.[18]
In the case at bar, there are no questions as regards the existence of the first, third and
fourth elements. Petitioner, however, questions the presence of the second element and
submits that Respondent Court of Appeals was ousted of its jurisdiction, because it
denied the petitioner due process and because it committed grave abuse of discretion.
To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising judicial or quasi
judicial functions, the remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the public
respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.[19] Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but
generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."[20]
It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court
simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. [21] A writ
of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the evidence and
factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which
are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[22]
In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. [23] As long as a
court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by
timely appeal and not by special civil action for certiorari.[24]
A denial of due process likewise results in loss or lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, no
double jeopardy would attach where the state is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case,[25] or where the dismissal of an information or complaint is
purely capricious or devoid of reason,[26] or when there is lack of proper notice and
opportunity to be heard.[27]

13.86 People vs. Nitafan, G.R. No. 707964

On January 9, 1992, three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, as amended, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 were
filed against private respondent Imelda R. Marcos. After arraignment, Marcos pleaded
not guilty. Petitioners filed motions for the consolidation of the three informations with
the 21 other remaining cases pending before the RTC. The Solicitor General alleged in
its motion that the indictable acts under the three informations form part of and is
related to the transaction complained. RTC granted the consolidation and the 3
infornations were re-raffled and re-assigned to Branch 52-Manila presided public
respondent Judge Nitafan. Without any motion from the accused, Judge Nitafan issued
an order requiring petitioners to show cause why the cases should not be dismissed on
the ground that it violates Marcos right against ex post facto law and the two other
informations on the ground that private respondents right against double jeopardy was
violated. On August 7, 1992, respondent judge issued an order dismissing the 1 st
criminal case on the ground of ex post facto law and also dismissed the two remaining
criminal cases on the ground of violation of private respondents right against double
jeopardy. Prosecution filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether a judge can invoke double jeopardy?


Held: In the case at bench. Private respondent pleaded to the charges without filing any
motion to quash and as such she has deemed to have waived and abandon her right to
avail any legal ground which she may have properly and timely invoked to challenge the
complaint or information. If the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only
pre-judging the case but also takes the side of the accused. It is clear that the only
grounds which the court may consider in resolving a motion to quash an information or
complaint are (1) those ground stated in the motion and (2) the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged. Pursuant to the Rules, the sole exception is lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged which goes into the competence of the court to
hear and pass judgement on the cause.

The right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. There is nothing in the
rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no
such motion was filed by the accused. Assuming arguendo that a judge has the power
to motu proprio dismiss a criminal charge, yet contrary to the findings of respondent
judge, the grounds of ex post facto law and double jeopardy herein invoked by him are
not applicable.

On ex post facto law, suffice it to say that every law carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality until otherwise declared by this court. [19] To rule that the CB Circular is
an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However, neither private
respondent nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. This Court, much more the lower
courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void
unless directly assailed in an appropriate action.
With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge, the same is
improper and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case. Double jeopardy connotes
the concurrence of three requisites, which are: (a) the first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (c) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first [20] or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information,
or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. [21] In this case, it is
manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any such jeopardy
terminated.

13.87 Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 120681

G.R. Nos. 120681-83


The Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate
informations against petitioner, Mayor Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of
the Revised Penal Code (Illegal Use of Public Funds), and two for violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019 (giving undue favor to private parties). The informations alleged that
the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioners
incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila. Petitioner argued
that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the cases filed against him.

G.R. No. 128136


Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas.
Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysays co-petitioners are
officials of the same municipality. Two complaints were raised against petitioners for
violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 for overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of
TDR Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School which
informations were filed before the RTC of Batangas City. While another complaint on the
same matter was eventually filed before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner moved to quash
the Criminal Case filed before the Sandiganbayan on the grounds that the same
complaints has already been filed with the RTC. The proceedings of both cases were
suspended by the Sandiganbayan and the RTC pending resolution of the Binay case as
to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

Issue 1: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject cases.

Held: The court ruled that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over
the subject cases. R.A. No. 7975 (took effect on May 16, 1995) as amended by RA.
8249 (took effect on February 8, 1997) specified that the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan over cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code when the principal
accused includes officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) with enumeration as to
officials specifically included. Even if the municipal mayor is not specifically included in
the list and despite the fact that the actual salary received is not equivalent to grade 27,
the court ruled that the classification of salary grades should not be based on the actual
amount of salary received but on the nature of the functions performed by the official
concerned - the level of difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof
-- relative to that of another position. It is the officials Grade that determines his or her
salary, not the other way around.

In the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades prepared by the
DBM lists the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27. Petitioners, therefore, fall within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code also
settles the matter as it provides that municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly
compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under
R.A. No. 6758.

Issue 2: In GR No. 128136, whether the filing of information with the RTC effectively
ousted the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case and estopped the
respondents from filing an information before the latter; and whether the filing of the
information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes double jeopardy.

Held: The court ruled that the Sandiganbayan was not ousted of its jurisdiction even if
the information was first filed in the RTC since the latter did not have jurisdiction in the
first place as provided in R.A. 7975. Estoppel could not also be invoked because
jurisdiction is determined by law and not by the consent or agreement of the parties.
The court has previously ruled that a filing of a complaint with one court does not
prevent the plaintiff from filing the same with the competent court. This does not
amount to forum shopping since the only authority of the first court was to dismiss the
case for lack of jurisdiction. By estoppel, it means that the party estopped consistently
invoked the jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the proceedings,
impugning such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse decision. Also, the filing of
another complaint with the Sandiganbayan does not also amount to double jeopardy
because there can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court
that had no jurisdiction. The remedy should have been for the petitioner to move the
quashal of information for lack of jurisdiction. The consolidated petitions
were DISMISSED.

13.88 Limpangog vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134229


Limpangog was charged with three Informations, one for murder and two for
frustrated murder. He pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. He, along with
some other petitioners, were found guilty by the trial court. When the case was
appealed to the Court of Appeals, the said case was dismissed because the CA had
no jurisdiction over an appeal of a trial court judgment imposing an indeterminate
sentence of reclusion perpetua. The CA also dismissed the trial courts decision for
lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to their guilt. When the case was later
appealed to the Supreme Court, Limpangog contends that his right against double
jeopardy was violated.
Issue: Was there violation of the petitioners right against double jeopardy?

Held: In view of the above provisions, especially that of the Judiciary Act of 1948, it is
clear that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over an appeal of a trial court
judgment imposing an indeterminate sentence, if the same ruling also imposes reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or death for crimes arising out of the same facts. The
Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over such appeals. The splitting of appeals is
not conducive to the orderly administration of justice and invites possible conflict of
dispositions between the reviewing courts.

In all, the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction in resolving the appeal of the
conviction for frustrated murder and dismissing the murder case. Hence, the CAs
acquittal of the petitioners on charges of frustrated murder is void. We hasten to add
that, with the voiding of the CA Decision and the review by this Court of the RTC
judgment, petitioners cannot claim double jeopardy, because they were never legally in
danger of conviction by the Court of Appeals.

13.89 Flores vs. Joven, G.R. 129874

Petitioner filed a criminal complaint criminal complaint for Rape against respondent
Emmanuel Navarro and nine other persons as principals by direct participation. After
preliminary investigation, information was filed with the trial court, accusing Navarro
and his other co-accused of the crime of Rape.

Before arraignment, Navarro filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
it does not sufficiently describe the crime of rape in any of its forms under Art. 335 of
the RPC. The trial court thereafter issued an order dated October 23, 1996 re-setting the
arraignment as the prosecution intends to file several other cases of rape against the
accused.

An Amended information for Rape was filed against Navarro as the principal accused.
Likewise, similar information for rape were filed against each of the other accused, the
only difference being that the accusatory portion of each information individually named
each of them as principal in committing the crime of Rape while the other co-accused
held the victim and stood as guard.

Respondent Navarro then filed a Motion to Quash the Amended Information on the
grounds that:

(1)the Amended Information does not comply with the Order dated October 23,
1996;
(2)the allegations in the Amended Information is in conflict with petitioner's
affidavit in that the Amended Information named respondent Navarro as the
only one who had intercourse with petitioner while her affidavit mentioned only
Rodulfo Codira alias "Babie" as the culprit; and
(3)the Amended Information does not sufficiently describe the event on the night
of January 18, 1996. (the time Rape was committed)

The trial Court issued the assailed order granting the Motion to Quash, finding that
Navarro was not one of those identified by petitioner to have abused her and that the
Information failed to show his particular participation in the crime. Navarro was not
released from detention as there are other cases against him that were still pending.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial court denied the same. Hence,
through her private prosecutors, petitioner filed an action for certiorari. Navarros other
co-accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty and trial commenced as regards
their respective cases. Thereafter, Navarro escaped for detention and has remained at
large.

Before prosecution could present evidence it filed a motion to withdraw respective


information against six principal accused for insufficiency of evidence but remained as
co-accused in the cases against Navarro and two others. The Court gave due course to
herein petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

Issues: Whether there is double jeopardy.

Ruling: Double jeopardy does not apply. The requisites that must be present for double
jeopardy to attach are:

1. a valid complaint or information;


2. a court of competent jurisdiction;
3. the accused has pleaded to the charge; and
4. the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated
without the express consent of the accused.

The third requisite is not present in the instant case. Private respondent Navarro has
not been arraigned.

13.90 Miranda vs. Tuliao, 486 SCRA 377

March 08, 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered I Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela.
September 1999, SP02 Mardeal was arrested. April 27, 2001, he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose Miranda, SP03 Ocon, SP03 Dalmacio , a certain
Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the death of Vicente
Buazon and Elizar Tualiao. Judge 6, 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since
the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly
heard by the Court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of the State
Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed
a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No.
36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and
executory.

Issue: Was there double jeopardy in the case?


Held: No. In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked
where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the
case was dismissed. As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for
certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of
discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of
Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leao, 41 by
transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of
Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.

13.91 Cabo vs. Sandiganbayan

Cabo was charged with violation of RA 3019 for allegedly bribing her co-accused. She
claimed to have been deprived of due process, so the Sandiganbayan (SB) ordered for
reinvestigation of her case. While the investigation was ongoing, she filed for a motion
to travel abroad. This was granted by the SB in exchange for her conditional
arraignment, in which case she pleaded not guilty. One of the conditions of her
arraignment was that, if the complaint was amended, she automatically waived her right
to object the amendment and her right against double jeopardy. Her arraignment was
set on another date, and for this, she filed another motion reiterating her previous plea.

Meanwhile, her co-accused, Municipal Mayor Balahay moved to quash the information
on the ground that the facts did not constitute the crime charged. The SB did not grant
his motion, but ordered the amendment of the original complaint, of which the
prosecution subsequently complied with. Cabo thus filed for a motion to cancel her
second arraignment, on the ground that the amendment was done after she had
entered her plea, and that since she had already reiterated her plea of not guilty, double
jeopardy had already attached.

Issue: Was there double jeopardy?

Held: No. double jeopardy did not attach to the amended information. Her first
arraignment was only conditional, and she was fully aware of one specific condition
which waived her right to double jeopardy. Double jeopardy was also held not to be
applicable to the case because its requisites were not met: The original information was
not sufficient in substance and form, and trial was not dismissed/terminated because
the motion to quash was denied, the complaint was simply amended.

13.92 Romualdez vs. Marcelo

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the
Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed
by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of
prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no
necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this
Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the
Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860 pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.

In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt
from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman
should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the
filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in
1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the
prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986
until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code.

For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment that, in accordance with the 1987
Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman need not
wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary
investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No.
3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations
Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription
Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the
offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the
same in the negative, should be applied.

Issue: Was the accused subject to double jeopardy?

Held: A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
fiscal to prepare the complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it
does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.

13.93 People vs. Terrado

Accused Joseph Terrado was charged with Carnapping under Republic Act 6538,
otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. According to the Information,
the accused carted away a motorized tricycle after threatening the driver with a fan
knife. The accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

The defense claimed that the accused merely borrowed the tricycle from its driver
Dalmacio. However, when accused was about to return the same, he hit a stone, lost
control of the tricycle and bumped a tree. Three persons came and helped him bring
the tricycle back to the roadside. The accused returned the tricycle at around 11:00 pm
of the same day to the Spouses Garcia, owners of the tricycle. The defense did not deny
that the tricycle, when returned, was damaged and, in fact, the accused voluntarily paid
the amount of P8,000.00 as partial remuneration for the repair of the tricycle.

The trial court acquitted accused Terrado for failure of the prosecution to establish intent
to take the tricycle and intent to gain from the same. Thus, the court held that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the trial court denied.
Aggrieved, the complainants come to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari seeking to
annul and set aside the decision

ISSUE 1: WON THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED


DECISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION.

DECISION: No. The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Its principal office is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law.

While petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of


jurisdiction, the imputation is premised on the averment that the trial court reached its
conclusions based on speculation, surmises and conjectures. As alleged by the
petitioners, the accused forcibly took the vehicle from the complainants driver and the
public respondent acquitted the accused for alleged failure to meet the element of
intent to gain. Specifically, the allegations delve on the misapprehension of facts by the
trial court.

As a rule, factual matters cannot be normally inquired into by the Supreme Court in a
certiorari proceeding. The present recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is
a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem beyond the ambit of
appeal.

At least, the mistakes ascribed to the trial court are not errors of jurisdiction correctible
by the special civil action for certiorari, but errors of judgment, which is correctible by a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. The mere
fact that a court erroneously decides a case does not necessarily deprive it of
jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguendo that the trial court committed a mistake in its
judgment, the error does not vitiate the decision, considering that it has jurisdiction over
the case.

In our jurisdiction, availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal


may be allowed in cases where petitioner has clearly shown that the public respondent
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. However, and more serious than the procedural infraction, if the petition
merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, we would run afoul
of the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Such recourse is tantamount to
converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, which is proscribed by the
Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.
Verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The
fundamental philosophy behind the principle is to afford the defendant, who has been
acquitted, final repose and to safeguard him from government oppression through the
abuse of criminal processes.

13.94 People vs Gabo, 626 SCRA 352

On May 14, 2011, a fire broke out inside the plant of Sanyoware Plastic Products
Manufacturing Corporation. Investigations were conducted, and Samson Cua Ting
(External Vice-President), Wilson Cua Ting (Plant Manager), and other high-ranking
company officials were accused of destructive arson before the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor. The RTC applied the equipoise rule in dismissing the case. The aggrieved
party (petitioner) later filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA
also dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Issue: Will the dismissal of the petition preclude the petitioner from resorting/availing to
any other actions?
Held: No. In any case, the dismissal of herein petition does not preclude petitioner from
availing of any other action it deems appropriate under the premises. Double jeopardy
cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his
express motion that the case was dismissed. [50] Moreover, while the absence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is a ground for the dismissal of the case,
the same does not result in the acquittal of the said accused.

13.95 People vs. Court of Appeals

Oporto, Carampatana, and Alquizola were found guilty by the RTC of the crime of rape.
When the accused appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, they were acquitted of the
crime charged on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Feeling aggrieved, AAA appealed the case to the
Supreme Court on the ground that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in
acquitting and reversing the RTC ruling.

Issue: Whether a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the
prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the prohibition against double
jeopardy.

As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred
from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but
only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may
be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing
that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors
of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and
void.16 If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioners prayer is not
tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy.

