G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014 ARAULLO VS. AQUINO IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio
“Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government
year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will
made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
merely being realigned via the DAP.
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s
power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case
at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even
then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but
the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make
was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their
respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP,
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the
the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
Projects, etc.
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects
are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA
other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional
DAP. Among their contentions was: and is without legal basis.

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be On the issue of what are “savings”
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
authority to use savings, respectively). definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers.
Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are
already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
“savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under
pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect
that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive. secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

(ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010. All three contained a provision requiring prior consultation with members of Congress for the release of funds. the pork barrel was revived through the “Mindanao Development Fund” and the “Visayas Development Fund”. as the case may be. OCHOA In 2000. PDAF also allowed FACTS realignment of funds to any expense category except personal services and other personnel benefits. Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of money regularly went Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds. It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-governmental organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced. The PSF is managed textbooks. as amended by PD No. PORK BARREL MISUSE The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department of Budget and Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House In 1996. Realignment of funds and release of funds were required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (“GAA”) called “Support for Senate Committee on Finance. the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of CIs: (i) Food Security Program Fund. government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative’s district. by virtue of being representatives of the people. Senators and congressmen could identify The PSF was created under Section 12. the Congressional Initiative Allocations. The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies. the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”) appeared in the GAA. among others. In 1999. Local Development Projects” (“SLDP”). 1993. HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL In 2005. is applicable. and stimulate the economy. a political parlance of American-English origin. 1869. Title IV of PD No. release of funds and realignment of unexpended portions The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for individual legislators. under the DAP. In 2011. This was also the first time when the Vice-President was given an allocation. allowed identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district. into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks. and administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR. criminal. otherwise known as the Public Works Act of 1922. G. However.R. PDAF required prior consultation with the representative of the district before the release of funds. It has funded numerous projects. 208566 BELGICA VS. refers to an appropriation of identifying authority. medicines. of the legislative district concerned and the legislators had the power to direct how. then it may cause more harm than good. the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President. 910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22. Yes. The CDF was meant to cover small local infrastructure and other priority community projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions the Public Works Fund. of an item or appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy. buildings and bridges to “soft projects” such as Amusement and Gaming Corporation (“PAGCOR”). also became involved in but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once. and scholarships. the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors. CDF Funds were. or these appropriations were to be spent. where and when implementers. In 1993. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential Decree (“PD”) No. 1976. The Doctrine of Operative Fact. The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (“PSF”). The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with the representative the validity of the DAP. project identification. and (iii) Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund. . No. the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the The term “pork barrel”. declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. or the Charter of the Philippine any kind of project from “hard projects” such as roads. It also contained a provision on realignment of funds In 1950. SLDP started the giving of lump-sum allocations to individual legislators.V. Legislators were also The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared. the pork barrel was renamed “Countrywide Development Fund” (“CDF”). and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil. administrative) that they have not acted in good faith. which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being Congressional insertions (“CIs”) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside from the CDF. released directly to implementing agencies subject to the submission of the required list of projects and activities. members of Congress. The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044. In 1990. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual legislators. with the approval of the President. health and livelihood. Under this provision. The DAP has definitely helped Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund. The SLDP also began to cover not only public works project or “hard projects” but also covered “soft projects” such as those which would fall under education.

(d) previous decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of the constitutionality of a limited response to a separation of powers problem. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the laws allowing for their utilization are (a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments has been violated. In July 2013. currently existing and operational and thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners. the bar and the the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks. The “moot and academic principle” cannot stop the Court from deciding the case considering that: (a) Legislators have been. of overreaching significance to society. The President does not have constitutional authority to nullify assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year audit investigation commanded the Court to act upon. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties regarding the constitutionality of the pork barrel system. (d) accountability. Enriquez [1] because the Philconsa case was legal standing to sue. (c) petitioners have The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs. several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme Court dismissed practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality to guide the bench. The post-enactment measures including project identification. and fund realignment are The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does not actually not related to functions of congressional oversight and. and (b) the inter-relation of post-enactment measures Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional contained within a particular CDF or PDAF article. the present cases involve a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and the PDAF Articles with each other. This power cannot be exercised by individual members of RULING Congress and the authority to appropriate cannot be exercised after the GAA has already been passed. the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate defrauded the (b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects. (e) political dynasties. department. (f) local autonomy. which belongs to the executive or annul the legal existence of the PDAF. hence. power. fund release. and (d) the preparation and passage of the national budget is an annual occurrence. (c) checks and balances. allow legislators to intervene and/or terminate the controversy on the matter. they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds. (c) there is a the ― regulation and release of funds in violation of the separation of powers principle. the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies considering that the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental importance. PROCEDURAL ISSUES (d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy. public. Secretary of Budget and Management[2] does not also bar judgment on the present case because it was dismissed on a procedural technicality and (a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy hence no controlling doctrine was rendered. (b) the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial review. . including not only those related to the area of project for violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers. ISSUE/S As citizens. enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. including ―the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter of paramount public interest. (b) non-delegability of legislative identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. authorized to participate in the various operational petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution. in one form or another. specifically on the propriety of conferring post- the Pork Barrel system. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES On the contrary. or of paramount public interest. PROCEDURAL ISSUES The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of the government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has In August 2013. (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel system aspects of budgeting. As taxpayers. jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of the government. Moreover. detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009. The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power such that the Supreme Court has the Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had gone into a power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of dummy NGO.In 2004. (c) Petitioners have legal standing to Sue Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases.

