This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of
Province of Mindoro.

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which states that
“provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized
tribes) are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest
of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board”. It
is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public
land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on
this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended
by the provincial governor.

Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2, which
says that the provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake
for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section
2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan
and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of
Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the
site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this
order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with
section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners’ rights were violated


The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a
person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said
section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the
opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police
power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of
the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart
the Tigbao reservation, it will be read, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following:
(1)The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the
province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to
oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following;
(3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which
they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say
that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise
of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. One cannot hold
that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization
of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.
To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not
always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule
which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative.

. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor. he should be compelled to do so. respondents . Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality. had no idea that the women being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes. who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila. ET AL. plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao. . 1919 FACTS Justo Lukban. The respondents.ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO. when called upon to defend his official action. may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts. purportedly. while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. ET AL. had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et. could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he. the Chief of Police. and then. Most of all. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. to work for a haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their will. if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted. and Francisco Sales. vs. within the reach of process. He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao. the official. petitioners. Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. indeed. the haciendero from Davao. at the dead of night. March 25. JUSTO LUKBAN. it came out that. ISSUE The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner. The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban. acting under no authority of law. al deported to Davao. the women were deported without their consent. Anton Hohmann. RULING The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each. the Governor of Davao. the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. ordered the deportation of 170 prostitutes to Davao. The prostitutes were confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded. His reason for doing so was to preserve the morals of the people of Manila. there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170prostitutes. in two boats bound for Davao. We believe the true principle should be that.. The women were under the assumption that they were being transported to another police station while Ynigo. During the trial. In effect. If the mayor and the chief of police. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue.

to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed. to founded or groundless fear. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency. has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. Aquino is . No. specifically Sections 1 and 6. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment.Caunca Vs. which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.L-2690. G. respondent herein. freedom to transfer from one place to another. They contended that Pres.R. However. Marcos Vs. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. owned by Julia Salazar. 88211. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement. Manglapus [177 SCRA 668. Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence. No. 1 Jan 1949] Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau. the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion. for her to work as a maid. regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid. etc. freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave? Held: An employment agency. Salazar [82 Phil 851. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. which was disallowed by the employment agency. 15 Sept 1989] Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs. to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will.

the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country. public order. Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation contracted and that he is a war sufferer.400 on or before August 27.1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the Manila for P9.600 of which P4. Essentially. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel. a distinct right under international law. which has been ratified by the Philippines. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law.L-3708. However. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. and the balance was made payable as follows: P2.800. independent from although related to the right to travel. including his own. 1943. in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution. a first mortgage has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon. with interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum. the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not. the interest due and the attorney's fees. No. the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". 18 May 1953] Facts: On August 20. On the other hand. having filed his claim with the Philippine War . as well as the interest that had accrued and so Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due. right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. Thus. Esteban [93 Phil 68.400 on or before August 7. and P2. They further assert that under international law. the right to leave the country. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in accordance with law. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.800 were paid outright. public health or morals or the separate rights of others. 1942. To secure the payment of said balance of P4. Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. Rutter Vs. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security. but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered. and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights.

A motion for recon was made which assails the constitutionality of RA 342. 25 and 32. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed. plaintiff herein. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation. The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years. Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment clause grounds. City of Manila Vs. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred. prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction. with greater force and reason considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations. No. Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. fairness and righteousness. it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. Its essence is the application of police power. declared that the continued operation and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive. 14355. or directly or indirectly. but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end. This holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into. Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. Thus.Damage Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war. and should not be prolonged should be declared null and void and without effect. The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally. The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. and that under section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law). 31 Oct 1919] Facts: The City of Manila. However based on the President’s general SONA and consistent with what the Court believes to be as the only course dictated by justice. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent . The complaint was dismissed. Held: Yes. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. the same filed an appeal. Chinese Community [40 Phil 349.

But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority. Under Sec. 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities. In 1959. 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. by authority of court. ceases upon the day fixed. however. without need of a demand (Art. Republic Vs. 1669. 15 Aug 1974] Facts: In 1947. 1959. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. and that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. did not apply Art. therefore. entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of contract . The “taking” of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must. or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain. The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property. L-20620. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the “taking” should not be reckoned as of 1947. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959. New Civil Code). There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time. it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property. the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question. “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. G. the republic. In the instant case. 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956. as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case.R. is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to. however. the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. the AFP refused. Castelvi [58 SCRA 336. No. be reckoned as of June 26. 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. The Supreme Court.domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. on August 10. through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP.