You are on page 1of 29

(To Appear in the ASEAN Economic Bulletin, April 2003 Issue)

ASEAN-CHINA FTA: ADVANTAGES, CHALLENGES AND


IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NEWER ASEAN
MEMBER COUNTRIES

“The most important trip you may take in life is meeting people halfway”
Henry Boye

“Judge a tree from its fruit, and not from its leaves.”
Euripedes

ASEAN has been and will remain the most important trade and investment
partner of Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), Myanmar
and Viet Nam (or ASEAN-4). China’s accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the proposed ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) will provide greater market access in resource- and agro-based
products and some manufactured goods for ASEAN-4. There will be, at the
same time, much greater competition from China in both ASEAN-4’s home and
third-country markets, especially in a wide range of labour- and technology-
intensive manufactures. Special and differential (S & D) treatment and
flexibility for ASEAN-4 will be necessary to enable a more effective
participation by the newer members in the proposed ASEAN-China FTA. In
this connection, two proposals are made for enhancing domestic
entrepreneurship and inter-firm networking, and for monitoring and
benchmarking supply capabilities and competitiveness at the enterprise level
within ASEAN6/4 and China.

I. Introduction
Globalization has provided a dynamic platform to sustain high and durable rates of
economic growth, structural transformation and social development for many
developing countries. In particular, it has opened up unlimited opportunities for
gainful co-operation and integration in trade, investment and services among
countries and communities, including China and most ASEAN members in this part
of the world. In this context, leaders of the two sides decided in Singapore during
2

November 2000 to explore measures to widen and deepen the process of mutual
economic co-operation and integration. A year later in Brunei Darussalam, they
endorsed a proposal to set up an ASEAN-China FTA within 10 years; negotiations on
trade liberalization for products under the “early harvest” programme were then
initiated.
Subsequently, a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-
operation (FACEC) between ASEAN and China was signed in Cambodia in
November 2002. The Agreement provides for, among other things, the completion of
negotiations on trade in goods by mid-2004. It also envisages the operation of a FTA
between China and, on the other hand, the six older member countries (or ASEAN-6)
from 2010. FTA arrangements between China and ASEAN-4 will be in force from
2015; there are three least developed countries (LDCs) and an economy in market-
based transition among the newer member countries. The Framework Agreement is
likely to become another milestone in the unfolding history and process of multi-
faceted growth and integration in trade in goods and services, and in investment
among developing economies in East and South-East Asia.
The following paper first discusses in section II the current patterns of trade
and investment relationships between China and ASEAN-4. It then considers the
potential and opportunities on the demand side, including additional market access for
resource-based products and for intra-industry activities, which can be expected from
the proposed ASEAN-China FTA (section III). Section IV examines the supply-side
impact on ASEAN-4 as a result of China’s proven competitive strength, recent WTO
membership, and proposed free-trade arrangements with ASEAN. Due emphasis is
given to the additional competition to be managed by ASEAN-4 in both home and
third-country markets, especially on a wide range of labour- and technology-intensive
manufactures. The nature and justification for special and differential (S&D)
treatment and flexibility for low-income and least developed countries are dealt with
in section V, with special reference to non-WTO members within ASEAN-4 in the
context of the proposed ASEAN-China FTA. The promotion of SME
competitiveness and capacity building are among the focal areas of economic co-
operation within the Framework Agreement. In this context, section VI contains two
actionable proposals for capacity building in entrepreneurship development and inter-
firm networking within and across borders, and for monitoring and benchmarking
enterprise capabilities and competitiveness in ASEAN-6/4 and China. The paper ends
3

with a number of concluding observations on the challenging management of greater


interdependence between ASEAN and China ahead (section VII).

