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Timothy J. Griesbach
43.1 INTRODUCTION [2] for heatup and cooldown limits in operating plants when it
became mandatory according to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G,
The integrity of the reactor pressure vessel is critical to plant Fracture Toughness Requirements [3]. Since the inclusion of
safety. A failure of the vessel is beyond the design basis. Appendix G in ASME BPVC Section XI, the appendix has been
Therefore, the design requirements for vessels have significant updated several times to use more up-to-date technology for
margins to prevent brittle or ductile failure under all anticipated determining stress intensity factors, safety margins, and material
operating conditions. The early vessels in the United States were reference fracture toughness. While incorporating these technical
designed to meet the requirements of ASME BPVC Section VIII. changes, the philosophy of protecting the vessel against brittle
The design requirements for these vessels were supplemented by fracture has remained the same.
special requirements based on earlier U.S. Navy design experi- As plants age, the effect of radiation damage on vessel materi-
ences. In general, the allowable stress limits were lower than ves- als has caused a narrowing of operating heatup and cooldown lim-
sels designed to later ASME BPVC Section III requirements. The its for PWRs and an increase of the hydrostatic test temperatures
early design codes did not include the rigorous fracture toughness for BWRs, which may cause hardships for plant operation. The
requirements found in today’s codes. Section VIII relied on a requirements for low-temperature overpressure protection (LTOP)
“fracture-safe” design approach, which sought to ensure that pres- systems for PWRs also reduce the operating window for plants.
sure vessels were operated in a temperature regime (upper-shelf Improvements in the Code methods for determining the heatup
region) where small flaws or cracks would not affect the load- and cooldown limit curves have provided some relief from the
carrying capacity of the structure. narrowing window of operation. However, the possible future
As Section III of the ASME Code was developed, many of the changes to embrittlement trend curves based on new embrittle-
early special requirements were incorporated and used to update ment data may negate the benefits obtained from the improve-
the earlier requirements of Section VIII. Section III included ments in Section XI, Appendix G.
requirements for more detailed design stress analyses than did For example, the NRC is planning to issue draft Revision 3 of
Section VIII. Thus, the explicit design safety factor could be Regulatory Guide 1.99 in 2009. Preliminary versions of the
reduced without reducing the actual margin against vessel failure. revised embrittlement trend curve model show higher predicted
Section III also included a fracture mechanics approach to estab- RTNDT shifts than Regulatory Guide 1.99, Rev. 2 for the limiting
lish operating pressure-temperature heat up and cooldown curves materials in many BWR vessels. The corresponding increase in
and to ensure adequate margins of safety against brittle or ductile Adjusted Reference Temperature (ART) causes a change in the
failure incorporating the nil-ductility reference temperature index, P-T limit curves for heatup/cooldown and hydrotest conditions. In
RTNDT, that was correlated to the material reference toughness. some cases, plants may have to perform the system hydrotest at
Radiation embrittlement is a known degradation mechanism in temperatures exceeding 212°F (i.e., boiling at atmospheric pres-
ferritic steels, and the beltline region of reactor pressure vessels is sure) in order to maintain the ASME Code safety margins for
particularly susceptible to irradiation damage. To predict the level prevention of vessel brittle fracture. This issue will need to be
of embrittlement in a reactor pressure vessel, trend curve predic- revisited by the ASME Code Section XI Working Group on
tion methods are used for projecting the shift in RTNDT as a func- Operating Plant Criteria.
tion of material chemistry and fluence at the vessel wall. Because Another aspect of ensuring reactor vessel integrity is character-
the ASME Code does not include trend curves for prediction of izing the actual toughness of the reactor vessel materials. Because
embrittlement, the NRC issued Regulatory Guide 1.99. Revision sampling of the vessel is not a realistic option, using surveillance
2 of this Regulatory Guide is being used by all plants for predict- sample coupons to measure a toughness may be the best available
ing RTNDT shift in determining heatup and cooldown limits and source for irradiated vessel material data. However, small speci-
hydrostatic test limits. mens do not provide a representative constraint for large speci-
In 1988, the ASME Code approved the Section XI Nonmandatory mens or structures, so the data must be characterized according to
Appendix G, Fracture Toughness Criteria for Protection Against a Master Toughness curve. The alternative Master Curve
Failure [1]. This appendix replaced the Section III, Appendix G approach, recently approved by ASTM and the ASME BPVC,

2. no plants to date have been able to take credit mine crack stability. The basis for The basis for these regulations first came from the recommen. which is a function of temperature. and it represented a sig- nificant change in the design procedure for nuclear pressure ves- sels.2 Postulated Flaw Size and Location. curve.1 KIR Index and Temperature Indexing. the KIR curve was the available unirradiated dynamic and crack dations of the PVRC Task Group on Toughness Requirements arrest fracture toughness data from three heats of SA-533-B1 and that was formed in 1971. which were then issued. It also provided a method for 43.2. the fracture mechanics concepts for prevention of brittle fracture were fully adopted. with some evaluation of reactor vessel integrity form severe events such as modifications. French and Japanese Codes are given in Chapters 49 and 50. 43. and was to be used in the analysis. first as Code Case 1514. To recommend. For locations Section III. The ASME Code approved. The initial RTNDT values for all reactor vessel for smaller than a 14 -t flaw. adjusted to include the effects of radi- the AEC was.2. Group in January 1972. . to deter. that determine the methods of compliance and margins to be maintained for prevention of vessel fracture. Smaller flaw sizes may be used on an individ- which can be compared to the measured material toughness ual case basis if a smaller size of maximum postulated flaw can be (Kcritical) as a function of reference temperature. The Section III. deep fracture mechanics term of crack tip “stress intensity factor” (KI). In particular. Code vessel steels. of Federal Regulations. Appendix G approach established margins against failure in three areas: FRACTURE (a) A reference toughness curve was adopted from a conserva- 43. Part 50 of the U. Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program Requirements (c) A safety factor of 2 was applied to the calculated stress [4]. the temperature to achieve either 30 ft-lb or 50 The ASTM test method was specifically developed to provide a ft-lb of energy are the results determined from a series of Charpy reliable measure of fracture toughness transition temperature. and the Charpy test specimens were stan. NB-2330 and a new Appendix G in the Summer 1972 away from discontinuities (e. With the establishment of the KIR the establishment of safe procedures for operating nuclear reactor curve for the lower-bound material toughness. test specimens that are then correlated to the vessel material refer- that is independent of specimen size. and subsequently as revisions to ASME BPVC 43. Appendix G. criteria for RTNDT is intended to be a heat-normalizing parameter. on the basis of current knowledge. and it was thought that the chosen reference flaw dardized as the method of establishing an initial RTNDT and was the largest flaw that could be missed by the inspection meth- changes in RTNDT due to irradiation. NDE reliability.g. For sections less than 4-in. a response to their proposal for new ation damage. The PVRC Task Group draft report was maximum postulated reference flaw is a semi-elliptical surface modified to be consistent with the ASME Code modifications and crack oriented in the axial direction. The relatively large quarter-thickness reference flaw size was Critical values of K are determined from precracked specimen selected because a database did not exist at that time to assess tests loaded to failure. vessel materials was required to be measured in vessels that were designed or fabricated to Code requirements after 1972.S. which is still being used today. this benefits for determining plant heatup and cooldown limits. This was the first time that a fracture mechanics – based respectively.2 Section III. To. Another determining factor was the on-site toughness. Appendix H. the Addenda of the Code.. This will have direct ence toughness. The requirements of Each of these assumptions and procedures of the traditional Appendices G and H became effective on August 16. and the pro- ferritic material toughness requirements for pressure-retaining cedure for obtaining the initial RTNDT is contained in ASME components of the reactor pressure boundary. flaw is postulated. when Appendix G method are discussed here in more detail. approach was used in the ASME Code.2. thick.2. define applicable rules and reference the Codes and Standards intensity factor for pressure loading. a 1-in. 1973.5 The key to this new approach was the establishment of the times the thickness. the vessel beltline region). The same requirements were not in place for those vessels prior to 1972. 1971. Section III. which had been published in July 1971 determining the allowable (P-T) limits for plant operation and for in the Federal Register. The charter of the PVRC Task Group SA-508-2 steels. approach permitted the safe design and operation of pressure ves- Related discussions of pressure vessel integrity margins in the sels for all anticipated normal and abnormal events. In this instance. beltline materials had to be measured or estimated from test data. NB-2300 [6]. This postulated flaw has a the final draft was published as WRC 175 [5] in August 1972. Fracture (b) A very large (quarter-thickness) postulated reference flaw Toughness Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors [3]. which will permit BPVC. ASME.1 10 CFR 50. RTNDT. desig- The rules and regulations governing the licensing of nuclear nated as KIR. While not a true measure of ods in use at that time. the new requirements proposed by the PVRC Task pressurized thermal shock (PTS) transients. Appendix G and WRC 175 the initial RTNDT for those vessels had to be inferred from limited The Task Group completed a draft report and delivered it to the data or bounded conservatively from generic data sets. has become the single most important parameter in toughness requirements. However. ensured.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 44 44 • Chapter 43 provides a measured To value that relates the measured fracture specimen are correlated to a dynamic or static reference toughness toughness data directly to the Master Curve reference toughness.2 CODES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE establishing acceptable plant operating criteria for the prevention PREVENTION OF BRITTLE of brittle fracture of the vessel. and AEC on August 13. the Charpy test specimen results for energy to break the preservice hydrotest failure of a fossil vessel. the RTNDT for all components below 700F. Appendix G tive lower bound of available fracture toughness data. When adequate Code margins were included. in part. The KIR curve was established as an empirical was as follows: lower bound to the data that were normalized on a (T-RTNDT) scale. The delivery to reference temperature index. The RTNDT PVRC. for reactor facilities are contained in Title 10. so 43. depth of one-fourth of the section thickness and a length of 1.2.ASME_Ch43_p043-062. In particular.

