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Human Terrain Teams: Reducing US Military Presence in Iraq and Afghanistan

(DOONESBURY © 1986 G. B. Trudeau.) Cut by Zane Ryan Schwarzlose,

Table of Contents
Preface..........................................................................................................................................3 Suggested 1AC.............................................................................................................................4 Storytime................................................................................................................................15 Harms.....................................................................................................................................16 Inherency................................................................................................................................17 Solvency.................................................................................................................................18 Advantage..............................................................................................................................20 AT: Topicality............................................................................................................................23 AT: “Military Anthropology”....................................................................................................24

All, This is a case stopping the use of Human Terrain Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. It’s good. The plan text reduces the presence of HTT’s and gives their institutional support to the Army and Marines for cultural training in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since this is far from a standard reduction in military presence, most of the generic disadvantages for this year are going to be advantages to this case. (Shhh.) For this reason, I’ve only cut one innocuous, systemic advantage based on the impacts of eroding the ethical standards of anthropologists. Once the 1NC beams at you after reading her 5 disadvantages with nuclear scenarios, calmly stand up and link turn every one. The most common challenges you’re going to have on this case are topicalities on “substantially,” “reduce,” and “military presence.” If you’re bad at topicality don’t run this case. Even though these HTT use some civilian anthropologists, your answers to topicality need to be: “These people wear Army fatigues, carry M-16’s, receive military training, and answer to military commanders.” Some of the we meet evidence concerning mercenaries will help you in this respect. Second, your interpretation of “military presence” needs to be “physical troop presence.” Hence, even though you’re increasing the military capability of the Army and Marine’s cultural training programs, you’re decreasing the military presence of the HTT’s. Finally, this program was a sacred cow to the now-departed General McChrystal. Here’s to hoping that General Patraeus won’t wreck your inherency. Your partner in crime, Zane Schwarzlose

Suggested 1AC
Let’s start with the story of Marcus. Dan Ephron, and Silvia Spring. "A Gun In One Hand, A Pen In The Other :The Army is spending millions to hire 'experts' to analyze Iraqi society. If only they could find some.. " Newsweek 21 Apr. 2008: ABI/INFORM Global, ProQuest. Web. 21 Jun. 2010. Marcus Griffin had never been to the Middle East before he arrived in Iraq last fall, as part of a project to help the U.S. military decipher the country's intricate social nuances. An anthropologist from Christopher Newport University in Virginia, Griffin knew much more about the Philippines, having accompanied his social-scientist father on a two-year research project there as a teen. In Virginia he'd been studying Freegans, those superenvironmentalists who forage for food in restaurant and supermarket Dumpsters. And so, during a recent outing with the unit he's attached to in Baghdad, Griffin rummaged through the trash of an Iraqi sheep rancher, looking for patterns that would tell him something worthwhile about the neighborhood and by extension, about Iraqi society. Well, they're drinking a great deal of Pepsi, he said dryly to a NEWSWEEK correspondent. When a man in a checked kaffiyeh emerged from one of the homes, Griffin peppered him with questions. Where did he get his electricity? (A generator.) Did his children attend school? (No, they're too young.) How did he make a living? (From his sheep.) Though he wears Army fatigues and carries a gun, Griffin is a civilian, part of a controversial program known as the Human Terrain System. According to a Pentagon blueprint from 2006, the idea is to recruit academics whose area expertise and language skills can help the military wage a smarter counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. These specialists, among other things, are meant to map the population of towns and villages, identify the clans that matter and the fault lines within them, then advise U.S. commanders on the right approach for leveraging local support. But implementation of the $40 million project, which was handed to British Aerospace Engineering (BAE) without a bidding process, has fallen short, according to more than a dozen people involved in the program and interviewed by NEWSWEEK. Of 19 Human Terrain members operating in five teams in Iraq, fewer than a handful can be described loosely as Middle East experts, and only three speak Arabic. The rest are social scientists or former GIs who, like Griffin, are transposing research skills from their unrelated fields at home. For their services, the anthropologists get up to $300,000 annually while posted abroad a salary that is six times higher than the national

average for their field. (The teams also include some active-duty service members who are paid their regular military salary.) Most team members admit they are hampered by an inability to conduct real fieldwork in a war zone. Some complain that the four-month training they underwent in the States was often a waste of time. Matt Tompkins, who returned home in January after five months in Iraq, said he thought his team provided helpful input to its brigade, but the contribution was more superficial than planners of the program had conceived. Without the ability to truly immerse yourself in the population, existing knowledge of the culture ... is critical, he said in an e-mail. Lacking that, we were basically an open-source research cell. Recruitment appears to have been mishandled from the start, with administrators offering positions to even marginally qualified applicants. The pool of academics across the country who speak Arabic and focus on Iraq, or even more broadly on the Middle East, is not large to begin with. Some of the best potential candidates probably grew leery of the program when the American Anthropological Association declared participants would most likely be violating the ethics tenets of their profession if they signed up (because they would be contributing data that could be used in military operations). Several team members say they were accepted after brief phone interviews and that their language skills were never tested. Contention One is Inherency First, the US military administration is emphasizing external programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Human Terrain Teams are an example of this shift in focus. James Denselow, June 11 2010, The Guardian, Scholar soldiers in Afghanistan are on dangerous terrain The competency and capability of our civilian war effort has been put into a sharp focus by Barack Obama's decision to have a "smart surge" into Afghanistan. General Stanley McChrystal is clear that the military component is only part of the solution and that a key ingredient to the success of the new counterinsurgency strategy is the use of civilian, not military, power. One of the US military's experiments with harnessing civilian power has been the creation of human terrain teams (HTT). This embedding of social scientists into military brigades to provide cultural understanding and intelligence has received little coverage in the UK while in the US it is seen as one of the most controversial aspects of the war. The logic of the emergence of HTT is a simple one. The now defunct "war on terror" found itself fighting among civilian populations with illdefined frontlines. If the cold war was the war of physicians, some argued that post-9/11 manifestation of a cultural clash of civilisations put social scientists at the heart of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Second, the leadership of the Human Terrain System wants to enlarge its Teams and extend its support. These resources trade-off with those for Army and Marine cultural training. Connable, B.. "All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence. " Military Review 1 Mar. 2009: Research Library, ProQuest. Web. 21 Jun. 2010. The 15 July version of the HTS brief proposes growing the terrain teams to 10 members and greatly expanding the reachback cells. Although the cost of the program is classified, it is not difficult to determine the expense of hiring so many contractors, equipping them with computers, deploying them to combat zones, and sustaining the inevitable bureaucratic support staff that will flourish at Fort Leavenworth. As DOD contemplates making HTS a program of record, the Army and Marine cultural training centers remain staffed primarily with contractors and subsist on fluctuating budgets. There has been little to no concerted effort by the undersecretary of defense for intelligence to develop cultural intelligence training programs. HTS has sapped the attention or financing from nearly every cultural program in the military and from many within the military intelligence community. The human terrain teams have given a number of staff officers an excuse to ignore a complex and challenging training requirement. Contention Two is Harms First, these HTT “Anthropologists” are woefully underprepared and bad at their jobs. Weinberger, S.. "The Pentagon's culture wars. " Nature 455.7213 (2008): 583-585. ProQuest Medical Library, ProQuest. Web. 21 Jun. 2010. The Pentagon, however, has had a hard time recruiting and keeping qualified anthropologists. Of 35 social scientists based in Iraq and Afghanistan, only about half have PhDs, and only seven of those deployed are anthropologists. One social scientist hired to work on a HTT was identified during screening as a convicted criminal (and dismissed prior to deployment), another was found medically unfit, two were let go because of security clearance issues, and two were fired for performance issues. The company responsible for hiring the researchers is BAE Systems, a major Pentagon contractor, and some have criticized its focus on recruiting through intelligence and militaryfocused websites, as opposed to academic venues.

One of those fired was Zenia Helbig, a PhD candidate in religious studies, who says she was let go by BAE after a joking comment she made over drinks with colleagues about switching sides if the United States attacked Iran. Helbig, who travelled to Iran as a graduate student, had even met Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Now back at the University of Virginia, in Charlottesville, to complete her degree, Helbig describes a programme in disarray, in which social scientists - few of whom have regional or linguistic expertise - sat around for weeks at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas, with little in the way of region-specific training. Matt Tompkins, Helbig's fiancé and another human-terrain participant, describes other problems. As a PhD student in political science with a military background, he was assigned as a team leader in Baghdad; but the social scientist on his team had no relevant field-research experience, he says, and their de facto translator was a Moroccan who barely spoke English. As for the military commander they were supposed to be supporting, Tomkins says, "I didn't get the inclination that he was particularly interested in what we were doing." Second, the Human Terrain System approach leads to operation failures. Connable, B.. "All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence." Military Review 1 Mar. 2009: Research Library, ProQuest. Web. 21 Jun. 2010. The HTS approach is inconsistent with standing doctrine and ignores recent improvements in military cultural capabilities. American military staffs have proven capable of using cultural terrain to their advantage in the small wars of me early 20th century, in Viet Nam, and contrary to common wisdom, in Afghanistan and Iraq. Whatever weaknesses in cultural capability existed had always proven most evident at the onset of low intensity conflicts but were later rectified as warfighters adapted to the environment. These firstround failures occur because a focus on cultural training and education has yet to be sustained between conflicts. Moreover, the practice of deploying academics to a combat zone may undermine the very relationships the military is trying to build, or more accurately rebuild, with a social science community that has generally been suspicious of the U.S. military since the Viet Nam era. Post-9/11 Joint doctrine pounds away at the solution to the systemic weaknesses identified in cultural training, education, and intelligence: Soldiers, Marines, and combatant staffs must become culturalterrain experts. Cultural terrain considerations must be closely woven into the full spectrum of military training and operations. The excessive focus the Department of Defense (DOD) has placed on the extraordinarily expensive Human Terrain System has, and may continue to come, at the expense of precisely those

long-term programs that will develop this mandated, comprehensive level of expertise. Failure to refocus effort on sustainable cultural competency programs will eventually lead to another wave of first-round operational failures the United States can ill afford. Finally, these HTT’s are killing, being killed, getting kidnapped, and spying on the United States. Shut Down Army’s ‘Human Terrain’ By Noah Shachtman December 11, 2008 Wired Magazine, Danger Room Section The Ivory Tower opposition to Human Terrain only grew louder, after whistleblowers charged the program’s chief contractor, BAE Systems, with improperly vetting and training its employees. More concerns were raised, when two Human Terrain social scientists were killed in separate incidents, seven weeks apart. July’s tentative endorsement in Nature seemed to provide a counterbalance to the academic groups’ misgivings. "Outrage at the current administration should not derail efforts that have potential to be a win–win for all concerned — including, most especially, the people of Iraq, Afghanistan and regions of future conflict," the journal said. The project also won praise from American military leaders in Afghanistan, as well as from General David Petraeus, the new chief of U.S. Central Command. "The concept is still relatively new, and the contributions of the teams obviously vary based on the quality of the teams’ members," he told Danger Room, over the summer. "But a good team — and there are many — is invaluable.” Then, in September, Human Terrain social scientist Paula Loyd was set on fire during a research foray in Afghanistan. Her teammate, Don Ayala, shot the attacker — and then was charged with second-degree murder in U.S. court. Days later, Human Terrain employee Issam Hamama was indicted for spying on America, on behalf of the Saddam Hussein regime. Thus, my partner and I offer the following plan to affirm this year’s resolution: The United States Federal Government will withdraw all Human Terrain Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. All funding for these teams will be redirected to Army and Marine cultural training personnel and infrastructure. We’ll clarify.

Contention Three is Solvency First, given proper institutional support, the US Military can absorb the HTT’s mission. Connable, B.. "All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence." Military Review 1 Mar. 2009: Research Library, ProQuest. Web. 21 Jun. 2010. In an effort to address these gaps the services and DOD provided impetus to a grass roots cultural "surge" generated in late 2003 by returning combat veterans who were frustrated with cultural training inadequacies. Taking a long-term view, both the Army and Marine Corps responded to their own selfassessed requirements by creating cultural training centers. The Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center and Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning were designed to meet the immediate needs of deploying combat forces while building comprehensive education curricula in support of ongoing, sustainable professional development. Both centers have seen some limited success. The Army Culture Center has created a progressive series of short-form cultural training sessions for deploying Army troops as well as a laddered curriculum designed to be woven into existing professional military education programs. The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning has taken a similar approach, supporting predeployment programs like Mojave Viper while embedding civilian social scientists and trainers at a range of Marine Corps professional development schools. In an attempt to address gaps in cultural intelligence capability, the Army and Marine Corps intelligence schools have begun to realign in order to train both enlisted and officer students in cultural analysis. Link analysis programs designed to help tear apart Al-Qaeda or Taliban networks are now also used to track tribal and sectarian relationships. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity has further developed its existing cultural intelligence program to address the cavernous gaps in baseline-cultural data while providing reachback cultural support to deployed forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Staff training has also expanded in recent years to encompass a wide range of cultural considerations. Currently, officers with direct counterinsurgency experience who have been trained by doctorate level social scientists at professional education programs are attending predeployment staff exercises focused on cultural terrain. Military staff planning instructors facing skeptical audiences in late 2003 now struggle to keep up with enthusiastic students of Afghan and Iraqi culture: students who understand that the success of their upcoming deployments will most likely pivot on social rather than combat considerations. The author observed this paradigm shift in attitude while teaching predeployment cultural courses

from 2003-2007 and while deployed with combat staffs in 2003, 2004, and 2006. The framework now exists for sustained focus on culture. Given the proper institutional support, these training centers and cultural intelligence programs can be used to leverage the experience of both troops and staffs to create a long-term, organic approach to cultural competence. Soldiers, Marines, and officers educated with these programs will come to embody the warriors that General Charles Krulak envisioned fighting the "three block war." They will be able to successfully conduct interlaced humanitarian, peacekeeping, and combat operations in support of the kind of strategic missions this Nation is likely to face in the next 50 years. Second, Foreign Affairs Officers, Civil Affairs Units, and PSYOPS can provide the cultural expertise training of the HTT’s. Connable, B.. "All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence." Military Review 1 Mar. 2009: Research Library, ProQuest. Web. 21 Jun. 2010. A properly trained, manned, and supported team consisting of a FAO, a CA unit and a PSYOP unit should be able to provide the kind of cultural expertise that staffs found lacking in 2003 and 2004. If these advisors and special staff sections are deficient, as implied in various HTS publications, then it is the clear responsibility of the services and the commanders to better train and prepare their Soldiers and Marines so they can fulfill their roles. If there is an insufficient number of available FAOs then, as implied in DOD 1315.17, it is the responsibility of the services to create more. Further investment in the preexisting and combat-proven FAO program would show long-term commitment to military cultural competence. According to the 15 July 2008 HTS briefing, the HTT is staffed by at least two officers or enlisted soldiers with FAO, CA, Special Forces, or intelligence backgrounds. The team is led by an experienced combat arms officer. Why is it necessary to create a separate program, costing (at a minimum) tens of millions of dollars, to assign these personnel to the very staffs at which they were trained to serve? What do the Human Terrain Team FAO and CA officer bring to the table that organic FAO and CA officers do not? If HTS can find these qualified officers, why can't the U.S. military services? Contention Four is Your Moral Obligation to Affirm: The actions of HTS anthropologists are uniquely tied to the overall morality of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. HTT’s must be able to

know the intelligence they gather won’t be used to capture or kill in order for their actions to be moral. The Morality of 'Military Anthropology' George R. Lucasa, Volume 7, Issue 3 2008 , pages 165 – 185 Finally, consider a third case-variation in which the moral legitimacy of the invasion is initially in heated dispute, and subsequently turns out to be insufficient. The moral legitimacy of the insurgency, however, is mixed at best, and is certainly not like case one, a clear case of insurgents resisting aggression and defending the homeland's liberty and the rights of its citizens. Instead, it is more like case two, in which the insurgents are taking advantage of the breakdown of law and order caused by the questionable invasion, in order to avenge long-simmering ethnic, racial, or religious divisions and hatreds, or as in the case of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, foment dramatic, politically charged mischief. Interestingly, in this third case, the role of HTS anthropologists comes centrally to the fore. The invading force, seeking to minimize the impact of its mistakes, implores for help from social scientists to defuse the insurgency, stop the killing, restore order, and extricate themselves from the mess they (or, rather, their government has) made. Again, in this instance, and providing the overall 'professional' criterion (#3) has been fully met or is being fully met, the participation in HTS projects is morally justifiable. Note that such HTS projects cannot be directed toward interrogation or torture, nor can their intent, consistent with criterion #3, be to aid the invading force to capture or kill insurgents. Instead, their intention and objective is to assist the invading force to halt violence, restore order, make and keep peace, and get out and go home. To clarify: HTS team members cannot justifiably help the invading forces to capture or kill insurgents; rather, their work is to understand and enlist the aid of the local population, for its sake and safety, to restore order, avoid violence, make peace, and establish the rule of law. It would require considerable vetting by the anthropologists' professional organization to 'watchdog' this situation to ensure that these principles were being met. Where does this leave us with the AAA and its problem with HTS in Iraq and Afghanistan? That depends upon whether either of those two wars, and the proposed role of HTS anthropologists in each, is more like case one (Nazi Germany), or more like case two (Belgium in Rwanda), or case three. Now, of course, these two actual wars are like none of those three cases. But, I will argue that at least they are vastly more akin to the second case than the first, and even more akin, by design, to the third case (which is a morally ambiguous variation of the second). And in cases two and three, the matter of anthropologists serving on HTS teams is not automatically proscribed in principle (as the AAA Executive Committee originally proposed), but critically dependent upon the outcome of the larger just war argument. That is: in this case (and, I suspect, most cases), the appropriateness of social scientists

aiding and abetting government projects like HTS is critically tied to the moral legitimacy of those projects, and if those projects be wars, including wars of humanitarian intervention, or wars of counterinsurgency to topple tyrants or combat terrorism, then the moral legitimacy of HTS becomes inextricable from the larger 'just war' debate about those conflicts themselves. We offer you one advantage: preventing unethical militarized anthropology First, HTT’s violate several ethical standards of the anthropology profession. Curiouser and Curiouser: Montgomery McFate's Strange Interpretation of the Relationship between Anthropology and Counterinsurgency Jeffrey A. Sluka, Massey University PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review Volume 33, Issue s1, Pages 99-115 Published Online: 7 May 2010 Even more controversially, in 2006, the US Army initiated the HTS and began to "embed" anthropologists and other social scientists with combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan to help them gather intelligence (referred to as "conducting research") and understand local cultures better. The stated goal [of the HTT] is to provide soldiers in the field with knowledge of the population and its culture in order to enhance operational effectiveness and reduce conflict between the military and the civilian population (Wikipedia 2008). The reason the military became receptive to this kind of approach at this particular historic moment was primarily due to the combination of two factors–desperation resulting from the failure of the predominantly "kinetic" (that is, military as opposed to sociopolitical) tactics and strategies they were employing, and the entrepreneurial agency of McFate, Felix Moos, and a few other advocates of a new military anthropology, who were there at the right time to "sell" the military what they touted as a remedy for this problem. Most anthropologists oppose the HTS program as fundamentally unethical, inherently harmful to those studied, and an attempt to recolonize and weaponize the discipline (Price 2006). Many have criticized it as "mercenary anthropology" that exploits social science for political gain, warned that it will cause all anthropologists to be viewed as intelligence agents or spies, and drawn a direct comparison with the Phoenix Program and Project Camelot during the Vietnam War.7 In 2007, the AAA Executive Board formally opposed the program and denounced it as "an unacceptable application of anthropological expertise" which could lead to serious ethical problems, disgrace to anthropology as an academic discipline, restriction of future research opportunities, and increased risk of harm to both researchers and research participants. The same year, "in response to concern that such developments threaten the integrity of anthropology," the Network of

Concerned Anthropologists (NCA) was formed and immediately launched a "pledge of nonparticipation in counter-insurgency" campaign which over a thousand anthropologists have already signed (NCA 2007).8 The pledge is specifically to "not undertake research or other activities in support of counterinsurgency work in Iraq or in related theaters in the 'war on terror'." Second, the current political environment is a “ticking time bomb” of support for militarized anthropology. Weinberger, S.. "The Pentagon's culture wars. " Nature 455.7213 (2008): 583-585. ProQuest Medical Library, ProQuest. Web. 21 Jun. 2010. In one typical case in the late 1960s, a research group contacted an anthropologist about work it wanted to do for the Pentagon in the Congo. "The anthropologist immediately raised a storm," says Deitchman, "writing to the American Anthropological Association and the press that an attempt was being made to enlist him in intelligence activities for the suppression of Congo tribes in the conflict that was then in its final stages there." In fact, the Pentagon had never agreed to fund the work. Deitchman, who is now retired, sees many of the same frictions echoed in today's efforts by the military to enlist social scientists. Although he does note that Congress and the secretary of defence support the modern studies - unlike in the Vietnam era - the underlying dynamics haven't changed. "The ticking time bomb in government support of social science research is there," he says, "just under the surface, waiting for the trigger." Finally, Unethical militarized anthropology in the form of HTS researchers could be used to commit war crimes. The Morality of 'Military Anthropology' George R. Lucasa, Volume 7, Issue 3 2008 , pages 165 – 185 Imagine that a malevolent government wishes to displace a troublesome tribe from their ancestral land, so that the majority population can settle on the tribe's territory, or mine and sell oil and other natural resources located there without obstacles or resistance. Something like this actually transpired in Burma, in which the government of 'Myanmar' sought to build a pipeline from the rich Yadana natural gas field off its coast to customers in Thailand. The pipeline traversed ancestral lands of an ethnic minority in the country, the Karen, whose members (according to accounts issued by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International) were brutalized and enslaved by the ruthless Burmese regime to build the pipeline through their land.13 In our hypothetical case, by contrast, there are reasons why the government doesn't wish to appear ruthless, or cannot afford to do so (e.g., because its

own citizens wouldn't stand for it). So, it employs anthropologists to engage in HTS, with the aim of uncovering some vulnerability in the people that would enable the government to manipulate them into appearing to vacate voluntarily. In our hypothetical case, the government in fact does not care in the least about the welfare or interests of troublesome tribe members; it just wants them to vacate without incident. HTS researchers discover that troublesome tribesmen are deeply afraid of evil spirits manifest as clumps of chicken feathers. Upon receiving this intelligence from its HTS researchers, the malevolent government arranges to have clumps of chicken feathers placed where they will certainly be discovered by troublesome tribe members in numerous, apparently random locations throughout their territory. Terrified, the tribe counsel meets and advises its members to migrate away from the calamitous area to other sites provided by the government, thereby achieving the government's morally illicit aims. This case is a straightforward 'con,' and the HTS researchers are complicit in the government's immoral scheme of fraud, deception, and theft of the tribe's property. The value of those 'little stories' that philosophers tell themselves is that, in direct contrast to ethnographic accounts like Geertz's famous field notes (e.g., on Balinese cock-fighting rituals), these 'stories' are intentionally devoid of specific cultural or historical content. That does not render them empty or useless. Rather, like mathematical models or so-called 'thought experiments' in physics, they are formal, abstract. They allow us to examine the formal structure of certain circumstances, and helpfully vary the boundary conditions, independent for the moment of terribly confusing cultural specifics. And nothing could be more apt than to describe the cultural specifics, in the case of Iraq in particular, as confusing.

Case Extensions
[Cutter’s Note: This narrative is superior to the one I have in the 1AC, but I chose the Griffin one since it’s more recent.] Let’s start with the story of David. DAVID GLENNTITLE: Anthropologists in a War Zone: Scholars Debate Their Role :The Chronicle of Higher Education N 30 2007 In 2002, Britt Damon was an Army reservist assigned to guard detainees at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Station. At the time, he had eight years of experience as a military police officer, and he was slowly piling up credits toward a bachelor's degree in criminology. Guantánamo changed Mr. Damon's plans. While most of his fellow guards treated the detainees in a way that he describes as "professional but cold," Mr. Damon, a pensive, slightly built man, often fell into conversation with them. "One of the Afghans would sit down and recite the poetry he had written," he recalls. "We both knew that I couldn't understand its verbal meaning, but you could understand the emotion and the context." Mr. Damon wanted to comprehend the cultural forces that had helped lead him and his prisoner to this remote place in the Caribbean. Before he left Cuba, he decided to switch his major to anthropology. Four years later, Mr. Damon was working as a bar bouncer and taking courses at the University of Kansas when he saw an online notice: The military wanted reservists with social-science backgrounds to join a new program known as the Human Terrain System. The program would give brigade commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan detailed information about local customs, kinship structures, and social conflicts. In the military's jargon, the idea is to assist with "cultural preparation of the battlefield." As Mr. Damon sees it, that means providing military leaders with information to help them make better decisions, and, especially, to help them avoid needless violence. Early this year, Mr. Damon landed in southeast Afghanistan as a member of one of the first experimental Human Terrain Teams. He also landed in the middle of a debate that has roiled his adopted field of anthropology. Critics of the Human Terrain System say that armed anthropologists in military uniforms cannot possibly be getting voluntary informed consent -- a principle at the core of the discipline's code of practice -- from their research subjects. They also worry that the program will directly or indirectly help the military select particular neighborhoods or people for attack. David H. Price, an associate professor of anthropology at Saint Martin's University who is one of the program's most visible critics, says he fears that

the new program might someday help the Iraqi or Afghan government conduct immoral scorched-earth counterinsurgency campaigns. (In 1970 several American anthropologists were accused of assisting the government of Thailand with such campaigns.) Some critics go further, arguing that the U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan is illegitimate and that the Human Terrain Teams are helping prepare the countries for neocolonial rule, in an echo of the imperial-flavored anthropology of the early 20th century. At this week's annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association, in Washington, a special committee is expected to release a set of ethical guidelines for scholars who work with military and intelligence agencies. The association's executive board has already released a statement formally disapproving of anthropologists' participation in the Human Terrain System, and the association has -- at least temporarily -stopped accepting recruitment advertisements for the program.

HTT’s Can’t Recruit Quality Candidates Due to Ethical Concerns DAVID GLENN. "Former Trainee in Human Terrain System Describes a Program in Disarray. " The Chronicle of Higher Education 14 Dec. 2007: Research Library, ProQuest. Web. 21 Jun. 2010. The Human Terrain System -- a $40-million U.S. Army program in which social scientists are embedded within military units in Afghanistan and Iraq -has been nearly paralyzed by organizational problems, according to a graduate student who was fired from the program in August after four months of training. Recruitment shortfalls have left all of the Human Terrain Teams in Iraq seriously understaffed, says Zenia Helbig, a doctoral student in religious studies at the University of Virginia. The participants' training has been haphazard and often pointless, she adds, with too little attention given to the culture and history of Iraq and Afghanistan. Ms. Helbig was released from the program amid an investigation of her national loyalty shortly before she was to deploy to Iraq. The investigation stemmed from a quip that she made over beers late one night in June. As she recalls, she said, "OK, if we invade Iran, that's where I draw the line, hop the border, and switch sides." Ms. Helbig says her firing -- which was first reported by Wired magazine last month -- was a ludicrous overreaction to a casual piece of hyperbole. With the help of at least one senior administrator in the humanterrain program, she is fighting to expunge her security record and to clear

her name. There is even a possibility that she will return to the program, which she describes as potentially valuable despite its problems. The human-terrain program has generated enormous controversy among academic anthropologists, many of whom claim that anthropologists in military uniforms cannot possibly gain free and informed consent from the people they study (The Chronicle, November 30). Ms. Helbig says that in her four months of training, she can recall no explicit discussion of informed consent or any other element of fieldwork ethics. But Ms. Helbig, who spoke before an emotional crowd at the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association last week, says she believes the program's scholarly critics are exaggerating its actual power. Organizational disarray, not ethics, is the real story, she suggests. "By raising the series of questions that you have collectively raised," she said during the conference panel, "AAA has inadvertently given the bungling and bureaucratic military far more credit than it deserves."

The US Military is Relying on Anthropology in the Form of HTT’s to Fight Counter-Insurgency Anthropologists on the front line. By: Gusterson, Hugh, New Scientist, 02624079, 8/2/2008, Vol. 199, Issue 2667 DURING the cold war, the US Pentagon called on physics to help it gain an edge over its enemies. To help win today's "war on terror" it is calling on rather a different discipline: anthropology. It believes cultural knowledge is just as useful a tool for counter-insurgency as technological superiority. So social anthropologists are being called to the front line - a highly worrying development. The Pentagon recently announced two major initiatives to improve its cultural understanding in Iraq and Afghanistan. The first is the Human Terrain System, for which defence secretary Robert Gates allocated $40 million last September. The HTS consists of 26 five-person teams, one for each combat brigade in Iraq and Afghanistan. Each team includes an anthropologist or other social scientist, who wears military uniform and receives weapons training. They advise US troops on culturally appropriate behaviour, such as avoiding staring at Muslim women or exposing the soles of the feet to local dignitaries. They also talk to local people about their needs, provide military commanders with information about genealogical, political and religious groupings, and help these commanders work out whom they can trust (and, presumably, whom they cannot).

Foreign Area Officers, Civil Affairs Officers, and Psy-Ops Officers Can Absorb the Missions of the HTT Connable, B.. "All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence. " Military Review 1 Mar. 2009: Research Library, ProQuest. Web. 21 Jun. 2010. Both the Army and Marine Corps train foreign area officers (FAOs) and civil affairs (CA) officers to serve as political and cultural advisors to combatant staffs. The counterinsurgency manual describes the intended roles of these officers developing the cultural terrain operating picture in section 3-17. For example, it states, "civil affairs personnel receive training in analysis of populations, cultures, and economic development. These Soldiers and Marines can contribute greatly to understanding civil considerations." As another example, "Foreign Area Officers have linguistic, historical, and cultural knowledge about particular regions and have often lived there for extended periods." The Marine Corps defines the role of the FAO as follows: "Uses the language and knowledge of military forces, culture, history, sociology, economics, politics, and geography of selected areas of the world to perform duties as directed." FAOs receive years of basic and advanced language training, earn an advanced degree in regional studies, and serve an immersion tour in their area of expertise. Because FAOs are commissioned officers with service in the operating forces, they can articulate cultural advice in an operational context. The FAO community received its first real operational exposure during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Foreign area officers served as cultural advisors to staffs and commanders. The author served as a FAO within the First Marine Division forward command post. From 2004 to 2008, FAOs continued to advise staffs down to the battalion level, coordinating tribal liaison, providing cultural input to information operations planning, and offering mitigating options during intensive combat operations. However, based on prewar tables of organization and service manning, there simply were not enough trained and experienced FAOs to support each brigade or regiment. Fewer than 20 Middle East FAOs were serving in the active Marine Corps in 2003 and approximately half of those were colonels (too senior to serve in a unit) or in nondeployable billets. To support the need for cultural expertise DOD has mandated that the services focus attention on recruiting and training of FAOs. DOD Directive 3000.5 and the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, both written in response to the perceived gap in cultural capability, require the services to strengthen their FAO programs. This requirement directly supports the doctrinal requirements found in the COIN manual and is based on recent combat experience.

In response, the Marine Corps has increased the number of Middle East FAOs in the training pipeline, but it is unclear whether this step will provide me fleet operating force with a sufficient number of trained officers. The Army has a more robust and distinct program.10 It typically assigns a significant portion of its FAO community to diplomatic or military assistance missions at U.S. embassies around the world. No fewer than five Army FAOs overlapped in three-year billets at the U.S. Embassy in Jordan between 2007 and 2009." Until the Army FAO branch shifts away from diplomatic missions it will likely be unable to meet the needs of units engaged in ongoing combat operations. FAOs work closely with the civil affairs and psychological operations (PSYOP) sections, often riding along with them as unit members conduct tactical missions. Many of these CA officers also have significant cultural training and experience and have begun to demonstrate as much in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Although training regimes have failed to adequately reflect doctrine, the Army's civil affairs FM states the role of the CA officer is to, "[advise] commanders on the political, cultural, and economic impacts of planned operations and their impact on overall objectives."12 According to the HTS website, the CA staff is responsible for "developing, coordinating, and executing plans to positively influence target populations to support the commanders' objectives, and to minimize the negative impact of military operations on civilian populations and interference by civilians during combat operations." CA officers "provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on FN/?? [foreign nation/host nation] social and cultural matters." This doctrinal description almost directly mirrors the claimed capabilities of an HTS human terrain team. Both CA units and PSYOP provide direct cultural data collection, collation, and analysis to the combatant staff. Often working side by side with CA units, PSYOP teams conduct social science derived field research. PSYOP Soldiers poll and interview locals to determine the effectiveness of both tactical and information operations. Data collected in the field is input into the intelligence cycle where it is merged with classified information. The FAO, CA staff, and PSYOP leaders all have an opportunity to provide further input as the staff develops courses of action


The lack of informed consent by HTTs raised several ethical concerns of militarized anthropology. DAVID GLENNTITLE: Anthropologists in a War Zone: Scholars Debate Their Role :The Chronicle of Higher Education N 30 2007 The element of the Human Terrain System that is most worrisome to academic anthropologists -- even those who are generally open to advising the military -- is the question of informed consent. No formal institutional review board supervises the social-scientific research conducted by the civilian anthropologists in the program. The program's leaders have said that because the work consists of "interview procedures or observation of public behavior," it falls outside the federal statute on human-subjects protection. But several critics have disputed that assertion, and the matter is reportedly being reviewed by the Pentagon's lawyers. David M. Hann, coordinator of the human-subjects committee at Kansas, writes in an e-mail message to The Chronicle that he believes the program should be reviewed by an independent federal board, perhaps at the National Institutes of Health. "Allowing the Department of Defense to decide for itself whether its own research plans need review," Mr. Hann writes, "would be a built-in conflict of interest, much like if departments within a university or hospital were allowed to decide the same question themselves, rather than submit their research protocol to their university's IRB to decide that question." Despite the lack of a review board, Mr. Damon says he obtained written consent from everyone he interviewed, even if it took several conversations to explain the concept of anthropology. "The best way I could get that across," he says, "was to tell them that I'm there to learn about their culture. They're my teacher and I'm their student, and I want to know what they think and how they feel." He says he told his informants that "we are going to be using them in a published study to the military commanders, but that we'll never reveal who we specifically got the information from." At this week's anthropology conference, much of the debate will concern how the Army uses the data compiled by Human Terrain Teams. That question probably cannot be fully answered for at least another year, as more teams arrive in Iraq and Afghanistan.


Empirical examples prove that HTT’s could be used to commit attrocities Weinberger, S.. "The Pentagon's culture wars. " Nature 455.7213 (2008): 583-585. ProQuest Medical Library, ProQuest. Web. 21 Jun. 2010. Beyond the AAA, a number of researchers in 2007 founded the Network of Concerned Anthropologists, which asks colleagues to sign a pledge committing them to "refrain from directly assisting the US military in combat, be it through torture, interrogation, or tactical advice". Though there hasn't been any known case of that happening with the HTTs, historical precedents exist. During the Second World War, for instance, anthropologists helped raise guerilla armies, passed information used to plan bombing raids and theorized about race-specific bioweapons. Critics say the current work flies in the face of everything anthropology represents, from transparency of research to informed consent (for example, the social scientists on the HTTs do not submit their research to an institutional review board, as would be normally required for human research). "I don't think there's a place for embedded anthropologists with combat missions," says Roberto Gonzalez, an anthropologist at the University of California, Berkeley, who is working on a book about the Human Terrain System. "It runs completely counter to anthropology's ethical framework, something that's come about over a long, bitter period that goes back to the First World War."

Advantage Solvency

[Cutter’s Note: Read this Card in the 2AC, if you have the time.] Returning HTT anthropologists to academia solves for the ethical concerns Connable, B.. "All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence. " Military Review 1 Mar. 2009: Research Library, ProQuest. Web. 21 Jun. 2010. Each human terrain team fields at least one civilian social scientist. In recruiting these social scientists for active military operations, the HTS program staff has widened a long-existing schism between academics willing to work with the military and those who are not. The HTS program has provided groups like the Network of Concerned Anthropologists a legitimate

target in their efforts to prevent social scientists from supporting the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan. Members of this network and others contend that the civilians on HTTs are violating academic ethical standards. These standards are in many ways akin to the Hippocratic Oath: field researchers are restricted from disturbing or harming the subject of their studies. Academic critics of HTS see social scientists wearing military uniforms, carrying weapons, and providing direct input to combat staffs that may use the information to apply deadly force. The HTS managers legitimately point out that academic cultural support is most often used to reduce the necessity for the use of violence. However, whether the criticisms or comparisons are legitimate is irrelevant; the controversy is real, and it degrades the ability of patriotic social scientists who help the military through less controversial means. Many cultural anthropologists working with the military have been ostracized by their academic peers as a result of HTS blowback. The alternative to deploying academics into combat theaters is to enlist their support in training and educating our staff officers. In this role they do not risk endangering their research subjects, provide no direct input into targeting cycles, and they do not provide antimilitary elements within their own community any substantial ammunition with which to undermine the military-academic relationship. Keeping them in an academic setting will help build an untarnished and sustainable relationship.

AT: Topicality
We meet: HTT’s are ‘military presence’. They are part of infantry combat brigades and report to brigade commanders. Connable, B.. "All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence. " Military Review 1 Mar. 2009: Research Library, ProQuest. Web. 21 Jun. 2010. Centered on the Human Terrain Team (HTT), the system is both comprehensive and discrete from any organic capability found in an infantry combat brigade (the targeted level of support). It injects civilian academic and military cultural expertise into the operational staff in the form of the five-man HTT The terrain team brings its own computers stocked with software that has been contract-designed from the ground up to crunch cultural data. A reachback team of cultural experts resides at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, adding an additional layer of academic support. Although program managers sell the image of a holistic, multi-faceted system, the Human Terrain Team is the physical, tactical embodiment of HTS. The civilian academic, the military cultural experts, and the leader of the team serve as special advisors to the brigade commander, providing a separate stream of data and advice that in theory is not "polluted" by the intelligence cycle. This separation makes it easier for the managers to sell the terrain team to academia and to recruit social scientists. If HTS is not related to military intelligence, then the fraught concept of applied academics seems more palatable. The progenitors of HTS took a requirement that called for a comprehensive and sustainable solution train combat units to navigate the cultural terrain and instead created a costly quick-fix response to an immediate need. That response relied heavily on nonorganic technology and contracted support. In theory, HTS could have addressed the perceived immediate need while the services addressed the long-term programs. In effect, the fundamental flaws in the HTS concept put the system at crosspurposes with the services' short-term goals and future needs.

AT: “Military Anthropology”
[Cutter’s Note: There is some good evidence about why ‘military anthropology’ is good thing. The cards will probably sound something like ‘military anthropology is critical to reducing violence in conflict.’ Fortunately for you, these cards aren’t talking about your case. ‘Military anthropology’ means anthropologists doing studies of the military, not for the military. This card will be your link-out evidence.] “Military anthropology” is different than “anthropology for the military.” The Morality of 'Military Anthropology' George R. Lucasa, Volume 7, Issue 3 2008 , pages 165 – 185 Hence, our first definitive conclusion is that MA(1) can and must be distinguished from any and all of the various meanings of anthropology 'for' the military, and that military anthropology as the study of military culture (whatever that may turn out to mean or to be) can, should, and indeed must proceed unfettered by regulation or misguided resolution. It is a worthy, even fascinating endeavor, with potentially important outcomes, that the wider anthropological and scientific community is entitled to pursue, and deserves to study. So much for 'anthropology of the military,' the primary meaning of 'military anthropology,' MA(1). I have spent this much time on it only because of the inordinate difficulty of bringing to the surface, scrutinizing, and dismissing visceral prejudices that subconsciously taint the better angels of our (rational) nature, and that are certainly unworthy of academics and professionals whose own expertise and research is directed in part against such blind prejudices in other cultural arenas. Before turning to what I will now label MA(2), the controversial 'human terrain' projects, let me consider some of the other possible meanings of the remaining broad category, 'anthropology for the military,' that the Commission report identified. I worried that the broad, dual distinction merely between 'of' and 'for' the military was probably insufficient. The Commission report, for example, considers a third type of military anthropology that is certainly 'for' the military. For clarity, let us label this, MA(3), encompassing anthropologists who work for the government or military in a routine capacity (for example, as language educators and behavioral-science faculty members in federal educational institutions - service academies, ROTC units, war colleges, language institutes, and so forth). Although this surely qualifies as a type of 'anthropology for the military,' the Commission report seems clearly to indicate that these activities should not simply be conflated with 'Human Terrain Systems' in the current debate.