14.71 AGATON BULAONG vs. PEOPLE


FACTS: Agaton Bulaong and others were charged before the Court of First Instance
with the crime of rebellion. Trial did not proceed with respect to Agaton Bulaong he was
then at large. Meanwhile Congress enacted the Anti-Subversion Act. Subsequently,
Agaton Bulaong was arrested. The information for rebellion filed with the Court of First
Instance of Laguna was amended said accused AGATON BULAONG being then an
organizer and leader.
On the same date another information was filed before the Court of First Instance
of Manila charging Agaton Bulaong of the crime of subversion defined in the Anti-
Subversion Act. Accused contends that rebellion is a lesser cognate offense to that
defined in the Anti-Subversion Act and he further contends that since the facts alleged in
the informations for rebellion and subversion are the same he cannot be legally
prosecuted for both offenses without being placed twice in jeopardy of being punished
for the same acts.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused can interpose the defense of double jeopardy in this
case.
RULING: Accused's contention has no merit. Under Section 9, Rule 1133 of the Rules of
Court, the defense of double jeopardy is available to the accused only where he was
either convicted or acquitted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his consent. Such is not the situation in this case. For accused has
not been convicted or acquitted in the case filed in the Court of First Instance against
him for subversion. Neither was the said case dismissed or terminated without his
consent, for as stated, it is still pending in said court. Needless to say, it is the
conviction, acquittal of the accused or dismissal or termination of the case that bars
further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. THE FIRST
JEOPARDY WAS TERMINATED BY FINAL CONVICTION.

14.72 DANILO BUSTAMANTE vs. HONORABLE JUDGE MAXIMO MACEREN

FACTS: The petitioner was accused of murder. Upon arraignment on petitioner


entered a plea of guilty, and after proving the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense and three (3) ordinary mitigating circumstances. He was
sentenced to serve one 1 year imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs. On the very same
day the judgment was promulgated to the petitioner, who thereupon made an express
waiver of his right to appeal. Accordingly, Judge Jorge Coquia, who rendered the
aforesaid judgment issued a commitment order. Three days later the Provincial Fiscal of
Laguna filed a motion for Modification of Penalty and upon receipt of said motion,
counsel for the petitioner on the same day filed a Motion for Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty
and Waiver of Commitment.
The motion filed by the accused was granted. Subsequently, Judge Coquia was
transferred to Manila, and the case against petitioner was reassigned to the sala
presided over by the Honorable Maximo Maceren, before whom petitioner was re-
arraigned and after petitioner entered a plea of not guilty, said judge held a new hearing
of the case on the merits and thereafter, Judge Maceren rendered a new judgment
against petitioner sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of the offended party. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, argued that the judgment of previous judge against
him had already become final when he started serving his sentence, the Court
thereafter lost jurisdiction over his case; and that no amount of waiver or consent on his
part could bestow on said court jurisdiction that it had already lost.

ISSUE: Was the first Jeopardy terminated?

RULING: Petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for. With the judgment of conviction
not only promulgated but actually carried out with petitioner having started to serve his
sentence, no such order re-opening the case should have been issued by Judge Coquia.
That was not in accordance with the controlling doctrine on the constitutional
right against being twice put in jeopardy. It is true that petitioner had in fact
contributed to bringing about such judicial deviation from the correct norm. That did not
forfeit though, his right to a remedy to which he is entitled. There should not have been
any approval of such a move. The Constitution does not countenance such a step. The
first jeopardy was terminated by final conviction.

14.73 PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA

FACTS: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of
Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the
charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted. From this
order of dismissal the prosecution appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.
RULING: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites
must have obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court,
c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or
the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the
defendant's motion to dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy as enunciated
in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the express
consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case is
dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the
reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the
merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express
consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double
jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.

14.74 Rivera, Jr. vs. People

FACTS: The instant petition seeks to annul and set aside the Order which sets aside
the verbal order earlier dictated in open court dismissing the case for failure to adduce
evidence on the part of the prosecution. Marcelino G. Rivera, Jr. was arrested and
detained for he allegedly was about to transport marijuana to Manila. Consequently, a
case for violation of Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425 was filed against him presided over by
respondent Judge Marcelino F. Bautista. Petitioner was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. The respondent Judge verbally ordered the immediate release of
the accused.
ISSUE: Has the first jeopardy been terminated?
RULING: This doctrine was re-echoed in the case of Abay, Sr. vs. Garcia, 162 SCRA
665Where there is a valid information and the accused has been arraigned, an order
of dismissal issued by the court, motu proprio, in the course of a trial of a criminal case,
whether based on the merits or for failure of prosecution witnesses to appear, has the
effect of a judgment of acquittal and double jeopardy attaches. The order is also
immediately executory. However, this order of dismissal must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him conformably
with the provisions of Rule 120, section 2 of the Rules of Court. In the instant case, it is
very clear that the order was merely dictated in open court by the trial judge. There is
no showing that this verbal order of dismissal was ever reduced to writing and duly
signed by him. Thus, it did not yet attain the effect of a judgment of acquittal, so
that it was still within the powers of the judge to set it aside and enter
another order, now in writing and duly signed by him, reinstating the case.
THIS CASE IS A NOT TERMINATION OF FIRST JEOPARDY.
14.75 Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People

FACTS: The CA found the petitioner guilty of the violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
(P.D. No. 1612) but set aside the penalty imposed and ordered the trial court to receive
additional evidence on the correct valuation of the pieces of jewelry involved for the
sole purpose of determining the penalty to be imposed. The petitioner contends that
public respondent Court of Appeals manifestly erred in remanding the case to the court
a quo for reception of evidence for the purpose of determining the correct penalty to be
imposed.

ISSUE: Is there existence of double jeopardy?

RULING: In the light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the
penalty imposed by the trial court and in remanding the case to the trial court for further
reception of evidence to determine the actual value of the pieces of jewelry recovered
from the petitioner and for the imposition of the appropriate penalty. We do not agree
with the petitioners contention, though, that a remand for further reception of evidence
would place her in double jeopardy. There is double jeopardy when the following
requisites concur: (1) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second, (2) the first jeopardy must have validly been terminated, and (3) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Such a
concurrence would not occur assuming that the case was remanded to the
trial court.

14.76 Commission on Elections vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari to set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals ordering the dismissal of the case against respondent Carmelo J. Locsin pending
before the Regional Trial Court. Respondent Locsin was accused of intimidating the
members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers during the canvassing of election returns
in said province and preventing them from performing their functions and duties. When
arraigned respondent Locsin entered a plea of not guilty. After the prosecution had
rested its case, respondent Locsin filed a Demurrer to Evidence, claiming that the
prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove his guilt. The prosecution filed
its Comment and Opposition thereto. The trial court denied the demurrer and
calendared the reception of evidence for respondent Locsin. Instead of praying for the
dismissal of the petition, the Solicitor General recommended that the criminal case
against respondent Locsin be dismissed since the prosecution utterly failed to come up
with even a single iota of evidence which would positively or remotely link petitioner to
any coercive act charged under the Information Respondents Locsin and the Solicitor
General separately contend that its filing places respondent Locsin in double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Is there double jeopardy?

RULING: Error in effecting dismissal of the case cannot be corrected because of timely
plea of double jeopardy.We are bound by the dictum that whatever error may have
been committed effecting the dismissal of the case, this cannot now be corrected
because of the timely plea of double jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches when the
accused, charged in a valid complaint or information before a competent
court, is acquitted or convicted or the case is unconditionally dismissed
without his express consent after he has been arraigned and entered a plea.
Nevertheless, even if the motion to dismiss the case is made with his consent or by the
accused himself, double jeopardy may be attached in two instances: (i) when
the ground is insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution, and (ii) when
the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the
accuseds right to speedy trial.

14.77 People vs. Bans

FACTS: An information against herein private respondents, brothers Vicente


and Gil Magsaysay, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions) was filed. Upon arraignment, private respondents pleaded
not guilty. Trial ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, private respondents filed a
Demurrer to Evidence alleging failure on the part of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, on the ground that since the search warrant and the order to
break open six vaults were illegally issued, the firearm and ammunitions seized in
compliance therewith are inadmissible in evidence. Despite opposition on the part of the
prosecution, respondent judge granted the Demurrer to Evidence. The prosecution filed
a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by respondent judge on the
ground that any reconsideration of the aforesaid order will place private respondents in
double jeopardy; the order granting the demurrer having resulted in the acquittal of
private respondents.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order. In this petition, petitioner assails the decision of respondent judge on the following
grounds:
Respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in: Denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration on the patently erroneous ground of double jeopardy

ISSUE: Is there a double jeopardy?

RULING: The dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the
express consent of the accused or upon his motion will not place the accused
in double jeopardy except if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence
or denial of the right to speedy trial.In terms of substantive law, the Court will not
pass upon the propriety of the order granting the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence and the consequent acquittal of the accused, as it will place
the latter in double jeopardy. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in
acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not
place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions,
namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy trial. In the case
before us, the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence was based on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence after a finding that the search warrant was illegally issued.
Hence, it clearly falls under one of the admitted exceptions to the rule. Double jeopardy
therefore, applies to this case and this Court is constitutionally barred from reviewing
the order acquitting the accused.
14.78 State Prosecutors vs. Muro

FACTS: In a letter-complaint respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro was charged by


State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance
of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Respondent judge dismissed 11 cases by virtue of the new foreign exchange
rules. It was argued that the questioned order of respondent judge have seriously and
substantially affected the rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense
of double jeopardy, considering that the dismissal was ordered after arraignment and
without the consent of said accused.

ISSUE: Was there double jeopardy, if so was the first one properly terminated?

RULING: Respondent judge could not have seriously jeopardized the rights of the
prosecution, even if the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, since the
remedy of certiorari is very much available. Defense of double jeopardy is
unavailing when the prosecution is denied due process.Precisely, as has been
pointed out in the majority opinion, the defense of double jeopardy is unavailing when
the prosecution is denied due process. This is in fact the office of the prevailing doctrine
to correct indiscretions of lower court judgeswhich does not necessarily make them
personally liable. In fact, if respondent judge was indeed in bad faith, he should have
given the prosecution an opportunity to be heard, and after a full-blown trial, acquitted
the accused. Then, the defense of double jeopardy would have been proper and the
accused would have gone scot-free. Thus, in Negado v. Judge Autajay, this Court
affirmed the conclusions of the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals that [w]hen
a person seeks administrative sanction against a judge simply because he has
committed an error in deciding the case against such person, when such error can be
elevated to a higher court for review and correction, the action of such person can only
be suspect.

14.79 People vs. Bellaflor

FACTS: Respondent judge Rodolfo M. Bellaflor was assigned as replacement of


Judge Fortun however the latter subsequently promulgated his decision convicting
private respondent of the crime of arson. Therafter, respondent judge issued a resolution
referred above granting private respondents motion for reconsideration and acquitted
the latter of the crime charged. In the same resolution, the decision rendered by Judge
Fortun was declared null and void for having been promulgated after said judge had
vacated his office. Petitioner now claims that respondent judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion in granting the motion for reconsideration of private respondent and
acquitting the latter. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the resolution
acquitting him of the offense charged has become final and executory and a
reconsideration thereof would place him under double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Is there an existence of double jeopardy if the resolution would be subjected to a


reconsideration?

RULING: Private respondents reliance on the defense of double jeopardy is


misplaced. In order that a defendant may successfully allege former jeopardy, it is
necessary that he had previously been (1) convicted or (2) acquitted, or (3) in
jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged, that is, that the former
case against him for the same offense has been dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information, and after the defendant has pleaded to
the charge. Generally, protection against double jeopardy is not available
where the dismissal of the case was effected at the instance of the accused.
There are only two instances where double jeopardy will attach notwithstanding the fact
the case was dismissed with the express consent of the accused. The first is where the
ground for the dismissal is insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution and the
second is where the criminal proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation
of the accuseds right to speedy trial.

14.80 Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: An information for Triple Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence was filed
against petitioner. On 1972 after petitioner entered his plea of Not Guilty. On 1975, the
prosecution finally rested its case. On February 1978, the defense rested its case. On
March 1978, the hearing was terminated and the parties were ordered by Judge Argel to
submit their respective memoranda. Judge Bernardo P. Pardo who ostensibly took over
as presiding judge Judge Argel, granted private prosecutors omnibus motion to file
memorandum. The presiding Judge set anew the retaking of the testimonies. Hence,
petitioner filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for the review of the
orders of the Regional Trial. The petition was anchored on the alleged violation of
petitioners constitutional right to speedy trial.

ISSUE: Is there an existence of double jeopardy?


RULING: Anent petitioners contention that the re-hearing would place him in
double jeopardy, suffice it to say that there has been no termination of the
criminal prosecution the following requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information,
or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
Requisites for legal jeopardy to attach: Legal jeopardy attaches only:
(a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) a
valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused
Re-taking of testimonies cannot be deemed a second jeopardy. In
the present case, there has not even been a first jeopardy, since the fourth
element dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of
the accused is not present. Moreover, measured against the aforequoted standard,
the re-taking of testimonies cannot in any wise be deemed a second jeopardy. Hence, it
is beyond dispute that petitioners claim of double jeopardy is utterly without basis.

14.81 Teodoro vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: The MeTC found petitioner guilty of simple slander by deed and sentenced
him to pay a fine of P110.00. Petitioner appealed. It appears that the parties were
required to file their memoranda but petitioner filed instead a motion to withdraw his
appeal and paid the fine of P110.00 imposed in the judgment of the MTC. The RTC
denied his motion. Petitioner filed a petition for review, which the Court of Appeals
dismissed. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Was the denial of petitioners motion for the withdrawal caused a double jeopardy
when petitioner already paid the fine?

RULING: In denying petitioners motion for the withdrawal of his appeal, the
RTC did not act with abuse of discretion. Because petitioners motion to
withdraw his appeal had been denied, his payment of the fine as imposed on
the judgment of the MeTC did not render that decision final and executory.
Hence, petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy by the decision of the RTC
on his appeal. Withdrawal of appeal is not a matter of right, but a matter
which lies in the sound discretion of the court and the appellate court.
Under the present rule the withdrawal of appeal may be allowed before judgment
of the case on appeal. the parties in this case had been required to file their
memoranda and the memorandum of the prosecution had been filed and a copy served
on appellant, it was too late for petitioner to move for the withdrawal of the appeal. It
was apparent that petitioners motion was intended to frustrate a possible adverse
decision on his appeal.

14.82 Cudia vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Petitioner was arrested for possessing an unlicensed revolver. Petitioner


pleaded not guilty to the charges. However, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga
also filed an information (2nd Case) charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. This prompted the prosecutor in the 1 st Case to
file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, stating that thru inadvertence and
oversight, the Investigating Panel was misled into hastily filing the Information in this
case. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal 2 nd Case on the ground that he had
been arraigned in 1st Case, and which had been dismissed despite his oppositionwould
violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The
trial court denied the motion to quash; the appellate court dismissed the same on the
ground that the petitioner could not have been convicted under the first information as
the same was defective.

ISSUE: Is there an existence of double jeopardy?

RULING: In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a
frustration thereof.
In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is
necessary to prove the existence of the following: (a) Court of competent jurisdiction; (b)
Valid complaint or information; (c) Arraignment; (d) Valid plea; (e) The defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused.
Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective
indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.

14.83 PEOPLE vs. ROBERTO RAMBO LISING, et. al.

FACTS: Conchise, 26 and Beebom, 22 were kidnapped and killed by herein accused.
Cochise had just graduated from the University of the Philippines with a degree of
Bachelor of Laws and was reviewing for the bar examinations, while Beebom was a
graduating student at the College of Mass Communications from the same university.
Both excelled in academic and extra-curricular activities. For the crimes for which they
were charged and sentenced, appellants now is asking the SC to give their case a
second look, insisting on their innocence. RTC exonerated Manalili and Garcia, while
sentenced the rest with Slight Illegal Detention.

ISSUE: Will an appeal by the State constitute Double Jeopardy?

RULING: The decision of the trial court exonerating Manalili and Garcia for the crime of
Kidnapping and finding the rest of the accused guilty for the crime of Slight Illegal
Detention only does not escape us. There being conspiracy, all the accused should be
equally guilty for the crimes as charged. Unfortunately, we can no longer convict
Manalili and Garcia for Kidnapping in consonance with the constitutional right
against double jeopardy. Nonetheless, they stand to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua for the double murder. The crime of Slight Illegal Detention should be qualified
to Serious Illegal detention. The State is proscribe to appeal from a judgment of
acquittal of some or all of the crimes already charged against the accused in a
case or filed in the same information.

