J. theor. Biol.

(1997) 187, 613629

Consciousness and Biological Evolution

B. I. B. L

Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden

(Received on 29 September 1996, Accepted in revised form on 7 November 1996)

It has been suggested that if the preservation and development of consciousness in the biological
evolution is a result of natural selection, it is plausible that consciousness not only has been influenced
by neural processes, but has had a survival value itself; and it could only have had this, if it had also
been efficacious. This argument for mindbrain interaction is examined, both as the argument has been
developed by William James and Karl Popper and as it has been discussed by C. D. Broad. The problem
of identifying mental phenomena with certain neural phenomena is also addressed. The main conclusion
of the analysis is that an explanation of the evolution of consciousness in Darwinian terms of natural
selection does not rule out that consciousness may have evolved as a mere causally inert effect of the
evolution of the nervous system, or that mental phenomena are identical with certain neural phenomena.
However, the interactionistic theory still seems, more plausible and more fruitful for other reasons
brought up in the discussion.
7 1997 Academic Press Limited

1. Introduction ution. Bunge contends that the only mindbrain

Darwins theory of natural selection has been used to
support the theory that conscious mental processes
and neural processes causally interact. The idea is that
if the preservation and development of consciousness
in the biological evolution is a result of natural
selection, it is plausible that consciousness has not
only been influenced by neural processes, but has had
a survival value itself; and it could only have had this,
if it had been efficacious. This evolutionary argument
for the interactionistic theory of the mindbrain
relation seems to have been suggested for the first time
by William James (1879), and has also been
formulated later and defended by Karl Popper (1977,
1978; Popper & Eccles, 1977). The argument is
controversial. It has been rejected by C. D. Broad
(1925), who argues that an evolution of consciousness
by natural selection would not make the interaction-
istic theory more plausible than the epiphenomenalis-
tic theory, that is, the theory that consciousness is
merely a causally inert effect of neural processes.
Mario Bunge (1979) goes even further to argue that
the whole idea of mind and brain being distinct
phenomena clashes with Darwins theory of evol-
theory compatible with Darwins theory is the identity
theory.
Although the terminology, and also the basic
notions to some extent, differ between the authors, the
mutual exclusiveness of the three mindbrain theories
is obvious. [James makes his analysis primarily in
terms of how consciousness is related to the
nervous system. Popper concentrates on what he
calls the relation between the world of subjective
experiences (World 2) and the world of physical
objects (World 1). Broad argues mostly in terms of
a distinction between the mind and the brain and
nervous system. Bunge defends a psychoneural
identity theory, which construes ideation as a
brain process, and which implies that mental
functions are brain functions.] Despite these
terminological and conceptual differences, the three
theories may be described in the following way. The
interactionistic theory asserts that conscious mental
phenomena and neural phenomena are distinct, and
that neural events may bring about and influence
conscious mental events, and vice versa. Also the
epiphenomenalistic theory asserts that conscious

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614 . . .
mental phenomena and neural phenomena are
distinct, and that neural events may bring about and
influence conscious mental events, but the theory
denies that conscious mental events may bring about
and influence neural events. The identity theory
asserts that conscious mental phenomena are neural
phenomena. Consequently, the theory rules out
any of the causal relations characterising the
interactionistic and epiphenomenalistic theories.
This paper will examine the evolutionary argument
for the interactionistic theory, both as the argument
has been developed by James and Popper and as it
has been discussed by Broad. I will also briefly
comment on Bunges criticism of the mindbody
dualism. In the discussion, the interactionistic theory
will be contrasted primarily with the epiphenomenal-
istic theory. I will distinguish between a strong and
a weak sense of the evolutionary argument. In the
strong sense, Darwins theory of natural selection is
understood to be compatible with the interactionistic
theory, but not with the epiphenomenalistic theory;
which means that the epiphenomenalistic theory
can be ruled out on logical grounds. This is, I will
argue, the sense in which Popper (Popper & Eccles,
1977) uses the argument. In the weak sense, an
explanation of the evolution of consciousness by
Darwins theory of natural selection would merely
make the interactionistic theory more plausible than
the epiphenomenalistic theory; the explanation would
not rule out that consciousness has evolved as a
mere epiphenomenon. This is, I will argue, the way
James (1879) uses the argument. I will argue that the
evolutionary argument for the interactionistic
theory is defensible in its weak sense, but that
the argument is untenable in its strong sense. I will
further question Bunges identification of mental
phenomena with certain neural phenomena, partly
on the ground that it presupposes a material-
immaterial distinction, and partly because a complete
ontological mind-brain identity does not seem
logically tenable.
I will refrain from trying to define explicitly the
conceptual distinction I make between conscious
mental phenomena and neural phenomena. (Nor he is not free, being prevented by external force from
will I define explicitly the way I use consciousness,
conscious mental events or neural events.) This means inconsistent with the other aspect of the facts of the
distinction will become clear enough, I believe, as the
discussion proceeds. I should point out from the
outset, however, that I view this distinction, not as
a division between different kinds of stuff, between
something immaterial and something material, but
merely as a division between something subjective
(the conscious mental phenomena) and something
objective (the neural phenomena). I will leave the
ontological issue, whether or not conscious mental
phenomena are material, an open question. [This
will be discussed in Section 2.2.2. The problems of
interpreting the mindbrain distinction has also
been discussed in connection with an analysis of a
mindbrain hypothesis recently proposed by Popper
(Popper et al., 1993); see Lindahl & rhem, 1994,
1996a, b; Libet, 1996, 1997; Beck, 1996.]
2. The Arguments
2.1.
Both James (1879) and Popper (1977, 1978;
Popper & Eccles, 1977) develop their arguments in
opposition to a paper by Thomas Henry Huxley
(1874), defending the epiphenomenalistic theory.
Huxley argues:
The consciousness of brutes would appear to be related to
the mechanism of their body simply as a collateral product
of its working, and to be as completely without any power
of modifying that working, as the steam-whistle which
accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without
influence upon its machinery. Their volition, if they have
any, is an emotion indicative of physical changes, not a
cause of such changes. (Huxley, 1874, p. 575)
Though he mentions only brutes, Huxley obviously
maintains that man is no exception. He says:
the argumentation which applies to brutes holds
equally good of men, and that in men, as in brutes,
there is no proof that any state of consciousness is
the cause of change in the motion of the matter of
the organism (Huxley, 1874, p. 577). Somewhat
unexpectedly, Huxley concludes that this epiphenom-
enalistic interpretation need not prevent us from
attributing free will to animals, and although even
humans are conscious automata, we are neverthe-
less endowed with free will (Huxley, 1874, p. 577).
Huxley illustrates his notion of free will with a
greyhound chasing a hare:
. . . if a greyhound chases a hare, he is a free agent, because
his action is in entire accordance with his strong desire to
catch the hare; while so long as he is held back by the leash
following his inclination. And the ascription of freedom to
the greyhound under the former circumstances is by no
casethat he is a machine impelled to the chase, and
caused, at the same time, to have the desire to catch the
game by the impression which the rays of light proceeding
from the hare make upon his eyes, and through them upon
his brain. (Huxley, 1874, pp. 575576)
Despite the fact that Huxley was an ardent
advocate of Darwins theory of evolution, he does not
put the idea of consciousness being causally inert into

an evolutionary perspective. One may wonder why
Huxley prefers to view the conscious mental processes
as distinct from the neural processesor, as he puts
it, the states of consciousness as distinct from the
molecular changes in the brainand yet deny that of pricking oneself? If one is willing to accept the
conscious events, such as pleasure and pain, have any
function in the struggle for existence. Would it not
have been more reasonable to assume, as adherents
of the interactionistic theory do, that sensations and
other conscious experiences may influence the
individuals chance of surviving and producing
offspring? Or could Huxley not just as well have
adopted the identity theory? Huxley does not discuss
these alternatives.
It is clear, however, that the identity theory
clashes both with Huxleys underlying ontological
assumptions and with his empirical arguments. For
Huxley, the states of consciousness have a different
ontological status from the activities of the brain;
the states of consciousness are immaterial, whereas
the changes in the brain are material. Huxley does not
elaborate on this ontological distinction, and it is not
easy to see what exactly it amounts to. But evidently,
in Huxleys view, nothing prevents material processes
from bringing about and influencing immaterial
processes. It is experimentally demonstrable,
Huxley argues, that a mode of motion of the nervous
system is the immediate antecedent of a state of
consciousness and, he continues, we have as much
reason for regarding the mode of motion of the
nervous system as the cause of the state of
consciousness, as we have for regarding any event as
the cause of another (Huxley, 1874, pp. 574575).
Huxley cannot see, however, that there is any
corresponding evidence that these states of con-
sciousness may, conversely, cause those molecular
changes which give rise to muscular motion (Huxley,
1874, p. 575).
Huxley gives only one example of an experiment
that would demonstrate the existence of a relation of
the first kind, and this experiment is not scientific,
but quite trivial: any one who cares to run a pin into
himself may perform a sufficient demonstration of the
fact (Huxley, 1874, p. 574). The simplicity of the
experiment is not important, however. The remark-
able thing is that Huxley accepts a combination of
intersubjective and introspective evidence as sufficient
for establishing that a relation of the first kind is
causalthe one from the nervous system to the
conscious experiencebut that he does not accept a
similar type of evidence as sufficient for establishing
that a relation of the second kind is also causalthe
one from the state of consciousness to the firing
of motor neurones. Why would the succession of
615
pricking oneself being immediately followed by a
sensation of pain, be more reliable than the succession
of experiencing oneself deliberately initiating an act of
pricking oneself being immediately followed by an act
former succession as causal, why not accept the latter?
Huxley does not say wherein the decisive difference
lies.
2.1.1. Jamess evolutionary argument
James (1879) does not comment on this weakness
in Huxleys analysis, but reasons as if we were to
accept that there is no direct evidence (Jamess
expression) of conscious mental events bringing about
and influencing neural events. There would still be,
James maintains, circumstantial evidence. James
discusses a number of facts (or, strictly speaking,
alleged facts), which, in his interpretation, may be
seen as circumstantial evidence of consciousness being
efficacious.
It is not always clear what James counts as a
separate piece of evidence. But at least four pieces of
evidence, of particular interest to our discussion, may
be discerned. One of the facts is that consciousness
has developed in the biological evolution. And it is
when explaining why this may be seen as evidence
(Evidence 1) of consciousness being efficacious, that
James develops his evolutionary argument. His
hypothesis is that consciousness is an organ added
for the sake of steering a nervous system grown
too complex to regulate itself (James, 1879, p. 18).
The other three pieces of evidence are not decisive
for our discussion of Jamess evolutionary argument.
But two of them (Evidence 2 and 3) are yet of interest
to our discussion, because James seems to regard
them as evidence of the flexibility of complex nervous
systems. And it seems to be this flexibility that he
sees as indirect evidence of the efficaciousness of
consciousness. The fourth (Evidence 4) is relevant
to the question of the role of consciousness in
the biological evolution, independently of Jamess
evolutionary argument.
I shall try to give an account of these four pieces
of evidence, by first suggesting an account of each
alleged fact, and then of Jamess explanation of these
facts. (Even if there may be reasons to question
whether the alleged facts really are, as James seems to
argue, well established, I shall not enter on this issue.)
Evidence 1: consciousness has developed in the
biological evolution
This indicates, James contends, that consciousness
might have been of some use in the struggle for
existence. And this it could only have been, he argues,
616 . . .
if it had been efficacious. He reasons: Consciousness,
namely, has been slowly evolved in the animal series,
and resembles in this all organs that have a use; and
if [consciousness] is useful, it must be so through its
efficaciousness (James, 1879, pp. 3, 18). In The Prin-
ciples of Psychology (1890), where James returns to
this issue, he states: [consciousness] seems an organ,
superadded to the other organs which maintain the
animal in the struggle for existence; and the
presumption of course is that it helps him in some way
in the struggle, just as they do (James, 1890, p. 138).
James (1879) does not specify any stages in the
evolution of consciousness. He merely states that
consciousness has evolved. In Principles he is only
slightly more explicit, stating that consciousness
grows the more complex and intense the higher we
rise in the animal kingdom (James, 1890, p. 138).
This is still very vague. But, even if we cannot be sure
what exactly James means by consciousness having
evolved, it is not difficult to accept that the evolution
of the brain has been associated with some kind of
evolution of consciousness. We need only think of
the difference we make between animals to which we
ascribe mere degrees of awareness and those we take
to be self-conscious. (This will be further discussed in
Section 2.2.1.)
It is important to note that James does not view the
epiphenomenalistic theory to be incompatible with
Darwins theory of natural selection. Nor does he
take the fact that consciousness has evolved to be
sufficient for concluding that consciousness must have
influenced the individuals chances of surviving and
producing offspring. James emphasises that, in order
to refute the epiphenomenalistic theory in favour
of the interactionistic theory, we need also to find
evidence of the nervous system not always being able,
without the assistance of some conscious mental
event, to generate the appropriate behaviour. We
need, he argues, to find evidence of some shortcoming
of the nervous system, and to find some reason for
believing that consciousness could remedy this defect.
He states:
Our problem consequently is: Of what use to a nervous
system is a superadded consciousness? Can a brain which
has it function better than a brain without it? And to answer
this question, we must know, first, the natural defects of the
brain, and secondly, the peculiar powers of its mental
correlate. (James, 1879, p. 4)
The defect is, James suggest, that nervous systems
of a certain complexity become unstable, and that this
instability increases even further with the growing
complexity of the system. James argues that con-
sciousness is needed for the steering of the unstable
nervous system. Jamess notion of instability seems to
be partly a matter of the degree of excitability (i.e. the
readiness to respond to a stimulus), partly of the
range of the repertoire (i.e. the number of alternative
ways of responding to stimuli of one and the same
kind a biological system is capable of), and partly of
the nature of the mechanism determining which of the
possible responses will actually occur. James seems to
mean by a nervous system that has grown too
complex to regulate itself, a nervous system whose
response is easily triggered, highly varying, and
randomly produced. James explains:
An organ swayed by slight impressions is an organ whose
natural state is one of unstable equilibrium. We may
imagine the various lines of discharge in the cerebrum to be
almost on a par in point of permeabilitywhat discharge
a given small impression will produce may be called
accidental [. . .] The natural law of an organ constituted
after this fashion can be nothing but a law of caprice. I do
not see how one could reasonably expect from it any certain
pursuance of useful lines of reaction such as the few and
fatally determined performances of the lower centres
constitute within their narrow sphere. [. . .] In short, a high
brain may do many things, and may do each of them at a
very slight hint. But its hair-trigger organisation makes of
it a happy-go-lucky, hit-or-miss affair. It is as likely to do
the crazy as the sane thing at any given moment. A low
brain does few things, and in doing them perfectly forfeits
all other use. The performances of a high brain are like dice
thrown for ever on a table. Unless they be loaded, what
chance is there that the highest number will turn up oftener
than the lowest? (James, 1879, p. 5)
The relevant property of consciousness, that makes
it reasonable to believe that consciousness can remedy
this defect, James contends, is its capacity for
comparing and selectively attending to experiences.
(At least some of these experiences James understands
to be effects, not of other conscious mental events,
but of sensory stimuli. Thus, the comparing and
selectively attending activities of consciousness imply
that consciousness may be influenced by neural
processes.) James points out: Whoever studies
consciousness, from any point of view whatever, is
ultimately brought up against the mystery of interest
and selective attention (James, 1879: p. 8). After
discussing several examples of this capacity of
consciousness, he concludes:
Looking back then over this review we see that the mind is
at every stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities.
Consciousness consists in the comparison of these with each
other, the selection of some, and the suppression of the rest
by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency of Attention. [. . .]
The items on the mental stage are the subjective aspects
of as many nerve-processes, and in emphasising the repre-
sentations congruous with conscious interest and discourag-
ing all others, may not Attention actually reinforce and
inhibit the nerve-processes to which the representations
severally correspond? (James, 1879, pp. 13, 14)