II. Current Relationships in Trade and Investment


There is a significant amount of unrecorded cross-border trade, involving largely
consumer goods and raw materials, among economies of the Greater Mekong
Subregion (GMS). Given this qualification, a number of observations can be made
from the patterns of trade and investment interaction between ASEAN-4 and China in
1995 and 2000 (Table 1). One, China’s trade share with the newer ASEAN members
has risen, especially on their import side. The exception is Myanmar where bilateral
trade declined appreciably in the late 1990s. Excluding Myanmar, the relative share of
merchandise trade between China and ASEAN-3 more than doubled from 4.6 per cent
in 1995 to 9.3 per cent in 2000 (equivalent to just over US$ 3.1 billion). This is much
faster than the growth of ASEAN trade with China as a whole.
Two, China and Viet Nam have become comparatively important as trade
partners – in terms of both the size and the rate of expansion of merchandise trade,
from US$ 0.7 billion in 1995 to over US$ 2.9 billion in 2000. Nevertheless, ASEAN
as a whole remain the most important trade partner of ASEAN-4 with a relative trade
share of almost two-fifths (US$ 15.9 billion) in 2000 (Table 1). In this connection,
there was a significant fall-off in Cambodian exports to ASEAN, especially Singapore
and Viet Nam, from 2000 because of the massive increase in exports to the United
States.1
Three, trade in services (notably tourism) has also risen appreciably between
ASEAN-4 and China. In particular, the number of Chinese tourists going to Viet
Nam constituted one-third (or some 626 thousand persons) of the total in 2000,
compared to just 5 per cent during 1995 (Table 1). Again, however, ASEAN
generally accounts for the large bulk of tourists visiting the other three newer member
countries. The potential for two-way tourism is really inviting. At present, ASEAN
tourists were less than 13 per cent of the total tourist arrivals (13.1 million) in China
during 2000 while Chinese tourists in ASEAN made up just 5 per cent of the 37.8
million persons visiting ASEAN in the same year (Table 1).
4

PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 NEAR HERE


5

Four, China has been a destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) from
several ASEAN members -- directly or via Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (SAR) of China.2 Likewise, several ASEAN countries have also been the host
to important FDI flows from China, both directly and via third-party ventures.
However, China is a net investor in ASEAN-4, notably with some large investment
projects in Cambodia during the second half of the 1990s. Nevertheless, ASEAN-6 as
a whole remains by far the most important source of FDI for most ASEAN-4 (Table
1).
In general, a large proportion of FDI from China is channeled to resource-
based activities in ASEAN-4. Manufacturing for the export and, to a much less
extent, domestic markets is also another important focus of such investment. In
addition, there is considerable FDI “in kind” – that is the investors supplying
manufacturing equipment and machinery as equity in the joint ventures while their
local partners provide land and building and related infrastructure.3

III. Demand-side Potential and Opportunities


There is a great scope for greater ASEAN-China complementarities in economic
development and structural transformation (Wattanapruttipaisan 2001). As income
and the standard of living rise, so will domestic demand for more as well as better
goods and services for consumption and investment purposes. Typically, the
additional consumption is met in part by imported products, and by outward travel for
tourism and other purposes, especially education and training. Imported consumer
goods and overseas travel, for example, have served both as an incentive for work
and, too, as an outlet for unsatisfied (or pent-up) demand. Surely, ASEAN will be in
a position to supply competitively some of such import demand for goods and
services from China, and vice versa.

III.1 Overview
In the above context, four positive factors operate at the macroeconomic level. One,
China has a huge economy and an equally huge population of some 1.2 billion
persons. The country’s GDP, for example, reached US$ 1,159 billion in 2001,
compared to an average GDP of US$ 576 billion for ASEAN during 2000-2001.
What is more, China has been among the fastest growing economies in the world,
with output expansion averaging some 9 per cent a year in the past two decades.
6