14.34 PEOPLE vs. NARITO ARANETA

FACTS: Joebert Araneta, Samuel Aronda-in, Joesel Araneta, Marvin Deogluis, and Narito
Araneta were charged with the crimes of MURDER and FRUSTRATED MURDER for the
death of Mansueto Datoon, Jr. and the injury sustained by Hilario. Accused Narito
Araneta posted a bond of P40,000.00 and pled not guilty. The other accused, Samuel
Aronda-in, Joesel Araneta and Marvin Deogluis, remain at large. The charges against
Joebert Araneta, an active member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person. Trial court convicted accused-appellant
Narito Araneta but only for the crimes of homicide and frustrated homicide. Court of
Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It found the accused-appellant guilty of
murder in First Case and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua but acquitted him in
Second Case. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Was double Jeopardy existing in this case?

RULING: Dismissal of accused-appellant's appeal at this stage will result in injustice. The
Decision of the trial court finding him guilty of homicide and sentencing him will become
final. The findings of the Court of Appeals that he should instead be convicted for
murder and meted a higher penalty and in the Second Case accused-appellant will be
acquitted from the charge of frustrated homicide as found by the Court of Appeals. To
avoid this mockery of justice, we resolved to continue exercising jurisdiction over 2 nd
Case. The acquittal of accused-appellant in the Second Case however, can no
longer be reviewed in view of the rule on double jeopardy for the 1 st and 2nd
Case did not result from one information.

14.85 Cuison vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Respondent Presiding Judge rendered a Joint Decision in in two cases rendering
accused Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide, beyond reasonable
doubt and therefore sentences him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day to 12
years and 1 day for each offense, with the accessories provided by law and to pay the
costs. Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of
P30,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification
that the civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00.

ISSUE: Is constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of


Appeals order the promulgation of only one part of the decision?

RULING: The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a


Court of Appeals order requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision
sentencing the accused to imprisonment even if, earlier, the same decision has
been promulgated in regard only to the payment of the modified civil
indemnity arising from the same criminal act. Otherwise stated, the
promulgation of only one part of the decision, i.e., the liability for civil indemnity, is
not a bar to the subsequent promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the
criminal accountability.
Elements to substantiate a claim of double jeopardy.To substantiate a claim of
double jeopardy, the following must be proven: x x x (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to
commit the same or is a frustration thereof (citations omitted). And legal jeopardy
attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.

14.86 People vs. Court of Appeals


FACTS: Accused was convicted of physical injuries by the RTC. CA ruled he was
innocent. An action for certiorari the solicitor general now seeks to set aside Respondent
Courts Decision, for having been allegedly rendered with grave abuse of discretion. The
Office of the Solicitor General raises a single issue: Whether or not the Assailed
Decision, of respondent court is void ab initio, for having been rendered in denial of due
process and with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Would an appeal by the state constitute Double Jeopardy?

RULING: The rule on double jeopardy, however, prohibits the state from appealing or
filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of the
case. It is rooted in the early case U.S. v. Kepner, in which the United States Supreme
Court, reviewing a Philippine Supreme Court decision, declared that an appeal by the
prosecution from a judgment of acquittal would place the defendant in double
jeopardy. A denial of due process likewise results in a loss or lack of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, no double jeopardy would attach where the state is deprived of a
fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, or where the dismissal of an
information or a complaint is purely capricious or devoid of reason, or when
there is lack of proper notice and opportunity to be heard.
(In dismissing this petition for certiorari, this Court is not ruling on the guilt or the
innocence of Private Respondent. Neither is it agreeing with the findings of the Court of
Appeals that the accused is innocent. Such conclusions are rendered only in an appeal
properly brought before this Court. But as already stated, an appeal or a petition for
review of a judgment of acquittal is barred by the rule on double jeopardy.)

14.87 People vs. Serrano, Sr.

FACTS: The Court, in the exercise of supervision over judges and court employees, has
initiated this action in consequence of the palpably erroneous ruling of Judge Pepe P.
Domael of the Regional Trial Court, Naval, Biliran, allowing an appeal filed by the
prosecution from a decision of acquittal.
Maribel D. Visbal filed a sworn complaint charging Danilo F. Serrano, Sr., with rape.
At the arraignment, accused Serrano pleaded not guilty. Regional Trial Court rendered
decision acquitting the accused on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Assistant Public Prosecutor Federico R. Huamayor filed a notice of appeal to the
Supreme Court from the decision acquitting the accused for being contrary to the facts
and the law. Judge Pepe P. Domael, presiding judge issued an order giving due course to
the appeal filed by the Provincial Prosecutor. Consequently, the Clerk of RTC forwarded
the original record of the case to this Court.

ISSUE: Would an appeal by the state constitute Double Jeopardy?

RULING: The rule against double jeopardy proscribes an appeal from a


judgment of acquittal on the merits.It is elementary that the rule against double
jeopardy proscribes an appeal from a judgment of acquittal on the merits. A verdict of
acquittal is immediately final and a re-examination of the merits of such acquittal, even
in an appellate court, will put him a second time in jeopardy for the same offense. The
Constitution itself provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. Such a constitutional guarantee prohibits an appeal from a
judgment of acquittal, and the law does not provide for exceptions other than
deprivation of due process or grave abuse of discretion under exceptional
circumstances.
14.88 Barangan vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: The San Mateo Small Town MultiPurpose Cooperative (SMSTMC) was organized
to uplift the economic condition of its members. Undeterred, the officers of the
SMSTMC lost no time in organizing the Biyaya Foundation (BIYAYA) and had the
Foundation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Apparently,
the formation of the new corporation was a mere subterfuge to perpetuate their illegal
activity as it continued operating as a paluwagan.
A criminal complaint for estafa was filed against BIYAYAs Chairman Federico
Castillo, Vice-Chairman Samuel Barangan, and Board Members. The complaint alleged
that these seven (7) accused feloniously solicited investments from John Gatmen and
despite repeated demands, John Gatmen was never paid his investment and guaranteed
profits. The trial court in both cases acquitted Samuel Barangan, Efigenia Marquez,
Federico Sison, Jr., and Rolando Remigio on reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Would an appeal by the state constitute Double Jeopardy?

RULING: It is indeed difficult to fathom why the accused were acquitted considering that
BIYAYA could not have possibly undertaken the illegal transactions without the
imprimatur of its officers and board members. Yet our hands are now tied by the
constitutional mandate against double jeopardy, hence, their acquittal must stand.
Petitioner Baran-gan cannot use the defense that since both parties were in pari delicto
they could have no action against each other. It is well to stress That the illegality is
attributable to the BIYAYA alone as there is no showing from the records that Jose was
aware of the illegality of their business operation or that it was prohibited by law. An
appeal by the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal would place the
defendant in double jeopardy.

14.89 People vs. Velasco

FACTS: Three (3) criminal Informationsone (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated
homicidewere originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
against Hono-rato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal
employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. However, the charges were withdrawn
and a new set filed against the same accused upgrading the crimes to murder 1 st Case
and frustrated murder 2nd and 3rd Cases. Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition, with
violation of PD 1866 4th Case for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence;
hence, a fourth Information had to be filed. After a series of legal maneuvers by the
parties, venue of the cases was transferred to the Regional Trial Court. The acquittal of
accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the Government before this
Court in a Petition for Certiorari. It is the submission of petitioner that the exculpation of
the accused Galvez from all criminal responsibility by respondent Judge Tirso Velasco
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Was jeopardy existing in this case?

RULING: NO. Even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would not be
placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had
acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal
contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot
be the source of an acquittal.
The instant Petition for Certiorari, however, fails to show grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. Rather, it
effectively urges this Court to re-evaluate the lower courts appreciation of the evidence,
which cannot be done by certiorari. The doctrine that double jeopardy may not be
invoked after trial may apply only when the Court finds that the criminal
trial was a sham because the prosecution representing the sovereign people
in the criminal case was denied due process.
Legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused. The philosophy underlying the rule
establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is part of the paramount
importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent
against wrongful conviction.

14.90 Tupaz vs. Ulep

FACTS: The case is a special civil action for certiorari with application for temporary
restraining order seeking to enjoin respondent Judge Benedicto B. Ulep of the Regional
Trial Court from trying the Criminal Case and to nullify respondent judges order reviving
the information therein against petitioner, for violation of the Tax Code, as the offense
charged has prescribed or would expose petitioner to double jeopardy.
SP Molon filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, two (2) informations
against accused and her late husband, for the same alleged nonpayment of deficiency
corporate income tax for the year 1979. Both accused posted bail bond for their
provisional liberty. Accused filed with the Regional Trial Courta motion to dismiss/quash
the 2nd information information for the reason that it was exactly the same as the 1 st
information against the accused pending before RTC. The prosecution filed with the
Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to file amended information. Petitioner submits
that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the
information in 1st Criminal because (a) the offense has prescribed; or (b) it exposes her
to double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Is Double Jeopardy existing in the case?

RULING: Reinstatement of the information would expose petitioner to double


jeopardy; An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for
which he has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment
against him was dismissed without his consent; Trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in reinstating the information against petitioner in violation of her
constitutionally protected right against double jeopardy. We sustain petitioners
contention. The reinstatement of the information would expose her to double jeopardy.
An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he
has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against him
was dismissed without his consent. In the instant case, there was a valid complaint filed
against petitioner to which she pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the case at the
instance of the prosecution, without asking for accused-petitioners consent. This
consent cannot be implied or presumed. Such consent must be expressed as to have no
doubt as to the accuseds conformity. As petitioners consent was not expressly given,
the dismissal of the case must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of
the case. Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
reinstating the information against petitioner in violation of her constitutionally
protected right against double jeopardy.

14.91 People vs. Verra


Acelo Verra was charged with the crime of murder for killing. A warrant of arrest was
issued by the Regional Trial Court. He remained at-large until he voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court accompanied by his counsel. Immediately,
arraignment proceeded during which he entered a plea of Not Guilty. Thereafter, the
prosecution moved for the dismissal of the case. The trial judge issued an Order
considering the case DISMISSED and the Warrant of Arrest was cancelled. Trial court set
aside the Order of Dismissal. Respondent moved for its reconsideration but his motion
was denied. He then instituted before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
challenging the Order. It ruled that the dismissal of the case against petitioner has
attained finality, and that its revival requires the filing of a new case or information.
Hence, the present course of action. That the Court of Appeals decided a question of
substance in a way that is not in accord with law and jurisprudence when it ruled that: (i)
the state was not denied its day in court and was not misled by private complainant in
the dismissal of the case; and (ii) the order of the trial court dismissing the case has
attained finality.

ISSUE: Will double jeopardy attach when the case will be reinstated after it being
ordered by the Trial Judge to be deemed Dismissed?

RULING: In a long line of decisions, SC have enumerated the following requisites for
double jeopardy to attach: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3)
after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant
was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused. In the case at bar, we find all requisites
present. First, there was a valid information, sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction; Second, the Regional Trial Court, clearly had jurisdiction to hear and try the
murder charge against the respondent; Third, he was arraigned in open court with the
assistance of a counsel de officio; Fourth, during the arraignment, he entered a plea of
not guilty; Finally, there was a valid termination of this case on the basis of the
trial judges Order to Dismiss the case.

14.92 Merciales vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Decision of the CA denying her petition to
annul the Order of the Regional Trial Court which dismissed the charge of rape with
homicide based on a demurrer to evidence filed by private respondents, accused
therein. During the trial, Public prosecutor filed a motion for the discharge of accused
Joselito Nuada, in order that he may be utilized as a state witness. However, the
prosecution contended that it was not required to present evidence to warrant the
discharge of accused Nuada, since the latter had already been admitted into the Witness
Protection Program of the Department of Justice. Consequently, the respondent judge
denied the motion for discharge.
The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court,
questioning the respondent judges denial of the motion to discharge the accused
Nuada. Herein private respondents filed a motion to set the case for hearing before RTC,
invoking their constitutional right to speedy trial. The respondent judge granted the
motion, and set the case for hearing. The Solicitor General filed a motion for issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order with the Supreme Court,
to enjoin the respondent judge from proceeding with the resolution of the case. However
the motion was denied by the Supreme Court. In due time, the accused filed their
demurrer to evidence.

ISSUE: Would Double Jeopardy be attached when the case would be remanded?
RULING: It is true that a private complainant cannot bring an action questioning a
judgment of acquittal, except insofar as the civil aspect of the criminal case is
concerned. In the case at bar, we agree with petitioner that this issue was rendered
moot when the Solicitor General, in representation of the People, changed his position
and joined the cause of petitioner, thus fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in
court. Indeed, it is not only the State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled to
due process in criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a
quo was done without regard to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as if
there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double
jeopardy.
By contending that the challenged Decision is void for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition does
not violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. The Order dismissing
Criminal Case is ANNULLED, and this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court.

14.93 Poso vs. Mijares

FACTS: The instant complaint for administrative sanctions against Judge Mijares is for
allegedly railroading the criminal case against a self-confessed killer and admitting him
to probation, which unduly obviated the accuseds otherwise definite date with prison.
Worse, the complaint demonstrates his apparent incorrigibility as exhibited by
documents on record showing a sinister pattern of bad faith to favor the accused
therein. While the rules excuse honest errors of discretion as acceptable professional
hazards, a defense ardently raised by respondent Judge, the series of his unbelievable
mistakes in the application of basic legal principles on probation and criminal penalties
together with his clear attempt at deception ought to be exposed, and punished, despite
his pretensions of uprightness and sincerity.
The instant administrative case stemmed from the proceedings for murder. In the
course of the pre-trial conference, the accused withdrew his plea of not guilty and
pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. This was done with the open consent of
handling Public Prosecutor Napoleon C. Lagrimas and the private offended parties. On
the same day and occasion of the pre-trial conference and without receiving evidence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, respondent Judge promulgated the judgment
or Sentence, finding the accused guilty of homicide. Curiously, Judge Mijares made
allowance for three (3) mitigating circumstances.

ISSUE: Will remanding the case constitute double jeopardy?

RULING: NO, Marred by what is obviously a miscarriage of judicial ethics, the


proceedings beginning with the issuance of the controversial Resolution are patently
void and therefore produce no legal effects whatsoever. From the lowering of
the penalty to qualify the accused for probation, the authorization for
temporary liberty on recognizance, and finally the grant of probation, the
orders of respondent Judge arising from these proceedings do not compel
respectability and finality to constitute res judicata or even double jeopardy.
A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due
process does not exist in legal contemplation and cannot be considered to
have attained finality for the simple reason that a void judgment has no
legality from its inception.
14.94 Alberto vs People

Facts: Subject of this appeal is the judgment convicting Lucio Alberto of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide. During his arraignment, appellant entered a
plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits then followed. The trial court issued an order
dismissing the case for failure of the prosecution to submit its formal offer of exhibits.
The said order was lifted after the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, the prosecution continued to present its evidence. The defense orally asked
for leave to file demurrer to evidence. The demurrer was filed but it was denied. The
trial court issued an order declaring that the accused should be deemed to have waived
his right to present evidence for the defense, and that the case be considered submitted
for decision. The trial court promulgated its judgment and is hereby rendered finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant contends that he was placed in double jeopardy when the trial court
reconsidered its order dismissing the case against him. More importantly, he contends
that without the extrajudicial confession placed on record, the evidence of the
prosecution would not be able to meet the needed quantum of proof to establish his
guilt.

Issues: Won the trial court gravely erred in reinstating the case as it had placed the
accused in double jeopardy for the same offense?