We may sum up, what we may call Jamess
evolutionary argument, in the following five points.
(i) If consciousness is useful, consciousness must
be efficacious.
(ii) Consciousness has developed in the biological
evolution, and resembles in this all bodily
organs that have a use in the struggle for
existence.
(iii) Nervous systems of a certain complexity
become unstable, and need therefore a steering
mechanism.
(iv) Consciousness has a capacity for comparing
and selectively attending to experiences, and is
therefore suitable as a steering mechanism of
the nervous system.
(v) From (iiv) we may conclude that it is
plausible that consciousness is efficacious
andsince the comparing and selectively
attending activities of consciousness, point
(iv), imply that consciousness may be influ-
enced by neural processeswe may also
conclude that consciousness and the neural
processes interact.
It would carry us too far, to try to determine to
what extent James adhered to his view on the
relation between consciousness and the nervous
system, expressed in the paper in 1879, also after
the publication of Principles in 1890, but it is of
interest to note that he later, in 1904, emphasised that
he for the past twenty years had mistrusted
consciousness as an entity and for the past seven or
eight years had suggested its non-existence to [his]
students, and tried to give them its pragmatic
equivalent in realities of experience (James, 1904,
pp. 477478). He explains:
. . . I mean only to deny that the word [consciousness]
stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it
does stand for a function. There is, I mean, no aboriginal
stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which
material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of
them are made; but there is a function in experience which
thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this
quality of being is invoked. That function is knowing.
Consciousness is supposed necessary to explain the fact
that things not only are, but get reported, are known.
(James, 1904, p. 478)
Evidence 2: the motor reactions to sensory stimuli are
more difficult to calculate in individuals with more
complex nervous systems, than they are in individuals
with less complex systems
James discusses certain differences in the motor
reactions of a frog; an example originally brought up
by Huxley (1874). James compares the reactions of
617
a frog without hemispheres with the reactions of one
with an intact brain. James sums up his point like this:
If we take the actions of lower animals and the actions of
lower ganglia in higher animals, what strikes us most in
them is the determinateness with which they respond to a
given stimulus. The addition of the cerebral hemispheres
immediately introduces a certain incalculableness into the
result, and this incalculableness attains its maximum with
the relatively enormous brain-convolutions of man. (James,
1879, p. 4)
James takes these difficulties in calculating the
motor reactions as evidence of the flexibility of
complex nervous systems. It should be noted,
however, that James seems to maintain that the
motor reactions are difficult to calculate even when
a consciousness may be involved in steering the
reactions. So he is likely to take the difficulties to be,
at least occasionally, due not only to the flexibility
of the nervous system, but also to a flexibility of the
steering mechanism, consciousness.
Evidence 3: individuals with more complex nervous
systems are more able to adapt to changes in the
environment, than individuals with less complex
systems
James also explains this by the flexibility of
complex nervous systems. He seems to argue that
the individuals are able to use the flexibility of
the nervous system to their advantage. James says:
We may thus lay it down as an established fact
that the most perfected parts of the brain are those
whose action are least determinate. It is this very
vagueness which constitutes their advantage. They
allow their possessor to adapt his conduct to the
minutest alterations in the environing circumstances
. . . (James, 1879, p. 5).
Evidence 4: pleasures are generally associated with
beneficial, pains with detrimental, experiences
This makes it plausible, James reasons, that
pleasures and pains are not epiphenomena, but
actually influences the individuals behaviour and
chances of surviving. James refers to Herbert Spencer
as the source of the idea that the association of
pleasures with beneficial and pains with detrimental
experiences is a result of natural selection, and that
the mere action of natural selection [. . .] would
certainly kill off in the long run any breed of creatures
to whom the fundamentally noxious experience
seemed enjoyable (James, 1879, p. 17). (This
example is perhaps not so well-chosen, since it seems
to take for granted that the mental state of finding
a certain experience to be enjoyable makes the
individual try to get this experience. Jamess point
618
seems to be, however, that it seems more far-fetched
to assume that these correlations between pleasures
and beneficial experiences, and between pains and
detrimental experiences, are pure coincidences, or
that they indicate that pleasures and pains are mere
epiphenomena, than to assume that these sensations
influences the individuals behaviour, and that the
correlations have been preserved in the biological
evolution because they have survival value.)
2.1.2. Poppers evolutionary argument
Popper (1977, 1978; Popper & Eccles, 1977) also
uses the evolution of consciousnessor, as he prefers
to put it, the evolution of World 2as evidence for
the interactionistic theory. In his account of the
emergence of consciousness, and in his discussion of
its survival value, Popper distinguishes between three
worlds (Popper & Eccles, 1977, p. 16):
World 1 (the world of physical objects);
World 2 (the world of subjective experiences);
World 3 (the [world of theoretical, i.e. logical,
conceptual, etc.] products of the human
mind).
World 1 is understood to have given rise to World 2,
and this, in turn, to World 3. This tripartite division
is fundamental not only to Poppers interactionistic
mind-brain theory, but also to his objectivist theory
of knowledge (Popper, 1972: chapters 3 and 4, 1973).
In several respects, Poppers explanation of
the evolution of consciousness resembles Jamess
explanation. Like James, Popper compares conscious-
ness to a bodily organ, he suggests that consciousness
is needed because of its selective capacity, and he
emphasises the role of attention in consciousness.
Popper states:
Consciousness is needed to select, critically, new
expectations or theoriesat least on a certain level of
abstraction. [. . .] As a wild conjecture I suggest that it is out
of four biological functions that consciousness emerges:
pain, pleasure, expectation and attention. Perhaps attention
emerges out of primitive experiences of pain and pleasure.
But attention is, as a phenomenon, almost identical with
consciousness: even pain may sometimes disappear if
attention is distracted and focussed elsewhere. (Popper &
Eccles, 1977, pp. 126, 127)
In contrast to James, however, Popper seems to
argue not only that the evolution of consciousness
indicates that consciousness appears to have been
of some use in the struggle for existence, but that
the epiphenomenalistic theory is incompatible with
Darwins theory of natural selection. Popper argues:
It is clear that this epiphenomenalist view is
unsatisfactory. It admits the existence of a World 2,
. . .
but denies it any biological function. It therefore
cannot explain, in Darwinian terms, the evolution
of World 2 (Popper & Eccles, 1977, p. 74).
Later on, Popper explicitly refers to my criticism
of epiphenomenalism as incompatible with the
Darwinian point of view (Popper & Eccles, 1977,
p. 94). Popper sums up, what he calls, the Darwinian
point of view in four principles:
(1) The theory of natural selection is the only theory
known at present which can explain the emergence of
purposeful processes in the world and, especially, the
evolution of higher forms of life.
(2) Natural selection is concerned with physical survival
(with the frequency distribution of competing genes in a
population). It is therefore concerned, essentially, with the
explanation of World 1 effects.
(3) If natural selection is to account for the emergence
of the World 2 of subjective or mental experiences, the
theory must explain the manner in which the evolution of
World 2 (and of World 3) systematically provides us with
instruments for survival.
(4) Any explanation in terms of natural selection is
partial and incomplete. For it must always assume the
existence of many (and of partly unknown) competing
mutations, and of a variety of (partly unknown) selection
pressures. (Popper & Eccles, 1977, p. 73)
It seems to be the third principle, (3), that makes
Popper conclude that the epiphenomenalistic theory
is incompatible with Darwins theory of natural
selection. Further, in this principle, as well as in the
first principle, (1), Popper suggests an interpretation
of the prerequisites for Darwins theory explaining
the emergence of World 2 phenomena, such as
consciousness. I think we may assume, however, that
Popper also takes these prerequisites to hold for the
explanation of the preservation and development of
these phenomena in the biological evolution. (In fact,
it seems to me as if this is really what the theory
of natural selection is all about: the preservation
and development, rather than the emergence, of
phenomena. I shall discuss this later.) It should
also be noted that Popper, like James, understands at
least some of the subjective experiences to be effects,
not of other conscious mental events, but of sensory
stimuli.
Popper seems to assert, in what we may call
Poppers evolutionary argument, four things:
(i) Darwins theory of natural selection is the only
theory known at present which can explain
the preservation and development of con-
sciousness in the biological evolution.
(ii) Darwins theory cannot explain the preser-
vation and development of consciousness,
unless consciousness is understood to provide
the individuals with instruments for survival.

(iii) Consciousness cannot provide the individuals
with instruments for survival, unless con-
sciousness is efficacious.
(iv) From (iiii) we may conclude that the
preservation and development of conscious-
ness in the biological evolution cannot be
explained as being due to natural selection,
in Darwins sense, unless consciousness is
understood to have been efficacious; and, if
we are able to make such an explanation,
we may also conclude, since consciousness
may be influenced by neural processes,
that consciousness and the neural processes
interact.
Poppers interpretation of Darwins theory of
natural selection has been discussed by William
Bechtel and Robert Richardson (1983). As they point
out, Popper (Popper & Eccles, 1977) argues that
Darwins theory of natural selection is incompatible
not only with the epiphenomenalistic theory, but
also with the identity theory. Popper explicitly
refers to the identity theorys incompatibility with
Darwinian principles (Popper & Eccles, 1977, p. 99).
Bechtel and Richardson object to Poppers character-
isation of the identity theory as logically implying
a parallelistic theory (i.e. a theory that mind and
brain are distinct, but causally unrelated). I shall not
discuss Poppers criticism of the identity theory here,
but refer the reader to Bechtels and Richardsons
paper (1983) and directly to Poppers analysis
(Popper & Eccles, 1977, chapters 22 and 23). I should
point out, however, that it seems to me as if Bechtel
and Richardson, by rejecting Poppers parallelistic
interpretation, expose the identity theory to another
severe argument; an argument that Popper tried to
save the identity theory from, by suggesting a
parallelistic interpretation. The argument is, that if
the identity is a complete ontological one, the mental
processes must be understood to have all the
properties that certain neural processes have, and vice
versa; an interpretation that Popper doubts anyone
would seriously try to defend. Popper states:
I very much doubt whether a formulation like mental
processes are identical with a certain kind of (physico-
chemical) brain processes can be taken at its face value, in
view of the fact that we understand, since Leibniz, a is
identical with b to imply that any property of the object
a is also a property of the object b. Some identity theorists
certainly seem to assert identity in this sense; but it seems
to me more than doubtful whether they really can mean it.
(Popper & Eccles, 1977, p. 82)
619
2.2. -
After this account of Jamess pieces of circumstan-
tial evidence, and of Jamess and Poppers versions of
the evolutionary argument, we may now proceed to
Broads criticism of the evolutionary argument and
to Bunges rejection of the mind-body dualism.
The questions to discuss are: do Jamess pieces of
circumstantial evidence, and Jamess and Poppers
evolutionary arguments, really weaken (or refute)
the epiphenomenalistic theory? And do these pieces
of evidence and these arguments really make the
interactionistic theory more plausible? Let us begin
with Broads rejection of the evolutionary argument.
2.2.1. Broads rejection of the evolutionary argument
Huxley does not seem to have responded to Jamess
criticism. When Huxley republishes his paper in his
Collected Essays (1893), he does not mention Jamess
analysis. However, Broad (1925) discusses from an
epiphenomenalistic point of view the idea that an
evolution of consciousness by natural selection would
make the interactionistic theory more plausible than
the epiphenomenalistic theory. (I am here using
epiphenomenalistic as in our definition of the
epiphenomenalistic theory in the Introduction.
Broads terminology is somewhat different, however.
What we call the epiphenomenalistic theory, Broad
calls the theory of One-sided Action of Body on
Mind. Broad applies a more narrow interpretation
of the epiphenomenalistic theory than we do. But this
need not concern us here. I shall continue to follow
our definition.) In fact, Broad discusses an example
of volition being an epiphenomenon (in our sense),
which principally resembles Huxleys example of the
greyhound chasing the hare. In Broads example the
effect is an artificial object, like a book or a bridge,
being necessarily preceded by a certain design and
volition, because these mental events and the artificial
object have a common physical cause. And it is this
physical cause, and not the mental events, that brings
about the artificial object. Broad does not go as far
as Huxley, however, calling the causally inert will a
free will. Nor does Broad personally find the theory
of one-sided action of body on mind convincing. He
points out: One-sided Action of Body on Mind is
logically possible; i.e., a theory which accepts the
action of body on mind but denies the action of mind
on body. But I do not see the least reason to accept
it, since I see no reason to deny that mind acts on
body in volition (Broad, 1925, pp. 117118).
Nevertheless, Broad rejects the idea that an
evolution of consciousness by natural selection would
make the interactionistic theory more plausible than
620 . . .
the epiphenomenalistic theory. Broad discusses a
version of the evolutionary argument, which he
attributes to James. Broad states:
The evolutionary argument runs as follows: It is a fact,
which is admitted by persons who deny Two-sided
Interaction, that minds increase in complexity and power
with the growth in complexity of the brain and nervous
system. Now, if the mind makes no difference to the actions
of the body, this development on the mental side is quite
unintelligible from the point of view of natural selection.
Let us imagine two animals whose brains and nervous
systems were of the same degree of complexity; and
suppose, if possible, that one had a mind and the other had
none. If the mind makes no difference to the behaviour of
the body the chance of survival and of leaving descendants
will clearly be the same for the two animals. Therefore
natural selection will have no tendency to favour the
evolution of mind which has actually taken place. (Broad,
1925, p. 119)
This is clearly a stronger interpretation of the
evolutionary argument than what we call Jamess
evolutionary argument. Broads interpretation
seems closer to what we refer to as Poppers
evolutionary argument. Broad seems to assume
that the evolutionary argument implies that the
epiphenomenalistic theory is incompatible with
Darwins theory of natural selection. What
Broad says about the development of mind being
unintelligible from the point of view of natural
selection, if mind is understood to make no difference
to the actions of the body, seems to follow from what
Popper calls the third principle of the Darwinian
point of view [cf. point (ii) of Poppers evolutionary
argument]. But, even though Broads interpretation
of the evolutionary argument more resembles
Poppers than Jamess version of the argument,
Broads criticism is still relevant to both. He reasons:
Natural selection is a purely negative process; it simply
tends to eliminate individuals and species which have
variations unfavourable to survival. Now, by hypothesis,
the possession of a mind is not unfavourable to survival;
it simply makes no difference. Now it may be that the
existence of a mind of such and such a kind is an inevitable
consequence of the existence of a brain and nervous system
of such and such a degree of complexity. [. . .] On this
hypothesis there is no need to invoke natural selection twice
over, once to explain the evolution of the brain and nervous
system, and once to explain the evolution of the mind. If
natural selection will account for the evolution of the brain
and nervous system, the evolution of the mind will follow
inevitably, even though it adds nothing to the survival-value
of the organism. The plain fact is that natural selection does
not account for the origin or for the growth in complexity
of anything whatever; and therefore it is no objection to any
particular theory of the relations of mind and body that, if
it were true, natural selection would not explain the origin
and development of mind. (Broad, 1925, pp. 119120)
Broad evidently rejects not only the idea that the
theory of natural selection could explain the evolution
of mindwhich we may assume includes also the
evolution of consciousnessonly if mind (including
consciousness) itself influenced the individuals
chances of surviving and producing offspring. He
denies that the theory of natural selection could
explain the origin and the growth of anything at all.
Broad may be understood to argue five things:
(i) natural selection is a purely negative process;
(ii) natural selection tends to eliminate individuals
and species with unfavourable traits;
(iii) if mind is causally inert, mind cannot be an
unfavourable trait;
(iv) if a mind of a certain kind is an inevitable
consequence of a nervous system (including
the brain) of a certain kind, and if natural
selection explains the evolution of the nervous
system, the explanation of the evolution of the
mind will follow inevitably;
(v) natural selection does not explain the origin or
the growth in complexity of anything at all.
The logic of Broads argumentation seems to
be, that the idea that mind has evolved as a mere
epiphenomenon (i.e. as a result of a one-sided action
of body on mind) would be compatible with
Darwins theory of natural selectionif Darwins
theory is understood to account for the evolution
of the nervous systembecause, according to the
epiphenomenalistic theory, the evolution of mind is
an inevitable consequence of the evolution of the
nervous system; but, since Darwins theory of natural
selection does not account for the origin or the
growth in complexity of anything at all, this
compatibility is only of hypothetical interest. Broad
seems to base his rejection of the evolutionary
argument both on the assumption that Darwins
theory of natural selection does not explain the origin
or the growth in complexity of anything at alland,
therefore, need not account for the evolution of
consciousnessand on the assumption that even
if Darwins theory did explain the origin or the
growth in complexity of consciousness and the
nervous system, the theory would not necessarily
make the interactionistic theory more plausible than
the epiphenomenalistic theory, but the evolution
of consciousness could be explained as an epi-
phenomenon of the evolution of the nervous system.
By this latter assumption, Broad seems to imply that
if Darwins theory of natural selection proves to be
just as compatible with the epiphenomenalistic theory
as with the interactionistic theory, referring to
consciousness having evolved will have no power as

evidence for the interactionistic theory, unless we are
able to specify in what way consciousness may have
had a survival value.
Thus, we have three problems to deal with when
examining Broads rejection of the evolutionary
argument. The first has to do with Broads idea
of what mechanisms in the biological evolution
Darwins theory of natural selection can explain:
Can Darwins theory really not explain the origin or
the growth in complexity of anything at all? The
second has to do with Broads idea of how a
phenotype may be related to the selection process,
and yet be possible to explain by Darwins theory
of natural selection: If Darwins theory could at
all explain the origin or the growth in complexity
of consciousness and the nervous system, would
the theory then be just as compatible with the
epiphenomenalistic theory as with the interactionistic
theory? And the third problem has to do with the
validity of the weak interpretation of the evolutionary
argument: If Darwins theory of natural selection
would prove to be just as compatible with the
epiphenomenalistic theory as with the interactionistic
theory, and the strong interpretation of the evolution-
ary argument, therefore, would not hold, would we
then instead be able to come up with a plausible
explanation of in what way consciousness may have
had a survival value?
Let us begin by examining the first problem,
what we understand to be Broads interpretation
of Darwins theory of natural selection [points (i),
(ii), and (v)]. We may imagine the following very
simplified example of three observations of different
stages in the evolution of a nervous system (using the
letters a, b, and c, followed by a subscript number, as
symbols for the individuals, and a superscript number
for the degree of complexity of their nervous system).
t1 (a14, a24, a34, a44, a54, a64, a74, a85)
t2 (b14, b24, b34, b44, b54, b68, b75, b85)
t3 (c18, c28, c38, c48, c58, c65, c75, c85)
In this example the observations are made at
the points of time t1, t2, and t3, respectively. The
individuals observed at t2 are all descendants of some
of the individuals observed at t1, and the individuals
observed at t3 are all descendants of some of those
observed at t2.
Let us assume that in this example the increased
prevalence of individuals with a nervous system of a
complexity 5 or 8, between t1 and t3, and the decreased
prevalence of those with a complexity 4, during the
same period, is partly due to the individuals with
more complex nervous systems being more successful,
than those with less complex nervous systems, in
621
producing offspring, and partly due to the offspring
always developing a nervous system at least as
complex as the most complex system of their parents.
Let us also assume that no individual can have a
viable offspring with an individual whose nervous
system is only half as complex. (This would mean that
individuals with a nervous system of a complexity 8
are of a different biological species than those with a
complexity of 4.)
How could Broads interpretation of Darwins
theory of natural selection be understood to apply to
this example? To begin with, what does Broad mean
by natural selection being a purely negative process
[our point (i)]? Applied to our example, does he mean
that the natural selection of the more complex
nervous systems, in favour of the less complex, work
only by eliminating individuals and species with less
complex systems? This interpretation is not very
plausible. It is important to keep in mind that what
counts in the biological evolution is ultimately how
successful the individuals are in producing viable
offspring (that survive to reproduce). Surviving is
only one of the necessary conditions of this end. Even
though a longer life may provide a greater number
of opportunities, than a shorter life, it is only the
reproductive success that has a direct effect on the
biological evolution. In our example, the mortality
between t1 and t3 may have contributed to the
prevalence of the various nervous system complexities
at t2 and t3, respectively. (It is also true that a
speciesthe nervous system complexity 4had
become extinct at t3. So the natural selection has also
worked by elimination in this respect.) But, again,
an individual need not die to be prevented from
producing offspring.
Perhaps we ought to make a wider interpretation
of point (i). Perhaps Broad, when he says that
natural selection is a purely negative process, is
not only thinking of this process as simply tend[ing]
to eliminate individuals and species which have
variations unfavourable to survival (Broad, 1925,
p. 119). Perhaps he is also thinking of other ways
individuals may be prevented from producing
offspring. Perhaps we should understand point (i) to
mean that natural selection works only by eliminating
various necessary conditions for the reproductive
success of individuals and species. The theory of
natural selection would then partly explain the
decreased prevalence of nervous systems of a
complexity 4 at t2, and also the extinction of this type
of nervous system at t3. The theory would explain
these changes to the extent they were due to
individuals with a nervous system complexity of 4
being prevented from producing offspring. But, and
622 . . .
this seems to be Broads point, the theory would not
explain the origin and preservation of any of the
nervous system complexities 4, 5 or 8.
Is this really a tenable interpretation of Darwins
theory of natural selection? When Darwin defines
natural selection in On the Origin of Species (1859),
he calls attention to both the negative and the positive
aspects of the biological evolution. Darwin compares
natural selection with mans selection in domestic made to other mechanismssuch as certain principles
production:
Can it, then, be thought improbable, seeing that variations
useful to man have undoubtedly occurred, that other
variations useful in some way to each being in the great and
complex battle of life, should sometimes occur in the course
of thousands of generations? If such do occur, can we doubt
(remembering that many more individuals are born than
can possibly survive) that individuals having any advantage,
however slight, over others, would have the best chance of
surviving and of procreating their kind? On the other hand,
we may feel sure that any variation in the least degree
injurious would be rigidly destroyed. This preservation
of favourable variations and the rejection of injurious
variations, I call Natural Selection. (Darwin, 1859,
pp. 8081)
In stock-breeding, the breeder not only prevents
animals with certain traits from producing offspring,
but also actively promotes the survival and pro-
creation of animals with certain other traits. In
nature, the animals are left to themselves and their
environment. Yet Darwin defines natural selection
to include not only the elimination, but also the
preservation of traits. This seems to imply, in our
example, that not only the decreased prevalence of
nervous systems of a complexity 4, between t1 and t3,
but also the increased prevalence of nervous systems
of a complexity 5 or 8, during the same period,
may be viewed as a result of the natural selection in
Darwins sense.
One could say that there has been a growth in
complexity of the nervous system, as a phenotype in
our example, both in the sense that most of the
nervous systems at t3 are more complex than most of
the nervous systems at t2 and t1, and in the sense that
the average degree of complexity has increased
between t1 to t2, and between t2 to t3. This growth may
be explained as a net effect of two changes: the
elimination of nervous systems of a complexity 4,
between t1 and t3, and the origin and preservation of
nervous systems of a complexity 5 or 8, during the
same period. And, as we noted earlier, both these
changes may partly be explained by a natural
selection mechanism: that individuals with more
complex nervous systems are more successful, than
those with less complex nervous systems, in producing
offspring. Hence, to this extent, and contrary to what
Broad argues, Darwins theory of natural selection
may be said to explain the growth in complexity of the
nervous system. Broad could still argue that the
theory of natural selection does not explain the origin
of new nervous system complexities, like, in our
example, the occurrence of a nervous system of
complexity 8 at t2. But this does not affect our
conclusion. The fact that reference also has to be
of inheritance (and, in neo-Darwinian theory,
mutations)in order to explain some aspects of the
evolution of a particular phenotype, does not rule out
that natural selection may partly explain the growth
in complexity of this phenotype.
Now, if I may conclude, as it seems justified to do,
that Darwins theory of natural selection could partly
explain the growth in complexity of the nervous
system, we may proceed to the second problem in
Broads rejection of the evolutionary argument, and
ask: Would Darwins theory then really be just as
compatible with the epiphenomenalistic theory as
with the interactionistic theory?
On this point, I am inclined to agree with Broad.
It seems to me quite obvious that Darwins theory of
natural selection does not rule out that consciousness
may have evolved as a mere epiphenomenon of
the evolution of the nervous system. I do not agree
with, what seems to be Poppers view, that Darwins
theory of natural selection is incompatible with
the epiphenomenalistic theory. There is nothing
contradictory in assuming that consciousness emerges
as a consequence of the nervous system reaching a
certain level of complexity, and that consciousness
then becomes more and more advanced as a
consequence of the growth in complexity of the
nervous system, and that more advanced forms of
consciousness have been naturally selected, in favour
of less advanced forms, partly because individuals
with more complex nervous systems have been more
successful, than those with less complex nervous
systems, in producing offspring, and partly because
the offspring have always developed a nervous system
at least as complex as the most complex system of
their parents. We could, for instance, assume that in
our example of the evolution of a nervous system,
every nervous system has given rise to a consciousness
of a corresponding degree of complexity (and perhaps
intensity). We would then be able to explain the
growth in complexity (and intensity) of consciousness
as party a result of natural selection, without having
to account for a manner in which consciousness may
have influenced the process of natural selection.
(Broad could still argue, however, that the theory of
natural selection does not explain the origin of

consciousness and the origin of new and more
advanced forms of consciousness.)
But, if the strong interpretation of the evolutionary
argumentwhich Broad formulates, and which
resembles the one Popper defendsdoes not hold, are
we then instead able to come up with a plausible
explanation of in what way consciousness may have
had a survival value? To this question there are at
least three affirmative answers. The first is, as we
have seen, Jamess hypothesis, that consciousness
is needed, and also suitable, for steering a nervous
system that has grown too complex to regulate itself.
The second, which we have also seen James discuss
(in connection with his Evidence 4), is the idea that
among the conscious mental events are pleasures and
pains, which generally are associated with beneficial
and detrimental experiences, respectively, and there-
fore likely to have had excitatory and inhibitory
effects on behaviour. The third is an idea, discussed
by Popper, that consciousness makes it possible to
let our theories die in our stead (Popper & Eccles,
1977, p. 210).
The first answer, Jamess hypothesis, is perhaps
the most speculative of the three. Unlike the other
two, Jamess hypothesis cannot be tested to any
extent by introspection. In fact, the hypothesis seems
exceedingly difficultif not impossibleto test at all.
The idea of an individual with a non-conscious but
otherwise intact and normally functioning higher
brain, has to be understood as mere a theoretical
construction. Despite this limitation, however, there
is a way of understanding Jamess hypothesis of why
higher brains are conscious, in which, I will argue, the
hypothesis seems quite convincing.
As we noted in the comments on Jamess
Evidence 1, by a nervous system that has grown too
complex to regulate itself, James seems to mean a
nervous system whose response is easily triggered,
highly varying, and randomly produced. If we take
these responsesor, as James prefer to call them,
performances or things the brain doesto be overt
behaviour, which is what James (1879) focuses on,
they could be of at least two kinds. The one would be
body movements. For example, the direct lifting of
ones legs or arms. The other would be behaviour
achieved by making certain body movements. For
example, walking. The first may be called basic
behaviour, and the second generated behaviour. reflexes, without being governed even by instincts, not
[In action theory a distinction is made between basic
acts and generated acts; see e.g. Goldman (1970), a Jamesian zombie would not have lasted long in the
and Nordenfelt (1987). But since the term acts is
often used only for intentional behaviour, and we are
discussing also non-conscious individuals, I prefer
behaviour, used in a broad sense, to include even
623
reflexes.] In these terms, it does not seem plausible
that James would have meant to suggest that the basic
behaviour of an individual with a non-conscious
complex nervous system would be varying in an
unco-ordinated way. He seems rather to contend that
the generated behaviour would be easily triggered,
highly varying, and randomly produced. Jamess
point seems to be that the more complex the nervous
system is, the richer is the individuals repertoire, and
that without a consciousness, the individual would
be altogether a victim of the environment. James
explains:
Considered merely physically, all that can be said of [the
animals reactions] is that if they occur in a certain way
survival will as a matter of fact prove to be their incidental
consequence. The organs themselves, and all the rest of
the physical world, will, however, all the time be quite
indifferent to this consequence, and would quite as
cheerfully, the circumstances changed, compass the
animals destruction. [. . .] But the moment you bring a
consciousness into the midst, survival ceases to be a mere
hypothesis. [. . .] Every actually existing consciousness
seems to itself at any rate to be a fighter for ends, of which
many, but for its presence, would not be ends at all. (James,
1890, p. 141)
This difference between being merely a victim of the
environment and being a fighter for ends, resembles
a distinction Popper (1982) makes between passive
Darwinism and active Darwinism. In Poppers
analysis, however, passive Darwinism is not confined
to non-conscious organisms. In fact, it is a point in his
analysis that there are evolutionists that tend to
disregard the active role of the conscious mind;
evolutionists that have adopted the view that the
mindlike properties of an organism, such as alertness,
curiosity, or the preference for certain kinds of food,
play a role in evolution exactly like its bodily
properties such as size or color of the hair or the eyes
(Popper, 1982, p. 38).
An individual with a non-conscious but otherwise
intact and normally functioning higher brain, would
be a kind of extreme zombie. In a strict sense, animals
are altogether victims of the environment only when
responding by unconditioned reflexes. The non-
conscious individual, James speculates about, would,
it seems, be a constant victim in this sense. Such an
individual would have a rich repertoire, but would
respond to stimuli from a hostile environment only by
even an instinct of self-preservation. Obviously, such
biological evolution.
When Jamess idea of a nervous system having
grown too complex to regulate itself is understood in
this way, it is not difficult to see that the emergence
624 . . .
of a steering mechanism, that would enable the
individuals to use the rich repertoire and the high
excitability of the nervous system to their own
advantage, would have a survival value. Obviously,
an individual with such a steering mechanism would
have a far greater chance of surviving and producing
offspring than a Jamesian zombie. [Incidentally,
this is why I think that David Chalmers completely
misses the point of the evolutionary argument
when he argues: Evolution selects properties
according to their functional role, and my zombie
twin performs all the functions that I perform just as
well as I do; in particular he leaves around just as
many copies of his genes (Chalmers, 1996, p. 120).]
I also find it easy to agree with James that the fact
that conscious minds have a capacity for comparing
and selectively attending to experiences makes it
reasonable to assume that consciousness, in this
form, actually has had, and still has, this steering
function. But, if consciousness has developed, this
steering function must have changed in the biological
evolution. In order to see what this change could
have amounted to, we need to distinguish not only
between being conscious and being non-conscious,
but also between different degrees and levels of
consciousness. [For a discussion of the coevolution
of cognition and consciousness, see rhem &
Liljenstrom (1997).]
Edelman (1992) makes a useful distinction
between primary consciousness and higher-order adaptive value [=] the property of a given genotype
consciousness.
Primary consciousness is the state of being mentally aware
of things in the worldof having mental images in the
present. But it is not accompanied by any sense of a person
with a past and future. It is what one may presume to be
possessed by some nonlinguistic and nonsemantic animals
[. . .]. In contrast, higher-order consciousness involves the
recognition by a thinking subject of his or her own acts or
affections. It embodies a model of the personal, and of the
past and the future as well as the present. It exhibits direct
awarenessthe noninferential or immediate awareness of
mental episodes without the involvement of sense organs
or receptors. It is what we as humans have in addition
to primary consciousness. We are conscious of being
conscious. (Edelman, 1992, p. 112)
What makes Edelmans distinction particularly
attractive from an evolutionary point of view,
compared with many other analyses of the notion
of consciousness, is his attempt to explain the
development of these two levels of consciousness
in neuroanatomical and neurophysiological terms
[see Edelman (1992), chapters 11 and 12]. Edelman
emphasises that primary consciousness is required
for the evolution of higher-order consciousness.
He speculates about which animals are likely to
have primary consciousness, and suggests that
chimpanzees have it, and probably most mammals
and some birds (Edelman, 1992, p. 122). [Also Eccles
(1989), suggests that the phylogenesis of conscious-
ness is restricted to birds and mammals.] Humans are
understood to have both primary and higher-order
consciousness: we experience primary consciousness
as a picture or a mental image of ongoing
categorized events (Edelman, 1992, p. 119). Higher-
order consciousness, Edelman contends, is associated
with the capability of language. Edelman does not
rule out, however, that even chimpanzees have
some form of higher-order consciousness; but since
they lack our capability of language, their form of
consciousness must be different from ours (Edelman,
1992, chapter 12). Mirror-image experiments clearly
indicate that chimpanzees have a capacity for
self-recognition (Gallup, 1977).
Edelman also discusses whether primary and
higher-order consciousness have adaptive value.
[Hitherto, we have not brought up the notion of
adaptive value, but only discussed the survival value.
The difference between these two notions is
important, but not decisive for our discussion. When
I say this, I am thinking of these notions as they are
defined in King & Stansfield (1985): survival value
[=] the degree of effectiveness of a given phenotype
in promoting the ability of that organism to
contribute offspring to the future populations and
when compared with other genotypes that confers
fitness (q.v.) to an organism in a given environment;
and fitness [=] the relative ability of an organism to
survive and transmit its genes to the next generation.
Hence, according to these definitions, the basic
difference between survival value and adaptive value
would be that the former is supposed to be used of
phenotypes whereas the latter is supposed to be used
of genotypes. But if both are used of the same thing,
consciousness, there would be no decisive difference
between the two.] Edelman bases his discussion on
what seems to be a strong interpretation of the
evolutionary argument. He argues: Obviously, for
that emergence [of primary consciousness] to have
survived, it must have resulted in increased fitness
(Edelman, 1992, p. 118). Edelman assumes that
the acquisition of consciousness either conferred
evolutionary fitness directly on the individuals having
it, or provided a basis for other traits that enhanced
fitness; which implies, he points out, that
consciousness is efficaciousthat it is not an
epiphenomenon (Edelman, 1992, p. 113).
As an example of the adaptive value of primary
consciousness, Edelman calls attention to its capacity

to process and evaluate simultaneous stimuli.
. . . primary consciousness helps to abstract and organize
complex changes in an environment involving multiple
parallel signals. Even though some of these signals may
have no direct causal connection to each other in the outside
world, they may be significant indicators to the animal of
danger or reward. This is because primary consciousness
connects their features in terms of the saliency determined
by the animals past history and its values. [. . .] Primary
consciousness [. . .] is limited to a small memorial interval
around a time chunk I call the present. [. . .] This does not
mean that an animal with primary consciousness cannot
have long-term memory or act on it. Obviously, it can, but
it cannot, in general, be aware of that memory or plan an
extended future for itself based on that memory. (Edelman,
1992, pp. 121, 122)
Higher-order consciousness is understood to
further promote the individuals ability to adapt itself.
Edelman states:
Higher-order consciousness adds socially constructed
selfhood to this picture of biological individuality. The
freeing of parts of conscious thought from the constraints
of an immediate present and the increased richness of social
communication allow for the anticipation of future states
and for planned behavior. With that ability come the
abilities to model the world, to make explicit comparisons
and to weigh outcomes; through such comparisons comes
the possibility of reorganizing plans. (Edelman, 1992,
pp. 133, 135)
Already primary consciousness is evidently a rather
advanced form subjectively experiencing. Primary
consciousness seems to have the capacity for
comparing and selectively attending to experiences,
which James argues characterises consciousness.
This would mean, if primary consciousness is
efficacious, that it may delay the triggering of the
response to a stimulus, and produce, instead of a
random automatic response, a more well adapted one.
But do animals without primary consciousness
completely lack subjective experiences? Would it not
be possible to define a level of consciousness below
the primary consciousness? Ernst Mayr (1982) goes as
far as arguing that the definition of consciousness is
a hopeless task. He argues: Various criteria indicate
that even lower invertebrates have consciousness,
possibly even protozoans in their avoidance reactions.
Whether one wants to pursue this down to the
prokaryotes (for example, magnetic bacteria) is a
matter of taste (Mayr, 1982, p. 74). But even if one
is not willing to go below the vertebrates, it is at least
conceivable that animals below a certain level are
sentient, without having the capacity for selectively
attending to and evaluating simultaneous stimuli.
And we cannot rule out that even such a primitive
form of consciousness would have a survival value.
Regarding the capacity for feeling, it is not difficult,
625
I think, to agree with James that the fact that
pleasures are generally associated with beneficial,
and pains with detrimental, experiences (Jamess
Evidence 4) makes it reasonable to assume that this
ability has had, and still has, an efficacious function.
However, if there are organisms with only a more
primitive form of consciousnessamounting to the
individual being sentient, without having a capacity
for comparing and selectively attending to experi-
encesJamess hypothesis, that consciousness is
needed and suitable as a steering mechanism of a
nervous system that has grown too complex to
regulate itself [cf. the points (iii) and (iv) of Jamess
evolutionary argument], would not explain the
preservation in the biological evolution of this more
primitive form of consciousness.
Higher-order consciousness radically changes the
individuals perspectives, both by introducing a new
cognitive capacitythe ability to model the world
and evaluate possible future scenariosand by
introducing a new categorythe idea of having an
identity. The first makes it possible to calculate the
outcome of possible overt responses, and eliminate
the less appropriate ones, without having to take the
consequences of actually responding. This is where
such things as theories and conceptswhat Popper
calls World 3 phenomenacomes in. As Popper
puts it:
Natural selection, and selection pressure, are usually
thought of as the results of a more or less violent struggle
for life. But with the emergence of mind, of World 3, and
of theories, this changes. We may let our theories fight it
outwe may let our theories die in our stead. From the
point of view of natural selection, the main function of mind
and of World 3 is that they make possible the application
of the method of trial and the elimination of error without
the violent elimination of ourselves: in this lies the great
survival value of mind and of World 3. (Popper & Eccles
1977, pp. 209210)
At least in humans, however, and provided that
consciousness is efficacious, the combination of this
capacity for cognitive modelling and for calculating
possible outcomes with the idea of having an identity
to protect and assert, not only provides the individual
with a powerful tool and driving force in the struggle
for survival and reproduction, but also creates a new
problem and a means for deliberately quitting the
whole game of biological evolution. The new problem
is the awareness of being mortal, and of inevitably
having to face death. Humans are able to plan even
beyond their own death, and may, if consciousness is
efficacious, fight for heroic ends (Becker, 1973),
sacrificing both reproduction and survival. In this
626 . . .
respect, an efficacious higher-order consciousness
may have both an adaptive and a maladaptive
value.
2.2.2. Bunges rejection of the mind-body dualism
Bunge (1979) does not discuss the evolutionary
argument for the interactionistic theory, but his
idea that Darwins theory of evolution is not
compatible with any other mindbrain theory than
the identity theory, is clearly relevant to this
discussion. Obviously, if Bunges interpretation is
correct, the basic assumption (that conscious mental
phenomena are distinct from neural phenomena) of
the evolutionary argument does not holdand,
consequently, our whole analysis up to this point has
been in vain.
Bunge analyses the mind-brain problem (or, as he
calls it, the mindbody problem) in terms of a
material-immaterial distinction. He seems to base
his position on three assumptions: (i) that Darwins
theory of evolution, and the modern neo-Darwinian
theory, rest on the assumption that every phenom-
enon involved in the evolutionary process is material;
(ii) that mental events influence the individuals
adaptation in the evolutionary process; and (iii) that,
if mental events are not identical with neural events,
the mental events must be immaterial. Bunge seems to
reason that for (ii) to be compatible with (i), mental
events must be material, and for this to be possible,
given (iii), the mental events must be identical with
neural events. Bunge argues:
. . . according to the neo-Darwinian theory, evolution
proceeds by genic variation (a material event) and natural
selection (another material event). That theory leaves no
room for immaterial agencies such as non-embodied souls,
ideas in themselves, and other Platonic inmates of Poppers
World 3. Dualists do not accept materialistic (biological)
explanations in the matter of mind: they cannot admit that
molecular changes and environmental factors can act on
minds. So, they must either deny mental evolution
altogether or speculate that it proceeds by some mechanism
other than genic variation and natural (and social)
selection. [. . .] Psychoneural identity theorists, on the other
hand, are in harmony with evolutionary biology and
psychology. In fact to them mental functions are brain
functions, so mental evolution is an aspect of the evolution
of animals possessing brains capable of mindingi.e. the
higher vertebrates. [. . .] the efficacy of behaviour and
ideation is assured by construing them as bodily functions,
whereas if detached from matter they are deprived of
testable power. (Bunge, 1979, p. 58)
I shall not here discuss Bunges material-immaterial
distinction. (I have already argued elsewhere that
I do not find this kind of ontological approach to
the mind-brain problem very fruitful. See Lindahl &
rhem, 1994, 1996b.) I shall confine myself to
commenting on the problem of identifying mental
phenomena with certain neural phenomena. This is,
of course, an ontological problem, but I think that
it can be discussed without involving a material-
immaterial distinction.
In this connection, it is of interest to note that
Darwin discussed ethological problems not only
in biological and behavioural terms, but also in
psychological terms. In Origin, he refers to instincts
as mental qualities and mental actions (Darwin,
1859, chapter VII). In The Descent of Man (1871),
he compares the mental powers of man with those
of lower animals, and the mental faculties of man
with those of higher mammals; he discusses the
intellectual faculties of higher animals; and he
cautions that we may easily underrate the mental
powers of the higher animals, and especially of man,
when we compare their actions founded on the
memory of past events, on foresight, reason, and
imagination, with exactly similar actions instinctively
performed by the lower animals (Darwin, 1871,
chapter II). In Descent, but especially in The
Expression of the Emotions (Darwin, 1872), he
discusses feelings: the lower animals, like man,
manifestly feel pleasure and pain, happiness and
misery; and Great pain urges all animals, and has
urged them during endless generations, to make the
most violent and diversified efforts to escape from
the cause of suffering (Darwin, 1871, p. 39; 1872,
p. 72).
This mental language does not say that Darwin
viewed mind and brain as distinct phenomena. Bunge
refers to a note in Darwins N Notebook from 1838
[published in Gruber (1974)], where he states that the
mind is function of body (N 5). And it is well known
that this appears to have been Darwins view at this
time (see e.g Gruber, 1974; Gould, 1977; Richards,
1987). Darwin does not seem to have analysed more
thoroughly the mind-brain problem. When he finally
devotes a special study to psychological matters,
Expression, he still does not feel certain about the
basic notions. At the end of the study, he notes: In
the course of the foregoing remarks and throughout
this volume, I have often felt much difficulty about the
proper application of the terms, will, consciousness,
and intention (Darwin, 1872, p. 357).
What Darwins terminology seems to show,
however, is that he did not find biological (including
physiological) and behavioural language sufficient for
analysing ethological problems. Even if he continued
to view mind as a function of the body, he evidently
did not abandon the common-sense idea that
subjective experiences, like pleasures and pains,

influence behaviour. Or how else could we understand
what he says about actions being founded on such
things as memory, foresight, reason, and imagination?
And what else could he mean, when he says that pain
urges animals to make efforts to escape from the
cause of suffering?
An identity theorist might argue, however, that
Darwin could, at least in principle, just as well
have discussed the ethological problems in neuro-
physiological terms, and that he used mental terms,
instead of neurophysiological, perhaps out of mere
convenience or lack of knowledge. For an identity
theorist of this kind, mental terms and neurophysi-
ological terms refer to the same events and
processes. The identity theory is therefore also fully
compatible with the idea that consciousness has
evolved by natural selection. But how, more exactly,
could such an identity be understood? If the identity
is understood to be a complete ontological one
which seems to be what Bunge suggeststhe theory
will be subject to the criticism Popper called
attention to (see Section 2.1.2.): that the mental
processes must be understood to have all the
properties that certain neural processes have, and
vice versa. This seems to me to imply, for example,
that if it is the case that each individual conscious
phenomenon (e.g. an instance of toothache) can be
experienced by only one individual (which is
obviously true), then it is also the case that each
individual neural phenomenon can be experienced
(meaning, in this case, observed) by only one
individual (which is obviously not true); and if it is
the case that each individual neural phenomenon
can be experienced by more than one individual
(which is clearly possible, at least in principle), then
it is also the case that each individual conscious
mental phenomenon can be experienced by more
than one person (which is clearly not possible, not
even in principle). In other words, a complete
ontological mindbrain identity, does not seem
logically tenable. [For a discussion in more detail of
the problems of identifying mental events and
processes with certain neural events and processes,
see Smythies (1994); Svensson (1994).]
The difficulties of identifying conscious mental
phenomena with certain neural phenomena have led
to a suggestion to abandon mental language
altogether. Some theorists argue that mental language
is basically misleading, and ought to be replaced by
a neuroscientific language [see e.g. P. M. Churchland
(1981); P. S. Churchland (1986)]. The fact is, however,
that the problem of how mental life is constituted and
how it works will not go away only because we stop
talking about it.
627
To a large extent, the many different attempts
to disregard or explain away conscious mental
phenomena [behaviourismand instrumentalism, in
the tradition of Ryle (1949), e.g. the theory proposed
by Dennett (1991)are further examples] are due
to an uneasiness about the subjectivity of these
phenomena. The objections to attempting a scientific
study of subjective experiences and how these may
be correlated with physiological phenomena, range
from those who argue that such studies would be
illegitimate, to those who declare them logically
impossible. There are those who argue that, since
subjective experiences cannot be directly experi-
enced from a third-person perspective, any study of
such experiences would be unscientific. And there are
those who argue that it simply make no sense to talk
about mental phenomena as something distinct from
physiological phenomena, because mental notions are
not of the same logical category as physiological
notions. These objections may be important for some
aspects of the mindbrain problem, but they need not
be decisive for all empirical investigations of how
subjective experiences are related to physiological
events and processes. I think that it is fully feasible to
view the conceptual distinction between conscious
mental phenomena and neural phenomena as a
division between something subjective (the conscious
mental phenomena) and something objective (the
neural phenomena) (see Lindahl & rhem, 1994),
and yet empirically study how conscious mental
phenomena are related to neural phenomena and
overt behaviour. Why should we not be able to
conjecture from first-hand reports, and even non-
linguistic behaviour, that an individual has had a
certain subjective experience? Would such conjectures
really be based on less direct data than, for
instance, the conjectures made about neural activity
from images on a computer display in conventional
neurophysiological studies? Clearly not. In fact, if we
did not allow of conjectures being made from
indirect data, much of what is generally recognised
as science would have to be rejected.
Much more would be gained, if we, instead of
getting stuck on the issue of the subjectivity of
conscious mental phenomena, and on whether or not
mind is material, seriously faced the challenge of
trying to explain how subjective experiences are
related to physiological events and processes and to
overt behaviour. [For a discussion of consciousness as
a scientific object, see e.g. Libet (1985), and the large
number of open peer commentaries immediately
following his paper in the same issue; Edelman (1992);
Gray (1992); Hesslow (1994); Svensson (1994);
Delacour (1995).]
628 . . .
3. Concluding Remarks
The main conclusion of this analysis is that an
explanation of the evolution of consciousness in
Darwinian terms of natural selection does not rule
out any of the three theories of the relation between
mind and brainthe epiphenomenalistic theory, the
identity theory, and the interactionistic theorybut
the interactionistic theory still seems, for other
reasons, more plausible and more fruitful than the
epiphenomenalistic theory and the identity theory.
We have discussed an interpretation of Jamess
hypothesis that consciousness is needed and suitable
as a steering mechanism of a nervous system that has
grown too complex to regulate itself. We have
analysed this hypothesis as a central part of Jamess
evolutionary argument for the interactionistic theory.
We have noted that, although the hypothesis partly
refers to neurophysiological conditions, it is still more
theoretical than empirical. A further limitation we
have noted is that the hypothesis would not explain
the existence of a more primitive form of conscious-
ness, which would amount to an organism being
sentient without having a capacity for selectively
attending to and evaluating simultaneous stimuli.
We have also commented on the evolutionary
significance, and relevance to an interactionistic
interpretation of the mindbrain relation, of Jamess
observation that pleasures are generally associated
with beneficial and pains with detrimental experi-
ences. We have briefly discussed Huxleys defence of
the epiphenomenalistic theory. And we have noted
that a weakness of this theory (at least in Huxleys
account) is that it fails to make clear why it would
be more justifiable to view successions from neural
phenomena to conscious mental phenomena, than
successions from conscious mental phenomena to
neural phenomena, as causal. The interactionistic
theory is more consistent in this respect. We have
discussed different forms of consciousness and their
possible survival value, and we have called attention
to the possible both adaptive and maladaptive value
of a form of consciousness that enables the individual
to model the world, evaluate possible future
scenarios, and which involves the experience of
having an identity to protect and assert. Finally,
we have also discussed the problem of identifying
conscious mental phenomena with certain neural
phenomena. And we have noted that a complete
ontological mindbrain identification does not seem
logically tenable.
Despite the fact that several mutually exclusive
mindbrain theories seem compatible with the idea
that consciousness has evolved through natural
selection, an evolutionary approach has the advan-
tage over more restricted behavioural approaches
to the mindbrain problem in that it forces us to take
the existence of consciousness seriously. When our
problem is to explain how consciousness has been
preserved and how it has developed in the biological
evolution, we will not be content with a theory
that disregards or explains away this unique and
fundamental aspect of mind. An evolutionary
approach also excludes any parallelistic mindbrain
theory. And as long as the inconsistencies of the
epiphenomenalistic theory and the identity theory
remain unsolved, these theories do not measure up
to the interactionistic theory as explanations of the
preservation and evolution of consciousness.
I would like to thank Michael Ruse for helpful comments
on an earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful to
Peter rhem, Herrick Baltscheffsky, Clas Blomberg, and
Hans Liljenstrom for advice and discussions in the writing
of this paper. This paper was written within a project
financially supported by the Swedish Council for Research
in the Humanities and Social Sciences (F 375/94).
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