RA 6236, the very law on which Aotes
Estenzo
bases his petition to reopen the cadastral
proceedings fails to supply any basis for
respondents contention. It will be noted
that while RA 2061 fixed the time to reopen
cadastral cases which shall not extend
beyond 31 December 1968, no similar
provision is found in RA 6236 expressly
extending the time limit for the reopening
of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land
declared public land. As correctly pointed
out by petitioners, the extension as
provided for by the RA 6236 makes no
reference to reopening of cadastral cases
as the earlier law, RA2061, expressly did.
Truly, the extension provided for by RA
6236 applies only to the filing of
applications for free patent and for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles and not to reopening of cadastral
proceedings like the instant case, a
proceeding entirely different from filing an
application for a free patent or for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles.
The Supreme Court set aside the 22 July
1972 decision of the respondent Judge and
reiterating the 28 September 1940 decision
of the Cadastral Court; without
pronouncement as to costs.
Demafiles v. Comelec
Case No. 91
G.R. No. L-28396 (December 29, 1967)
Chapter 4.18, Footnote 126, page 159
FACTS:
Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due
to the Provincial Board voting to reject
returns. Petitioner challenged the right of 2
board members to sit, considering
that they were reelectionists. Respondent
Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner.
Galido then asked for reconsideration,
stating that the 2 board members in
question
were disqualified only when the board was
acting as a provincial but not as
municipal. In light of this, Respondent
Commission reversed its previous decision.
ISSUES:
1. W/N this case is moot and the board had
the authority to reject the returns from
Precinct 7.
People v.
GR L-35376, 11 September 1980 (99 SCRA
651)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur
Facts: In a decision dated 28 September
1940 by the Cadastral Court, Lot 4273 of
the Ormoc Cadastre was declared public
land. Respondent Aotes filed on23 February
1972 a petition to reopen the decision of
the Cadastral Court under Repuplic Act 931
as amended by Republic Act 6236. Aotes
claim that since the time limit for filing
applications for free patents and
applications for judicial confirmation of
incomplete and imperfect titles have been
extended up to 31 December 1980, the
reopening of cadastral cases is also
extended until 31 December 1980. The
judge denied the opposition for lack of
sufficient merit on 9 May 1972, and
rendered decision on 22 July 1972 after due
hearing, declaring Lot 4273 public land and
adjudicating said lot in favor of the Aoetes
in undivided interest in equal share of
each. Dissatisfied with the decision of the
lower court, petitioners filed the instant
petition.
Issue: Whether the extension provided for
under RA 6263 also applies to Re-opening
of Cadastral Proceedings.
Held: Under the legal maxim of statutory
construction, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius (Express Mention is Implied
Exclusion), the express mention of one
thing in a law, as a general rule, means the
exclusion of others not expressly
mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable
legislative intent, is based upon the rules of
logic and the natural workings of the
human mind. If RA 6236 had intended that
the extension it provided for applies also to
reopening of cadastral cases, it would have
so provided in the same way that it
provided the extension of time to file
applications for free patent and for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title. The intention to exclude the reopening
of cadastral proceedings or certain lands
which were declared public land in RA 6236
is made clearer by reference to RA2061
which includes the reopening of cadastral
cases, but not so included in RA 6236. Thus,
Judge del Rosario overruled the decision of
the Collector of Customs and held that dust
shields should be classified as detached
parts of vehicles for use on railways.
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge
was correct in classifying dust shields under
paragraph 197 of section 8 of the Tariff Law
of 1909, and in refusing to classify them
under paragraph 141 of the same section of
the law. It thus affirmed the appealed
judgment in its entirety, without special
taxation of costs in either instance.
1. Nature of dust shields
Dust shields are manufactured of wool and
hair mixed. The component material of
chief value is the wool. The purpose of the
dust shield is to cover the axle box in order
to protect from dust the oil deposited
therein which serves to lubricate the
bearings of the wheel. Dust guard, which
is the same as dust shield, is defined in
the work Car Builders Cyclopedia of
American Practice, 10th ed., 1922, p. 41, as
follows: A thin piece of wood, leather, felt,
asbestos or other material inserted in the
dust guard chamber at the back of a journal
box, and fitting closely around the dust
guard bearing of the axle. Its purpose is to
exclude dust and to prevent the escape of
oil and waste. Sometimes called axle
packing or box packing.
2. Burden of proof on the validity of
a legal collection of duties upon who
questions it
The burden is upon the importer to
overcome the presumption of a legal
collection of duties by proof that their
exaction was unlawful. The question to be
decided is not whether the Collector was
wrong but whether the importer was right.
3. Interpretation of statutes levying
taxes do not extend their provisions;
in case of doubt
It is the general rule in the interpretation of
statutes levying taxes or duties not to
extend their provisions beyond the clear
import of the language used. In every case
of doubt, such statutes are construed most
strongly against the Government and in
favor of the citizen, because burdens are
not to be imposed, nor presumed to be
imposed, beyond what the statutes
2. W/N the board members who were
candidates for reelection were disqualified
from sitting in the board in its capacity as a
municipal board of canvassers.
3. W/N Respondent Commission can order
the board of canvassers to count a return.
HELD:
RA 4970 reads the first mayor, vice-mayor
and councilors of the municipality
of Sebaste shall be elected in the next
general elections for local officials and shall
have qualified. The Supreme Court ruled
that and shall have qualified is devoid of
meaning. The term of office of municipals
shall begin in the 1st day of January
following their election, despite the fact
that Sebaste was a newly created
municipality.
No, a canvassing board may not reject any
returns due to whatever cause.
However, since there is a possibility of
fraud, the canvass made and proclamation
should be annulled. The law states any
member of a provincial board or of
municipal council who is a candidate for
office in any election, shall be incompetent
to act on the said body. Since Respondent
Commission has the power to annul and
illegal canvass and proclamation, there is
no reason as to why it cannot order
canvassing bodies to count all returns
which are otherwise regular.
Manila Railroad Company v. Insular
Collector of Customs [GR 30264, 12
March 1929]
En Banc, Malcolm (p): 6 concur
Facts: Paragraph 141 of the Tariff Law of
1909 provides that the manufactures of
wool, not otherwise provided for are subject
to 40% ad valorem tax, while paragraph
197 provides that vehicles for use on
railways, and detached parts thereof, are
subject to 10% ad valorem. Dust shield are
manufactured of mixed wool and hair, and
are used in railroad cabins of the Manila
Railroad Company. The Insular Collector of
Customs decided that dust shields should
be classified as manufactures of wool, not
otherwise provided for.
declared Ordinance 7, 11, 131 and 148 of
the City of Butuan unconstitutional and
ultra vires, as far as they imposed a 2% tax
on the gross sales or receipts of the
business of electric light, heat and power of
Butuan Sawmill. The court also annulled
Ordinance 104 for being unconstitutional,
arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive.
Hence, the direct appeal on questions of
law to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed
decision with costs against appellant City of
Butuan.
1. Taxation of franchise beyond citys
taxation power.
The Local Autonomy Act did not authorize
the City of Butuan to tax the franchised
business of Butuan Sawmill (see Section 2,
Act 2264). The inclusion of the franchised
business of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the
city of Butuan within the coverage of the
questioned taxing ordinances is beyond the
broad power of taxation of the city under its
charter; nor can the power therein granted
be taken as an authority delegated to the
city to amend or alter the franchise, since
its charter did not expressly nor specifically
provide any such power. It must be noted
that the franchise was granted by act of the
legislature on 18 June 1949 while the citys
charter was approved on 15 June 1950.
2. Earlier special over the latter
general
Where there are two statutes, the earlier
special and the later general the terms of
the general broad enough to include the
matter provided for in the special the
fact that one is special and the other is
general creates a presumption that the
special is to be considered as remaining an
exception to the general, one as a general
law of the land, the other as the law of a
particular case.(State vs. Stoll; Manila
Railroad Co. vs. Rafferty).
3. Construction must consider other
provisions of the same act; and its
effects
Subparagraph (j) of the section 2 (RA 2264)
specifically withholds the imposition of
taxes on persons paying franchise tax.
Further, the citys interpretation of the
provision would result in double taxation
against the business of the franchisee
expressly and clearly import. In the case at
bar, taking account the purpose of the
article, it is acknowledged that in reality, it
is used as a detached part of railway
vehicles.
4. Particular enactment must be
operative over the general one in the
same statute
Paragraph 141 is a general provision while
paragraph 197 is a special provision. Where
there is in the same statute a particular
enactment and also a general one which in
its most comprehensive sense would
include what is embraced in the former, the
particular enactment must be operative,
and the general language are not within the
provisions of the particular enactment.
Butuan Sawmill v. City of Butuan [GR
L-21516, 29 April 1966]
En Banc, Reyes JBL (p): 9 concur, 1 on
leave
Facts: Butuan Sawmill, Inc. was granted a
legislative franchise (RA. 399, 18 June
1949), for an electric light, heat and power
system at Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan,
subject to the terms and conditions
established in Act 3636, as amended by CA
132 and the Constitution. It was also issued
a certificate of public convenience and
necessity by the Public Service Commission
on 18 March 1954. On 1 October 1950,
Ordinance 7 imposed a 2% on the gross
sales or receipts tax of any business
operated in the city. This ordinance was
amended by Ordinance 11 (14 December
1950), by enumerating the kinds of
businesses required to pay the tax. It was
further amended by Ordinance 131 (16 May
1961) by modifying the penal provision, and
further by Ordinance 148, approved on 11
June 1962 by including within the coverage
of taxable businesses those engaged in
the business of electric light, heat and
power (sic). On 13 April 1960, Ordinance
104 was enacted, making it unlawful for
any person or firm to cut or disconnect the
electrical connection of any consumer in
the city of Butuan without his consent.
The issue on the gross sales tax was raised
with the CFI Agusan (Special Civil Case 152;
Petition for declaratory relief), the court
Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico
suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI
Mla complaint against the City which
dismissed the same. On appeal, CA
sentenced the City of Manila to pay
damages.
Issue: WON the City of Manila have control
or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it
responsible for the damages suffered by
Teotico.
Ruling: Decision affirmed.
In its answer to the complaint, the City,
alleged that "the streets aforementioned
were and have been constantly kept in
good conditionand manholes thereof
covered by the defendant City and the
officers concerned" Thus, the City had, in
effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was
and is under its control and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary
for the liability therein established to attach
that the defective roads or streets belong to
the province, city or municipality from
which responsibility is exacted. What said
article requires is that the province, city or
municipality have either "control or
supervision" over said street or road. Even
if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a
national highway, this circumstance would
not necessarily detract from the City's
"control or supervision.
FACTS: Teotico fell inside an uncovered and
unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila as he was trying to board a
jeepney, causing injuries which required him to
incur medical expenses.
Teotico filed, with the CFI of Manila, a complaint
for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor,
city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and
chief of police.
The CFI of Manila rendered a decision in favor of
Teotico and dismissing the amended complaint,
without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was
affirmed by the CA, except insofar as the City of
Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay
damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00.
because the internal revenue code already
imposes a franchise tax. The logical
construction of section 2 (d) of RA 2264,
that would not nullify section 2 (j) of the
same Act, is that the local government may
only tax electric light and power utilities
that are not subject to franchise taxes,
unless the franchise itself authorizes
additional taxation by cities or
municipalities.
4. Ordinance 104 an invalid exercise
of police power
The passage of ordinance 104, prohibiting
the disconnection of any electrical wire
connected to any consumers building with
the power plant, without the consent of the
consumer, except in case of fire, clear and
positive danger to residents, or order of the
authorities, is an unwarranted exercise of
power for the general welfare The
ordinance compels the electric company to
keep supplying electric current to a
company even if the latter does not pay the
bills thereof, and to that extent deprives the
company of its property without due
process. How the general welfare would be
promoted under the ordinance has neither
been explained nor justified. The general
welfare clause was not intended to vent the
ire of the complaining consumers against
the franchise holder, because the
legislature has specifically lodged
jurisdiction, supervision and control over
public services and their franchises in the
Public Service Commission, and not in the
City of Butuan.
City of Manila vs. Teotico
City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico
and CA
G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the
CA
Concepcion, J.:
Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at
the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and
unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As
he stepped down from the curb to board
the jeepney he hailed, and took a few
steps, he fell inside an uncovered and
unlighted catch basin or manhole on P.
any person by reason specifically of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other-public works under
their control or supervision.
In other words, said section 4 refers to liability
arising from negligence, in general, regardless of
the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs
liability due to defective streets, in particular.
Since the present action is based upon the
alleged defective condition of a road, said Article
2189 is decisive thereon.
xxxxx
Teotico alleged in his complaint his injuries were
due to the defective condition of a street which is
under the supervision and control of the City. In
its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in
turn, alleged that the streets aforementioned
were and have been constantly kept in good
condition and regularly inspected and the storm
drains and manholes thereof covered by the
defendant City and the officers concerned who
have been ever vigilant and zealous in the
performance of their respective functions and
duties as imposed upon them by law. Thus, the
City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos
Avenue was and is under its control and
supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said
Avenue is a national highway was made, for the
first time, in its MR of the decision of the CA .
Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of
fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial
court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on
appeal, much less after the rendition of the
decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the
reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it
is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or
streets belong to the province, city or municipality
from which responsibility is exacted. What said
article requires is that the province, city or
municipality have either control or supervision
over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue
Hence, this appeal for certiorari by the City of
Manila.
ISSUE: WON the City of Manila should be held
liable as the incident happened on a NATIONAL
highway
HELD: the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed
YES
The question to be determined is if present case
is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409
(Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or
injuries to persons or property arising from the
failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any
other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this
chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or
other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable
for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered
by, any person by reason of defective conditions
of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or
supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should
prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409,
is a special law, intended exclusively for the City
of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general
law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The CA , however, applied the Civil Code, and, we
think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its
territorial application is concerned, Republic Act
No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a
general legislation; but, as regards the subject-
matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4
of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule
regulating the liability of the City of Manila for:
damages or injury to persons or property
Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
Code constitutes a particular prescription making
provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for
damages for the death of, or injury suffered by
contends that there is a violation of Art. 10,
Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1. What the term of office of barangay
officials is.
2. W/N there was a violation of Art. 10, Sec.
8 of the Constitution.
HELD:
1. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable
conflict between two laws that the later
legislative enactment prevails. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court in Paras v. COMELEC
had the opportunity to mention when the
next barangay election should be when it
stated that the next regular election
involving the barangay office is barely 7
months away, the same having been
scheduled in May 1997.
2. No. Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution
provides that, The term of office of
elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years It is not to be
construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of
office
for barangay officials.
Sec. 8 Art. X of the Constitution: The term of office
of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law.(term of office of
barangay officials)
FACTS:
This case involves the consolidation of 2
petitions that tackle the common question of how long
the term of office of barangay chairmen and other
barangay officials who were elected to their respective
office on the second of May 1994. Petitioner in his
capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone
7, Kalookan City and as president of the Liga ng mga
Barangay sa Pilipinas filed before this Court on
December 2, 1996 a petition for prohibition , under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to prohibit the holding
of the barangay election scheduled on the second
Monday of May 1997. On January 29, 1997, the
Solicitor General filed his four-page Comment siding
with petitioner and praying that "the election scheduled
on May 12, 1997 be held in abeyance." Respondent
Commission on Elections filed a separate Comment,
dated February 1, 1997 opposing the petition. On
were, therefore, a national highway, this
circumstance would not necessarily detract from
its control or supervision by the City of Manila,
under Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x)
thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal
Board shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to
provide for the laying out, construction and
improvement, and to regulate the use of streets,
avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks,
cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for
lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and
public places; . . . the building and repair of
tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in
and under the same to provide for and regulate
cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . . and
regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and
culverts; to regulate the lights used on all
vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . .
Then, again, the determination of whether or not
P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or
supervision of the City of Manila and whether the
latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the
maintenance of said road, which were decided by
the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of
fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not
subject to our review.
David v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 85
G.R. No. 127116 (April 8, 1997)
Chapter X, Page 413, Footnote No. 105
FACTS:
Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the
question of when the barangay
elections should be held and questions the
COMELECs schedule of holding such
elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997.
The COMELECs basis is R.A. 7160 or the
Local Government Code which mandates
barangay elections every 3 years.
Petitioner David contends that an earlier
law, R.A. 6679, should be the one followed.
R.A. 6679 provides that barangay elections
should be held every 5 years. He also
RA 7160. Since RA 7160 is a newer law than RA 6653,
notwithstanding the fact that RA 7160 is a general law
since the particular provision on the term of office of
barangay officials is a specific provision which
supersedes the provision in RA 6653.
2. No, The Court held that RA 7160 sec 43(c) is
not unconstitutional. Since under Sec 8 Art X of the
Constitution the term of office of barangay officials
shall be as determined by law. There is nothing in the
Constitution or in the record of the constitutional
commission which would support the view that the
term of office of barangay officials could not be for 3
years.
David v. COMELEC
Sec. 1 of RA 6679 provides that the term of
barangay officials who were to be elected on the
second Monday of May 1994 is 5 years
The later act RA 7160 Sec 43 (c) states that the
term of office of barangay officials who were to be
elected also on the 2nd Monday of May 1994 is 3
years.
There being a clear inconsistency between the
two laws, the later law fixing the term barangay
officials at 3 years shall prevail.
General law does not repeal special law,
generally
A general law on a subject does not operate to
repeal a prior special law on the same subject,
unless it clearly appears that the legislature has
intended by the later general act to modify or
repeal the earlier special law.
February 11, 1997, the Court issued a Resolution
giving due course to the petition and requiring the
parties to file simultaneous memoranda within a non-
extendible period of twenty days from notice. It also
requested former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. 1 to
act as amicus curiae and to file a memorandum also
within a non-extendible period of twenty days. It noted
but did not grant petitioner's Urgent Motion for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction dated January 31, 1997
Accordingly, the parties filed their respective
memoranda. In a separate case filed before this court
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter
represented by its president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 128039, "to seek a
judicial review by certiorari to declare as
unconstitutional: Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which
prescribed the term of barangay officials to be for 3
years which shall begin on the regular election to be
held on the second Monday of May 1994. COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the
holding of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and
other activities related thereto;
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the term of office of barangay
officials shall be for 3 years as prescribed by RA
7160(The Local Government Code of ) or 5 years as
prescribed by RA 6653.
2. Whether or not RA 7160 sec 43(c) is
unconstitutional
HELD:
1. Yes , The Court held that term of office of
barangay officials shall be for 3 years as prescribed by