Ruling: No. It is clear that no double jeopardy has attached in this case. Solicitor
General was correct, that the dismissal order made by the trial court was not valid and
cannot be used as basis for a claim of double jeopardy. The said right cannot be
grounded on an error of law. Such dismissal is invalid for lack of a fundamental
prerequisite, that is, due process, and, consequently, will not constitute a proper basis
for the claim of double jeopardy
The trial court exceeded its authority when it dismissed the case without giving
the prosecution a right to be heard, hence there was a violation of due process. Further,
the failure of the prosecution to offer its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case.
Even without any documentary exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its case
through the testimonies of its witnesses. Thus, when the trial court reconsidered
its order of dismissal, it merely corrected itself.

14.95 CONRADA vs PEOPLE

FACTS: The petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the criminal case of rape
charged against him. The prosecution was postponed thrice due to the absence of the
complainant and her witnesses. Petitioner moved for a temporary dismissal of the case.
The prosecution manifested that it would not object to a temporary dismissal. On the
same date, the trial court issued an order temporarily dismissing the case. The
prosecution filed a Motion for Reinstatement and/or Revival of Criminal Case. The Court
issued a resolution reinstating the said case and reiterating the issuance of a warrant of
arrest for petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution insisting that the
reinstatement of the case will place him in double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reinstatement of Criminal Case places the petitioner in
double jeopardy?

RULING: NO. There is no merit in the petition. It is clear from the records that the
dismissal ordered by the trial court was a temporary dismissal of the case, and not a
permanent dismissal on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had
been violated by the delay in the prosecution of the said case.
Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with the
reinstatement because as earlier stated, said case was provisionally dismissed
by the trial court upon his motion. Thus, the requirement that the dismissal of
the case must be without the consent of the accused is not present in this
case. Neither does the case fall under any of the exceptions. Moreover, as previously
explained, said dismissal was temporary in nature, as the case was subject to
reinstatement within thirty days from the date of dismissal. Hence, the Court finds no
error on the part of the trial court in allowing the reinstatement of the case.

SEC 21: TERMINATION OF JEOPARDY; EXISTENCE; NON-TERMINATION


15.71 PEOPLE v ROMERO
FACTS: Romero was found guilty of Murder as penalized under RA 7659 (aka Act to
Impose Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes). Upon arraignment, the accused
pleaded guilty not to Murder but for a lesser crime of Homicide. Appellant insists that his
right against double jeopardy was violated when the trial court granted the prosecutions
motion to re-open the case after it approved his plea to the lesser offense of homicide.
ISSUE: Whether Romeros right against double jeopardy was violated
RULING: NO. There was no double jeopardy in this case, considering that it was not
terminated as a result of appellants acquittal, conviction or dismissal. The order
approving the guilty plea to homicide, with conditions, was not a judgment of conviction.
The dispositive portion of the said order which in part reads WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, this case is deemed submitted for decision, clearly shows that the trial court
still had to render a decision on the criminal and civil liabilities of the appellant. The said
order merely approved the agreement between the parties on the new plea to a lesser
offense by the appellant and the conditions attached to it. The trial court neither
sentenced the accused nor made any ruling on the civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of
the victim.
15.72 PEOPLE v ESPINOSA
FACTS: Separate cases of Estafa and attempted corruption of public officers were filed
against Espinosa and others. Thereafter, the Ombudsman filed in the same court seven
Informations for Malversation of Public Funds against Espinosa and several others.
Espinosa filed a Motion to Quash the Informations. He argued that double jeopardy had
already attached, because (1) he had been arraigned in the previous Estafa cases; and
(2) the Motion to Withdraw the two earlier ones had been granted without his express
consent (his motion to travel was granted by the Court, he was not there during the
approval of the Motion to Withdraw)
ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of Espinosas right against double jeopardy
RULING: NO. As correctly pointed out in the challenged Resolution, the dismissal of the
estafa and the corruption cases was made upon petitioners ex parte Motion for the
withdrawal of the Informations. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that private
respondent was not notified of this Motion. Neither was a hearing held thereon. It is
clear that the dismissal, having been secured by petitioner without the
express consent of the accused, does not amount to a waiver of the right
against double jeopardy. But it does unequivocally show the fourth requisite
for the proper invocation of such right.

ELEMENTS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY:


To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following must be demonstrated: x x x
(1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or
the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. And legal
jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c)
after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.

15.73 ORIENTE v PEOPLE


FACTS: Oriente was found guilty of the crime of Homicide. Subsequently, an Information
was filed charging him for Murder. Upon arraignment, Oriente pleaded not guilty, trial
ensued and he was found guilty. However before the judgment became final and
executory, RTC issued an order motu proprio, setting aside the judgement due to a
mistake in the judgment proper. However, he was still found guilty after the decision
was modified. Oriente now asserts that that the RTC promulgated two decisions and, by
doing so, he was placed in double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether he was placed in double jeopardy

RULING: NO. Courts have the inherent power to amend their decisions to make
them conformable to law and justice subject to limitations. And as the Solicitor
General correctly noted, the trial court modified the penalty in its Decision before the
petitioner could perfect his appeal from the first Decision. Noteworthy is that it was the
RTCs second Decision which the petitioner elevated on appeal to the CA. It is well-
settled that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he
waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy, and, as
discussed above, throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate
court, which is then called to render judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable, and whether they are made the subject of assigned errors or
not. This precept should be borne in mind by every lawyer of an accused who
unwittingly takes the risk involved when he decides to appeal his sentence.
15.74 PACOY v CAJIGAL
FACTS: Accused was charge of Homicide and pleaded not guilty. The respondent Judge,
issued an order directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to
Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the
Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.
Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double
jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his express
consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case.
ISSUE: Whether the accused was placed in double jeopardy
RULING: NO. The first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e)
when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal or termination of the case that bars further prosecution for the same
offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information. Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge
dismissed or terminated his case for homicide without his express consent, which is
tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced. Dismissal of the first case contemplated is a
definite or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case. And for the dismissal to
be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal

Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge
merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original
Information. To repeat, it was the same original information that was amended by
merely crossing out the word Homicide and writing the word Murder, instead, which
showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.
15.75 SUMMERVILLE v EUGENIO (ABOUT CERTIORARI NOTHING ABOUT DOUBLE
JEOPARDY AT ALL)
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
15.76 HERRERA v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Petitioners were charged of Murder in an Information, they pleaded not guilty.
However the information was amended and petitioners were convicted on such basis.
Petitioners insist that respondent Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them for the crime
of murder under the amended informations as they had earlier been arraigned under the
original informations for murder and their rearraignment under the amended
informations placed them in double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether the accused was placed in double jeopardy
RULING: NO. The rule on double jeopardy does not apply. The Sandiganbayan
ordered the amendment of the informations and made it of record that the evidence
adduced during the pre-trial of the case and the hearing on the petition for bail shall be
deemed automatically reproduced as evidence during the trial of the case on the merits.
Double jeopardy did not attach by virtue of petitioners plea of not guilty
under the amended information. In the present case, petitioners and the other
accused pleaded not guilty to the original informations. Thereafter, at the instance of the
petitioners, through a joint petition for bail, they raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on
the ground that the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that the crimes were
committed "in relation to their office." On the same day, respondent court ordered the
amendment of the informations accordingly. Thus, the first requirement for double
jeopardy to attach, that is, that the informations against the petitioners were
valid, has not been complied with
15.77 JAVIER v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Javier was charged for violation of RA 3019 (aka Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act) before the Sandiganbayan. Accused was also charged with malversation of Public
Funds under the RPC. An amended Information for the malversation charge was made,
Javier filed a Motion to Quash the malversation case by invoking her right against double
jeopardy, her motion was denied.
ISSUE: Whether accused was placed in double jeopardy
RULING: NO. It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case
against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon valid
information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the
charge. In the instant case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the Information for violation
of the Anti-Graft Law. She was not yet arraigned in the criminal case for malversation of
public funds because she had filed a motion to quash the latter information. Double
jeopardy could not, therefore, attach considering that the two cases remain
pending before the Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner had pleaded to
only one in the criminal cases against her.
15.78 CO v LIM
FACTS: Lim was charged with violation of PD 1612 (aka Anti Fencing Law), the case was
remanded to court for further proceedings. A Motion to Withdraw Informations was filed,
thus during pre-trial the case was orally moved for dismissal on the ground of such
motion, the dismissal was granted. A petition for certiorari was file seeking to reverse
the resolution.
ISSUE: Whether the present appeal by certiorari violates that accused right against
double jeopardy considering that they expressly moved for the dismissal of the criminal
cases against them
RULING: NO. The Order of the RTC categorically stated that the defense counsel moved
for the dismissal of the cases against the respondents. Verily, respondents, through
counsel, had given their express consent to the termination of the case. Therefore, the
fourth requisite, which necessitates the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case without his or her approval, was not met. Undoubtedly, the rule
on double jeopardy is inapplicable to this case.
15.79 LEJANO v PEOPLE
FACTS: The accused was acquitted by the SC in 2010, reversing the judgment of the CA
on the ground of lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The relatives of the victims
asked the Court to reconsider its decision.
ISSUE: Whether reconsideration of a judgment of acquittal will place the accused in
double jeopardy

RULING: YES. As a rule, to reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the


accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has
already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In
criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no
limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been
acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated
litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and
the will to fight.
15.80 BANGAYON v BANGAYON
FACTS: Petitioners are accused of having committed the crime of bigamy, during
arraignment petitioners pleaded not guilty. The RTC dismissed the case against
petitioners for insufficiency of evidence. The complainant elevated the case to the CA
via a petition for certiorari. The petitioners objected to this.
ISSUE: Whether the CA in a certiorari proceeding may inquire into the factual matters
presented by the parties in the lower court, without violating the constitutional right of
herein petitioner (as accused in the lower court) against double jeopardy
RULING: YES. Petitioners acquittal was already valid, entitling them to invoke
their right against double jeopardy. A demurrer to evidence is filed after the
prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is required to evaluate whether the
evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not
sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on the
merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused. Well-established is the
rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence
and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because
to do so will place the accused in double jeopardy.

*For RECIT & REFERENCE, it feels prudent to include this here because this
case discussed double jeopardy exhaustively
Elements of Double Jeopardy to Attach; Jurisprudence allows for certain
exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it was made on
motion of the accused.Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are
present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the
dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused, to wit: (1)
Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the
prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates
as an acquittal. (2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because
of the denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.
The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right
against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to
make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham.
An acquittal by virtue of a demurer to evidence is not appealable because it
will place the accused in double jeopardy. However, it may be subject to review
only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or
a denial of due process.
15.81 GOODLAND v CO
FACTS: Makati Prosecutors Office filed an Information for Falsification of Public
Document defined and penalized under Article 172 in relation to Article 171 (2) of the
RPC against private respondents Co. After the prosecution formally offered its evidence
and rested its case, Goodland filed a Demurrer to Evidence claiming that the
prosecution failed to substantiate its claim that they are guilty of the crime charged, this
was granted by the lower court. A MR was filed by it was denied by the court on the
ground, inter alia, that the dismissal of a criminal case due to a granted demurrer to
evidence amounts to an acquittal of the accused. Co and Chan claimed that Goodland
can no longer file an appeal for such would violate their right against double jeopardy
ISSUE: Whether there was double jeopardy
RULING: NO. A judgment of acquittal cannot be recalled or withdrawn by
another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case nor can it be modified
except to eliminate something which is civil or administrative in nature;
Exceptions.It is settled that a judgment of acquittal cannot be recalled or withdrawn
by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case, nor can it be modified except
to eliminate something which is civil or administrative in nature. One exception to the
rule is when the prosecution is denied due process of law. Another exception is when
the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case
by granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence. If there is grave abuse of
discretion, granting Goodlands prayer is not tantamount to putting Co and
Chan in double jeopardy.
In this case the SC affirmed the CAs decision that there was no grave abuse of
discretion thus, the exception does not apply.
SEC. 21: RULE ON SUPERVENING FACTS
15.82 MELO v PEOPLE
FACTS: Melo was charged with the CFI for frustrated homicide, on the following day an
amended information was filed charging him of consummated homicide because his
victim died. Melo filed a motion to quash the amended inf formation alleging double
jeopardy, motion that was denied by the respondent court; hence, the instant petition
for prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from further entertaining the amended
information.
ISSUE: Whether the accused was placed in double jeopardy
RULING: NO. It was proper for the court to dismiss the first information and
order the filing of a new one for the reason that the proper offense was not
charged in the former and the latter did not place the accused in a second
jeopardy for the same or identical offense. FURTHER, the rule of identity does
not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the
accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then
inexistent.
"Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant
is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts
existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the
accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
15.83 PEOPLE v BULING (NON-EXISTENCE OF NEW OR SUPERVENING FACT)
FACTS: Accused was charged with the crime of less serious physical injuries for inflicting
wounds on a person which, according to the complaint, would require medical
attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days. Having pleaded guilty, he served his
sentence fully. Later, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information against the accused
charging him with serious physical injuries, the information alleging that the same
wounds inflicted by the accused would require medical attendance for a period from 1
% months to 2 months. It appears that a different physician examined the offended
party anew, taking an X-ray picture of the arm of the offended party which had been
wounded, which method of examination was not adopted by the first physician. The
second physician's certification was the basis of the second complaint.
ISSUE: Whether prosecution and conviction of the accused for less serious physical
injuries a bar to the second prosecution for serious physical injuries?
RULING: YES, right against double jeopardy applies. If the X-ray examination
disclosed the existence of a fracture when the second examination was made, that
fracture must have existed when the first examination was made. There was, therefore,
no new or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen
since the filing of the original action, which would justify application of the
rule of double jeopardy.
SEC. 21: SAME OFFENSES
15.84 PEOPLE v TIOZON
FACTS: Accused killed a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm which gave rise to
separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of
either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the RPC. The accused pleaded
that one is a bar to the other and invokes his right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether the accuseds contention is correct
RULING: NO. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy
may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. The rule
against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a
special law while the second, homicide or murder, is punished by the RPC.
Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code)
defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each
crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.
15.85 LAMERA v CA
FACTS: Accused is charged for two separate offenses under the RPC, under two
separate informations. One for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property
with multiple physical injuries and another for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of
the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment. Accused contends that his right against
double jeopardy was violated.
ISSUES: Whether accused was placed under double jeopardy
RULING: NO. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be
invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. Phrased elsewhere, where
two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other.
ALSO, since the informations were for separate offenses, one cannot be pleaded as a
bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy, case at bar.
15.86 GONZALES v CA
FACTS: A criminal complaint for qualified seduction was filed against the accused, he
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Later on, the prosecution filed a motion to instead
commit the accused to answer to a charge for rape since the evidence submitted
indicated that rape, not qualified seduction, was evidently committed. Thus the charge
for qualified seduction was dismissed but the accused invoked his right against double
jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether the accused was placed under double jeopardy
RULING: NO. The accused cannot invoke double jeopardy because, among others,
rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses. While the two felonies
have one common element, i.e., carnal knowledge of a woman, they significantly vary in
all other respects.
15.87 PEOPLE v TURDA
FACTS: Turda was charged with illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, in a criminal
case and 2 counts of estafa in 2 other separate criminal cases. (There are 3 cases here)
Court found Turda guilty of both charges. Accused invoked his right against double
jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether the accused was placed under double jeopardy
RULING: NO. Where some other crimes or felonies are committed in the
process of illegal recruitment, conviction under the Labor Code does not
preclude punishment under other statutes. The rule is settled that the recruitment
of persons for overseas employment without the necessary recruiting permit or
authority from the POEA constitutes illegal recruitment; however, where some other
crimes or felonies are committed in the process, conviction under the Labor Code
does not preclude punishment under other statutes.
15.88 PEOPLE v MANUGAS
FACTS: Manugas was found guilty of estafa and illegal recruitment at a large scale
under the Labor Code. Pursuant to the provisions under Article 13(b) and Article 34 of
the Labor Code can be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and
estafa [Revised Penal Code, Article 315, 2(a)]. Accused invoked his right against double
jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether accused was placed under double jeopardy
RULING: NO. A person who violates any of the provisions of Article 13(b) and
Article 34 of the Labor Code can be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment and estafa because illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum where the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for a conviction while estafa is a malum
in se where criminal intent of the accused is necessary for a conviction.
15.89 PEOPLE v DEUNIDA
FACTS: Accused was charged with murder and illegal possession of firearms under
Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm. in two separate informations. However, the
prosecution moved for for the withdrawal of the information for murder and the
amendment of the information for illegal possession of firearms on the ground that the
filing of two separate informations was erroneous since what the accused had
committed is only one offense, which is the violation of Qualified Illegal Possession of
Firearm. Accused invoked his rights against double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether the accused was placed under double jeopardy
RULING: NO. The offense defined in 2nd paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866
does not absorb the crime of homicide or murder under the RPC and therefore
does not bar the simultaneous or subsequent prosecution of the latter crime.
The 1982 decision in Lazaro vs. People involving a violation of P.D. No. 9, which the
investigating prosecutor invokes to justify the withdrawal, is no longer controlling in
view of our decisions in People vs. Tac-an, People vs. Tiozon, and People vs. Caling. In
Tac-an, we ruled that the accused who had been charged with illegal possession of a
firearm and ammunition under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 was
not placed in double jeopardy when he was also charged in another case with murder
because the former offense is a different offense punished by a special law while the
latter offense is defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. We reiterated
that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a
second or later prosecution for the same offense and that when the
subsequent information charges another and different offense, although
arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no double jeopardy.
15.90 PEOPLE v FERNANDEZ
FACTS: Accused was found guilty of the crimes of Homicide and for violation of P.D. No.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm). Accused urges that the right against double
jeopardy proscribes simultaneous prosecution for several offenses made out of the same
act.
ISSUE: Whether the accused was placed under double jeopardy
RULING: NO. There is no violation of the constitutional proscription against
double jeopardy where two informations charge distinct and different
offenses.Accused-appellant Fernandez invokes the rule of double jeopardy and
procedural due process. The two (2) Informations against accused-appellant charged
him with two (2) distinct offenses, i.e., murder and illegal possession of firearm. The first
crime is punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code while the second crime is
punished by a special law, P.D. 1866. The charge for Illegal Possession of Firearm is not
necessarily included in the charge for Murder. Accused-appellant cannot therefore
complain that he has been charged with two (2) offenses on the basis of the same act.
15.91 PEOPLE v QUIJADA
FACTS: Quijada was found guilty by the RTC for murder under the RPC and illegal
possession of firearm under PD 1866 in two separate informations. Quijada invokes his
right against double jeopardy contending that his conviction for the crime under RPC
bars another conviction under the special law.
ISSUES: Whether the accused was placed under double jeopardy
RULING: NO. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available
only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the
subsequent offenses charged.Elsewise stated, where the offenses charged are
penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the
important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged. Undeniably, the
elements of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form are different
from the elements of homicide or murder, let alone that these crimes are defined
and penalized under different laws and the former is malum prohibitum while both the
latter are mala in se.
15.92 PEOPLE v BALLABARE
FACTS: Ballabare was convicted of murder under the RPC and violation of PD 1866 aka
illegal possession of firearm, in 2 separate criminal cases. He contends that the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
proceeding against accused for murder and illegal possession of firearm in violation of
his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether the accused was placed under double jeopardy
RULING: NO. One who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm is guilty of
two separate offenses of (1) either homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code
and (2) aggravated illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866,
15.93 PEOPLE v CALONZO
FACTS: Calonzo was charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and five (5) counts
of Estafa, the RTC found him guilty as charged. Accused assails his conviction and
advances, inter alia, that conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code
precludes another conviction under other statues as such is violative of his right against
double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether the accused was placed under double jeopardy
RULING: NO. Recruitment of persons for overseas employment without the necessary
recruiting permit or authority from the POEA constitutes illegal recruitment and where
some other crimes or felonies are committed in the process, conviction under the Labor
Code does not preclude punishment under other statutes
15.94 PEOPLE v BENEMERITO
FACTS: Benemerito was convicted by the RTC of illegal recruitment and three counts of
estafa. He assails his conviction as being violative of his right against double jeopardy
ISSUE: Whether the accused as placed under double jeopardy
RULING: NO. A person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment and estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code In short, a conviction for offenses under the Labor Code
does not bar punishment for offenses punishable by other laws.
15.95 PEOPLE v TOBIAS
FACTS: Tobias was charged with murder in a criminal complaint, upon motion of the
Prosecutor, the complaint was amended from that of murder to "Qualified Illegal
Possession of Firearm Used in Murder," because the firearm used was not
licensed/registered. Accused filed a motion to reconsider the admission on the ground
that the amended complaint does not refer to the same offense charged in the original
complaint nor to an offense necessarily included therein but to one distinct from that
originally charged.
ISSUE: Whether accuseds right against double jeopardy was violated
RULING: No. The amendment of the information is allowed and valid.
16.71 People v. Maozca
Facts: Accused-appellant Nestor Manozca y Almario was charged in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 88, Quezon City with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale in
violation of Article 38(a) in relation to Article 39(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 2018; and with two (2) counts of estafa punished under Article
315, paragraph (2)(a), of the Revised Penal Code.

