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TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 31
31 AUC 1944
Nmttle mperiencesm a r e guL11 she6 r e g u l & r l j r by this h e e d q ~ w r t e r s t o e n a b l e e u n i t s i n t r a i n i n k - t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t o c ~ m b ~ tx p e r i e n c e s r,f cur t r c ~ ? snow ~ l t h o u g ht h e nxperiences of c e r t a i n 1xi:-ts et a f i g h t i n g t h e G e r m n s i n France. p r t i c u l ~ rl o c a t i o n are n o t n e c e s s a r i l y h p p l i c a b l e t c a l l u n i t s i n h l l situations, t h e i t e m r l u t l i s h e d w i l l be those based cn p r a c t i c c l e x p e r i e c c e an3 t r e r e c w x e n d e d Reports f o r c e r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by w i t s w h ck- m y eacounter siz.ii1e.r a r c b l e n s . ~ of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s are p e r t i c u h r l y d e s i r e d in o r d e r t h t h e ~ validit? of t h e indicated b ~ t t l e less011 may be determined.
By commnd of t h e =my

w o u p Conlmnder a

B r i g a d i e r Genertll, USA Ad j u t o n t General

The f o l l o w i n g ob%ervations a r e e x t r a c t e d f r o n a recer,t r e p o r t of t h e war Depertment Observer Board t o t h e Comrmnding G s n e t r ~ ~ l , r m y ~ mound p r c e s .

1 .

Location of D i r e c t s u p p o r t A r t i l l e r x o

UCGirect s u p ~ o r t r t i l l e r y battaJ.lons a

should n o t be c l o s e r t h a n 3000 o r 4000 y a r d s t o t h e f r o n t l i n e s . If t h e y a r e up e s c l o s e as 1500 o r 2000 y a r d s , a s t r o n g c o u n t e r a t t a c k w i t h ta~ks n d armor w i l l overrun a t h e p o s i t i o n , and t h e heart of your c o m u n i c e t ~ o ci s l o s t , a s is l i a i s o n w i t h supported regiments. ~ t t a c h e db a t t a l i o n s may and o f t e n ~ h o u l dbe c l o s e r t h h n 3000 c r 4500 y a r d s t o t h e f r o n t w i t h o u t t h i s r i s k , a s a l l c m u n i c a t i o n is c l e a r e d through t h e d i r e c t support. D i r e c t s u p p o r t ba tte l i o n s m a t know r~hex~e i n f a n t r y is a t a l l times. our
g a f e t y of f i r e s i a c l e a r e d through therne@--Wippdier General Reese M Howell, A r t i l l e r y . O f f i c e r , 9 t h Division.
2 e Conduct of m r w a r d Observers. w u t i l ! . e r y forwerd o b s e r v e r s b . v e been e o i n g t o o 'They c a n n o t tag a l o n g w i t h t h e company c o m n c i e r . ~f t h e y f a r forward i n many ceses. do, they a r e pinned t o t h e ground and cannot s e e whet is going on except i n a very s m l sector. Often t h e y can Bee n o t h i n g a t a l l acd a r e unable to perforni t h e i r m i s s i o ~ s . I know of one forward o b s e r v e r who went a l o n g with t h e p o i n t of t h e advance, where he s h o u l d never heve been. The l i a i s o n o f f i c e r and not t,he a s s a u l t commander must h a n d l e t h e forward observeraw--Rrigadj.er General Reese M Howell, a r t i l l e r y O f f i c e r , 9 t h Divi. sion.

3. Cub P l a n e s on Air ~ l e r t . nwe always keep a Cub p l e n e up on p a t r o l even d u r i n g q u i e t p e r i o d s when no m i s s i o n s a r e h e i n g f i r e d . y e s t e r d a y (7 ~ u g u z t )o u r p a t r o l obeerved a Germn tank parked o n t h e edge of a - 1 1 p a t c h of woods. He c a l l e d f o r a b a t t e r y (6 guns) and f i r e d on t h e l o n e tank. When t h e f i r s t rounda l a n d e d , t h e obs e r v e r s p o t t e d s i x more tanks bunched up i n the same area. H e then c a l l e d f o r t h e

b a t t a l i o n , we got f i v e of the seven tanks, ~t t h e conclusion of this mission, which d i d n *t l a s t long, the came observer s p o t t e d a German m o t o r column on a nearby road, which'was inmediately taken under f i r e . By a c t u a l count we s t 25 vehicles. I n a l l w e got f i v e tanke and 25 motor v e h i c l e s very quickly, which shows what a n e l w t obs e r v e r can do i n a cub planes'--Captain James B. Gregory, A i r Officer, 4 t h Division Artillery.

I1 TECHNIQUE OF blOTOR MOVEMENT WlTH A I R SUPPQ(T.

- r e g a r d i n g coordination of a i r , armored and other ground f o r c e s i n f a s t NOTE* observers f r o m t h i e headquarters have been d i r e c t e d t o t r a n s m i t information
moving o p e r a t i o n e i n as much d e t a i l &nd a e r a p i d l y a 3 p o s s i b l e e The informaother ret i o n given below is contained in t h e f i r s t r e p o r t on t h i s subject. p o r t s w i l l be disseminated a s promptly a s p o s s i b l e a f t e r r e c e i p t .

1 S i t u a t i o n o I n a r e c e n t m t o r i z e d advance, the 79th ~ n f a n t r y . Division used t h e following methods f a r maintaining c o n t r o l and c l o s e a i r support. A c a v a l r y group was p r o t e c t i n & t h e division*^ f r o n t and r i g h t f l a n k , and an ar&red d i v i s i o n was-marching on the l e f t flank.
moved i n two columns with s e c t i o n s of t h e 2 , Communication. The 79th ~ i v i s i o n d i v i s i o n reconnaissance group a t t a c b e d t o t h e heads of each column and t o the &lored d i v i s i o n , s o t h a t c o n t e c t could be maintained through t h e ' s m 506. ~ h f 2 s(=R 508 i n t h e hE-8 armorea cars of t h e s e c t i o n s were s e t t o the frequency of t h e a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n p l a n e s which covered t h e columns. I n some i n s t a n c e s these planes determined the method of advance t o t h e columne.

3. c o n t r o l . The CL) comnanders were i n d i r e c t c o n t a c t w i h t h e d i v i s i o n commanders through t h e sCR 193. Combat teams m v e d from p o i n t t o point on order of hieher a u t h o r i t y , u s u a l l y t h e d i v i s i o n ccmmntler with one col~unnand t h e a s s i s t a n t d i v i s i o n c o m n d e r with t h e other.

4, I n f a n t r y Movement. Truck c o ~ z n i e se g d t r u c k s from t h e d i v i s l o n and a t t a c h e d I n some i n a t e n c e s t h e motorized i n f a n t r y a r t i l l e r y were u t i l i z e d t o m v e t h e infactry. moved s o r a p i d l y t h a t there was an i n t e r m i n g l i n g of columns with t h e erroored d i v i s i o n on t h e f l a n k , and a t o t h e r times they had t o h a l t and wait f o r t h e cavalry t o r e g a i n i t s d i s t a n c e ahead. The & v i s i o n chief of s t a f f recomraends t h a t the covalry i n such a s i t u a t i o n be given an a w l e head s t a r t , e.g. c a v a l r y s t e r t i n g a t d a y l i g h t , i n f a n t r y a t 1300.
5 . A i r Support. The a j r support p a r t y u s u a l l y r e m i - m d wj.t h d i v i s i o n h e a d q u r t e r s , a l t h o u & i t occaelonally m v e d t o t h e u n i t wh=e t h e g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t y was expected* CL) commanders or t h e recclnnaissat~ce t r o o p could g e t a i r sup2ort almost irmedietely by r a d i o r e q u e s t t o the armed reconneissance f l i g h t s which were covering t h e edvancicg columns. Requests o f t e n went from t h e c a v a l r y grcup t o oin reconneiseance troop t o t h e d i v i s i o n a i r support p a r t y t o t h e planes. The armed reconnaissar.ce f l i g h t s a l s o cove r e d a r e a s a s requested by corps and & v i s i o n a i r s u p p o r t p e r t i e s . The m i s s i o ~ l su s u a l l y were flown by four or e i g h t a i r c r a f t c a r r y i n g 500 pound g e n e r a l purpose bombs and .5O c a l i b e r m c k ~ i n eW s e
,kcproduce& the ing/neerRe~ro, fief /2tb Amy, &t?;;a

TWELFTH A R M Y C R O U P

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No, 32 31 A U C 1944
'Battle ESperiences* are published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from the l a t e s t combat erperienoea of our troops now fighting the Cennans i n France. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r location are not necessarily applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l situations, the items published w i l l be those baaed on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommended f o r c a r e f u l consideration by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. Reports of corroborative or contrary experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t the v a l i d i t y of the indicated b a t t l e lesson may be determined.
Ey conmiand of the
L

Group Commander:

H B. LGIIISL .
Brigadier General, USA Ad jut a ~ Gener a 1 t

--_--.-----.------------F HT I USE O CUB PLANE3 FOR P O O WSSIONS: 1 .We improvised a photo laboratory and dark roam by making ply-wood aides and top . f o r a 1-ton t r a i l e r . I n t h i s laboratory r e do the e n t i r e proceesing including enlargements and can normally d e l i v e r about 20 photos two hours a f t e r request f o r a photo miesion. A l l photos a r e oblique and a r e taken from l i a i s o n planes with the regular K-20 camera. 2. Win addition t o the usual uae of these f a c i l i t i e s f o r a r t i l l e r y purposes it is poasible t o reproduoe s u f f i c i e n t copies f o r delivery t o and use of infantry b a t t a l i o n s a r a qeans of supplementing maps o r i n the absence of maps. Concentrations uan be figured, plotted, end numbered on regular arepa, transposed t o the photoa, and uaed by any i n f a n t r y o f f i c e r t o c a l l f o r s p e c i f i c f i r e when required. They may a l s o be used f o r general orientation. O course more time i s required t o t u r n out such large q u a n t i t i e s , f the f a c i l i t i e s of the improvised laboratory being quite limited, but t h e supply neaessary f o r a d i v i s i o n can be produced i n l e e s than 24 hours. Such photoa were supplied f o r the 29th Division f o r t h e i r a t t a c k on H i l l 192 a t St. Lo.

mm 3 . *An enlarged (10 x 14) photo waich shows the l o c a t i o n s or any suspected w t h o a t i l e a r t i l l e r y is uaed by Cub Observer while i n the air. Should the enemy open f i r e , upon radio c a l l of observer, our f i r e is delivered on the suspected location nearest t o the point indicated by t h e observer. This point is usually within a few hundred yards of a suspected location. Often the f i r e s o delivered has been r i g h t on the h o s t i l e artillery.

4. WSorne information a s t o the e f f e c t of our f i r e is a l s o obtained from oblique photos taken by our cub planes thereby supplementing data l a t e r obtained from A i r Force reconnaissance s ~ r t i e a . ~ Major W. M.. Smith, Counterbattery OTfioer and Lt. D J Gray, .. Bsst. 5-2, X I X Corpa A r t i l l e r y .

--

.In this Corps re ley a d i r e c t l i n e t o Group Headquarters and M v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y Heaaquartera from our f i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r , i n a d d i t i o n t o the normal l i n e s f r a u Corps A r t i l l e r y t o those headquarters. This d i r e c t l i n e i s a l s o connected t o ouk normal l i n e s through t h e i r witchb board and by remote control may be plugged i n t o the Radio n e t . Group and Division A r t i l l e r y Headquartera a l s o have s i m i l a r d i r e c t l i n e s , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e normal l i n e s , t o each of t h e i r subordinate headquarters. This eystem makes i t p o s s i b l e f o r Corps A r t i l l e r y t o e x e r c i s e imnediate c o n t r o l over a l l i t s subordinate u n i t s and t o bring i n f i r e of any o r all elements i n an absolute minimum of t i m e . l i r e i s much f a s t e r and b e t t e r than radio,m--Major I M. W t h , Counterbattery Officer and . Lt. D J. Grey, Asat, S-2, XM Corps A r t i l l e r y . .

O t h e morning of 7 Auguet an i n f a n t r y regiment belonging t o t h e XM Corps s t a r t e d n an advance. A t 1000 hours t h e s i t u a t i o n was a s shorn on t h e accompanying sketch. For two hours t h e 3rd b a t t a l i o n made no attempt t o mote forward. They were being f i r e d upon by machine guns from t h e r i g h t but t h e m could hare b e n outflanked by a small force with l i t t l e trouble. One reason f o r t h e i n a c t i v i t y was t h a t negotiations were U e r way t o b r i n g about t h e surrender of t h e German forces, Even the morement of German f o r c e s which could be o b s e m d w a s not f i r e d upon. The regimental commander f i n a l l y ordered t h e b a t t a l i o n forward preceded by an a r t i l l e r y preparation, and Ccrppany K s e n t a platoon t o outflank t h e machine -8, These t a c t i c s r e s u l t e d i n taking t h e position8 wi,bhout d i f f i c u l t y , but our u n i t s i n the draw were extremely f o r t u n a t e i n eeaaping t h e h o s t i l e mortar and a r t i l l e r y f i r e which i r a uaually brought d o m during Report based upon personal observations. such a delay.--0bserosr's

INITIAL OBJECTIVE ,

\

Fr

& , u c e d b ."re Engineer Rep~oducf~on f , /2fh Army y ile

No. 33

Ak:c

r2,9&$, - d 3

g'&Dkfehee re&uPwLy @yr&i-e h @ d $ ~ u * t m s enable to nmttle merienaso* u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t 9jrm t h e l a t e a t combat ~x-psrzencee our $mops now of f i g h t i n g t h e Germane i n F r m ~ e . Although the ex.fl~ben,ss ~f c e r t a i n u i t s a t a. p a r t i c u l a r Pocation e r e not necessarily applicable ss ell u i t s in a l l a i t u a f i o m , t h e irema published rill ba thoee based on p r a o t i c a l a ' ~ g e@nee mad we rec ~f f o r carefuP consideration ny mi.cs whluh may O ~ C O L L ,B M ~ r ~ b l e m R8p@rx8 .~ p W ~ of c o r r o b o r a t i r s o r c o n t r a r y erperiencea cue particulei-,y bssLzeQ %a orbe2 s h e -;)L~,, v a l i d i t y or t h s i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e lsseon m y be determinepc!

camend of t k a k m y Group @-&or:

/ -%

I JEADEGHP EPISODE NO. 1.

Notat In an e f f o r t t o build up s p e c i f i c a s t u w a '60 t h e q?~co%fon vhat e o m t i t u t e ~ sf n good leadership, i t 2 8 p % a ~ e tdo inelude i n t h i s g n b l f ~ a " ~ ; c a s e r 2 . s ~ci agecii8i: instancee, giving i n d e t a i l a c t i o n s o r words s f a individual which have &sen eons i d e r e d t o c o n s t i t u t e good leadership i n a s p e c i f i a s i t u a t i o n , The fxz-s% a f t h s s s , e x t r a c t e d fran an 8 t h Infantry documen%, i a g9vex~bcrlsw.
P. On 24 June, trra ~ l e u % a ~ ~ds~aur u 2 % & g i h i & i 2 : : Li a 30upa.1~: : z - r s v tf tunaeP~,d i ~ g O./{S 725 s t r o n g l y f o r t i f i e d Cennarp p081LioKia eonslatin& of a gun emplacements. The crmpany~w a s pinned down by dlevastrrtizg a r t i l l e r y , ~ - . % k i ~ s and mall arm f i r e a b u t 139 yards froma t h e g ~ 8 i % i e n , Heavy c a s u a l t i e s :'c-cad 4 t 80 withdraw.
L--O

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2 . rnpp~ptf~ &-k-i'r&a, %;.$& ?:mpw C B ~ ~ @ L e i ~ k t:. ~ ~ % .? :?FOZ t h e Q.m atrong p o i n t , r a f l i e d h f u 5 8 ~eimiriingman who wem dieorganloso .;tcs$ oae d f t h e tenks and calmly etood b s i d e the luctant The acmpany ccrlpmaader t u r r e t a8 i t advanued, Th@m a folbowad, .& t:8@ battle hemfa hand-to-hand, t h e c m p q camandsr ( f i ~ ~ c P r2a ? ~ ~ B : ~ ~ tb; P , fa ,;bf $ 2 3 men with rifle bayonet--literally sarvf ng lbj i ~ & yn t o tb( Ge-as;rr, 4 3 . ; n~~r&oEd 2 i -

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' a ' d &efii&Pici~ : ; i Z a y E 0 'Li~e~i-ibgb 3k 1 The After Action .3eysit of &he :&&t . t h e e f f e u t i v e m e of i t 8 light tank c o q a n y aa a mopping UP "mix i i ~ ~vomecG,isa aith t h e a t t a c k i n euppsrti of elemteato of* t h e 2nd DSvfaion i n %Esv area mosthetaut of St, Lo,

t 2. Canpany B of t h e teak b a t t a l i o n wee as% ~ d % ~me i ld 28 July, two days after t h e opaning of t h e o f f e n a i m . With referenom t o i t s aotioa, the r e p o r t makes t h i s

etatement* DThe light tanka prwed t o be ereellen& i n t h i s e i t u a t i o n , where t b main resiatanoe had been broken and t h e operation waa e@mntialLyone of loopping up, They were able, a l e 0 t o kaep up r i t h t h e advancing i n f a n t r y , even through difficult t e r r a i n . They w e d 37 mn o a n l s t e r very effectively w a i n s t h o s t i l e

Reoent obsarration by a War DepaftEmnt o b s e r m r of' the action of a n t i a i r c r a f t u n i t s egainst an attack by approrimately 75 German planes, has led him t o make the f ollowing comments:
1 aSearahlignts went i n t o aation but were wholly i n e f f e o t i v e as t h e planes wen, . a h t h e cloude Bnd a t no tlm r i s i b l e frcm t h e ground, They might well hare remained out of a c t i o n e n t i r e l y , as they m m d only t o disclose ground i n e t a l l a t i o a s .
2. #Although t h e attacking planes could nat be seen, autamatic weapons u n i t s were delivering barrage f i r e . It a p p e a r e d t h a t t h e attacking planes ware well outside the range of automatlo weapons. I n t h i s inetance, autanatic weapons b a t t e r i e s could hare determined t h a t t h e target was not i n range frm the d a t a of adjoining gun b a t t e r i e s , and f i r e mould have been held.

camanders w i t h whcm the mattar w a s discuseed were unanimous i n t h e i r 3. opinion t h a t t h e need for searchlight illumination for gun8 no longer exlate, and t n a t they etrould be wed only u l t h aprsad beam f o r AW, as beacon l i g h t s , and f o r t h e i l l u mination of air s t r i p s ,

4. *The r u l e e of wnen and when not t o open f i r e ahould ba brought home with g r e a t e r emgneeis t o s e e t i o n leadere i n training. It i e a great mistake and a waete of ammun i t i o n f o r a gun cnmmnnder t o open f i r e bofore a target is within range.#
IV G~SUIWITRICK.
German U S ' mines ham beau found s i x t o eight iaehes apart with one i g n i e a r above ground but with a threa-prong i g n i t e r buried soms distance away. Amine detector operator san e a s i l y d e t e c t t h i o mt-up by t h a double warbling on tne sound indicator.-lkcaa After Action Report, 4th Infantry Mvlsion.

a w e f e e l t h a t the 4.2 mortar h a a d e f i n i t e d s s i o a of it8 o m and does not tales t h e plaee of a r t i l l e r y . It is moat effeetivo far quiak f i r @upon t a r g e t s of opportunity, including personnel, m h i c l e r and buildings. It i e not an o f f e e t i r e weabon f o r fiblaating outs misoione. W a m b r i n g f i r e on a t a r g e t more quickly than een a r t i l l e r y . OPT e g r e a t e s t s e r v i c e is instantaneous f i r e on quickly appearing targetr.n--Et Col H. B B s t t , . CO, 07th Cml Battalion.

- 2 Qepduccd by the Enp/neer Reproduct/on Drf, /Z fh Army Group

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 34
31 AUC 1944
- B a t t l e Experiences* a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t n i s headquarter8 t o enable u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f x m t h e l a t e s t canbat experiences of our t r o o p s now f i g h t i n g t h e Cernana i n France, Although t h e experienaes of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r location a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s , published rill be those baaed on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recoimrsnded the itf o r c a r e f u l consideration by u n i t s which may encounter similar problems, Report8 of corroborativs o r a o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u 1 a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y or' the indicated b a t t l e lesaon may be d e t e m n e d .
By camand of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:
/ I

Ekigadier General, USA Adjutant Ceneral

I TROOPS WANT THE * P I m m .
*Troop8 sad lower headquarters desire a o i t u a t i o n map and glimpse of the big pic1% seems t h a t s p e c i a l d i e t r i b u t i o n of ture more than -hiexcept d l f r m m a h i n f m t i a n , l i m i t e d a s pecoasary far s e c u r i t y , could be r a p i d l y disseminated t o En CO, 3 5 t h Division. d i v i s i o n s o r rrgimsntr for.reporduction,m-Noto:

-.

Itu Xn Corps 0 2 S e a t i o n hao p r o d d e d e x e e l l e n t * b i g p i c t u r e m G 2 r e p o r t s

far dimtribution t o u c h company i n t h e Corpm.

The sucoassful, though unplanned, use of an a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n plane aa p a r t of an advance guard f o r f o o t t m p s wcu described by a canpany c-der of t h e 83rd I n f a n t r y M r i s i c m as follows: .Our c a p a n y waa t h e advance guard f o r our b a t t a l i o n , when t h e poi1 suddenly msde aontact with a group of enemy r i f l e n u n . Two squads and a BAR team from tL advance p a r t y d e a l t with t h l e resisterice. Then an a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n p i l o t flew ovsr, cut h i s motor, and t o l d ua t h e mJerrlesm were a t a r t i q t o r e t r e a t 500 yards t o our front. Wf a t once resrrppsd t b advance, t h w p r e v s n t i w e d e l a y of t h e main body. An we moved f o r ward, the l i a i s o n plane continued t o keep us infomad regardinq the enemy:

*Tlu r h i n o d e d c e e solved a tank problem i n hedgerow country. Tho t r o u b l e with d.rolitionm w a s that they g a t e arrag o u r ' p o s i t i o n a and t h e i n f a n t r y would r e c e i v e mortar i H t h tb rhino i n use n need only one tank dozer p e r campany, i n s t e a d of one p s r p1etoon.m--C0, 747th Tank Battalion.

ISOIL d i v i s i o n s have had a l o t of t r o u b l e with bomb8 l a t e l y . That b r i n g s o u t t h e importance of e e l e c t i n g proper CP s i t e s . Stay o u t of t h o s e b i g v i l l a s . The Germans have used them a l l and have them p l o t t e d ; a l s o s t a y out of open f i e l d s because t h e y are d i f f i c u l t t o camouflage and soon wheel t r a c k s w i l l g i v e you away. The b e s t p l a c e f o r a CF i s i n t h e s e l i t t l e peasant farmhousee and barna. There t h e CP can o p e r a t e much e more e f f i c i e n t l y . U simply sandbag t h e doors and windows.*--G3, 4 t h Division.

*Be c a r e f u l t h a t only t h e f r o n t l i n e s d i s p l a y panels. Once our o r n planes s t a r t e d s t r a f i n g our CP1a and everybody s t a r t e d p u t t i n g out panele. The a i r never did know where t h e f r o n t l i n e s were. I f you .have t o use smoke, r e d a m k e i s b e s t . * - - 6 3 , 4 t h Div

*The key t o t h e whole show is good b a t t a l i o n commanders. J u s t t h i n k of t h e number of t h i n g s he h a s t o do. He haa h i s B r t i l l e r y o f f i c e r , tank o f f i c e r , tank decltroyer o f f i c e r , $2, S-3, cammunication o f f i c e r , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o f f i c e r , heavy weapons o f f i c e r , and l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s , a l l along wit:^ .hlm i n h i s p a r t y . He must know how t o use a l l h i s weapo n s and t o c a l l f o r t h e i r s u p p o r t i n g f i r e e . He i s t h e most important commander i n t h e burinesa. B a t t a l i o n s f i g h t a s a amall combat teem, and we need more s t r e s s on t h i s t y p e 9f t r a i n i n g . B a t t a l i o n crrmvlnders muet h o w and a p p r e c i a t e t h e d i f f e r e n c e between a sunp l e envelopment and a wide envelopment. The Heinies simply w i l l not f i g h t any longer when you g e t behlnd tnem.*--Asalt M v i s i o n Commander, 9 t h Division.
SCREENING FORCE.

*In a f a s t moving s i t u a t i o n , when we do not have armored o r c a v a l r y u n i t a i n f r o n t ,
T h i s f o r c e is oauposed s f one motorized r i f l e cmpany (mounted on h a l f - t r a c k s ) , one p l a t o o n of medium tanka, one p l a t o o n of M-10 t a n k d e s t r o y e r s , one platoon of t h e cannon campany, and two o r t h r e e reconnaieeance v e h i c l e s . T h i s f o r c e is a b l e t o n e u t r a l i z e o r f i x enemy r e e i s t ance encountered, t h e r e b y p e r m i t t i n g t h e advance of our f o o t t r o o p s m t h o u t f e a r of unexpected a t t a c k fram t h e f r o n t . This f o r c e s e r v e s rn our advance guard, while d i r i n i o n reconnaiseance u n i t s p r o t e c t any exposed flank.*--Rsgtl Exec 0, 1st Division.

re hare organized a r e g i m e n t a l t a s k f o r c e t o a c t an a a c r e a n i n g force.

PI11 SPECIAL USE O THE 6 0 U WITPAR. F
*lCs u s e t h e 6OPlm m o r t a r without base p l a t e , e s p e c i a l l y on p a t r o l s , up t o e l g n t hundred yarda. One man c a r r i e s t h e tube and two rounds of amnunition. T h i s use ot' t h e mortar l a l i m i t e d t o h i g n l y experianced personnelOD--Regtl Exec 0, 1st Division.

IX IdARKIMti TARGETS WITH SAAOICF;.
gEue t o t h e u n c e r t a i n t y a s t o t h e e r a c t time of a r r i v a l of a i r c r a f t over a t a r g e t , psaplanned t a r g e t marking by smoke i s not g r a c t i c a b l e and amoke must be placed a f t e r VHF r a d i o ccmmunication between t h e BSP O f f i c e r and t h e a i r c r a i ' t . Only as a l a s t r e s o r t and upsan f a i l u r e of t h e VHF r a d i o should smoke be placea when t h e planes a r e seen t o a r r i v e In t h e t a r g e t 91'ea.*--G-'j fir, 4th Divisione End -2-

.

TWELFTH ARMY CROW

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 35
* R a t t l e w p e r i e n c e s * a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s Beadquartart! t o enable u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e e t combat e x p e r i e n a e s of OW t r o o p s n m f i g h t i n g t h e W r m m i n France. ~ l t h o u g t it h e experienoee sf c e r t a i n units a t a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n e , t h e i t e m s published w i l l be t h o a e based on p r a c t i c a l experience and are reconmended of f o r o w e f u l aoneidertltion by u n i t e which may encounter similar problems. ~ e p a r t e Corroborative or c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i a u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t the v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l o s e o n may be determinsd.

By a-nd

of l i e u t e n a n t ~ e n e r a W I E Y : l

----.......................................
wgandbags have proved a n a c c e p t a b l e s u b s t i t u t e f o r a d d i t i o n a l o r spaced a r r m r i n m e bn r e p a r t a an ~ 1 0 s,o p r o t e c t e d , r e c e i v e d a d i r e c t h i t from an scrme TD unite. 88 nm without danrage. m o t h e r TD u n i t r e p o r t s t h e b a e ; ~e f f e a t i v e l y p r o t e c t e d a n wlO t against h o s t i l e rouket w o j e a t i l e e . ~ o t hh e s e u n i t a have added r o c k s t o hold t h e I n p l a c i n g bags on t h e t u r r e t , c a r e i s taken t o avoid i n t e r f e r e n a e sandbags i n plaae. with e f f i c i e n t ope~ation.#-41D observer 9 8 Report. ( m E r Sane u n i t s have expressed t h e belief t h a t aandbage w a i s t p e n e t r a t i o n by prev e n t i n g riaocrbst.)

B r i g a d i e r ~ e n e r a l ,USL Mj u t a n t ~ e n a r a l

#One TD unit hae modified i t s .5O c a l i b e r h Z mount by p l a c i n g i t low on the r i g h t f r o n t of t h e t u r r e t , lowerine t h e handlee, nmnllnition box, and t r i g g g r , and aiming with cr s t a n d a r d p r i m . T h i s makes it p o s s i b l e t o defend t h e d a e t r o J e r aminat inf f i r e and bazookae, which have been u e d very e f f e c t i v e l y by t h e enemy in c l o s e t e r r a i n . - 4 D Obsemer*~ Report.

I11 M'X;RBSTVBJBSSAT DIBK AM) BEFORB IYRN.

1 *yt WEIS discovered t h a t t h e - m a , . when being a t t a c k e d a t duek, withdrew t h e i r main dsfense about t h r e e hedgerows, l e a v i n g only l i g h t covering f m c e a . gy c o n t i n u i n g the p r e s s u r e a t t h i s tim, an a p p r e c i a b l e gain would be made d t h l i t t l e l o s s .
2. *m accounts i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e GWIIIBM a l m y a expected an a t t a c k t o follow an ~f t h e r e w a s s u f f i c i e n t time f o r d a y l i g h t rcn, a t t a a k e w e e arranged a r t y preparation.

t o t a k e p l a c e one hour b e f a r e d a y l i g h t , u i n g no p r e p a r a t i o n and no d l arm f i r e , but l e a v i n g t h e ID with f i x e d bayonets, and upon meeting oppoaitfon, u d n g hand &ret h r e e eucceesive occasions, t h i s method proved a f f e c t i v e , and t h e nades f r e e l y . t r o o p s had g r e a t oonfidence i n i t . ~ ) u r i n gt h e hour of semi-darknees, a l i m i t e d o b j e c t i v e advance a s made of about t h r e e f i e l d s , and a t d a y l i g h t our t r o o p s w e r e on t h e enemy main position.@--Eom CLftar Combat Report of t h e 29th D i r .

1 D e s t r u c t i o n of ~ a n k a . @oure x p e r i e n c e hae been t h a t me .tank w i l l n o t a t t a c k . ' a a n o t h e r t h t i e i n p o e i t i o n w a i t i n g f cr it. ~ l r ; bazooka men i n m o b i l i z e t h e T i g e r @ and Ranthere by f i r i n g a t the t r a o k e a n d wheels, Then our infantrymsn surround than end r i f l e g r e m d e i s 8 b s t aa good as t h e bazooka. the crew8 alwaye surrender. The

W k i n g m o n t L;lnes. rThe b e s t method of -king t o cut up t h e r e d f l u o r e e c e n t p a n e l s i n t o e m a l l panels. and i s b e t t e x t h a n coXared smke.@--CG, 29th I& Div.
2.

f r o n t l i n e 8 f o r t h e a i r is T h i s has worked ti- and a g b i n

@Ourm n llloe W grenades a g r e a t deal because t h e y g e t t h e holea. ~f you h o l d your r i f l e a t about 30 d e g e e s , you c a n g e t t h e g e n a d e p r o j e c t i o n adeptera. gur men have l e a r n e d t o b u r a t 29th t h e Hciniea h o l e s , a n d Rlls aay they r e a l l y h a t e it.'-4-3,

Heinies o u t of t h e i r a i F b u r s t s by u i n g t h e a e g e m d e a over

Dr i.

VI

COMt/lENIIS OF CO, 22D

@wer i d e e i g h t mer on a medium t a n k and 1 More about Tank rid in^ I n f a n t r m . . e i x on a l i g h t tank, a l l on t h e r e a r deck. It o n l y t a k e s t e n mlknutes t o t r a i n t h ~ we f F r s t send o u t a wave of tank8 buttoned up, put time f i r e from t h e a r t y them, and follow with t h e t a n k s c a r r y i n g t h e men. The e r t y observer r i d e 8 w i t h t h e l e a d i n g r a v e end c o n t r o l s t h e fFre, s e t t i n g h i s f u e e s a l i t t l e high. To i n s u r e c o n t r o l by t h e inf CO and t h s tank CO, I put them both in t h e eame tank. The i n f CO hangs h i e sCR 300 r a d i o on t h e o u t s i d e of t h e tank a n d works d i r e c t l y w i t h t k a t p a r t of h i e bn r h i o h f o l l m a , i n t r u c k 8 or on foot. 1nf c o cornmnders c a n t a l k t o tank p l a t oomnander~by tel* phone8 hung on the back of t h e tanks. we fought t h i s way f o r e i g h t day8 and n i g h t s , a n d t h e f o o t s o l d i e r s love the scheme. ~t doe8, however, have one dieadvantage, i n t h a t i t does n o t c a p i t a l i z e on the f u l l s t r e n g t h of t h e i n f r e & , s i n c e i t f a i l 0 t o uee m e t of t h e crew-served weapons.. we e r e g o i n g t o t r y t o u t i l i z e the heavy weapons oo by r i d i n g i t on tanks.
2. atr role. 'we have a n o t h e r acheme that works well. we c a l l them r a i d e r s and U g h t hawke. E i g h t men a r e s e l e c t e d from s e c h r i f l e p l a t for t h e i r endurance, i n i t i a t i v e , u i g h t v i s i o n , a n d a b i l i t y t o r e a d rmpe. They do no f i g h t i n g d u r i n g t h e day and , no ~ p guard, f a t i g u e , e t c . They are s p e c i a l l y t r a i n e d n i g h t f i g h t e r s only. They have a two-fold miaeionc f i r s t , t o go t o a a p e c l f i c p l a c e and e c c m p l i a h a e p e c i f i c t h i n g ; second, having accanplished t h e i r rnisaion, t o haraaa t h e enemy a e much aa p o s s i b l e , even s h o o t i n g captured G e r m burp gun8 (schmeiseer p i s t o l s ) a t them. when t h i a happens, t h e @wmana come r u ~ i n g out y e l l i n g end a f r a i d t o shoot t h e i r o m men. ~8 en t3Xarnplt3, last n i g h t f o u r r a d i o p a t r o l s of f i v e men eech brought back 33 German pri8aners.fl

TWELFTH ARMY CRQUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 36

3 AUC 1944 1

#mtt l e f P p e r i e n c e s # a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i a h e a d q u a r t e r s t o enable u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from'the l a t e s t combat experiences of our t r o o p s n o r f i g h t i n g t h e Gerrmns i n France. ~ l t h o u g ht h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o m , t h e i t e m published w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommended f o r c a r e f u l considerat i o n by u n i t s ~ h i c h may encounter similar problems. Report s of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t the v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.
By camnand of Lieutenant General mDW:

n
B r i ~ d i e r neral, U w S Adjutant General

----.-.--------.---.----.I
ONE WAY CF FIXITG S N I P E R S .

p 1 The f o l l o w i n g i a f r m a m i t i ~ h u b l i c a t i o n : . flgnipers i n hayetacka were more e f f e c t i v e l y e n ~ g e d s e t t i n g f i r e t o t h e hayby s t a c k with t r a c e r s and then s h o o t i n g t h e s n i p e r a 8 he r a n out,

1 Rcn, HThere i s a n a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y f o r p e r s o n a l rcn. AS a n example, I ,ggt . l o s t on a cow path one day and n e a r l y got captured, The next day my knowledge of t h e cow p a t h enabled me t o work a co t o t h e enemy18 r e a r , whereupon t h e e n t i r e enemy p o s i t i o n surrendered.
2, Use of Personnel. #There is a tendency over h e r e t o employ t o o many geople t o do a job. Once I c u t t h e number of men a t t a o k i n g a c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n from a p l a t t o a squad, and they went and c a p t u r e d it anyway,@--C0, 22d I n f , I11 DIVISION T R U C W D S .

-

The G-4 of t h e 2d m d Div f i n d s t h a t supply i s f a c i l i t h t e d by t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a d i v truckhead f o r each combat conrmand i n s t e a d of one f o r t h e div. They a r e eatabl i s h e d f a r 'enough farward s o t l ~ tth e u s i n g t r o o p s w i l l not have t o h a u l t h e i r g a s o l i n e and a r ~ m i t i o n mare t h a n f i v e o r six miles. The canbat commands r e p c r t t h e system of c o n s i d e r a b l e help,

a Cooperation betwesn our combat connnand and t h e s u p p o r t ~ n g i r h a s been e x c e l l e n t .
&qp 0 and our 3-3, h i r , r i d e t o g e t h e in a t a n k i n t h e l e a d i n g echelon, his t a n k h a s t h e VHF equipment f o r camnunication t o p l a n e s and a l s o ha8 a crypton l i g h t t o p e r m i t t h e p i l o t t o i d e n t i f y t h e t a n k t o wUch he i s talking. W have one t a p e r bn e ~

l i s t e n on t h e a i r frequency and give t h e c o l o r e d p a n e l s t o i d e n t i f y our t a n k s f o r f r e q u e n t l y , a a t h e Cerrnens soimtimes use ent i n t e l l i g e n c e and r c n informetion, a s

e dnforxmtion o b t a i n e d t'o t h e CO, w a l s o use t h e planes, but we have t o change t h e c o l o r t h e s r color. The planes flu'nish u s e x c e l l am w e l l a s p r o t e e t i o n . w ~ ~ - 3 ,Combat comuand,

2d ~ m Div. d

'Pie had t r o u b l e u s i n g s l i d e x when we depended upon one person t o o p e r a t e it. 'llhere were s o meny mistake8 t h a t i t wae a d e f i n i t e hindrance. W remedied t h i s f a u l t by have i n g two persom--one t o check t h e other. T h i s h a s e l i m i n a t e d mistakes, end w now cone s i d e r s l i d e x our b e s t code. n - g r o o p Connander, 6 t h m v .
VI AUXILIARY CFARGER

CAR. ~

8

0
c a r M-8 r e q u i r e s such a t h e b a t t e r y charged. me r e a r wheels to keep t h e radioow--Troop Cornwinder,

awe have found t h e t o g e r a t i o u of t h e r a d i o i n the zrmd heavy output *om t h e b a t t e r y t h a t i t i s d i f f ' i c n l t t o keep remedied t h i s by mounting a wriny Timn charger between t h e b a t t e r y up and save running t h e c a r engine while u s i n g t h e 6 t h Cav.

VII

REMOTE CCNl'ROL FROM M O B I I E CP.

*we have s e t up a m b i l e CP i n a one-ton t r a i l e r . I n f r o n t of t h e f e n d e r on each s i d e we have placed a r e e l of heavy c a b l e wire f o r r e n o t e r a d i o c o n t r o l . This permits d i s p e r s a l , and one o p e r a t o r can o p e r a t e two r a d i o s from inside.#--?rroop cornwinder, 6 t h Cav.

P o s i t i o n s on and TD u n i t s a r e s t i l l i n c l i n e d t o sight t h e i r guns down roads. f l a n k s g e n e r a l l y a f f o r d more concealment and produce more e f f e c t i v e f i r e a m i n s t f l a n k s and r e a r of advancing tanks.m--Bn CO, 1st ~ i v .

IX Q.UICK PUNCH.
have organized a f o r c e composed of two r i f l e squads, one un squad, and one a quick hard punch is needed. T h i s p r o v i s i o n a l p l a t is composed of s e l e c t e d personnel and is assigned t o Hq d i r e c t l y under m y c o n t r o l , s o During a march t h i s p l a t a c t s a s a point o f t h a t I can employ i t on s h o r t n o t i c e . the advance g~ard.w--Bn CO, 1st Div.
U I

60 mm laortar squad, t o use where

X

INFOFUdATION FROM H S .

#It h a s been found t h a t m a w i l l n o t p o i n t out t h e i r C p s on a n m e r i c a n m p due t o t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o r e a d t h e s e mags, but g e n e r a l l y r i l l r e a d i l y i n d i c a t e t r o o p locat i o n s , e t c . on a G e m n map. l e have f u r n i e h e d all our i n t e l l i g e n u e a e c t i o n e w i t h copies of GtU-man mps which have been raprodwed by our carpa. T h i s ha8 g r e a t l y fauil i t a t e d t h e tranamiasion of information in a d d i t i o n t o a i d i n g i n interogation.w-;Report by XLX Cmps.

#A G e m n prisoner of war was found wearing c i v i l i a n c l o t h e s under h i s uniforme He r e p o r t d t h a t when observing f o r martar f i r e i n forward a r e a s , he would remove h i s unif o r n and move about i n c i v i l i a n c l o t h e s . # - d f t s A c t i o n ~ e p o r tof 4 t h Div.

ma

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 37

I SEPT 1944

w t t l e mperiencesa a r e published r e g u l a r l y by this headquarters t o enable u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o prof it from the l a t e a t combat experiencee of our troops now f i # t i n g t h e GarlBane i n F e n c e . glthough the experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t a a t a p a r t i c u l a r l o o a t i o n are not n e c e a a a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l e i t u a t i o n e , the items published w i l l be thoae baaed on p r a c t i c a l experiences and a r e recommended f o r c a r e f u l aonsideration by u n i t e which m y encounter similar problem. Reports of corroborative or contrary erperienaee a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y deaired i n order t h a t tha v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e leason rney be determined.

By command of Lieutenant w n s r a l

wi gadier

General, US A j u t a n t General d

- I - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I - - - - . - - - - . - - - O - - -

NOTE1 U1 of t h e c o m n t a given below were m d e t o an observer from t h i s headq u a r t e r a by a oourageoue young l i e u t e n a n t of t h e 5 t h ~ i only a feu hours after he v had l o s t both lega in combat. In s p i t e of t h i s f a c t , he not only w s a b l e t o give a t h e m conatruetive and connected cements upon timely m i l i t a r y s u b j e c t s , but h e aleo informed t h e obeerver t h a t he Bad a l r e a d y made p l a n s t o complete h i s s t u d i e s and reaume h i e chosen c a r e e r i n c i v i l l i f e . He a l s o t o l d the observer t h a t he always t r i e d t o do h i e beet aa a p l a t lea&, becaws h i e p l a t m e composed of a c r o s s s e c t i o n of t h e f i n e s t yough who inapdred and were e n t i t l e d t o the higheet type of leaderahige type of -ican
fl m e o l d f i r e and move~obntd o c t r i n e ending with a bayonet 1 Bayonet u e a u l t . . a s a a u l t i s most a f f e c t i v e a m i n s t t h e enemy i n t h e preeent phase of operatione. I n one a t t a a k of my p l a t i n which I placed heavy f i r e on h i e poeitiona with w e and r i f l e s and followed with a bayonet a e s a u l t , we counted 306 Germans dead while loaing eectore* 0d-Y e i g h t nmn k i l l e d e This a c t i o n occurred in the ~ n g e r s

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men have learned, because of v a r i o u s rusres and 2. D i s t r u d of t h e maq, t r i u k a , not t o trust the ~erman.8, ~n m s instance6 t h e Gemmns have hidden t o avoid m our f i & t i n g echelon8 and-then eurrsndsred t o r e a r echelons, who a m i n c l i n e d t o t r e a t them more kindly. m o n t l i n e troops deplore t h e a t t i t u d e towards p r i s o n e r s displayed by r e a r echelons, such a e giving them c i g a r e t t e s , candy bare, and o t h e r f a m i l i a r i t i e e . Our a o l d i e r a must be endowed with a h a t r e d and d i a t r u t of t h e enany i n order t o sutc e s a f u l l y pursue t h e war.#

3. B a d m a h i p . o f f i c e r s have t o be leaders. Discipline i n combat dependa l a r g e l y upon the knowledge by t h e men t h a t t h e 0 leadingthsm knowa h i s buainees and l a not r e l u o t a n t t o take ri8ks.r

4. ~nfantry-Tank @ordination. infantry-tank coordination, I use an N O t o d i r e c t each tank by mama of a telephone a t t a c h e d t o eaoh tank. The t a r g e t derignatione #Target scriptio ion)^--* 'Ihree o pclockw --*watch ray tracerw. follows t h i s eequ&ce The i n f a n t r y l ~ a n i r e s t h e t r e s e r and then t h e tank inmediately opsrrs f i r e w i t h UP f o l f lowed by HE, This system has worked very e f f e c t i v e l y a g a i n s t enemy poe1tions.a
Booby ?Tape. W X have had no c a a u a l t i e a from booby t r a p s i n my p l a t due t o the f a c t t k t I do not permit w- men t o pick up anmy weapons, watcheo, and other a r t i c l a a from enemy k i l l e d by a c % i o n a

5 .

6. menoh Collaboration8 Vhe naquie have been most halpful and cooperative r i n e e re hr&e out of the N a r m ~ n d ypsnineula. ~n t h e -re sector, t h e maquis supplieC each of our p l a t laadars with accurate and h e l p f u l mapa showing d e t a i l e d enany positions, ineludlng enipers, l empla,cs;~ents, and other poa1tiona.a &

7. m d i c s . # m e m d i e s arc b i n g a uondrrful job in t h i s - 0 They have @eat courage and exercise a high d e s e e of t r e i n i n g and s k i l l i n the perfarnrance of their d u t i e s o f t e n under heavy memy f t m . I owe ~qyl i f e t o t h e aomage and s k i l l of a co a i d rmn, who ran t o rn under heavy mrtar f i r e and, together with one of quad leaders, applied tourniquete t o xiy and then carried nu^ t o oomparative a a f e t y in a h d i t c h some 75 yarb t o %e rear.@
8. I&iscellaneouo Camperits. a. W h Gernrane invariably attempt t o gst OR pow Te f l a n k with small groups of men with nraahine guns. #plat acouta nust be very thorough in acouting a n area, or t h e e n rill l i e b . lor u n t i l you get on t o p of them M o r e they open f i r e . c. W e ebould be t r a b d t o pay l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e machine p i s t o l of aburpw Mn gun, but t o l i a t e n c a r a f u l l y f o r t h e f i r i n g of morWs. d. WRecently, approxiarately one-third of t h e Gemmn a a i p e r r have bean officers. They no longer t r u a t h a v i n g e n l i s t e d men behind, a8 they w i l l soon abandon t h e i r gosit i o n and follow t h e r e t r e a t i n g forcea. hedgerow f i g h t i n g always deny t h e enemy the use of the next hedgerow i n e. rear by laying mortar f i r e on it. f . q generally use two squads i n a t t a o k and one i n support. I attempt t o f i n d from which f l a n k he is advancing h i e r~aneuveringfarue, then attauk t h a t flank. ~t i s mo& Important t o m i n t a i n contact w i t h adjacent u n i t s and t o keep flank8 well protected. @Theensmy does moert of h i s p a t r o l l i n g i n the e a r l y marning. He w i l l f i r e h i s g. aburpw gun i n t h e a i r I n an e f f o r t to amke us reveal our position. W have learned t o e di 8regard t h i s , and i f he g e t s c l o s e enough, w throw a few grenade8 a t hi& e he W I have used 60 mn mortars both i n b a t t e r y and attached t o plat. W e attached hn t o p l a t , I g e n e r a l l y uae it without h a 8 plate. 1 "nits on l i n e should be given r e l i e f - t i t s prolonged pariodg i n eornbat cause pabn . to tmome c a r e l e m , l a r g e l y through fatigue. mt r J e '1 have f i r e d the n r a s h e l l from the r i f l e , but I do not think i t is worth the e x t r a weight of agrrmlni tion. Two f r a g m n t a t i o n hand grenade8 rill o b t a i n about %he same r e a u l t s when f i r e d by the r i f l e 1auncher.w

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TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 38
3 SEPT 1944
' B a t t l e Experiencesn a r e published re&ularly by t n l s headquarters t o enable u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e i a t 2 s t m D a c experiences of our t r o o p no,i f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n France. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n aro not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a o l e t o all d i ; s in a l l s i t u a t i o n s , t h e itm published w i l l ~ t . h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l experience and are recornended t f o r c a r e f u l c o m i d e l . a t i o n by u n i t s which m y encounter similar g r o b l e m , Reports of col.roborative o r c o n t r a r y experiences a ~ c :p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n order t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e les.son may be determined. By command of L i e u t e n a n t General BRADLEY :

He Be L m E S B r i g a d i e r General, USA Adjutant General
m m s . m w w . . . -

I

A I R SUPPORT O ARrdORD LOLW.DLS. F

The f o l l o h l n g is e x t r a c t e d f s o n a n of Combat Ccrmmand A of t h e 2d krmd D i v , given air s u p p o r t p a r t y 0 w i t h t h e Canbat Camand. one w i t h t h e d i v cnrrrm~ndes, and one w i t h each

NOTE1

account of v e r y s u c c e s s f u l air support by L t Col J m e s L Zirranerman, who was . The d i v hau t h r e e air support parties-cmbat c o m ~ ~ ~ d column.

1 . ' w&9 m u t e a in an M-4 tank. A l l of t n e tar-k crew except t h e t a ' c corn1 mander were a i r f o r c e personnel. The t& com-=der communicated with t h e coluun commander by means of an SCH 528. I had an SCR 522 t o c o m u n i c a t e w i t h t h e planes, I had changes made i n t h e i n t e r i o r of t h e tank s o t h a t I cccupied t n e a s s i s t a n t d r i v e r ' s s t a t i o n , from which I had o u t s i d e v i s i o n and could -+ark radio.
2. 'Column cover of' f o u r f i g h t e r bombers t o each column was maintained zheneves we moved i n daylight. The f l i g n t s were r e l i e v e d a t about 30 n i n u t e m t e r v a l e . The l e a d e r of each f l i g h t contacted m: as he approacned, g i v l n g h i e c a l l sign. t

"The planes workeu q u i t e c l o s e t o us, g e n e ~ . a l l y wisn e x c e l l e n t r e s u l t s . For exmplt: on 27 J u l y we were held up b y ~ h o s t i l er e s i s t a n c e , I d k e c t e d t h e planes a g a i n s t i t , and t h e y dived s o c l o s e t h a t they made me nervous, However, not a b d l e t h i t our tanks, and t h e r e s i s t a n c e w a s knocked out. During t h e e n t i r e p = r i o d , 25 J u l y t o 6 August, the,.e were only two i n s t a n c e s of bombs f a l l i mar. o u r troops. I n Gne w of t h e s e i n s t a n c e s t h e banb was aroppzd by a s i a g l e plane f r a n some o t h e r area. I k e p t i n constant c o n t a c t with t h e cover a d kept them notif'ied of t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e r head of our c o l m . The planes l o c a t e d my tank by a yellow panel which I had placed. acr-s it a t t h e extreme rear. They always checked i n with me Sef o r e attackir.g doubtf u l t&-gets.

3.

,

40 *our best a i r rcn i m oimat ion came rran the column cover. on occasions ~ 4 2 asked ms f o r specific i n f o m t i o n , and I asked t h planes t o get it. I n most cases ~ e t the p i l o t s furnished inr'orllation t o m without request, e s p ~ c i d l y h a t of enemy mtar navments. Before liaving, the f l i g n t leader would report t o ma on l i k e l y prospective t a r g e t a , aM I would pass the information on t o the incacing f l i g h t ccnrmander.

5 0 .On one occasion we mile an unexpected move f o r which no a i r cover had been p ~ r l d e d . Information w a s received of a group of h o s t i l e tanks i n some woods three or four miles away. I called d i r e c t t o a plane o p e ~ a t i n g n the zone of another corps i and asked him t o r e l a y a request t o f i g h t e r control center f o r sane fighters. mithin 15 minutes about 12 planes reported i n t o me. I located my tank f o r t h e plane canmander by t e l l i n g him of the yellow panel, then vectored him on t o the woods whare the enemy w a s reported. When'he seaned t o he uver .tMe t a r c e t , I told him t o c i r c l e and aheak the woods under him. IB located the tanks, and they were attacked s u c c e s s f u l l y ~
6 . . thinlc t h e air support party 0 with amd columna should perform f o r the a i r I much the same function as the perform f a r arty. He should be i n a tank and must have outside vision and control of his own radio. Assigning a tank f o r t h i s purpose does not reduce the tank strength of t h e axmi unit. Our tank was habitually immediately in r e a r of the attacking wave of tanks, and in many cases w actually took part in the e f i g h t .a

A '1 rmA ?OP'S. R P. n 1 a
10 . e handle a i r Opes by W example d i v planes f l y t o 1000 i n attack of a s m a l l area. W e time by having F Group planes A

coordinating levele w e d by div ard corps planes. For f e e t an$ c o r p a b v e 1500. T h i s procedure is e s s e n t i a l also l i m i t the number of planes in the a i r a t aqy one patrol on a timb schedule.

e 2 . " e back up cav rcn with a i r OP patrols. ~t one time w organized a t a c t i c a l W rcn f o r t h e corps commander t o report on t r a f f i c and bridge conditions, location of leading e l e ments and t o cover exposed f lante, etc. G-38s sole d a t a a t one stage c a m from a i r OPls. Ve a l s o reported l o c a t i o n of enemy tanka t o our own tank elements, who then deployed and surroundad the enemy.

3 . We ran a counter-flak progran over Brest with a h OP's observing arty f i r e on h o s t i l e AA guns, especially during bcmbing attacks.

4. "Corpe arty planes have had only one fatality-that through c o l l i s i o n in the air. Flying technique on s h r r t f i e l d s should be stressed. Green p i l o t s arriving h w e not had enough of t h i s t y p training. W send p i l o t s back t o the r e a r t o ree practice in a d e r t o avoid lmmess i n f l y i n g and hold down the accident rate.

5. W e w p i l o t s and observers are weak on oanruunicatians-they f a i l t o think out what they must t r d t t o give t h e FDC ccmplete information far rapid a t h c k of targets.
6 . W r e t a o t i c a l training, e s p e c i a l l r on operatiyoung O*a s o t h a t they may observe more intelligently.
--VIII C o r p Arty

i t h i s war, should be given n

70 .Replacement p i l o t s should be attached t o corps f o r training pendbg assignment.

m

0.

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 39

6 SEPT 1944

aBattle ~ e r i e n c e s ~ published regularly by t h i s headquarters t o enable are u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t caubat experienoer of our troops nor f i g h t i n g the Germans i n France. Although the experiences of a e r t a i n unita a t a p a r t i c u l a r location a r e not necessarily applicable t o a l l unite i n a l l e i t u a t i o n ~ , t h e item publiehed rill be thoae based on p r a a t i c a l experience and are recamended f o r careful consideration by u n i t s which may encounter similar problem, Report8 of corroborative or contrary expwiencea are p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t the v a l i d i t y of the indioated b a t t l e lesaon may be d e t e d n e d . commnd of Lieutenant General BRADLEX:

H. B. L c ms b 5 g a d i e r General, USA Adjutant General

I KEEPIN3 W O N 3 I N ACTION.
n C r e r served weapons, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e BBR'a and t h e bazookas, hare not been kept i n a c t i o n err they should by member8 of t h e a r e r when t h e gunner becamen a caaualty, o r when t h e weapon has been s l i g h t l y d q e d , Idmy e n l i s t e d men have not been taught t h a t supply i n combat c o n s i s t s t o a large degree of repair o r t h e issue of repaired items, Crew8 must keep weapons i n a c t i o n as long a s t h e r e i a a man left, o r i f the weapon i e damaged, the crew m s i n i t i a t e r e p a i r 8 o r replacement pereonnally o r by reporting t h e ut location. Weapons replacement became s a t i s f a c t o r y i n one u n i t only a f t e r a salvage o f f i c e r and d e t a i l were s e t up t o recover the combat loneas. This crew e i t h e r made minor r e p a i r s o r evacuated t h e weapon throvgh t h e uaual channe1a.a--0'8 of t h e 134 Id.

1 m t t e r i s a . aDaily i s s u e of r a d i o b a t t e r i e s with r a t i o n s w a 8 found t o be the . beet man8 t o insure keeping r a d i o s i n action. 2. Time f o r reconnalsaence and ordere. .Time f o r reconnaissance and issuing of orders s t i l l i s not provided by higher echelons. Ttus, when the u n i t s i n turn attempt t o take it, the lower u n i t s have no opportunity e i t h e r f o r proper planning o r t h e o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e troops.

3. Radio Interception. RRadio interception, both f o r s e c u r i t y and location, i s considered impracticable f o r t h e enemy ineofar as small unite a r e concerned i f s i n p l e prearranged code8 are used. Good ju-nt a s t o how f a s t t h e information became obsol e t e determines the necessity f o r ueing rarioua types of codes.

'When the d t u a t i o n doe8 not permit t h e motor pool m t o r pool Conmunic ation. C of t h e 134 Inf. t o be forward, an S R 300 gives prompt vehicle service.*--0's

4.

PI1 CLEARIN3 STATIONS AND FIELD HOSPITAIS.
1. Hospitals. "1 am convinced t h a t t h e f i e l d h o s p i t a l , s e t up by platoon8 i n t h e v i c i n i t y of c l e a r i n g stations, i e t n e best p l a c e f o r e f f e c t i v e surgery. These units, however, m w t be well forward. The l e s s the d i s t a n c e between t h e place of i n j u r y and t h e f i e l d h o a p i t a l f o r a l l non-transportable c a s e s , t h e g r e a t e r t h e incidence of ree e covery, W have r e c e i v e d a e v e r a l s e v e r e l y wounded m n whom w were a b l e t o save by prompt surgery and by administering plasma and p e n i c i l l i n within an hour ard a half from time of i n j u r y . These cases could not have been saved had t h e time l a g been f o u r o r f i v e hours. I f we can always s t a y w i t h i n f i v e milea of t h e f r o n t , t h e death r a t e can be much reduced.
2. C l e a r i ~ t a t i o n s , nsome d i v i s i o n s keep t h e i r c l e a r i n g s t a t i o n s e n t i r e l y t o o S f a r t o the r e a r . O one occaaion we were forced t o remain f i f t e e n m i l e s benind t h e n l i n e s o r s e t up forward of t h e c l e a r i n g s t a t i o n s .

3. Red Crosa Respected. DSo3nsmedical u n i t s a r e r e l u c t a n t t o keep well forward because of a r t i P l e r y f i r e and bombing. My experience has been t h a t t h e G e m s have c a r e f u l l y respected h o s p i t a l i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n t h e i r a c t i o n s . We have avoided l o c a t i o n e near main highways and bridges.'--C0, 2nd P l a t , 51st F i e l d Hospital.

1. # I n t h e e a r l y o p e r a t i o n s t h e r e was a tendency t o make p a t r o l 8 t o o large. Once a p a t r o l of t h r e e s q u a i s w a s sent out t o o b t a i n i n f o m t i o n . It was too big f o r secrecy and t o o amall f o r a r a i d . It; s u f f e r e d many c a s u a l t i e s and obtained l i t t l e information. It i s believed t h i a e m o r w i l l o f t e n occur ~ i t g r e e n troops and green canmanderer. h

2. ~ I n i t i a l l y ,p a t r c l a were n o t giwa s u P f i , i e a t d e t a i l e d information and i n s t r u c t i c n a regarding t h e oaissjor;, I n one i n s t a n c e , a p a t x o l l e a d e r mas not n o t i f i e d u n t i l 2100 h w u s t h a t he wotid ? l e a 6 a p a t r o l during t h e n i g h t , although i t w a s know much e a r l i e r i n t h e day t h a t t h i a p a t r o l was t o be dispatched. P a t r o l s now are g e n e r a l l y w e l l b r i e f e d and well Lsu~,13s4with maps.

3 . "The mechanimd r 8 y a l r y should r e c e i v e more traaniog i n diemaunted scoutin~g and patrol1ing.r--G-2, XLX Corpe.
V

GERMAN GUN POSITIONS.

. e have found t h a t t h e German8 p l a c e SP and l i g h t AB ~~ t o cover long, s t r a i g h t W s t r e t o h e 8 o f main roads t o e n f i l a d e troops end transprt. Where roads are l i n e d with t r e e s t h e enemy f i r e 8 i n t o t h e s e and i n t o hedges f o r a i r bursts. To meet thi8 r e s t a y off t h e s e long s t r e t c h e s and d e t o u r our leading e l e m n t s around them. Method of r e t o o u t f l a n k road blocks.*-ducing t h e s e t h r e a t 8 i a t o advance on a broad f r o n t s o Brig Gen A. D.. Warnask, Barrt D i r Comdr, 5 t h Div,

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P TEUWHOMES TYPE -88 I

AND EX-8~..

*Scens telephone u s e r s have a tendency t o t u r n t h e switch t o CB (co~rmonb a t t e r y ) . T h i s causes g e n e r a t o r ts t u n hard and the opposite party phone w i l l not r i n g . Telephones have been e e n t t o ua f o r r e p a i r when t h e r e r a e nothing mong except t h a s u i t a h w c ~ e turned t o CB. Keep switch t u r n e d t o LB."-CO, 6 9 t h Sig Bn.

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 4 0
8 SEPT 1944
.Battle Experiences* a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable u n i t a i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our troop8 now f i g h t i n g t h e German8 i n E u r o p e Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t e a t a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s , t h e items published nil1 be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e reco~lrmended f o r c a r e f u l consideration by u n i t a which m a y encounter similar problems. Reports of corroborative o r contrary experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n order t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e indicated b a t t l e lesson may be determined.
Bg connnand of Lieutenant General

BRADLEY:

H. B. LBWIS Brigadier General, USA ~d jutant General

ROTE:

O 14 M y , t h e 92nd Cml Bn was a t t a c h e d t o t h e 3 5 t h I d Div f o r t h e d r i v e soutl n toward St. Lo. The following d e s c r i p t i o n by t h e b a t t a l i o n c m a n d e r of t h e operations of t h e mortar bn damonstrates various p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r t h e employment of t h i s weapon:
1. * I n t h e l a t e afternoon of 14 J u l y , t h e bn moved i n t o p o s i t i o n t o f i r e a cont r o l l e d barrage i n support of t h e 134th Inf Regt which was t o make t h e i n i t i a l push on t h e d i v l e f t f l a n k . R e g i s t r a t i o n of one mortar w a s accrpnplished by our own observer 11 the d i v a r t y o b a e m t i o n plane.

.Fire mieaion began a t 0600 hours 15 J u l y , with a l l cos f i r i n g preparatory firc 2. and c o n ~ i n u e dwith a c o n t r o l l e d r o l l i n g barrage i n f r o n t of t h e advancing i n f u n t i l 2 C 0 hours--a f o u r t e e n hour continuous shoot expending 6953 rounds of smmtlnition. During t l whole time f i r e w a s c o n t r o l i e d by t h e a s s a u l t i n g i n f . They c a l l e d through t h e i r a r t y who had d i r a c t communication t o t h e mrtar bn HM; which i n t u r n c o n t r o l l e d the f i r e of the t h r e e cos. Throughout t h e day, r a t e of f i r e , r a t e of advance, and changes of direc t i o n were made whenever d e s i r e d by t h e a s e a u l t i n g i n f . A t one period f i r e waa held on a l i n e f o r f o u r hour8 with t h e r a t e of f i r e determined by t h e reorganizing i n f .

3. "On 16 July, t h e a t t a c k of the 134th Inf having been successful, t h e mortar cor were attaoked t o t h e various regiments f o r independent d i r e c t eupport missions. Co C continued i n aupport of t h e 134th; Co B was aeaigned t o t h e 137th and Co A t o t h e 320tl During t h i s period each co s e n t forward F p a r t i e e with t h e leading element8 of t h e id O and f i r e d mission8 deaired by t h e bn commander on t a r g e t 8 of opportunity. Co C , f o r example, accounted f o r f o u r machine guns with an exgenditure of 26 rounda. The tiw, lapse from ' t a r g e t s i g h t e d t u n t i l 'mission accamplished* was eleven mlnutes.

"At a l l time durFng these independent missions, each co had a t l e a s t two platoon^ i n f i r i n g p o s i t i o n . glthough platoons were normally assigned t o support the a s s a u l t bna, t h e f i r e of a l l platoons was controlled through t h e Co FDC and the co could always mme f i r e on the regimental f r o n t . Normal defensive f i r e s were assigned each night with mortars l a i d and ammunition prepared. The attachment t o regiments f o r d i r e c t eupport l a s t e d 2 days and a l l coa reverted t o bn c o n t r o l a t 1800 houre 17 July.

4.

In t h e f i r a t phase, t h e bn of 36 nmrtars moved i n t o p o s i t i o n t o give maximum concentrated f i r e support f o r t h e f i r s t punch; i n t h e second phaae, t h e supported regiment having
broken through, the mortar coa l e f t bn o o n t r o l and were attached t o t h e regiments f o r independent missions. I n the l a t t e r phaae mortar platoons were 'leaped-froggad' forward t o maintain continuous support f o r a s s a u l t bns.m

5.

"The complete operation gives a c l e a r p i c t u r e of the f l e x i b i l i t y of 4.2 ztortare.

n 1. "1 have learned not t o place mgr 57-nm~AT guns too close together. O 26 August e east epd n o r t h of FONTENAY 3 P1IWl.E. w were attacked by tanka. I had two 57-mn aT guns ebout f i f t y yarda a p a r t with an observer i n a straw stack. The enemy s e t the s t a c k on f i r e and jockeyed h i s tanka s o t h a t he kept h i s heavily armored f r o n t towards both gune , so t h a t n e i t h e r could g e t a shot i n t o t h e flank. One gun was put out of action before I a h i t through t h e t r e a d end f r o n t aprocket immobilized t h e tank.*-40, 1st Bn, 314th Id. 2 . " I n a counterattack by enemy id, 26 August, AT gun8 rnasistgd i n breaking up the a t t a c k by uee 6 i f HB 8hePla in 5'7-rum g~lae. The ground naa s o f t from r a i n and s h e l l s aciillq not explode on impact, There was a hard s u r f a c e road t h a t the enhad t o croee, 8c r e I f i r e d a t t h h t , causing considerable c a s u a l t i e s . b o t h e r t h e , t h e enemy employed 6 how.$ as a strong point. We wrecked the w e l l s with annor p i e r c i n g s n e l l s and then used EE causing a b u t t a e n t y a m u a l t i e a out of about t h i r t y Germme using the bui1di~a.A--GO, , A Co, 314th 1D-f. T
I

,

III

.

1, 'Young officir~should be t a u t t o f i r s p r e c i s i c n adjustments, Forward obaersati~~z methods ax-e ns$ ea e f f e c t i v e as p r e c i s i o n methods i l a f i r i n g at ensmy conerate g g emplacements. W s t y a w o f f i c e r s cannot f i r s precision adjutnsgnte.

2 . "Op'n 8hod.d bo c o m t m t l y manned and observers taught t o be p a t i e n t and always o the a l e r t t o a t t a c k enemy guns while a c t u a l l y f i r i n g . Otherwise, the enm is s a f e l y underground when w fire.'--Arty e Executive, PIII Corps.

*One of t h e g r e a t e s t t r a i n i n g needs i s i n night scouting and p a t r o l l i n g especiallk i n the maintenance of contact with t h e enerqy. Around Vire contact waa not maintained a t night and t h e enemy succeeded i n withdrawing. W muat a180 s t r e e s and re-streea f i r e e and movemeat i n a l l training.*--C0, 116th Inf, 29th Div.

--

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No 41
I I SEPT 1944
Bhir headquarters t o enabla *Battle grperienceo8 an published raguParly rraitr i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t a o t cambat ergerienaer of our troop8 n o r fighting t h e dermane i n m o p e . Although the ergeriancee of c e r t a i n units a t a p a r t i c u l a ~l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c a s r a r i l y appliaable t o all u n i t e i n all eituation8, the i t m a publinhad rill be tho80 basad on p r a c t i a a l experience and a r e recammended Reports for aareiP1 a o n d d e r a t i o n by unit. rhich may encounter r i m i l a r probl-. of corroborative o r oontrary axparionoar a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n order t h a t tho v a l i d i t y of tha indicated b a t t l e leseon nay be datermined.
By aamnRna of Lieutanant General BRPDLW:

H. B. LmIs Erigadier Oenernl, U S Adjutant Oensral
I I I I I ~ o ~ I o o ~ o o ~ ~

~

*Recently planted minefield8 i n varioue ereae have been marked by two rows of warning boards, t h e outer row painted black with white l e t t e r i n g , and the inner row painted white with black l e t t e r i n g . The spaaa between t h e rows is f r e e fromndnes. In other areas t h e presenue of mines i e reported t o be indicated by lengths of barbed wire wound around t h e wooden poets of t h e bopadary fences. Anti-personnel miner a r e indicated by a length of wire p r o j e a t i ~ about three inches frca! t h e top of t h e post while two hoops d wire forming a d o r ~ top of *he post i n d i c a t e antitank mines..*--MIS, VD Bulletin. on

*kt r i e d echeloning one 105 id how up t o a defiladed p o s i t i o n behind t h e inf f r o n t eonerete p i l l boxes. The cannon co cormnander f i r e d with exaellent l i n e r t o f i r e at enr e r u l t r ueing forward obeervation methods and very mall corrsctione. W found t h a t HB b armor piercing shell i r nmre e f f a u t i m ~againat g i l l boxes than concrete piercing ahell.8-S-3, 115th I d , 29th Div.

1 ~ D t h i s div all nalvage clothing and individual equipment i e e a r s f u l l y norted by . I the QM. That which is s e r r i c e a b l e is then cleaned, rosized, r e c l a s e i f i e d and r e i s m e d . This procedure not only s a w s ti-, labor and material, but u t i l i z a r t h e f a u i l i t i e s of tha corpr Q)d laundry at t h m s when it i e not othemiee h e y . About 70 par oent of tho a a l r a g . i e sarriceable and reiseued t o the troops.
2, 8Salvaged blankets a r e a l s o cleanad and supplied t o the clearing s t a t i o n , which uses a very l a r g e number of blanketa, thua eliminating necessity f o r clearing s t a t i o n t o obtain blankets from medical eupply.8--gxecutive 0, 30th M v ~bd.

~ o t e *The bn a t t a c k described below r e s u l t e d i n the oapture of an fmportant and well protected German position. Its auoaess w a s a t t r i b u t e d by t h e D i r G3 t o i n i t i a t i v e , aggresaiamnaae, am3 leaderahip whdch achieved t h e i d e a l t a c t i a a l smplopmsnt of id.

1. German rnfenaa8: dl1 154 was a dominating t e r r a i n f e a t u r e whiah had k e n highly organized by the German8 with s t r o n g forward and reverse rlope goeitions on a North-South l i n e . merqp p o s i t i o n s included 8 aoncrete, steel-a=efn.forced, p i l l bore8 and o complete network of c i r a u l a r trenches around the e r e e t connected by a network of iateraanmunication trenchse and protected by an outer defense r i n g of s i n g l e apron barbed wire, The t e r r a i n was rocky with a minimum of cover a d concealmsnt. The defensea v e r s gslrrieoned by a n estimated 508 enemy troop8. 2. The Attack: Cos I and L were t h e aasault cos, I on the r i g h t , .and 60 K ras i n r e e e m , The a s s a u l t coa, each with a s e c t i o n of heavy E s attached, advanced i n column o of g l a t 8 , C f advanced under f i r e over t h e north elope ~f t h e hill, dropping its heavy a section a t t h e c r e s t t o a s s i s t Co L, and reached position8 200 yard8 down the reverse a mlope where i t etogped. Co ~ * advance w a 8 pinned down by heavy f i r e on the eastern elopsr ne of the h i l l u n t i l dark, A gap of soape 600 yards @ f i s t e d between Cos I and L, U d r the in the mornfgg @oL resumed t b s eover s f d a r h e s s Co K waa moved i n t o t h e gap. -1y advance, t h e i i r o t p l a t f r o n t a l l y , t h e second p l a t maneuvering t o the south. One squad of the f i r s t p l a t w a s committed on the r i g h t f r o n t t o i n f i l t r a t e i n t o t h a enemy lines. T h i e aqua8 succseded i n p e n e t r a t i n g the enemy p o s i t i o n unobserved and began attacking tha re8iatastre with grenade, eutslmatio weapon and r i f l e f i r e , A t Q6W t h e enemy counterattacked t n e euppomed gap betwese Cos I and L i n co strength. Co K k i l l e d or captured the e n t i r e oounterattaaking f o r c e ard than moved up on t h e l e f t flank of 60 1 and opened f i r e om enemy p o s i t i o n s on top of the h i l l . Under cover of the attaok made by the squad of $fa f i r s t p l a t and t h e f i r e fram Co X t h e r c m ~ ~ i n d e r Co % mmel up and t h e bn aapthe tured the h i l l by 1600,

3. Result of O p s r a t i o n ~Bnetay casualtie8: 154 PW8, I00 known dead, an estimated 300 k i l l e d o r wounded, C u r a a a u a l t i e s o '7 k i l l e d , 26 wounded.

4 Section ff BE 15 c,s. t h i s Hq s t a t e d t h a t an M Gun BB with the VIfI 1. par-apB Corps while being olrsgd aa f i e l d a r t i l l e r y obtained its f i r e d a t a i k a n t h e FA FDC. The followi~ statement of t h e mthode a a t u a l l y ueed has been received tram the 60, 119th ALA Gun RI (I) whfah wan the u n i t involreel. .No f i r i n g d a t a waa furnished t h e unit frcm outside. A l l omputatione wera mado i n
t h e u n i t m, Qllteat any o t h e r FDe furnnishmd ua was air observation f o r r e g i ~ t r a t i o n end same ground a r l f l a a h obsielzration f o r r e g i s t r a t i o n and miesionr. One battery of the unit stood by a s an a l t e r n a t e FIX, i n case t h e Bn H got s h e l l e d out. FA u n i t s assiated q i n p o s i t i o n surveys,.
2. The iaagortanoe of a i t i z g AAA was ale0 8trees.d by the saw o f f i c e r as follora: . n e n umd i n a ground r o l e , p r i a r i t g i n miting a r t i l l e r y xm be given t o f l a t t r a t t jectory WefQOXI8. They cannot just sit down anywhere. There i 8 only one propelling charge f o r these guns. Reoonnaisranee f o r s u i t a b l e position8 is a long dram-out job especially

i f o t h e r types of weapons have arrived ahead of the 90tm..

END

Reprodocedby fnpr Repro Det. /2 A Gp

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 42

1 SEPT I944 2

* B a t t l e Experiencesr a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquartera t o e n a b l e u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experiences of our t r o o p s n o r f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n j t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n all s i t u a t i o n e , t h e item published w i l l be t h o s e baaed on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommended f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r p r o b l e m . Reports of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.
By command of ~ i e u t e n a n tGeneral BRADLEf:

H. B. LEWIS B r i g a d i e r General, U ' Adjutant General

w i n g a r e c e n t pause i n o p e r a t i o n s of t h e 7 t h &mil M v near Vmdun, Major General Lindsay M..D. S i l v e s t e r , t h e d i v commander, c a l l e d a meeting of c e r t a i n cannnanders and s t a f f o f f i c e r s a t which t h e o p e r a t i o n s of t h e d i v were discuesed.. C e r t a i n comments a r e summarized below a8 they i n d i c a t e t h e phases of those o p e r a t i o n s which impressed thems e l v e s most c l e a r l y on t h e minds of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s .

1. T a c t i c 8 i n Advance, a. * I n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s t h e d i v o f t e n h a l t e d i n a column extending more t h a n 40 miles. I do not t h i n k r e f a n out' f a s t enough. I l i k e combat cannnands t o more i n m u l t i p l e columns..~--A g e n e r a l o f f i c e r . b. rDo not stand on t h e road 2 or 3 hours while some one t r i e s t o g e t i n touch with h i s s e n i o r . Make up your mind and do something. When a column s t o p s f i n d out general officer, what is s t o p p i n g it,"-A 1 c. ' agree about u s i n g m u l t i p l e columns, even t h o u g h . i t does complicate t h e supply s i t u a t i o n and report8.n--Division G-.!t. d. 'Our d i f f i c u l t y is having enough reconnaissance i n f r o n t of us. W went e s t r a i g h t down t h e road and f r e q u e n t l y t h e f i r s t 2 o r 3 v e h i c l e s were knocked out. I f we have t o keep going d o m roads and through towns, we w i l l use advanced guards of i n f and a p l a t of t a n k s t o f i n d o u t t h e situetion.."--Lt Col of a combat command.. e. "he armor should go around c i t i e s and t h e i n f f o l l o w up and go i n and t a k e keep moving fo17oard.n-- A g e n e r a l them. The main t h i n g I want t o impress on you i s or'f i cer

.

--

2. ~ d v a n c ePlanninq. "The g r e a t e s t t r o u b l e Ihad is g e t t i n g commanders t o t h i n k ahead of what t h e y w i l l do when they run i n t o t r o u b l e . The advance guard especially m s ut hare soms p l a n f o r immediate a c t i o n when f i r e d on.."--A g e n e r a l o f f i c e r .

3. Use of A r t i l l e r y . a . nAlways have one b a t t e r y c l o s e t o t h e f r o n t , k t y on t h e road i s no good. AS soon a s r e s i s t a n c e i s met t h e b a t t e r y co~~lmander should put h i s guns

i n p o s i t i o n ao they can be useden--Lt C o l e , F i e l d A r t i l l e r y . o be T o u r b e s t weapon a g a i n s t AT guns i s a r t y , D not t r y t o a t t a c k them d i r e c t l y . Get a r t y f i r e on them and then pprn your t a n k s around, come i n behind, and overrun them. It is S P and I know i t work8.n--An armored f o r c e 601. O
I1 AIR-GROUND
W e

Members of t h e s t a f f of t h e 7 t h Armd Div and of tho 9 t h A i r Force who have been same 0% t h e mutual o b l i g a t i o n s between air and ground operating with t h a t d i v s m ~ a r i z e f o r c e s as fo$lows:
1. Reports. The a i r should report immediately on a l l troop movements, both f r i e n d l y and enem, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e s i z e of t n e elements involved, The r e p o r t s ehould include time observed, l o c a t i o n , s t r e n g t h , c m p o s i t i o n and d i r e c t i o n of movement.

2. Panels. When ground elements dismount they must d i s p l a y panels t o insure against g e t t i n g s t r a f e d by f r i e n d l y planes.

Routes of Movemnt. The a i r must be kopt informed of t h e missions and r o u t e s of With t h i s knowledge they can f u r n i s h appropriate information without s p e c i f i c request. T h i s was exemplified a t t h e seizure of t h e bridgehead a t Chateau Thierry. The a i r did not know t h a t t h e bridgehead was t o be s e e w e d and made no r e p o r t regarding t h e bridges over t h e blame and Aisne u n t i l i t was c a l l e d for.
sll ,ground elements.

3.

III

WSCELLANEDUS COABENTS.

1,. m a t i o n of Radios. @ S t o r i e sof Germans s p o t t i n g our r a d i o s a r e untrue. I n our first aampaign we did not use the rad,io;. now w would not go without i t . W keep our e e CP c l o s e enough t o use the t s l e p h ~ n eo r t h e SC,R-30Q with telephone connections t o cos i n t h e l i n e . Tho SCR-284 i s used only from t h e r e g t Back. The r a d i o a l s o permits conJ, P J e t e r , 60, 121st Iaf. . s t a n t c o n t r o l of f o o t o r motor columns.."-Col.

2, German I n f a n t r y Organization, A captured document from t h e German 275th Inf Dio g i v e s a new d i v organization, It i s streamlined t o meet t h e e x i s t i n g shortege of personnel and material.. 1n.f cos we seduced t o 90 men end 2 of'a"icers. Armamect i s 1 l i g h t 1 E s and one heavy b E p e r eo, f i b excess equipment and personnel a r e t o be t m e d over t o a d i v reserve depot,

3. C i v i l i a n Cooperation, wLf c i v i l i a n s were informed a s t o t h e closeness of succeeding echelons they would cooperata more f r e e l y with advanced elements, such a s a r m r e d n u n i t s . O several ocaasions the Germans have returned t o town a f t e r armored spearheads had passed through and @severely handled' those who openly a s s i s t e d us.*--Lt Jones, 746th Tank Bn.

4. Minee, *PWe s t a t e t h a t minea a r e of curves i n t h e roads, The theory being curves hug t h e s i d e t o g e t a good view i n and do not watch f o r mines,*--6-2 Report,

-

being l a i d hurriedly on t h e i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h a t tanks and amd v e h i c l e s rounding t h e an e f f o r t t o spot enemy positions and v e h i c l e s 30th Dio.

5. Uae of Germ= Mines i n blocking a road, rnPWa say t h a t T-35 mines hove been used t o block roads a s fsllowa: A t r e n c h about 10 inchee deep is dug acroea t h e road. Three o r 4 mines are placed in it. A s t e e l connecting bar i a bolted across t h e pressure p l a t e s of t h e mines. A f l a t i r o n p l a t e i s then placed on top of the connecting bar. Pressure a t any p o i n t w i l l detonate a l l mines,n--G2 Report, 83rd Inf Mye

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 43
13 SEPT 1944
r r g a t t l e ~ p e r i e n c e sa~ e published r e g d g l y by t h i s hesdquarters t o enable units i n t r a b h g t o p r o f i t fram t h e l a t e s t combet experjences of our troops now t f i g h t i n g the Wrmans i n m o p e . ~ l t h o u g h h e experiences nf c e r t a i n u n i t e a t a p e r t i a u k l a a t i o n are not n e c e s s a r i l y applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n e l l s i t u a t i o m , the i t e m .published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c e 1 experience and are recormended f o r aaraf u consideration by u n i t s which may encounter similar problems. m p o r t s l of aorroboretive or c o n t r a r y experiences q e p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t t h e n a f i d i t y of t h e indicated b e t t l e lesaon may be determined.

CBP& i
A.
~ ~ ~ , 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ " -

Be IJmIS

&igadier General, USA Adjutant General
-

SUPPLY WT m TRE BnISION. (Rote 8 The following discussion of the operation i n IH oombat c supply in d i v i a i a n s and lower u n i t s i e e x t r a c t e d f'rcan a number of r e p o r t s d oa t h e subject.)

1

c

w

1 SUPPLY.

. Since r a t i o n s reach t h e using unit 48 hours a f t e r re1 plrpcibildty. a . Q u i a i t i o n , it is manifestly impracticable t o eeize unexpected opportunities t o e b e t t e r type r a t i o n , such as may r e s u l t fram a 2-dey r e l i e f frm t h e l i n e OUT 3-4 t r i e s t o keep on hand a PO-in-1 or B r a t i o n far t h i s of a oertaini =it. eddition, we t r y t o meet the d e e i r e e and apecial s i t u a t i o n s of subPWpoee, e =dinate units. rneguently w i s s u e two-thirde of a C r e t i o n and one-third of a K r a t i o n , o r vice-versa, f o r a s i n g l e day. -(Sf i c e r e of the 137th ~ n f , t h s Df. Diva C an mezpe&ed opportunity s r i a e s f o r a u n i t b. W maintain (r reserve. e t o use a B ar 10o.i~-1 r a t i o n and they $ a m d r a m another kind, we e%chan@ with them and adjust by t h e use of our reaeme. -EL. C o l . Van ~ o t t e n 30th pf.

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-

Dir.

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Reparati-. a . When w e sem6 e i t h e r the @ or t h e 18-in-1 r a t i o n , they a r e f b e t heated in t h e kitohens. We u u a l P y serve them hot far k e a l b a a t end e u ~t noon t h e msn e a t a cold K r a t i o n . - ~ tesl. m r , G-4 Pat Dive , Per b. we nark thie eyetem t o serve hot c rations+ Tke r a t i o n s , s t i l l i n e m s , a r e heated i n b o m g water. They a r e then i e t o marmSte m n a , d o preheated Ye '.cers of t h e 137th ~ n f ,35th in b o U n g water. They reach C b troops hozs -Mi They care i e s w d between 0600 and 1280 Rations ueruaffy G-4 1st Dive not during hours of darknees. z. Cole t b* Rations m e moved f m d in] t o n trucke %o bn am dps, where so jeepa Biak them up and take them aa aloee t o t h e l i n e s as p r a c t i a a b l e seldcrrP more than 500 yards array, p l a t w y i n g g a r t i e s take them t h e r e a t of t h e way. r he e m a @ tireb f r m kitchen8 t o troope i s about two hours. df c e r a o t h e 137th Info i f
moved v m f m a r d befare dark. n

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Ini. Div. 3. ~ ~ w m s p m a r d . nt

a.

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91 Tne a r e alwaye r e l e a s e d t o units.

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we have a medium ord ao i n d i r e c t support of t h e dim* w e 1 veepone. a. . o b t a i n mapan replscemente throu& t h i s co, d i r e c t f r m U p s . ~ t 1201. mr, . 0-4 lrat Diva g a while we reported weapon r e p a i r and r e p l e c e m n t needs ea& night m b . time of replauenrsnt was two dayao mter we d e t a i l e d a d v a g e through 9 4 ~ o r m a l -. o f f i a e r with s e v e r a l men with t h e Bnty of handling t h i e e~ork, w e b improvement has ie believed a amell stock af weapons m d spare parta i t h e service n been noted. oo would be a ereat help. Lt. c o l a o ~ ~ a ~ eC8,l 2nd an 3-3 L37 W. l , principcrl d i f f i a u l t i e a i n t h e resupply of ulothinpt were d w t o clothin 08 d t h e 137th X n f m t h e r a p i d a d - a e and t h e shortage of transportation. 7 m auggusted nabtenance of a emall stock af clothing i n t h e M%PV 00 d 8 0 . d. m h i a l e e . ~ e h i c l e replacement e have been obtainad i n t h e tigb neoesaary f t o send t o t h e ~ g end r e t u r n them. y~ostof t h e vehicles l o e t m e jeeps. 1 t h e p d i v were authorized t o stock a few of these vehiclee f a r immdiate replacement, I t h i n k t h e eyetem would be improved. mjcr Huff, ~ e e e 4 , 9th mr. t 1 1 CIICISS 1 1 1. 1.

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1 a. . Eaah r e g t and sep bn and co &are d i r e c t from the ~X'W dace 1 1 1 t truckbead, ~ o r m e r l y h i s was 6 t o l5 milee back. Now it is a s much a8 150 t.0 w5 milee. Tho d i v o a r r i e s a reserve of 4000 m l l o n e of @wofinem To save t h e lower u n i t e t h e long haul, w iaaue t h e d i v r e 8 and then r e f i l l it e Maj R e Me O 30th 1nf Div, w e m y ,

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b . he Dip ~ b tranrsporte @ m e III supplies f r o m ASP^ t o aiv dps, d w a b they a r e pioked up by u i n g unite. m c e n t l y we have ~ B P o t t e dan e n t i r e t r u c k with d i f f i campany t o moving f o r w a r d these supplies, but they . a r e ketwina up 0 n . l ~ culty. mjur Huff, Aeet G-4. 9 t h ~ i v .

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I. B

C U S S I. V

r e p a r t e indicate t h a t class I supply aervicea have operated well and V 1 . are well etooked. ~n some oases, they have f a l l e n t o o far behind.

u1

1 None of t h e m i t e of t h i s d i v have e s t a b l i s h e d am dpa. . hey with baeic loads. NO am is a a r r i e d on div ord truoks. Far resupply, unit traneportat i o n passee beak through t h e d i v am dp, where they obtain m d e r e on t h e w. ~ t c.o l a mr, G-4, let Diva

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&n is 2 , 0ur reginwnts r a r e l y dump am and bna dwnp a s i i t t l z a8 possible. usually t r a n s f e r r e d from bn am t n vehiclee t o co jeepe and t r a i l e r a . Bn A and P p l a t e break open chests of ea a , including t h e liners, i n opdetr t o aave time for n t h e combat coa. Lt. col. ~ ~ C o n n e l CO, 2nd gn and gda jor F l, r, S-3, 137th 1nf. 35th Diva

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3.

&n is transported d i r e c t f r o a n bgpe t o ueine units.

W ' use no dumps. e

R e o r o h c e d by Enqc Repro Def. /2 A Gp

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 44

I SEPT 1944 6

r g a t t l a D p e r i e n c e s n are p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l ~ t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o enable by unity i t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r c ~ n t t h e l a t e s t combkt ex!?eriences of o u r t r o o p s n m n f i g h t i n g t h e Gem.n.9 i n p o p e . ~ l t h o u g ht h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n u n i t s at a p a r t i c u l a r l c c a t i c n & r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l umi t a i n a l l s i t u a t i c n s , t h e items published will be t h o e e based on ,meet i c a l experience and are recommended f n r c a r e f u l ccrnsiderat i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. R e p o r t s of c o r r o b o r a t i v e or c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c ~ t e d ~ t t l el e s s o n may be determined. b
By comr.wnd of
Ij e u t e

m t ~eneral EWkDms

He B* LEWIS B r i g a d i e r General, Ad j u t e n t G e n e r d
I &I&~IPEJ=ISCDES
NO9*

3, 4 and 5 .

( N ~ S : The f e c t s and opinions given be9ow were o b t e i n e d by p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w w i t h Lt. c o l . J. E. Rudder, @Q ?d R b n g e r gn, m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h a t Bn has completed 17 days of c m h t a 3 a p a r t c f s t a a k f o r c e of t h e 2 9 t h Div a s s i g n e d t o t h e r e d u c t i o n of ~ c Crmquet p o n i n e ~ ~ ht h e southwest p o r t i o n of t h e mest peninsula. w i n g t h a t : p e r i o d t h e f o l l o a i n g were c e p t u r e d ~ The main b h t t e r y e a s t of L o c r i a t c o n t a i n i n g four 280 m and t h r e e mn guns; an AA b a t t e r y o t Ploumoguer; a 5 mn b a t t e r y a t pt. de c o r s e n ; 75 m batter;. e t pt. de st. m t h i e u ; a b a t t e r y a t ~ a r v i l l o u i t h f o u r 20 w The ~n l o s t e i g h t k i l l e d durf i guns and two 75 mm c o s t a l guns; and 1213 p r i s o n e r s . ing t h e e n t i r e perlod. These f a c t s , t o g e t h e r wlth the incidental d i s c l o s u r e , through

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h i s i n t e r v i e w , cf t h e t h i n g s t h a t Lt. c o l a Ruddar t h i n k s about as Bn Comdr, appear t o e n t i t l e him t o a r e s p e c t f u l h e a r i n g when he d i s c u s s e s t h e s u b j e c t of Leaderahip. )
1. L e e d e r ~ b l p pzmdaxental. prm my o p i n i o n , l e a d e r a h i p r e q u i r e s t h a t bn, co and -p l a t comilrs c o n s t a n t l y keep up w i t h t h e men i n t h e l i n e and encr.)ura&e them by example. The week l e a d e r must be promptly r e p l a c e d or t h e r e a c t i o n w i l l gc on down t o t h e last man and t h e u n i t w i l l n o t move. Leadership i s a c . i e s t i o n of l i f e o r d e a t h t o t h e men i n t h e ranks.

one n i g h t t h e Germns opened with two 280 mns on our personnel. 2. An memple. The 280 has v e r y large. sheJ.1 f r a p n t s ~ n d s not a n a n t i p e r s o n n e l weepon, but t h e i b b . s t i a t e r r i f jc. he Germna m d e no d i r e c t h i t s . we had no s e r i o u s c a s u a l t i e s but two men were buried j.n t h e i r f o f i . o l e s e n d hkd t o be dug out. hqorale wae s e v e r e l y s t r ~ i n e d . However, t h e men s t o o d t o t h e i r f o x h o l e s ; l e s s w e l l t r a i n e d me11 might have retired.

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provided what I consider a good example of leadm c t h e r m a m ~ l e . Lt. ~ d l j n ership. He l e d a p a t r o l of 10 men i n t o t h e 280 m (Uwaf SpeeM) b a t t e r y neer L o m i s t . He e n t e r e d t h e t of the German b t r y comdr with a h c ~ d p grenade i n his hand and dehe Garroan c e l l e d colonel F u r s t , i n c o m n d of t h e &mmne on t h e mended surrender. p e n i n a u k , then offered t o a r b i t r a t e . m l i n i n s i s t e d upon inrmediate surrender. 1 had a r r i v e d i n t h e meantime and c o l o n e l F u r s t r e q r ~ e s t e dwe corn t o h i s Cp, 3000 yds away. I moved t r o o p s around wst 1s C? t h e n took Edliil ts p a t r o l i n with me. m a t surrendered t h e f m t and we took about 500 prisoners.

3.

4. HOW t o ~ a v e n f e n t r y . a.- 1nf sometimes t a k e s heavy l o s s e a when a l i n e ie I e b u i l t up t o o s t r o n g l y and t h e enemy a t t a c k s with a r t y and mccrta. W ahould keep moving and f l a n k i n g out posj.tions. If I cannot f i n d a flank, I hold t i g h t and b u i l d up i n s ~ . o t h e r l a c e by a t e a l t h o r under cover of darkness. p b . - In one. case where we were b u i l t u e t r o n g l y , w s u f f e r e d 30 c a e u a l t i e e among ! , e 240 men i n two hours more t h a n our C R R U I t i e s f cr any o t h e r two deye. The next ~ dey we f l a n k e d the p o s i t i o n and gained 2000 yds with only 21 c a s u a l t i e s o c.- when warking with t k s we should use minimum numbers of inf around t h e tke only enough t o p r o t e c t t h e t k s from bezooka f i r e f r o m both flanks. 1f we plaoe a l o t of inf around t h e t k e , t h e y t s k e c a s u a l t i e s from w t y and mort fire aimed a t t h e tks.

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5 . m o t h e r =emplea ~ t W n s k i r a n onto a Gerrmn outpost. He h s d li&ht t k a . h i t it frc,m t h e f r o n t . ~e and t e n men t h e n went arvund and behind t h e p o e i t ion and wiped it out while t h e Garman8 were concerned with t h e t k s t o t h e i r h'ont.
e 6. Dealina; with W r m n p a t r o l s . The @irmans s e t up t h e i r p a t r o l s as w do, with some men intended t o ~ * t,ck with information a s t o the p o s i t i o n from which t t h e p e t r o l r e c e i v e d f i r e . They then put a r t y and m o r t f i r e on t h e position. ~ f . a memher tff R h ~ si t e p a t r o l get s away a f t e r c o n t a c t i n g one of our poeitions, t h e l p o s i t i o n should be moved imnediately a e v w a l hundred yards. The best procedure is t o l e t t h e whole p a t r o l get i n s i d e our p o s i t i o n and then eurround it, t o i n s u r e that none escapee.

wmont l i n e s can be p l o t t e d q u i t e well if panele a r e displayed a t specifiect time8 and observed from t h e In plane by e i t h e r t h e a r t y obsr o r I n 0 f l y i n g f a r t h e purpose. F l i g h t s of 1000, 1200, 1400, and 1600 hours were standardized. he obar p l o t t e d h i s obans on a photo m p . * - - ~ $ c o l o ~ c o n n e l l , CO, 2d Bn, 137th Inf, 3 5 t h Inf Dive

RND

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Pepmducedby rhe Lng~neer Reproduction Det, /2th Army Group

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 4 5

16 SEPT 1944

n g a t t l e S p e r i e n c e s r a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e a t cambat experiences of our t r o o p s nor f i g h t i n g t h e -mans i n m o p e . ~ l t h o u g ht h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t e P a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n are not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t 8 i n a l l e i t u a t i o m , t h e items published rill be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l eorperience and e r e reconmended f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t e which m y enoounter s i m i l a r problems. ~ e p o r t s of c o r r o b a r a t i v e or c o n t r a r y experiences a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e e i r e d i n order t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e leaaon m y be determined.

ICBPYs-,
H* B.

ms 1

B r i m d i m General, U ~ A Adjutant General

1. saving gpark plugs, By i n c r e a s i n g t h e normal i d l i n g r a t e of about 400 rpo! 3ince replaaet o about 1000 r p carbonization of spark pluga ie g e a t l y reduced. mente a r e d i f f i c u l t t o o b t a i n , t h i s g e a t l y reduced a t r y i n g problem. I3 i a doubtf u l i f t h i a p r a c t i c e wastee g a s i n t h e long r u n , s i n c e f o u l e d engines consume f w l at s a e s e i v e =ate.
1. 1 WACUTIW CiE' T N WOWllEDe AK

1 I n every a c t i o n t o d a t e we have had t k s a t t a c h e d t o our bns. A t o t a l d . 15 t a n k e r s have been wounded. We haw had a t t a c h e d one t k rned a i d man and o m halft r a c k ambulance. These were not needed. The h a l f - t r a c k drew f i r e d e s p i t e i t s Red (=roes ~lrarkinge.

2 The p r i n c i p a l problem has been t h e removal of wounded and t r e a t m e n t of very . eevere burne, w had our a i d men p r a c t i c e t h e s e two o p e r a t i o m before our inf r e n t e i n t o a a t i m . T h i s t r a i n i n g ha8 proved e f f e c t i v e and invaluable. The rounded t a n k a r s r e r e eiven f i r s t l a i d by our r i f l e c o a i d men. They were moved from t h e point of injury by a l i t t e r boarer q u a d xmde up of men from t h e regtl s e c t i o n , p l u s a few msn from t h e bn s e c t i o n , mcm t h e a i d s t a t i o n t h e y are evacuated by norm1 methods.
11 1. FFtUI'ECTION FOR TANK C O W .

Re do not # b u t t o n up* om' d r i v e r s and a s s t d r i v e r e except hnder heavy a r t y fire. The t k c o m d r ~ st u r r e t a t a y s open. To give him s u m p o t e c t i o n we devised a v shaped a h i e l d which was welded around h i a e t a t i a n , ( s e e eketch)

SHIELD

The s h i e l d i a made of 3/8 o r 1/2 inch s t e e l , slit8 1/2 inch wide and 6 t o 8 inches long Permit vision. T h i s device provides good p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t 9A f i r e and has g e e t l y reduced t h e number of m i p e r v i c t ime.--I;t ~ o C.O. R a k e r , co 1st gn, 66th l Regt.

IV

AIR

corn.

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O u r a i r cover has been e x c e l l e n t and h a s helped ua out of many t i g h t spots. ~t g9 ~oeufthey knocked out 8 German m r k v and W k Vi tanks t h a t were giving us a p e a t d e a l of t r o u b l e . They a l s o helped ue a t Teasy-aur-Vfre by knocking out tanks. hey are on c a l l by any u n i t down t o a p l a t , c a l l i n g through c o and bn, and giving t h e locac t i o n o' t h e t a r g e t . Then t h e ~ g mo n t a c t e t h e a i r cover and g e t 8 a e t r i k e w i t h i n a f a I have seen t h e a i r s t r i k e w i t h i n 3 minutes a f t e r t h e c a l l w s mde. m t t e r of minutee. we l i k e t o know the a i r i s t h e r e . W want it a l l t h e tinn.--Et e Col C.O. Parker, cs 1st m, 66th AFRU~ Re&,; concurred i n by Lt c o l E.C. Herkness, Co 2nd E and rnj R. o l p r r e l l , m co 3d m.

our a r t y FO, who f o l l o w s t h e l e a d i n g p l a t , rneintaina corn with our cub plane while it i s i n t h e a i r , and while we aro moving. He t h u s g a i n s valuable i r & o m t i o n of h o e t i l e elements which might hinder our mverr~snts.--mj R o s p a r r e l l , CO 3d gn, 66th . m d Regte m

1 Forward observere w i t h c m e d Units. . The id and t k s should each have an lpo. In t h i e way The F o l s should work s e p a r a t e l y but be i n c o n s t a n t cam with each other. fire can be p h c e d promptly on t a r g e t s picked up by e i t h e r t k s o r id. he t k lpo must be well forward.
2. Road gLocka. when you h a l t prepare r a i d blocks. Dig 2 h o l e s about 15 yde a p a r t , one on each s i d e of t h e r o a d , and put 3 o r more men i n each hole. 3 t r i n g mines on a rope and on t h e apprm.ch of h o s t i l e v e h i c l e s draw t h e minea i n f r o n t of them.

3. m a c u a t i o n of Armd Wounded. I n combat it is o f t e n imposeible for t h e medics t o I n such c a s e s we put a s t r a t c h e r on t h e back of a evacuate wounded i n t h e normal way. l i g h t t k and evacuate wounded by t h a t means. The e n t i r e r e @ u s e s t h i s system. - - ~ t c o l C.O. Ilarkar, co l,et gn, 66th ~ r m d Re&.

4. F m ~ . r d Observation v e h i c l e . To secure obsn f o r my a s s a u l t guns and mrts, t h e a s s a u l t gun p l a t l e ~ d e ri s mounted i n a l i g h t t k i n s t e a d of t h e assigned half-track. Using t h e l i g h t tank h e can go wherever t k s go and ?erforrn e f f i c i e n t i ~ h e d u t i e s of a n t FO, which he csnnot do i n a half-track.--lt c o l L.C. Herkness, C O 2d Bn, 66th u m d Re@.

5. T a r g e t s on ~ u n d a r i e s . speedy piecing of f i r e on t a r g e t s l o c s t e d on d i v bounda r i e s i s a problem, c l e a r a n c e must be o b t a i n e d from t h e a d j a c e n t div. The Germena seem u s u a l l y t o heve important t a r g e t s on o r near d i v boundaries.--Col R. R. Raymond, jr, Arty Exec, 8 t h Inf Div.

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A%pmducer?&~+he Engtneer .?eproduct,on Del, /Zfh Army Groq

TWELFTH ARMY CRCUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 46

22 SEPT 1944

W h t t l e Experiences# a r e p u b l i d e d r c g u l s r l y by t h i s h s s d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e u n i t s i n t r n i n i n ~ o ?profit from t h e l a t e s t combat e x p e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p 8 now t f ightin~t h e Gems i n Ei~rofle. Althoti& t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t e a t a particular l o c ~ t i o n Eire n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c e b l e t o a l l . u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t iona, t h e i t e m s publi..shed w i l l be t h o s e baaed on p r a c t i c a l ex?erience and a r e reconmended f o r ceref u l a o n s i d e r a t i n n by u n i t e which m y encounter s i m i l a r problems. , R e p o r t s of c o r r o b o r a t i v e or c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e y e l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b e t t l e l e s s o n may be determined. By cammand of Lieutenant General EIRADUY:

..........................................
I WIRE CO~LIIMKNICATIQIJ FAST MdVIIJG SITUAT IONS. U\J
T h e recent

C. R. L N m 4D Colonel, AGD Ad j u t a n t General

15

to

75 m i l e d a i l y advances m d e

by t h e d i v p r ~ s e n t e d s i t u a t i o n a

in which i t was beyond t h e c s p a b i l i t i e s of t h e d i v personnel and equipment t o maint a i n continunus wire a o m u n i c a t i o n with f i e l d wire. Extensive r e c o n n a i s s a n c e wae
c ~ i r r i e do u t y i o r t o t h e movanent of t h e C P s o t h a t a wire n e t could be q u i c k l y l a i d . A l l a ~ a i l ~ b French c m e r c i p . 1 w i r e and _noam l i n e s were used; i n one inle e t a n c e R n e t of 70 m i l e s o f o ? e r a t i n g c i r c u i t s was i n s t a l l e d i n 3 h o w w i t h o n l y 1 2 m i l e s of f i e l d wire. It wag found beat t o decld-end c i r c u i t s a t each end of a v i l l a g e ~ n l a y f i e l d wire t h r o u ~ hthe-town. T h i s e l i m i n s t e d t h e n ~ e d c u t t i n g d of numeroils l e ~ d - i n st o bui1dings.L-Reports from u n i t s of 9 t h 1 3Div. 1

Mach TD h a s e chamel o n t h s a r t y air-ground net. b . c h TD co c o d r has t h i s chsnnal monitored d u r j n p : hnura of dFlylioht. When t h e A i r OP s p o t s 3 TD t a r g e t he c n J . 1 ~* H e l l o ? 9 # ~ i v j n t,h~ c0ordimte.s. The TD cc camdr n e a r e s t t h e t e r e t anse wera ~ n d o t i f i e 3 t h e p l e t concerned. The ? l ~ c!~nd.r checks i n on t h e a i r - g c t m d n t net, an3 hncs his I! TD3 l i s t e n in. The ? 1 ~ t thsr! r p v e r e e s t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i c n p s n e l s on theij. v e h i c l e s for i . d e n t i f i c a t i o n by t b a a i r OP and engages t h e t a r @ . The e i r OP k e n s the p!?t informed of t h e movements @f t h e t a r g e t .#--Reportj f r 3 m u n i t s of 9th Div.

p r e p e r p t j o n w i t h m 1 2 r t s t h e l a s t r n l ~ n d .f r r v e r c h wy: i s smoke. Y\Vhenwe f i r e When t h e inf see t h e ~ m k e h e y a d v ~ n c e . Even i f t h e enemy c c t c h e s on t o t h i s s y s t tem w e h ~ v e h e jump f o r he czn never be sure t h a t t h e fire h a s l i f t e d . " - - L t Col. t JOE. G:lden, Exec 0, 1 2 t h I n f , L~thDiv.

N --CO~IDDiATi'I3PJ GF RCN 'L'ROUP 2.145 & I -----

R PLi;r WTrH

"he r e e l I & R p l a t s awl t h e d-iv r c n t r c we t r e i n a t ! t o ~ d j u s ta r t y f i r e . When A i;lst of t h o r c n t r y i s working w i t h 2 crrnbat t y z m i t ]?eves a n M8 w i t h r o d i o at t h e C . If t h e remainder of the p1.t i s s t , ~ p p e d elleiny r e s i s t s r c e i t P by r a d i o s b l c k t h c l o c ~ t i . o nof t h e t e a r g e t erld t h ~ ti t w i l l ~ _juet. fire. &?endent d upon t h e ran@, e i t h ~ r h e c v c o i>rt h e a r t y bn msy hc? u 3 e d e I n t h i s W ~ > I o p ; ~ g s i t t i o n i s o f t e n c l e a r e d o ~ r~i o r t o t h e ~ r r i v n lof t h e f ~ o troo.-#am#--Col t t Framer

T h o m a , ~ / 3 ,'79th Div.

1. Tanks. flTho b e s t t h i n e a s o l d i e r cen a e e o n t h e f r o n t i s h i s o m t k s . W e w ~ n t h e t k s r i g h t on e l i n e with 1 1 3 , n o t 150 y a r d s t o OUT r e a r e n - - M e n of Co I, 1 0 t h Inf, 5 t h Div.
2. Iieep Movins. "when c r n s s i n ~open t s r r a i n !inder *.::I1 crms f i r e kee? mcving If' one h i t 3 t h e g o u n d h e bscomss 3 s t i l l t a r g e t f o r s m l l R r m s , m n r t e r forward. end a r t y f i r e . T h i s c o m r c h ~ i l3 m i l e 3 ~ c r o 3 , sope1 grol~nil a t La C h s r e l l e f i r i n g from a n u ~ i g h t o s i t i o n . W k e p t J e r r y down hy c ' ? n s t s r . t f i r e a n d d i d n c t hf~.ve a p e s i n g l a c g s u ~ l t y . ~ - - M e n of CO I, 1 0 t h Inf, 5 - t h Div,

3. --- i s o n e r--.--.- of Yier. *n0 n o t s e p e r s t o p r i s c > n e r s and t h e documents t h e y cmry. Pr s b y t i m e s w e get m r k e d u p s snit d o c u m e n t , ~ h ~ m e need t h e p r i s c n e r s t o e x p l a i n . t t --Lt Col. M . r r a y , G-2, 7 t h A m d Div.
Me91 Holu-s. *In R d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n n 2 s r E b l l e r g y we h ~ our d t h e f r o n t 11ne. Hot m e a l ? w e ~ es e r v e d a t (3600, 1200 and 1700 hr3urs. As a r e s u l t we -re s b e l l q d d a i l y a t t h c g e h o u r s . Meal h o u r s near t h e f r o n t s h o u l d he s t a g g o r e d . '--3/3@ T r a i n o r , Ikss S p t , Co I, 1 0 t h I n f , 5 t h Div.

4 .

ki s h u t

7;p--"f r o m 00 yerd.s

S t a ~erin .

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Tank D e s t r o y e r s i n S u p g o r t of F i e l d A r t i l l e r ~ . "When s u p p o r t i n g t h e arty im-~rovised FDC from t h e co hq. The a r t y f l i r n i s h e d s l ~ r v e y AD and obsn. #--Lt Col Cole, CO 6 2 9 t h TD Bn.

5.

6 . Imtzrovised Antennae f o r 3CR-300. "Rep1ecemcnt s h n g s c e r c e we i m p o v i e e d i a n a e r i a l f o r t h e SGt-300 by . s o l d + r ~ . n t o t h e o r i g i n a l b a ~ e t h e AN-1304 a ~ of l e n g t h of W e n c h tran.smiasion w i r e , p u p 8 o r 1 0 , e q u a l t o t h e o r i g i n a l a n t e n n e . T o s u p g a r t the t r ~ n . s m i s s i o nw i r e i n t h e baae, s e l z i n g w i r e waa wound 2 i n c h e a above ~ n d below t h e j o i n t e n d t h e n so1dered.u--Reports from u n i t s of 9 t h Inf Div.

4t

9

TWELFTH ARMY

CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 47
24 SEPT 1944
*Battle BperienceaQre published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e u n i t a i n t r a i n i n g t o *prof it from t h e l a t e s t combat e x p e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p s now f i g h t i n g t h e G e r m n s i n Burope. Although t h e ex,periences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t e p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p 2 l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s , t h e items published w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and a r e recornended f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by i m i t s which m y encounter similar 2 r o b l e m . R e p o r t s of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e g a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

Co R. LANDON

Colonel, AGD

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CLASS I SUPPLY 11\1 C M A C BT

Ad j u t ant General

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1. 3ourcea. During t h e p a s t two weeks d e t a i l e d r e s o r t s on t h e o2ercltion of c m b a t s l ~ p ~ 7 l yi t h i n t h e d i v heve been r e c e i v e d from o number of u n i t s i n combat. w h o n e t h o s e f u r n i s h i n g i n f ormation are t h e f o l l o w i n g ; G 4 3 r d Armd Div; G-4 2d I d Div; G-4 1st Inf Div; G-4 3 0 t h Inf Div; A s s t G-4 9 t h Inf Div; Aset G 4 6 t h Armd Div; C O 102d Cav Gp Mecz; S-l; 134th Inf; 3-4 3 1 4 t h W ; 3-4 1 2 1 s t Inf; 3-4 1 1 9 t h I d ; 5-4 1 3 t h Inf; S-4 28th I n f . 2. Treatment. A summary of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o C l a s s I supply i s given i n succeeding paragraphs. A more o r l e s s t y p i c a l d e e c r i p t i o n of t h e g e n e r a l methods of o p e r e t i o n is followed by a d e s c r i p t i o n of c e r t a i n e x p e d i e n t s or methods adopted t o minimize a d i f f i c u l t y i n t h e system o r o t h e r w i s e t o improve t h e Other c l a s a e s of s u p p l y w i l l be di?cuseed i n f u t u r e s e r v i c e t o t h e combat t r o o p e . iesuea of Q t t l e experience^^.

3, Method. SOB u n i t s attempt t o f e e d 2 hot meals d a i l y , e a a d v i s e d i n c u r r e n t b7D manurils. Some, however, h a b i t u a l l y f e e d o n l y K r a t i o n s while i n combat. A f e w of t h e l a t t e r have o b t a i n e d s u f f i c i e n t one-burner cooking o u t f i t s t o permit p r a c t i c a l l y a l l men t o h e a t t h e s e r a t i o n s before. t h e y a r e eaten. H a t i o n s a r e i s s u e d by t h e d i r t o r e g t l 3-4 by unit d i s t r i b u t i o n from t h e d i v t r u c k h e a d end i n t u r n by t h e r e & l 3-11 t o c o k i s under r e g t l c o n t r o l , by t h e r e g t l t r a i n bivouac. Both of t h e s e i s s u e 8 a r e normally made i n d a y l i g h t . The r e g t l 3-4 t h e n determl-nes, from h i s knowledge of t h e s i t u a t i o n whether t h e morning and e v e n i n g meals r i l l b e s e r v e d i n d a y l i g h t o r under cover of darkness. 3ometirne between breakf'ast and e a r l y a f t e r n o o n , t h e bn 9 4 s r e p o r t t o t h e r e g t l 3-4 t h e i r f e e d i n g p l a n s , based upon t h e s i t u a t i o n of t h e i r u n i t s . T h i s i n f o r m t i o n i s passed on t o t h e k i a which p l a c e t h e meals i n c o n t a i n e r s a c c o r d i n g Sonae r e g t s send one 24T t r k _wr bn t o t h e bn motor pool o r o t h e r t o requirements. s e l e c t e d r e l e a a e p o i n t , The meals a r e t h e r e picked up by c o jeeps and t r a n s p o r t e d t o

a p o i n t Prom which t h e y are h a n d - c a r r i e d f o r f i n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h i e method req u i r e s about one t o one and one-half h o u r s . Other u n i t s have t h e c o jeeps with t r a i l e r s go t o t h e r e g t l k i b i v at a p r e s c r i b e d time. Using t h i s system, t h e tiwa from ki t o t r o o p s i a s a i d t o be o n l y about 30 minutes. Where' t h e C r a t i o n is prep a r e d i n t h e k i , m e t u n i t e p r e h e a t t h e c a n s and p l a c e them i n s i m i l a r l y p r e h e a t e d m a r m i t e cane t o b e t r a n s p o r t e d forward. The time f o r f e e d i n g a f t e r a r r i v a l a t t h e t r o o p a r e a v a r i e s from 40 minutes t o one and one-half hours. Water u e u n l l y i s s e n t forward w i t h t h e meals.

4. Unit Reserves. A number of u n i t s r e p o r t t h e p r q c t i c e of m a i n t a i n i n g a r o l l obi n g r e e e r v e , u s u a l l y of one of t h e more d e s i r a b l e t y p e s of r a t i o n . The ~ r i n c i p a l unexpected o p p o r t u n i t i e e t o s e r v e o m of j e c t of t h i s i a t o permit t a k i n g advantage of t h e b e t t e r t y p e s of r a t i o n . In t h e 3 0 t h Div, t h e d i v QM t r a i n c a r r i e s a r e s e r v e of B and X r a t i o n s and c a n a d j u s t on s h o r t n o t i c e t o g i v e a u n i t t h e best t y p e it can u s e . The 3 1 4 t h I n f , which normally s e r v e s K r a t i o n s when i n combat, c a r r i e s a 10-in-1 r a t i o n i n r e s e r v e , I n a d d i t i o n , each of i t s b n s keeps a f i e l d k i w i t h t h e bn t r a i n . T h i e k i h a s a u f f i c i e n t cooking u n i t s and personnel t o cook a hot meal f o r a u n i t which h a s t h e op-portunity t o u s e it. The 134th Inf keeps on hand one C r a t i o n , one K and one 10-in-1.

5 Feeding I s o l a t e d Groups. I n t h e 28th Inf, 6-11 i s o l a t e d groups, such as o u t p o s t s o r guerda f o r r o a d b l o c k s , a r e given one dcy I s uncooked r a t i o n and prepare t h e i r own hot food on s m l l i n d i v i d u a l b u r n e r s .
6 . Cleaning of b a s Kits, I g e n e r a l , t h e c l e a n i n g of mees k i t e seems t o be n working s a t i a f s c t o r i l y . These two methode o r e i n u s e i n t h e 8 t h Div. F i r s t , hot r a t e r o r e s t e r i l i z i n g s o l u t i o n i s c a r r i e d forward with t h e m a l s and a mess k i t c l e a n i n g l i n e i s formed i n t h e c o a r e a ; seccnd, t h e mess k i t s a r e kept a t t h e c o k i , a e n t forward with t h e meel and i s s u e d i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y . They o r e c o l l e c t e d a f t e r t h e meal a n d t a k e n back t o t h e k i f o r washing, The f i r s t of t h e two methods d e s c r i b e d i s eornewhat n o i s y and i n v o l v e s a danger of drawing h o s t i l e f i r e . The 1 3 t h Inf of t h e 8 t h Div, on t h o s e o c c a s i o n s when h o t water o r a c l e a n i n g s o l u t i o n cannot bs aent f o r w a r d , f u r n i s h e s t h e men w i t h napkins f r o m t h e 10-in-1 r a t i o n s t o p l a c e i n t h e i r mss k i t s . The 6 t h Armd Div r e q u i r e s i t s c o 0s t o s u p e r v i s e c l o s e l y t h e c l e a n i n g of mesa k i t e end a l s o r e q u i r e 6 a d a i l y s p o t check by a bn medical 0.

7. a t r a s . A number of u n i t s d u r i n g t h e l o n g days i s s u e d a n extrci X r a t i o n t o t h e men i n the morning t o b e e a t e n i n t h e l a t e a f t e r n o o n and t i d e over the gap between t h e noon meal and a supper which t h e y might not r e c e i v e u n t i l elmost midnight. S t i l l o t h e r u n i t e t r y t o economize on o r a r r a n g e f o r e x t r a f r e s h bread and c o f f e e t o p r m i t a e r v i n g hot c o f f e e and sandwiches l a t e a t n i g h t , on t h e t h e o r y t h ~ a - h o s t a l l men t i n f r o n t l i n e u n i t s a r e awake d u r i n g much of e v e r y n i g h t .

h'e,roducedby fnqr Repro Def ./2 Gp A

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No.48
25 SEPT 1944
8 B a t t l o $rparienaes8 are publimhed r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable u n i t r i n t r a i n i n g t o psofit frcm t h e latert ooprbat exxmrioncrea of our troops row fighting t h e Gsrmanr i n ICuFope. Although t h e euprrienoer of c c r t a i n unitr a t a p c r t i o u l a r location are not neoesaarily applicable t o all unit. in a l l s i t u e t i o ~ ,t h e itgublirhed w i l l be t h o r s b a r d oa p r a c t i o a l u p e r i e a c e .rrd are rearrmraniled for uareful connidaration by units r h i e h m y ~ o ~ t rlmlar ~ o b l o m . Report8 of oorroborative or C O ~ ~ ~ U J a r a p a r i s n c e s are p s r t i o u l a r l y desired in ordar t h a t the v a l i d i t y of the indicated b a t t l e lemon may be d . t d n e d .

S, R. PINDChI Colonel, UID

U@t~lkmbl t
~ ~ s B ~ ~ o ~ c . = ~ u w ~ ~ ~ ~ o , ~

1 Source@of &tea:. Aa o3as.r ? r m . ! i ~ re< ) S : . A ~ ~ e ~ t . m B g 8 ~ na & % 0' co Cia % &t and hQa of a bm of an inf re& e-ged ia % a s e g m d m g t h s i s i d e a r as La the esasntial q u a l i t i e e of lmdermhip, The r e a u l t a d eenpori8 p i e t - ~ e e g i r e n b e l m a i
2. QUllltra. Derired. The r o c u m n o e of demmds f o s a e r t s b q u a l i t i e s their l e a d e r r nrake t h e m q u a l i t i e s appoar t o ba of outstanding inrportanoe. They are as f o l lowor self-eonfidoace and decision; a e w e knoaledlge o f h i e job; f s l m e e r , e e l f eontrol; a t t e n t i o n t o t h e s a f e t y and welfare of h i e subordinates; exmplaPy conduct; a r a t h e r vague laa~letbingrhiuh oan beat be a i l l e d 8 p ~ o o ~ l b tA ynunbar a l e o r t r e r a d ~ ~ t h e i m p o r t a c e of a leader keoping h i r msm aontiauallg in2 d 0% the a b f ~ t i o x a , The rucaeeding psragraphar deal with eaoh of t h e r e q u a l % t i * e o:as tba language of the ~ B B who were qwrtianed.

3. 3 e l f - o o a i i d a n w ~ $deoisioa. He must be able % o d e cpui& d e c i e i o ~ a . He must be c a b an2 L L ~ A A C I ~ I . c i n hi% dacieisns when t h e gajag i-8 FOU@, Be met mke h i 8 own decisions withc~uthesite "-ona Be m u % iarw: wr-aara ~ a t hm apperaaca, c r f c-ne fidence in h i 8 own judgmrt,

4 bowled=. He muat have a ~$WSI.@ . i f ~ X jobs He l p s ~ t BLILQw h i s S t a o t i c s , H e mat &AVO -thing whid a w r himi t o " I a u k m a t i c a l l y accept@$.b~ h k r M men a8 B a t f s t t d t o g u d e t h m , He m u t b 3 v h l r j2k % - & g6L?@+
5. Bairnear. He m u t r o t a t e duties and m i s s i o a s ~ He muat show no p a r t i a l i t y b He narst be f a i r minded. He mast hava a o a u e of beireaer. Be muat be h w but mt allow personal a m t i o n s t o affect the p e r f a r ~ ~ a n cof him duticas. e

6. S e l f - c o n t r o l . He must show a c h e e r f u l f r o n t under t h e most t r y i n g c o n d i t i o n s . He must never g e t e x c i t e d . He must n o t show h i s r e a l f e e l i n g s a t t h e end of a hard day. He must be a b l e t o keep from blowing h i s t o p i f something goes wrung. He must have t h e utmost c o n t r c l of h i s p e r s o n a l emotions. He must be c l e a r t h i n k i n g .
7. Care of h i s men. He must make t h e men f e e l t h a t 'he is doing h i s b e s t t o h e l p them. He must s;ieak up ( a n o t h e r one s a i d ' s t i c k up*) f ~ hit! I?&L, E3 - r i n t e r e s t e d c a r e of h i s men.
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5, U J ~ C Z : rie nelsc ? - x i . : E-3 *mn :> L ~ B B r w g ~ r t l t i o n s . He must never a s k h i s men t o c a r q - o u h e;*111~~-3n mauld n o t be w i l l i n g t o u n d e r t a k e himself. he He
must be a b l e t o c a r r y o u t any t a s k he a s s i g n s h i s men. Be must be with t h e men a t a l l t i m e s i n combat. He must not, expose himself u n n e c e s s a r i l y o r permit h i s men t o do so. H e need n o t expose himself f o o l i s h l y but must be i n t h e f i g h t w i t h h i s men. He must have courage and sometimes p u r p o s e l y d i s p l a y i t a s an example.

9. P e r s o n a l i t y . s h a r i n g t h e i r common personally. He must f r e e t o come t o him, h i s superiors t o h i s

He must i,S?'- the confidence and f r i e n d t i h i p of h i s men through We :.ika t o f e e l that he i s one of us. He musb know n i s Len lot. understand L ~ B job of every man under him. If Lhe men d o not f'eei he i s nut a i e a d e r . He must n o t c a u p l s i n o r b e l i t t l s o r a t t a c k men. He ,lz:isr; encoilrage, r a t h e r t h a n nsg.

10. Keepigp, men i r f o r m e d - He s h o u l d o r i e n t t h e men 8.s t o %he s i t u a t i o n and miss i o n , One of t h e best p l a t k a d e s e we e v e r had always t o l d u s e v e r y t h i i l g he knew absut what was going on.

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
b,+.~*iene,rs~'. ~ publish& r e N - 1 3 69- f3;i.s h e i , 5 ; i , ~ r $ m 8 emblts iia.Q.&e $~ .e the &te@t s r p e r h o ~ e e si Q%= :-roopr nm! %f&&R,~g: d : h &L~hou& t h e experaseces 02 c a - t s h u i be r - a p a r t i c u l a r Pacat n >;,n rt ehtihatiags, &he itams publishei-: w ~ i ' ne.n~sm.~iHy p % ~ a b B teo a l l u d t ~ ap i.5 be thoso -b&e& p e g t i o a l snpsrianoe gz;, rec a d d far;. 3zardul e o a e i d ~ a r : ~bn y - u h t a , wDi& m;; e n m u t a r BMLW r ~ b l w , 3 e p ) ~ 2 f t c a r r i i i x r a t i r e or c o a t r m g exp ~ ~ parianoes m e p a r t i c u l a r l y deeired i n order e h e the L.,-&2idftyP t h e indicated beit%%@ r
p.&t$lci
$.l.t.~a

2% % r a u i n gt a

C. R. UNDON Colonel, AGD Ad jutant General
w D _ O _ e _ _ _ * w ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -

1 Redu~tion . af illb bore^, a t t m p t i n g t o enlarge 8 p i l l b o x e a a u r e e , tho s i d e 8 rpo t k t 10and 3# gum can pieroe t h e cone n a i y hare weakened $he & a s w e c r e t e r i t h i ua and U5'r r i t h ordinary a . Since r e m d e t h i s d i e c o r e r r p i l l b o x o r P m a t the ha76 been d e a l t w i t h o f f e e t i r e l y by m n e u r a r i s g SP wpna t o g e t a d i r e s t anbraaure, Otherr hare beon n e u t r a l i z e d by a r t y o r a i r . The hnf t h e n r o r h up and put8 a aatchel aharge throu& t h e embraare. When a p i l l b o x i a captured t o prevent i t 8 reoacupatioa by the a n, it muat be a m l e d or denolished. or a guard l e f t .
~ a a nis

20 H o s t i l e p.rsoruw1. @Its becaPPiog inoreaalngly apparent t h a t every a v a i l a b l e i being l u e d in t h e defenuo. E l i t e 23 troop. have been ancountered a s w e l l a s men only r e c e n t l y r e l e a a e d from h o r p i t a l a after being neriouely roundod. The i n t e l l i g e n o e of plany is q u i t e lor and t h e p s ~ o e n t a * w m - a g e mon i a high. A h a s t i l y o r e n i z e d bn of 0 candidaten alm ha8 beon encounterad,

9The eloae a i r euppost s f t h e id B l r s haa producod ex3 eelloxi% s e a l t s a e i n r t heavy enamy a r t y whi& has been d e f i n i t e l y located.
&gee

@Theset k o b r t a o l s r have beam dmmliahed by f i x e d placed by inf ar e n s s War o o r w of f i r e o r darkness. Chargee dislodge t h e a b r t a c l e s rfhP& are t h e n pu8h.d a a i d e by t k doma.--0s of V Cmpn.

4 .

1 The 3d lulPd D i r r e p o r t e d that on . 6nce from e q givilialqg and s o l d i e r s .

17 Sapt t h e i r a t t a c k received stubborn remist-

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III FUUW?l! aRCU a H DIVISIW

1 .

We&

reeirtan~e.

r e reached the Sie-ied

l i n e , 10 Sept, our p a t r o l e walked

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t h o u & without opposition. By 12 8ept the mnmay had c o l l e c t e d usotqb troop. t o ouetrm the buakgl'. d-ting t h e roa--rely* on our tePdency t o be roadbound, 9inae then amugh troop8 h a r e e r r i r e d t o oauupy a m j o r i t y of t h e pillboree. Horerec, reeiatanaa h a bean weak in wet aa.er and the garrieon w i l l t u u a l l y rusrsndaa? f f rigorou8ly attaakad. 2 Poorly orgapizd pereonnd, @Thetwo unit. facing uo hare beeta reinforced by . and 01 have no groups of s t r a g g l e s o o o l l e c t e d pa they beuame available, Saae ~ 1 0 l d i t W 4 d, kcaaledw o f tb; o s g ~ e-e %bas m d a m s t m a C L E L D ~ :&ar:iA', tBr n e a t ha&= @ t As $$.BY W E &.a@edt>led, guide take. t h e a t o a louation aad order8 than t o oceugy the a wpn. a r e oarried in, pj.1Bbax3e ic the arm and defend them t o t h e b a t h , S-t-s o t k e s 3s they a r e $surd Fn t h e pomitioru. The remulting gwrieomr its a hod-podg. of Cour~tasattacks,howwor ( mof whiuh a r e only r a i d . of mtro- patrol.) mixed unite. a r e generally ataged by good troop8 a11 3 and from t h e w unit, The MJM a t a t e of 3 dimsrganis.aticn did not meam t o e x i a t in t h e a~ty.--0-2. 28th D i r e

--

We avoid the strong d a f a u e a of dragonf. t e a t h , a t e e l gatem. 1, dace end other p a w e d dsdeneaa by uring r a n p a t r o l s ts l o c a t e t h e lanes through such

defenaer~scm8ioned by t a r r a i n feature. auuh a a streems and ravines. Through f i n d i n g rueh @ a @ , b u i l d i n g bridges, and qreparing f o r b , w@ wers a b l e t o g e t through with l i t t l e intcrrference from e m f i r e .

~ o 2. R I ~m t r Yn ~ point^. @Ourm p ovtnprintm ahor only part of t h a pillboxem a a t u a l l y present, Strong p o i n t s a r a generally located 80 a8 t o c w e r roada, t r a i l . aad f i r * A alzong point u u u aonsist. of a pillbox, 88m g m and entranehad ea l u breaks i n forest., . i n f a a t r m n equipped with a u t m m t i c wm and r f f l e e . The p i l l box i umed p r l n a i p a l l y an p Yoat e n f i r e i s delivered fram 8umounding dug in pomitiona. a mhelter f r a a our fire.. The G m n s fear being trapped i n pillbore. and do not l i k e t o f i r e from than. One GtrcPan 0 murrendsred him s o u p of 20 men, .tat* that they beceme h y s t e r i c a l in t h e p i l l b a r uadar s h e l l fir*.

3, Yrthoda of attaak. @We manemor t o a f l a n k of a l i n a of p i l l b o r e 8 and throw a l l t h e lead we a t m e U s use a r t y far t r e e burat. mar due i n poeitioee around pillboxem wherever poeeible, I n general a bn attack. with two con a b r e a s t and on* i n .uppart m p p i n g . dom, a kma of f i r e i m eatabliohed while m o t h e r 8qd or p l a t U . If a u n i t i pi& P nmnouvera t o t h e r a m of t h a e n position, U w r e e n t i r e l y aura.. aountry, b . h M our a om a r t y fire., 8taying away f r a m r o a b , trail8 md f i r e break.. Our f l r a a u8ually d r i v e t h e snsrql i n t o t h e pillboxem. If they f a i l t o m~rrarrdorwe bring up t b , TDe, IT gunr, hzookaa and 1 5 (SP) w and open f i r e a t d w a e u r e s . Thia u u a l l y b i n g o them out m but if it doem not we use t k dozars t o s e a l t h e doore and embraeurea with d i r t .

4, New ~ X % W X weeDon. @Wehave oaptured a new Geraran 888811 pieoe t h a t can be mr& ~ handled and w h i d hadl only cs 2 foot s i l h o u e t t e above g o u r d when i t a oarriage wheels a r e ~eamved, W have found 2 of theee in t h e r i a i n i t y of on9 pillbax. e
5. U.s of illb box^, @TheJ s r r i e a uae g i l l b o u o f o r mrt and a r t y OPs, It l a a mistake t o ueo t h e pillboxaa f o r our CPa o r Wm, a o J e r r y knowo exactly where they are.
6. G m beliefa. primonera ray we have two d o c t r i n e s of warfare upon d i c h they can r e l y : 'Americana mrar a t t a c k a t night and g & e r i c a ~ i g h t along rsoda I . f
our line.

a

9

8 @We have had d e f i n i t e indksatione of a i r i l i a n a bekind supplying m i l i t a r y information t o tmmgy u n i t a . @ - - ~ ~ 6 3 , 60th 1n.f. and

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. SO

2 8 SEPT I944

# b a t t l e Experiences# a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h o l a t e s t combat experiences of our troops n o r f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe.. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o all u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n a , t h e item published w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recammended f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t ion by. u n i t s which may encounter similar problems. Reports of corroborative o r contrary e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n order t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of ' t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined,

Ry command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

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I FIGKTING IN THE CITY OF BReST
Note: The following i s e x t r a c t e d from camnents of Maj Gen Walter M. Robertson, CG* 2d Inf Mv. on t h e f i g h t i n g w i t h i n t h e c i t y of Brest.

C. R. LANDON Colonel, AGD Ad j u t a n t General

1 . S t r e e t F i ~ h t i n & ; . a. The term " s t r e e t f i g h t i n g ' i s a misnomer, f o r t h e s t r e e t was the one p l a c e w could not go. S t r e e t s were completely covered by pillboxes and e r a p i d - f i r e 4 h guns, ~ i t each s t r e e t corner swept by a t l e a s t f o u r p i l l b o x e s . Our h procedure was t o go from house t o house b l a s t i n g h o l e s through t h e walls with s a t c h e l charges. b. The biggest problem was i n reducing f o r t i f i e d apartment houses s i x t o seven e s t o r i e a high; i n a number of c a s e s w b u i l t f i r e s and smoked t h e enemy out. Another a problem w s t o c r o s s s t r e e t s and g e t i n t o t h e next block, I f p o s s i b l e we found a I f not, t h e TDwsf i r e d a t p o i n t blank range and b l i n d a l l e y o r a d e f i l a d e d access. e D knocked a h o l e i n t h e wall a c r o s s t h e s t r e e t , W than covered t h e p i l l b o x e s with h f i r e and i n f i l t r a t e d a c r o s s , p r e f e r a b l y under cover of darkness. c. The Boche adopted a c l e v e r expedient t h a t slowed u s down t h e l a s t t h r e e o r If t h e y saw u s about t o break i n t o a house, they s e t i t a f i r e and delayed f o u r days. us from s i x t o twelve hours while t h e house burned out. T h i s delayed u s more than any o t h e r s i n g l e t h i n g they did. When a house was burned, a sunken p i t was l e f t , i n t h e basement, and i t was necessary t o f i l l i t with rubble before TDts could be taken i n t o another time-consuming operation.. t h e next block d. A moat s u r p r i s i n g t h i n g t o me i n t h e house-to-house phase i n the Ekest opera(SP) guns f i r e d a t t i o n was our e x t e n s i v e use of d i r e c t f i r e guns i n c l u d i n g 15ranges a s c l o s e a s 500 t o 600 yds. I t r i e d i n i t i a l l y t o keep e. Another i n t e r e s t i n g s i d e l i g h t on c i t y f i g h t i n g f a i r l y uniform p r o g r e s s along t h e l i n e t o cover t h e f l a n k s , but found t h a t it made l i t t l e difference i n t h e c i t y . Unequal progress d i d o f f e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r outflanking j u s t a s i t does anywhere e l s e without t h e same jeopardy t o our f l a n k s .

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2. Assault of Walled City. a. Another I n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e was t h a t when w g o t e a g a i n s t t h e wall i t s e l f an o l d f o r t i f i c a t i o n with modern p i l l b o x e s surmounted by shrubs and t u r f we had t o do a l o t of shooting t o uncover the p i l l b o x e s before we c o u l d knock them out. W c a l l e d it * a g r i c u l t u r a l shooting'. e In t h e f i n a l a s s a u l t of t h e walled c i t y , i t w a s t h e d i r e c t f i r e wpns r a t h e r t h a n t h e normal a r t y which supp r e s s e d enemy f i r e on t h e wall. I had t h e pldce ringed w i t h d i r e c t f i r e wpns which completely dominated t h e pillboxes. b. Before t h e a s s a u l t , I kept a slow c o n c e n t r a t i o n of a r t y and mort f i r e going w i t h i n t h e c i t y f o r 60 hours. It was a l i g h t concentration. The r e s u l t was t h a t i n t e r n a l corns, hence, t h e enemy command set-up was a b s o l u t e l y h o c k e d out and normal supply could not be e f f e c t e d . In o t h e r words, w r a n them i n t o deep p i l l b o x e s and e t u n n e l s and kept them t h e r e . When t h e a s s a u l t was made, t h e r e was no change, i n t h e tempo of a r t y f i r e except t o l i f t it at t h e p o i n t of p e n e t r a t i o n , e c. The a c t u a l r e s u l t 8 were b e t t e r t h a n I had hoped f o r . W e f f e c t e d the penet r a t i o n , f i n d i n g t h e s o f t s p o t s f o r which I was searching, and pushed a whole bn t h r o t g h .before t h e Boche, except t h o s e i n t h e immediate l o c a l i t y , were aware of it. W knocked out a p i l l b o x and p i l e d r i g h t on through without meeting r e a l r e s i s t a n c e e u n t i l w reached t h e c e n t e r of t h e city.. e d. T h i s a s s a u l t was made a t dusk, and w e moved i n under cover of darkness. T h i s was one of f o u r s e p a r a t e assaults.. The Eoche expected an a s s a u l t from the e a s t r a t h e r t h a n t h e n o r t h , and w e had t h e i r a t t e n t i o n d i v e r t e d ,

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3. Sumary.. I f e e l t h a t t h e d i v came out of t h e Brest o p e r a t i o n f a r b e t t e r t r a i n e d than it went i n , p a r t i c u l a r l y because of t h e house-to-house f i g h t i n g , which was e s s e n t i a l l y a squad l e a d e r ' s b a t t l e . To i l l u s t r a t e a t n i g h t when w 'buttoned e up' f r e q u e n t l y it would t a k e t h e co camdr from three t o f o u r hours t o l o c a t e a l l p o i n t s occupied by h i s squads i n apartments, basements, e t c . Leadership of NCOts was develope t o an a s t o n i s h i n g degree. I found t h e Brest o p e r a t i o n an i n t e n s e l y i n t e r e s t i n g one, and I t h i n k t h a t t h e men did t o o , because t h e y were a b l e t o supply e f f e c t i v e l y a superi o r i t y of f i r e power and see t h e inmediate r e s u l t s ,

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TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 51

29 SEPT 1944

* B e t t l e Experiences* are published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat e x p e r i e n c e s of our troops n o r f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n ~ u r o ? e , Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s , t h e item8 published rill be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recommended f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. Reports of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of the i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s a o n may be determined. camnand of Weutenent General BRADLEY:

C . R . I.ANmN Colonel, AGD A j u t a n t General d

I

FlEmPmY O 4 2 MDFfTAR BATTALIONS F .

n e have established dpe f o r 4.2 mort, when atohd, due t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y t h e cml W coa have i n resupplying themselvee.. They have only i - t o n t r k s and t r a i l e r s and t o e send t h e s e back f o r am would be an uneconomical use of T. W use d i v T t o b r i n g am from t h e ASP f o r t h e s e wpns and. e s t a b l i s h a IIP c l o s e t o t h e r e g t l f i e l d t n of t h e r e g t t o which t h e mrts a r e a t c h d . a - - h j . T.M..Andrewa, G 4 , 40th Inf Mv..

"1 have m y o m m i n t u n i t which has functioned very e f f i c i e n t l y . I hare only l o s t one v e h i c l e . ~ l o l h e r s h i t have been r e t u r n e d t o a c t i o n within 24 hours. The t more m i n t done by forward u n i t s t h e g r e a t e r t h e number of v e h i c l e s t h a t can be kept i n a c t i o n . . a - - ~ t C O ~ . Dunnington, CO 486th Aaa a .
I11 PRflECTm SANDBAGS FOR TAKE
Personnel of t h e 749th Tk Bn, i n c l u d i n g t k crews, t h i n k t h a t sandbags a r e worth while even a t t h e erpenee of t h e added weight,
1. O 20 Sept a t k of Co "Am r o c e i v e d a d i r e c t h i t from a l a r g e c a l A wpn on n T t h e f r o n t of t h e t k between t h e d r i v e r ' s and a s s i a t a n t d r i v e r ' s bulges, The sandbags seemingly d e f l e c t e d o r r e t a r d e d t h e p r o j e c t i l e . The armor p l a t e was cracked and a s i z e a b l e nwell* was made but only minor i n j u r i e s were s u t a i n e d . The same t k received a d i r e c t h i t on t h e r i g h t sponson a month ago and i n t h a t c a s e a180 t h e p r o j e o t ' i l e glanced o f f causing no Y n j u r i e s becauae of t h e sandbags.

O t h e same day a t k of Co "En received a d i r e c t h i t on t h e f r o n t elope p l a t e n 2. t o t h e r i g h t and s l i g h t l y above t h e a s s i s t a n t d r i v e r ' a bulge. The p r o j e c t i l e m a d e f l e c t e d though i t gougsd out a l a r g e furrow. In t h e same a c t i o n Co .Bn received A T gun h i t s on t h e t u r r e t of another t k which was not sandbagged. The p r o j e c t i l e penet r a t e d t h e t u r r e t , k i l l i n g t h e gunner and loader and i n j u r i n g t h e t k comdr. JNFANTRY TJNK COOPERATION have reported t h a t t h e i n f u n i t s t o which they a r e atchd do not Some t k bn cs g e t maximum e f f e c t i v e n e e a f r m t h e t k s because t h e y do not i n c l u d e t h e t k comdr i n s t a f f confereaces and planning. Use of a t k comdr a8 an a d v i s o r of t h e i n f c d r can o f t e n prevent committing t k s t o u n s u i t a b l e t a s k e and o t h e r e r r o r s which may cause c a s u a l t i e s of t r a i n e d personnel and a l a c k of mutual confidence between inf and armor, i n t h e opinion of t h e s e t k comdrs. Lack of accuracy and d e p e n d a b i l i t y 01 information g s t o t h e p o s i t i o n s of our o m t r o o p s and of t h e ground t h e enemy i a holding, have 7 t h kmnd Group. sometimes handicapped t h e t k u n i t e , they report.--C0,

1. M-10 Tank Destroyer. #The high r o a r of t h e M-10 motor can be considerably s i l e n c e d when o p e r a t i n g i n c l o s e proximity t o t h e enemy by u s i n g second Gear with RPM of 800. T h i s i s hard on t h e motor, but almost s i l e n t o p e r a t i o n is obtained," --Cole L.E. Jacoby, CO 5 t h TD Group.
2, Bazooka B a t t e r i e s , B a t t e r i e s f o r t h e bazooka have not always been a v a i l a b l e , By e n l a r g i n g t h e hole i n t h e s t o c k t o hold but w have ample f l a s h l i g h t b a t t e r i e s . e f l a s h l i g h t b a t t e r i e s and r e a r r a n g i n g t h e connections t o f i t we can use them,--S-3, 120th Inf. Note: The f o l l o w i n g comments a r e e x t r a c t e d from a r e p o r t of b a t t l e e x p e r i e n c e s of h. t h e 823d TD E .

1. The Right Weapon. Choose t h e wpn f o r the job. Too o f t e n M; p o s i t i o n s a r e d i s c l o s e d by f i r i n g on t a r g e t s more s u i t e b l e f o r r i f l e f i r e . 2. Reconnaissance bv F i r e . During an i n f a t t a c k w a i n s t gun p o s i t i o n s use your MSs t o f i r e a t any suspected l o c a l i t y . I n o t h e r words r e c o n n o i t e r by f i r e . I f h i t ,
t h e e n e q w i l l scream and d i s c l o s e h i s l o c a t i o n .

3. Use your A r t i l l e r y . Remember, i f you cannot reach a t a r g e t , a r t y may be a b l e t o do so; g e t your p l a t comdrs a r t y conscious. The a r t y has helped us a l o t ,

4, Defending Towns, Defend a t o m from t h e o u t s i d e , not from within.. The enemy w i l l i n f i l t r a t e i n t o b u i l d i n g s over-looking your gun p o s i t i o n s and knock out your personnel.

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 52
3 0 SEPT 1944
' B a t t l e m e r i e n c e s n a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t conbat e x h e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p s now f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Europe. Although t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n Unit8 a t a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s , t h e i t e m s p u b l i s h e d w i l l be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and a r e r e c o m n d e d f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problems. R e p o r t s of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n may be determined.

Ey command of L i e u t e n a n t General BRMILEY:

C. R. IARDCN Colonel, AGD Adjutant General

I

RECONNAISSANCE PWTOCNS O T N DESTROYER BATTALIONS. F AK

1. The two r c n p l a t s provided by T/O f o r t h i s Sn a r e inadequate s i n c e a l l t h r e e gun cos are i n v a r i a b l y committed and each needs a r c n p l a t .
2. Ye have organized a t h i r d p l a t , t a k i n g p e r s o n n e l from t h e maint , T and hq p l a t s . P The r c n 0 cornmcmds i t . To e q u i p i t we robbed o u r r e a r echelon and C of j e e p s , r a d i o s , e wpns, e t c . W f e e l t h a t t h e b e n e f i t s have f u l l y j u s t i f i e d t h e e f f o r t .

3. Though t h e primary m i s s i o n of t h e r c n r l a t s i s t o l o c a t e enemy t k s , we u s e them a l s o t o determine t h e l o c a t i o n of our own f r o n t l i n e s . They perform t h i s t a s k by t h e following methods. The r c n p l a t sends a s g t t o each f r o n t l i n e i n f bn of t h e u n i t i t i s s u p p o r t i n g . The r c n p l a t r e a d e r r e c e i v e s r e p o r t s from t h e s e s g t s a t r e g t l hq and checks them a ~ a i n s tt h e r e g t l s i t u a t i o n map. The information i s t h e n f u r n i s h e d t h e gun co comdr and re]-ayed by him t o bn where i t i s checked a g a i n s t t h e informution r e c e i v e d by t h e dive--Report of 823d TD Bn, 3 0 t h Inf Div.
I1
BAZOOKA TEAMS.

Te f i n d t h a t i t i s a good i d e a t o holcl f r e s h bazooka teams i n r e s e r v e , s o t h a t Often t h e when t k s are l o c a t e d t h e f r e s h men can be s e n t forward t o engage them. W have l o s t e f r o n t l i n e bazooka teams a r e not a g g r e s s i v e enough because of fat.5gue. s e v e r a l of t h s s e teams because h e y were t o o exhausted t o use p r o p e r cover and movement t a c t i c s . The bazooka i s d e f i n e l y e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t t h e t k . H i t i t on t h e s i d e , do not shoot st t h e f r o n t . A f t e r i i s stopped work around t o t h e r e a r and l e t him have one, : a d t h e t k w i l l normally c a t c h fire.--Rsport of 1st Bn, 1 1 9 t h Inf t o 3 0 t h Div.

6

AS a i d t o c o n t r o l v i t h i n p l a t s , we have been l a y i n g wire t o each gun p o s i t i o n , e p r o v i d i n g t h e p l a t comdr w i t h r a p i d sure cam t o e a c h gun s g t . W f i n d t h i s more r e l i a b l e t h a n r a d i o . Also a t e l e p h o n e can be o p e r e t e d from a f o x h o l e . When we u s e of r a d i c we dismount an SCR-610 and p l a c e i t i n t h e f o x h o l e w i t h t h e operator.--Report 823d TD B t o 3 3 t h I n f Div. n

1. Prepared Mortar F i r e a . Always a r r a n g e p r e p a r e d mort f i r e s , t h a t can without obsn. Send o v s r l a y s t o t h e f r o n t l i n e c o s s o t h e y can r e q u e s t t h o s e when necessary. I n o r d e r t h a t r e q u e s t f o r fj.res can be promptly e c t e d upon, should be com from t h e mort p l a t t o t h e bn B e - - R e p o r t of Co D, 1 1 9 t h I n f t o

be f i r e d fires there 3 0 t h I n f Div.

2. Harassing F i r e . The Germans o f t e n f i r e h a r a s s i n g a r t y f i r e on a tischedule, Check your watch o f t e n t o determine i f t n i s i s t a k i n g p l a c e . It w i l l l e t you know when t o g e t low, However, do n o t depend upon i t t o o much a s J e r r y w i l l o f t e n change h i s time schedule.--Report of Co D, 1 1 9 t h I n f t o 3 0 t h I n f Div,

3. Hip S h o o t i q . "We need t r a i n i n g i n f i r i n g from t h e hip. I n s h o o t i n g t h i s way I found t h a t my tendency was t o shoot t o o high.."--Rifleman of 1 1 9 t h I n f , 3 0 t h I n f Div.

4. c l e a n &munition. "lave t h e r i f l e m e n check t h e am they have c a r r i e d f o r days. W have had many jsms caused by r u s t y c a r t r i d g e s . T h i s always happens a t t h e c r i t i c a l e time."--Sgt 9 . A . Yawes, 1 1 9 t h I n f , 3 0 t h I n f Div.

5. mzooka T e r n . "When s t z l k i n g t k s bazooka teams should be m l l covered by f i r e . The teams should be kept t o g e t h e r n e a r t h e co hq s o t h e y can be moved t o t h e p o i n t of need r e a d i l y . " - - 0 s of 3d Bn, 1 1 9 t h I n f . 3 0 t h I n f Div.
6. Counter l:?ortar F i r e . n60mm m o r t s should be a t c h d t o t h e p l a t and should move w e l l forward f o r obsn. Af'ter f i r i n g f o r e f f e c t t h e m o r t s should change p o s i t i o n by a t l e a s t 100 y d s f o r t h e e n e w w i l l u s u a l l y r e t u r n t h e mort fire."-0s of 3d En, 1 1 9 t h I n f , 3 0 t h Inf Div.

- 2 -

Reproduced4y /he fng~neer Reproduct/on Det, /2fh Army Gm;o

$ e .

$

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 53
I OCT 1944
'Battla Prpeaisncae@nra published r a & a r l ~ b7 t h i r h m d q u t r r s t o omunit8 In training t o profit frar the l a t u t earbat u p a i m o a r of our troopr acrrr righting tha Ogaanr in Brrop.. Uthough tha apariancar of uertain u i a t a n k pal'tioular location a r a not moaraarily appliarbla t o a l l &tr i n a l l sit~ti-• the itpubliehod w i l l be tho- h e a d on polaatiml a p o r i and ara roefar ~ e f u sonsideration by unit* which m y a e o u n t r r .irilar problmmo. Rapact8 l of aoerobarativa or aontrary a r p g i a m e a m a particularly &airad in ardrr that tho Validity c the indicated b a t t l e lorron may be datrsninad. d

C. R. IISQMBl Co10p.1, AaD

Adjutant b a m r a l

Div, in Th@following aoaount of the actiaas of 8 It, a ?A ?O with the 36 action nssr Bmsa, Frsnaa. in Ipid-Augut, ir u t z a a t e d f t an~aacount givon by Ur btry oaPdr, While tha 0 rar not u a r a i a i n g lem&ahip a t the t i r e ha dlap-d a tiralem - , 1 i n i t i a t i v e , rarouradulaarr aad a m1uulat.d williaqwra t o h i r own l i f e i n cedar t o gegrota the rua8088 of hi8 unit, which appmr t o ba w & b j OS rmlZati~nr
A part d t b b a t t l e group t o whioh tha it bdonq.d -8 taff i'ru 1 friandly troops. Tha It rolunt.rr.8 t o a e o w an inf patrol* Thi8 a s Paw01 loeatad r.sr iaf and a a o l m of niP. trkm. Tha m t r o l r i t h d r a bpt tb. 1 rmiU in &PI and oallad fur a r t y fire. Thir firm dartroyod four t b and far-& r troop. t o a m t h a raaipdor. Them troops to& ama. In th f i a l d r h i a t h e It . a m obrraing, oot m a than S yda fraa h k . h a p i t a t b i r o l m m ~ e O ha 0all.d f o r a r t y rim w thmm a d obtained a birwt h i t in the middla of th@ S W e killing 19 t b 20.

7

*-

to 2. 8.cord mitirat% Vpon h i r raturn t o tho CP ha war rmt t o m i d ohm. arriml%ra 1urn.d t b t a patrol w r a b o e t o i a m 4 a d nq pamiamion t o amampany it* inf at t h i r patrol in t+o* Tho It* who -8 with tha l a d i x half of tbe split m t r o l , u m d f.r a n o w fo01ud t o ohm datau . qroad Uoolr and than workd h i 8 ry baok tbro- th. uq t o N J O ~ n his unite Opn him rotha atatad hi8 Mi&t&t ha eould -t r o L to a p o d t i =

fr~m &iah he a o a d direot o b s m e d $We oa t h e road b S 0 ~ k r bccaapanied by a r a a& he m b Ma way ba& em3 located two W k B Qgarsa tka scneaerPw the r ~ a d c and apprare t id a m with B1000kQa. HB a d J ~ ~ t a rd y fire and Premgdiately m d i.iaata9y a g k t s% iePI Be obtained two d i r e c t h i t s on saah t k , but witht b s % r o p darcl diaperwed t h s Be then m l h i s m y baok t o the d s reported t h e e r a o t lomas%% hocking them outs t o spot them %or air a t t a d , Dire b d thoa o f t b B b a d f a row8 d red spa dsletroyad bath tks*

h, &%h
%B@,

The e a m a n t s below a r e e r t r a a t e d fraa en aecouat @ran by &jar AasIPe CO. 1st e of h i e etadf a f t e r a period Qf attaahPent t o the 33d

1,

Opmar

s . e m d and t o

.

le we t h e inf t o d~temainsr h a t poaitione ape tanka aan be b r o w t up t o fkFO om them, We .eve

2 a Fight* 1~ tamas, IA t&e ~ t r e e t fighting in U a p b Bad a wat d f & Tha leading t k s f'olPored with waseda the h f - t k %am By about a half bloek. fdmehirag os the eideualksa The t k s ooveeed the inf by firlng Mh i n t o t h e a ~ m e a The w i n c i p a l r e a b t a a a e encountered aoneietad of W e and A f i r e s from t h e S e e a t &set m o ~ i r m g aaodl junctionsa W oreraam t h i s by mrrsurering t o t h e i r fhxdta and rear, U grenades were used affectivaly i n t h i s fighting, Marta waFe n ~ t r o effective b e ~ ~ ~ u s s of poor sbmo
Lmf

m n arm3 urni t a upearhead a n a t taak f ole 3* Smad b Blockr acmered by f e e a t a r i t i a a l point6 e m re-onntsy by %is%@ enw t b d m e &.Be reaches the m a . 1% i s %rrpeciaUy t a t t h a t key B P i d g m Be s o grotgatedo At Liege one at niy p l a t s and a p l a t of If&% tku wwe left W i n d t o guard an w o r t a n t I b r i Q e . The G g a a n e a l e o had l e f t a p l a t t o destroy it, mile tbe Cbmmns wars drinking i n a o d e , my p l a t eeized the kid@ end, with t h e a a s i s t e n e ~ sf Belgian white &my forcee, h e l d it for two b y 8 upti1 the 9th Div rrrir& A f a z r w s to 3".r. ? bate would probably ham r e r u l t e d i e eonriderable delay. a

8. &tt& c9loW. The a b i l i t y t o fdl.ntify and die% m ba$tl. rormdr is ab h eumm importurse. The ol& pabn i n my Bn aae r e a d i l y t e l l by ths u o u d of a n arty a e b l l ar b w ~ f'rm a E f l it i r % h a t o h i t t h a p o m d or aontinue t o a& t
Ymw.
l l

w~i l ~ umnlly t a b aarer n e d l a u e , l

,P.Q

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
' B a t t l e Experiencesa a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i a headquarters t o enable u n i t s i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e s t combat experience8 of our t r o o p s now f i g h t i n g t h e ~ e r m a n si n Burope. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s , t h e i t e m published w i l l be those based on p r a c t i c a l experience and a r e recamended f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s which may encounter a i m i l a r problems. Reports of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p r i e n c e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n o r d e r t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s a o n m y be determined.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

..........................................
The 112th Engr C Bn i n p i l l b o x demolitions on t h e S i e g f r i e d l i n e has obtained a. good r e s u l t s by tanping with sandbags 40 l b charges of TNT againet each end of 4' embrasure p l a t e s . S e v e r a l boxes of c a p t u r e d 8 h mort s h e l l s , o r two l 5 h s h e l l s were ueed with t h e TNT charges i n each case, With t h i s arrangement t h e embrasure p l a t e was e i t h e r b l o m o u t o r badly damaged and t h e concrete arcund t h e emharaure badly ruptured. Two l5Om a h e l l a s t a n d i n g on end at each end of t h e embrasure w i t h 4 pounds of TN? faetened t o t h a n y i e l d e d good r s s u l t e without tamping a g a i n s t 1 ' 2 concrete and 3/8r embrasure p l a t e . be The Third A m y harr used 400 pound charges of TNT. captured am o r e x p l o s i v e s with t h e r e s u l t t h a t the doore a r e blown off and t h e roof s h a t t e r e d . The d e s t r u c t i o n is u s u a l l y s u f f i c i e n t t o r e n d e r them unusable. Another method which r e q u i r e s only one pound of explosive is t o lock o r .jam a l l openings f r m t h e i n s i d e and then l o c k t h e door and blow t h e handle o f f a i t h a amall charge. T h i e i s not foolproof a s the charge sometimss blows t h e door open. A t h i r d method i s t o eover the & i l l b o x with e a r t h by u s i n g a bulldozer. T h i s d 3 c p + i s f a c t o r y but is r e l a t i v e l y slow, Rote* The Xngr SBC. t h i a hq oonsidere t h e w e of 400 pounds of exploeive e x c e a s i v s m d does not reccamnd f t f o r g e n e r a l u s m e

R. LANDON Colonel, AGD Ad jutant General
C.

"It i s o f t e n fmgraoticable f o r a TD t o move f o r r a r d t c engage enemy t k e bec&we of dug i n AT guns. O m c h o c c a a i o n s t h e f i r e by an 1610 on a rgverse s l o p e has been n d i r e c t e d by an ober on t h e o r e s t holding up hie hand i n Pine between the TD and t h e t a r g e t . The o b s r then moves r i g h t o r l e f t u n t i l a c o r r e c t d e f l e c t i o n is obtai~m4, Sensing of over o r s h o r t m e r e l a y e d by v o i c e u n t i l t h e t k i s destroyed. If t h e o h is i n o r n e m a hgd$erow BP s h e l l 8 can be ubed a s BE may axpiode i n t B e + b Po~.~--Col.. L.E. J a c o b , CO, 5 t h T@ Gsoug.

"Be need 1/25,000 map8 w i t h t h e phase l i n e s marked on them i n 1. Mortar F i r e s . e v e r y sqd of t h e m o r % p l a t . Then by c m m m i c a t i n g w i t h bn we could f i n d out where our t r o o p s were by G ? l a i e l i n e and d e l i v e r h a r a s s i n g f i r e even when we could not g e t oban. W seldom kn:-'- f o r s u r e how f a r forward o u r r i f l e m e n a r e and of course we e c a n ' t fire."-Cpl. A.;,. p i o r , hvy wpns c o , 119th Inf, 3 0 t h Inf Dive
Machine Guge, "Make s u r e t h a t all men have f i r e d t h e hvy ba3 u s i n g t h e l i g h t we u a e ~ o f t e n e r t h a n t h e hvy t r i p o d i n t h e hedgerowsew--Lt. M G it .. R r i g h t , XIG P l a t Leader, 1 1 9 t h I n f , 3 0 t h I n f Div.
2.

IVG t r i p v d

-

3. mnke Shoes. nWe cannot g e t brake shoes f o r o u r jeeps. W have retmved t h e e 3rake shoes fram t h 3 +-ton t r s i l e r s and i n s t a l i e d them i n our jeeps.*--Lt. E. Johnson, Motor 0, l!.qth Inf, 3 0 t h Inf Div.

4. Cannon Canpany Observer. " I n hedgerow country s t a y with t h e a a a a u l t co; i n open c o u n t r y s t a y a t t h e bn C O s CT a s l o n g a s you can g s t obsn. Be prepared t o adj u s t your f i r e c l o s e t o t h e f r o n t l i n e t r o o p s but s t a y i n t h e f r o n t l i n e s when you do. Keep ccans a t a l l thesew--Lt.L.J. Kraus, P l a t l e a d e r Cn Co, 119th I n f , 3 0 t h Div.

5. Communications f o r t h e 8 b Mortar Platoon, We found t h a t by p r o v i d i n g t h e 8mort p l a t w l t h an SCR 300 we could g e t mort f i r e i n any s e c t o r on t h e bn f r o n t . R i f l e co comdrs hove SCR 3 0 0 s and can c o n t a c t t h e mrt p l a t and b r i n g down and a d j u s t C.P. Wayne, Exec, 1st Bn. 119th Imf, 3 0 t h D i r . f i r e w i t h i n a very s h o r t time."-Cnpt.
6 . C o n t r o l After Dismounting Frcan Tanks, *One of our g r e a t e s t problems was t h e conf'usion when we dismounted from t k s t o a t t a c k on f o o t , To p r e v e n t t h i s r e a l t e r e d o u r orgn t o f i t t h e number of t k s we were t o work with and p u t a complete unit on each tk. T h i s ~ y a t e m helped g r e a t l y . n - - ~ / ~ g t J E Carver, Sqpad Leader, 1 1 9 t h I n f .. 3 0 t h Inf Dive

,

7. Don'ts i n t h e Anti-tank Gun Sauad. a.Donlt set up on a c r o s s r o a d J e r r y h a s them a l l zeroed i n . b. Don't l e t t h e sqd r i d e i n t o t h e gun p o s i t i o n . Dismount and man handle t h e gun. One s h e l l almost g o t o u r t r k , gun and sqd. c. m n l t have unneceseary movement around t h e gun p o s i t i o n . A German t k ear one of o u r men, and though t h e gun waa hidden, became s u s p i c i o u e and g o t away. d. Don't go i n t o a gun p o s i t i o n b l i n d . Make a thorough reaonnaiesanoe. Mare t h a n once if I hadn't r e c o n n o i t e r e d I ' d have l e d my p l a t i n t o an enemy e t r o n g point.*-T/S& Anaya, P l a t Sgt. A Co, 1 1 9 t h I d , 3 0 t h MI. T

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END

TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 55
3 OCT 1944
aBattle Bperiencas. are pttblished regularly by this headquarters t o enable nor units i n training t o p r o f i t frcm the l a t e s t cambat experience8 of our t r ~ o p a Although the experisnces of certain units a t a fighting the German8 i n 1Rrrope, p a r t i c u l a r ~ l o c a t i o na r e not neceaaarily applicable t o all u n i t s i n all situations, the itsme published rill be tnoaa based an praatiaal axperisnce and a r e reaammnded f o r aareful consideration by u n i t s which lpay enaotmter 8iBlilar problems, a p o r t 8 of corroboratim o r contrary erperienees a r m p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n ardar t h a t the v a l i d i t y of the indicated b a t t l e l e s m 8ey be detenuined.

C. R LANDOM . Colonel, AGD

Adjutant General -----.--------------------------cus3

11 ~SSDIII m a y

m

COW

Hotat

There is given below a m m a r i z a t i o n of reports regarding C l a m XI and 1 1 supply i n combat colleoted from a number of units over 1 a pariod of f r o two t o three wwka.

1 . laa as 11 a p p l y , a. Ikapons. (1) Praetiually a l l unit8 reportiadoptad sa~rssy6taa dasigned t o a p e d up the replaaemont of wpm, In amid u n l t s the supporting ord heavy araint ao g i n s aonsiderable assistanoe alorrg this line. The m r d TD Bn reported that replaeemonts generally were r e a e i w d in from two t o three days, I n the 3rd Amd M r , the Ord medium m i n t co is kept r i g h t up with the dir and ~ ~ e i n t a i n of a i r stock of arailable item, aa does the d i r ord itself. The maint a ba of the 6th Ud D i r aarriee a mall number of extra E s . fram wnich i m d i a t a re. plaeamont oan be mad.. (2) Inf units reported the adoption of rarloua expedients t o speed the process of rpn replaasmbnt. Sam of them followt (a) In the 28th D i r b a t t l e oaeualtiea of rpns a r e phoned i n by r e g t l S-4a t o the d i r ord coo lbsn replaoemnta a r e reaeirsd the r a g t is notifiod by phone end pick8 the rpm up hmediately. , gun (b) The 2mi Inf M r 00 o8rrIu 8 &l otoak of r p ~ includirrg one 5and one 1 0 bow, ma-a are repartad by r e g t l 9-48 d i r a a t t o d i r ord mapply 0. If Bb does not Bars a rsplaorolont In stock he contacts the a d #upply 0 and arrang.8 t o gat a replaaetmnt in tins t o deliver i t t o the rsgt the aana day. When isnues are mde f r a stoak, r e q u i a i t i o m f o r repl-msnt are auhaitted iaPsdiately. ¶'ha l3kth I f bas worked out a i l a n f o r the u m of an o r a ~ ~ e t r e n g t h and a ~t (0) mmorer-artiflaor of the 8amlw oo t o operate a upn r e p a i r ahop. The 3-4 c l w t h a t t h i s acheme mws the evautratioo of a larga manbar of rpm. b . Other C l ~ a Item, ;Tb. operatian of the oupply of 0th- Claa8 1 itam I1 1

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i'

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than rpna uorka alosrg nonnal l i n e 6 and seem8 t o function s a t i d a e t o r i l y when tho nod& m p p l i e a ero a v a i l a b l e and eupply p o i n t s o l o m enough t o t h o f r o n t . C e r t a i n s p e a i a l atepa ham bean t a h n by m m units an f o l l a r a : (1) The 1 3 t h fai p l a a e s heavy anghaais on .upply d i s o i p l i n e end b s l i a r r a t h a t t h i a ha8 resrrlted i n a lare saving of e q u l p ~ b n tby reduuing t h e amounts thrown away. (2) Tha 121st Inf s t r e s s e a the r e m r e r y ob i n d i d d u a l and organizational etpipnasnt f a e a 6 u a l t i e s by m d i e a l and graros registration personnel. I n t h e 314th X i t h e rer oupply of shoes poasd 3 s e r i o w problem f o r a tW when a lo- period of operatian on f o o t through & and water r e s u l t e d i n e x w s a i r a failurorn of shoes. Their solution, which ras reasonably mcwssful, ras t o pool a l l e x t r a p a i r s amd i s s u e them t o tho m in great e a t n e d . (3) In t h e 3 4 t h Inf t h e Ila 3-48 e r e required t o make constant cheaka on d r a g . in t h e forward arecu, a s s i s t a d by Psrnbers of t h e bn A & P p l a t . Clothi= aal-d is examined f o r e e r r i c a a b i l i t y and a a n a l l stock of unit-laundered itom is kept on hand t o mat emergemlea.

a. Clasa S u ~ p l z . a. I n armcrod units. (1) The 6 t h Anad D i r follows themethods of resupply of tuel and lubricants, aceording t o t h e situation. Whon a p p l y p o i n t s a v a i l a b l e t o the d i r are aloae, re-aupply i 8 e f f e c t e d by a b o r d i n a t e uait t r b on a can-exchaqp barnis. In a moving s i t u a t i o n t h e d i r e s t a b l i s h e s a C l a s s I11 sapply point i n i t s d i r t r a i n area. (2) I n t h e 3 r d Armd M r . d i r t r k a w u a l l y k i n g forward the supplies from the U P and d e l i v e r tam t o t h e using unlts about dark. T'he d i r f u e l t r k s tnen r e t u r n t o the supply p o f i t f o r a r e f i l l . (3) I n the m d TD En t h e bn fuel t r u c k is sent forward an a a l l from the 008. The t r k is met by p l a t guides who lead it t o the p l a t CPs o r t o individual vehicles, i f practicable. Normally the d i e t r i b u t i i n is from p l a t Bs by hand-carry when the unit is engaged. b. In inf units. (1) The 2nd MI QM draws suppliee from a carps or ASP and establ i s h e s o m o r more dir dp8. The r e g t a &an from t h e m dps and e s t a b l i s h r e g t l dpa. Vehicles fram loner u n i t s r e t u r n t o the r e g t l dp f o r r e f i l l o r , on oocaeion, t h e neoded supplies are s e n t forward on a l i g h t t r k . (2) Both t h e 13th Inf and the 3 U t h Inf conebnt an t n e f a c t t h a t no f u e l t r k i a organically a v a i l a b l e t o id r e g t s . Making one a v a i l a b l e f o r normal supply a c t i d t i e s causeo no e p e c i a l concern, but i n f a s t wring a i t u a t i o n e , when two or three t r k e i r e needed, considerable d i f f i o u l t y i s oncotmtered. (3) The 134th Inf r e p o r t s using 2 2) T t r k a with t r a i l e r s (not explaining where t h e t r k s came f r a n ) t o haul t h o supplies frcm the BSP t o t h e r e g t l f i e l d t n b i r ~ . En m i n t vehicles t h e r e exchange empty f o r f u l l can8 end a l l v e h i c l e s oaning i n t o the biv are d i r e c t e d t o f i l l up t o save transportation. The bns usually have t o ground sane gasoline, i n order t o use the d n t v e h i c l e s , but seldom very narch.

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,&~roducedb fhe Eng~neer y k'eproduct;an Det, /Zth Army Group

4'

TWELFTH

ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 56
4 OCT I944
mBattle Eqmrienaosm are publiahad r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquart&. t o onable unit. in t r a l n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e latoat a d a t erperioncem of our troop. nor f i g h t i n g t h e (krmn. in Wrrope. Although tho oxpsrioncom of s e r t a i n u n i t 8 a t a p a r t i u u l a r looation a r e not neuomscrrily appliaablo t o a l l u n i t 8 i n a l l s i t u a t i c w , the itam published w i l l be those bn8ed on p r a o t i a a l orperienoe andame reaapsndod f o r o a r e f u l aonsideration by u n i t 8 r h i e h n y ornountar 85ailar p r o b l m . Roportm of corroborative o r contrary oxg.rienoes a m p a d l u u l a r l y desired I n order t h a t the be doterained. v a l i d i t y of the indloated b a t t l e l o u o a

C. R. U O mH Colonel, AGD Adjut ant 6enerdP

'=ellent mccosr haa been r e p t r t e d by tho 813th and 607th TD E m i n delivering harasriq f i r e on long s t r a i g h t roads. A p l a t of TPI -8 plaood i n position i n prolongation of t h e tangent. A cub plane would conduct an adjuetment d a i l y a t rangee betwoen e e r r n and twelrs thousand yd., m i n g tho p l a t i n f o r dir.ction. k, 24 hour harassin& f i r e at odd i n t a r v a l s and varying ran408 ma f i r e d with BE. After t h e road had been oaptured an oxmination d i s a l w o d t h a t t h i s f i r e had boon very offoctivo, Roadaide t r e e s had o a w e d air bursts; rounds s t r i k i n g t h e hard roadway had rieoohoted oausing heavy a a s u a l t i e s t o vehicles and personnel on tho roadom--C05 t h TD Gmup.

wmy nmn do not r e a l i z e the power of t h e i r own SA biro. Recently on. of our outposts of 4 men, located about 20Q 4- i n front of t h o m, mw a Cernan nigh* a p a t r o l of 8 x n mars aurore t h e i r f r o n t only about 30 yda away. Another group of 5 m enemy went i n the o t h e r direction. The outpost personnel s a i d t h a t they d i d not f i r e beeapse they were out-nubared and f i r i q would d i s c l o a e t h e i r position. BQth group. could have been ellmlnated by a few b l a e t s from the BAR and with two o r three penndes.. --PM: M T. Didelot, DLi R i f l e Co, 30th M r . .

1x1 FIGHPrnG I N O E COUm'RY PN
*Aiter f i g h t i n g i n tbe hedg~rowsour u n i t s , back i n open country, did not apprecia t e a t f i r e t t h a t t h e encould. by lang range f i r e ' , catch t h e e n t i r e eait r i t h one o burst, N w it i s neceeaary t o hare t h e scout6 and flanker8 well out. I n o m a c t i o n t h r Garmans l e t the aaauts g e t within 50 yd8 boiore f i r i n g . Aa tho p l a t waa t o o alose

i t w a s pinned down while s t i l l i n column and could mt develop enough f i r e power t o f e engage t b e e m , I w had not had t k s present .&Be careualtlee would Bare been heaqr,a - - ~ n i c e , 30th mv. GO

'on one occmion during t h e recent o p e r a t i o m , our three r i f l e aos were attaaking m l i n e t o eaah t h e enposition " *cat three s i d e s , Wire aoer w a s available and t h e o co wars put on a conference c i r c u i t . The bn eolpdr I n a t m c t e d t h e co e c d r s t h a t he would monitor t h e o i r c u i t and a s e i s t where possible, but t h a t the ehow d e f i n i t e l y belonged t o t h s co comdrs. By w e of t h e conference eironi* the oo caadrs were able t o exchange informatiaar &ad coordinate t h e i r e f f o r t s . A l l coppdps concerned believe t h a t t h i s prooed w e gmatxy aided i n t h e weedy reduction of the enp a s i t i o n . * - 4 0 2d Ea, 28th Id.

"Senior gs of u n i t s sapported by T I b a - t h s c a r t a i l t h e effiaienay af t b i r suppost by insisting upon p r e a c r i b i w detail83 of the methods t h e TD hall use t o achn campliah t h e i r Paissions, even t o the point of t e l l i n g a s e c t i o n w e t o B i g . end when not t o f i r e , The TD O. ehauld know t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s aad limitations of their o m weapons and ahsuld bo pemdtted t o employ t h e i r own mthods i n c w i n g out -signed missione t o the g r e a t e s t extent practicable.*--Regort of 701at TD Bn.

Repla~slpsnts~ Olio matter h o w badly m n a r e needed r e p l a c m n t a sholihd not They 8hould be brou43.8 i n during a m e t period i n order t h a t they may l e a r n t h e i r leaderslB A t one tima w received reglacemonta w e w were mne hn e gaged i n heavy fighting. The new men became bswildered, f r o z e i n p a i t i o n and miff-ed heavy c a m a l t i e s , * - ~ S g t Wolf, inf aqd leadwr, 30th Inf MI,
1.
be ruahed i n t o battle.

of 2. U B ~ Tank Daatroyers M Tsnk.. "TIM 8hould got be ueed e4 t k a ; they omnot firs while moving and do not hare the U s and naneurerability of the*--Repcart of 701at )

TD Bn*

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3. Bezceka Fire. "The bazooka i 8 an excellent rpn a g a i ~ th, hooser and p i l l t boxe8. Frequently enemy machine gunners located i n boasea w i l l withdraw . . bazooka hn f i r e i s directed against them. Every ran ahould be a b l e t o f i r e t b bazooka i n %he event t h a t the r e g u l a r bazooka man becoma a casualty.*--3gt % Si-r, . inb r i f l e eo, 3 0 t h EElf MI.
T 4. ? l a n . k i ~Fire. "The Gsrmma put t h e i r mall A guns d i r e o t l g t o your f m n t t o ~ draw your a t t e n t i o n while h i s 88's h i t yow. tk8 f r o m tha flank. W-a h a m f e r n s lwses when the morts smoke our f l a n k s aa w jmp off.*--Lt, 31at Tk a e .

5. Jnfornation t o Reaervm Wt. & i n an a t t a c k . l p l a t bas p a r t of t h e were thrown i n t o plug t h e gap ereated etoppsd by t h e sm A d i t a h whiah had t m T had I h o m o f i t s presence.*--Lt, 31et

*Information m a t g e t baak t o the reserve u i t reserve oo i n t h e a t t a a k on CHUEMS. wa by d i a o r g a n i z a t i m of m o t h e r unit, my flu wore stopped i t * I uould h a m avoided thi8 ob8taels Tk Bn.

TWELFTH

ARMY

CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 57
4 OCT 1944
* m t f 10 m r i e m O 8 a pub1i.M F.ad~'u thi8 h O C d ~ w t W 8 o e d l 0 t u n i t a in tralnihg t o p r o f i t e r t h e l a t e s t oaabat expsriencaa of our troop8 nor a ~ l t h o u g h h e orp.rienco8 of a o r t a i n unit8 a t a t f i g h t i n g t h o Ci.rranr i n m o p . . p a r t i c u l a r looation an not w m 8 8 a r i l y applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o ~ , tho itpublished w i l l be thoam bsrwd c p r a o t i c i l exporieme and an reoara6pd.d m f o r oaroful ooamideration \mit8 d i o h may enaourrter a i r i l a r problsr~e.. Reparta of c o r r o b o r a t i r , o r contrary o ~ i o n a e 8 p a r t i o d l a r l y desired i n ordm that tho are v a l i d i t y of tho Indicated battle loaaon rag k detuminod.

C. R, LlrblDON Colonsl, AGD Ad Jut ant General
I D I I n n -

R(rrE1 The f o l l o r i n g , & r a t t e d f r a r t h e roport of an 0 of a s e p a r a t e t k bn on an operation i n tho I t a l i a n t h e a t r o , contain8 an unusually d e t a i l e d d e s a r i p t l o n af tho m c h a n i a s of proparing and conducting a combined d n o r e f f o r t . Tho caaplete-

noas of the planning and preparation I8 p a r t i a u l a r l y notewartby. The a c t i o n inrol-d a roinforcod r i f l e 00, a p l a t of adiu tka, an ellgr dot and nino bn8 of -7. Dpoa m o i p t of ord-a f a r t h e operation, on of 1 )etiom om r o a e i ~ t cod-. . 0-4, I went i r r d 1 a t . u a f t o r dark t o t h o CP of tho i n f bo CO WQO a l e o had jwt b e n

a o t i f i o d . rn r d o a t o n t a t i v a outlimo of t b plapr of a c t i o n and ngx-088 upon a request t o higher hq t o change t h o tins of a t t a a k frca 1800 hours t o d a m , i n order t o permlt tho approaah t o be nade r i r t u a l e undor aorsr of darkneae, but with s P i f i c i e n t light t o permit t h o tankarm t o m e t h e f r i e n d l y i n f in f i o n t of theaa. The recommendation w e 8 approved.
2. plnnniwz and reconnaissanue. A t our f i r s t conference t h e i n f bn CG and I discuesed and %reed upon c e r t a i n d e t a i l . connected with t h e following preliminary ~tlPiti~ar a. P a t r o l l i n g t o d e t e d n e t h e h o s t i l e strength, obstaclee, mlne f i e l d s and avanuee of approaoh f o r both inf and t k s , b. The preparation of gag8 in o b s t a c l e s and mine f i e l d s , both f r i e n d l y and enemy, and msrlring l a n e s through then. c. Personal r c n by combs t o l o c a t e t h e prepared gape, become familiar with t h e t e r w i n and ensay positionm a n d , s e l e c t t e n t a t i v e r o u t e s f o r t h e a t t a c k . d. lS8tabli6hment of a a c a a y s b betwoen l n f and t k camdra.

e. brr-enta f o r m k e oorsr f o r withdrsnl. locratiorrs f o r #pare t k m $0 taka t h a glrcre of eq -ah light k f. ~ l o o t i n g dieabled durlng the action. o m r l a y 8 of tho f i r e -port ,plan. g . p r e p e r i w and distribut* fraa rear t o fornerd a8-bl3 4uoa8, h. lrixing a timb a c b d u l e f o r t he mo-nt ao t h a t t h e t k m wauld not i n t d e m with t h e rarohiPq inf.
h 3. p e c o n n a l s a a r , ~ , c b-3 I r e n t r i t h t h e t k oo o a r d r , p l a t e a d r , eeoh of U8 t k aorpdrs and t h e t k r a n 0, t o tho i a f bm CP whore t k and i n f a 8 disouaeed p l a ~ a l l went togqtbsr l a t e r i n t h e evening t o t b p o a i t i o n from rhfeh and operations. the i n f would launch i t 8 attaok. Ik t h e e ohom. l m a t i o n o f o r t h e t k r i r e gap and f o r a dug-in t k position, mob t k o c d r w a 8 8hom the o b j e e t i m , t h e maspeated loeation of enemy gun positiona and t h e approximate position eaeh t k rcmld take after p.seing through t h e wire. m o h t k ctmdr w a s i r p r e 8 d with t h e i r g o r t a n w of keeping h i 8 f i r e I n f r o n t of t h e advanaing id. The i n f 0 rho rss t o p r o r i d . t h e ' t k gaides worked with the t k r a n 0 on their l o o a t i o m . le returned t o t h e i n f CP and disauemd t h e a t t a a k f u r t h e r i n t h e l i g h t of what we hed learned.

o 4. pehearnala, OIL D-2 rehmar8aln w e r e held i n a r e a r area om t e r r a i n v w sinilar t o that over whioh the a t t m k mu t o ba made. The moond reheareal w a a held a t d w k in order t o aonduct it under l i g h t oonditiona @ m r a l l y sirilar t o tho80 whioh would grerail during the a c t u a l operation. A l l obtained a r e w n a b l y exact p i c t u r e o f t & attaok plan, t o include t h e mthod of withdrawel. That night re a l l m e t again and
d i s o u s e d a number of questions that had uri8on a n g t h e r o h a ~ f ~ a r,r i v i n g a t a l e a t i s f a c t o r y conolumion on a l l . Uter t h i e d l a c l w i o n , my r c n 0 took Us gulden over the r o u t e and a c t u a l l y placed than i n t h e positiona they w o r e t o take.

1 the night of O11 the g q 8 Pado in o\lr wire. T b 5 J?~e~kim e r -W t k r a n o w a i n r e n t t o t h e forward p o s i t i o n t o r w b a k t h e r o u t e and t o make c e r t a i n t h a t the gape w e r e properly mde,

6. p n a l Dtaiis, On the night before t h e aetaok my t k p l a t cardr wont t o the inf ba CP and discuaaed l a s t minute d e t a i l s r i t h t h e i n f co c c d r . Q q 8 i n t h e mlne f i e l d s w e r e albo made during tnis night and rarM r i t h white e w tape.

7. Eontrol, The t k co oomdr wont with t h e i n f tm c o d r t o tho forward CP. fraa t h a t point t h e i n f co cumdr raa i n d l r e c t r a d i o oaa r i t h the tm and t h e t k oo coadr had d i r e c t r a d i o contaat r i t h the p l a t c c d r .
8. withdraral, The e n t i r e operation worked eroothly t h e inf began i t a withdrawal the t k s sometined i n p o s i t i o n withdrawal had been cgmpleted. One t k rae h i t during t h e Since the mission of t h e operation had k e n aocaagliahed, t h i s t k , r a t h e r than attempt t o r e t r i e v e i t ,
end raa mooesaful. W u n t i l n o t i f i e d t h a t the w i t M r a r a l and ierobilizad. i t waa decided t o destroy

@ 9. As8aul.t Gnn S t l P ~ o r t . l aaeerult gun p l a t , organizad i n t o two f i r i n g btrys each of t h r e e 103m home and three medium t k 8 i n i n d i r e c t f i r i * p o s i t l o n e f i r e d under t h e d i r e a t i o n of t n e d i v a r t y FDC u n t i l S h o w . It then reverted t o the tk bn control.and brought inmediate prearranged concsntrationa i n aocordanw r i t h r e q w e t 8 of t h e wmdrs tranasritted through t h e t k bn campdr. The u e a u l t gun8 as well tw tbe t k s aidad i n t h e withdrawal by f i r i n g smoke t o f i l l gaps t h a t developed i n t b arty amen.

TWELFTH ARMY

CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 58

5 OCT 1944

# B a t t l e m - r i e n o e s l a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t from t h e l a t e a t combat erperiencas of our troops now f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n Wlrope. Although the experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n e r e not necessarily applicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s , t h e item8 published w i l l be tnose based on p r a c t i c a l experienea and are rec-ndrd f o r aareful consideration by u n i t s which may encounter s i m i l a r problem. Raports of' comoborative o r contrary erperienoes a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e indicated b a t t l e lesson mW be determined.

By command of Lieutenant General EUDLEYt

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C. R, Colonel, AGD Ad j u t a n t Gexm~al

C * wmW X b R .

IH TEIE s1

LINE

Note: Thia isaue of * B a t t l e Ehperiences* c o n s i s t s e n t i r e l y of obsm of 08 and m n of the 28th Div i n contact with t h e enemy i n t h e Siegfried l i n e since 1 Sept, The t e r 1 r a i n i n uhioh they have been operating contains many s t e e p h i l l s , samo a s high a8 515 msters, woods with t h i c k underbrush, aad streaam, Consequantly it is g e n e r a l l y poor t k country. Pillboxes a r e of 3 types some w i t h one a p e r t u r e , some with t h e A emG placements and 2 a p e r t u r e s , and o t h e r s used a s troop s h e l t e r s . P i l l b o x e s a r e of a d e n s i t y of approamately one per 100 yda i n width and depth and are mutually supporthas had e x c e l l e n t oban and an abundance of a r t y and mort support, ing. The en-

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I RIFLE COMPANIES (Comments of four R i f l e Canpan. Cammenders)
1. Wvement. *Most of the p i l l b o x e s seam t o be s i t e d f o r long range f i r e s , and onoe you g e t f a i r l y close t h e r e a r e q u i t e a f e u dead spacea through which troops aan P f i l t e r . Routes shouid e i t h e r be viewed the previous day from a good O o r a thorough map r c n made. It it3 best t o move across t h e open ground from r i d g e t o r i d g e during t n e hour j u s t before daylight. Aa an example, C B fought a l l one day and gained only o 100 yds due t o extremely heavy mrt and' M: fire.. I n t h e hour before daylight t h e next morxing they covered 1000 yds without losing a man and took b p i l l b o x e s wlzhout t h e a i d of supporting wpns.
2. S u p g o r t i w Weapons. ~ T k s r TDs are excellent supporting q o of pillboxes. They must, however, be c l o s e l y followed by i n f . The upn and sometimes w i l l p e n e t r a t e t h e a t e e l doors on a pillbox.. The a heavy p i e c e of equipment and only good f o r a s h o r t time. It only s q u i r t t o do t h e job. Conserve i t and use i t only when receseary. on another p i l l b o x f u r t h e r on,

n s for t h e attack bazooka i s a good fleme thrower is takes a s h o r t It may be needed

Cooperation with mechanized s u ~ s ~ o r t .*$men tka o r TIM a r e used, i n f ahould be deployed i n p o s i t i o n t o r i s e and advanse with them a8 they paas t h r o w t h e inf position.

3,

Inf m e t not b e allowed t o s t o p because of mort o r a r t y f i r e f o r i f loee c l o s e contact with t h e tka they are more r u l n a r a b l e and t h e demoraliziqg & f e a t ugon the enemy of an i d - t k a a s a u l t i s l o s t .

tw

4. assault tesars. .Re urn a 12 t o 16 man aaeault team. Bach man muat know h i s wpn and job, plus t h e rpn and job of everyone e l s e i n t h e team (fltbrower, dame l i t i o n charge, rocket launcher, e t c ) . W som9timbs a s s i g n eaoh r i f l e p l a t e f i x e d zone of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Each p i l l b o x bcorsra a phase l i n e f o r coordination and reorganization. I n many i n s t a n c e s one p l a t can cause 2 or 3 p i l l b o x e s t o wbutton upB by f i r i n g ' o f t e n oan continue t o f i r e through 8 m a l l slits i n t h e a t t h e embrasures, but t h e enembrasure. h n must not f o r g e t t h a t p i l l b o x e s a r e mutually supportirrg. Inalude i n your p l a n f i r e on flanking p i l l b o r n e a s well as on those t o be cusaulted,

'

5. Use of e ~ o k e . .Never f o r g e t t h a t a b l i n d m a cannot .hoot s t r a i g h t . Xake ttee of t h e 81mm mort and a r t y f o r UP and snroke, Smoke ean be uaed before the u ~ a u l t o save the l i v e 8 of your men,
f i r e rpns ( t b , 6 . I n f a n t r y and d i r e a t r n v o r t i n g f i r e s , "he supporting d-at e t c ) should cease f i r e on p i l l b o x apertures without s i g n a l when t h e i n f oat106 within 25 yds of t h e pillbox. The infantrylnen n e a r e s t t h e aperture must iaPlPediate1.y t a k e the aperture under f i r e t o i n s u r e i t s b e i l y kept closed. Two f l a n k i n g p o u p a of 3 o r 4 men each ehould t a k e p o e i t i o n i n r e a r of the p i l l b o x t o cover t h e r e a r entrance and apertures. The support sqd must look f o r , and cover with f i r e , t h e embrasures i n t h e p i l l b o x e s which are a i t e d t o support t h e p i l l b o x being attacked. The r e 8 t of the co o r p l a t should move p a s t t h e p i l l b o x and securethe ground beyond i t t o p r o t e c t t h e a s s a u l t team while it does i t s job.

7. p l o e e UP action. .A man should be worked i n c l o s e t o t h e p i l l b o x t o throw i n a fragmentation o r RP grenade. When t h e r e i n a q u i e t manent he should ahout, WHemeradPW and B W i r schutzen nichtm (We won't shoot).. I f t h e endoesn't surrender, uao r i f l e grenades o r the bazooka againat the steel door. o r q o r t u r e s . While a l l t h i a is underI way, other riflemen mast cover a l l f i r e port..
8. D i m ~ 1 tfh e enemy doen not eurrender, some men mu8t work t o t h e blind s i d e of t h e p i l l b o x and blow t h e embrasure with TNT. H t e r this, it is beat t o work f r a n t h e t o p t o place a pole chargu a g a i n a t t h e door. l e v e r allow anyone t o e n t e r the excavated a r e a t o t h e r e a r of t h e p i l l b o x an i t is always c w e r e d by a amall anbraeure b u i l t e s p e c i a l l y f o r t h a t purpoae, W e r no circumstance allow anyone t o e n t e r the p i l l b o x t o take prieonera;, make t h u come t o you, Socnetiresta t m y rill claim t o be injured, but w have found t h a t a f t e r a 8econd aharge of TWT they samebow manage t o walk e out. When approaching t h e s e p i l l b o x e s all persona should '6s warned againat 'ointment box' mines. They are very a m a l l , but very dangarous, (NOTE: T h i s mine is a m e t a l box 2 i n diameter and 1 t h i c k , It telescope8 when 8bpped on, t h u r a c t i v a t i n g t h e 3 oz w ' charge )

.

'If t h e above measure8 f a i l , a demoliticm 9. other methods of knocking them charge can be used, t k s can b l a s t i n t h e rear of t h e p i l l b o x , o r a t k doter ean oover the door and embrasures with d i r t . The UBO of t k dozer. may not p r o m m ~ c e s s f u li n the f u t u r e because the J e r r i e s are p l a n t i a g minea, some of them activated by remote c o n t r o l , a s a counter remsdy. The f l a a s throwor and pole charge method of a t t a a k proved q u i t e s u c c e s s f u l t h e one t i m we w d it, The combination a t m t e d a f i r e itr t h e i n t e r i o r of t h e p i l l b o x among som am and the r e e u l t i n g c o n f u i o n made it eeay t o clean out.

a .

iO. The 'W grenade. a J e r r y w i l l o f t e n remain i n r i i u h o l e a f t e r an embrasure :-as been blown o u t u n t i l persuaded t o leave by a flame thrower o r hand grenade. A hand grenade i n t h e v e n t i l a t o r of a p i l l b o x sometimes s t u n s t h e aoche b u t a KP g r e n a d e i n t h e same a i r s h a f t i s a g r e a t l i t t l e r e v i v e r ,
11. P r e c a u t i o n on s u r r e n d e r . * I f t h e eneay s u r r e n d e r s do n o t f o r g e t t o keep the p i l l b o x covered and throw a grenade i n each room b e f c r e e n t e r i n g ; t h e r e may be some men who d i d n ' t come out.
12. bkke them u s e l e s s . n P i l l b ~ x e 3should be demolished i i n e a i a t e l y a f t e r taking'as t h e y m y be reoccupied. S i x p i l l b o x e s i n o u r p o r t i o n of t h e l i n e have had t o be taken The p i l l b o x t h r e e times. Blowiig of t h e a p e r t u r e and a o o r s does not ruake i t untenable. has t o be c o n 2 l e t e l y d e s t r o y e d , r i g h t 5own t o t h e ground. Otherwise i f one wall i s l e f t s t a n d i n g i t l e a v e s a p l a c e t o f i g h t from, T n e r e f c r e , saieorie s h c u l a f o l l o w c l o s e behind with t h e e q u i p m ~ n tt o c m p l e t e l y d e s t r o y t h a a e pillboxes.

13. P r e p a r e f o r c o u n t e r a t t a c k . * a f t e r t h e p i l l b o x i s taken e v e r y m e ~ m s tdeploy t o t h e f r o n t and f l a n k t o guard a g a i n s t c o u n t e r a t t a c k and be prepared f o r t h e r a i n of mort and a r t y f i r e t h a t always follows. Con I t bunch up around p r i s o n e r s . Send most of t h e n t o t h e r e a r a s quickiy a s p o s s i b l e , because we have had J e r r y shoot h i s own men r a t h e r tnan l e t thern b e taken p r i s o n e r s .

14. When t o p r e p a r e , 'Attacks should s t o p i f p o s s i b l e a t l e a s t one hour b e f o r e d a r h e s s , even earlier i f p o s s i b l e ao a p r o p e r defense can be s e t up; t h e Z e r r i e s w i l l push a s t r o n 9 c o u n t e r a t t a c k j u s t a f t e r d a r k and i f you a r e n o t organized t h e y w i l l pash you o f f your hard-won ground. 15. .Where and how t o p r e p a r e . nIf you a r e t o occupy t h e p o s i t i o n d i g ycur men i n &-cud and i n between t h e pillbc,xes. Zae t h e ; i l l b o x : as 5 r . s s f 2osiLion tc r e l i e v e y = ? r men from t h e i r f i g h t i n g p o s i t i o n s . Can't l e t the enand c c x i t e r a t t a s k m d z a t c k ysu bmched i n a p i l l b o x . Enemy combat p a t r o l s may send one c r two men around your f l a n k tc kncck o u t your M G e when t h e y a t t a c k from t h e f r o n t , Do n o t become so i n t e r e s t e d in f i r h g pa t h e m i n a t t a c k t h a t yc;a n e g l e c t t o wa"Yrk 3:mr f l d i z ~2 re=.
"man c o u r t e r s t t a c k s have been made a u r l c g dark1 0 . Smashing t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k . neaa and preceded by a 1st of s c r e m i n g and t a l ~ i i g , It I s ~ e r v a - r a c k i n gt c t r o c ? s t h a t know they do n o t have a w e l l organized p o s i t i o n . I f , however, t h e t r o o p s a r e i n a stxmong p o s i t i o n and experienced, i t inerely makes them a l e r t and -she a t t a c k u s u a l l y s u f f e r s . o C m i l l u m i n a t i n g s h a l l a a r e good against t n e s e a t i a c k e . hold your f l r e u n t i l , ' c r y canes i n c l o s e , then cut h m down in your FPL. Use 2 l e c t y of grenades, f r a g m e x t a t i o n axd Wken he r e t r e a t s f o l l o w h b with f i r e and y o o r i f l e fr-entation grenades#

17. General rules. Tlie r e g t h a s found t n e follc,wir;g g e n e r a l r u l e s applicable in o u r zone 1 a, P o l e o r s a t c h e l charges must c o n t a i n a t l e a s t 3 C l b s mT. b . B e s a u l t teams cannot be g i v e n just one p i l l b o x b u t rrarst be prepared t o t a k e whatever p i l l b o x e s a r e i n t h e i r zones. This i s because m p a do n o t skow a l l xhe p i l i b o x e a . c, SP T s a r e e s p e c i a l l y v a l u a b l e i n f i r i n g 0:: l;i41boxes f a r t h e r away t h a n t k o s e unD d e r immediate a t t a c k . Towed TDs and AT guns a r e of Less u s e due t c enemy a r t y anC 30rt fire, 6, Smoke i s d e s i r a b l e only i n s a n e i n a t a n c e s , e. Light a r t y f i r e h a s no e f f e c t on p i l l b o x e e , b u t time f i r e causes persc:rael arc!m2 t h a n t o r e t i r e inaide. f . The flame thrower i e used very l i t t l e . Er m o s z cases t h e meo carrj-ing i t a r e ~ o i a b l e t o g e t w i t h i n good f i r i q d i s t a n c e .

-3-

,Qsssult c o s cannot t a k e t g e t b e t o d e s t r c y o r occupy p i l l b o x e s ; t r c o p s i m e d i a t e l y i n r e a r c% t h e a s s a u l t bn s h o u l d mop up and occupy t h e grcund.
g.

16. E;xEtnple. The f o l l o w q example o f a r i f l e co a t t a c k occurred on l j S e p t : a . UWe a t t a c k e d a h i l l on which were 3 p i l l b o x e s . Due t o heavy f o g , o u r TLs could not f i r e b u t by 0730 we were w i t h i n 50 yde o f t h e p i l l b o x e s , b. V e t h e n moved c l o s e encugh t o t h e p i l l b o x e s t o b r i n g f i r e on t h e a p e r t u r e , causiw i t t o c l o s e . T i i s t w k e BWSi and a couple o f rifleoler,, '#hen t h e a p e r t u e was c l o s e d w moved around t o t h e back o f t h e p i l l b o x . Thoee men n o t g a r % o f t h e a s s a u l t s e c t i o n e m v e d o u t beyond t h e p i i l b o x e r and s e c u r e d t h e h i l l which was o u r o b j e c t i v e . The a s s a u l t teaa3e were l e f t t o reduce t h e p i l l b o x e s . Tha teams then c l o s e d i n on t h e p i l l b o x e s from t h e rear. W c a l l e d f o r t h e Germans t o s u r r e n d e r but they fired a few s c a t t e r e d s h o t s in e r e t u r n . We t h e n f i r e d two bazooka r o u n d s i n t o t h e doors e t t h e r e a r of t h e box. T t e bazooh and a c o u p l e 3 f hand grenades thrown through t h e a o c r s b s o ~ g h 2tkim oilt i n t h e oper. e T~2i.a happen& t o t a of t h e p i l l b o x e s , W had f o u r p r i s o n e r s from c n e and six from t h e ~
other. c. "t Tl $bird p i l l b o x , however, p r e s e n t e d a b i t of a roble lea because t h e e n m y r e e fused t o come o u t of it. A couple of bazooka rounds f i r e d a t t h e d o o r s and a c o u p l e o f hand g r s r a d e s thrown through t h e d o o r drove t h m f r o n one room t o a c o t h e r . F i n a l l y t h e y were d r i v m i n t o t h e room h e r e t h e a p e r t u r e was and a s n o r t b u r s t cf t h z flame thrower b-wught trim c;ut. We l e f t t h r e e men i u t h e v i c i c i t y cf t h e : i l l b o x and. t h e r e s t o f the men m v e d up with t h e i r p1atoon.u

1. Tracers. V y u s i n g o n l y a few t r a c e r s a t t h e begimi,ag cf each b e l t w e have fom.d t h a t t h e g a s draw l e s s a r t y and rnort f i r e t h a n by u s i n g t h e usual 4 a n c Z l o a d . Sane NCOs b e l i s v e we should e l i m i n a t e t r a c e r a l t o g e t h e r .
2. Close s u p p o r t i n g machine wns. ' n t h e a t t a c k we have used a s e c t i ~ n heavy I of i n s u p p o r t cf each a s s a u l t co. T h e i r m i s s i o n i s to p r o t e c t %k.e $ l a r k 2 of t h e bra. When t h e atttzlck succeeds t h e y may come up c l o s e r t o ccursr t h e s s o r g ~ - ; i ~ w i t i o n t h e o b j e c t i v e . cc *en t h e a T t a c k is resumed t h e y drop back t~ carry o u t t h e i r f l d s e c u . r i t y mission. If t h e y g e t t-,:,q close t o t h e a s s a u l t co t h e y cannot accomplish t h i s a n d they draw nort. c r a r t f i r e on t h e a s s a u l t t r o o p s . A f t e r r e a c h i w a f i r a i o b j e c t i v e we l i k e t o draw t h e B I G aect i o n a into t h e c e n t e r o f t h e two E o r a ~ r d cos mL l ~ t h e U C s take t h e fl . e ! a , t

3 . brig rawe machine guns. BThe o t h e r p l a t o f I-lhriCa should i f m s s i b l e foPlvw t h e a s s a u l t c o s n e a r o r i n *cnt of t h e s u p p o r t co. 'Ihey should be g i v m t h e missior? of i o n g range a n d cverh-d fire, They mst not f i r e u n l e s s t h e y have a t a r g e t ; t h e y .mst c o t u s e t r a c e r s ; t h e y must change p o s i t i c n a . f t e r a few b u r s t s ; t h e y n u s t g u t one s e c t i o n abcve t h e o+,her when ground pr;:.its; t h e supp9r-L co rmsi. p r o t e c t i L a - c w i t h a sqd fro= s h e aupp o r t p l a t ; t h e p l a t lcn' mist bs g i v e n f r e e d o n o f m v e m e ~ ta n d t e c i s - o r ? by tkie c c ccn(&, e s p e c i a l l y a s t o a i s p l a c i r i forward.
4. Lacnine wns f ~ s r p p c r t r i f l e company_. V f t h e s u 2 p ~ r tc c i s cor,mittcd w e seized t i m e s a t t a c h t h e l o o g rerize and overhead p l a t o r &t least a s e c t i c n o f i t t c ; t h i s c u , ~f one s e c t i o n g c e s with t h e s a p ~ c r tco t h e remaining s e c t i c n can c o n t i n u e t h e lorig ra-nga GI: ~ v e r h e a 6rnf.esicr, ~ r 2(5 ~ i l ~ v eforward t o tLe c : ~ e l e j r e c . ky :;,",c ' 2 d h e a v i e s t f ~ e r:r sL:p~c.rt; , i t by f i r e from vhere i t i s ,

5. bhchine gun3 i o defense. When i t has b e 5 2 n e c e s s a r y t c defead we have f o ~ x i d it q u i t e difficult t o establisl: f'icah g r o t s c t l . v e i i r s s b e c a ~ s ?r,f the h i l l y terraii;. Ue have p l a c e d t h e M u t o p r c t e c t f i l e f l a n i c s a;d evexoes o f a&i.rsacb i ~ t c u r positicns, .& a rear s l o p e d e f e n s e seems t o be t h e zest p r a c t i c a l as extremely e c c a s a t e a r t y f i r e a a k e z a forward s l o p e almost u n t e n a b l e ,

,

6 . C o n t r o l o f m o r t a r s . ~ c o n t r b io f t h e 8 h m o r t 4 p l a t 1s by SG? 300. Giving tfie p l a t l d r one of t h e s e s e t s p e r m i t s each mort o b s r with a r l f l e s o comLr t~ c a l l f o r f l r e d i r e c t , o v e r t h e r i f l e co SCR 300. The hv wpna c o conidr e x e r c l s s s any n e c e s s a r y cont r o l by u s i n g t h e SCR 300 o f t h e bc c m d r ,
7. Displacement. MThe mort p l a t l d r r m s t be g i v e n g r e a t freedom of 5 e c i s i c 2 a8 t o movement. He d i s p l a c e s q n s forward only when n e c e s s a r y t o remain i n c l c s e s u p p o r t as t h e movement of am i e a d i f f i c d l t problem.
V p o n r e o r m n i z a t i o n t h e 81mm p l a t moves up D e a n . 8. Mortars i n r e o r g a n i z a t i o n . t h e c e n t e r of t h e bn zone and i s immediately p r e p a r e d t o l a y p r o t e c , t i v e f i r e s , o r h i t t a r g e t s of o p p o r t u n i t y . W k e is r e a d y i f needed and r c n i s made f o r f b r t h e r moveme~it. I f t h e f i n a l o b j e c t i v e i s reached, d e f e n s i v e f i r e s a r e g i o t t e d acd s e c u r i t y especiali s gut out o r requested. l y t o t h e r e a r and f l a n k s

-

-

9. E f f e c t i v e n e s s of m o r t a r f i r e . W e have found o u r HE heavy w i l l n o t e . l W n a t e pillboxes. I have eeen d i r e c t h i t a on them i n e f f e c t i v e . Hcwever, a round o r two of smoke around them w i t h a f a r rounds of l i g h t r i g h t behind c a u s e s c a s u a l t i e s among t h e enemy whc seams t~ always p l a c e a gun o r twc o r a few covering P i f l e n e n around a p i l l b o x o r an emplacement, Also we f i r e on t e r r a i n above o r dominating a p i l l b o x t h e enamy w i l l be found t h e r e alcro. It i s a l s o a good i d e a t o throw some smoke on a h a y s t a c k o r z l u r q o f bushes on a r i d g e . W have l o c a t e d s e v e r a l enemy OPs i n t h e s e harmless l o o k i n g p l a c e s , e

-

10. 3 s e of p e r s c u e l . U t h e a t t a c k we u s e t h e i n s t r u m e n t c p l s f o r I n . The p l a t s e do not send a r u n n e r t o co. They 'need e v e r y man. W u s e t h e T c p l s and d r i v s r s a s c a r r y i n g p a r t i e s when needed."

1, Targets. #!The 5 m AT gun h a s been used t o p l a c e f i r e on t h e r i a g e l i n e t o the 7 m F e a r of t h e a t t a c k i n g i n f and on embrasures o f p i l l b o x e s a n d t a r g e t s o f o p i o r t u n i t y , T a r g e t s o f o p p o r t i m i t y i n c l u d e d h a l f - t r a c k s , p e r s o n n e l , M G s , AA g u n s , m o r t s and AT wpz6.
2, P r e p a r a t i o n needed. WThe towed AT gun h a s l i t t l e chance o f g i v i n g any c l o s e - i n s u p p o r t to t h e a t t a c k i n g i n f u n l e s s t n e amount of enemy f i r e frm mort8, a r t y , AT gum, and AA guns can be g r e a t l y reduced by a thorough a r t y p r e p a r a t i o n and v i g o r o u s counterbattery fire.

3 . HE needed. I f i r e on t a r g e t s of o p p o r t u ~ i t yr e q u i r e s a c o n t i n u o u s supply of FA. The use of Qp f o r t a r g e t s of t h i s n a t w e is r a s t e f i a l axid x u a l l y of l i t t l e e f f e c t . @
IV
INFAKEFtY GAKNON
(Cornants o f W r L o n b p a n y Commander).

1. S e l e c t i o n of p o s i t i o n s . 'It rnust be remembered t h a t when a p o s i t i o n i s s e l e c t e d i t must be one t h a t p r o v i d e s a wide s e c t o r of f i r e and a l l o w s d e l i v e r y of c l o s e - i n f i r e f o r the front line. I n one i n s t a n c e R mask prevented u s from f i r i n g c l o s e - i n f i r e s ,
making n e c e s s a r y a change i x i g i n pcsiotcns, W s l a c s e l e c t o u r p o s i t i o n s s o t h a t i n e t h e event o f a c o u n t e r a t t a c k we ca;l p i a z e f i r e on t h e p s i t i o n occupied by our t r o o p s . i A l t e r n a t e p o s i t i o n s must be s e l e c t e d b:cal~.~€?f m c h n i g h t f i r i n g i a done t h e enemy w i l l soon l o c a t e your p o s i t i o n .
2. Use of time f i r e , @Wehave F i z e d a, hzrge encunt o f time f u z e . It i s a n e x c e l l e r t method of a d j u s t i n g fi-rs ic ~ o o d sand in t k e e a r l y morning, e s p e c i a l l y if t h e fog i s t h i c k . W have had t o u s e ire I -,e faze GL; u e t o t h e s c a r c i t y of W smoke, e a P Time f i r e i s e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t open e:qlece--s:-~~s 7h;t stirround almost e v e r y p i l l b o x .

I n one instance one of our FOs f i r e d with 6 4 fuze with the plan i n mind of aausing a
graze buret i n f r o n t of the p i l l b o x , causing t h e f r q p e n t s t o e n t e r the aperture of the

box. This has proved suacesaful but demands a precision r e g i e t r a t l a n . not crack the pillboxes i n our sector.

S h e l l heat r i l l

3. &Laison. *It i e most important t o maintain conatant In betreen t h e gun posit i o n s and the bne - especially a t night. In t h e event of enemy a c t i v i t y a t night the C n G In O can o f f e r suggestions t o the bn S-3 a8 t o which concentrations can be f i r e d o with bent e f f e c t . The C n GO comdr should contaat the bn S-3's eaoh day and o f f e r auggeations a s t o f i r e s f o r the night and i n t e r d i a t o r y f i r e s . H should a l s o g e t t h e bn e plan of p a t r o l s and other night a c t i r i t i e e .

4. Forward Obeervsrs, 'FO's tend t o g e t too f a r forward with the foremost elements of t h e r i f l e coa. When pinned down t h e F cannot observe and often cannot use O the SCR 300 because the long mtenna draws a d d i t i o n a l f i r e . We ham used the method of l e a p f r o g g i n g from one point of oban t o the o t h e r and have been able t o d i r e c t f i r e t i t on enemy ~ p ~ . - ~ ~wheno in presents i t e e l f . W have adjusted f i - e through FO1s ex; e clusively since w arrived i n France.

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5. P i r e aontrol. 'The SCR 300 is very e a t i s f a c t o r y f o r com 'between obsr and gun position. A r e l a y s t a t i o n was necessary only when the r a d i o s were masked by g u l l e y s e or denae mode. W are experimenting with 610ea, mounted i n jeeps, a s r e l a y a t a t l o n s one 610 a t the gun position and one near t h e bn CP a8 r e l a y o n
V
PKE3OI;LINC AND JXlTLJJGBJCE (Comment8 of I n t e l l i g e n a e Officers)

1.. Canmon mistakes,

a.
b.

c.

flm have f omd camon p a t r o l l i n g e r r o r s t o be: Returning without accomplishing mission. Engaging i n a f i r e f i g h t contrary t o ordere. Failure t o send prompt r e p o r t s of r e s u l t 8 t o higher echelons.

2. Remedies, .To eliminate these d i f f i c u l t i e s , t h e r e g t ansigned p a t r o l l i n g simple ones a t f i r s t , gradually inareaaing i n d i f f i c u l t y and missions f o r each night importance. Schools ware conducted behind the l i n e s t o t r a i n inexperienced men.

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3. Help f r o a p r i ~ o n e r e , 'BP?, found 2% valuable t o w e the 1/25,000 map with t h e e a defense overprint t o f a c i l i t a t e gin-poin%fna?;of p o s i t i o n s by G m n prisoners. They could point out + h e i r pillboxes and tho- oacapied By t h e i r comrades.
P have watobd Oeneanr rePDain in p i l l b o x e r 4. Observer information. @OurC 0-8 f o r aeveral days, c d n g out only t o get food from f i e l d s m d farmhauses. The G w n o a8 w i l l get c a r e l e s s i f t h q do not know you are observing and w i l l start f i r e s i n t h e pillboxes and mods. They occasionally shoot f l a r e n f r a n the p i l l b o x e s t o help them spot patro1s.n

VI AMMMITION AND PICSES4 PUTOOlQ PRACTICILS (Camento of Platoon ~ a d e r )
1 Battalion distributinct ~ o i n t r , .We keep eaoh c o t s em loaded on t h e i r o m wpn . c a r r i e r s . I n t h i s way we c a n e s t a b l i s h a forward D1P and a r e a r DP. The forward CB is is some distance behind with the balance of usually close t o the bn C . The r e a r P t h e bn vehicles. 2. W r y i n g partiee. *We t r i e d pack boards but t h e men d i d not l i k e thsm. The carrying p a r t i a s can carry as much i n both arms, and i f i t beaomsa neaesaary t o f i g h t , i t i s easy t o drop t h e i r load8 and take up t h e f i g h t . Carsying p a r t i e s hare been iolraed fram replacements going forward t o t h e cos.

3. Ammuftion reserve. m~ever- e t your feessve am g a t lor on the ta, l time the ASP was n i n e t y miles from our p o s i t i o n ,

bt o m

4. ? i r i s i o n of d u t i a e , divided t h e mi end pion pa a t 2nto three groups. Ore sgd operates the m$ne & t e e t o r s , One is w e d as %Q am sqd ant) the o t h r is u s e d for o t h e r p i m duties* The En Cot's vehicle and m d l c vehicle ' k t P e a mine d e t e a t o r . The d r i v e r e have been t r a i n e d i n t h e i r uss 80 they aaa aheck suepected meas.?

1. Snpplp ser~eaxats, *We found i t adaisable t o have supply a g t e r i a i t t h e i r co C once daily regardless of t h e d i f f i c u l t y i n getting h a k and fcrth* P 2.
Supply by carrying p a r t a .

*%he s i t u a t i o n generalby required ~ a m y i a g8uppPPea

fran 400 t o 1500 yds t o t h e troopr. A p r i o r i t y of supplies waa e e t up rn follorrrg 0 x 4 , am, r a t i o n s , PX r a t i o n s , blanketa and s h e l t e r h a l r s s , K - l materiale, new clotlnirig, and water. Water r a a given l o r p r i o r i t y b a a u s e of i t 8 weight, The water augply problem was ~ o l v e dby t&hg forward empty eaaa and a c h l o r i n a t i n g s o ~ u t i o n . tSss f i l l e d t h e s e water a m 8 from nearby streams cnad p u r i f i e d their r a t e r with the c h l s r i n a t . 3 . ~ eolution. RigB: lossee i n water cans waa experienced as a r e s u l t sf shell fragments and P4: f i r e , .

3. papply requests. *Requests f o r s u p p l i e s by carrying party m a t b m a d s 24 honra in advance; the i n d i d d u a l making t h e reoatzest m u t be i a f o m d of the p r i o r i t l e a a s t h a t ha can properly proportian Ufl rrsqueata,
4. Formation of carrying p a r t i e s , *Normalby carrying g a r t l e w COKB be mde up Of ons h i t w w neceeaary t c form a separate co d e t a i l s bat due t o h e a v c m a l t i e s i ~ bn carrying p a r t y , c o m i e t i n g of drivers, s t r a g g l e r e , and m e n replaaemento, It wae found by t h i s $n t h a t it t w k 60 nrsn t w o t r l p a n i g h t l y t o raeupply t h e i r unit. TBs idea cf using replacements f o r carrying p a r t i e a f o r r a r d p s a ~ s deucaesaful as i t Boon aacustorned them t o opwatlng in t h e d m h e s e end to f r o n t :lac f:+~n.'*f tiom,

5 . Farrying blanket r o l l s , *The p r a c t i o e of going i a t o a s a i t i a l p~aessof a c t i o n without a one blanket r o l l a t l e a s t , i n t h i s r e a t h e r , proved a 8~rioueh-iaag. !&ken i t became necsseary t o m v e r o l l s forward under combat conriitisns it was found t h a t t h e m a t e f f i c i e n t system was t o r o l l a s m n y blaakete and nisceklaneoua s i z e s of ahoes, i f neceeaary, i n t o a one-man load r a t h e r than s i n g l e blanke% r o l l s o r sqd r o l l s . Yersonal a r t i c l e s mmt nevor be included i n rolls s i n c e t h e r o l l s c r s frequenzly r e - r a l i e d by personnel o t h e r than the owner.
6. E e c t f o n f o r aarryina p a r t i e e . *Carrying p a r t i e s saould aeves be allowed ts operate without riflemen f o r p r o t e c t i o n and t h e s e r i f l e guard8 should not be cargo bearera of any s o r t . One bn operated carrying p a r t i e s succeesfully by organizigg them f o r r a r d and sending thcrm t o rear, r a t h e r than t h e reverse.*
VIII MEDICAL ~A~

EXPB?3ENCE3 (CoPrments sf Roglmenta W g e o n )

I. A I e t a t i s n radios. *We h a e a r a d i o i n eech m a i d a t a t a s 9 operating i n t h e i r ~ l i t t e r bearers t o r e s t f r a p u e n t l y and r e e p e o t i m bn n e t r . This h a s enabled us t o pe-t remain on a d 1 at t h e a i d s t a t i o n i n r t a a d of continuouely esarshing t h e f i e l d f o r c a s u a l t i e s , ~ a c h l a able t o a a l l f o r l i t t e r bearera as required. The l i t t e r bearerr co

r i d e fcrward an t h e jeeg as f%r aa p o e e i b l s , t h e n go on f o o t t o t h e c a s u a l t y and b r i n g him t o t h e jeeg which g e t s t h e c a s u a l t y r a p i d l y t o t h e e i d a t a t i o n s If t h e r e are nnny c a s u a l t i e s t h e l i t t e r b e a r e r s e s t a b l i s h a c o l l e c t i n g p o i n t a t a p o i n t a c c e s e i b l e t o t h e jeep, and t h e jeeg ambulance t h e n Can q u i c k l y t r a n s p o r t t h e P a t i e n t 8 t o t h e a i d station.

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a h o t h e r o f our p r a c t i c e s i s t o e s t a b l i s h t h e bn a i d a t a t i o n where 2. p a c u a t i , , , , t h e ambulances ce- come t o i t , I k r i n g p e r i o d s of heavy c a s u a l t i e s t h e l i t t e r b e a r e r s of the o o l l co a- used ahead c f t h e a i d a t a t l o n t o h e l p clear t h e f i e l d . W b s l i e v u e i t would be d e a i r b l e t o have r e g t l corn t o t h e s u g p o r t i n g c c l l C O D Such can would a l l o w -t t h a n t h e u n c e r t a i n method of ambulance I n which i s a o t . a l w a y a more a c c u r a t e co, s a t i s f a c t o r y in r e p i d moves,@

bX

COLBEJNICAl'IOE.'

( C o m e n t e of R e g b e n t a l Chxamnicatioe O f f i c e r

h A d d i t i o n a l F ~ ~ O B @ 'We issue two e x t r a ~CR'300st o each bn, one f ~ t r e AT p l a t of t h a h q co a&. one f o r each bn a i d s t a t i o n . %en c n p l a t s are a t e h d t o bna each p l a t i s g i v e n two 300s and they e n t e r t h e bn n e t . 'Ibia p u t s t h e cn p l a t s w i t h i n r e a c h e of a l l co csmdrs a s w e l l a s t h e bn comdr. W are going t o g i v e our r e g t l s u g an 284 t o c a l l t h e c o l l co f o r o x t r a ana aces when neededsa

1. Generrl. #The g r i n c i p l e s of a s s a u l t i n g f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n s as tal-lghe a t t h e l h g i n e e r School and a t A s s a u l t T r a i n i n g Center i n t h e :J;.K, are sound. T h i s was damna t ~ a t e dwhen s n a t t w k p i n which i n f , a r t y , t k s , SP Bw-bl?l$,m ! . i engra ware we19 coordin a t a d , succeeded beyond e x p e c t a t i o n s , It d i f f e r e d from o u r a s m u - l t t r a i n i n g fa two r s s p e c t s , the J a r r i a s were t h e r e and t h e f o r t i f i c a t i o n s were more than p i l l b o x e s , they were f o r t s ,
2. D e s c r i p t i o n of l a r g e p i l l b o x . #In large p i l l b o x e s , wall8 aad r o o f a a r e s i x t o seven f t t h i c k and t h e rmofs are r e i n f o r c e d w i t h 128 1-beema. There a r e u s u a l l y f o u r t o seven rcoms, al-th heavy c ~ m e c t ~ n t e e l doorsh . & b r a s c a . p l a t e s a r e 4)~a t e e l , h sg pole charge won't eAuays d r i v e t h e J e r s i e s c u t . 'iTe b:ew one box f r w t h e i n s i d e , u a i n g 330 l b s of TlfjT p l a c e d i n an i n n e r room, and after t h e explosiora a J e r r y walked o u t .

Use of e x p l o s i v e s . W h d e s t r ~ i c t i o nof ficnt line m g l a c m e ~ t si a e l o n , h c k Te 'nrea;rir,b work f o r t h e e a g r s , k x p l o s i v e s mst be c s r r i e d i n , u m a l l y crawled in. W e ha-gs dsea packboards borrowed from t h e i n f , 1.Be haversack f o r d e n u l i t i o n block bl-I. these a r e e x c e l l e n t ar?d sand bags s l u n g i n p a i r s cvsr t h e _shoulders."
; I

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TWELFTH ARMY CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 59
5 OCT 1944
mmmttla bcperisnom. a m publinlted r e g u l a r l y by t h i r headquarters t o ennbla unit8 la t r a i n l a g t o p r o f i t f r a tbe 1ata.t oombat argariencas of our troops now f i g h t i n g t h e c 3 o n ~ 1n m p a . Although the eqxwioncea of c e r t a i n u n i t 8 a t a i ~ applicabla t o a l l u n i t 8 in all 8 i t u a t i o n a , p a r t i c u l a r l o a a t i o n a r m not n a a a ~ a r i l y tbb itam pnbliahod rill k tho80 batad on p r a c t i o a l axperienoe and an raegp.ynded f o r c a r a f n l oonsidaratioa units which aay enocmntar a i m i l a r problem. RaPQFt8 of w r r o b o r a t i r s or contrary eqnrriencas are p a r t i c u l a r l y &sir& in o r d a t h t t b r a l i d i t y of t h e 1ndioat.d b a t t l e leraon re^' be QtaFsliW. a of ~ i e u t e n a n t General ERADLQr

C. R. m n Colonel, YID Adjutant General
, , , , , , - , - - , - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - L L L L L L - - -

1 . .When a t k on whiah id i r r i d i n g I8 Inroekd o u t thm id ahcmld i r p e d i a k l y mmnt a w t h e r tk. So more than 4 parp rhould r i b on one tk. A g r e a t o r ~umborrry p r e r s a t mvammnt of t h e turmt When t k 8 attnek i n r a m 8 t h e machine g ~ n n a s n i tk8.m--GO Co ., B . t h e r e a r t k s must be careful t o a m i d h i t t i n g tho m n on t h e 1 33d m m. w
.when m w inf on th. r a a r do& of 7atr t k 8 through t o m u k mre that 2. t h e t k r l a r e a r do not f i r e their borr garu 88 t h e b u l l e t 8 rill gl8noo o f i bulldl438 .and i n f l i c t o r n r a l t i e 8 w y your o m id..--Lt, l 31nt Tk B . 4

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1. *The a f f e c t of delay f u s e on prepared e n s q p o a i t i o n a wan not appreciatad -ti1 reoantly. Obnra reported t h a t when delay fuze w a s naed i n a coneantration i t out i n t h e o m end enough r i c o c b s t r were present f o r a a m a l t y brought t h e end e f f a c t . It is k l i e r s d t h a t i n f i r i n g a g a i n s t dog I n p o r i t i o n s a t l a a a t 9% e l q should be used e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e lwditm and hoary o a l i b e r r . The enemy d w o u t a with overhead c o r s r could a a s i l y w i t h 8 t . n d t h e e f f e c t of t b e and impact b u r ~ t e , bnt t h e delayed a a t i o n b u r s t s t o r e i n t o t h e p o s i t i o l u and brought.tbb epaqy out.

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m 2 . medim a r t y t and a l i g h t bn t a d ug on s e m r a l oeaaaionr f o r g r e a t e r . A caaualt7 e f f a c t . liter l o o a t i n g a bunker t h o ~ I X bn would f i r e a r o l l e r of delay M tuze t o dsirs t h e a n e w i n t o t h e open. The list bn would f i r s t W a h a l l i n t o t h e area about 30 second8 1atar.n--LC?.ktoard Report from I t a l y .

nmery e f f o r t wna made t o have FOB n n l i z o t h a a r a i l a b i l i t y and ralw o f t b varied c a l i b e r w m within their m a t o r . Pmaision a d j u s W n t 8 of U n horn w e n mada, p durfng pamrw8 I n tne attack, an p i l l b o x e r , bunkered h o m e and o t m r obataclae that would hold qg t n e next advanoe of the in?, Light and medium a r t y would have l i t t l e e f f a a t OR streh tug.ts. A t f i r e t obers seldcm tnought of ar realizod t n e a a a i l a b i l i t y of any guns exmpt tnose of t h e i r o m unizs. Latar they callad f o r a aaliber t o taka ear@ of t h e job t o be done. The i n f oaught on too, and on 8mver.l oaoasiona requested f i r e by aaliber. The use o r h e a r ~ lc a l i b e r a r t y i n c l o s e o?qporting destruction a s aiona i e a bQ help i n breakin& d o m enresietanae.*--AGF Board report from I t a l y .

1, n and mart smoke are inraluabla doring daylight, but I am a f i n a believer i n t h e uao of n n a t u r a l amke', 1.0.. t h e periods of low r i S i b i l i t y i n e a r l y morning f i g h t 8 stubbornly a t longar r6mgos. but his rill t o f i g h t and l a t e e r s n i w . The enquiokly diaappeara a t the b q o n e t point. The choapeet way t o g e t from IC range t o ust h e o m e r of darkness of e a r l y morning a+i l a t e evening bayonet range is d a t a , I am not r e f e r r i n g t o a caaplicatad night a t t a a k , but d t h e t a e t i a of using & perioda of l o r r i s i b i l i t y f o r approaching enpositions. I bn aomdrs a r e enthus i a s t i o over tais a y e t s r and f i n d t h a t it lessens t h e e f f e c t of t h e enemy's mutual supportf i r e s and prevents e a r l y dirreipation of our e t r i k i n g forae.

*In one inetanoe I had two G o e n r i f l e cos which needed a s h o r t , auccesaful 2. f i g h t t o weld them i n t o ccmbat units. I d e l i b e r a t e l y held then i n r e o e r r s although t h e i r objective was obrioru moat of t h e day, because the open t e r r a i n thFough which they had t o pass t o reach t h a t o b j e o t i n ms c-ded a by the f i r e of a etrong point i n the zone of an adjoining rogt. Ilhen l a t e i n t h e day t n i e strong point had f a l l e n , these t w o new coa quickly and cheaply pursed through tho open t e r r a i n under corer of l i a i t e d r i s i b i l i t y and took t h e i r o b j e e t s ? . ~i~ e an experienced o u t f i t . They a r e l k good r i f l e cos now--both they elad I know.l--CO, 121et In?.

1. mchlne gunners, 'kst machine gunners f i r e too long b u r s t s . i n exoesaivu e k e , duet, and scamtimea steam, thereby diaolosing the t i a n , Suoh l o w burst8 a l s o r e s u l t i n wild f i r i n g unleea followed by The r a t e of f i r e rhould not be reduced, but b e t s of not more than 5 B oe e f f e c t i t s . pr

This r e s u l t 8 gunner's poeire-laying. rbunde a r e

2. E o t i f i c a t i o n of jumboff timq. 'Higher hq should always n o t i f y adjacent m i t e i f a c e r t a i n u n i t doer not jrrap off on ti- when making a coordinated attack. F a i l u r e t o do t h i s haa remilted i n near d i s a s t e r t o u n i t e which a t t a c k on time. Ano.ther mistake often made i e t h a t of attaoking a t the samg hour every day f o r aamraa4. days --Jer'ry soon g e t s r i m and g e t s set a t t h a t hour.*--C0 1st Bn, 26th Inf, 1st Diva

Repmducedby Engr Repro Def 1 . 6 , 24

.

TWELf TH ARMY

CROUP

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 6 0
8 OCT 1944
' B e t t l e Experiences* a r e published r e g u l a r l y by t h i s headquarters t o enable u n i t e i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t frcra t h e l a t e s t combat experience8 of our t r o o p s now f i g h t i n g t h e Germane i n IPurope. Although t h e experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r location a r e not necessarily applicable t o a l l units i n a l l e i t u a t i o m , t h e items published w i l l 6e those baaed on p r a c t i a a l experienae and a r e recamended f o r c a r e f u l consideration by u n i t s which may encounter similar p r o b l u u . Reports of corroborativm o r contrary experience8 a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y desired i n order t h a t the v a l i d i t y of t h e indicated b a t t l e lesson may be determined. camand of Lieutenant General BRADLEY*

..........................................
* W i n g an a t t a c k against a f o r t i f i e d hill t h e ao c d r of t h e reserve co brought h i s co i n t o t h e l i n e a t 0700 hours. He personally l e d a t t a c k s with SA, hand grenades and bayoneta u n t i l wounded i n the aplp a t 1000 hours. Refusing t o be evaouated he l e d another a t t a c k and waa cut o f f . Tha Germans demanded h i e surrender and upon h i s ref u s a l attaaked. Standing up hs k i l l e d four Oennans, f i r i n g hi8 aarbine with h i e good hand. He continued t o lead t h e a t t a a k u n t i l 1800 houre when moat of t h e h i l l w a s c l e a r , and then went t o t h e O and adjusted a r t y f i r e f o r two houre before he allowed P himself t o be evaauated-*--Extracted f r u n an 8 t h Inf document.

C . R. .LANDON Colonel, AGD Adjutant Oeneral

OPrnbTI014S

IN THE SIEFRIED LD'q

1. Prior planning. *Using t h e mosaic eupplied by corps, supplemented with oblique photoa, eaah co i n the bn.conetructed a sand t a b l e r e p l i c a , t o s c a l e , of i t 8 zone of action. lill 08 and HCOs studied it u n t i l thoroughly f a m l l i a r with every d e t a i l . b s s a u l t teams were a l s o rehearsed on s i m i l a r t e r r a i n i n t h e r e a r . 'Fhia t r a i n i n g proved invaluable..*--C0 1st Bn, 117th Id.
UM 2. p i v e r croaaing. *In our area tba W R River has very ateep bank. 6 t o 7 f e e t 5 high and i a about 3) f e e t deep and 10 t o 1 f e e t wide. To f a c i l i t a t e cronsing by troop8 s e v e r a l three-section foot bridge. were construated, 12 f e e t long and 2 f e e t wide. m o seationa were placed a t a s l a n t , one on each bank, extending from t h e bottom of t h e r i v e r t o t h e t o p of the bank. The t h i r d s e c t i o n wae plaaed ae a bridge between t h e other two.*--CO, 1st Bn, 117th Inf.

3. Breechiwc wire. *The only r i r e obstacle found along the German border cons i s t e d of two rows of double apron fenae with concertina between t h e rows. W blew e gaps i n i t with 4.2 morte using 703 rounds of HE t o make two gaps.'-4-3, 3 0 t h XS Div. I

4 Trenches o u t s i d e of pillboxes. * W s t p i l l b o x e e had foxholes f o r W e dug on t h e t h r e e a i d e s not covered by an embrasure. Riflemen were found i n most of thoour a r t y and f i r e a p p a r e n t l y having prevented t h e W 8 from being occupied b o u g h t up.l--+3, 3 0 t h Inf Mv.

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5. ~ e f e n s i r ef i r e e . * I f r e q u e n t l y have my a r t y bn CO prepare t h e f i r e p l a n f o r t h e employment of a l l upns l a r g e r t h a n t h e 81mm mort, t o include t h e i n d i r e c t f i r e s sf t h e 4.2 m o r t , AT co and TDa. Thi8 procedure saves d u p l i c a t i o n of e f f o r t and make8 f o r b e t t e r coordination of f i r e s . * - 4 0 9 t h Inf Regt..

*Regardless s f t h e i n i t i a l formation, i t i s not e e e e n t l a l t h a t t k e and i n f keep t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s i n an a s s a u l t . A t k must s t o p t o f i r e e f f e c t i v e l y but t h a t be stopped by b f i r e and i f t h e G i e t h e time f o r t h e i n f t o p r e s e on. The i n f x& enemy A defenses are i n e f f e c t i v e t h e t k s should p r e s s on. Both armrs must r e a l i z e T t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t one s t o p s is not n e c e s s a r i l y a reason f o r t h e o t h e r t o atop,*-Report of XIX Corps..

IV ~gcmT3NM)US COMMENTS
1. S n i p e r s r i f l e , # I f e f f e c t i v e use l a t o be made sf t h i s wpn t h e s n i p e r must be considered a e p e c i a l i s t not a f r o n t l i n e rifleman. Snipers 8hould be oarefizlly s c l e c t e d and not allowed t o t r e d e t h e i r r i f l e f o r an M-1 b e c a u e of its g r e a t e r f i r e p o w e r , * - - ~ ~ , 1st EZI, 26th 1nf.

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2. Successive enemy a t t a c k s . ' I f an enemy a t t a c k a g a i n a t a u n i t on nty f l a n k is r e p u l s e d , I always g e t o u t my em a s he rill u s u a l l y h i t my p o s i t i o n s next. On one occaaion when I w a s defending a l a r g e h i l l t h e enemy a t t a c k e d succeeeively every pss i t i o n on t h e hill.*--CO, 1st Bn, 26th I n f ,
K1 r i f l e . *The Oermans have a v e r y healthy r s s p e e t f o s t h i s wpn. Markmaras h i p t r a i n l a g should emphasize well-aimed s h o t e , increaeed r a t e of f i r e , and t h e use of erlings i n aombat. If you s e e a J e r r y r h o doee not s e e you, t h e r e is no reason f o r haaty unaimed fireel--CO, 1st E , 26th Inf. b

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4. Use of a t a a l t h , *A s u r p r i s e a t t a c k by t h e inf without t k s w i l l o f t e n catch e s p e c i a l l y when i n c l o s e contact. The noise of t h e t k s warmfng t h e enemy unaware n up warns him of t h e impending a t t a c k . O one occasion after a tk-ixd a t t a c k had f a i l e d , I a t t a c k e d t h e next morning i n a s l i g h t ground haze withaut t k s o r a r t y m d 1st Bn, 26th I n f . caught most of t h e enelqy asleep..l--0,

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5. Telephone l i n e s , , *We always c u t a gap in t h e enemy s i r e . Usually r e a r e a b l e t o p i c k up a p r i s o n e r who is eent out t o r e p a i r t h e line..*--CO, 1st Bn, 26th Id.
6 . J,eaderehi~. *The preaence of h i g h ranking 0 s bn, r e g t l and d f v comdfs well forward g i v e s men confidenee. They reason t h a t ' i f t h e o l d man l a up t h i s f a r , W should be f u r t h e r ahead ,r--C0, 1st a, 6 t h drnd Regt. e 3

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7. ~ e r m a i v i l i a n e , 'It ie SOP in t h i e u n i t t o aend a l l m i l e civilieuns t o t h e e p 1 aaage f o r questioning. Recently I aent back two men who were peasaing through our l i n - m n d at turrmd out they r a r e both German 8oldiers.n--C0, 1st E , 36th b h %gt,