If there mentation of the LTOP systems causes restrictions in the operating is fuel in the reactor during hydrostatic pressure test or leak test. the minimum permissible means that additional margin was added for protection against brit- temperature is 60F above the adjusted reference temperature of tle fracture in the implementation of the LTOP systems. the reactor vessel must not be lower than 40F above the mini. Appendix G was first introduced into the Code in considered to be an end-of-life flaw size that supposedly would 1987 as a duplication of ASME BPVC Section III. add to the margins for protection against brittle critical and noncritical core operation. the reference flaw was Section XI. officially replacing ASME BPVC Section lower factor of 1. light-water reactors (LWRs) and the fracture toughness degrada. For example. The PVRC Task Group recommended the CFR50. Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient by at least 120°F for normal operation and by 90F for hydrostat.2.5-in.2 [7] and the than for the purpose of low-level physics tests). i. changes in the fracture toughness properties of ferritic materials The stress intensity factors of Appendix G are based on an in the reactor vessel beltline region. Appendix G method needed to be revised.2. of 1. Appendix G include any (unspecified) environment-induced subcritical crack with the addition of toughness shift due to irradiation embrittle- growth. and the results were a ic pressure tests and leak tests.1 Revisions to ASME BPVC Section XI.0 on the thermal stress intensity factor (KIT). The adoption of Appendix G into Section XI provided a vehicle to 43. The fact that these operation and the pressure is less than 20% of the service system valves are set below the limits of the calculated Appendix G curve hydrostatic test pressure. Appendix G for operating plants. One such requirement for pressurized water core is not critical and when pressure exceeds 20% of the presser. Appendix G method is used as the basis for ASME BPVC Section III. the temperature of establishment of Branch Technical Position RSB 5-2 [8]. The impact collocation methods. Appendix III became mandatory by calculating pressure-temperature operating limits and tempera- reference in Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50. there is no equiva- 2. the BPVC appendix ture limits for cold hydrostatic testing and leak testing.2.ASME_Ch43_p043-062. when the fracture of the vessel. Appendix G produced after weld repair.0 on KIT in WRC 175 “due to its secondary and III. Appendix G. Appendix G. For vessels projected to be above this fluence. there are and cooldown when the core is critical. Although no NDE was performed on In the mid-1980s it became obvious that the original Section this vessel after the repair. Reactor Vessel plants with a significant amount of vessel embrittlement. long flaw that was 43. in essence. K Im = Mmsm (1) al surveillance program is required. nor lower than the minimum permissible temperature for the heatup and cooldown limit curves. When the core is critical (other revision to NRC’s Standard Review Plan Section 5. Appendix H applies to all assumed semi-elliptical surface flaw oriented in the axial direction. Charpy impact ing are described in Welding Research Council Bulletin 175 [6].2. the failure was used as evidence that III. These restrictions become even more severe for lance requirements by adding Appendix H. However. Finally.3 Factor of Safety. Appendix H requires a material surveillance program to monitor 43.. specimens are exposed to the neutron flux in surveillance capsules The methods included classical stress function methods. deep by 13-in. This was accomplished by inservice system hydrostatic pressure test. These LTOP system vice hydrostatic test pressure. procedures and modified equipment to protect the Appendix G tion. Material Surveillance Program Requirements.0 for pressure is consistent with the Code margins for other nonmandatory appendix. pump cavitation. Appendix G is considered to be a 2. and the (then emerging) finite element specimens are tested and the Charpy shift data used in accordance method. For reactor vessels that can conclusively show the and the general expression is given as follows: peak neutron fluence (E  1 Mev) at the end of the vessel design life is below 1  1017 n/cm2. A safety factor of Appendix G. normal to the direction of maximum principal stress. PWRs have implemented mum permissible temperature established for noncritical opera.e. installing or enabling relief valves with fixed or variable setpoints An exception was made for boiling-water reactor (BWR) ves.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 45 COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 45 failure resulted from a 3. The imple- the reactor vessel material in the region that is controlling. For the KI due to pressure.” The Section XI. Following these regulatory actions.3.0 on the stress intensity factor due to pressure (KIM) and a factor lent group in Section III that meets to review the Section III. Protection for Pressurized Water Reactors. The LTOP setpoint limits may the preceding requirements apply. For normal and upset events (Levels review the Appendix and update it to current technology. that would function during low-temperature operation to mitigate sels when the water level is within the normal range for power the severity of inadvertent pressure excursions. or the net positive suction head (NPSH) limit for prevention of In July 1973.3 ASME BPVC Section XI. boundary and withdrawn periodically from the reactor vessel. defines the pressure-temperature requirements for vessel heatup in the implementation of the Appendix G method.2. numerous additional technical and administrative requirements ments were added to 10 CFR Part 50 for the flange region and for that. surveillance programs must be in place in where sm is the membrane pressure stress and the M m factor was accordance with Appendix H. ment for plant operating pressure-temperature limit curves. Appendix G to Section III of the Code adopted safety ASME Section XI Working Group on Operating Plant Criteria factors within the range included in WRC 175. sen was based on the collective work of many experts at that time. Supplemental require. reactors (PWRs) is to have a LTOP system. a safety factor of has responsibility for this section of the Code. self-relieving nature. The A and B). Appendix G. While Section XI. The orig- tion is directly related to the exposure of the beltline materials to inal methods used for computing KI for pressure and thermal load- neutron irradiation and thermal environments. ASME BPVC large flaws could exist in vessels. depending on whether the core come close to the minimum required pressure to achieve pump seal is critical during the test. window for heatup and cooldown. The recommendations were exceed the reference temperature of the material in those regions documented in NUREG-0224. In this case. the particular expression cho- with trend curve prediction methods and 10 CFR Part 50. the temperature of the closure requirements came about as part of the resolution of a generic flange regions that are highly stressed by the bolt preload must safety issue (USI-A26) in the 1970s. the NRC established specific material surveil. it became mandatory by reference in 10 allowable loadings. based was based on a semi-elliptical surface crack solution in a . Appendix H specifies that no materi. to 10 CFR Part 50.

The M m factor combined flaw shape 43. The basis for this reference flaw is discussed in the EPRI White Paper on Reactor Vessel Integrity Requirements for Levels A and B Conditions [9]. APPENDIX G plate under uniform tension. wall thickness is given in Fig 43.1. a simplified stress function A-3000 [10]. In 1993. This Article provides a method for calculating KI was used that related the thermal stress intensity factor to the ther- mal gradient as follows: K lt = M t ¢Tw (2) where Tw is the temperature difference through the wall due to heatup or cooldown. 43. the ASME correction factors and included corrections for plastic zone size for Section XI Working Group on Flaw Evaluation approved changes the 14 -thickness reference flaw. THICKNESS FOR BENDING tion applies to the simplified method of stress intensity factors used STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR FROM ASME SECTION XI.ASME_Ch43_p043-062. the general approach for flaw evaluation (given in ASME BPVC Section XI.3. The postulated reference flaw adopted in WRC 175. in Article For the KI due to thermal loading. has a semi-elliptical surface geometry with a 14 thickness depth and a surface length equal to six times the depth. and later in Appendix G of ASME BPVC Section III. Appendix A) was a simplified method for calculating stress intensity factor whereby stresses at the flaw loca- tion are resolved into membrane and bending stresses using a lin- earization technique. in ASME BPVC Section XI. Mm FACTOR FOR MEMBRANE STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR FROM ASME SECTION XI.2. Mt FACTOR vs. to the Appendix A flaw evaluation method including revisions for tion of wall thickness and stress ratio is given in Fig 43. The Mt factor was based on a plate solu- tion for an infinitely long flaw assuming a typical (parabolic) tem- perature distribution across the vessel wall. 43. Prior to 1993. Appendix G. A plot of the Mt factor vs. KI.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 46 46 • Chapter 43 FIG. FIG.2. determination of the applied stress intensity factor. APPENDIX G .3. This method was judged to be conservative for the full range of heatup or cooldown rates in the range of 0 to 100F/hr.2 Revised Stress Intensity Factors. A plot of the M m factor as a func. The equivalent linear representation of stress distribution is shown in Fig.1. This figure demonstrates the dif- ferences between the actual stress distribution and the equivalent lin- ear stress distribution through the vessel wall. This same approxima.2. 43.