From February to March, 1989 in Quezon City, Philippines, the accused, without
any authority of law and for a fee, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to FERDINAND TUAZON,
ARNULFO CAAMPUED and NORLITO HULAR without first securing the required license or
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment in violation of the aforesaid
law.

Appellant, as was to be expected, denied the charges. He interposed an alibi for


his defense. He averred that he is a businessman engaged as a meat dealer, and that he
had his own slaughterhouse. He denies having been engaged in recruitment for
overseas employment, claiming that he did not know the three complainants until their
confrontation at the office of the NBI in the National Capital Region. The RTC rendered
its decision finding appellant guilty of the charges beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the
appellant filed an appeal before the CA asseverating that the trial court erred in
convicting him on the bases of the incredible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
and in not giving credence to his testimony. The appellant was detained in Batangas City
Jail for another offense during his trial in this case.

Issue: Whether the accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: No. Illegal Recruitment and estafa are entirely different offenses. It is settled
that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of
estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no problem of double
jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which the criminal intent is
not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the criminal intent of the accused
is necessary

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in


toto, with costs against accused-appellant Nestor Manozca y Almario.
16.72 People v. Tan Tiong Meng
Facts: Accused-appellant Tan Tiong Meng alias "Tommy Tan" was charged with Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale and six (6) counts of estafa. That on or about the period
comprising June 1993 to August, 1993, in the City of Cavite, the accused, using a
business name RAINBOW SIM FACTORY, a private employment recruiting agency, and
misrepresenting himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino
workers for employment abroad with the ability to facilitate the issuance and approval of
the necessary papers in connection therewith, when in fact he did not possess the
authority or license from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration to do so,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly for a fee, recruit in a large scale
and promise employment in Taiwan to Ernesto Orculio, Manuel Latina, Neil Mascardo,
Librado Pozas, Edgardo Tolentino and Cavino Asiman.

Tan admitted having received money from all the complainants but he said that all
the money was turned over to Borja after deducting his commission. Tan likewise
admitted that he and his wife are respondents in about seventy (70) cases of estafa and
illegal recruitment but that it was Lorenzo who was the main recruiter. The RTC rendered
its decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the charges beyond reasonable doubt.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.
Ruling: It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in
addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is
no problem of double jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in
which the criminal intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary
16.73 People v. Sadiosa
Facts: Arsenia Conse went to Bayombong, Nueva Ecija in early 1992 where she met the
four complainants, Cely Navarro, Marcela Manzano, Erly Tuliao and Benilda Domingo.
She enticed the four to apply for overseas employment informing them that she had a
cousin who could send them to Kuwait as domestic helpers. Apparently convinced by
Arsenia Conse, the four went with her on February 5, 1992 to Manila. Upon arrival, they
proceeded to Room 210, Diamond Building, Libertad St., Pasay City where Arsenia Conse
introduced the group to accused-appellant Delia Sadiosa. The four then applied for work
as domestic helpers.

On that occasion, accused-appellant assured the four that she could dispatch
them to Kuwait and forthwith demanded P8,000.00 from each of them for processing fee
and P1,000.00 for passport (P1,500.00 from complainant Cely Navarro). She assured the
group that she would facilitate the processing of all the necessary documents needed by
them. She further promised them that upon payment of the required fees, they would be
able to leave for Kuwait immediately. The four did give accused-appellant the money
demanded although on different dates. However, not one of them was able to leave for
Kuwait. When they asked for the return of their money, accused-appellant refused and
ignored their demand. Consequently, the four filed the complaint for illegal recruitment
against accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant resolutely denied having a hand in the illegal recruitment,
claiming that she merely received the money on behalf of one Mrs. Ganura who owned
the recruitment agency called Staff Organizers, Inc. The trial court found accused-
appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale. Through an appeal before the CA,
accused-appellant assails the trial court's Decision.
Issue: Whether the lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant and in
convicting her of the charge in the information.
Ruling: In the case at bar, accused-appellant could have been validly charged
separately with estafa under the same set of facts in the illegal recruitment case, but
she was fortunate enough not to have been so charged. Nevertheless, there is no doubt
from a reading of the information, that it accurately and clearly avers all of the
ingredients that constitute illegal recruitment in large scale.
16.74 People v. Sanchez
Facts: Appellant was charged, on 25 November 1993, with violation of Article 38(b) of
Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code), as amended, for illegal recruitment in large
scale. agency. Likewise filed against appellant on the same day (25 November 1993)
were the corresponding five cases of estafa.

Appellant denied having tried to recruit complainants for overseas employment.


He asserted that he was not in Baguio City, let alone billeted in Leisure Lodge, during the
period from October to December 1992. Assessing the evidence, the trial court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale and of
three counts of estafa.

Issue: Whether the accused-appellant was placed under double jeopardy.

Ruling: No. It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in
addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is
no problem of double jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in
which the criminal intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the trial court finding appellant Elvis
Sanchez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large
scale and three counts of estafa and sentencing him accordingly, as well as ordering the
payment to the complainants of actual damages, is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
16.75 People v. Saley
Facts: Appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict
finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable under
the Revised Penal Code and six counts of illegal recruitment, one committed in large
scale, proscribed by the Labor Code. The Court finds accused Antonine B. Saley, also
known as Annie B. Saley, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the corresponding crime as
charged.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: No. The offenses in this case are identical, accused-appellant cannot invoke
double jeopardy considering that the offenses are not the same.
Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the
punishment of the offender for estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense
where criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction while estafa
is malum in se which requires criminal intent to warrant conviction. 62 Under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the offense (estafa) are that
(1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit
and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended
party or third person. Clearly, these elements have sufficiently been shown in the cases
under review.
WHEREFORE, the Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of illegal recruitment, illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby
AFFIRMED.
16.76 People v. Juego
Facts: Nenita Juego and Wilfredo Gaerlan were charged before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale by twenty-six (26) individual
complainants. In addition, Nenita and Wilfredo were also charged with three (3) counts
of Estafa by three (3) of the twenty-six (26) offended parties. Only Nenita stood trial as
Wilfredo has eluded arrest and remains at large.
Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in


addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is
no problem of double jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in
which the criminal intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding accused-appellant NENITA T.


JUEGO guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and two (2) counts of Estafa is
AFFIRMED.
16.77 People v. Ganadin
Facts: SPOUSES Felipe and Myrna Ganaden and spouses Gerry and Emma Ganaden,
together with one Polly Guillermo, were charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale and four (4) counts of Estafa by Maritess Umblas, Elma Jimenez, Evelyn Escao
and Ilarde Ventula. Only Felipe Ganaden was arraigned as his co-accused Myrna, Gerry
and Emma have remained at large.

On May 21, 1996 the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 14 found the accused
Felipe Ganaden guilty as charged and sentenced him accordingly. In Crim. Case No. 94-
5248, the trial court found Felipe Ganaden guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale constituting economic sabotage. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, to pay a
fine of P100,000.00, and to indemnify private complainants.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: No. It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in
addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is
no problem of double jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in
which the criminal intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary

In the instant case, the Court is sufficiently convinced that accused-appellant is


guilty of Illegal Recruitment and estafa.
16.78 People v. Balasa
Facts: Sixty-four informations, all charging the offense of estafa, as defined in
Presidential Decree No. 1689, were filed against Priscilla Balasa, Normita Visaya, Norma
Francisco, Guillermo Francisco, Analina Francisco and eight other persons, mostly
incorporators and employees of the Panata Foundation, before the Regional Trial Court
of Palawan.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: With respect to the third assignment of error, appellants cannot raise the
defense of double jeopardy for which the following requisites must concur: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information,
or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof . In the instant case, the
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 8429 is different from the offense charged in the
other cases. While these cases arose out of the same scheme, the fraudulent acts
charged were committed against different persons, hence they do not constitute the
same offense.
16.79 Paluay v. CA
Facts: It appears that at about 5:30 p.m. in the afternoon of March 30, 1986, petitioner
Vicente Palu-ay and private respondent Domingo Pulmones were having drinks with
Edgar Soldevilla, Jonathan Fernandez, Efren Lauron, Basilio Pulmones, and Tirzo Superio
at the house of Nelson Irecillo when a gun (a .38 caliber Super) being held by Pulmones
went off near the face of petitioner. As a result, petitioner sustained serious injuries
which could have been fatal had it not been for timely medical attention given to him. As
a result of the incident, petitioner's face was paralyzed.
An information for frustrated homicide, later amended to frustrated murder, was
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 28 against private respondent. Private
respondent pleaded not guilty, whereupon trial was held. The trial court rendered a
decision finding private respondent Domingo Pulmones guilty of serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence.
Petitioner filed this case for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals. The
case was, however, dismissed.
Issue: Whether the petition was an attempt to secure review of a final and executory
decision of the trial court and that a review of the case would expose the accused to
double jeopardy.
Ruling: Indeed, the question raised by the petition for annulment of judgment is a
factual question that cannot be reviewed not only because the decision of the trial court
is now final but also because a review of such question at the instance of the
prosecution would violate the right of the accused against being placed in double
jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
16.80 People v. Mercado
Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XLI, finding accused-appellant Vicente Mercado y Mercado alias Vicente Tan guilty of (1)
illegal recruitment committed in large scale and sentencing him to suffer life
imprisonment and estafa. The trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant
guilty for the crime of illegal recruitment and estafa.
Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.
Ruling: No. It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in
addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is
no problem of double jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in
which the criminal intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary
16.81 People v. Yabut
Facts: On appeal is the decision dated February 16, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 159, convicting appellant Fernando Cortez y Vega of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale. The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision finding
appellant Fernando Cortez y Vega guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether appellant could be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale despite
his acquittal of the crime of estafa.
Ruling: It is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2
(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code . The offense of illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction,
while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for
conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for
offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2 (a) of
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code. It follows that ones acquittal of the crime of estafa will not
necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale,
and vice versa.
16.82 People v. Ong
Facts: This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Baguio
City, finding accused-appellant Benzon Ong y Sate, alias Benz Ong, guilty of (1) illegal
recruitment committed in large scale, and (2) seven counts of estafa.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in


addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is
no problem of double jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in
which the criminal intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary.
16.83 People v. Meris
Facts: This is an appeal from the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 1, convicting accused-appellant Leonida Meris y Padilla of illegal recruitment in
large-scale and six counts of estafa.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in


addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is
no problem of double jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in
which the criminal intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary.
16.84 People v. logan
Facts: This is an appeal from the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 103, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-96-66231 to Q-96-66234 convicting the
appellant of the crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale. The appellant,
Mercy Logan y Calderon, was charged with three (3) counts of the crime of estafa, as
defined and penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in three (3) separate
informations

Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in


addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is
no problem of double jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in
which the criminal intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary.
16.85 Potot v. People
Facts: Joey S. Potot, petitioner, was charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 2739
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Catarman, Northern Samar. That on or
about the 2nd day of November, 1999, at about 3:00 oclock in the early morning in the
public cemetery of the Municipality of Mondragon, Province of Northern Samar, the
accused, armed with a knife locally called dipang, with deliberate intent to kill and
without justifiable cause, did then and there wifully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab RODOLFO DAPULAG with the use of said weapon which the accused
had provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon said Rodolfo Dapulag a
mortal wound which caused the death of said victim.

The trial court, after being satisfied that petitioner understood the meaning and
consequences of his plea of guilty, rendered and promulgated its Decision in open court
convicting him of homicide.

Issue: Whether the assailed orders would violate petitioners constitutional right against
double jeopardy.
Ruling: We agree with the petitioner that the assailed orders would violate his
constitutional right against double jeopardy. Such right prohibits any subsequent
prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or
convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest,
assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of
a second charge against him for the same offense.
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be
present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the
case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
16.86 People v. CA
Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
judgment of acquittal rendered by the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1999 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 16423, which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pili,
Camarines Sur, Branch 32, convicting private respondents Claudio Francisco y Recto and
Rudy Pacao y Parone of the crimes of homicide and attempted murder, respectively.

Claudio Francisco, Rudy Pacao, Capt. Rodolfo Malbarosa, Pfc. Catalino Bonganay,
Sgt. Roberto Cana, Sgt. Virgilio Azucena, Sgt. Nathaniel Interino, Pat. David Valenciano,
Pat. Cesar Quiambao, Joseph Pellas, and Gabriel Alosan were charged with Murder for
the fatal shooting of one Marcial "Boyet" Azada. The RTC rendered its decision finding
the accused Claudio Francisco Jr. y Recto, also known as Danilo and Danny Francisco,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. On appeal, the trial courts
decision was reversed and respondents Francisco and Pacao were acquitted of the crime
charged

Issue: Whether an appeal of the judgment of acquittal by the Court of Appeals violates
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.

Ruling: Respondents Francisco and Pacao, after having been found not guilty by a court
of competent jurisdiction, must be afforded rest and tranquility from repeated attempts
by the State at conviction and their anxiety finally laid to rest. Their acquittal must
therefore be accorded finality in faithful adherence to the rule against double jeopardy.
16.87 Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: In 1998, the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigation (Blue Ribbon) and on National Defense and Security (collectively, Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee) carried out an extensive joint inquiry into the "coup rumors and
the alleged anomalies" in the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Philippine Retirement
Benefits Systems (AFP-RSBS). In its Report, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee outlined,
among others, the anomalies in the acquisition of lots in Tanauan, Batangas, Calamba,
Laguna and Iloilo City by the AFP-RSBS, and described the modus operandi of the
perpetrators as follows:

The modus operandi in the buying of the lots was to cover the same transactions with
two deeds of sale. One deed of sale would be signed only by the seller or sellers
(unilateral deed). Another deed of sale would be signed by the seller or sellers and the
buyer, AFP-RSBS (bilateral deed). These Unilateral Deeds of Sale recorded lower
consideration paid by the System to the buyer(s) than those stated in the Bilateral
Deeds. The motivation was obviously to evade payment of the correct taxes to the
government and save money for the seller(s), broker(s) and who knows, probably even
for the kickbacks going to certain officials of RSBS, the buyer.
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to "prosecute
and/or cause the prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS President,
who had signed the unregistered deeds of sale covering the acquisition of certain
parcels of land," Ombudsman Investigators conducted a fact-finding investigation. They
executed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint, stating that based on their findings, B/Gen. Jose
Ramiscal, Jr., among others, may be charged with falsification of public documents and
violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner may be charged and prosecuted for all five (5) counts of
estafa thru falsification of public documents.

HELD: Yes. The question of the number of criminal charges that must be instituted
against a criminal respondent (whether one count or multiple counts of the same
offense) is one addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecution service. It is
enough, as this Court has already ruled, that the informations filed in these cases are
based on facts establishing probable cause for the offenses charged. This Court will not
compel the Office of the Ombudsman to file only one information for Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents when its preliminary investigation established the
commission of several counts thereof as such action on the part of this Court would
constitute undue interference with the Office of the Ombudsman's control over the
prosecution of these cases. In the second place, this Court is not persuaded that what is
involved in these cases is a continuous crime, that is to say, a single crime consisting of
a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of
division, with each act in that series being merely the partial execution of a single delict.
On the contrary, the Court is of the view that what is involved herein are several
completed and distinct purported criminal acts which should be prosecuted as multiple
counts of the same type of offense. Thus, as correctly perceived by the prosecution,
there are as many alleged offenses as there are alleged anomalous transactions
involved in these cases.
16.88 People v. Comila
Facts: On April 5, 1999, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, an
Information1 for Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate, as defined
and penalized under Article 13(6) in relation to Articles 38(b), 34 and 39 of Presidential
Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the New Labor Code, as amended, and 7 counts of
estafa was filed against Charlie Comila, Aida Comila and one Indira Ram Singh Lastra.
The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 60, in Criminal Cases Nos. 16427-R to
16439-R finding accused-appellants guilty of (1) illegal recruitment committed in large
scale; and (2) seven (7) counts of estafa.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in


addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is
no problem of double jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in
which the criminal intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary.
16.89 Diaz v. Davao
Facts: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68709, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Davao City. Diaz, Ramos, and Arguellas, as complainants, filed a criminal
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Davao del Norte charging the officers
of DLPC with estafa through falsification of public documents. They also alleged that the
officers of DLPC exacted additional and illegal profits from its consumers by devising a
deceptive Varying Discount Formula; based on the alleged misrepresentation of said
officers, the Board of Energy (BOE) granted DLPC provisional authority to apply the
formula, thereby resulting in losses of more or less P300,000.00 to Diaz, Ramos, and
Arguelles.76 As regards the charge of falsification, the complainants alleged that DLPC
had its properties appraised by the Technical Management Services, Philippines, Inc.
(TAMSPHIL), and included non-existent properties that did not belong to it; it also
recorded the TAMSPHIL appraisal in its books of account even before it had been
approved by the BOE; and submitted financial statements containing the appraisal to
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the BOE.

The Investigating Prosecutor found probable cause against the respondents. An


Information was filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tagum, Davao del
Norte, docketed as Crim. Case No. 5800. Respondents appealed the resolution of the
public prosecutor finding probable cause against them. The appeal was granted. On
motion of the Prosecutor, the RTC dismissed the case in an Order dated July 13, 1983.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: While the institution of separate criminal actions under the provisions of P.D.
401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876, and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on theft may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof
cannot be limited to one offense because a single criminal act may give rise to a
multiplicity of offenses; and where there is variance or difference between the elements
of an offense in one law and another law, as in the case at bar, there will be no double
jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of
elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not
prohibited; what is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, no fault could
be attributed to respondent DLPC when it instituted the two separate actions.

16.90 Merencillo v. People


Facts: This petition for review assails the June 18, 1999 decision of the Sandiganbayan
in A.R. Case Nos. 004-005 affirming the omnibus decision4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Branch 47, in Criminal Case Nos. 9482-83 finding petitioner
Juanito T. Merencillo guilty of violating Section 3(b) of RA 3019 5 and Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code.

That, on or about the 28th day of September, 1995, in the City of Tagbilaran, the
accused being then a public official connected with the Bureau of Internal Revenue as its
Group Supervising Examiner, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
with intent of personal gain, directly demand and extort from a certain Mrs. Maria
Angeles Ramasola Cesar the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00),
Philippine Currency, in connection, in consideration and in exchange for the release of
the certification of her payment of the capital gains tax for the land purchased by the
Ramasola [Superstudio] Inc. from one Catherine Corpuz Enerio, a transaction wherein
the aforesaid accused has to intervene in his official capacity, and to which the said Mrs.
Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar reluctantly agreed but upon prior consultation with the
military authorities particularly the elements of the 702nd Criminal Investigation
Command [CIC] who set up the accused for a possible entrapment resulting to (sic) his
being caught in the act of receiving an envelope supposedly containing the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) but consisting only of four (4) marked one
hundred peso bills and the rest all bogus (paper) monies, to the damage and prejudice
of the said Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar in particular and the public and the
government in general in the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.
The Trial Court finds the accused Juanito T. Merencillo, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal by direct participation, defined and penalized by Section 3(b) of [RA]
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the trial court
further finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct
participation, for the crime of Direct Bribery defined and penalized by Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan, however, denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with
modification reducing the penalty of imprisonment for violation of Section 3(b) of RA
3019.
Issue: Whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy.
Ruling: No. One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a
felony under the Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either
concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a felony under the Revised Penal
Code.27 There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously or
successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code.
The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with the
other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other, as provided in Section 7 of
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. An offense charged necessarily includes that which is
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in
the complaint or information, constitute the latter; and an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form a part of those constituting the latter.

16.91 Lapasaran v. People


Facts: In September 2001, private complainant Menardo Villarin (Menardo) and his
sister Vilma Villarin (Vilma) met petitioner Arlene N. Lapasaran, who worked at Silver Jet
Travel Tours Agency (Silver Jet) at SIMCAS Building, Makati. For a fee of P85,000.00,
petitioner undertook the processing of the papers necessary for the deployment (under
a tourist visa) and employment of Menardo in South Korea. Petitioner informed Menardo
that he would be employed as "factory worker," which was, subsequently, changed to
"bakery worker." Thereafter, Menardo paid the said fee in installments, the first in
September 2001 in the amount of P10,000.00, which was received by a certain Pastor
Paulino Cajucom; the second installment was P35,000.00; while the third and last
payment was P40,000.00; the last two installments were delivered to the petitioner.
After two postponements in his flight schedule, Menardo finally left for South
Korea on November 25, 2001. Unfortunately, he was incarcerated by South Korean
immigration authorities and was immediately deported to the Philippines because the
travel documents issued to him by the petitioner were fake. He immediately contacted
petitioner and informed her of what happened. Thereupon, petitioner promised to send
him back to South Korea, but the promise was never fulfilled. Consequently, Menardo
and his sister Vilma demanded the return of the money they paid, but petitioner refused
and even said, "Magkorte na lang tayo." It was later found out that petitioner was no
longer connected with Silver Jet.
Hence, the separate charges for illegal recruitment and estafa against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Raffled to Branch 34, the cases were
docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-215331 for Illegal Recruitment and Criminal Case No.
03-215332 for Estafa. When arraigned, she pleaded not guilty to both charges. The RTC
rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
recruitment and estafa. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC Decision
with a modification in the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 03-215332 for estafa.
Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in


addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is
no problem of double jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in
which the criminal intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary.
16.92 Ivler v. Modesto
Facts: The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy
Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident
grounding the second prosecution.

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner)


was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with
two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor
C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his
temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No.
82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No.
2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No.
2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC
proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail
and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after
his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the
motion remained unresolved.
Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A.
2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be
placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in
Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367
for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to
determine his penalty.
Issue: Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Ruling: The Courts ruling secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a
stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing
formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated
by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses"
(or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded,
Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of
Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung
of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006
and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double
jeopardy.
16.93 People v. Ocden
Facts: That sometime during the period from October to December, 1998 in the City of
Baguio, accused-appellant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud JEFFRIES C. GOLIDAN, by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, as follows, to wit: the accused knowing
fully well that she is not (sic) authorized job recruiter for persons intending to secure
work abroad convinced said Jeffries C. Golidan and pretended that she could secure a
job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of P70,000.00 when in truth
and in fact they could not; the said Jeffries C. Golidan deceived and convinced by the
false pretenses employed by the accused parted away the total sum of P70,000.00, in
favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said Jeffries C. Golidan in the
aforementioned amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000,00). The RTC rendered
a Decision finding Ocden guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal
recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. 16315-R) and three counts of estafa. The
instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision, dated 02 July 2001, of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 60 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling: It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in


addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is
no problem of double jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in
which the criminal intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary.
16.94 People v. Lalli
Facts: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, in its Decision dated 29
November 2005 (RTC Decision), found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons committed by a
syndicate, and sentenced each of the accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
plus payment of fines and damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) in Cagayan de
Oro, in its Decision dated 26 February 2010 (CA Decision), affirmed in toto the RTC
Decision. The accused-appellants appealed to this Court by filing a Notice of Appeal 3 in
accordance with Section 3(c), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether accused-appellant was placed in double jeopardy.
Ruling: No.The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous
case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is
worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without ones consent and to be sexually violated
four to five times a day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no
doubt that Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when she
was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was
aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is
likewise justified.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 February
2010, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City dated 29
November 2005, finding accused Lalli and Aringoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate
16.95 People v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Assailed in the instant petition for certiorari is the Resolution dated October 11,
1999 of public respondent Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) in Criminal Case No. 13006
("People of the Philippines v. Geronimo Z. Velasco") granting the Demurrer to Evidence
filed by the accused and dismissing the said criminal case for insufficiency of evidence.
The Information filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
against Geronimo Velasco, then Minister of Energy, for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 ("The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act").

Issue: Whether the case should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Ruling: Clearly, no trace of impetuosity or wantonness on the part of respondent


Sandiganbayan exists which would place this case within the purview of the evil sought
to be prevented by the said constitutional proscription. In Yao v. Court of Appeals,24 this
Court, through Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., struck down a decision of a Regional
Trial Court for being "starkly hollow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in
its form." The challenged Resolution can hardly be characterized as such.
All told, we find no grave abuse on the part of respondent Sandiganbayan
warranting the nullification of its October 11, 1999 Resolution.

17.71 Yuchengco v. CA, 376 SCRA 531

Facts: Several articles of defamatory imputations against the petitioner were published
in the Philippine Daily Inquirer by the respondents. The trial court finds herein
respondents guilty of libel. The CA reversed the appealed decision of the trial court and
acquitting both accused. The OSG recommends that the assailed decision of the
appellate court must be upheld principally on the ground that the alleged guilt of the
respondents was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether the acquittal of the respondents by the CA bars the petitioner from
appealing the present case

Ruling: A judgment of acquittal in criminal proceedings is final and unappealable


whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. This means
that a review of alleged errors in the said judgment arising from misappreciation of facts
and the evidence adduced cannot be made without trampling upon the right of the
accused against double jeopardy which is firmly established in this jurisdiction.

By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a


petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court but only upon a clear showing
by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely
reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment
void. In which event, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy which
has the following essential elements: 1) the accused is charged under a complaint or an
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; 2) the court has
jurisdiction; 3) the accused has been arraigned and he has pleaded; and 4) he is
convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his express consent.
17.72 San Vicente v. People, GR132081, Nov. 26, 2002

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with homicide for killing Wong. Petitioner begged leave
to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the trial court. Subsequently,
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of
positive identification of the accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal; (2)
prosecutions evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent. The trial court granted the
motion and dismissed the case together with the civil aspect for insufficiency of
evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution may appeal the trial courts resolution acquitting
him of all the charges against him without violating the constitutional proscription
against double jeopardy.

HELD: the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal
and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription
on double jeopardy.

MAINPOINT: Upon acquittal, any further prosecution of the accused would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.

17.73 People v. CA, GR 132396, Sept. 23, 2002

FACTS: The trial court rendered a decision finding appellants to have conspired with one
another to deceive complainant, and convicted them of Estafa. They interposed a timely
appeal to the CA thus, amended the decision. Accused Ma. Lourdes Deutsch whose
crime has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, is hereby ACQUITTED. She argued
that the acquittal was unfounded, arbitrary, unjust, and constituted grave abuse and
hence, following several contentions. Petitioner likewise denies that Deutsch would
suffer double jeopardy should this petition be granted. Relying on People vs. Castaeda,
that this petition is merely a continuation of the case before the trial court and not a
new one, no jeopardy has yet attached. The OSG, in turn, avers that in case of acquittal,
the appeal on the criminal aspect should be taken solely by the state and the private
complainant is limited only to the appeal of the civil aspect. The OSG argues that
Deutsch stands to suffer from double jeopardy in the event that this petition is given due
course.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners appeal is merely a continuation of the case and does
not constitute double jeopardy

HELD: it is likewise true that an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion


amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really acquit and therefore does not
terminate the case. There can be no double jeopardy if the said acquittal is based on a
void indictment, however, as pointed out by the OSG, whatever error might have been
committed by the Court of Appeals in said decision, it could only be an error of judgment
and not of jurisdiction. It could not affect the intrinsic validity of its decision.
Consequently, the acquittal of Deutsch may no longer be reviewed, for to do so would
place her in double jeopardy in violation of the basic tenets of our fundamental law and
current jurisprudence.

Legal jeopardy attaches only:


1. upon a valid indictment;
2. before a competent court;
3. after arraignment;
4. when a valid plea has been entered; and
5. the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.

17.74 People v. Sandiganbayan 491 SCRA 185

FACTS: This case is for the reversal of the Decision of the Sandiganbayan acquitting the
accused who were charged with technical malversation for lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt of guilt, when Dominador T. Belac assumed office as Governor and
Noe V. Dannang the Provincial Budget Officer at the time. Outraged, the People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, sought for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted contrary to
law and applicable jurisprudence and with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in acquitting all the accused of all the charges, considering
that proof beyond reasonable doubt had been adduced to prove the guilt of the accused
for all the crimes charged.

ISSUE: Whether an acquittal by erroneous ruling can be subject to appeal w/o violating
the law on double jeopardy.

HELD: The prosecution cannot simultaneously avail of the remedies of a special civil
action for certiorari, petition for review on certiorari, or appeal in civil cases. A petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are two and separate remedies. A petition under
Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment, while a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 covers errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45.21 A
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal.

The government has already been afforded one opportunity to prove defendants
culpability and, when it has failed to persuade the court not to enter a final judgment
favorable to the accused, the constitutional policies underlying the ban against multiple
trials become compelling. It matters not whether the final judgment constitutes a formal
"acquittal" and no matter how erroneous the ruling.

MAINPOINT: The judgment of acquittal, however erroneous, bars further prosecution on


any aspect of the count, and consequently, bars appellate review of the trial courts
error. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction is shown, the
errors committed by the trial court in the exercise of its jurisdiction, or even the legal
soundness of such decision, errors of judgment, mistakes in its findings and conclusions,
are not proper subjects of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It can may be
assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is
burdened to establish that the court a quo, in this case, the Sandiganbayan, acted
without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.

MAINPOINT: Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy
whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the CA. Thus, the State is
proscribed from appealing the judgment of acquittal of the accused to this Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

17.75 People v. CA 516 SCRA 383


FACTS: The instant case stemmed from a criminal complaint filed by the petitioners
against Hilario Florece and his wife Socorro Florece for falsification of public document.
In the said complaint, the petitioners alleged that they are the children-heirs of the late
spouses who were the registered owners of a 1,290 square meter parcel of land in
Camarines Sur. After the death of their parents, the petitioners, together with their other
siblings, orally partitioned said parcel of land amongst themselves. Hilario and Socorro
were convicted of the crime charged. Socorro filed a petition for review, asserting that
the prosecution failed to prove that she indeed falsified the questioned deed and that
her conviction for the offense charged was merely based on presumption.
Petitioners instituted the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N the said acquittal was valid

RULING: Yes. It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the
State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to
the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainants role is limited
to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court
or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be
undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General
may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant
may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
A review of the findings of the CA acquitting Socorro of the charge against her is not
warranted under the circumstances as it runs afoul of the avowed constitutional right of
an accused against double jeopardy. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final, and a re-
examination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the
accused in jeopardy for the same offense.

17.76 People v. Laguio 518 SCRA 393

FACTS: Police arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for
unlawful possession of shabu. In the course of the investigation, three arrested persons
were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment operation was then set after
the three were prevailed upon to call their source and pretend to order another supply
of shabu whereby Wang was caught in possession of the drug. Wang filed his undated
Demurrer to Evidence praying for his acquittal and the dismissal cases against him for
lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecutions
evidence against him. Considering that the prosecution has not yet filed its Opposition
to the demurrer, Wang filed an Amplification to his Demurrer of Evidence which resulted
to his acquittal for lack of evidence. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N the prosecution may appeal the trial courts resolution granting Wangs
demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him without violating
the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy

RULING: Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would
violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. Where the prosecution is
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is
thereby violated. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the
trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its
case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to
correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must
clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave
as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.

17.77 People v. Dumlao 580 SCRA 409 (void acquittal)

FACTS: This is an appeal to the Sandiganbayan resolution which granted the motion to
dismiss/quash of respondent Dumlao and dismissed the case against him.

An information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging respondents Dumlao and
others with violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. After the pre-trial,
Dumlao filed a motion to dismiss/quash on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. And was held meritorious. Hence, this petition for certiorari
seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Sandiganbayan resolution.

Issues: W/N the court acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence when it dismissed
the criminal case against Dumlao

Ruling: Insufficiency of evidence is not of the grounds of motion to quash. Insufficiency


is ground for dismissal only after the prosecution rests its case. In this case,
Sandiganbayan deprived the prosecution to present its evidence in doing so violated the
rights to due process.
In the instant case, double jeopardy has not yet set in. The first jeopardy has not yet
attached. There is no question that four of the five elements of legal jeopardy are
present. However, the Court find the last element valid conviction, acquittal, dismissal
or termination of the case wanting. In the instant case, there was no error of judgment
but a denial of due process resulting in loss of jurisdiction. Respondent Dumlao would
not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the Sandiganbayan
had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal
contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.

17.78 Tiu v. CA 586 SCRA 118

FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA
7227 entitled An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other
Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this
Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes.

On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97 (EO 97),
clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives. Nine days after, on June 19,
1993, the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A), specifying
the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative.

The validity of the laws was challenged on the ground that these said laws violated the
principle of equality. The CA upheld the constitutionality. Hence, this petition before the
SC.

ISSUE: w/n there was a violation of the equal protection of the laws, thus discriminatory.

RULING:
The SC ruled in favor of the constitutionality and validity of the assailed EO. Said Order is
not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory.

The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must
apply to all those belonging to the same class. Explaining the nature of the equal
protection guarantee, the Court in Ichong v. Hernandez said:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is
not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either [by] the object to which
it is directed or by [the] territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand
absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditionsboth as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not.

17.79 People v. De Grano 588 SCRA 550

FACTS:
An Information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the
RTC Batangas, against Joven de Grano, Armando de Grano, and Estanislao Lacaba,
together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho, Domingo Landicho, and Leonardo
Genil, who were at-large.

When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was
present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for
their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. Sat to say, RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents
who were at large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.

The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for
Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have
considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by
Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in
court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison
or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to
the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from
the court.

ISSUE: Whether those accused can invoke double jeopardy considering that they have
already lost their standing in court when they were absent without justifiable reason
during the rendering of the judgment, making the lower court liable for abuse of
discretion.

RULING: Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because,
from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any
ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and
does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal. The RTC clearly
exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration with
respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have considered the joint motion
as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven
and Domingo have not regained their standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing
in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.

NOTES:

A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Exception: a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition


for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the
petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely
reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed
judgment void.

Double jeopardy has the following essential elements: (1) the accused is charged under
a complaint or an information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and he has pleaded;
and (4) he is convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his express
consent.

It also should be noted that any acquittal or conviction before a court having no
jurisdiction would not violate the principle of double jeopardy since it failed to attach in
the first place.

17.80 People v. Nazareno 595 SCRA 438

FACTS:
Nazareno, Regala, Laureaga and Hular were charged with murder. However, Nazareno
and Regala were convicted, and Laurega and Hular were acquitted for lack of evidence
against him.

Nazareno and Regala contended that they were arrested without warrant, thus, a
violation of their constitutional right. However, they only questioned the validity of the
warrantless arrest after the lower court has rendered its decision.

ISSUE: W/N the appellants can still question the validity of their warrantless arrest even
after conviction.

RULING: Nazareno and Regala waived objections based on the alleged irregularity of
their arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and
participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when they
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest affects
only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Consequently, if
objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not a
sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment rendered after a trial, free
from error. The technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive
the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the
culpability of accused.

17.81 People v. Duca 603 SCRA 159 (void acquittal)


Facts: A petition for certiorari which seeks to set aside and annul the CA decision
reversing the decision of the RTC of Dagupan City, in Criminal which affirmed an earlier
decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan,
convicting respondent Arturo Duca of the crime of falsification. Petitioner argues that
the prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved the respondents appeal
without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the
pendency of the same and without requiring the Solicitor General to file his
comment. Petitioner contends that once the case is elevated to the CA or this Court, it is
only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the
People. Thus, the CA gravely abused its discretion when it acted on respondents appeal
without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the
decision of the CA acquitting respondent should be considered void for being violative of
due process.

Issue: Whether the decision of the CA, acquitting respondent should be considered void
for being violative of due process

Ruling: Yes. In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme
Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor
General. Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of
the OSG was to represent the government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings. This provision has been carried over to the Revised
Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt,
the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.
The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor
General the chance to file his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the
State of its right to refute the material allegations of the said petition filed before the
CA. The said decision is, therefore, a nullity. The CA decision being void for lack of due
process, the filing of the instant petition for certiorari without a motion for
reconsideration is justified.

17.82 *Mupas v. People, GR 189365, October 12, 2011 (void order on demurrer)
Fact: The Ombudsman filed two Informations with the RTC-Pasay against petitioner
Zafra, Beltran and Roga charging them for violating Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and malversation under Article 217 of the RPC. After the prosecution rested its case,
petitioner Zafra filed a Motion for Demurrer to Evidence. She alleged therein that the
prosecution failed to present proof that she and her co-accused had wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously caused the withdrawal of the 200 cases of Bear Brand Powdered Milk
and appropriated these for themselves to the prejudice of DSWD. Thus, she concluded
that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime of malversation. She
likewise contended that the prosecution was not able to present proof that she and her
co-accused had done so in violation of R. A. 3019. public respondent Judge Mupas issued
an Order granting the demurrer to evidence of petitioner Zafra. Public respondent ruled
that, after evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, he found
them substantially insufficient to warrant the conviction of petitioner Zafra under the
charges filed against her by the Ombudsman. With the grant of her demurrer to
evidence, petitioner was acquitted. Public respondent then filed with the CA a Petition
for Certiorari assailing the lower courts grant of petitioner Zafras demurrer to evidence,
resulting in her acquittal. The CA found that public respondent Judge Mupas committed
grave abuse of discretion through his grant of private respondents demurrer, which
consequently resulted in her acquittal. Holding that the prosecution was able to present
sufficient evidence to prove the elements of the crimes in the Information filed against
private respondent

Issue: Whether petitioners constitutional right against double jeopardy was violated

Ruling: No. As a general rule, an order granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence
amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant
thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. When there
is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
dismissing a criminal case by granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence, its judgment
is considered void.

In this case, the SC agrees with the CAs disquisition that the lower courts grant of the
demurrer to evidence of petitioner Zafra was attended by grave abuse of discretion. The
prosecutions evidence was prima facie sufficient to prove the criminal charges filed
against her for her inexcusable negligence, subject to the defense that she may present
in the course of a full-blown trial. The lower court improperly examined the prosecutions
evidence in light of only one mode of committing the crimes charged; that is, through
positive acts. The appellate court correctly concluded that the crime of malversation
may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or
passively through negligence by allowing another to commit such misappropriation. In
the instant case, the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Court of Appeals that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the accuseds
demurrer to evidence, as such, the Supreme Court deem the trial courts consequent
order of acquittal void

Parties
17.83 Metrobank v. Meridiano, G.R. No. 118251, June 29, 2001

Facts: Petitioner challenges the decision of the RTC of Manila, in this petition for
certiorari acquitting private respondent Dominador Ong for violation of P.D. No. 115,
otherwise known as the Trust Receipts Law. Petitioner contends that its petition for
certiorari does not put the private respondent in double jeopardy since the petition only
seeks the nullification of the judgment of the public respondent and does not in any way
place the private accused on trial again. The defense of double jeopardy, according to
the petitioner, is therefore premature in these proceeding. And that public respondent
gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the latter
acquitted the private respondent. According to the petitioner, a nullification of the said
judgment will not violate the constitutional principle of double jeopardy on the ground
that the case at bar falls under one of the exceptions to the rule.

Issue: Whether this petition for certiorari puts private respondent in double jeopardy

Ruling: Yes. Exception to the double jeopardy rule attaches only when the trial court
commits grave abuse of discretion due to a violation of due process, i.e., that the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or that the trial was a sham.
In the present case, inasmuch as the prosecution was never denied any opportunity to
present its case and that there is no indication or proof that the trial was a sham, a
review and consequent setting aside of the trial courts decision of acquittal will put the
private respondent in double jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon valid
indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea
has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Consequently in such an event, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or
for any attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof, or for any offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

Accordingly, whenever there is an acquittal or dismissal of a criminal case and the


private complainant intends to question such an acquittal or dismissal, the same must
likewise be undertaken by the State through the Solicitor General. This, petitioner failed
to comply. The present petition for certiorari before this Court was filed by petitioner. It
was not initiated by the Solicitor General. In fact, the Solicitor General intimated to this
Court in his comment that a reversal of the assailed judgment would place the private
respondent in double jeopardy. Thus, this petition for certiorari must be dismissed.

Ordinance and Statute


17.84 *People v. Relova - 148 SCRA 292

FACTS: Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light
System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City,
searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold
Storage owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police
discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the
necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the
walls of the building"

An information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of


1974.

Manuel pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss because the crime there
charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be
recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award.

The Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it
should have filed within 2 months, but the information was filed more than 9 months.

14 days later, Manuel was charged for theft of electric power punishable under the
Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Was there double jeopardy considering that the first offense was punishable
under an ordinance and the second offense was punishable under a national statue?

RULING: No. A person acquitted in violating the city ordinance cannot be further charged
with crime punishable in RPC since the Identity of the offense is on a single act
committed by the offender.

The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the


essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in
the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The question of Identity of
the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance
and a national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the
location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the accused as set out in the
two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably
regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been
moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence,
such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise
to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance
and a national statute).
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be
understood with absolute literalness. The Identity of offenses that must be shown need
not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same
offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily
included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the
first or a frustration thereof.

Applied to Impeachment
17.85 *Estrada v. Desierto, GR 146710-15 and GR 146738, March 2, 2001and MR-GR
146710-15 and 146738, April 3, 2001

FACTS: This was a case on who has the better right to the Office of the President,
whether Estrada or Arroyo.
But the history was that:

Estrada was impeached. Estrada asserted that he is the President on leave and Arroyo is
only the Acting President, when Estrada was impeached for plunder and graft and
corruption.

Since the impeachment proceedings was aborted, a criminal prosecution was initiated
against him. He contended that he cannot be prosecuted unless he was convicted in the
impeachment proceedings.

During the impeachment proceeding, Estrada tendered resignation as president.


Contention: He cannot be filed with criminal offense because the impeachment
proceeding must come to its finality first because he believes that he is acquitted. And
that, the proceeding was dismissed without his consent.

ISSUE: Can the constitutional right against double jeopardy be applied in impeachment
proceedings?

RULING:

Requisites of Double Jeopardy

Because he did not sastisfy the fifth requirement

The SC rejected Estradas argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he
must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of
petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that
led to his loss of the presidency. The Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since the Impeachment
Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first
be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted,
would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to
commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who
has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a
criminal prosecution.

This is in accord with the SC ruling in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of
their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance
that the impeachment process against Estrada has been aborted and thereafter he lost
the presidency, he cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal
prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings.

17.86 People v. Logan, G.R. No. 135030-33, July 20, 2001.

Facts: Mercy Logan y Calderon, was charged with three (3) counts of the crime of estafa,
as defined and penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in three (3)
separate Informations. Regional Trial Court convicted the appellant of the crimes of
estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale.

That on or about and during the period comprised from January to August 1994 in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Rodrigo Acorda y Javier in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused, by means of false manifestation and fraudulent representations which she
made to said Rodrigo Acorda y Javier to the effect that she had the power and capacity
to recruit and employ factory and construction worker for Japan and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in
inducing said Rodrigo Acorda y Javier and to give and deliver, as in fact gave and
delivered to said accused the amount of P65,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false
and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of
P65,000.00 which amount once in possession, with intent to defraud wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Rodrigo Acorda y Javier in the aforesaid
amount of P65,000.00.

Issue: Whether WON person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged and
convicted separately of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and
estafa.

Held: YES. It is well-settled that a person who has committed illegal recruitment may be
charged and convicted separately of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor
Code and estafa under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The
reason for the rule is that the crime of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while the crime of estafa is
malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is necessary for conviction. In
other words, a person convicted under the Labor Code may also be convicted of
offenses punishable by other laws.

Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder


17.87 *People v. Ferrer - 48 SCRA 382

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or
the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of
subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and
insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity.
2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating
people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government.

Issue: Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.


Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of
attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the
substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a
statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.)
the statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) The statute is applied retroactively and
reaches past conduct.

17.88 *Virata v. Sandiganbayan - 202 SCRA 680

PCGG filed a complaint to Virata for recovery of ill gotten wealth

Contention: PCGG is a bill of attainder because it punishes without trial.

Ruling: There is judicial trial because the trial must be heard by a judicial tribunal which
is the Sandiganbayan. It was created to recover the ill gotten wealth.

Facts: Petitioner Cesar E. A. Virata is one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 The
case, which was filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government in behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for brevity) against fifty three persons
including Virata, involves the recovery of ill-gotten wealth amassed by the defendants
during the twenty year reign of former President Ferdinand Marcos.

Asserting that the foregoing allegations are vague and are not averred with sufficient
definiteness as to enable him to effectively prepare his responsive pleading, petitioner
Virata filed a motion for a bill of particulars.

The Sandiganbayan partially granted the said motion by requiring the Republic to
submit a bill of particulars concerning the charges against petitioner Virata stated only
in paragraph 17 (acting as dummy, nominee and/or agent) and paragraph 18 (gross
abuse of authority and violation of laws and the Constitution) of the expanded Second
Amended Complaint.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse in admitting the bill of
particulars.

Held: A bill of particulars is a complementary procedural document consisting of an


amplification or more particularized outline of a pleading, and being in the nature of a
more specific allegation of the facts recited in the pleading. It is the office of the bill of
particulars to inform the opposite party and the court of the precise nature and
character of the cause of action or defense which the pleader has attempted to set forth
and thereby to guide his adversary in his preparations for trial, and reasonably to
protect him against surprise at the trial. It gives information of the specific proposition
for which the pleader contends, in respect to any material and issuable fact in the case,
and it becomes a part of the pleading which it supplements. It has been held that a bill
of particulars must inform the opposite party of the nature of the pleaders cause of
action or defense, and it must furnish the required items of the claim with reasonable
fullness and precision

17.89 Trinidad v. CA - 202 SCRA 106

Pres. Decree 957 is not ex post facto law.

FACTS: The accused in this case, being the administrator of the estate of the late Nicolai
Drepin, President and General Manager of the Mother Earth Realty Development
Corporation, owner-developer of the Munting Baguio Village Subdivision, located at
Antipolo, Rizal, and having knowledge of the sale of Lot No. 19, Block No. 51 of the said
Subdivision to Francisca T. Dimabuyo for the purchase price of P14,000,00, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to deliver the title of said subdivision lot to
the said lot buyer upon full payment thereof in violation of the aforementioned P.D. No.
957.

In the cross examination of this witness he admitted that he was not able to deliver any
title to the complainant for according to him the complainant had not actually paid all
her obligations because there is no adjustment considering the value of the peso which
has declined these days. The complainant has not even paid the taxes of the land so
that the contract has not been duly complied with.

Petitioner maintains that PD 957 impairs the obligations of the vendee (Ms. Dimabuyu)
in the contract to sell and that it is an ex post facto law as the provision thereof provides
retroactive effect.

ISSUE: Whether PD 957 qualifies to be an ex post facto law which must not be applied
in this case

RULING: P.D. 957 cannot be assailed as an ex post facto law. The act made punishable
thereunder is the failure of the owner-developer or administrator to deliver the title of
the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment, not the execution of a deed of sale or
contract to sell over such lot or unit before the passage of the law. In the instant case
although the contract to sell was executed long before the enactment of P.D. 957, the
failure of appellant (herein petitioner) to deliver the title over the lot upon full payment
transpired when the decree was already in effect. Such law is not ex post facto for the
simple reason that what is being punished is the failure to deliver such title after the
enactment of the Decree on July 12, 1976.

17.90 People v. Taguba - 229 SCRA 188

P.D. 2018 cannot apply to the appellants retroactively as it would be an ex post facto law
to them. A law is ex post facto if it refers to a criminal act, punishes an act which was
innocent when done, and retroacts to the disadvantage of the accused.

FACTS: Enrique Taguba and Mirafe Taguba were both charged with eight counts of
illegal recruitment and three counts of estafa in separate informations. The
complainants narrated almost identical versions of the deception practiced on them by
the accused.

These witnesses testified that Enrique an Mirafe approached them on separate


occasions and assured them that upon their payment of a specified sum of money they
would be sent to Korror, Palau, to work variously as a waiter, fisherman, master cutter,
dressmaker, farmer, laborer, mason carpenter or macho dancer.

The consideration for their recruitment ranged from P2,200.00 to P20,000.00 while the
promised monthly wages ranged from $300.00 top $500.00.

The required payments were made by them from loans they had contracted or from the
proceeds of the sale of their properties. However, no overseas employment materialized.
Only Gilbert Fabrigas and Norman Sarrion (the son of Josefina Sarrion) were able to
reach Korror but after three months, during which they were not given any work, they
were deported to Manila for expired visas. The rest of the complainants were never even
able to leave the Philippines.

The appellants argue that before one can be held guilty of illegal recruitment, two
elements have to be established, to wit, that (1) the offender is not a licensee or holder
of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) the
offender undertook the recruitment activities defined under Article 13(b) or any of the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code. Their argument is
that the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt each of the
elements of the offense charged and that this burden had not been discharged in the
cases against them.

The appellants also contend that the penalty of life imprisonment for illegal recruitment
committed on a large scale is not applicable to them because the presidential decree
imposing this penalty was published in the Official Gazette only on February 10, 1986.
P.D. 2018 was thus not yet effective at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes
imputed to them. Only two of the eight complainants for illegal recruitment testified that
they were recruited after February 10, 1986. If at all, therefore, the appellants can only
be convicted of eight separate counts of illegal recruitment under Art. 39 (c) of the Labor
Code, which is subject to a lesser penalty.

ISSUE: Whether PD 2018 is inapplicable and that the appellants can only be held guilty
of eight counts of illegal recruitment and penalized in accordance with Sec. 39 (c) of the
Labor Code
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RULING: Yes. The Court agrees that the appellants cannot be convicted of illegal
recruitment on a large scale because only two of the complainants, Jesus Garcia and
Elena Santiago, categorically testified that their recruitment came after February 10,
1986. This was the date when P.D. 2018, the law defining and penalizing illegal
recruitment in a large scale, took effect.

P.D. 2018 cannot apply to the appellants retroactively as it would be an ex post facto law
to them. A law is ex post facto if it refers to a criminal act, punishes an act which was
innocent when done, and retroacts to the disadvantage of the accused. Prior to the said
date, recruiting on a large scale was not yet punished with the penalty imposed in the
said decree.

17.91 People v. Sandiganbayan 211 SCRA 241

Violation under Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The new 15-year prescriptive period
(formerly 10) in the Act cannot be given retroactive effect because it will be prejudicial
to the accused.

Intellectual property rights.

Facts: Two letter-complaints were filed on 28 October 1986 and 9 December 1986, with
the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of
Congressman Democrito O. Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after the Ceferino S. Paredes
had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial governor of Agusan del Sur in March 1986.
Gelacio's complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the
provincial attorney in 1976, of a free patent title for Lot 3097-8, Pls. 67, with an area of
1,391 sq.m., more or less, in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur.
On 23 February 1989, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the City Fiscal of
Butuan City who subpoenaed Governor Paredes. However, the subpoena was served on,
and received by, the Station Commander of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, who did not
serve it on Paredes. Despite the absence of notice to Paredes, Deputized
Tanodbayan/City Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy conducted a preliminary investigation ex
parte. He recommended that an information be filed in court. His recommendation was
approved by the Tanodbayan who, on 10 August 10, 1989, filed an information in the
Sandiganbayan.
Paredes was arrested upon a warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan. Claiming that the
information and the warrant of arrest were null and void because he had been denied
his right to a preliminary investigation, Paredes refused to post bail. His wife filed a
petition for habeas corpus praying this Court to order his release, but the Supreme Court
denied her petition because the proper remedy was for Paredes to file a bail bond of
P20,000 fixed by the Sandiganbayan for his provisional liberty, and move to quash the
information before being arraigned. On 5 April 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan
"An Urgent Motion to Quash Information and to Recall Warrant of Arrest." After the
parties had filed their written arguments, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution on 1
August 1991 granting the motion to quash on the ground of prescription of the offense
charged. The People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed the petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his violation of RA 3019 in
1976.
RULING: Batas Pambansa 195 which was approved on 16 March 1982, amending
Section 11 of RA 3019 by increasing from 10 to 15 years the period for the prescription
or extinguishment of a violation of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be
given retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January
1976 yet, for it would be prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the
substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11, RA
3019 which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed it. To
apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would alter his
situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had
already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. Since an ex
post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article III, 1987 Constitution),
the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that Paredes may no longer
be prosecuted for his supposed violation of RA 3019 in 1976, 6 years before BP 195 was
approved. The new prescriptive period under that law should apply only to those
offenses which were committed after the approval of BP 195.

17.92 Co v. CA 227 SCRA 444

FACTS: Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a


check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the
sum of P361, 528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored
two days later, the tersely stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
The salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City filed
a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2. The case eventuated
in Co's conviction of the crime charged.

Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that
it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict
of conviction, on the ruling rendered in Que v. People. He argued on appeal that at the
time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four years prior to the
promulgation of the judgment in Que v People on September 21, 1987, which stated
that B.P. Blg. 22 covers a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an
obligation.

ISSUE: Whether the ruling rendered in Que v. People violative of the constitutional right
against ex post facto law

RULING: Yes. It would seem, then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of
the proposition that the Courts decision in Que v. People, that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22
should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and
other persons similarly situated, who relied on the official opinion of the
Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg.
22. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines, according to Article 8 of the Civil Code.
Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided declares Article 4
of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code:
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal

17.93 Rosales vs CA 255 SCRA 123

Facts: LEOVIGILDO ROSALES was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Northern
Samar with murder and illegal possession of firearms. Prosecution witness Francisco
Buensalida narrated that he and Nilo Bulan were together in the morning of 26
September 1982 on their way to get some bamboo poles. Bulan however proceeded to
the side of the fishpond used by residents for defecating to answer the call of nature. It
was at this moment when Rosales approached Bulan from behind and at a distance of
six (6) meters fired at him with a shotgun. After he fell to the ground Rosales shot him
again. The certificate of death issued by Dr. Caridad T. Bulusan who autopsied Nilo Bulan
revealed that the cause of death was internal hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds and
that of the two (2) shots that hit the victim one (1) came from behind. On the other
hand, Leovigildo Rosales invoked self-defense. His version was that at about ten oclock
in the morning of 26 September 1982 he went to inspect the fishpond owned by a
certain Bernardo Bulan but placed under his care as overseer. There, according to
Rosales, he caught Nilo fishing. He fired his shotgun into the air to scare Nilo after the
latter resolutely refused to leave. Nilo then struggled for the possession of the shotgun
which fired and hit him. The Information for illegal possession of firearm alleged that
Rosales had under his custody and control an unlicensed 12-gauge Winchester shotgun
bearing Serial No. 1628119. He claimed that the shotgun was given to him by the owner
of the fishpond with authority to possess coming from Mateo Olindo, its alleged owner.

Issue: Whether PD 1866 can be retroactively applied?

Ruling: No, P.D. No. 1866 prescribing the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua approved on 29 June 1983 cannot be
retroactively applied in this case which transpired on 26 September 1982 inasmuch as
this law is unfavorable to the accused.

17.94 Subido vs Sandiganbayan 266 SCRA 379

Facts: Petitioners Subido and Parina were charged with Arbitrary Detention (penalized
under Revised Penal Code) in an information filed on 28 July 1995. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case 22825. The information alleged that then Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation Bayani Subido Jr. and then BID Special Agent Rene Parina
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously caused the issuance and implementation of an arrest
warrant dated 25 June 1992 against James J. Maksimuk, in conspiracy with each other
and while performing their official functions. The said warrant caused Maksimuks
detention for forty-three (43) days. The petitioners then filed on 28 August 1995 a
Motion to Quash, where they alleged that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over
their person and the offense charged and they should be tried in RTC of Manila, as
Arbitary Detention (penalized under the Revised Penal Code) is not covered under R.A.
No. 7975. Also, they argued that R.A. 7975 should be given prospective application
because when the case was filed, Subido was already a private person since he
separated from government service on 28 February 1995 while Parina did not hold a
position corresponding to Salary Grade 27. The prosecution filed their opposition to the
Motion to Quash on 28 September 1995, contending that under Sec. 4(b) of R.A. 7975,
the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the petitioners and the offense charged and
that the basis of Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the position of the accused in the
government service when the offense charged was committed and not the nature of the
offense charged, provided the offense committed by the accused was in the exercise of
his duties and in relation to his office. The petitioners Motion to Quash was denied by
the Sandiganbayan (in its Resolution dated 25 October 1995). The Sandiganbayan ruled
that it has jurisdiction over the case, as stated in Sec. 4 (a)e of R.A. 7975. As the
arraignment was 10 November 1995, the petitioners filed on 9 November 1995 Motion
for Reconsideration, but the Sandiganbayan that motion through its Order dated 10
November 1995. Hence, this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 on ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether RA 7975 has retroactive effect?

Ruling: Yes, All told, as a procedural and curative statute, R.A. No. 7975 may validly be
given retroactive effect, there being no impairment of contractual or vested rights.

17.95 Sesbreno vs CBAA 270 SCRA 360

Facts: On April 3, 1980, petitioner purchased from Estrella Benedicto Tan two (2) parcels
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55917 issued by the Register of
Deeds of Cebu City and described in the deed of sale as follows: A parcel of land (Lot
308 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu), with the improvements thereon, situated in the
City of Cebu (formerly Municipality of Cebu), containing an area of Forty Nine (49)
square meters, more or less. A parcel of land (Lot 309 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu),
with the improvements thereon, situated in the City of Cebu, containing an area of Forty
Eight (48) square meters, more or less The conveyance included a residential house of
strong materials constructed on the lots above-mentioned located in Cebu City.

Issue: Is CBAAs Assessment Unconstitutional?

Ruling: Yes,
Equally unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the imposition of back taxes on his
property is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 22, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. When both Public Respondents CBAA and City Assessor imposed back
taxes on petitioners property, they did not violate the rule that laws shall have only
prospective applicability. Respondents were only applying PD 464 which had been in
effect since 1974. Besides, Section 25 of PD 464 is not penal in character; hence, it may
not be considered as an ex post facto law.