TITAN-IKEDA VS.

PRIMETOWN
G.R No. 158768. February 12, 2008
FACTS: The respondent Primetown Property Corporation entered into contract weith
the petitioner Titan-Ikeda Construction Corporation for the structural works of
a 32-storey prime tower. After the construction of the tower, respondent again
awarded to the petitioner the amount of P 130,000,000.00 for the tower s architect
ural design and structure. Howevere, in 1994, the respondent entered inot a cont
ract of sale of the tower in favor of the petitioner in a manner called full-swa
pping. Since the respondent had allegedly constructed almost one third of the pr
oject as weel as selling some units to third persons unknown to the petitioner.
Integrated Inc. took over the project, thus the petitioner is demanding for the
return of its advanced payment in the amount of P2, 000,000.00 as weel as the ke
ys of the unit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to damages.
RULING: No, because in a contract necessarily that there is a meeting of the min
ds of the parties in which this will be the binding law upon them. Thus, in a re
ciprocal obligation. Both parties are obliged to perform their obligation simult
aneously and in good faith. In this case, petitioner, Titan-Ikeda can not recove
r damages because it was found out there was no solutio indebiti or mistake in p
ayment in this case since the latter is just entitled to the actual services it
rendered to the respondent and thus it is ordered to return the condominium unit
s to the respondent.
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Telefast v. Castro Digest G.R. No. 73867
Telefast v. Castro
G.R. No. 73867 February 29, 1988
Facts:
The petitioner is a company engaged in transmitting telegrams. The plaintiffs ar
e the children and spouse of Consolacion Castro who died in the Philippines. One
of the plaintiffs, Sofia sent a telegram thru Telefast to her father and other
siblings in the USA to inform about the death of their mother. Unfortunately, th
e deceased had already been interred but not one from the relatives abroad was a
ble to pay their last respects. Sofia found out upon her return in the US that t
he telegram was never received. Hence the suit for damages on the ground of brea
ch of contract. The defendant-petitioner argues that it should only pay the actu
al amount paid to it.
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded compensatory, moral
, exemplary, damages to each of the plaintiffs with 6% interest p.a. plus attorn
ey s fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling but modified and eliminated
the compensatory damages to Sofia and exemplary damages to each plaintiff, it al
so reduced the moral damages for each. The petitioner appealed contending that,
it can only be held liable for P 31.92, the fee or charges paid by Sofia C. Crou
ch for the telegram that was never sent to the addressee, and that the moral dam
ages should be removed since defendant's negligent act was not motivated by "fra
ud, malice or recklessness.
Issue: Whether or not the award of the moral, compensatory and exemplary damages
is proper.
RULING: Yes, there was a contract between the petitioner and private respondent
Sofia C. Crouch whereby, for a fee, petitioner undertook to send said private re
spondent's message overseas by telegram. Petitioner failed to do this despite pe
rformance by said private respondent of her obligation by paying the required ch
arges. Petitioner was therefore guilty of contravening its and is thus liable fo
r damages. This liability is not limited to actual or quantified damages. To sus
tain petitioner's contrary position in this regard would result in an inequitous

Had petitioner not been remiss in per forming its obligation. Intheir agreement. No. The lots were then mortgaged wi th the PNB. are liable for damages.She demanded payment of the balance of the p urchase price. Though incapable of pecuniary computat ion. Respondent Administratrix wrote petitioners informingthem that the PNB had agree d to release the lots from mortgage. and those who in any mann er contravene the tenor thereof. they agreed tha t upon the release by PNBof the lots.GONZAGA[G. the Estate of Gonzaga shall immediately ex ecute aDeed of Sale in favor of the Villanuevas. the parties stipulated that the estate of Gonzaga would cause the release of the lots from PNB at the earliest possible time. th en P194k upon theapproval by the PNB of the release of the lots. was precis ely the cause of the suffering private respondents had to undergo." Art. Petitioners g ave respondent10 days within which to do so. situation where petitioner will only be held liable for the actual cost of a te legram fixed thirty (30) years ago. Petitioners demanded that respondent show the clean titlesto the lots first befo . Crouch's testimony.Petitioners then requested permission from respo ndentAdministratrix to use the premises for the next milling season. Petitionersinformed respondent that their immediate use of the premiseswas absolutely necessary and that any delay will cause themsubsta ntial damages. Lastly.Respondent r efused on the ground that petitioners cannot use the premises until full payment of the purchase price. 157318. mental anguis h. fright. moral shock . 2006] FACTS: Petitioners Generoso and Raul Villanueva bought parcels of land from the estate of Gonzaga (through its judicialadminsitratrix). ------------------ ENEROSO V. Art.R. Crouch represe nting the expenses she incurred when she came to the Philippines from the United States to testify before the trial court. As stipulated in the agreement." Award of Moral. compensatory and exemplary damages is proper.and demanded that petitio ners stop using the lots as atransloading station to service the Victorias Milli ng Companyunless they pay the full purchase price. negligence or delay. moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate results of the def endant's wrongful act or omission. there would have been no need for this suit or for Mrs. The award of exemplary damages by the trial court is likewise justified for each of the private respondents. Respondent remained firm in her refusal.000. there being fault o r negligence. as a warning to all telegram companies to observe d ue diligence in transmitting the messages of their customers." Then. social humiliation. P191k on Jan 1990. the award of P16. petitioners introducedimprovements after paying 60% of the total purchase price. that the Villanuevas will pay P100k upon signingthe agreement.00 as compensatory damages to Sofia C. The petitioner's act or omission. which amounted to gross negligence. August 09. besmirched reputation. wounded feelings. is obliged to pay for the damage done. 2176 also provide s that "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. Art. and similar injury. petitioner s assured respondent of their readiness to pay the balance but reminded responde nt of her obligation to redeem thelots from mortgage with the PNB. In a letter-reply. 1170 of the Civil Code provides that "those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud. 2217 of the Civil Code states: "Moral damages include physical suffering. STATE OF GERARDO L. theVillanuevas may start to introduce improvements in the area if they so desire. It was alsostip ulated that upon payment of 60% of the purchase price. VILLANUEVA V. serious anxiety.

Petitioners then filed a complaint against respondents for breach of contract. CA erred in ruling thatrespondents had alread y fulfilled their obligation to cause the releaseof the lots from the PNB at the time they demanded payment of the balance of the purchase price. Since ownershiphas not been transferred. and (2) petitioners violated the MOA by using the lots as a transloading station without permission from the resp ondents.As to Article 1191. petitioners should be allowed to pay the bal ance now.unless the contract of sale is rescinded a nd set aside.The records show that the lots were finally released from mortgagein July 1991. specific performance and damages before theRTC. 3 condition s were laid down by the bank before the lots could be finally released from mor tgage.the vendor has lost ownership of the thing sold and cannot recover it. rescission was invalid. is conditioned upon the release of the lotsfrom mortgage with the PNB to be secured by the respondents. if they sodesire. We have heldin numerous cases that the remedy does not apply to contracts tosell . Hence. ISSUE: WON respondents failed to comply with their reciprocalobligation of secur ing the release of the lots from the PNBmortgage? HELD: YES. no further legal action need have beentaken by the respondents.Moreover. Article 1592 spe aks of non-payment of the purchase price as a resolutory condition. If the vendor should eject the vendee for failure tomeet the conditio n precedent. the vendor remains the owner for as long as thevendee has not complied fully with the condition of paying the purch ase price.to rescind the M OA. The effects in law are not identical. there is no legal basis for the rescission. casual or serious. but a situation that prevents theobligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obli gatoryforce. In a contract tosell. Failure to pa y the price agreed upon is not amere breach. title remains with the vendor and does not passon to the vendee until the purchase price is paid in full.Although there was no express provision regarding reservedownership until full payment of the purchase price. Thus. This is entirely different from the situation in a contract of sale . Petitioners have always expressed readiness to pay the balance of the purchase price once that is achieved. 1191 is predicated on a breach of faith by theother party that viol ates the reciprocity between them. It was not required under the MOA. In a contract of sale.re they pay the balance of the purchase price. the inten t of the parties in this regard is evident from the provision that a deed of abs olute sale shall be executed only when the lots have been releasedfrom mortgage and the balance paid by petitioners. However. where non-payment of the price is a negative resolutorycondition. since it is established that respondents demand for t hem to pay in April 1991 was premature. The remedy of rescissio n under Art. ------------ . he is enforcing the contract and notrescinding it. Neither provis ion is applicable [to a contract to sell]. petitioners may notdemand produ ction by the respondents of the titles to the lots as acondition for their payme nt. Petitioners obligation to pay. Petitioners alleged that respond ents delayed performanceof their obligation by unreasonably failing to secure th e releaseof the lots from mortgage with the PNB.The MOA between petitioners and respon dents is a conditionalcontract to sell. in acontract to sell. Respondent Administratrix then executed a Deed of Rescission rescinding the MOA on two grounds: (1) petitionersfailed to pay the balance of the purchase price d espite notice of the lots release from mortgage. except an action t o recover possession incase petitioners refuse to voluntarily surrender the lots . however. it is subordinated to the provis ions of Article1592 when applied to sales of immovable property. failing in that.In a contract to sell. Ownership over the lots is not to pass t o the petitioners until full payment of the purchase price. th e payment of the purchase price is a positivesuspensive condition. in turn. It was herefore premature for respondents to demand payment of the balanc e of the purchase price from the petitioners and.A reading of PN B s letter of approval clearly shows that theapproval was conditional. It does not apply to a contract to sell.

as long as it mightre asonably be inferred from the facts. If thecomment is an expression of opinion. nevertheless.S. California. when thediscreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity. fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privilegedand const itute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. and (2) Resolution5 of the same court denying JAL's motion for r econsideration. The facts herein follow: In 1991. JAL's airline crew suspected respondent of carrying a falsified travel document and im puted that he would only use the trip to the United States as apretext to stay a nd work in Japan. explaining that he was issued a U. th e rule on privileged commentaries on matters of public interest applies to it.visa. the stewardess along with aJapanese and a Filipino haughtily order ed him to stand up and leave the plane.S.U. ISSUE: Are commentaries on public officials and on matters of public interests. in UCLA School of Medici ne in Los Angeles. Loreto Simangan. the imputations against JAL are not actionable.Even though JAL is not a public official. UCLA wrote a letter to the American Co nsulate in Manila to arrange for his visa.respondent was issued an emergency U. it is not necessarily actionable. However. S hortly after. to wit: To re iterate. In ord er that such discreditableimputation to a public official may be actionable. Considering that the published articles involve matters of public int erest and that its expressed opinion is not maliciousbut based on established fa cts. respondentpurchased a round trip plane ticket from petitioner JAL and was issued the corresponding boarding pass.A. 2008) FACTS: In this petition for review on certiorari. JAL may not clai m damages for them ------------ . Hence. visa by the American Embassy in Manila. While inside the airplane. it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposit ion. andcandidates f or office. visa. and includes matters of public concern.Japan Airlines vs SIMANGANGR 170141 (April 22. T heprivilege applies not only to public officials but extends to a great variety of subjects.petitioner JAL appeals the: (1) Decision of the CA ordering it to pay respondent Jesus Simanganmoral and exe mplary damages.S. privileged? RULING: As explained in the case of Borjal v. Hence. he filed a case against JAL airlines.Having obtained an emergen cy U. to facilitate respondent's travel to the United States.Respondent protested. The doctrine of fair co mment means that while in general every discreditableimputation publicly made is deemed false. Therefore. then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken. In due time. based on established facts.S. Respondent needed to go to the United State s to complete his preliminary work-up and donation surgery. public men.respondent Simangan decided to donate a kidney to his ailing cousin. because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicia lly proved. Court of Appeals.The stewardess asked respondent to show his travel documents. He was still constrained to go out of the plane.