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Diplomatic engagement is limited to presidential visits and State


Department diplomatic actions thats distinct from military engagement
even though the military sometimes does diplomacy
Derrick, 98 - LIEUTENANT COLONEL, US Army (Robert, ENGAGEMENT: THE
NATIONS PREMIER GRAND STRATEGY, WHO'S IN CHARGE? http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA342695

Economic engagement covers a wide range of programs. Financial incentives are an effective
engagement tool since countries usually interact with the US when money is involved. Whether it is obtaining
funding for a national program; acquiring materiel, food or medicine; or maintaining Most Favored Nation Status,
financial aide has always been a preferred way for the US to affect the behavior of others. Diplomatic
engagement ranges from recognition of sovereign states and foreign governments, to
presidential visits, to all aspects of the embassy itself. The mere existence
of an embassy is an engagement tool. Through official diplomatic ceremonies, informal
meetings, and embassy employees living among the locals, the Department of State's presence
is engagement in and of itself. Similarly, "...overseas...forces embody global
military engagement . They serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies; contribute
uniquely to the stability, continuity, and flexibility that protects US interests; and are crucial to continued
our military
democratic and economic development."14 In addition to our presence overseas,
engagement consists of a variety of military to military and political to
military events. U.S. and host nation defense forces conduct combined exercises to improve cooperation
and strengthen ties.

Violation: Cybersecurity is part of the military.


NCI 15 National Cybersecurity Institute, 10-27-2015, "Cybersecuritys role in the modern military," National Cybersecurity Institute,
http://www.nationalcybersecurityinstitute.org/government/cybersecuritys-role-in-the-modern-military/

The main role of the military is to defend our country from outsiders
threats. In previous years, this exclusively meant taking up arms against
ones opponents. However, technology has evolved, and out of that evolution
came new weapons and warfare. While many of the new technologies advanced the militarys
capabilities and readiness to defend the country, they also introduced new threats. The battlefield is no longer
The inclusion of the Internet has increased the need for
always a tangible place.
cyberdefenses across military technologies, especially because of the vital
roles cybersecurity plays in the modern military .

Vote neg---limits and ground---explodes the topic to include thousands of


random military cooperation and confidence building measures it turns
the topic into cooperate with China in X region which evades core links
based on trade and changing overall US diplomatic posture
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The queer is inextricably linked to the terrorist deviant bodies are seen
as lethal threats to state motives homonationalism has become the only
option for the queer in the with us or against us narrative of the Military
Industrial Complex Puar 07
Puar, Jasbir K. Terrorist assemblages: homonationalism in queer times.
Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.
http://files.meetup.com/4292952/Terrorist_Assemblages_Homonationalism_in_Queer_Times_Jasbir_Puar.pdf . JD

Sexual deviancy is linked to the process of discerning, othering, and


quarantining terrorist bodies, but these racially and sexually perverse
figures also labor in the service of disciplining and normalizing subjects
worthy of rehabilitation away from these bodies , in other words, signaling and
enforcing the mandatory terms of patriotism . In this double deployment, the
emasculated terrorist is not merely an other, but also a barometer of
ab/normality involved in disciplinary apparatuses. Leti Volpp suggests,
September 11 facilitated the consolidation of a new identity category that groups together persons who
appear Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim. This consolidation reflects a racialization wherein members of
terrorists, and are dis-identified as citizens. This
this group are identified as
disidentification is a process of sexualization as well as of a racialization of
religion. But the terrorist figure is not merely racialized and sexualized; the body must
appear improperly racialized (outside the norms of multiculturalism) and perversely
sexualized in order to materialize as the terrorist in the first place.
Thus the terrorist and the person to be domesticatedthe patriot are not distant, oppositional entities,
Through this binary-reinforcing youre either with us
but close cousins.
or against us normativizing apparatus, the war on terror has
rehabilitated someclearly not all or mostlesbians, gays, and queers to U.S.
national citizenship within a spatial-temporal domain I am invoking as
homonationalism, short for homonormative nationalism.
Homonormativity has been theorized by Lisa Duggan as a new neo-liberal sexual politics that hinges
upon the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture
anchored in domesticity and consumption. Building on her critique of gay subjects embroiled in a
politics that does the sexuality of terrorism 39 not contest dominant
heteronormative forms but upholds and sustains them , I am deploying the
term homonationalism to mark arrangements of U.S. sexual exceptionalism explicitly in relation to the
nation. Foucault notes that the legitimization of the modern couple is complicit with, rather than working
against, the outfitting and proliferation of compartmental, circulating, and proximity-surveillance
sexualities, pursued pleasures and contacts. We see simultaneously both the fortification of normative
heterosexual coupling and the propagation of sexualities that mimic, parallel, contradict, or resist this
normativity. These proliferating sexualities, and their explicit and implicit relationships to nationalism,
complicate the dichotomous implications of casting the nation as only supportive and productive of
the
heteronormativity and always repressive and disallowing of homosexuality. I argue that
Orientalist invocation of the terrorist is one discursive tactic that
disaggregates U.S. national gays and queers from racial and sexual
others, foregrounding a collusion between homosexuality and
American nationalism that is generated both by national rhetorics of
patriotic inclusion and by gay and queer subjects themselves: homonationalism. For
contemporary forms of U.S. nationalism and patriotism, the
production of gay and queer bodies is crucial to the deployment of
nationalism, insofar as these perverse bodies reiterate
heterosexuality as the norm but also because certain domesticated
homosexual bodies provide ammunition to reinforce nationalist
projects.
The 1AC orientation toward what could possibly happen in the future
creates the inability to address the temporality of anti-queer violence
Kouri-Towe 13
Kouri-Towe, Natalie. "Queer Apocalypse: Survivalism and Queer Life at the End | FUSE Magazine." FUSE Magazine. January 06, 2013. Accessed May 11,
2016. http://fusemagazine.org/2013/06/36-3_kouri-owe. JD

The apocalypse is coming and queers are going to spoil it . As


narratives of impending apocalypse and postapocalyptic survival permeate our
cultural and political landscapes, it becomes increasingly easy to imagine
our end. Whether the end of a sustainable environment, the end of culture, or the
end of global capitalist economies, the end of life as we know it is both a terrifying
possibility and a promising fantasy of a radically different form of life beyond the present. Mainstream
depictions of postapocalyptic survival largely centre on the archetypical figure
of the male saviour or hero, and advance a familiar patriarchal
instrumentalization of womens bodies as vessels for the survival of
the human species. But what alternate stories might we tell about the
end, and how might a queer framework reshape our apocalyptic
narratives? The proposal to think queerly about the apocalypse is not an attempt to rescue
apocalypse stories from the insidious reproduction of hegemonic relations; rather it is an opportunity to
playfully consider what queer approaches to survival at the end might offer to our rethinking of the
present. Apocalyptic narratives are appealing because we find it hard to
imagine a radically different social and political world without the complete
destruction of the institutions and economies that were built and sustained
through colonial and imperial violence and exploitation. If we are already thinking and
talking about the apocalypse, then queer thinking about the apocalypse serves
as an opportunity for rethinking narratives of politics in both the future and
the present. As global, structural, economic and political asymmetries accelerate, more people live in
conditions lacking basic resources like food and water, and increasingly suffer from criminalization and
postapocalyptic survival is also not simply a fiction but a
incarceration. It is clear that
daily reality for many people. From refugee camps to welfare reforms, survival is more than
an exercise in imagining a different world. But, even for those who are not living through conditions of
catastrophic loss, thinking about apocalypse is enticing. We take pleasure in imagining how we might
prepare or attempt survival in a shifted environment because to imagine how we might live differently is to
introduce new realms of possibility for living differently in our present. So how can we reconcile both the
demand for attending to the crisis of survival in the present and the fantasy of postapocalypse? Here
queerness might offer us some considerations for rethinking the apocalypse and narratives of survival.
Queer Survivalism Survivalism noun A policy of trying to ensure ones own survival or that of ones social
or national group. The practicing of outdoor survival skills. [2] If survivalism is wrapped up in the
preservation of the nation state, of race, of gender or of our social order in general, then the first
contribution of queerness to the apocalypse is its disruption to the framing of who and what survives, and
how. There can be no nation in queer postapocalyptic survival, because the
nation presents a foundational problem to queer survival. The nation, which regulates
gender and reproduction, requires normalized organizations of sexual
and family life in order to reproduce or preserve the national population. If we are
already at the end, then why not consider survival without the obligation of reproduction and the
Masculinist narratives of postapocalyptic survival deploy the
heteronormative family?
male protagonist as the extension of the nation. Here, the male hero stands in the place of the
providing safety and security to his family and
military, the police or the law by
weak survivors like children and animals. Queer survivalism, on the other hand, disrupts the
normative embodiments of survivalism by redirecting our desires to queer bodies, opening up survival to
those outside of the prototypes of fitness and health. Because postapocalyptic narratives replicate racist
and ableist eugenic tropes of survival of the fittest, a queering of survivalism opens up space for thinking
about, talking about and planning for more varied and accessible frameworks for doing survival.
queering of survival might also open up the option of
Conversely, a
choosing not to survive, through the refusal of reproduction or the refusal of
life itself. The Queer Apocalypse Apocalypse noun More generally: a disaster resulting in drastic,
irreversible damage to human society or the environment, esp. on a global scale; a cataclysm. [3] If we
are going to imagine the destruction of the world as we know it, then why not
make these fictions meaningful to the present? Lee Edelman has argued that queerness is
the place of the social orders death drive. [4] If queerness is a kind of end to the norms and structures
of our world, then it makes sense that queerness might say something meaningful about imagining the
end. Narratives of postapocalyptic survival function primarily as stories of individual survival against a
hostile world, and often a hostile otherin the form of dangerous strangers or zombies. These narratives
privilege the individual as the basic unit for survival, replicating the neoliberal values of individualism. At
best, these narratives expand beyond the individual survivor when he is joined by his immediate family or
builds a new family. Queer models of kinship offer alternate frameworks for imagining survival beyond the
individual, through collectivity and alternative kinships. If we are going to imagine surviving either our
present or our impending futures, we need collectives to survive. This is old news to people who have long
survived through collective struggle and collective support. This is not to simply produce a romantic
fantasy of a utopian community, but rather to acknowledge and recognize that strength comes from
organizing together. If capitalist, nationalist, patriarchal, heteronormative and neoliberal logics tell us that
were each responsible for our own lives, then what better queering can we offer than to reimagine stories
for queer
of how we think about survival, or even to refuse to survive? So what tools do we need
survival? First, we need alternative models for building survival
strategies. For instance, learning how to repurpose everyday objects, everyday networks and
everyday resources. [5] Second, we need to consider models of communalism, and to develop better ways
of communicating and working through conflict. Third, we need to strategize collectively, share skills, build
we need to mobilize what queers do best
skills and foster collaboration. And lastly,
spoiling, twisting and perverting the normative narratives that
dominate survivalism and stories of apocalypse.
Queerness in China has emerged between the two paradoxical extremes of
queerphobia and homonationalism Martin 11
Martin 11 (Fran, Professor at Melbourne University on the topics of Gender
and sexuality, globalization, contemporary Chinese and Taiwanese fiction,
film and popular cultures, transnational cultural flows in Asia, popular
television in Asia, and transnational student experience, Inter-Asia
Cultural Studies, Volume 12, Number 1, 2011, pg 132 - 137. She is
analyzing Wenqing Kangs Obsession: Male Same-sex Relations in
China) JD
In the second chapter, Kang moves on to consider the cultural translation of
European sexology in China by its translators and other cultural intermediaries who re-
presented it for Chinese audiences in the 1920s and 1930s. This study is nicely nuanced,
similarly to Tze-lan D. Sangs work on the subject in The Emerging Lesbian (2003), and contrasts
once again with the over-simplifications of Xiaomingxiong, Hinsch and Chou, with their
shared assumption of uniform social attitudes on same-sex
relations and their reflectionist model of the relation between these
attitudes and law and literature two assumptions with which Kang directly takes issue.
Instead, Kang notes the presence of homophilia alongside homophobia
and utopian longings as well as paranoid imaginings attaching to the
newly emerging figure of the homosexual. Kang credits sexologys translators with a
high level of agency in choosing texts for translation according to their own political and ideological
persuasions, which he groups into two broadly opposing camps: cultural conservative-nationalist and
radical utopianist-nationalist; the former predisposed to negative or stigmatizing accounts of male same-
under the
sex love, and the latter to positive or utopian depictions. For example, Kang shows how,
influence of social Darwinism, homosexuality was pressed into
service, on the one hand, by Yang Youtian, drawing on Krafft-Ebing, as a signifier of social
disease and atavism and a scapegoat for national weakness in the
face of foreign encroachment. On the other hand, Hu Qiuyuan drew on
Carpenter to frame same-sex love between men as a social ideal central
to the future of the species: a shining hope for the construction of a
modern nation. The following chapter analyses the positive portrayal
of same-sex love in literary works by a coterie of modernist authors :
Yu Dafu, Guo Moruo, Huang Shenzhi, Ye Dingluo and Ye Lingfeng. Most of these writers were involved in the
Creation society and influenced by European decadent literature. As intellectuals involved in the New
Culture movement, they shared in that movements ideological challenge to feudal sexual-social practices
While other authors championed
like arranged marriage and womens subordination.
romantic cross-sex love as the vehicle to mount such a challenge , Kang
shows that this group of writers also saw same-sex love as a fruitful form of
defiance of the current sexual-social orthodoxy. Scandalously, this major
body of literature on male same-sex love from the 1920s and 1930s has to date been more
or less universally ignored by the literary-critical establishments within and outside China. To
quote Kangs Conclusion, it is ironic indeed, given the subsequent silence on homosexuality in the early
years of the PRC, [that] it was utopian socialist thought that enabled early 20th-century writers to imagine
a human future in which same-sex love served as the social foundation (148). Kang sums up the interest
and significance of this body of neglected writings well, when he writes that: [ T]hese
writings
represent a very important historical moment when the meaning of
male same-sex relations or homosexuality was highly contested.
[T]hey portrayed intimacy between male friends as a beautiful life
experience, using it as a vehicle not only to express their desire to
escape from and protest against the conventional social and sexual
morality but also to convey their concerns about the suffering
nation. More significantly, these writings testify to a moment in
modern Chinese history when same-sex love could function as an
inspiration for an alternative human future. (83)
Society and the law are anti-queer, the aff reproduces and normalizes the
laws power, that is an active steps toward queer destruction. Nardini 09
(criminal queers from Milwaukee, Wisconsin toward the queerest
insurrection 2009)

A fag is bashed because his gender presentation is far too femme. A poor transman cant afford his life-saving hormones. A sex worker is
murdered by their client. A genderqueer persyn is raped because ze just needed to be fucked straight. Four black lesbians are sent to prison

Cops beat us on the streets and our


for daring to defend themselves against a straight-male attacker.1

bodies are being destroyed by pharmaceutical companies because


we cant give them a dime. Queers experience, directly with our
bodies, the violence and domination of this world. Class, Race, Gender, Sexuality, Ability;
while often these interrelated and overlapping categories of oppression

are lost to abstraction, queers are forced to physically understand


each. Weve had our bodies and desires stolen from us, mutilated
and sold back to us as a model of living we can never embody . 1 Free the
New Jersey 4. And lets free everyone else while were at it. Foucault says that power must be

understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations


immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute
their own organization; as the processes which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms,
strengthens or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or system, or on the

; and lastly, as the strategies in


contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another

which they take effect, whose general design or institutional


crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation
of the law, in the various social hegemonies. We experience the
complexity of domination and social control amplified through
heterosexuality. When police kill us, we want them dead in turn. When prisons entrap our bodies and rape us because our
genders arent similarly contained, of course we want fire to them all. When borders are erected to construct a national identity absent of
people of color and queers, we see only one solution: every nation and border reduced to rubble. VII The perspective of queers within the
heteronormative world is a lens through which we can critique and attack the apparatus of capitalism. We can analyze the ways in which
Medicine, the Prison System, the Church, the State, Marriage, the Media, Borders, the Military and Police are used to control and destroy us.
More importantly, we can use these cases to articulate a cohesive criticism of every way that we are alienated and dominated. Queer is a
position from which to attack the normative - more, a position from which to understand and attack the ways in which normal is reproduced
and reiterated. In destabilizing and problematizing normalcy, we can destabilize and become a problem for the Totality.

Fetishization of queer death and overkill permeate heteronormative


culture, thus pushing queers out of existence Stanley 11
Eric Stanley, Near Life, Queer Death: Overkill and Ontological Capture, Social Text 107 Vol 29 No 2 Duke University Press, 2011. JD

Warrants:

1. Overkill=Need for all queer life to die


2. Queerness is the threat so unimaginable is must be stopped at all costs
3. Logic of queer/trans panic

Overkill is a term used to indicate such excessive violence that it


pushes a body beyond death. Overkill is often determined by the
postmortem removal of body parts, as with the partial decapitation in the case of
Lauryn Paige and the dissection of Rashawn Brazell. The temporality of violence, the
biological time when the heart stops pushing and pulling blood, yet the
killing is not finished, suggests the aim is not simply the end of a
specific life, but the ending of all queer life . This is the time of queer
death, when the utility of violence gives way to the pleasure in the
others mortality. If queers, along with others, approximate nothing, then the task of ending, of
killing, that which is nothing must go beyond normative times of life and
death. In other words, if Lauryn was dead after the first few stab
wounds to the throat, then what do the remaining fifty wounds signify? The
legal theory that is offered to nullify the practice of overkill often functions under the name of the trans- or
the murderer became so
gay-panic defense. Both of these defense strategies argue that
enraged after the discovery of either genitalia or someones sexuality they
were forced to protect themselves from the threat of queerness.
Estanislao Martinez of Fresno, California, used the trans-panic defense and received a four-year prison
sentence after admittedly stabbing J. Robles, a Latina transwoman, at least twenty times with a pair of
scissors. Importantly, this defense is often used, as in the cases of Robles and Paige, after the murderer
The logic of the trans-panic defense as an
has engaged in some kind of sex with the victim.
in its gory semiotics, offers us a way of
explanation for overkill,
understanding queers as the nothing of Mbembes query. Overkill names the
technologies necessary to do away with that which is already gone.
Queers then are the specters of life whose threat is so unimaginable
that one is forced, not simply to murder, but to push them backward out of
time, out of History, and into that which comes before. 27
Thus, Jake and I endorse queer failure as a radical means of rejecting
heteronormative notions of success Halberstam 11
J. J. Jack Halberstam, professor of English at the University of Southern California, The Queer Art of Failure, pg. 2 JD

In this book I range from childrens animation to avant-garde performance and queer art to think about
ways of being and knowing that stand outside of conventional understandings of success. I argue that
success in a heteronormative, capitalist society equates too easily to
specific forms of reproductive maturity combined with wealth
accumulation. But these measures of success have come under serious
pressure recently, with the collapse of financial markets on the one hand and the
epic rise in divorce rates on the other. If the boom and bust years of the late twentieth century
and the early twenty-first have taught us anything, we should at least have a healthy
critique of static models of success and failure . Rather than just arguing for a
reevaluation of these standards of passing and failing, The Queer Art of Failure dismantles the logics of
success and failure with which we currently live. Under certain circumstances failing, losing, forgetting,
unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more
cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world. Failing is something
queers do and have always done exceptionally well; for queers failure can be a
style, to cite Quentin Crisp, or a way of life, to cite Foucault, and it can stand in contrast to
the grim scenarios of success that depend upon trying and trying again.
In fact if success requires so much effort, then maybe failure is easier in the long run and offers different
rewards. What kinds of reward can failure offer us? Perhaps most obviously,failure allows us to
escape the punishing norms that discipline behavior and manage
human development with the goal of delivering us from unruly childhoods to
orderly and predictable adulthoods. Failure preserves some of the wondrous anarchy of
childhood and disturbs the supposedly clean boundaries between adults and
children, winners and losers. And while failure certainly comes accompanied by a host of negative
affects, such as disappointment, disillusionment, and despair, it also provides the
opportunity to use these negative affects to poke holes in the toxic
positivity of contemporary life. As Barbara Ehrenreich reminds us in Bright- sided, positive
thinking is a North American affliction, a mass delusion that emerges out of a combination of American
exceptionalism and a desire to believe that success happens to good people and failure is just a
consequence of a bad attitude rather than structural conditions (2009: 13). Positive thinking is offered up
in the U.S. as a cure for cancer, a path to untold riches, and a surefire way to engineer your own success.
Indeed believing that success depends upon ones attitude is far preferable to Americans than recognizing
that their success is the outcome of the tilted scales of race, class, and gender. As Ehrenreich puts it, If
optimism is the key to material success, and if you can achieve an optimistic outlook through the discipline
of positive thinking, then there is no excuse for failure. But, she continues, the flip side of positivity is
thus a harsh insistence on personal responsibility, meaning that while capitalism produces some peoples
success through other peoples failures, the ideology of positive thinking insists that success depends only
upon working hard and failure is always of your own doing (8). We know better of course in an age when
the banks that ripped off ordinary people have been deemed too big to fail and the people who bought
bad mortgages are simply too little to care about. In Bright-sided Ehrenreich uses the example of American
womens application of positive thinking to breast cancer to demonstrate how -dangerous the belief in
optimism can be and how deeply Americans want to believe that health is a matter of attitude rather than
environmental degradation and that wealth is a matter of visualizing success rather than having the cards
stacked in your favor. For the nonbelievers outside the cult of positive thinking, however, the failures and
losers, the grouchy, irritable whiners who do not want to have a nice day and who do not believe that
getting cancer has made them better people, politics offers a better explanatory framework than personal
disposition. For these negative thinkers, there are definite advantages to
failing. Relieved of the obligation to keep smiling through chemotherapy or
bankruptcy, the negative thinker can use the experience of failure to
confront the gross inequalities of everyday life in the United States. From the
perspective of feminism, failure has often been a better bet than success. Where feminine success is
always measured by male standards, and gender failure often means being relieved of the pressure to
measure up to patriarchal ideals, not succeeding at womanhood can offer unexpected pleasures. In many
ways this has been the message of many renegade feminists in the past. Monique Wittig (1992) argued in
the 1970s that if womanhood depends upon a heterosexual framework, then lesbians are not women,
and if lesbians are not women, then they fall outside of patriarchal norms and can re-create some of the
meaning of their genders. Also in the 1970s Valerie Solanas suggested that if woman takes on meaning
only in relation to man, then we need to cut up men (2004: 72). Perhaps that is a little drastic, but at
any rate these kinds of feminisms, what I call shadow feminisms in chapter 5, have long haunted the more
acceptable forms of feminism that are oriented to positivity, reform, and accommodation rather than
negativity, rejection, and transformation. Shadow feminisms take the form not of becoming, being, and
doing but of shady, murky modes of undoing, un- becoming, and violating.

The Role of the Judge is to vote for the team who best performatively and
methodologically queers US-Chinese Relations:
The performance of the 1NC speaks out against dominant forms of power
judges of situations should act against power relations Butler 93
Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "sex" New York: Routledge, 1993. JD

*Brackets for gendered language

queer performativity ask us not only to consider


Eve Sedgwick's recent reflections on
how a certain theory of speech acts applies to queer practices, but how it is that 'queering'
persists as a defining moment of performativity,3 The centrality of the marriage
ceremony in J.L. Austin's examples of performativity suggests that die heterosexuaJizarioa of the social
bond is the paradigmatic form for those speech acts which bring about what they name. 'I pronounce
you...' puts into effect the relation that it names. But from where and when does such a performative draw
its force, CRmCALLY QUEER 225 and what happens to the performative when its purpose is precisely to
Performative acts are forms
undo the presumptive force of the heterosexual ceremonial?
of authoritative speech: most performatives, for instance, are statements that, in
the uttering, also perform a certain action and exercise a binding
power.4 Implicated in a network of authorization and punishment, performatives tend to include legal
sentences, baptisms, inaugurations, declarations of ownership, statements which not only perform an
action, but confer a binding power on the action performed. If the power of discourse to produce that
which it names is linked with the question of performativity, then the performative is one domain in which
power acts as discourse. Importantly, however, there is no power, construed as a subject, that acts, but
only, to repeat an earlier phrase, a reiterated acting that is power in its persistence and instability. This is
less an "act," singular and deliberate, than a nexus of power and discourse that repeats or mimes the
the judge who authorizes and installs the
discursive gestures of power. Hence,
situation he names invariably cites the law that [they] he applies[apply], and it is
the power of this citation that gives the performative its binding or
conferring power. And though it may appear that the binding power of his words is derived from the
force of his will or from a prior authority, the opposite is more true: it is through the citation of the law that
the figure of the judge's "will" is produced and that the "priority" of textual authority is established.5
Indeed, it is through the invocation of convention that the speech act of
the judge derives its binding power; that binding power is to be found neither in the
subject of the judge nor in his will, but in the citational legacy by which a
contemporary "act" emerges in the context of a chain of binding
conventions.
1NC DA

The U.S. employs a broad-based containment strategy toward China now


Etzioni 16
Etzioni 16 (Amitai, professor of international affairs at George Washington
University, The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: A Case Study of
Multifaceted Containment, Asian Perspective, 40(2), p. 187-188)
US officials often state that the United States does not seek to contain China (Carpenter 2011). In April
2014, for example, President Obama stated, Our goal is not to counter China. Our goal is not to contain
China (Manesca 2014). Secretary of State John Kerry repeated the sentiment a month later, stating that
the U.S. does not seek to contain China (BBC News 2014a). However, there are often great discrepancies
between the statements made by top officials and the conduct of the states they speak for. The
actions of the United States reflect a containment strategy that seems to
have evolvedrather than developedthrough complex interactions among various agencies, with the
Pentagon being particularly influential (Etzioni 2013). The strategys main element involves positioning US
or allied military forces along Chinas borders and in the regional areas into which China might seek to
expand. Thus, the United States has announced that it views the contested Senkaku Islands as being
covered by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan;
encouraged Japan to build up its military; developed military ties with Vietnam; reopened its military bases
in the Philippines; provided India with nuclear know-how and access to uranium, in violation of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, as a means of inciting India to balance China; and moved troops and naval
All these moves draw a red line that, if crossed
vessels to the Asia Pacific region.
by China, could lead to war. The so-called Asia pivot thus appears to be a
thinly veiled China containment strategy (Roach et al. 2015). John Mearsheimer has
pointed out that involving regional states in various military alliances raises the risk that the United States
and China will engage in war due to reckless actions taken by one of the allies (Mearsheimer 2014). Barry
Posen concurs and points out that an alliance with the United States gives allies a false sense of security
and encourages them to challenge more powerful states, confident that Washington will save them in the
end (Posen 2013). (This point also applies to China in its relations with North Korea.) At the same time,
one may argue that the most basic foundation of the international order, supported even by many who do
not necessarily accept the liberal elements of that order, is that states may not use force to change the
status quo and must not invade other states. Thus, one might argue that for the United States to position
its military forces or allied forces in places into which China might expand would help stabilize the
international order. However, the same cannot be said of other elements of US policy toward China, as
highlighted by the US response to the AIIBs launch, which itself was of limited import. To proceed, I must
introduce a distinction between a strategy of all-encompassing containment and a strategy that combines
some forms of containment (especially military) with competition (especially economic and ideational) and
integration (especially the governance of international institutions). To distinguish between these two kinds
of containment, I refer to the first kind as multifaceted containment and the second as aggression-limiting
containment. Multifaceted containment seeks to block practically any and all gains by another power,
whether territorial, economic, or status (such as voting rights). By contrast, aggression-limiting
containment seeks to block only those advances that are made through the use of force, while granting
room for competition and cooperation. It is useful to think about aggression-limiting containment as a
flashing red light in some lanes and a green one in others, as opposed to a barrier that blocks all lanes. In a
previous book I examined the ways the United States sought to contain the USSR during the Cold War and
showed that the United States practiced multifaceted containment (Etzioni 1964). Thus, if the USSR sought
landing rights for its civilian aviation in Bolivia, the United States sought to block it. If the USSR granted
foreign aid to Ghana, the United States pressured Ghana to reject it. The United States sought to suppress
USSR ideological and cultural outreach. The USSR treated the United States the same, and the result was
high levels of tension that led several times to the brink of nuclear war. When President John F. Kennedy
unveiled his Strategy of Peace, he scaled back these nonmilitary forms of containment, which resulted in
US efforts to contain China
considerably diminished tensionsa dtente (Etzioni 2008).
have not been limited to countering Chinese aggression, such as by posting
military forces, building military alliances, conducting more military exercises, or ordering major weapons
Instead, the United States has also
systems to respond to a possible attack from China.
sought to block China in nonmilitary sectors. For example, the United
States pressured states on Chinas borders to resist Chinas economic
overtures, blocked Chinese efforts to begin negotiations on a free
trade zone spanning the Pacific (Davis 2014), cautioned regional states against depending too
strongly on China for humanitarian aid, and pledged $187 million to Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and
The United
Vietnam in an effort to decrease Chinas influence over those states (Var 2015).
States also seems to be diplomatically and economically working to
halt the expansion of Chinas relative influence in Africa (Sun and Olin-
Ammentorp 2014) and Latin America (Noesselt and Landivar 2013)

Concessions to China signal appeasement which causes China to doubt US


resolve on containment Glaser 15
Glaser 15 (Charles L., Prof. at Elliott School of International Affairs and the
Department of PoliSci at George Washington University, A U.S.-China
Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and
Accommodation, International Security, 39(4), p.74)
The next set of potential risks concern U.S. security. The first of these involves possible reductions in
Chinas assessments of the United States resolve for protecting its interests in Northeast Asia. As
accommodation can lead an adversary to doubt
discussed earlier, territorial
the states resolve to protect other interests, which is dangerous if the states
concessions do not leave the adversary fully satisfied. Two mechanisms could be at work here. One
mechanism depends on China seeing a similarity across one or more features of the potentially connected
interests, including their geography, the nature and extent of the U.S. interests, and the U.S. history of
involvement with these interests. If China is uncertain about U.S. resolve to protect
Taiwan and other American interests, and if China believes that similar factors determine U.S. resolve to
then accommodation on Taiwan would reduce U.S.
protect all of these interests,
credibility elsewhere . The other mechanism comes into play if China believes that
U.S. accommodation on Taiwan reflects a change in a factor that also affects
U.S. decisions on these other issues; in that case, U.S. credibility on these
issues would be reduced. The broad change that is currently most relevant is the shifting
balance of power, specifically, increasing Chinese military capabilities in East Asia. If Chinas
leaders believe that the United States chose accommodation on Taiwan
in response to Chinas growing regional military capabilities, then
they would also reasonably conclude that the United States could be
expected to make concessions on other regional issues as well. These
mechanisms are reflected in prominent arguments against accommodation of Beijing on Taiwan. For
example, Nancy Tucker and Bonnie Glaser argue that China
would respond to
appeasement as have virtually all governments: It would conclude
that a weaker United States lacking vision and ambition could be
pressured and manipulated . Richard Bush argues, Should the United
States concede to Beijing on Taiwan, the lessons that China would learn
about the intentions of the regions dominant power would likely
discourage moderation and accommodation on other issues, like
Korea or maritime East Asia. These are powerful arguments, which the United States
needs to take seriously. There is a clear similarity across the disputesthey are all located in East Asia.
China could be expected to reason that U.S. accommodation on
Thus,
one of these disputes indicates a greater willingness to make
concessions on all the others. Arguably, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan might even
lead China to believe that its growing power will enable its leadership to convince the United States to fully
exit East Asia. In addition, Chinas view of the shifting balance of power could reinforce these conclusions:
many Chinese officials believe that the shifting balance of power partly reflects the failings of the U.S.
domestic political system and the superiority of the Chinas model of governance and development; the
result is a new international system in which Chinas growing power should generate greater influence and
the major powers should acknowledge its rising status. Because this transformation influences all issues in
U.S. accommodation on Taiwan could validate these expectations
East Asia,
and put other U.S. interests at greater risk.

The affirmative grants China false legitimacy sanctions are vital. Inserra
15
Inserra 15 David Inserra, Policy Analyst in Cybersecurity at the Heritage
Foundation, 2015 (4 Highlights From Obamas Ridiculous Cyber
Agreement With China, The Daily Signal, September 29th, Accessible
Online at http://dailysignal.com/2015/09/29/4-highlights-from-obamas-
ridiculous-cyber-agreement-with-china/, Accessed On 07-01-2016)
This point doubles down on the flawed ideas expressed earlier in the document. But it also betrays a key
assumption present throughout the document: the Chinese are victims and partners in the fight against
this is a huge step back to the mindset the
cyber criminals. Regrettably,
Obama administration held years ago. China is not a partner and it
is not a victim it is the perpetrator . By granting China moral
equivalence with the U.S., the Obama administration has sacrificed the
moral high ground , giving the Chinese exactly what they want
legitimacy . The U.S. government has now all but adopted the
Chinese position and language on cyber policy , surrendering to
Chinese demands in exchange for a nice sounding press release.
What is worse, this agreement will probably stop the U.S. from
implementing any of the cyber sanctions waiting in the wings
against China . This agreement will do nothing to keep the U.S. safe
in cyberspace , but gives China the moral and political legitimacy
they want on this issue and will likely keep important cyber
sanctions at bay . Of course we could just trust everything the
Chinese say. And if thats the case, Ive got a bridge to sell you in
China .

That undermines U.S. primacy Tellis 14


Tellis 14 (Ashely, Carnegie senior associate, Balancing Without
Containment, 1-22,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf)
This transition will not occur automatically if Chinas GNP one day
exceeds that of the United States. Rather, the threat of supersession
will be more gradual as continuing Chinese economic growthat levels
steadily enables Beijing to acquire all
superior to the expansion occurring in the United States

the other accoutrements that make for comprehensive national


power. On current trends, China will consistently accumulate these
capabilities over the next two decades. It certainly aims to do so, at the latest, by 2049, the 100th
anniversary of the founding of the Peoples Republic of China and the date by which Chinese President Xi Jinping has declared Chinas intention

Acquiring the appropriate foundations of power


to become a fully developed nation.

will position China to achieve, first, strategic equivalence with the


United States, thus transforming the international system into a
meaningfully bipolar order. Then, depending on Beijings own
fortunes, China may possibly surpass Washington as the center of
gravity in international politics. Irrespective of which outcome
occursor wheneither eventuality would by definition signal the
demise of the primacy that the United States has enjoyed since the
end of the Second World War. Even if during this process a power transition in the strict vocabulary of realist
international relations theory is avoideda possibility because Chinas per capita income will lag behind that of the United States for a long

Beijings capacity to challenge Washingtons


time even if it acquires the worlds largest GNP

interests in multiple arenas, ranging from geopolitics to trade and


from advancing human rights to protecting the commons, will only
increase as its power expands. In other words, China will demonstrate how a rival can, as Thomas J.
Christensen phrased it, [pose] problems without catching up.8 <end page 3> As Avery Goldstein has persuasively argued, these

hazards could materialize rather quickly because China is currently


pursuing provocative policies on territorial disputes over islands in
the East and South China Seas.9 That these disputes, which a former U.S. official described as involving
uninhabited and uninhabitable rocks,10 do not appear prima facie to implicate a systemic crisis should not be reassuring to the United

States because every serious contestation that occurs in future Sino-


American relations will materialize against the backdrop of a
possible power transition so long as Chinas growth rateseven
when diminishingcontinue to exceed those of the United States.
This dynamic, as William R. Thompson has pointed out, can produce extended crisis
slides in which even relatively trivial incidents or a string of
seemingly minor crises may suffice to escalate what was up to that
point a precarious structural transformation into full-fledged
geopolitical polarization and major war .11 Since the relative disparity in Sino-American economic
performance is likely to persist for quite some time, even trifling quarrels will push bilateral ties

ever more concertedly in the direction of greater abrasion as


accumulating Chinese power further constrains U.S. freedom of
action. AN UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE In many ways, the challenge posed by China will be
more serious than that posed by the previous American competitor
the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union was indeed a formidable military power, its economic base was always much
smaller than that of the United States. Although insufficiently appreciated during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was

actually a deformed entity: a military giant possessing coercive


capabilities that rivaled the United States but an economic midget
nurturing a productive base that was less than half the size of its
avowed competitor.12 Angus Maddison, for example, has estimated that the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Soviet
Union, when at the height of its relative power in 1975, was approximately 44.4 percent of that of the United States in the same year.

China does not share this weakness, which makes the dangers posed
by its ascent and the prospect that it will one day acquire
genuinely comprehensive power rivaling that of the United States
far more problematic. Furthermore, Chinas central location within the larger concentration of Asian economic power
the fastest-growing hub in the international systemendows its growth with even greater significance. There is a risk that Beijing might
someday exercise choking control over this critical geopolitical space and thereby endanger larger American and global security.13 Today,
even before China has completely risen, it is already committed to the objective of enforcing a strict hierarchy in Asia, meaning that Beijings
position at the top of the continental order is acknowledged and respected by all its neighbors. As Franois Godement has pointed out,

Chinese strategy for securing such primacy has revolved around


translating <END PAGE 4> the massive economic gains it has made in recent
years into a geopolitical approach that emphasizes coercion without force.14 Even more astutely,
Christopher Ford has noted that the thorough submission of other countries that China seeks is meant to be voluntary that is, these
countries would be expected not to have to be forced to comply, but rather spontaneously to choose to take their place within the status-
hierarchy under the benevolent guidance of the virtuous leader.15 This is the only explanation that does justice to then Chinese foreign
minister Yang Jiechis outburst at the 2010 meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations when, staring directly at Singapores then
foreign minister, George Yeo, he bluntly declared that China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and thats just a fact.16
Just in case Beijings neighbors do not get the message, however, China has begun to put in place the foundations for enforcing its own
version of the Monroe Doctrine along its various peripheries. Beginning with cartographic aggression17 through claims such as its 9-dash
line in the South China Sea and its expansive assertions along the Sino-Indian border to further efforts at national enclosure18 through its
recently expanded air defense identification zone in the East China Sea to mounting the worlds biggest military expansion 19 for several

China is systematically laying the foundations to ensure that


years running,

its neighbors acquiesce to its burgeoning hegemony while


simultaneously ensuring their isolation vis--vis their most
important external protector, namely the United States. To be sure, China does not
yet pose the kind of military threats to Asia that the Soviet Union posed to Europe in its heyday. This condition, however, may not last for long

Disputes over continental and


given that Chinas relations with its neighbors are troubled in many ways.

maritime boundaries persist, status rivalries between China and its


Asian peers have not disappeared, and Beijing has, at least so far,
studiously refused to renounce the use of force in resolving
geopolitical disagreements at a time when its own capacity to mount
significant standoff attacks on adjacent countries is rapidly growing .
Consequently, however remote the prospect may seem at present, the United States could find itself in a conflict with China in the future
thanks to its extended deterrence obligations to various Asian nations. Conflicts between China and its neighbors that do not directly involve
the United States but nevertheless affect U.S. interests are also possible. On balance, both these contingencies have inevitably impelled China
to expand and rapidly accelerate improvements in [its] military and economic capabilities as well as increase its external influence to
simultaneously establish political and economic dominance over the periphery [in order to] provide leverage against future great power
pressure.20 And these developments, all told, will almost automatically accentuate regional security dilemmas vis--vis both Chinas

The specific location of Chinas military capabilities


neighbors and the United States.

makes this danger to the Asian theater especially problematic . The Soviet
Unions air and land lines of communication to its Asian peripheries were long, tenuous, and relatively underdeveloped, which made the
sustainability <END PAGE 5> of Soviet military forces in the Far East a challenging proposition. Soviet combat power adjacent to the Pacific,
however significant in absolute terms, was considerably weaker than its equivalent in Europe. China, by contrast, is highly advantaged on both
counts. It can threaten all the major regional states located along both its continental and maritime peripheries through highly robust, and
rapidly improving, interior lines of communication. Furthermore, the bulk of its military capabilities are either directly deployed along its
eastern seaboard or can be swiftly moved to any one of its strategic peripheries. Thus, by comparison to the Soviet Union, China can more
easily overawe the major power centers in the Indo-Pacific while at the same time more effectively preventing the United States from bringing

All these realitiesbeing a


rearward reinforcements to bear in defense of its regional allies.21

continental-sized power, possessing a gigantic and technologically


improving economy, enjoying superior rates of relative economic
growth, having a strategically advantageous location, and rapidly
acquiring formidable military capabilities add up quickly to make
China a far more consequential rival to the United States than any
Washington has faced in the past . Although U.S. officials are bashful
about describing China plainly as a geopolitical threat, there is little
doubt that they recognize the possibility of a coming power
transition, with all its attendant dangers. Because of the perennial arguments among liberals,
realists, and neoconservatives, there is no agreement in Washington about what the implications of this transition might be. Yet it is

precisely this contingency that U.S. grand strategy should aim to


thwart because American primacy has been beneficial for the
international system and, even more importantly, for the United
States itself. Preserving this preeminence, accordingly, remains the
central task for U.S. policymakers today. Devising a strategy that is
equal to this responsibility must begin with an acknowledgment of
both the significance and the complexity of the challenge given
Chinas deep enmeshment with the world. There is no better way to
begin this assessment than by recognizing that globalization in the
postwar period has spawned uneven gains that have produced in
China a new competitor to the United States. This most recent bout
of international integration has been reinvigorated and nurtured by
American hegemony, understood simply as possessing more
comprehensive power than any other state and being willing to use
that power to structure the global order in certain ways . Beijings continuing
ascent in these circumstances creates a difficult dilemma for Washington: unlike previous great powers that rose largely through autarkic
means, China has grown rapidly because it has benefited disproportionately from American investments in sustaining a liberal international
economic order. China, admittedly, is not alone in this regard. Many other European and Asian states have enjoyed economic revitalization in
the postwar period because of their integration into the multilateral trading system underwritten by American power. But China has
experienced disproportionately greater gains than the United States and others because its native comparative advantages have been
magnified through three distinctive policies. First, Beijing has opted to maintain a domestic economy characterized by significant protectionist
components even as it has pursued an investment-driven, export-led growth strategy that exploits the free access available to the more open
economies of the developed world.22 Second, the dominant role of the Chinese state in economic decisionmaking has permitted the
government to control critical factors of production, such as land and capital, maintain advantageous exchange rates, and sustain huge state-
owned enterprises, which in their totality have enabled China to advance nationalist aims beyond simply allocative efficiency and the
increased welfare of its population.23 And third, the consistent and systematic targeting of foreign intellectual property on a gigantic scale has
advanced Chinas industrial policy goals, which emphasize the speedy acquisition of advanced technologies by both legitimate and illegitimate
means in order to accelerate Chinese growth vis--vis other rivals in the international system.24 All these elements operating in unison have
raised Chinas level of development, which in turn has helped increase American welfare through tradebut at the cost of embodying a rising

it is by no means inevitable that China will continue


challenge to U.S. power. However,

to rise to the point where it becomes a genuine peer competitor of


the United States. Although China has experienced meteoric economic growth in recent decades, the Chinese state has
manifold weaknesses. It grapples with the prospect of adverse demographic transitions, contradictions between Beijings command polity and
pseudo-liberal economy, and an unbalanced growth strategy that emphasizes overinvestment at the cost of domestic consumption. These
weaknesses may yet take their toll, leading to either a collapse of Chinas hitherto relentless expansion or its severe moderation.25 The
evidence indicates that Chinas leaders are acutely aware of the precarious character of the nations economic achievements thus far. Given
their own problematic legitimacy, there is no doubt that they are deeplyeven fearfullyconcerned about the survival of Chinas Communist
regime in the context of the rising threats to domestic stability. Given the growing internal inequalities along multiple dimensions, the rampant
corruption throughout society (and especially among the elites), and the increasing individuation in the prospering middle classes, Chinas
leaders remain obsessed by the dangers of internal chaos. They understand that they might not be able to satisfy the rising expectations of
their now highly informed and restive population. The decisions reached during the recent third plenum of the 18th Party Congress indicate
that the Xi Jinping regime remains intently focused on confronting the countrys myriad economic problems head-on both in order to sustain
Chinas global rise and to ward off any indigenous threats to Communist control within China.26 However, the Xi regime remains reluctant to
face up to the need for constitutional political liberalization, which raises questions about whether its policies (or any similar policies followed
by its successors) will indeed satisfactorily dissipate the dangers of domestic instability. On this score, only time will tell. But the reality of
Chinas internal troubleswhich undoubtedly are considerablehas often strengthened the belief that its rise as a great power will not prove
as troublesome to others as might be ordinarily expected. According to this line of thought, Chinas domestic challenges will prevent its
leaders from pursuing those self-regarding policies that have been prosecuted by all other great powers in history.27 There is no doubt that if
the Chinese economy falters badly and for a substantial period of time or the Chinese state is gripped by a cataclysmic crisisfor whatever
reasonthe growing challenge to American hegemony would be attenuated. But absent such calamitous developments, it is unlikely that the
weight of Chinas internal challenges alone will prevent its leaders from pursuing those willful policies that would seem natural to Beijing as its
power continues to grow. After all, elevated levels of Chinese assertiveness, which have been on display since the 20072008 global financial
crisis, have occurred despite persistent domestic restiveness for over five years now. Moreover, internal problems have not prevented the
Chinese state from successfully extracting the necessary resources to sustain a dramatic military modernization over a long period of time.
Nor have they prevented recent Chinese leaders from steadily disregarding Deng Xiaopings old counsel to hide and bide in favor of a new
belligerence that takes the form of show and go. In fact, Beijing has been able to harness popular sentiments to support its increasingly

the United States cannot count on


abrasive foreign policies in the Indo-Pacific region. Given this reality,

the possibility that China might stumble in any fundamental sense.


Nor can it assume that Chinas relatively higher growth rates will
naturally decay well before Beijing acquires sufficient
comprehensive power to become a consequential rival. Washington
also cannot presume that its own national capabilities writ large will
always remain more powerful or more fecund than Chinas . Still less can it count
on the prospect of Chinese oppugnancy vanishing merely because Chinese growth rates threaten to ease up somewhat in the future. After all,
as Moscow did in years past, Beijing could still pose a major threat to U.S. interests despite possessing a smaller economy or experiencing

Because China alone among all other emerging powers


slower economic growth.

has the potential to displace the United States at the top of the
international hierarchy, Washington confronts the necessity of
consciously developing a grand strategy that limits Beijings ability
to erode overall U.S. preeminence. This corrective strategy needs to
be developed now , while China is still some distance away from
being able to effectively challenge the United States, or else it risks
being too late . Chinas deep integration with the international economy, however, implies that the containment strategies that
worked so effectively against the Soviet Union cannot be successfully replicated today. Consequently, if Washington is to escape

from the Scylla of paralyzing helplessness in the face of Chinas rise and the Charybdis of inveterate opposition to that ascent, it must

embark on a novel course of action that can be best described as


balancing without containment. This report lays out the logic of such a strategy, focusing not so much on the current crises
enveloping China and the United States but rather on the structural quandaries created by Beijings continuing rise. It begins by reviewing why
Chinas rise is unique in modern history and examines the specific predicament posed by Chinas ascendancy to the United States. Thereafter,
it elucidates the imperative of balancing China, given that other alternatives such as containment are not options that can be easily exercised
by Washington at the present time. Finally, it develops the outlines of a strategy that the United States should pursue toward China, an
approach that preserves the benefits of economic interdependence while limiting the dangers of a Chinese exploitation of its growing power.

They read our impact card for us the 1AC Zheng ev


1NC CP

Text: The United States federal government should implement sanctions


on Chinese cyber criminals, companies, and foreign intelligence operatives
that benefit from cybercrime.

Sanctions change Chinese cyber actions indictments prove. WaPo 15


WaPo 15 Washington Post, Major US Newspaper, citing, James Lewis,
Cyberpolicy Expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
and Rob Knake, Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations, 2015 (China shifts commercial hacking away from
military to civilian agency, Byline Ellen Nakashima, November 30th,
Accessible Online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/following-us-indictments-chinese-military-scaled-back-hacks-on-
american-industry/2015/11/30/fcdb097a-9450-11e5-b5e4-
279b4501e8a6_story.html, Accessed 06-29-2016, MA)
Then in May 2014, the Justice Department, following a months-long FBI investigation,
announced the indictments of five PLA officers on economic
espionage charges. One of the accused was a hacker profiled in the Mandiant report a moon-
faced, bespectacled officer named Wang Dong, also known by the online moniker Ugly Gorilla. The
indictments had an amazing effect in China , more than we could
have hoped for , said James A. Lewis, a cyber-policy expert at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. The Chinese hated them . They complained about
them every time there was a meeting . They said there couldnt be
any progress [in cyber-talks, which the Chinese pulled out of] until
the indictments were withdrawn and we promised not to do them
again. In the following months, the Chinese military quietly began
dismantling its economic espionage apparatus, officials said. PLA leaders, with
Xis approval, reviewed the militarys cyber-activities. They cracked down on
moonlighters within the PLA who were hacking on the side to sell
information to companies, and they attempted to halt collection of data that was not central
to the national security mission. What the change in PLA activity shows is that
China is not this implacable, immovable object , said Rob Knake, a senior
fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former White House cyber-official. We can in fact
alter the behavior of at least portions of the Chinese government . In
April, Obama signed an executive order establishing the power to
impose economic sanctions on individuals and entities that take part
in or benefit from illicit cyber-activities such as commercial espionage. If the
indictments had the effect of getting the PLA to scale down, then
sanctions likely will have a wider effect on other Chinese state-
sponsored groups , Knake said.
1NC - CP
Text: The United States Federal Government should
Implement state of the art vulnerability-mitigation measures for
companies against cyberattacks
Greatly expand the number of green cards available to foreign
students who earn science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics degrees in American universities and who have a job
offer in their field upon graduation

Deny the use of American banking system to foreign companies that


repeatedly benefit from the misappropriation of American
intellectual property

Creating comprehensive vulnerability-mitigation measures is key to


preventing cyberattacks
Blair et al. 13 their author (Dennis C. Blair, former U.S. Director of National
Intelligence and White House Fellow at the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Jon M. Huntsman Jr., the former US Ambassador to China and former
Governor of Utah, Craig R. Barrett, leading advocate for improving education in the
United States and around the world, he was Chairman of the United Nations Global
Alliance for Information and Communication Technologies and Development, Slade
Gorton, former US Senator and a member of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, the CEO of DRS Technologies, Inc., and former U.S.
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deborah Wince-Smith, the President and CEO of the
Council on Competitiveness, Michael K. Young, the President of the University of
Washington. Also a tenured Professor of Law, -- The Commission on the Theft of
American Intellectual Property - The IP Commission Report, May 2013,
http://www.ipcommission.org/report/ip_commission_report_052213.pdf)//IZYP
Encourage adherence to best-in-class vulnerability-mitigation measures by companies and governments in the face
of an evolving cybersecurity environment. Despite their limited utility against skilled and persistent targeted
hackers,computer security systems still need to maintain not only the most
up-to-date vulnerability-mitigation measures, such as firewalls, password-protection
systems, and other passive measures. They should also install active systems that
monitor activity on the network, detect anomalous behavior, and trigger intrusion
alarms that initiate both network and physical actions immediately. This is
a full-time effort . Organizations need network operators standing watch who are prepared to take actions
based on the indications provided by their systems, and who keep a man in the loop to ensure that machine
responses cannot be manipulated. Organizations need to have systemssoftware, hardware,
and staffto take real-time action to shut down free movement around the house, lock inside doors,
and immobilize attackers once the alarms indicate that an intrusion has started. Some government agencies and a
emphasis should
few corporations have comprehensive security systems like this, but most do not. Finally,
be given to developing cutting-edge technologies that will promote a healthier
Internet ecosystem. Examples of such technologies come in many forms. For one, since a large
number of the successful targeted attacks are still arriving in the form of
email campaigns containing links or files exploiting a zero-day
vulnerability in common software packages, systems that are capable of rapidly analyzing
the behavior of unknown files and links are an important element. So too is technology that allows for the isolation
of computing environments so that damage is limited to a quarantined area and cannot infect the rest of the
network. Last, systems providing advanced, real-time network analysis would also be a necessary element of this
ecosystem.
Case
Plan

China says no they wont uphold their side of cooperation if they would
then previous engagement solves. Chowdhry 16
Aisha Chowdhry 16, March 31, 2016 "U.S.-China still at odds on
cybersecurity issues," Aisha Chowdhry is a staff writer covering Congress,
the State Department, the Department of Veteran Affairs and the
Department of Homeland Security. Prior to joining FCW, Chowdhry covered
foreign policy for CQ Roll Call. Her overseas work prior to that took her to
Pakistan and Afghanistan. She has worked as a correspondent for Reuters
based out of Islamabad. Chowdhry has also worked at the CBS affiliate in
Washington as a multimedia journalist. She began her career as a
freelance reporter for USA Today and covered stories from conflict zones.
Her work has appeared in the New York Times, Foreign Policy, and Voice of
America, among others. Chowdhry received her masters in broadcast
journalism from American University in Washington, D.C. FCW,
https://fcw.com/Articles/2016/03/31/obama-xi-cyber.aspx (da-6/8/16)
In the fall of 2015, the two countries agreed that they will not
"conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual
property, including trade secrets or other confidential business
information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to
companies or commercial sectors," according to the White House.
But it remains to be seen if China has followed through on that
promise. "It doesnt seem like much has really happened since the
agreement in September," Sarah Granger, a fellow at the Truman
National Security Project, told FCW. "I havent seen any evidence of
increased arrests in China for 'cyber-enabled theft of intellectual
property' outlined in the agreement, even though the idea was for
more cooperation on investigating crimes. The number of incidents
reported in recent months looks to be similar to those before the
agreement, so we have no real evidence of any changes yet." China has
been unofficially tagged as the country responsible for the massive Office of Personnel Management hack
that compromised the personal information of more than 22 million Americans, including federal
"I think China has not let up on cyberattacks, and this is
employees.
Obama's silent war," Jason Maloni, leader of the data security and
privacy team at LEVICK, told FCW. "I think Obama will be pressing
them harder to curtail the cyberattacks coming from the region, and
thats just not China -- it's [also] North Korea." Maloni said one of the reasons why
it's difficult for China to restrain those activities is because many hackers' livelihoods depend on it. "They
are not doing the minimum, and I'm sure thats what President Obama is going to press Xi on," Maloni said.
Rep. Chris Smith (R-N.J.), whose computer and committee networks
were hacked by someone traced back to Beijing, told FCW that "not
even a little bit" has been done when it comes to the cybersecurity
agreement. Smith is a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and co-chairman of
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China.
China is more advanced and has no reason to communicate with the US
they say fuck off McAfee 16
John Mcafee 16, 3-23-2016, "JOHN McAFEE: The US should subcontract its
cybersecurity to China," Founder of world's first public cyber security
company. Has founded four other cybetsecurity companies and now is CEO
of Future Tense Central - the world's leading mobile device, corporate
network and secure communications company.Business
Insider,http://www.businessinsider.com/john-mcafee-us-should-
subcontract-cybersecurity-to-china-2016-3
China, by any cybersecurity measures is 20 years ahead of the US.
So advanced, that the White House voiced open frustration at our
inability to stop or even slow down Chinas increasing invasion of
our cyberspace. China is not concerned about encryption because
it's capable of gathering all inputs prior to encryption and capturing
screen shots after data has been decrypted. They don't care what
encryption techniques are used. Why should they waste time on the
interim communication step? If the American government could grasp this powerful
departure from our archaic cybersecurity paradigm, then we might have a chance of survival in this
technological world for which we have entirely missed the boat. How does China achieve such dramatic
results compared to the US? The answer is through a brilliant application of the foundation upon which
digital science rests - mathematics. One of the most powerful tools of intelligence gathering in this new
age of digital communications is a nearly forgotten field of mathematics called Point Set Topology. I
chose this field as my specialty in grad school because it was trivially easy and I was lazy. At the time it
had absolutely no practical use, about which I cared little. I was simply enjoying college life for as long as
Topology deals with the relations
possible, and it's simplicity gave me lots of free time.
between and among sets, or collections of things. The things can be anything,
fish, buttons, shoelaces, orPeople. Let me give you an oversimplified example of how
it can be used in intelligence gathering: Imagine that I am a terrorist
(not difficult for my detractors within the FBI), and I have a set (collection) of people that I
frequently or infrequent call in my phone. If China suspects me it will
first plant spyware on my phone that merely transmits the phone
numbers of my contacts and the frequency and duration of my calls.
Nothing else. The spyware planting is trivial for the Chinese and
they can do it from halfway around the world. They then plant the
same spyware on the phones of everyone I contact, and then
everyone that they contact, and so on down the line until upwards of
100,000 phones or more are infected. Since the software is merely
transmitting interactions, each individual phone is minimally
impacted and few, ever detect the spyware.
SCS

1. South China Sea will remain peaceful interdependence, desire to avoid


war, accidents and miscalc are unlikely to escalate
Kim 16 - Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Studies, Bradley University [Kim, Jihyun. "Possible Future of the Contest in the South
China Sea." The Chinese Journal of International Politics (2016)] doa 5-11-16

Chinas rise per se is not considered to pose a threat to


In this research,
regional security or directly challenge Americas interests in Asia. Also,
the peace-inducing aspects of Chinas relations with its neighbours
and the United States, in line with pragmatic realism, would continue to
prevail over the conflict-producing ones in the foreseeable future.6 As aptly pointed
out by Richard Rosecrance, however, there is as yet no clear answer as to how the United States and the
rest of the world will take the rise in Chinas power and astutely react to it.7 Whats more, whether their
shared interests would continue to be a foundation for cooperation and self-restraint in both the medium
and the longer term is not predetermined, hence this call for the states to choose the right policy, one
that has more cooperative than conflictual elements to it, thereby avoiding the doom-and-gloom scenario
that too many of todays analysts portray.8 Among other issues, Chinas territorial disputes with its
neighbours are considered as constituting a potential source of its dissatisfaction, of the breakdown of the
status quo, and even of war. Nonetheless, one cannot automatically assume that
China will indeed adopt an unequivocally expansionist stance in the
future, given that taking such a measure would be unrewarding, as the
potential political, diplomatic, military, and economic costs of controversial territorial expansion
far outweigh any benefits to be gained from it.9 In other words, a cost-
benefit analysis makes conflict over territory less than desirable ,
and gives China greater incentive to maximize its interests other
than through blatant territorial expansion. Besides, it is hard to imagine
a war scenario between China on the one side and the United States (and its Asian allies and
friends) on the other, bearing in mind the absence of any intense ideological
competition between them, as well as their complex interdependence,
which tends to have the pacific effects induced by the condition of mutual assured
destruction as regards economic damage and security costs.10 As Robert Keohane and Joseph
Nye assert, complex interdependence refers to a situation in which a number of
countries and their fortunes are inextricably connected through multiple channels and various
issue linkages. This is how increases in economic and other types of interdependence facilitate
cooperation among states; thus military force as a policy tool is less likely to
be used by governments towards one another.11 Chinas intensifying relations with its Southeast
Asian neighbours as well as with the United States in the realm of economics and other issue areas appear
one
to approximate this ideal type of international system Given the continuing tensions in the region,
must not completely rule out the possibility of conflict flare-ups due to accident or
miscalculation. However, the chances of Beijings deliberately
initiating an armed conflict are still limited, not necessarily because it is genuinely
risk-averse or peace-seeking for peaces sake, but because the benefits to be accrued through relatively
stable coexistence with other states due to complex interdependence would outweigh the expected
Despite Beijings
military and diplomatic costs of a war that overt territorial expansion would risk.
unswerving sovereignty claims, encompassing virtually the entire
South China Sea, and buttressed by its reclaiming of land and building of infrastructure,
Chinese leaders have so far known, as evident in their peculiarly shrewd way of dealing
how to avoid crossing the red line while
with these maritime territorial disputes,
assiduously publicizing their core interest and views on how to
prevent tensions from escalating into a full-scale war. Moreover, both
China and the United States have shared interests as regards cooperating on major global
problems that have regional implications, including nuclear proliferation, terrorism and other
transnationally organized crimes, along with natural disasters, infectious diseases, energy security, and
environmental issues. Additionally, despite Chinas anxiety over Americas military
what the United States considers as its
superiority and continuing political influence in Asia,
strategic goal of upholding freedom of navigation (FON) is not incompatible with
Chinas interest in keeping regional stability, given their mutual stake in preserving an
environment conducive to international commerce. Thus, it is less likely that China
would rashly challenge US interests, including navigational freedom, or cite the South
China Sea disputes as a case confirming Beijings expansionist ambitions. Accordingly, one can
be cautiously optimistic about a relatively stable future though not in the
form of positive peace12even in the midst of Chinas increasing
assertiveness, its territorial disputes with neighbours, and its rivalry with the United
States for regional supremacy.
Econ

1. No impact to economic decline prefer newer data


Drezner 14 - professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University [Daniel W. DREZNER, The System
Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics,
Vol. 66, No. 1 (January 2014), p. 123-164]

The final significant outcome addressesa dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on
cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple
analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase
their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic
downturn would lead to an increase in conflict whether through greater internal repression,
diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict.
Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy
movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder.

The aggregate data suggest otherwise , however. The Institute for Economics and Peace
has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately
the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined
since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most
sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not
triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude:
"[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular
decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been
reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge
in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been
expected."43

2. Economic interdependence checks conflict


Ikenberry 14 - Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International
Affairs at Princeton University and George Eastman Visiting Professor at
Balliol College [G. John Ikenberry, , From Hegemony to the Balance of Power: The
Rise of China and American Grand Strategy in East Asia, International Journal of
Korean Unification Studies Vol. 23, No. 2, 2014, 4163]

the U nited S tates and China are not simply poised on a geopolitical
Finally,
playing field . The two countries also occupy key positions in the world
economy, the world environment, and the world society. In all these areas,
China and the United States are increasingly interdependent . They are not
simply pitted in zero-sum geopolitical competition . They are also tied
together in deep and complex interdependent ways. In various areas
related to the world economy, global warming, transnational crime, energy
security, and so forth, they cannot realize their objectives without the help
of the other. These are problems of economic and security
interdependence . These circumstances of interdependence create
incentives for the two countries to bargain and moderate disputes . They
cannot be secure and stable alone; they can only be secure and stable together. To the extent that this is true,
the two countries will find powerful reasons not to go all the way down
the path to balance of power rivalry and security competition . They will
grudgingly look for ways to moderate and manage their contest for supremacy.