464. the revisions to Appendix G provide a method to calculate the thermal stress intensity factor.3 Pressure Stress Intensity Factors.85 for 2t 6 2 This methodology of stress intensity factor influence coeffi- Mm = 0. C1. The revi- sion to Appendix G in 1996 incorporated the most recent elastic solutions for KI due to pressure and radial thermal gradients dur- ing heatup and cooldown of reactor vessels. the revised solutions do not include plastic zone size correction. These solutions provided results that were essentially the same as those obtained by Raju and Newman [13]. the Appendix A coefficients were determined from several sources. Consistent with the original version of Appendix G.3. because plastic zone size is negligible during normal heatup and cooldown conditions. G2. is calculated using an equation of K Im = M m * (pRi/t). . The new solutions were based on finite element analyses for inside surface flaws per- formed by ORNL [11] and other research published by EPRI for outside surface flaws [12]. Ultimately. 43. and G3 are stress intensity factor influence coefficients and Q is a flaw shape parameter. C3  curve-fitted constants.926 2t for 2 … 2t … 3. for any thermal gradient through the vessel wall and at any time during the transient.2. flaw aspect ratios. no contribution for crack face pressure is included in the KI due to membrane tension (i. KIm.464 cients was proposed by Raju and Newman for internal and external surface cracks in cylindrical vessels [6]. The stress intensity factor.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 47 COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 47 finite element analyses were used to determine the specific G coefficients as a function of crack depth for semi-elliptical cracks. and three-dimensional Mm = 3. In addition. Also. The variation in hoop stress due to internal pressure in a hollow cylinder can be expressed as follows: R2i p R2o su u(r) = a1 + b (5) R2o .Ri 2 r2 FIG. KI. LINEARIZED REPRESENTATION OF STRESSES FOR SURFACE FLAWS where p  internal pressure r  radial distance through the vessel wall using a representative third-order polynomial stress distribution at Ri  vessel inner radius the flaw location of the following form: Ro  vessel outer radius s = Co + C1 (x/a) + C2(x/a)2 + C3 (x/a)3 (3) While the through-wall stress varies. which is a special case of the general solutions provided in Appendix A. These solutions are determined to be a more accurate method for implementation in Appendix G that provides consistent com- putational methods for both pressure and thermal stress intensity factors. Mm = 1..ASME_Ch43_p043-062. C2. intensity factor determination in ASME BPVC Section XI.e. and crack tip positions [11]. pressure) loading terms. Appendix G was simplified by using a stress formula (pRi/t) and a x  distance through the wall from the flawed surface constant (Mm) such that the membrane stress intensity factor. a  maximum flaw depth is given by the following: Co. G1. and the tabulated coefficients in Table A-3320-1 were chosen for applicability to surface flaws of various depths.3.21 for 2t 7 3. (6) the following form: where Mm for a postulated inside surface axial reference flaw is K 1 = [C0G0 + C1G1a + C2G2a 2 + C3G3a 3]2pa/Q (4) given by the following: where G0. This same approach was applied for the 14 -thickness reference flaw of Appendix G (with a 6:1 aspect ratio). 43. the revised pressure stress where. KIT.

a sharp. The flaw is assumed to Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). the relief may be relatively small in terms of absolute pressure. The new stress intensity factor solutions surface flaw during heatup from the following equation: better characterize the conditions for irradiated vessels in the low- temperature region where the thermal stresses and allowable pres- sure are low.3.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 48 48 • Chapter 43 Similarly. it has a depth of one- fourth of the section thickness and a length of 112 times the section Q = 1 + 1. and the results were used to determine the exact traditionally been the interpretation of WRC 175 and Appendix G coefficients used in Eq.” The basis for this reference flaw is documented in WRC 175.464 Mm = 3. the shape factor is the following: For section thicknesses of 4 in. STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR METHODS dient at the reference flaw location as given by Eq.4 Thermal Stress Intensity Factors. A general solution for stress thermal stress intensity factor was provided in the revi- sion to ASME BPVC Section XI. surface defect normal to the direction of maximum stress. semi- elliptical (6:1 aspect ratio) surface flaws in cylindrical vessels. (7) [12].893 2t for 2  2t  3. For these conditions. COOLDOWN CURVES for assumed 14 -thickness surface flaws [7].77 for 2t 6 2 Mm = 0.481C2 + 0. For the refer. The new Appendix G USING THE ORIGINAL AND REVISED APPENDIX G method used the same polynomial form of the radial thermal gra.) t = vessel wall thickness (in.464 where p = internal pressure (psi) Ri = vessel inner radius (in. that a longitudinal flaw must be assumed. C1.65 = 1. While this is clearly pared to the Raju and Newman solutions and other published conservative. Mm for a postulated outside surface axial reference flaw is given by the following: Mm = 1. (3).. the Note that these equations differ slightly from the form of Eq. the Klt value can be determined for an axial outside plastic zone size correction. These new solutions are elastic solutions that do not include a Similarly.464 (1/3)1. it has ratios.239 (10) thickness.09 for 2t  3. it is unrealistic for vessels with only circumferen- results that showed good agreement in all cases.4 for a sample 50°F/hr cooldown where C0. Although tup or cooldown transient. The 3-D influence coefficients for the inside surface flaw were The axial orientation was assumed because it is normal to the generated from finite element stress analyses conducted at Oak maximum (membrane) stress in the vessel.4.) These Mm factors were calculated for the 41 -thickness. This Q = 1 + 1. The 3-D tially oriented welds. Even if there are no longitudinal welds in the vessel. Then. K It = [1. This new method will provide some relief in the allowable operating pressure curve.ASME_Ch43_p043-062.401C3] 2pa (8) and the elastic solutions are the technically correct solutions. The flaw shape factor for an elliptical crack is approximated by the following equation: 43. and are determined to be exact solutions for a vessel mean radius- to-thickness ratio of 10. as shown in Fig.6322C1 + 0. . the KIt value can be determined for an axial inside surface flaw during cooldown from the equation following: influence coefficients for the outside surface flaw were deter- mined from closed-form solutions by Zahoor given in the EPRI K It = [1. ness reference flaw. Detailed finite element be in the vessel beltline weld or plate material with the highest analyses were performed for a range of crack depths and aspect RTNDT.2. and C3 are the curve-fitted constants determined limit curve. (5). the plastic zone size is negligible.2. The benefit is approximately a 70 psi increase in allow- from the thermal stress distribution at a particular time in the hea- able pressure at the low-temperature portion of the curve.630C1 + 0. 43.464 (a/c) (9) came about from the words in Article G-2120 as follows: “The postulated defect used in this recommended procedure is where a is the depth and c is the half-crack length.0359C0 + 0. to 12 in. C2.043C0 + 0. ence flaw geometry (a/2c  1/6). The traditional 1.5 Circumferential Reference Flaw. 43. 43. The ORNL analyses were com.4753C2 + 0.65 Appendix G reference flaw is assumed to be axially oriented. EXAMPLES OF 50F/hr.3. Appendix G for any thermal stress distribution at any specified time during heatup or cooldown FIG. benefits to plant operators are substantial because even a small the term ( 2Q) representing the flaw shape parameter is included in increase in allowable pressure can be a significant increase in the the influence factor terms since Q is a constant based on the 14 thick- operating window at the low temperatures.3855C3] 2pa (7) Ductile Fracture Handbook [13].

43. Appendix G to permit the assumed orientation of circumferential reference flaws for vessels with circumferential welds. This is a more physically realistic assumption for a reference flaw for vessels fabricated from ring forgings. and O. the LTOP issue became an Unresolved Safety assume long axial flaws at the vessel I. at the vessel 1/4-thickness location. these assumed circumferentially oriented reference flaws would remain within the plane of the girth weld. this assumption was Prior to 1992. RTNDT  90°F. This was accomplished by plants installing or enabling pressure (d) worst-case girth weld properties are used with the assumed relief valves to limit the pressure at low-temperature operation.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 49 COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 49 where KIm  the applied pressure stress intensity factor KIt  the applied thermal stress intensity factor KIR  the material reference toughness of the limiting vessel beltline material The corresponding changes for calculation of applied pressure and thermal stress intensities have been incorporated into ASME BPVC Section XI.6. have LTOP P-T limits that precluded exceeding the P-T limits (b) the weld thickness is small compared to the total reference for normal heatup and cooldown at temperatures less than flaw length.2. extending out. In the implementation of the require- FIG. When using the circumferential reference flaw for girth welds. The applied stress intensity factor for pressure loading on a circumferential flaw is half as large as that for an axial flaw because the vessel membrane stresses normal to the circumferential reference flaw are half as large. Although physically unrealistic. as shown in Fig.4 LTOP Setpoints Reactors must operate within the specified pressure-tempera- ture limits to maintain adequate safety margins against brittle fracture. The final set of operating heatup and cooldown limit curves is then a composite of the lowest allowable pressure as a function of temperature for all conditions. 43.7. one TIAL WELDS such requirement for PWRs is to have LTOP. 43. the other regions of the vessel must still assume an axial reference flaw and similar pressure-temperature limits calculated for these regions.6. and it results in improved pressure-temperature operating limits. the Section XI Working Group on Operating Plant These requirements for LTOP protection create further restric- Criteria approved a Code Case [15] and a Code Change to tions in plant operability. ASSUMED AXIAL FLAWS IN CIRCUMFEREN.5. LTOP transients sometimes cause reactors to operate beyond those limits. Fig. the ASME Code did not provide guidelines for generally agreed to be conservative because the margins and setpoints for the LTOP systems. vessels made from ring forgings have had to LTOP occurrences. Issue in 1978.ASME_Ch43_p043-062. Appendix G and are now standard practice for determining allowable pressure-temperature limits. The allowable pressure is determined from the following equation: 2K Im + K It 6 K IR (11) FIG.5.D. In 1996. Because of the frequency and severity of Historically. This results is an increase in the allowable pres- sure vs. This came about in the 1970s when the NRC conducted a review of 30 reported over- pressure transients that exceeded the Appendix G pressure-tem- perature (P-T) limits. ture. including margin. The fact that the pressure settings for the LTOP valves were set (e) there is no evidence of transverse-oriented defects occurring below the limits of the Appendix G curve meant that the margin in welds. 43. As shown in Fig. affected zone or base metal. 43. against brittle fracture of the vessel had been added by the LTOP systems.D. However. 43. temperature for heatup and cooldown. CIRCUMFERENTIAL FLAWS IN GIRTH WELDS . This was resolved in 1979 by the NRC recom- side the weld region as well as the toughness properties of the mending that all PWRs must implement procedures and install weld occuring at the deepest point of the crack front as shown in LTOP systems to mitigate such events. ments for prevention against brittle fracture reactor vessels. where RTNDT is the adjusted reference tempera- (c) no credit is given for the toughness of the adjacent heat. The regulatory guidelines at that time required plants with LTOP systems to (a) the flaw is projected to occur well outside the girth weld region. axial flaw orientation.

minus 60°F. SHOWING RTNDT SHIFT DUE TO IRRADIATION . whichever is greater. CHARPY V-NOTCH SURVEILLANCE DATA curves provide a larger window of operation. The fracture toughness of ferritic steels is very temperature dependent. 43. 43. When the KIC curve is used in place of KIR. and welds must be established to perform a vessel integrity analysis or to establish pressure-temperature operating limits. the resulting heatup and cooldown plant limit FIG. and RTNDT ⫺85°F for assumed flaws in circumferential welds. plates. The Charpy V-notch (ASTM E 370-88a) and the drop weight tests (ASTM E 208-87a) are the most commonly used specimens for this purpose. as noted by distinct changes in fracture behavior from brittle to ductile.ASME_Ch43_p043-062. This transition behavior is most apparent when the specimen contains a sharp notch or a crack. obtained from Charpy tests. Article G-2215. This shift is equated more severe for plants with a significant amount of vessel to the change in temperature of the Charpy 30 ft-lb energy level embrittlement.7. The near the core region. There are two setpoints involved: Guide 1. Subsequent changes to Appendix G allowed the use of the KIC reference toughness curve instead of KIR. as given in eq. which provides trend curves as a function the enable temperature below which LTOP systems must be active and the LTOP pressure setpoint limiting the maximum pressure during a low temperature overpressurization event.1 Initial RTNDT and Shift Due to Irradiation The toughness levels of reactor vessel plates.8. 43. The change addressed both of these setpoints by incorporating the following words into Appendix G: “LTOP systems shall be effective at coolant temperatures less than 200°F or at coolant temperatures corresponding to a reactor metal temperature less than RTNDT ⫹ 50°F. (11). 2 [13]. using actual vessel gins that are added to account for pressure overshoot during an steel samples loaded in surveillance capsules and placed in or LTOP event and to account for instrument error uncertainty. Reactor vessel surveillance programs. material exhibits at least 50 ft-lb of impact energy and 35 mils lat- tion of pump cavitation. as measured in the drop weight test. LTOP systems shall limit the maximum pressure in the vessel to 110% of the pressure determined to satisfy Appendix G of Section XI. RTNDT. with characteristic changes in fracture toughness from low to high values as temperature increases. at which the required pressure to achieve pump seal or the NPSH for preven. The temperature at which the material changes from ductile to brit- tle behavior. or NDTT. the Section XI Working Group on Operating Plant Fig. FIXED LTOP SETPOINT AFFECTS OPERATING as the nil-ductility transition temperature. is the higher of either the The LTOP setpoint limits may come close to the minimum NDTT or the temperature. between unirradiated and irradiated material. ring forgings. Criteria approved a Code Case and a Code change to incorporate Prediction of embrittlement in reactor vessel welds. The initial WINDOW RTNDT for vessel materials must be established in accordance with ASME BPVC Section III. This Code Case allows an enable temperature of RTNDT ⫹ 40°F for assumed axial surface flaws in axial welds and plates. Use of this Code Case increases the plant operating window when determining the LTOP enable temperature setpoints.” The criteria for the pressure setpoint of 110% of the Appendix G curve pressure at the lowest temperature applies only if the curve is based on the KIR reference toughness.3. and the method for determining LTOP setpoints into ASME BPVC forgings is determined according to the methods in Regulatory Section XI. of these systems has to do with additional administrative mar. NB2331 requirements. Part of the restriction in implementation eral expansion. Appendix G. Rev. is often referred to FIG. The reference nil-ductility transition temperature. monitor neutron embrittlement of reactor net effect of these administrative margins is to make the plant vessel materials.8. 43.3 REFERENCE TOUGHNESS CURVES 43. as shown in In 1992. however. Embrittlement is measured by an upward shift operating window narrower. These restrictions become even in the RTNDT temperature of the materials. the corre.qxd 6/5/09 12:01 PM Page 50 50 • Chapter 43 sponding LTOP pressure setpoint criterion is only 100% of the pressure to satisfy the Appendix G limits. An alternative method for determining the LTOP enable tem- perature setpoint was approved in Code Case N-641.99.

9. (a) large postulated flaw. so the resulting stresses are essentially constant. should be used for the curves from KIR to KIC. Each of sidering that core region inspections have been required to con- these is described in the following paragraphs. but as follows. ASME CODE KIC AND KIR TOUGHNESS CURVES of copper and nickel content and fluence or determines projec. as well as in ASME BPVC Section Xl. fastest rate allowed typically being 100°F/h. with the fitted results to actual Charpy surveillance data. The justification for this change is This situation may be postulated during a PTS transient event. These include weld residual stresses and significantly more information was known about these uncertain- stresses due to clad-base metal differential thermal expansion.ASME_Ch43_p043-062. follows: KIC. all operating transients (levels A.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 51 COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 51 FIG.3. the rate of change of pressure and temperature is 43. centrate on the inner surface and near inner surface region since . the use Although the four safety margins were originally included in of KIA (KIR in the terminology of the time) to provide an addition- the methodology used to develop P-T limit curves and hydrotest al margin was thought to be necessary to cover uncertainties and temperatures. Code Case N-640 [17]. and D) correspond to toughness only. 43. changed The only time when dynamic loading can occur and where the the fracture toughness curve used for development of P-T limit dynamic/arrest fracture toughness. 43.1 Use of KIC Is More Technically Correct. standards of ASME BPVC Section XI in the entire 28-year histo- There are several reasons for the limiting toughness in the ry of Section XI. original methodology. In fact. B. The methodology defined in Appendix G of ASME is not a credible scenario during the heatup or cooldown process- BPVC Section XI incorporates four specific safety margins as es.2 KIC Versus KIR Reference Toughness often constant. Therefore. KIA. there have been no indications found at the inside surface of any sideration to assess their effects on safety margins and justify the operating reactor in the core region that exceed the acceptance use of KIC.2. With regard to flaw indications in RPVs. Almost 25 years later. For this rate of tem- perature change. process remained unchanged. dynamic. Therefore. these elements required con.3. 14 thickness (14 T) (b) safety factor  2 on pressure stress 43. Furthermore. KIA (also pressure test conditions that have little or no thermal stress. which was approved in 1999. The heatup tions of embrittlement (for the same heat of material) from the and cooldown processes for nuclear plants are very slow. and arrest essentially static processes.3 Flaw Size. There are two lower bound fracture toughness curves available Therefore.2. static loading conditions. This is a particularly impressive conclusion con- Appendix G P-T limits being changed from KIA to KIC.2 Use of Historically Large Margin Is No Longer (c) lower bound fracture toughness (KIA) Necessary. are known as KIR) is lower bound on all static. as shown in Fig. C. 43.3. is more technically correct for development of P-T limit curves.2. use of the static lower bound fracture toughness.9. both the heatup and cooldown processes. ties and effects. the original methodology assumed that the maxi- mum value of the computed stress intensity factor occurred at the 43. with regard to fracture tough- fracture toughnesses and KIC is lower bound on static fracture ness. when the Appendix G methodology was first (d) upper bound adjusted reference temperature (RTNDT) approved for use and implemented into the ASME Code.3. deepest point of the flaw. The other margins involved with the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) is when a crack is propagating. some sources of stress were not considered in the several postulated (but unquantified) effects. In 1974.

43. leads to the conclusion that the KIC examination and surface exam are required before cladding is curve is a lower bound for a large percentage of the data. COMPARED TO KIC the implementation of U.12. the fracture KIA in the original version of Appendix G was based on the con- toughness database has increased by more than an order of magni.11. Consideration of these points. and these Fig.5 Local Brittle Zones. local brittle zone in the weld or tude. KIC REFERENCE TOUGHNESS CURVE WITH CURVE. compared to Fig.4 Fracture Toughness. An exam- applied.2.2. such as the Midland vessel and the age fracture toughness.ASME_Ch43_p043-062.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 52 52 • Chapter 43 FIG. 10 that there are a few data points falling just below the KIC are related to the fabrication and inspection practices for vessels. 43. curve. 43.3. the temperature range over which Flaws have been found. 43.11. This is heat-affected zone of the base material that could pop-in and shown in Fig. 43.10 include PVRUF vessel. Data in Figs.10 for KIC [1]. Also. which is produce a dynamically moving cleavage crack. 43. a full volumetric 1. 43. 43. ORIGINAL KIC REFERENCE TOUGHNESS FIG.S. and both KIA and KIC remain lower bound curves. of carefully screened data in the extreme range of lower Further confirmation of the lack of any surface indications has temperatures.3. Since the original formulation of 43.500) points above the curve. 43. cern that there could be a small. the FIG.12 satisfy KIC validity limits in ASTM E 399 standard for cleav- of several commercial RPVs.10. significant ductile tearing in higher toughness data points. NRC Regulatory Guide 1. the original database [2]. whereas KJC data in Fig. Therefore. as well as the many (over For the base metal and full penetration welds. is shown in Fig.150 in 1983. but all have been qualified as buried or the data have been obtained has been extended to both higher and embedded. WITH SUPPORTING DATA SCREENED DATA IN THE LOWER TEMPERATURE RANGE .12 [3]. ple set. Another argument for the use of the KIA and KIC fracture toughness curves in 1972. and these exams are repeated after cladding deposition. STATIC FRACTURE TOUGHNESS DATA (KJC) NOW AVAILABLE.11 and recently been obtained by the destructive examination of portions 43. lower temperatures than the original database. It can be seen from There are many reasons why no surface flaws exist.

servatism in the current Appendix G approach that could in fact Figure 43. This implies flaw size and a lower bound fracture toughness curve considering that 95% of all fracture toughness measurements should fall dynamic and crack arrest loading. This procedure was made possible by the development of J-integral fracture toughness test techniques generally used on 1-in. The ASME Code endorsed this new tech- nology by adopting two Code Cases in 1998. This means that researchers have not produced cata. 43. the standard deviation of this population is ty and reduces personnel exposure for both PWRs and BWRs. a lower toler- This argument provided a rationale for assuming a 14 T postulated ance bound noted as 5% is most commonly used. The shape production weld metals. on other systems (such as pumps) and also on personnel exposure. designated as To. The ASME KIC After over 30 years of research on RPV steels fabricated under reference toughness curve and the 5% bounding curve from the tight controls. By comparison.2°C (36. tulated condition and the use of the lower bound KIA curve to The procedure used to determine To is based on measurements assess fracture initiation. Section III and the equivalent KIA curve in Appendices A and G of The statistical basis of the ASTM E 1921 procedure allows a Section XI provide this lower bound curve for high-rate loading consistent level of conservatism to be set by selecting an appro- (above any realistic rates in RPVs during any accident condition) priate level of confidence. one Master Curve is used for all ferritic steels and the curve is shifted along the temperature axis to match a measured mean fracture toughness. The KIC ness test specimen in the transition temperature regime.54 cm) (or less) thick specimens.) is defined as the fracture toughness reference related to dynamic or crack arrest conditions. and fracture toughness by treating the horizontal shift temperature son for developing Code Case N-640 was to reduce the excess con. is defined for reduce overall plant safety. based on measured fracture toughness testing using the Master Curve approach [21]. relied on the advances in fracture mechanics technology that were not available existence of a local brittle zone. This argument. However.3. the ritic RPV steel showing distinct temperature and loading-rate Master Curve approach might also be used to construct a bound- (strain-rate) dependence. temperature. microcleavage pop-in has not been found to be sig. Wallin then performed a 43. of course.13. there is excess conservatism associated with this pos. the fracture toughness curves are not changed from the reference fracture toughness curves.2. the distribu- other ASTM-defined fracture toughness values (KIC and/or KJC).qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 53 COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 53 toughness property used to assess the moving crack should be 2m (91 ksi 2in. constructed with a specified level of confidence. especially for a fer. is predictable and described by the Weibull parameters. with a corresponding degree of confidence.4°F). industry research focused on the direct data to 1T equivalent values and comparing the results to the 5% use of measures fracture toughness properties in the assessment of lower confidence bound to the corresponding Master Curve. Considering the impact of the change the plate and forging data used for the KIC curve. Therefore. Wallin performed a statistical analysis of the empirical relationship between RTNDT 43. the manner in which these lower limits to the frac- strophic failure of a vessel. but the indexing parameter RTNDT is determined from the ref- erence temperature To from the Master Curve method of ASTM E 1921 [22]. as RPV integrity.4°C (72. The average shift between the measured data and the KIC curve a strong argument was made that the change increases plant safe. The ASTM procedure incorporates and crack arrest conditions. In these Code Cases. of fracture toughness. Code Cases N-629 and N-631. while the Master Curve bound is a statistically derived has shown some evidence of early pop-ins for some simulated bound based on measurements for a specific material. Because it is a statistical methodology. the KIC curve appears to represent a 2- lower bound of the original KIC data. To. The dynamic crack should arrest at a 14 ing curve for the data. The tempera. The KIR curve in Appendix G of above the confidence/tolerance bound. is 40. thickness depth (14 T). In contrast to RTNDT.3. for determining a material transition temperature. To is determined by performing fracture toughness tests on the material of interest.ASME_Ch43_p043-062. (2.14. when the ASME reference curve was adopted. These efforts were initiated to develop procedures shown in Fig. FIG. 20. ture toughness data leads to some significant differences. component. data. tion of measurements with respect to the ASTM bounding curve Therefore. The development of the Master Curve is based on the observa- tion that fracture toughness transition curves for all ferritic steels have a characteristic shape. However. 43. By testing multiple specimens at a single temperature. Therefore.3 Master Curve Reference Toughness similar analysis by size-adjusting the same fracture toughness During the late 1990s. it is possible to use Weibull statistics to determine the median fracture toughness. The primary rea. and a lower bound toughness curve can be sary margin that could reduce overall plant safety. the level of fracture toughness and location of the KIC reference curve is actually set by a rela- for these possible early initiations is within the data scatter for tively small sampling of materials. used as a lower bound on the fracture toughness. ASTM test method are both lower limits to the fracture toughness nificant. between the data and the KIC curve as a statistical variable [23]. This conservatism leads to the unneces. Testing of curve is a lower limit to all data on a series of pressure vessel some specimens at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) [4] steels. KIC and KIA. ORIGINAL ASME KIC DATA AND NEW VARIABLE ture at which the mean fracture toughness curve equals 100 Mpa TKIC -T .7°F).6 Overall Plant Safety Is Improved.13 shows how the new variable TKIC T. and any reinitiation should consider the Typically a bounding curve with a 95% degree of confidence is effects of a minimum toughness associated with dynamic loading. or even a fracture tough.

for welds with Linde 80 or Linde 0091 flux 0. where ness data to the 1-in. ORIGINAL KIC TOUGHNESS DATA VERSUS tions and.173] F(Cu) G (ft) (13) Master Curve technique is defined for a specific specimen size. was derived from Regulatory Guide 1. Since that time. Following this. 43.18. RTTo.54 cm) thickness (1T) equivalent value. KIC curve is an empirical lower bound curve. provide further statistical basis [29]. F(Cu) = e f 0. other plates shows how this applies to three large data sets evaluated in the PVRC Task Group activities.25. Standard Guide for Predicting Neutron Radiation Damage to Reactor Vessel Materials [24]. the primary difference between the EPRI the Master Curve: both curves bound the static crack initiation study and the NRC studies was in the interpretation of the statisti- toughness results. The key parameters required to determine the Master Curve- based lower bound structural curve are To and the appropriate sta.106 Ni1. These draft trend equations were developed using mechanistic modeling of the embrittlement process and statistical analyses.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 54 54 • Chapter 43 43. 2 [16]. Figure 43.305. for other welds and G(ft) is a fluence function term as follows: + tanh c d 1 1 log(ft) .TO which contains several additional correlation parameters.5076 tistical lower tolerance bound level. Cu … 0. (2. the database of Charpy surveillance test data has increased by a factor of about five. FRACTURE TOUGHNESS DATA NORMALIZED curve prediction methods. The EPRI correlation agreed with the general form of the draft NRC There is a fundamental relationship between the KIC curve and correlation parameters.072 wt% and subject to the following: Cu max = e f 0.072)0.4 Alternative Shift Prediction Method: E900 Trend Curves The embrittlement correlation described in ASTM E 900-87.15 156. Tc  the cold leg (irradiation) temperature (F) The method for applying the Master Curve as given in Code (ft)  the fluence (n/cm2 for E > 1MeV) Cases N-629 and N-631 is to determine To and then add an appro- priate temperature shift to the KIC curve using the following equa- tion: 234. weld B = μ ∂ 128.3.730/(Tc  460) (ft)0. it should be possible to use the parameter cal results.ASME_Ch43_p043-062. T . Guide for Predicting Radiation-Induced KIC curve appropriately bounds the fracture toughness data. Cu 7 0. and was based on 216 Charpy V-notch surveillance data points that were available in the mid-1980s [25. forging RTTO  To35F (12) 208.577. This EPRI correlation was subsequently accepted for To to define a value of reference temperature. and the overall fit to the latest database TO 1T AND COMPARED TO CODE CASE N-629 CURVE has a standard error of 22.70  10 18 even though the actual test specimens might be larger or smaller. A reevaluation of these data produced draft radiation embrittlement trend equations.052 This correlation showed improvement over previous trend FIG.24 G(ft) = 2 2 1.26]. in particular. plates in CE vessels where the value of R0TTo replaces the initial RTNDT. which were submitted for ASTM Subcommittee E 10.072 wt% (Cu . EPRI sponsored work to independently evaluate the mechanistic and statistical bases for these draft trend equa- FIG.15. whereas the Master The revised transition temperature shift correlation has the fol- Curve method fits the median of the measured fracture toughness lowing form: data. such that the use in ASTM E 900-02. These toughness data were first nor- malized to 1T size and the corresponding alternate KIC curve Ni is the measured nickel content in wt% indexed using To  35F is shown relative to data. In using the ASTM E 900-02 . In determining To. The bounding curve for the  B[12.02 consid- eration [27. A  6. Shift  A exp[20. Rev. The Transition Temperature Shift in Reactor Vessel Materials [30].].0F. Thus.0. it is common practice to adjust all fracture tough.

43. which enables a best estimate determination of the vessel integrity limits. The built-in assump- tions and safety factors are intended to bound the uncertainties in the analysis without knowing the exact condition of the vessel. An adjusted RTNDT of 320F was simplified version of the general form originally developed by the selected because it approximates the highest end-of-life value cur- NRC [27].ASME_Ch43_p043-062. neutron fluence. There is a general consensus that this form of the trend rently predicted for U. 14 t ref- erence flaw) and safety factors. Probability distributions were used for many of the correlation. However. a cooldown rate of 100F/hr from 500F to 410F and a rate of This newly adopted ASTM E 900-02 trend equation is a 20F/hr from 415F to 100F. controversy over the significance and importance of some of the A deterministic crack initiation limit was also calculated to terms in a later version of the draft NRC equation [28]. The analyses assumed 34F for base metal and 2s  56F for welds. Analyses were performed using both deterministic and probabilistic methods to assess the true margins in the Appendix G heatup and cooldown limit curves. which shows a compari- son of the residual (actual/predicted) results for the two methods. applies a two-standard deviation approach. because FIG. initiation Rev. 2 of the Regulatory Guide is to be used for developing P-T limits and for performing vessel integrity analyses. 43. reactors.17. A probabilistic fracture mechanics analysis that quantifies the conditional probability of failure for a PWR vessel as a function of temperature and pressure was performed by Gamble [31]. 43.16. stress due to a difference in thermal expansion between the clad and FIG. Rev. which has compare with these results for conditional failure probability of not been openly published. 2 equations [16]. The results of the evaluation are equation provides an improvement over the current Regulatory shown in Fig. much can be learned about the margins or degree of conservatism in the Appendix G method.99. COMPARISON OF RESIDUALS FROM ASTM base metal. residual stress associated with the pressure boundary E900-02 AND RECENT NRC EMBRITTLEMENT TREND welds. Four stress components were considered: pressure stress. initial RTNDT. 43. we have the technology to use focused NDE techniques to detect the presence or absence of vessel flaws and to measure the toughness of the vessel irradiated vessel materials.. In fact. These analyses are discussed in the White Paper on Reactor Vessel Integrity Requirements for Levels A and B Conditions [9]. and arrest toughness (KIa). and thermal stress due to the heatup or cooldown of the CURVE EQUATIONS vessel. The Appendix G approach uses a deterministic fracture mechanics method with defined assumptions (e. these analyses formed part of the technical basis for changing from the KIa toughness to the KIC ref- erence toughness curve for P-T limits. They also allowed the simplification of the Appendix G method.4 MARGIN STUDIES FOR OPERATING P-T LIMITS Several studies to evaluate margin in the P-T operating limit curves have been performed to support the activities of the ASME Section XI Working Group on Operating Criteria. a proper understanding of uncertainties is required.99. there remains some cooldown based on the KIa curve is also shown. This probabilistic analysis used LEFM to predict conditions for which brittle failure would occur in the embrittled vessel beltline region. copper and nickel con- The past regulatory practice in using Regulatory Guide 1.g.16. Rev. 43. The Appendix G P-T limits for a 20°F/hr Guide 1. shift in RTNDT.99. there were no good inspection techniques that could detect and characterize actual flaws or indications in a reactor vessel. TO P-T LIMITS FOR NORMAL COOLDOWN TRANSIENT . A comparison of the two differing trend the vessel.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 55 COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 55 At the time the method was developed. such as the factor of 2 on pressure stress to establish allowable pressure as a function of temperature that ensures no brittle fracture of the vessel. Evidence supporting the similar- ity of the approaches is given in Fig. where 2  toughness (KIC). 2. Today. tents. but until the NRC decides to make the change. Using the state-of-the-art technologies. so a large reference flaw was assumed. The deterministic analysis used similar vessel model curve forms shows much similarity. A form of these new trend curves may be included in a future revision to Regulatory Guide 1. ESTIMATES OF CRACK INITIATION COMPARED they were generally regarded to have adequate conservatism. unknown variables including flaw depth.17.S.

18. ABLE SURFACE INDICATIONS (ASME BPVC SECTION XI) . the event frequencies. 43. and with the current requirements of Appendix VIII of Section XI for demonstration of near-surface flaw detection capabilities. it provides another benchmark developing an alternative means to assess the acceptable level of for comparison of the margin embedded in the Appendix G protection against vessel failure.” Unfortunately. sensitivity studies mechanics algorithms and identical assumptions were not entirely can be performed to more accurately assess the effect of uncer- possible. and reliable volumetric examina- tion techniques were not expected to be used inservice.5.18. the same cooldown rate and vessel RTNDT).5 AREAS FOR FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS TO SECTION XI. can be included in the evaluation to better define attempts were made to ensure compatibility between the analyses margins associated with normal operation and postulated events. two of the key areas are dis- cussed here. LATED DEFECT (ASME BPVC SECTION III) AND ALLOW- tance standards can be met. The probabilistic analyses have several advantages.ASME_Ch43_p043-062. curves of allowable PT can be con- and cooldown events. 43. This relationship was estab- lished to maintain a factor of 10 on the allowable flaw size in the flaw acceptance standards. improved version 3. Appendix G method have been identified [9]. toughness.g.. Appendix G (Article G-2120) states that. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAXIMUM POSTU- for adjusting the Appendix G reference flaw size if certain accep. Because the inputs for the variables are given risk of vessel failure due to PTS is very low. Consequently. in choosing a refer- ence flaw size. It is recognized that. The comparison of lished for the nuclear industry. reference flaw size. An addi- tional factor to note is the relationship between the allowable sur- face indications in ASME BPVC Section XI (Table IWB-3510) and the Appendix G reference flaw. under NRC funding. of the vessel with a depth through the clad Probabilistic fracture mechanics analyses have been considered and 10% into the base metal thickness (1. with an assumed semi elliptical 43. and the same method as distributions rather than single values. A comparative as an alternative means for assessing margins in the Appendix G evaluation of these curves estimated the conditional failure proba. As part of the and safety factors). This is where the probabilistic analyses can be used risk of vessel failure during PTS events. the uncertainties can be could be applied to evaluate vessel integrity during normal heatup built into the method. has developed an variables in the Code method (e. there are trade-offs to consider in the selection ongoing pressurized thermal shock (PTS) reevaluation effort by of the individual values or assumptions used to establish the P-T the NRC. method.D. a database did not exist to assess NDE reliability. the updated FAVOR code has been used to analyze the limit curves. it may be appropriate to evaluate the new inspection reliability in light of the credit that may be derived FIG.1 of the FAVOR Code [32]. 43. structed without having to assume conservative values for each of the variables for a specific reactor vessel. (i. as well as fail- failure during a normal vessel cooldown is less than 10 6. identical fracture Finally. The results of the NRC most effectively to assess the level of protection against nonductile PTS reevaluation study from the NRC draft NUREG state that the failure of the vessel. In fact. the results can be directly compared to safety levels estab- approximately 10 4 at the low temperatures. such as what vessel conditions are conditional failure probability with the Appendix G cooldown needed to ensure a probability of less than 1  10 6 that a large limit (based on KIa toughness) shows that the probability of vessel release will occur. At the time it was selected. Nevertheless. as noted in Fig. because distributed variables are used. With the improve- ments in NDE technology. method. ORNL. there is no guidance on how to justify a smaller reference flaw in the ASME Code.e.2 Consider Probabilistic P-T Limit Curves surface flaw at the I. bility associated with the deterministic crack initiation limit as Firstly.5.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 56 56 • Chapter 43 assumptions (including cladding).). and it was thought that a 14 t flaw was the largest flaw that could be missed by then current ASME inspection methods. While ure probabilities. Secondly. because of the interaction between the More recently.17 in.. The 41 t flaw was intentionally chosen to be a conservative bound to any existing flaws in the vessel. the above evaluation only provides a tainties on the overall failure margin. UT inspection methods were not yet available. APPENDIX G Several areas for improvement to the Section XI. 43. The probabilistic methods rough estimate of conditional failure probability associated with a provide a useful tool for evaluating vessel integrity margins and crack initiation limit.1 Reduce the Reference Flaw Size The postulated flaw size used in determining the allowable P-T curves has a great effect on the margin associated with the Appendix G limits. “smaller defect sizes may be used on an individual case basis if a smaller size of maximum postulated defect can be ensured.

If aging and potential degradation of reactor vessel internals and to it can be shown that the internals components are either not sus- develop materials/components performance criteria. Then. and Jeff of License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants D. Nickell (Consultant). cient fracture margins. Gilreath III (Duke Energy). When these analyses indicate that aging (c) evaluating flaw tolerance of lead components or regions of mechanisms exist that may affect the function of the internals dur- greatest susceptibility to cracking. demonstrate that it is not a concern through the end of the license The important elements of this framework are as follows: renewal period for PWR plants.6. As plants near the have committed to performing inspections for detecting and man- license renewal term. stress corrosion cracking (SCC). and monitoring with the possibility of enhancement or augmenta. including the use of inservice inspection function of the PWR vessel internals. years from completion and submission to the ASME Code for and ensure integrity of the fuel and the surrounding vessel pres- approval.1 Overview ence and changes in Regulatory Guide 1. materials. Tang (EPRI). loss of preload). (NUREG-1800) [33]. or ing the license renewal term. License renewal applicants in their submit.e. but it may offer the best hope for managing the difficul. operation and maintenance histories including Internals Issue Task Group (RI-ITG) is actively working to devel. gather data for improved understanding of license renewal term. plant-specific AMP are implemented. performing effective leak detection and minimizing dation.. H.2 Aging Management Review mechanisms An LRA has to consider the effects of aging on SSCs within (b) performing functionality analyses of the components with the scope of license renewal.6 AGING MANAGEMENT OF PWR irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC).6. including an alternative method for calcu. loss of toughness. based on that technical basis. depends on the important part of a plant LRA. Void research results and the state of knowledge. future advances in technology and evalua- Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines will be developed for plants tion methodology may be able to show the adequacy of compo- nents to avert further measures. aging effects do not lead to the loss of component function is an al. The NRC has either approved these applications framework for the implementation of an AMP is proposed in this or has required additional utility commitments to perform inspec- paper. such as irradiation embrittle- ment. The subcomponents of the reactor representative material toughness properties under PWR internals are subject to an AMR to identify any potential age- conditions related degradation.. and the extent to which op the data and methods to quantify understanding regarding they are susceptible to the age-related degradation mechanisms. (d) using focused inspections to demonstrate no loss of integri. However. coolant system (RCS) and is located inside the reactor vessel. or are susceptible but to such a degree that the specific tools for utilities to implement for extended plant operation. and internals. recommend aging management strategies tals to the NRC have identified the general elements of AMP for for plants considering license renewal. Revision 3. or cracking. There are some differences in the internals designs ties associated with the increasing hydrotest temperatures in among the three different NSSS vendor types of plants. focus. Similarly. (a) the screening of components for susceptibility to the aging 43. BWRs. The oping P-T limit curves. provide guidance and the hydrotest temperature. an AMP must be defined to address these potential conditions. costs and personnel risks while maintaining fracture margin) are needed to avoid the additional burden caused by increases in flu. thermal embrittlement. component safety function is not affected throughout the license Under this MRP.99. As more PWR plants are submitting LRAs. fluence and temperature environments. Demonstration that these potential Management of materials aging effects. 43. passive structural components that lating the hydrostatic pressure test curve limits that would reduce support the RCS functions of core cooling. and the Generic Aging Lessons Learned . 43.e.ASME_Ch43_p043-062. sure boundary. PWR internals significant. such as loss of materi. providing ceptible. One The reactor internals assembly in a PWR is part of the reactor promising option is the use of a risk-informed approach for devel. evaluate. the aging mechanisms. and irradia- tion-induced void swelling. irradia- VESSEL INTERNALS1 tion-enhanced stress relaxation (i. and uses inspections swelling appears to be an issue that may require additional data to and flaw tolerance evaluations to manage the degradation issues. reactor internals are long-lived. 1 The author acknowledges the contributions of coauthors for this In 2001 the NRC issued the Standard Review Plan for Review section: Robert E. several utilities tion if a relevant condition is discovered. an AMP has to be in place to effec- swelling tively manage the potential aging effects. Several industry programs and demonstrated capability to detect. then the component/degradation mechanism is not documented. reduction in fracture toughness. Several aging mechanisms have been identified that may affect the reactor internals components. The potential for significant age-related degradation of specific ty in the lead components or regions of the vessel internals PWR vessel internals components depends on their design fea- The EPRI Material Reliability Program (MRP) Reactor tures. and potentially correct Owners Group programs are being conducted to examine these conditions that could affect function of the internals during the effects in more detail. This EPRI-funded study is one or more protection (for insertion) of the rod control cluster assemblies.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 57 COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 57 Options for managing the increase in hydrotest temperature in to manage reactor internals aging and associated potential degra- BWRs (i. the technical basis for the framework will be renewal term. This proposed framework is based on currently available tions for managing the aging effects in reactor internals. Both options will reduce the and guidance and in the flow of coolant through the reactor vessel hydrotest temperature to manageable levels while assuring suffi. and ensure component PWR reactor internals. Another option may be to justify the use of a smaller flaw many similarities exist in the overall means of structural support for the Appendix G analysis. A nals components.T. Otherwise. aging cracking and loss of toughness of susceptible reactor inter- ing on those regions most susceptible to aging degradation.

1 Scope of Program. The acceptance criteria. 43. but rather that there is reasonable assur. The parameters to be monitored or inspected tion(s) are maintained under all CLB design conditions during the should be appropriate to ensure that the structure/component period of extended operation. The mitigation programs should be described. to allow trending. con.” and “how” degradation should continue to function as originally designed.7 Corrective Actions.6 Acceptance Criteria. which do permit degradation. These actions should parameter or indicator trended should be described.6. in the period of extended operation. to the degradation of the particular structure/component intended function(s). Provisions should also be grams preclude the effects of aging. locations most susceptible to the specific aging effect of concern dition monitoring. This includes aspects tance criteria.6. diversi. The sample size should be based their intended functions will be maintained consistent with the cur. challenge safety directly from the design basis information that is included in the systems.” “where. such as method or technique (e. Detection of aging effects against which the need for corrective actions will be evaluated. The acceptance criteria of the program and its basis should be described. mitigation. operating components subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that environment. a license renewal applicant is of the structures/components as a similarity of materials of con- required to demonstrate that the effects of aging on structures and struction. service environment. size. 43. including codes 43.3. mit degradation because a structure and component without This program element describes “when. This 43. When sampling is used to inspect a group of structures/compo- quate without modification and where existing programs should nents.5 Monitoring and Trending. Information from avail- Nuclear power plants are licensed based on redundancy. technical basis for determining where existing programs are ade. The samples should be biased toward AMPs are generally of four types: prevention. to the extent possible. inspect for the presence and extent of aging effects. on such aspects of the structures/components as the specific aging rent licensing basis (CLB) for the period of extended operation. The scope of the program ria and a prediction regarding the rate of degradation to confirm should include the specific structures/components of which the that timing of the next scheduled inspection will occur before a program manages the aging.3. volumetric.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 58 58 • Chapter 43 (GALL) Report (NUREG-1801) [34]. Monitoring and trending to perform its intended function(s). and defense-in-depth principles.3. fabrication. A degraded or failed compo.3. This program element describes “how” the data collected are evaluated and may also include trending for a forward look. Information should be provided that links the parameters the structure and component intended function(s) will be main- to be monitored or inspected to the aging effects being managed. Corrective . maintaining the intended function under all CLB design loads. provide the basis for the inspection population and sample be augmented for extended plant operation. and timing of consist of a discussion of the process for calculating specific new/one-time inspections to ensure timely detection of aging numerical values of conditional acceptance criteria to ensure that effects. tained under all CLB design conditions.6. or aging effects. In defining an AMP. visual. The parame.g. Trending is a comparison 43. should occur before there is a loss of the structure/component should ensure that the structure and component intended func- intended function(s). thus.3. existing technical information. installation.. ty. Condition monitoring programs detected in the initial sample. aging indicators 43. The program should include a intended function(s) will be adequately maintained for license methodology for analyzing the results against applicable accep- renewal under all CLB design conditions. The method or technique and fre.3 Aging Management Program Attributes previous failure history. An acceptable AMP should consist priateness of the technique and frequency. design. Plant-specific and/or industry-wide ance that they will perform the intended functions through the operating experience may be considered in evaluating the appro- period of extended operation. The activities for prevention and should be quantified.6. which provided the NRC adequate to detect the aging effects before a loss of structure/com- staff’s evaluation of existing plant AMPs and documented the ponent intended function. The method- mitigate or prevent aging degradation. The inspection population should be based on such aspects According to these documents. surface Acceptance criteria could be specific numerical values or could inspection).3. rective or mitigative actions. quency may be linked to plant-specific or industry-wide operating experience. procurement. Although aging indicators may be quantitative or qualitative. loss of structure/component intended function. effect. that the technique and frequency are acceptance criteria are not met should be described. Also.3 Parameters Monitored or Inspected. of the current monitoring results with previous monitoring results ters to be monitored or inspected should be identified and linked to make predictions for the future.6. are based on data as part of the program). Thus.. Performance monitoring programs test the ability of a structure or component 43. Mitigation programs attempt included on expanding the sample size when degradation is to slow the effects of aging.4 Detection of Aging Effects. frequency. Prevention pro. and they should provide pre- necessary to demonstrate absolute assurance that structures and dictability of the extent of degradation and.6. or 43. system and struc- ture design. it is not necessary structure or component should be managed to ensure its availability to discuss CLB design loads if the acceptance criteria do not per- to perform its intended function(s) as designed when called upon. Justification should be provided.6. ology for analyzing the inspection or test results against the acceptance criteria should be described. materials of construction. it is not activities should be described. The specific program necessary for includes an evaluation of the results against the acceptance crite- license renewal should be identified. affect timely cor- components will not fail. Actions to be taken when the and standards referenced.ASME_Ch43_p043-062. program data are collected (i. able references may be cited.2 Preventive Actions.6.e. location. the effects of aging on a FSAR because that is a part of the CLB. and contribute to plant risk. sample size.3. and performance monitoring. all aspects of activities to collect Acceptance criteria. data collection. of the 10 elements described in the GALL Report [34] and here. It is not necessary to justify any acceptance criteria taken nent might reduce the reliability of the system.

For example.3 Stress Corrosion Cracking. 43. (SCC) is a potential age-related degradation mechanism for PWR pleted and are effective.8 Confirmation Process. Thus. along with screen- 43. Thermal aging recurrence. and recurrence is prevented.21(d) to require that the FSAR supplement includes a summa. demonstrations that rely on the toughness properties. ulatory and administrative controls.3. there should be follow-up with combinations of high accumulated neutron fluence and oper- activities to confirm that the corrective actions were completed. because the (RI-ITG) has been sponsoring research to obtain data for improved feedback from operating experience should have resulted in understanding of the degradation mechanisms and develop recom- appropriate program enhancements or new programs.6. may be necessary for certain components in certain regions. Almost all of the currently available data are from non-PWRs existing programs should be discussed. mended strategies and guidelines for managing the effects of aging mation can show where an existing program has succeeded and in PWR internals. Irradiation embrittlement is a well. nents with substantial preloads. The effectiveness of prevention and miti. A proposed framework for the implementa- managed adequately so that the structure and component intend. the root cause determination was performed.6. An applicant may have to commit to providing operating experi. It should ensure that preventive actions are 43. A limited number of A 286 core barrel bolt managing internal corrosion of piping. ating stress above some prescribed thresholds.6.ASME_Ch43_p043-062.3.6 Void Swelling. The operating experience of AMPs. The synergistic effect of thermal aging and irradiation embrittlement is a particular concern for CASS materials. The internals components most susceptible relationship between frequency/coverage of inservice examina- to irradiation embrittlement are those located nearest to the reactor tions. 43.4.4. They should provide a formal their intended function.9 Administrative Controls. the reference flaw location. ing an incubation period before accelerating to a higher rate. the analysis should ensure that the structure and component components (predominantly for materials with high delta ferrite intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB. The procedure 43. . where it has failed (if at all) in intercepting aging degradation in Inservice inspection and flaw tolerance evaluation are key ele- a timely manner. reactor internals components that are fabricated from alloy 286 or gation programs should be verified periodically.g. (water chemistry) may be used to minimize susceptibility to cor- rosion.4.6. and the critical flaw size that serves as a surrogate for material toughness and a lower resistance to crack initiation. monitoring program (ultrasonic inspection) to verify that corrosion Irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking is a potential age- is indeed insignificant.10 Operating Experience. fast reactors).4. component failure. it may also be necessary to have a condition.4. any informal programs under the combination of high fluence neutron exposure and high relied on to manage aging for license renewal must be administra.1 Irradiation Embrittlement. 43. for cast austenitic stainless steel (CASS) PWR vessel internals ment. 43.3. Stress corrosion cracking adequate and that appropriate corrective actions have been com. ing postulated reference flaws. Also being evaluated are flaw documented effect that is known to increase strength and reduce tolerance. Irradiation-enhanced stress relax- ation is a potential age-related degradation mechanism for PWR 43.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 59 COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 59 actions.5 Aging Management Strategies The EPRI Materials enhancements or additional programs. Irradiation-induced void swelling has ry description of the programs and activities for managing the been identified as a potential age-related degradation mechanism effects of aging for license renewal.5 Stress Relaxation. This infor. in Alloy X-750 materials.4. because Any AMPs to be relied on for license renewal should have reg.6. 43. tion of an AMP incorporating these research results and using ed function(s) will be maintained during the period of extended inspections and flaw tolerance evaluations to manage these issues operation. embrittlement is a potential age-related degradation mechanism If corrective actions permit analysis without repair or replace. related degradation mechanism for PWR internals components When corrective actions are necessary.4 Aging Concerns in PWR Vessel Internals ing to identify lead components and flaw evaluation criteria.2 Thermal Aging Embrittlement. Operating experience with (e. Enhanced visual examinations. ments of the overall process for managing aging effects for PWR dence to support the conclusion that the effects of aging will be internals components. A key element in this framework is the reliance on focused ence in the future for new programs to confirm their effectiveness. A Reliability Program (MRP) Reactor Internals Issue Task Group past failure would not necessarily invalidate an AMP. adequate preload may be required to their functionality. However. including root cause determination and prevention of 43. orientation and size. temperatures. is given in Fig. The main concern related to irradiation embrittlement is that loads expected to occur during the period of operation between cracked or fractured parts may be the result of a reduced toughness inspections. such as torqued bolts. The confirmation process should be described. Swelling generally proceeds at a very low rate dur- tively controlled and included in the FSAR supplement. a mitigation program failures have been observed that may be attributable to SCC. content). This information should provide objective evi. which experience neutron fluences in excess of are being considered along with flaw tolerance evaluations assum- 1  1020 n/cm2 (E  1 MeV). inspections to detect the presence (or absence) of degradation in the lead components. vessel internals fabricated from austenitic stainless steel and Visual examinations using VT-3 and enhanced VT-1 techniques nickel-base alloys.6. should be timely. That is the basis for 10 CFR 54.6.4 Irradiation-Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking. or fitness-for-service.6. Irradiation embrittlement will use screening and categorization of components to eliminate is a potential age-related degradation mechanism for PWR reactor those regions that are not susceptible to aging degradation. including past corrective actions resulting in program 43. should be considered. service core. This is a concern only for those compo- review and approval process.19. The administrative controls internals components that require adequate preload to perform of the program should be described.

43. Radiation effect on materials behavior and reactor internals components performance is a complex phenomenon. The research and development will provide data Examination Category B-N-3 is inadequate. In: Code of Federal Regulations. examination distance and character recognition height for VT-1 and VT-3 inspections. 8. PVRC Recommendations on Toughness Requirements for 43. as given in Table IWA-2210-1. New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers. These models will be based on (NARA) Office of the Federal Register (OFR)/Government Printing irradiated materials data obtained in hot cell tests. in part.7 REFERENCES tion height are essentially twice as large for VT-3 as for VT-1. Welding Research Council.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 60 60 • Chapter 43 FIG. Part 50. Group (RI-FG). U. In: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel nents subject to relatively high service or residual stresses. Fracture Toughness Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors. The objectives are to better understand aging and the poten. and owners groups sponsors to coordinate the 7. with bounding assumptions for crack growth due to IASCC and loss of toughness due to irradiation. Appendix H.2. NB-2300.S.2. In: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.2 (compared with those of IWB-3520. In particular.1 for VT-1 visual actions under the NEI 03-08 materials initiative for managing the examination) together with the differences between maximum effects of aging degradation in PWR vessel internals. 5. These Guidelines will include “mandatory” or “needed” 3520. forming functionality analyses of the components to assure no loss Washington. Appendix G. ASME BPVC Section XI. Protection Against tion may not be capable of surface-breaking crack detection and Nonductile Failure. Reactor Vessel Materials Surveillance Program Requirements. models can be useful in determining the performance of these com- Washington. includ. Branch Technical Position RSB 5-2. Code. the inspections to detect the effects of cracking. New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers. FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF AGING MANAGEMENT USING INSPECTIONS AND FLAW EVALUATION The NRC staff have stated that ASME Subsection IWB in PWR internals. For such cases. enhanced VT-3 visual examina- 2. as a program and tools for evaluating aging effects in the internals components for managing some of the effects of aging during the license and will form the technical basis to recommend strategies and renewal term. guided by its utility advisors. The EPRI 6.S. In: Code of Federal Regulations.19. industry research and development related to PWR vessel inter. ASME BPVC Section III. In: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Materials Reliability Program (MRP) Reactor Internals Focus Code. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 3. DC: National Archives and Records Administration’s of component function throughout the period of extended plant (NARA) Office of the Federal Register (OFR)/Government Printing operation. DC: National Archives and Records Administration’s ponents in the PWR environment. examination may be an acceptable alternative for PWR internals. Standard fracture mechanics methods may be used along Office (GPO). ing relatively high preload stresses. CFR Title 10. Another key aspect of the aging management strategy is per. Overpressure Protection. DC: U. CFR Title 10. Part 50. Appendix G. . in 2008. New sizing without excessive uncertainty. Fracture Toughness Criteria For the accessible surfaces of removable PWR internals compo. for Protection Against Failure. Office (GPO). 1972. 43. EPRI MRP is planning to issue IRE Guidelines for PWR internals sons for this question are the relevant conditions cited in IWB.6. ASME BPVC Section III. Washington. Overpressure Protection of tial degradation mechanisms and to quantify the effects of aging Pressurized Water Reactors While Operating at Low Temperatures. NRC Standard Review Plan 5. is working with utilities. Appendix G. They questioned the capabilities of current VT-3 approaches for managing these aging effects. Fracture Toughness Requirements for Materials. WRC 175.6 Status Ferritic Materials. VT-1 visual York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers.ASME_Ch43_p043-062. Both the maximum direct examination distance and the character recogni. The ostensible rea. Research data and predictive 4. 1. nals. vendors.

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