to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive for local development. Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only recommendatory in nature. insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1). impairs the President‘s power of item veto. who are national officers. the Court must defer from ruling on this issue. dynasties as may be defined by law. The Court. without taking into based on their own discretion. This is because the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the individual legislators. The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14. wherein economic a ―budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. investigating or unconstitutional. which provides that the state shall prohibit political except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. does not readily indicate a discernible item which acting as a body. violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development. which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress. therefore. may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto. (f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local autonomy (c) Checks and balances The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows Under the 2013 PDAF Article. cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. (b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis. their programs. PDAF can be tapped as a funding source. That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators. who are vested with post-enactment its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of authority. effectively appropriate PDAF funds The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office. 1869 are valid appropriation laws. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL (d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress is incapable of checking itself or its members. efforts within its territorial jurisdiction. (a) Section 8 of PD No. after the GAA is passed. even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature. Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing. In fact. Article II of the 1987 Constitution. policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by appropriation. They which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter before any office of the Government.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit district representatives. The 2013 PDAF Article. would. (e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not self-executing. The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation because each of them determines Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for (a) how much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they enforcement. the law. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality. . monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. however. themselves also determine. and coordinating development rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects. personal lump-sum allocations and could. in effect. account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: ― No money shall be paid out of the Treasury Section 26. even admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before the because it renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office. be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. is not a self-executing provision. the 2013 PDAF Article would Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum local affairs. the amount of P24. This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF allocation without knowing the Local Development Councils (“LDCs”) which are already legally mandated to―assist the corresponding specific projects of the legislators. who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when appropriation for further determination and.

THE RULING [The Court DENIED the petition. 1935. all sources. therefore. [W]here a the President without any guideline to construe the same. private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. the petitioner sought the dismissal It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of respondent’s protest. is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if of the government. remains legally effective and subsisting. the could pertain to any kind of facility. On December 8. revenues. nor prevent the filing of a direct and. L-18463 P. however. PERFECTO Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Section 12 of PD No. returns and the Malampaya Funds ―to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects qualifications of members of the National Assembly. general power is conferred or duty enjoined. NO. On December 3. the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in II. in effect. and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly. the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election Fund comprised of ― all fees. returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. [T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in The law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and hence. Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount: a Special 1935. or 60%[. it is enough that (a) the provision of law sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.R. the National Assembly passed a . it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. December 9. 1869 constitutes undue delegation of legislation powers. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara.R. In the absence of any further constitutional provision The delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said term relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission. L-45081 ANGARA VS. incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election. protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration election by resolution of the National Assembly? of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities. ELECTORAL COMMISSION I. it had remained originally in the legislature. No. 1935.000. THE FACTS G.000. G.] (b) Section 8 of PD No. Section 12 of PD No. III. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers because it lies Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. The following day. No. allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines. VS. the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 election by resolution of the National Assembly. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount: [a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax. leaves character to limit the time with which protests entrusted to its cognizance should be filed. Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly. of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion. by law”. This notwithstanding. and receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from any and protest that was not submitted on or before December 9. of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. 1935.For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1). THE ISSUE the aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR].00. xxx. insofar as it allows for the use of The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election.] if the aggregate gross earnings be less than Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the P150. independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. which resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the provides that “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made adoption of the said resolution.

Punishment for The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles." public law: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political On American occupation of the Philippines. or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . punishing "Any person who. shall defame. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things. government." Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel HELD: DECISION: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of To summarize. published an article about it to the effect that "the author or authors of the robbery of authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath." government." is still in force. that all the members of the court are of the opinion. Said article the records from the iron safe of the Senate have."political" being used to denominate the laws and by proclamation of the latter. officio. although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. filed an information alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. a new government. by instructions of the President to the Military Commander. official class is not. the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. writing. but followed the example of certain Senators is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of who secured their election through fraud and robbery. FACTS: Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of testimony given representatives of the King. So ordered.g. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due. as in monarchies. edited by Mr. the Attorney-General. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in Gregorio Perfecto.. abuse. by . the result is. through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate. that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience ISSUEs: when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. "From an entirely different point of view. Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change from Spanish to but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of American sovereignty the people any official halo. But with the change of sovereignty. was set up in the Philippines. perhaps. . with costs de relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. and a new theory of by witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies. Our Instance of Manila. although for different the ceded region are totally abrogated -. relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -. The newspaper La Nacion. of person and property and providing for the punishment of crime (e. it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials. . . . Consequently."The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code."political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the reasons. which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks. an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves.