Akbayan Youth v.

COMELEC The right of suffrage invoked by
petitioners is not at all absolute. The
Facts: exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the
Petitioners in this case represent the youth sector enjoyment of all other rights is subject to
and they seek to seek to direct COMELEC to existing substantive and procedural
conduct a special registration before the May 14, requirements embodied in our Constitution,
2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. statute books and other repositories of law. As
to the procedural limitation, the right of a
According to them, around four million youth failed citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
to register on or before the December 27, 2000 certain procedural requirements he must
deadline set by the respondent COMELEC. undergo: among others, the process of
However, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be
3584 disapproving the request for additional qualified to exercise his right to vote, in
registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 addition to the minimum requirements set by
of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to
shall be conducted during the period starting one register, at present, under the provisions of
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the
and that the Commission has no more time “Voter’s Registration Act of 1996.” Section 8, of
left to accomplish all pre-election activities. the R.A. 8189, explicitly provides that “No
registration shall, however, be conducted
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed before the during the period starting one hundred
SC the instant case which seeks to set aside and twenty (120) days before a regular election
nullify respondent COMELEC’s Resolution and ninety (90) days before a special
and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 election.” The 100-day prohibitive period
unconstitutional insofar as said provision serves a vital role in protecting the
effectively causes the disenfranchisement of integrity of the registration process.
petitioners and others similarly situated. Without the prohibitive periods, the
COMELEC would be deprived of any time to
Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ evaluate the evidence on the application. If we
of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to compromise on these safety nets, we may very
conduct a special registration of new voters and to well end up with a voter’s list full of flying
admit for registration petitioners and other voters, overflowing with unqualified
similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them registrants, populated with shadows and
to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections. ghosts
Issues: Likewise, petitioners invoke the so called “standby”
1. Whether or not respondent COMELEC powers or “residual” powers of the COMELEC, as
committed grave abuse of discretion in provided under the relevant provisions of Sec. 28
issuing COMELEC Resolution of RA 8436 “Designation of Other Dates for
2. Whether or not the SC can compel Certain Pre-election Acts”.
respondent COMELEC to conduct a special
The act of registration is concededly, by its very
registration of new voters during the
nature, a pre-election act. Under Section 3(a) of
period between the COMELEC’s imposed
R.A. 8189, “(a) Registration refers to the act
December 27, 2000 deadline and the May
of accomplishing and filing of a sworn
14, 2001 general elections.
application for registration by a qualified
voter before the election officer of the city or
municipality wherein he resides and
1. No
including the same in the book of registered

voters upon approval by the Election
Registration Board. Bañares v. Balising

It bears emphasis that the provisions of Section 29 DOCTRINE: The maxim interpretare et
of R.A. 8436 invoked by herein petitioners and concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi
Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by respondent means that every statute must be so construed and
COMELEC, far from contradicting each other. harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence.
SC hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the
present case, for the purpose of upholding the
CASE SUMMARY: P were filed estafa cases,
assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the
but they said case should be dismissed because the
instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law
cases have to be referred first to the Lupon of the
explicitly provides that no registration shall be
barangay. MTC dismissed the cases, but R later
conducted during the period starting one hundred
filed motion to revive case. MTC granted motion to
twenty (120) days before a regular election.
revive. P filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with RTC but RTC denied petition.
The provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would
come into play in cases where the pre-election
Petitioner Contends:
acts are susceptible of performance within
P contend that an order dismissing a case
the available period prior to election day. The
without prejudice may attain finality if not
“stand-by power” of the respondent COMELEC
appealed within the reglementary period. Hence, if
under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the
possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and no motion to revive the case is filed within the
not otherwise. reglementary 15-d period, the order of dismissal
becomes final, and may only be revived by the filing
Moreover, the petitioners in the instant case are not of a new complaint or information.
without fault or blame. They admit in their petition
that they failed to register, for whatever reason, Respondent Contends:
within the period of registration and came to this R submit that cases covered by the 1991 Revised
Court and invoked its protective mantle not Rule on Summary Procedure such as the criminal
realizing, so to speak, the speck in their eyes. cases against P are not covered by the rule
regarding finality of decisions and orders under the
Doctrine: Impuris minibus nemo accedat Revised Rules of Court. They insist that cases
curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean dismissed without prejudice for non-compliance
hands. Well-entrenched is the rule in our with the requirement of conciliation before the
jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and not Lupon concerned may be revived summarily by the
those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantis sed filing of a motion to revive regardless of the number
non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt. of days which has lapsed after the dismissal of the
2. NO SC construed the law by harmonizing with
other statutes. It granted P’s petition, ordered
SC believes that petitioners failed to establish, to estafa cases dismissed. (Ruled in favor of
the satisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled Petitioner)
to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to
effectively compel respondent COMELEC to
conduct a special registration of voters. FACTS:

 MTC granted R’s motion to revive. if no motion to revive the case is filed respondents. and the amount involved in each by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary of the cases did not exceed P200. YES RULING: . P Fidel M. executory since R did not file any MFR of said MTC then dismissed the 16 criminal cases order. finality of decisions and orders under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure to Revised Rules of Court. 18 of the Revised Summary Procedure. ISSUE: WON an order dismissing a case without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within the reglementary period. P filed MFR. 408 of P . the  They filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground court which issued the same loses jurisdiction that case was premature due to failure of thereon and. the said Procedure such as the criminal cases against cases were required under Sec. injunction and failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral of prohibition assailing the MTC Order claiming the cases to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or the criminal cases had long become final and Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. Bañares II. The cases were assigned to the within the reglementary 15-d period. are not covered by the rule regarding the Local Government Code of 1991 and Sec 18. referral to the Lupon had already been complied with. injunction and prohibition. 412. It said the Order  After 2 mos. Emilia Gatchialian and without prejudice may attain finality if not Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen appealed within the reglementary period. 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on accordance with law – Sec. P filed with  The MTC denied MTD on the ground that they the RTC petition for certiorari. R argued that motion to revive was in pursuant to Sec. R submit that cases covered respondents. but they failed to reach an amicable settlement with respect thereto. 20  RTC denied P’s petition for certiorari. Rule on Summary Procedure.00. criminal cases for estafa filed by the private Hence. P averred that since they lived in the same barangay as private  On the other hand. stating that the requirement of SC. with the requirement of conciliation before the Lupon concerned may be revived summarily by the filing of a motion to revive regardless of the number of days which has lapsed after the dismissal of the case. They insist that cases be referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa or dismissed without prejudice for non-compliance Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo in the barangay.  P contend that an order dismissing a case Edgar M. and may only be revived by the filing of a new complaint or information. the order MTC Antipolo. Lilia C. . Valeriano. does not have the authority the parties to undergo conciliation to act on any motion of the parties with respect proceedings before the Lupong to said case. P further argue that after the order of dismissal of a case attains finality. Sec. thus. P filed petition with criminal cases. . R filed motion to revive the has not attained finality. Tagapamayapa. of dismissal becomes final. Bañares.

and therefore Rule 13.Contrary to R’s claim. leads to no other conclusion than has no other remedy but to file a new complaint. Court of Appeals . It is but logical to infer that this principle provisions of Presidential Decree No. an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which  A careful examination of Sec. Section becomes outside the court's power to amend and 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. same would prevent the courts from settling . a party who wishes to reinstate the case amended. To construe Sec. 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on statute must be so construed and harmonized Summary Procedure allows the revival of cases with other statutes as to form a uniform system which were dismissed for failure to submit the of jurisprudence applies in interpreting both same to conciliation at the barangay level. Sections 9 and 10. Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith. This as allowing the revival of dismissed cases even provision shall not apply to criminal cases where after the lapse of the period for appealing the the accused was arrested without a warrant. 18 thereof requirement shall have been complied with. shall be dismissed without governing the same is precisely to settle these prejudice. It is The regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of a final disposition of the complaint. 18 in relation to rendered it to further amend or revoke. — Cases requiring referral must become final at some definite date set by to the Lupon for conciliation under the law. Applicability of the regular rules. and Rule 36. is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen- day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed. 1508 also applies to cases subject to summary where there is no showing of compliance with procedure since the objective of the Rule such requirement. and may be revived only after such cases expeditiously. as modify. as well. the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary dismissing a case without prejudice is a final Procedure expressly provides that the Rules of order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal Court applies suppletorily to cases covered by therefrom is timely filed. Section 2 in relation to prejudice has become final. In Olympia the former: International vs. — not mean dismissal order was any less final. After Sec.The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does Sec. that the rules regarding finality of ---. There sets of Rules. 22. Doctrine: Hence. the principle expressed in the maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi. 22 of the 1991 Revised Rule of Summary the order of dismissal of a case without Procedure and Rule 40. This Court has previously held that an order Moreover. the rule applies judgments also apply to cases covered by not only to civil cases but to criminal cases the rules on summary procedure. or that every R claim that Sec. The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on public policy and sound practice that judgments Referral to Lupon. After the lapse of the fifteen-day period.

petitioners mortgaged their 200 sqm offer of purchase. He also enclosed 10k in check as earnest money. Decision of the RTC is set offered to purchase the property for 250. they filed a case with the RTC of QC extension of 30 days to the November date. The Gsis AAD declined. Having learned about the transaction with dela The petitioners asked for more time to recover the Cruz. on the other hand. Was Gsis in bad faith in dealing with petitioners? property.000 downpayment with Procedure. It October 16. justiciable controversies with finality. pursuant cash. the petitioners requested the formal property while the Acquired Assets Department investigation with the GSIS regarding the sale. had their loan the property and emerged as the highest bidder. The Board informed them that it had adopted VDA. request rescinded because a certificate of award or sale was not issued in favor of the applicant. the 124k balance to be paid in 5 years. Hence this petition. GSIS bid 154k on The petitioners. Criminal Cases are DISMISSED. GSIS negotiated with Dela Cruz for the purchase of the property.000 with the GSIS real property through public bidding? estate department to repurchase their foreclosed 3.000 spot aside. A new TCT was issued to her. 1984. Urbano the petitioner. 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary petitioners then offered a 50. DISPOSITION: The respondent De La Cruz entered the picture and Petition is GRANTED. Ruling: Petition Dismissed Ratio: . They wrote to the GSIS Acquired Assets Moreover. to Gsis to secure a housing loan. upheld by the court of appeals. 1. Failure branch 102. Does GSIS have a duty to dispose of the subject to file a loan worth 240. Facts At the same time. In 1984. the the petitioners were unable to pay. thereby Despite attempts from Vice Governor Mathay to undermining the stability of our judicial system. The petitioners wrote again requesting for remortgage through repurchase of the Issues: property. property in Q. Do petitioners have a right to repurchase the subject property? The petitioners wrote to the Board for an approval 2. GSIS told them to pay the redemption wasn’t given due consideration. Without knowledge of the rival offer. They accepted her In 1971. was Department signifying their intent to reclaim.C. GSIS then issued a TCT in its favor. price of 154k in full before Nov 18. Not subsequently told them to pay 174k in cash with an satisfied. adjust to a more liberal arrangement for the petitioners. the petitioners tried to reclaim their property. the applicant. to do so forfeited the reclamation of the The petition was dismissed. GSIS foreclosed the mortgage in 1988. The same view was property and sold in a public bidding. On 81 years old and no longer a member of the GSIS. the to Sec. De Urbano v. GSIS resolution 881 that declined their offer to repurchase. Since they were unable to pay the loan.

faulted for their failure to repurchase as it acted and it is an established rule of law that all under the petitioner’s application under Operation acts in pari material are to be taken together as if they were one law. condition of financial accommodations to its SC. No Pabahay. the petitioners were sale thru negotiation. failure. the Court held the question whether the subject observation was that the petitioners lacked the property was covered by the said Circular or capacity to pay up. The sale to respondent can’t be annulled Charter of the GSIS was PD 1146 which stipulated on such invoked “right”. falls under its exception. . and dispose of real or personal properties in the 2. the In the comments of the AAD manager..aver that Sec. repeatedly unable to fulfill their obligations to pay. And it was still used by petitioners. Why? The provision (SEC 79) members with the dual purpose of making the applies only to unserviceable govt property or those GSIS more responsive to the needs of GSIS no longer needed. Philippines or elsewhere. proclamation no 50. The house was obviously not members. utilize. the Court also held that repurchase business.The laws granted the GSIS Board the power to apply because it covered unserviceable govt exercise discretion in determining the terms and property and not acquired assets. the power of the GSIS to acquire. It was amended by PD Pets. in held for sale in the regular course of Natino v IAC. could exercise discretion on whether to accept or With regard to COA Circular 86-264 or the reject petitioner’s offer to repurchase the subject “General guidelines on the divestment or disposal property taking into account the dual purpose of assets of government owned corporations” the enunciated in the whereas clause of PD 1981 which law stipulated that it availed of an exception made the GSIS more responsive to the needs of its to the requirement of disposition members. It held that 89-296 was to be interpreted with 86-264 in The petitioners are not entitled to a request adherence with stat con wherein statutes that for repurchase as a matter of right. Doctrine: With regard to these 2 laws. No. The laws also stipulated that the Board unserviceable.1. The modes of disposal included Public auction and Based on the circumstances.Gsis was right. through a public sale. The agreement with de la Cruz was valid. The Court read it in relation to Coa of foreclosed property after redemption period circular 89-296 which provided for “Audit imposes no such obligation on the purchaser (the Guidelines on the Disposal of Property and other board in this case) to re-sell the property since the Assets of Government Agencies”. 79 of PD 1445 and the COA 1981 which gave the GSIS the power to compromise Circular 86-264 mandated the GSIS to dispose of or release any claim or settled liability to the the assets through public bidding and only upon its system. through public bidding and such exception applied to sales of merchandise With regard to the Board’s exercise of discretion. which also did not property belongs to him (the board as well) apply the public bidding disposal requirement to merchandise or inventory held for sale in the The board’s denial of petitioner’s request to regular course of business nor to the disposal by purchase the subject property was not based on gov’t financial institutions of foreclosed assets or whim but on a factual assessment of the financial collaterals acquired in the regular course of capacity of the petitioners to make good their business and not transferred to the Govt under repeated offers to purchase the subject property. The Board relate to the same thing ought to be taken in exercised its discretion in accordance with law in denying their requests and the GSIS can’t be consideration in construing any one of them. GSIS contended that SEC 79 of PD 1445 did not SC.

This was in pursuance to COMELEC Resolution No. the court looked into the intent of both laws and held that these were used to generate more revenue for GOCC’S through the disposition of its non-preforming assets. 3992[6] promulgated on April 24. which of acquired assets then governed the case at bar. Can’t demand to be the said Resolution of the Office of the informed of such public negotiation since they had President.. 2001. . 2001. can’t also impute bad faith on GSIS when it entitled Vice Governor Danilo P. Lina. Jr. no public official shall make or cause any transfer/detail whatsoever of any officer or employee in the civil service. 2001. P-16-99) case. municipal or barangay official. and thus did not offend July 1. 3. denied petitioner Governor Antonio Calingins Was the property covered by the public bidding petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary exceptions in these laws? The court said yes.R. Prohibited Acts (a) During the election period from January 2. The DILG Memorandum bore the authority of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which granted an exemption to the election ban in the movement of any public officer in its Resolution No. or suspend elective provincial. issued a Memorandum [4] implementing private transaction. by authority of Secretary Jose imbued by public interests as it was a purely D. 2001. except upon prior written Calingin v. including public school teachers. Calingin for 90 days. 2001 of the to the court. Also. are as factual determination of the petitioners’ financial follows: capacity and the GSIS charter. In the versus Governor Antonio P. PD 1146. the court held that the Oriental) suspending Gov. SP No. was secretly negotiating with Dela Cruz. (Look into PD 50 or Before us is a petition for review seeking to the asset privatization trust in the case) According annul the Resolution[1] dated May 11. Gov. Lagbas. reconsideration. Resolution[3] dated March 22. CA approval of the Commission. GSIS denial of petitioners’ further requests for The antecedent facts. 2001 until July 13. on the strength of the Valmonte 00-1-9220 (DILG ADM.Moreover. which restraining order and/or the issuance of an order meant that their sale negotiation fell under the of status quo ante. city. the policy intent on the disposition Court of Appeals in CA-G. No. as well as its Resolution [2] dated regular course of business. Calingin filed no interest on the subject property since they failed before the Office of the President a Motion for to comply with the GSIS terms of repurchase and Reconsideration. GSIS sold the property to dela Cruz only after giving The Office of the President issued a them one year to repurchase. et al.The sale of the property was not Government (DILG). Undersecretary Eduardo R. The petitioners. 64583. Pets.[5] the denial to repurchase under the GSIS terms. On constitutional right to information was limited to April 30. Case No. 3401 which provides in part that Section 1. On May 3. 2002. Calingin (Misamis Valmonte case. 2001 in OP Case No. Soliman matters of public concern to transactions involving of the Department of the Interior and Local public interest. denying the motion for the requirements of the said coa circulars. as summarized by the repurchase of subject property was based on a Court of Appeals and borne by the records.

Thus. action against an elective local official. [15] Rule 43 of the (2) Was the exemption from the election ban in Revised Rules of Court. 12. 2001. In dispute is the validity of the DILG [13] Further. On May 7. particular case. We are asked 1987. Gov. that which was specially intended for the said case must prevail. 2001. FINDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS FINAL AND The case on hand involves a disciplinary EXECUTORY AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 67. Court of Appeals. Under the Petitioner’s Contention: same case of Lapid v. However.[12] we DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD IS WITH held that it is a principle of statutory construction AUTHORITY FROM THE COMMISSION ON that where there are two statutes that apply to a ELECTIONS. In statutory construction. OF REPUBLIC ACT 7160.[18] we enunciated that the decisions of the Office of the Petitioner contends that decisions of the Office President under the Local Government Code are of the President on cases where it has original immediately executory even pending appeal jurisdiction become final and executory only after because the pertinent laws under which the the lapse of 15 days from the receipt thereof and decisions were rendered mandated them to be so. the sangguniang panlalawigan. No motion for of the Administrative Code of 1987. Court of Appeals. Sec. and sangguniang petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred bayan of municipalities within the Metro Manila in Area. Book VII President are final and executory. the Office of the President shall be final and executory. Court of Appeals dismissed the said petition and by applies only to decisions of the Office of the resolution issued on July 1. reconsideration is allowed by law but the parties may appeal the decision to the Court . 2002. THE Local Government Code is the applicable law LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.[14] (1) Was the decision of the Office of the President already final and executory? and Besides. this appeal by certiorari where independent component cities. on May 11.[9] Chapter 3. denied petitioners President on administrative cases appealed from motion for reconsideration. which provides that decisions of the suspension order. 1. It does not cover decisions on cases where the Office of the President has original jurisdiction such FINDING THAT THE EXECUTION OF THE as those involving a Provincial Governor.[16] Rule 43 of the the movement of any public officer granted by Revised Rules of Court in relation to Sec. [10] prevent the DILG from executing the assailed Act 7160). Calingin filed a petition Petitioner further contends that Section 67. even though appeal to the Court of Appeals is granted under Sec. the CHAPTER 4. 68 [17] of COMELEC valid? the Local Government Code provides for the immediate execution pending appeal. sangguniang panlungsod of highly-urbanized cities and Hence. for prohibition before the Court of Appeals to Chapter 4 of the Local Government Code (Rep. that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration shall suspend the running of the said period[8] in In sum.[11] SUSPENSION ORDER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT Doctrine: In Lapid v. all laws or parts to resolve in this connection two issues: thereof which are inconsistent with the later law are repealed or modified accordingly. the Local Government Code of 1991 was Memorandum implementing the suspension order enacted much later than the Administrative Code of issued by the Office of the President.[7] and must prevail over the Administrative Code which is of general application. the decisions of the Office of the accordance with Section 15.

does not stay the 1.P. P1. duly signed and promulgated. Petitioner maintains 7084. with the City Treasurer of the City of Naga a claim for refund of the following amounts. 360 of the City of Naga enforceable in 1971 the year following its approval A perusal of the records. 3992. reveals that and requiring petitioners to pay to private the Resolution in O. et that a draft cannot produce any legal effect. 3992 on April 24. of the decision of the Court of resolution of a case until the proper resolution is First Instance of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No. 2[20] of COMELEC Resolution No. and Affidavit of Controversion. 1970. 2001. the City of Naga enacted Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the Ordinance No. Reply and Draft Resolution. and submitted together with the formal Catalino Agna paid P1.. SP No. 360 changing and amending the President pursuant to the requirements stated in graduated tax on quarterly gross sales of the Resolution. 1971. 2001 by the Senior On June 15. According to him.17 as complaint executed under oath and containing the per Official Receipt No. 1970 to September 30. together with WHEREFORE. al. et al. 2002 in CA-G. to Felipe Agna. and the reason for said movement. of Appeals resolutions dated May 11. As to the validity of the exemption granted by COMELEC in its Resolution No. versus City of Naga. There being a proper basis for its grant of exemption. indicating the office and place from which the 1970. which We treat as a draft resolution does not operate as a final special civil action.81. The record also shows respectively. 3992 is On February 13. COMELEC Resolution No. Hence. 4 of the City of Naga to percentage tax on gross Moreover. specific charges and the answer to said complaint.17. Agna claims that the exemption was invalid for being based on a mere draft resolution. The request for the exemption was Felipe Agna paid P625. 2002 and July and to Salud Velasco. The pertinent documents required by Salud Velasco paid P129.of Appeals. 00-1-9220 was respondents the amounts sought for in their approved and signed on March 22. Thus. the approval was Vicente P.805. the instant petition for interests thereon from the date of payments: To review on certiorari is DENIED. Official Receipt No.R. the DILG Secretary AFFIRMED. P127. The assailed Court Catalino Agna. Included Executive Secretary Renato de Villa by the in the present controversy as proper parties are authority of the President. Case No. that the request to implement the said suspension order was filed on March 22. sales provided for in Section 2 thereof.555. private respondents filed valid.00.81 as per the COMELEC to substantiate the request were Official Receipt No. 1826594. 1820339. however. private respondents paid to the City relation to Sec. merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No.00 as per accompanied with the Affidavit of Complaint. The appeal. however. submitted. may validly move for its immediate execution. 2001 by complaint plus attorney's fees and costs. of Naga the following taxes on their gross sales for 3401 merely requires the request to be in writing the quarter from July 1. Petition for review on certiorari. Pursuant to 3529[19] which may be applied by analogy and in said ordinance. 64583 are hereby execution of the decision. 1826591. representing the difference between the amounts they paid under . the City before the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution Mayor and City Treasurer of the City of Naga. entitled Agna. No. declaring Ordinance No. Cleope. petitioner City of Naga v. P560. as follows: officer is removed. COMELEC Resolution No. Sibulo and Joaquin C.

Ordinance No. that is in July that the refund prayed for by the private 1970. 4 of the City of Naga. September 30. oppressive and arbitrary. 1970 to them. 7084). did not take effect in 1970. otherwise known as the Charter .000. quarter of the year of its approval. and to Salud under existing law the City of Naga is authorized to Velasco. null and void. that the private which amended Section 3. During the hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and at the pre- The City Treasurer denied the claim for refund of trial conference as well as at the trial on the merits the amounts in question. respectively are alleged that under existing law." which ordinance was transmitted to therefore. the sum of unless otherwise stated in said ordinance. P127. 305 and required the petitioners to reimburse the (Charter of the City of Naga) an ordinance takes following sums.00 as exemplary damages. the year it validity and/or constitutionality of the provisions of was approved but in the next succeeding year after Ordinance No. 1970. the P500. that petitioners Vicente 305.555. the taxes they paid in 1970 on their gross unlawful and malicious filing of the claim against sales for the quarter from July 1. the City Mayor P250. quarterly sales or receipts on all businesses in the 360 declared unjust. 360.00. invoking Section 14 of Republic Act No.00 and P12. series complaint does not allege facts sufficient to justify of 1970 of the City of Naga. and City of Naga. seeking to have Board of the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No.17.00 respectively. that is. that the said 1970 of the City of Naga was enforceable in the year ordinance was published in accordance with law. i. prayed that the petitioners be enjoined from but that on February 15. year following the year of its approval. to have Sections 4. not proper parties in interest. Cleope. 1971. Petitioners counterclaimed for the year of its approval. respondents is untenable. in 4. took effect in the the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. the Petitioners' submit that Ordinance No. They and Treasurer of the City of Naga. Ordinance No. no cause of action against them. that private respondents voluntarily paid the sum of P1.. from the date they paid their taxes effect after the tenth day following its passage to the City of Naga: to Catalino Agna. or in 1971. as amended. that P1. 1971.000. and to require petitioners the City Mayor for approval or veto on June 25. 360.Section 3. pursuant to Ordinance No. following the date of its approval. and that P20. Ordinance No. 1970 were illegal and should be refunded to them by the petitioners. the parties agreed on the following filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of stipulation of facts: That on June 15. 360 declared effective only in the 360 entitled "An ordinance repealing Ordinance No. 360. they filed a claim for enforcing Ordinance No. the respondent Judge rendered "compelled" but voluntarily made the payments of judgment holding that Ordinance No. imposing a sales tax on the 1971.00.00. Sibulo and Joaquin C. the petitioners among other things. 360.e. So private respondents of the case. the City Naga (Civil Case No. Private respondents further the gross sales tax. to Felipe Agna.81 and the corresponding interests impose certain conditions to secure and accomplish from the filing of the complaint up to the the collection of sales taxes in the most effective reimbursement of the amounts plus the sum of manner. 6 and 8 of Ordinance No. 360. that is. P. in such amount as the court may determine. 360. that the ordinance was duly posted in the thereon from the date the taxes complained of were designated places by the Secretary of the Municipal paid and to pay all legal costs and attorney's fees in Board. series of their taxes under Ordinance No. for the alleged therefore. refund with the City Treasurer who denied the same. In their answer. claimed that private respondents were not On October 9. P65. to refund the sums being claimed with interests 1970. that granting that the collection of taxes can be enjoined.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the petitioners allege that the private respondents have proceedings. As special and affirmative defenses. in 1971 that in accordance with Republic Act No. 360. 1 as amended. 4 of the respondents are estopped from questioning the City of Naga. P560. Ordinance No.

1970. series of approved after the lapse of ten (10) days from June 1970 of the City of Naga. of Republic Act No. or as earlier explained. According to the succeeding year. the ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day same should take effect in the next succeeding year after its passage unless the ordinance shall provide after the year of its approval or in 1971. 1970. the divergence of opinion as to when after its passage by the Municipal Board of the City Ordinance No.. 305. 1970. it enforceable is mainly due to the seemingly could have taken effect on July 6. pursuant to Section 2309. a municipal license tax already in Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1970 or on July 6. 360 became effective and 360 was enacted by the Municipal Board of the City enforceable in 1971. ". the year following the year of of Naga on June 15. On this date.. which is the fifteenth day Evidently. 1970. Administrative Code which provides: 1970 3 but it was not acted upon by the City Mayor until August 4.of the City of Naga. 1970. 305.—A should have taken effect after the 10th day municipal license tax already in following its passage on June 15. 360 was deemed approved. or on June existence shall be subject to 25. 1970. it is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1970.. is one which changes the 25. otherwise'. Of the two provisions invoked by there really such a conflict in the above-mentioned petitioners to support their stand that the provisions? It will be easily noted that Section 2309 ordinance in question took effect in the year of its of the Revised Administrative Code contemplates of approval. but an entirely same Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1970. and be enforced on and after the 10th day following its passage unless otherwise stated in said On the other hand. said ordinance and duration of license. Ordinance No. 360 became receipts of dealers of merchandise and sari-sari effective. Imposition of tax Section 14 of Republic Act No. Is upon its approval. 2264 (Local City of Naga to a percentage tax on their gross Autonomy Acts) 5 which expressly provides: "A tax sales prescribed in the questioned ordinance. private respondents contend ordinance . namely: (1) a (Local Autonomy Act) that is more relevant because municipal ordinance which changes a municipal it is the provision that specifically refers to license tax already in existence and (2) an effectivity of a tax ordinance and being a provision ordinance which creates an entirely new tax." Since the ordinance beginning of any subsequent in question was not returned by the City Mayor quarter. "if within new tax may be created by any 10 days after receipt of the ordinance the Mayor ordinance enacted during the does not return it with his veto or approval 4 the quarter year effective at the ordinance is deemed approved. 360. with his veto or approval within 10 days after he received it on June 25. provides City of Naga) in so far as effectivity of a tax that "Each approved ordinance . among others. 1970 2 and was transmitted to its approval. Ordinarily. which. invoking Section 2309 of the Revised the City Mayor for his approval or veto on June 25. They further contend that even under merchants provided for in Ordinance No. 4 of the Section 2. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). that Ordinance No. 305 (Charter of the existence shall be subject to change only by an . the date the apparent conflict between Section 2309 of the ordinance was deemed approved because the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of ordinance itself provides that it shall take effect Republic Act No. shall take effect ordinance is concerned.. 360 took effect and became of Naga on June 15. 360 could have taken effect on June 30. 2264 two types of municipal ordinances. But because the ordinance itself provides change only by ordinance enacted that it shall take effect upon its approval. the existing graduated sales tax on gross sales or petitioners claim that Ordinance No. They contend that Ordinance No. it prior to the 15th day of December becomes necessary to determine when Ordinance of any year after the next No. the same was deemed They submit that since Ordinance No. Under of much later law it is deemed to have superseded the first type.

When statutes ordinance creating an entirely new tax in Section 2 are in pari materia. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) construction dictates that they should be construed which merely refers to a "tax ordinance" without together. The same subject in the absence of words to that effect conflict. All that is mentioned therein new provision in accordance with the legislative is Section 9 which reads: policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all should Section 9 — All acts. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) in so existing legislation on the same subject and to have far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned? An enacted its new act with reference thereto. or to the same class of persons or things. if any. or unless the new law is evidently provisions can be reconciled by applying the first intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter clause of Section 2309 of the Revised . is more apparent than real. Every new year. The harmonize and stand together. 8 Having examination of Republic Act No. 9 In construing them the old orders. when the new provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be The foregoing provision does not amount to an reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter express repeal of Section 2309 of the Revised expression of the legislative will. 10 Actually we do Administrative Code.. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) refer to the same ordinance where an entirely new tax may be subject matter-enactment and effectivity of a tax created by any ordinance enacted during the ordinance. administrative orders. And the two between them. This means that the ordinance enacted prior statute should be construed in connection with to the 15th day of December changing or repealing those already existing in relation to the same a municipal license tax already in existence will subject matter and all should be made to have to take effect in next succeeding year. 2264 (Local thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the Autonomy Act) fails to show any provision expressly same subject matter. We do not find any such materia when they relate to the same person or distinction between an ordinance which changes a thing. It is a well established not see any conflict between Section 2309 of the principle in statutory construction that a statute Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of the will not be construed as repealing prior acts on the Republic Act No. whenever the legislature repealing Section 2309 of the Revised enacts a new law. or municipal license tax already in existence and an 7 have the same purpose or object. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). if they can be done evident purpose of the provision is to enable the by any fair and reasonable interpretation . provision of each.. In this respect they can be considered quarter year to be effective at the beginning of any in pari materia. 6 It taxpayers to adjust themselves to the new charge or will also be noted that Section 2309 of the Revised burden brought about by the new ordinance.ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of in hand and to comprise itself the sole and complete December of any year after the next succeeding system of legislation on that subject. that Now to the meat of the problem in this petition. be compared with the new provisions and if possible inconsistent with any of the by reasonable construction. . executive be construed together. Is later statutes are supplementary or complimentary not Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its Code deemed repealed or abrogated by Section 2 of acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the Republic Act No. it is deemed to have enacted the Administrative Code. both should be so provisions of this Act are hereby construed that effect may be given to every repealed and modified accordingly. statutes relating to the same subject matter should proclamations or parts thereof. Statutes are said to be in pari subsequent quarter. However. This is Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act different from the second type of a municipal No. legislature on the same subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform system. This is because enactments of the same any qualification whatsoever. It is one unless there is an irreconcilable repugnancy that is not incapable of reconciliation. the rule of statutory of Republic Act No.

But under the Constitution to authorize expropriation where the problem refers to effectivity of an of lands. 1959 year after the year of its approval or in 1971 and private respondents should be refunded of the taxes RA 2616 took effect without executive approval— they have paid to the petitioners on their gross sales for the quarter from July 1. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) With the ff opinions:Zaldivar. Congress: RA 2616 August 3. 1963 Short version: RA 2616--the expropriation of the RA 2616 was decided unconstitutional. v. II. in favor of the petitioner JM Tuason & Co. effectivity of an ordinance changing or repealing a reviewing the scope of power given to Congress municipal license tax already in existence.. concurs in the In the case before Us. J. (to be interests from the filing of the complaint until subdivided into small lots and sold to their reimbursement of the amount. concur in the opinion of Justice No. Respondent Land Tenure Administration instituted the proceeding for the expropriation of the Tatalon Teehankee (Chairman). the ordinance in question is result. the instant petition is hereby dismissed. 4 of the City of Naga to percentage tax on their Tehankee gross sale-an ordinance which definitely falls within the clause of Section 2309 of the Revised Facts: Administrative Code. occupants) was authorized by Congress in view of social and economic problems..B. Reyes. 1960 SO ORDERED. Secretary. November 15. JJ. concur.Concepcion. let Section 2 of Republic Act No.Administrative Code when the problem refers to the The Supreme Court then reversed this decision. JJ. concurs and dissents in a separate sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise and sari. Accordingly it should be effective and enforceable in the next succeeding I. Villamor.. 1970 to expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon September 30.L.. 1970 plus the corresponding City owned by petitioner JM Tuason & Co. granting the Tatalon Estate authorized by Congress (the first writ of prohibition. proceedings . C. concur. J. concurs in a separate opinion. 1960Petitioner JM Tuason & Co. Makasiar. as directed by the Executive Muñoz Palma. J. Lower Court: RA 2616 is unconstitutional J. Esguerra and Estate RA 2616.M. Tuason & Co. Sanchez and govern. Land Tenure Admin November 17.. Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction Date: February 18.. JJ. was decided unconstitutional by the lower III. ordinance creating an entirely new tax. J.Makalintal.J. 1970Ponente: Justice Fernando January 10. one which changes the graduated sales tax on gross Tehankee. statute to be specifically tailored to expropriate land).Barredo. opinion. filed special action for prohibition of RA 2616 with Doctrine: Constitutional ConstructionNature: preliminary injunction against the respondents to Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court for restrain expropriation proceedings. SC: Reversing the decision and further court. Dizon and sari merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance Castro.

counsel for the accused filed Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. People. Trial court granted both counsels’ motion and gave March 30. February 18. counsel for the accused moved for postponement. respondent judge granted the counsel’s request and reset the Held: No. 1970 them thirty (30) days to submit their memoranda. 3453)-. 1976. 1976. 1. Tuason & Co. 1975) protection of laws. 1970 On January 19. and setting aside the Rizal. Petitioner was charged with rape before the On January 12. Cruz the decision. counsels for the accused (petitioner) and complainant People of the The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s Philippines in the rape case filed before the CFI of decision that RA 2616 is unconstitutional—denying the writ of prohibition. June 15. (30 days from August 04. 1975 concludes on Motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner invoking his rights to due process & equal September 03. has already been commenced. counsel for the accused moved anew for the resetting of the promulgation of Marcelino v. through counsel. 1970 On the same date. and respondent judge granted the same and moved anew the promulgation on FACTS: January 26. moved for time within which to submit their preliminary injunction filed by petitioner JM respective memoranda. 1975. promulgation to January 19. 1975. 1976. 1976. The expropriation of the Deputy Clerk of Court his decision in said for Tatalon Estate in Quezon City is unconstitutional promulgation. respondent judge filed with Petitioner filed for a rejoinder. 1975. May 27. (as amended by RA November 28. filed his memorandum SG Felix Antonio filed detailed opposition to the in due time.prohibiting the enforceability of ejectment proceedings or the continuance of a proceeding that On the date set for promulgation of the decision. Petitioner. The decision was also dated pursuant to RA 2616 sec 4. but no memorandum was filed by the reconsideration. Issue: Is RA 2616 (rightfully amended) citing the loss of jurisdiction of the trial court for unconstitutional because it violates the petitioner’s failure to decide the case within 90 days from rights to due process and equal protection of law? submission thereof of decision. Branch XII. respondent judge from promulgating his decision . before the Supreme Court this petition (Petition for and his case was conducted and concluded on prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin August 04. 1970 On November 28.

the as mandatory. unless reduced by the rather than the general rule. the very instruments 2. RULING: On November 28. v. Petitioner avers that the three-month period September 4. would make the courts. 1975. which conflicts are resolved. temporarily restraining respondent judge from promulgating said decision.observance mentioned criminal case. shall be eighteen months for the mentioned provision falls within the exception Supreme court. being a constitutional directive. and not inferior courts. WHETHER OR NOT jurisdiction of the court over 4. 3. where they refer to matters merely PROCEDURAL. month period prescribed by the Constitution. Supreme Court issued an Order mentioned provision. Article X of the 1973 Constitution states that: Doctrine: The established rule is that “constitutional provisions are to be construed “Upon the effectivity of this Constitution. and three months for all other that constitutional provisions are directory. which declares collegiate courts. twelve months for all inferior Albemarel Oil & Gase Co. through ninety (90) days. Morris. above mentioned). since respondent judge is already . in filing the decision within courts with the aforesaid provision would result in the given period of three (3) months. ISSUES: Exceeded or not. Article X of the to foster unresolved cases by reason merely of 1973 Constitution is mandatory in character or having failed to render a decision within the merely directory. Article X of of jurisdiction. WHETHER OR NOT Section II. To hold that non-compliance by the the 1973 Constitution. Supreme Court believed that the above submission. or eighty five (85) days from 9. and. allotted term. a different intention is shall be decided or resolved from the date of its manifest. UNLESS by express provision or maximum period within which a case or matter by necessary implication. a decision rendered by an inferior 1. the date the case was deemed prescribed by Section 11 of Article x of the 1973 submitted for decision. *Section 11. is the deputy clerk of court the decision in the above mandatory in character and that non. 1973. citing the case of Supreme Court. equivalent to loss of jurisdiction.” mandatory. The petition was DISMISSED and the the unresolved criminal case was lost due to non- Restraining Order issued by the Supreme Court is compliance by respondent judge with the above lifted however. respondent judge thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court was able to render his decision within the three- over the unresolved case. respondent judge filed with Constitution. Thus. WHETHER OR NOT respondent judge failed to court outside of the 90-day period is not void for loss comply with the provisions of Section II.

1479 wiped work and conflict of interest. a decision that he in fact rendered.D. relied on P. which was  The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on before outside the scope of its competence.deceased. NLRC HELD: YES The Labor Arbiter. his successor is ordered to decide the Preliminary Injunction”. and at the ground of lack of jurisdiction. its personnel are (which is on March 17.. Being the time the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision government entity. government owned Ministry of Labor and Employment in San or controlled corporations with original charters. this complaint in an appropriate  Hagonoy filed a “Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution with Application for Writ of .  Petitioner Hagonoy moved for dismissal on At the time the dispute in the CAB arose. NLRC denied the application. may refile Development Bank. No. Criminal Case on the basis of the record thereof within 90 days from the time the case is raffled to Issue: Whether local water districts are GOCC him. illegal suspension and Moreover. whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Law Hagonoy Water District v. Villanueva. By the time the And the protests concerning the lawlessness of NLRC rendered its decision (August 20. the Labor Arbiter failed and thereafter dismissed for abandonment of to take into account that P.” Fernando. the Labor Arbiter to render a decision. 1986). 1987). 198.. a decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter Arbiter. A “Writ of Execution” was issued by without jurisdiction over the case is a complete the Labor Arbiter to garnish petitioner nullity. The jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission SC believes that the 1987 Constitution does not and not the Ministry of Labor and operate retroactively as to confer jurisdiction upon Employment. known as “Provincial Water  Private Respondent Dante Villanueva was Utilities Act of 1973” which exempts employees of employed as service foreman by petitioner water districts from the application of the Civil Hagonoy when he was indefinitely suspended Service Law. away the said exemption  Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: living allowance against Hagonoy with the “[T]he Civil Service embraces . if he so wishes. Section underpayment of wages and emergency cost of 2. vesting no rights and imposing no Hagonoy’s deposits with the planters liabilities. favor of Villanueva  NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Therefore. However. the NLRC relied upon Article 9. Pampanga. in asserting that it has FACTS: jurisdiction over the employees of Hagonoy.D. the dismissal from service fall within the 1987 Constitution has already come into effect. the applicable law is governed by the provisions of the Civil that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to render Service Law and not by the Labor Code.

Pampanga. PETITION IS GRANTED of private corporations since they perform proprietary functions for the government. Full Text The Labor Arbiter proceeded to hear and try the case and. respondents are b) the Resolution of the National Labor Relations hereby ordered to reinstate Commission dated 20 August 1987 affirming the petitioner immediately to his mentioned decision. illegal suspension petitioner the amount of P4. a Writ of Execution was issued by the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Meanwhile. respondents are On 14 August 1985. without loss of seniority Private respondent Dante Villanueva was employed rights and privileges.927. Petitioner the Labor Arbiter on 16 November 1987.50 and underpayment of wages and emergency cost of representing the underpayments living allowance against petitioner Hagonoy with of wages from July 1983 to May the then Ministry of Labor and Employment. and protests concerning the lawfulness The petitioner moved for reconsideration. are in the nature 1987. private respondent Villanueva contended issued as its motion for reconsideration had not yet that local water districts. Petitioner immediately moved for outright On appeal. insisting of dismissals from the service fall within the that public respondents had no jurisdiction over the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. rendered a Decision in favor of the private respondent and against The present petition for certiorari seeks to annul petitioner Hagonoy. The dispositive part of the and set aside: a) the decision of the Labor Arbiter decision read: dated 17 March 1987 in NLRC Case No. claimed. the National Labor Relations dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor jurisdiction. from the date he May 1985. not by the Labor Code. entitled "Dante Villanueva versus LWA- WHEREFORE. "considering the rulings that local water districts are instrumentalities owned and controlled by the Petitioner then filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of government and that their officers and employees Execution with Application for Writ of Preliminary are government employees. with full as service foreman by petitioner Hagonoy Water backwages. abandonment of work and conflict of interest. been resolved. By Resolution dated 10 December though quasi-public corporations. RAB-III-8- 2354-85. premises Hagonoy Waterworks District/Miguel Santos. on 17 March 1986. SO ORDERED. Regional Arbitration Branch III. 1985. Being a government entity. when he was indefinitely suspended and was terminated up to his actual thereafter dismissed on 12 July 1985 for date of reinstatement. San Fernando. like petitioner Hagonoy. including all benefits District ("Hagonoy") from 3 January 1977 until 16 provided by law. 16." In opposing the Injunction arguing that the writ was prematurely motion." and considered. former position as Service Foreman. not case. petitioner Arbiter in a Resolution dated 20 August 1987.WHEREFORE. 1540 of the Social Security was enforced by garnishing petitioner Hagonoy's Commission cancelling petitioner's compulsory deposits with the Planters Development Bank of coverage from the system effective 16 May 1979 Hagonoy. The writ cited Resolution No. public respondent Commission denied the . private respondent filed a hereby ordered to pay the complaint for illegal dismissal. its personnel are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law. In addition.

application for a preliminary injunction. reads in part: as Section 25 in the following manner: . lease pro-rata Water District Law of P. Section 25 of P. The Section 26 of the same decree motion to quash was similarly denied by the [P. be subject 198. as amended. 6 of that decree 'a quasi- during the preceding fiscal year. 198 quoted decision rendered in September. which went into effect on 11 June 1978.D. said net revenue representing income The Baguio Water District was from water sales and sewerage formed pursuant to Title II-Local service charges. public corporation performing public service and supplying The Labor Arbiter however failed to take into public wants. a district is Arbiter asserted jurisdiction over the alleged illegal hereby granted the power of dismissal of private respondent Villanueva by eminent domain. 1 the petitioner Water District sought Provided. however. 198 exempting the employees of water districts from the application of Exemption from Civil Service. the exercise relying on Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. P. wages. A part of the public respondent's No. district may exercise all the powers which are expressly Hence. share of debt service and expenses 198. Collective Bargaining shall the position that the Labor Arbiter here adopted.D. are hereby exempt from This is not the first time that officials of the the provisions of the Civil Service Department of Labor and Employment have taken Law. — the Civil Service Law was removed from the statute The district and its employees. 1479. 1973" which went into effect on 25 May 1973. below supervisory levels: etc. No. account the provisions of Presidential Decree No. In be available only to personnel Baguio Water District vs. 198 was renumbered 1983. books. That the total review of a decision of the Bureau of Labor of all salaries. granted by this Title or which are necessarily implied from or The only question here in whether or not local incidental to the powers and water districts are government owned or controlled purposes herein stated. — The deposits. and which provides as follows: Thus. however. Cresenciano B. Trajano. 1479 wiped away Section 25 of P.D.D.577. benefits or other calling for a certification election among the regular compensation paid to all rank-and-file employees of the Baguio Water employees in any month shall not District (BWD). The BWD is by for fuel or energy for pumping Sec. et al. above. the Court exceed fifty percent (50%) of said: average net monthly revenue..D. and Section 26 of P. known as the "Provincial Water Utilities Act of to review by the Administration. being engaged in a proprietary function. 198] is hereby amended to Commission which directed petitioner to reinstate read as Section 25 as follows: immediately private respondent and to pay him the amount of P63.75 out of petitioner's garnished Section 25. Authorization. In granting the petition. the instant petition. The Labor objectives of this Act.D. thereof shall. For the corporations whose employees are subject to the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Civil Service Law. Relations which affirmed that of a Med-Arbiter emoluments.

1.D. p. civil service system. [1973] Constitution. We find the appeal [of the BWD] Rules and Regulations was addressed by this Court to be devoid of merit. The same The broader question of whether employees of explicit intent is shown by the government owned or controlled corporations are addition of "agency" and governed by the Civil Service Law and Civil Service "instrumentality" to branches and . XII-B.D.D. As loophole which allowed such its officers and employees are government-owned or controlled part of the Civil Service. Sec. that is. (Rollo. branches and subdivisions of the 4 of P. 26 of P. Service Law and that its personnel below supervisory level Section 1. Justice governed and regulated by special Gutierrez. government-owned or controlled 590. 1479. 198 was A Civil Service embracing all amended to read as Sec. 1479. 686. 25 by Sec. 2 show that the operation and After a review of constitutional.D. We grant the petition for the following reasons: The 1935 Constitution had a similar provision in its Section 1. 1. 1978. said provision has not been amended much more abrogated The Civil Service embraces every expressly or impliedly by PD 1479 branch. (Sec. including every or collective bargaining.D. corporations to avoid the full Art. Juco. Article XII-B of the shall have the right to collectively [1973] Constitution specifically bargain. the Court. The BWD is a corporation service shows a deliberate effort of created pursuant to a special law the framers to plug an earlier — P. and which does not make mention of instrumentality of the any matter on Civil Service Law Government. Contrary to appellant's provides: claim. Section 25 of P. . statutory and case administration of BWD is law on the matter.) corporation. No. The inclusion of "government- xxx xxx xxx owned or controlled corporations" within the embrace of the civil 3. through Mr. No. No.. held: laws. The Government shall be provided by amendatory decree took effect on law. 198 was Article XII which stated: repealed by Sec. as amended.D. No. No. June 11. Section 25 of employees of government-owned Presidential Decree (PD) 198 or controlled corporations are clearly provides that the district governed by the civil service law and its employees shall be exempt and civil service rules and from the provisions of the Civil regulations. The records in 1985 in National Housing Corporation vs.) encompassing coverage of the. 198 and 1479 which created There should no longer be any local water districts throughout question at this time that the country. 3 of P. No. subdivision.. Presidential Decrees Nos. 198. consequences of the all P. agency.

nonetheless. Of course.e. Thus. 17 March 1986. apparently relied upon liabilities. the 1987 group. The NLRC took the position that although The amendments introduced in petitioner Hagonoy is a government owned or 1973 are not Idle exercises or controlled corporation. Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution. it had no original charter meaningless gestures. the Court spelled out the law on the issue Arbiter. there is no question that the xxx xxx xxx applicable law was that spelled out in National Housing Corporation vs. [1973] Water District vs. or corporate arms At the time the dispute in the case at bar arose. It means Constitution had already come into effect. For cases involving private firms whatever that effect might be. the Labor to modify the phrase "government. corporations with original All offices and firms of the charters. 5 There all possible and all. Trajano (supra) Constitution uses the word "every" and that under such applicable law. It does not cover the pre-existing statutory and case law. 17 March 1986). Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution upon controlled entity. (Emphasis supplied) government are covered. For it is self- 1984. therefore petitioner Hagonoy fell outside the scope embracing insofar as employment of the civil service. the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. By the time the public respondent Commission rendered its decision of 20 "Every" means each one of a August 1987 which is here assailed. Arbiter had no jurisdiction to render the decision owned or controlled corporation." that he in fact rendered. subdivisions of the Government. under the law applicable at the Court. the respondent Commission had at bar as such law existed under the 1973 nothing before it which it could pass upon in the Constitution and the Provisional Constitution of exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The NLRC concluded that service coverage is broad and all. 3 time of the rendition of such decision. and public respondent government owned or controlled Commission's Resolution dated 20 August 1987 and .. Article IX (B). which provides that: ACCORDINGLY. taken one by is. 4 until just before the effectivity of the 1987 evident that a decision rendered by the Labor Constitution. without exception. no necessity for this Court at the one. Public respondent Commission. in Arbiter without jurisdiction over the case is a confirming the Labor Arbiter's assumption of complete nullity. and is concerned. They carry having been created simply by resolution of a local the strong message that civil legislative council.. in the government in any of its governmental. was clearly outside the scope of competence of the Labor In Juco. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated [T]he Civil Service embraces . — and we will deal taken over by the government in with that when an appropriate case comes before foreclosure or similar proceedings. vesting no rights and imposing no jurisdiction over this case. the Court — we believe and so hold that the 1987 We reserve judgment on these Constitution did not operate retrospectively so as to latter cases when the appropriate confer jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiter to render controversy is brought to this a decision which. at the time the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision (i. Juco (supra) and Baguio Section I of Article XII-B. our decision in this present time and in the present case to pass upon case refers to a corporation the question of the effect of the provisions of Article created as a government-owned or DC (B).. Cresenciano B.

however. this complaint in an appropriate forum... Commission in this case subsequent thereto.J. Fernan C. without prejudice to the right of private respondent concur. if he so wishes. Jr. are hereby SET ASIDE.. Gutierrez. JJ. No pronouncement as to costs. .all other Resolutions and Orders issued by the SO ORDERED. Bidin and Cortes. This decision is. Villanueva to refile.