Equally striking is that GDP in China continued to expand by around 7 per cent a year
during the financial and economic crisis of 1997-1998, and the global and regional
slowdown in 20014.
Two, income per head of population in China almost tripled -- from US$ 342
to US$ 911 between 1991 and 2001. This income level, which doubles every 7 to 8
years with the maintenance of the country’s high-growth path, will soon approach the
average per capita income within ASEAN as a whole (about US$ 1,137 in 1991 and
US$ 1,038 in 2001). There is, of course, a big gap between per capita income in
Singapore and Brunei Darussalam and, on the other hand, the average income level
among the remaining member countries5. Relative to China, however, the rate of
expansion in GDP as well as per capita income will likely be slower in most parts of
ASEAN in the future.
Three, China’s external trade expanded at a double-digit rate for more than a
decade before WTO accession; such a rate was twice faster than the global average.
Yet, trade penetration remains comparatively limited: the ratio of trade to GDP was
still comparatively low at 44 per cent during 2000; the corresponding ratio being over
135 per cent for ASEAN-10 and 78 per cent in the case of ASEAN-4 (Table 1). In
addition, the proportion of China’s trade with ASEAN to GDP of China, although
rising, is very low – for example, from 2.0 to 3.6 per cent between 1991 and 2000.
Meanwhile, the value of ASEAN’s trade with China relative to ASEAN GDP was less
than 6 per cent in 2000; the corresponding figure for ASEAN-4 being just 7.8 per cent
(or US$ 3.8 billion).
Four, the trade flows between exports and imports have been relatively
balanced between ASEAN and China. In recent years, some ASEAN-6 members
have enjoyed a considerable surplus in merchandise trade with China but the newer
ASEAN members tend to record a large trade deficit with China. Large economies,
such as that of China, tend to have lower trade/GDP ratios than those of their smaller
counterparts. However, an increase of even a few percentage points in the trade/GDP
ratios between ASEAN and China can be expected with reasonable confidence (more
later). These few points are equivalent to several billions dollars in effective demand
on the basis of current trade flows in 2000 (Table 1).

III.2 Post-WTO Trade Liberalization


China joined WTO in December 2001. This is a significant and welcome
development for the global community because the country had been negotiating
7

since 1986 for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the
WTO predecessor organization. In the intervening period, China became the world’s
seven largest trading economy, with an annual turnover averaging US$ 470.5 billion
during 2000-2001. The country now accounts for about 4 per cent of global export
value, and 3.5 per cent of world imports (UNCTAD 2002: 141). In addition, China is
the world’s largest destination for FDI among the developing countries, hosting an
inflow of US$ 47 billion in 2001 alone.
Substantial tariff cuts as well as the removal of a variety of non-tariff barriers
(NTBs) had already been carried out by China in preparation for membership of the
global trading community. The average tariff rate, for example, was slashed from
42.9 per cent in 1992 to 23.6 per cent four years later and to 17.5 per cent in 1999.
The effective tariff rate, measured by the ratio of tariff receipts over import value, was
only 4.5 per cent during the first half of 1999.6 China’s WTO accession involves a
package of further and more comprehensive liberalization in cross-border trade in
goods and services.
One, the weighted average tariff on all imports in China will fall to 5.7 per
cent with most of the reductions taking place within 2 to 4 years after accession but in
no case later than 2010. This rate is slightly higher than that in Japan (4.7 per cent),
comparable to that of the United States (5.5 per cent), and slightly lower than that in
EU (6.9 per cent) after the Uruguay Round. Notably, tariffs on information
technology products (including computers, telecommunications equipment and
semiconductors) will go down from an average rate of 13.3 per cent to zero by 2005.7
Two, significant commitments have also been made by China to remove
NTBs.8 Imported agricultural products, in particular, face high tariff rates and strong
barriers as well. NTBs are converted to their tariff equivalents while market access is
also enlarged through the imposition of low tariffs on imports within quota ceilings.
Major agricultural commodities of interest to ASEAN and other exporters will be
subject to an in-quota tariff level of less than 10 per cent (except sugar) – compared,
for example, to an out-of-quota tariff rate of 65 per cent on rice (and wheat). Between
2001 and 2004, moreover, the quota ceilings rise from 1.7 to 2 million tons for sugar,
2 to 3.6 million tons for soybean and palm oils, 3.3 to 5.3 million tons for rice, and 7.9
to 9.6 million tons in the case of wheat. In addition, import licensing and NTBs on
162 out of 377 import items were eliminated upon accession while NTBs on another
75 items are to be removed by end-2003.
8

Three, extensive liberalization is to be implemented by China as regards the


supply of cross-border services. There had been severe restrictions on external
participation and foreign presence firstly, in many service sectors and subsectors;
secondly, in a large number of geographical locations; and lastly, in terms of the
extent and ceiling of equity ownership. These restrictions are being removed and
relaxed mostly within 2-4 years after WTO membership. Such liberalization is
particularly significant in a wide range of financial services, in telecommunications,
and in wholesale and retail trade as well.

III.3 Estimated Impact on Trade and Income Growth


The short- and long-term impact of China’s WTO accession has been of great interest
virtually across the world. It was examined by at least 20 major econometric and
simulation studies (both published and unpublished) between 1996 and 2000.
Estimates from these studies are quite diverse – a result of the different sets of
assumptions and specifications made as regards the extent and depth of trade
liberalization, the sequence of domestic policy and economic responses, and the
interactive effects of such responses over time. Nevertheless, some elements of
convergence can be drawn from the estimates so far available although the order of
magnitude involved are not necessarily uniform and, in several cases, comparable.9
One, with WTO membership, China’s share in global trade will be
considerably higher, by as much as 30 per cent each in both export and import
volumes. In particular, the net import of selected agricultural products may increase
by US$ 1.5 billion a year between 2000 and 2009. Meanwhile, annual grain imports
may rise by 2 million tons, while those for oilseeds, by 2.5 millions tons. Two, there
will be higher GDP growth in China, with the estimated gains in the range of 0.9 per
cent to well over 2 per cent on top of the already rapid output expansion (some 7-8
per cent annually) in recent years. Thus, one additional percentage point in GDP is
equivalent to almost US$ 12 billion of domestic resources available for consumption
and investment (including via imports).
Regarding ASEAN-China interaction, greater market access and more trade
opportunities are likely to materialize directly through trade liberalization measures,
and indirectly through the consequent and cumulative enlargement of trade flows
coupled with significant income and welfare gains on both sides. There are presently
no separate estimates of the positive spill-over effects of China’s WTO membership
9

on ASEAN-4. Several observations, however, can be drawn from the few indicators
available for ASEAN.
In aggregate terms, firstly, China’s post-accession demand for ASEAN
imports will expand by about 10 per cent a year. Thus, the value of such imports will
reach US$ 35.5 billion in 2005, compared to US$ 22.2 billion in 2000 (ASEAN 2001:
7). Secondly, assuming duty-free access under the ASEAN-China FTA, the export
value of six ASEAN members to China would rise by 48 per cent and that of China to
ASEAN-6, by 51 per cent. At the same time, the combined GDP of these six ASEAN
countries would expand by at least US$ 5.4 billion (or just under one per cent) while
that of China by US$ 2.2 billion (or 0.3 per cent).10
As regards the composition of trade flows, firstly, ASEAN-4 may directly gain
some additional market shares in China in resource-based goods. These include
notably oil, gas and hydro-energy; several other mineral commodities; many forestry
and agriculture items (such as food grains, sugar, edible oils, timber and furniture
etc.); and fishery and aquaculture products in fresh, processed and frozen forms. In
addition, through rising income and affluence, there will be higher demand from
China and ASEAN-6 for a variety of high-value, income-elastic agro-products –
including high-quality rice, fish and seafood, cut flowers, tropical vegetables and
fruit, nuts and spices and so on (Lam and Wattanapruttipaisan 2001b: 29-30). In the
process, furthermore, ASEAN-4 producers can expect a large premium for
environmentally preferable, natural products – including those from organic farming,
and from farming with plants and species which have not been subject to genetic
modification.
Secondly, some ASEAN-4 members can also be suppliers to ASEAN-6 of a
variety of assembly services, and of parts or components for electrical and automotive
machinery and equipment and for consumer electronics, too. Driven by trade-related
FDI, these product categories have become important exports of several ASEAN-6
countries, and many elements within these categories are likely to be competitive in
third-country markets or as complementary (intra-industry) inputs for China’s export
production (ASEAN 2001). As noted earlier, the heavy tariffs and strong NTBs on
such imports are being cut substantially by China – for example, from 13.4 to 6.6 per
cent on machinery and equipment, and from 31.3 to 14.1 per cent for motor vehicles
and parts.
It is possible, furthermore, that the actual increase in trade flows may even be
larger, given the likely faster rate of China’s imports of ASEAN products relative to
10

China’s imports from all sources. This possibility is attributable to falling prices of
traded goods and inputs as a result of mutual trade liberalization, and to greater
economic cooperation and integration in the context of FTA arrangements. Higher
trade and income growth will also have a positive, flow-on impact on trade in
services, ASEAN-China tourism especially, and on two-way FDI flows -- including
those channeled to resource-based projects, and to trade-related manufacturing
activities and services.
As noted earlier, there is a significant potential for a substantial increase in
two-way tourist flows between ASEAN and China, and for service-related FDI in
restaurants and tourism facilities, and wholesale and retail trade. In particular, the
mutual flows of tourists are still relatively small, especially in terms of the total
number of tourists visiting ASEAN or China (table 1). At the same time, the growing
markets for eco-tourism, thematic tourism, adventure tourism and multiple-destination
tourism remain to be tapped in, as well as by, both ASEAN and China. However, the
skills and resource base, and the policy capacity tend to be limited within ASEAN-4,
especially among the smaller and least developed economies. This has imposed a
severe constraint on domestic and external efforts to induce the needed reallocation of
resources to take advantage, directly and via ASEAN-6, of current and emerging trade
and investment opportunities, including those in China.

IV. Challenging Supply-side Competition


Other things being equal, the widening and deepening of market access can be a
positive stimulus on domestic economic growth and diversification, social
development and poverty reduction in the long term. This accounts for the
proliferation of preferential trade arrangements (PTAs) or FTAs, among other trade-
facilitating approaches, over the past four decades, especially those coming into force
from the 1990s. Increased competition in home and third-country markets, and
adaptive structural adjustments and resource re-allocation are among the consequent
costs and disruptions. These can be considerable and prolonged in many cases, as
experiences have revealed. Nevertheless, they have to be managed by all concerned
in a sustainable and forward-looking manner for greater collective efficiencies over
the long term.11

IV.1. Global and Regional Trade Interaction and Implications


11

It is not within the scope of the paper to speculate on the shape of things to come
under the proposed ASEAN-China FTA. A number of observations, however, can be
made concerning the shifting patterns of trade flows and their economic implications.
One, ASEAN-6 will remain an important trade and investment partner for most
ASEAN-4 in the foreseeable future. As such, the older members continue to serve as
a useful market for ASEAN-4; they can act, too, as a crucial gateway for ASEAN-4’s
trade in both final export and import products, and in intermediate inputs for
processing within ASEAN-6 and, possibly in the longer term, in China as well.12
Two, intra-Asian trade has been on the increase – with the Asian newly
industrializing economies (NIEs), China and several ASEAN member countries
playing collectively an important part. This upward trend augurs well for further
advances in trade and investment integration in the coming decades among Asian
economies and economic groups (ASEAN-6, ASEAN-4, Asian NIEs and China).
China, for example, sourced only 47 per cent of imports from the EU, Japan and the
United States in 1999, compared to 54 per cent a decade ago (Table 2). The
corresponding figures for ASEAN-6 are 45 and 54 per cent for these two respective
periods.
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 NEAR HERE

Three, in the above context, China has developed strong trade and investment
linkages with other developing economies in East and South-East Asia. In fact, these
economies supplied over one-third each of China’s import of agricultural
commodities and manufactured products in 1999 (Table 2). Largely as a result, the
Asian NIEs and ASEAN-6 have a combined merchandise trade surplus (totaling just
over US$ 2 billions in 2000) with China (UNCTAD 2002: 155-156). On the other
hand, the limited supply capacity and competitiveness of most ASEAN-4 members
has contributed to their on-going trade deficit with China, as noted earlier (Table 1).

IV.2 Competition in Home and Third-country Markets


In general, the bigger beneficiaries from China’s liberalized and deregulated markets
(in goods and services) are developed countries, or developing economies rich in
natural resources, scenic tourist attractions and/or at higher levels of industrialization
and technological development. The likely beneficiaries among the latter group
include the Asian NIEs and several ASEAN-6 members (OECD 2002: 69-78 and 138-
156; and UNCTAD 2002: 157-164). These Asian regional suppliers have developed
12

extensive production and export linkages with China. As such, they are now
possessing invaluable first-mover advantage through well- or long-established trade
and investment complementarities.
Nevertheless, ASEAN home market as a whole can expect much greater
competitive pressures in from China. The products involved include labour-intensive
manufactures (such as many lines of textiles and clothing plus consumer electronics,
footwear, toys and plastic products). In particular, garment producers at a lower stage
of technology sophistication in South Asia and several ASEAN members (both newer
and older) are going to feel considerable pressures from home-market penetration and
third-market displacement by China in the coming years. The pressures are likely to
be intensified with the phasing out of (preferential) export quotas under the Multifibre
Arrangement at the beginning of 2005 (UNCTAD 2002; and Walmsley, Terrie and
Hertel 2000).
In addition, China also has a competitive edge or has developed
competitiveness in a wide range of other manufactures -- including building materials,
machinery and electrical appliances, optical instruments, clocks and watches,
measuring and checking instruments, metal products and several chemicals. In fact,
these manufacture goods accounted for about 70 per cent of all ASEAN imports from
China -- with machinery and electrical appliances alone reaching just over one-half of
the import value in 1999. Such imports have also expanded faster than ASEAN
import of similar products from all other sources during 1993-1999 (ASEAN 2001:
20-21).
Concerning third-country markets, China will likely be a formidable
competitor in several export categories of major interest to both the older and newer
ASEAN members in the three most important export markets for both ASEAN and
China – namely, the United States, Japan and EU. During the 1990s, for example,
China’s share doubled to around 20 per cent in the G-7 market for clothing.13 This
gain in market share has occurred largely at the expense of exporters from the Asian
NIEs; however, the major ASEAN exporters (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and
Thailand) managed to keep their relative share largely constant at around 8 per cent.14
The G-7 market for footwear is now dominated by China whose relative share was
less than 10 per cent in the late 1980s but went as high as 38 per cent in the late
1990s. Again, this has taken place at the expense of both the Asian NIEs and, to a
lesser extent, such ASEAN members as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and
Thailand (OECD 2001: 138-140).
13

As regards tourism, the potential for mutual gains is substantial. Out-bound


tourists from China amounted to around 10 million with just over one-fifth heading
for ASEAN. Comparatively, however, the number of Chinese tourists in ASEAN-4
(except Viet Nam) has been much fewer (Table 1). Meanwhile, the growing markets
for eco-tourism, adventure tourism, and multiple-destination tourism remain to be
tapped. The major selling points for such “niche tourism” – namely naturalness,
rarity, and pristine quality – are in good supply, particularly within ASEAN-4.
There has, indeed, been a considerable amount of FDI and many investment
projects in infrastructure development with a positive spillover effect on tourism
development generally. In particular, ASEAN-6 has been an important source of
investment capital in tourist-based hotels, resorts, and facilities in the newer ASEAN
members since the early 1990s. But such investment resources have been confined
largely to more accessible localities and internal regions, or “cheery picking” in
nature. Within ASEAN-4, meanwhile, good quality accommodation is not always
available or affordable for different classes of tourists and at various scenic locations.
In addition, a large number of tourism-related services remain to be improved and
their variety diversified (Lam and Wattanapruttipaisan 2001b: 30-31).
An over-arching issue concerns the impulses and imperatives in future
competition to be managed by both ASEAN and China. A key factor in maintaining
market shares or in gaining new markets relates to innovation-led and learning-driven
improvement and differentiation in products and production processes. Meanwhile,
there are other non-price attributes of competitive advantage – reflecting, for example,
more demanding, more sophisticated and constantly changing consumer choices and
market preferences.15 Largely as a result, there are now shorter product cycles and
smaller production batches, more frequent design changes, greater mass
customization and just-in-time sourcing, and tighter delivery scheduling.
Thus, the structural adjustment and resource reallocation so involved in
building up capabilities and sustaining competitiveness have become greatly
complicated, costly and time consuming. A compounding factor in this connection is
that the process has to be initiated, nurtured and carried out on an on-going basis so as
to ensure a timely and flexible response to the fast changing impulses and imperatives
from both domestic and external economic and technological conditions, as noted
earlier. This leads on to the need for preferential treatment and greater flexibility in
favour of the poorer and more disadvantaged economies.
14

V. Special and Differential Treatment for ASEAN-4


A large number of LDCs, including Cambodia and Lao PRD in this region, and
economies in transition, such as Viet Nam, are not GATT/WTO members. As such,
they will not be able to enjoy the S&D treatment provided in the Uruguay Agreements
and in China’s WTO commitments for that matter. At the same time, it should be
noted that substantial new WTO obligations are being assumed by developing
economies and, in many cases, by even the LDCs. In addition, the greater specificity
of S&D provisions under various WTO Agreements means that such treatment tends
to be less extensive or inclusive.
S&D provisions for low-income economies and LDCs in various WTO
Agreements normally comprise four categories – namely the recognition of their
specific interest, the imposition of fewer obligations on these economies, the granting
of longer adjustment and transitional timeframes to them, and the provision of
technical assistance in their favour (Table 3). Thus, S&D treatment is expected to
give low-income countries time and opportunities firstly, to make the necessary
changes in their legislation; secondly, to re-orientate policies and put in place new
packages of policies, and to establish the necessary institutional and administrative
infrastructure; thirdly, to minimize and manage more effectively the inevitable
economic disruptions and losses associated with their new obligations; and lastly and
most crucially, to build up their supply capabilities and competitiveness for gainful
and sustained participation in the global trading system in the long run.

PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 NEAR HERE

In practice, however, the S&D provisions are generally inadequate as regards,


among other things, the length of time required to set up the hard and soft
infrastructure, noted above. In addition, they do not sufficiently reflect the special
needs or individual performance of the intended beneficiaries (developing economies
and LDCs). Furthermore, there is a variety of implementation problems in S&D
treatment on the part of the developed countries.16 All these issues are being
addressed in the current Doha (Millennium) Development Round, and their
complexity is evidenced by the extended deadline for reaching a consensus on
strengthening S&D provisions to the end of 2002 (instead of 31 July 2002).
More importantly, however, S&D treatment is only part of a bigger picture
because the net stimuli and mutual gains from PTAs and FTAs depend on several
15

other factors. One is the number (or range) as well as the relative importance of
“sensitive” activities and sectors which are excluded, and the duration of their
exclusion, from the PTAs and FTAs under consideration. Two relates to the
definition and calculation of (minimum) local contents or county of origin, plus the
ways in which such measures are applied in practice. In this connection, there is the
related issue of the safeguard provisions, and the manners by which these provisions
are applied and interpreted under various PTAs and FTAs.
The third factor is the availability of systems and modalities for orderly and
speedy dispute settlements which are, at the same time, less “lawyer-intensive”, less
overly legalistic, and hence less prohibitively expensive in terms of time and cost; the
WTO dispute settlement model is far from ideal in this regard. Lastly, there are the
transitional adjustments in policies and structures. The timeframe provided for such
adjustments tends to be rather short in many instances; they are also far from uniform
among different developing economies and LDCs – given the diverse speeds,
flexibility and sequence with which their resources, policies and institutions can be
shifted, created, transformed and adjusted to meet the existing, enlarged,
differentiated and new demand associated with the concerned PTAs or FTAs.
There is thus a justifiable need to link S&D treatment to the development
needs and to the strengthening of supply-side capabilities of developing economies
and LDCs under the Doha Round, as indicated earlier. Regarding AFTA, ASEAN-4
is given longer adjustment timetables, among other elements of flexibility and
preferential treatment. Under the recently signed FACEC as well, China has accorded
the Most Favoured Nation status in the context of the proposed ASEAN-China FTA
to (the newer) ASEAN countries which are not WTO members.
In addition, there are provisions in the same Framework Agreement for
capacity building and technical assistance to ASEAN-4 in several other areas of
economic co-operation between ASEAN and China, including specifically in the
promotion of efficiency and competitiveness among small- and medium-scale
enterprises (SMEs). Such firms have been and will remain the backbone of virtually
all economies in East and South-East Asia in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the
1997-1998 economic crisis has served to renew policy focus on SMEs virtually across
the region (Wattanapruttipaisan 2002:65-66). A few proposals for ASEAN-China
collaboration to foster SME sector development will be made in the following
discussion.
16

VI. Enhancing SME Capabilities and Competitiveness


VI.1 Overview of Issues
A detailed discussion on the above matters is outside the scope of this paper although
a number of observations can be briefly noted. One, just like a rich base of physical
resource endowments, capabilities alone are not sufficient to guarantee current or to
sustain future competitiveness.17 There are deeper factors and forces at work in
transforming capabilities into comparative and competitive advantage.18 They
include, firstly, the ready availability of socio-cultural capital -- such as work ethics,
trust, moral norms, ethnic- or community-based development and social networks etc.
Secondly, there are the accessibility and affordability of economic and social
infrastructure and services, the quality of domestic policies and institutions, plus the
extent of development-oriented governance. Thirdly, a culture or tradition of
entrepreneurship, innovation and networking is essential; and so are the competence
and relevance of research and development institutions and facilities, and the extent of
their linkages to business end-users. Lastly, the external conditions and
circumstances must be and must remain conducive to the multi-faceted and interactive
processes of economic development and social transformation of the developing
economies.
The second observation is that competitiveness is not a static concept. Simple,
initial price advantage will be exhausted or eroded over time by the rising costs of
labour and land, by widening infrastructure shortages, by more intensifying
competition, and by the increasing fragmentation and sophistication of consumer
demand and market requirements. Indeed, competitive advantage has become more
and more the result of knowledge-based and learning-driven upgrading,
differentiation and innovation for continuous productivity and brand-name
enhancement as firms adjust competitively to an environment of constant change but
still of ever-fierce competition and rivalries. In addition, learning and innovation
themselves can be further leveraged and improved by inter-firm linkages within and
across borders – including through mergers and acquisitions, through becoming part
of clusters and networks of collaborative firms, and through the formation and
deepening of strategic alliances and technology partnerships.

VI.2. Some Proposals for Co-operation in Enterprise Capacity Building


Benchmarking of SME .Capabilities and Competitiveness
17

Competitiveness has a foundation in microeconomics – in particular, at the enterprise


level -- whether or not it is measured and benchmarked at the industry, sectoral or
national level (Porter, Sachs and Mcarthur 2001: 16-21). In fact, the competitiveness
of an industry or sector (and by extension, of an economy itself) is as strong and
durable as that of the weakest link in the chain or network of enterprises supporting
the industry or sector concerned.19 However, information and data on enterprise
capabilities and competitiveness are not available virtually across the region. It is
thus important and pressing that a co-operative effort be made by governments, SME-
support agencies, and donor countries and agencies. This is to survey and assess -- in
a systematic, objective and statistically robust manner -- the competitive potential
and, by extension, the needs for remedial capacity enhancement of selected
enterprises in priority sectors within ASEAN-6/4 as well as China.
There can be identified at least 78 variables for measuring, monitoring,
evaluating and benchmarking the capabilities and competitiveness of enterprises,
including SMEs. These variables can be grouped into seven categories to provide a
quantitative assessment of the overall operating environment facing, and the current
capabilities and competitive potential associated with, the (sampled or surveyed)
enterprises.20 The results so obtained will reveal various areas of competence as well
as shared weaknesses and deficiency on the supply side. As such, they provide a solid
foundation not just for further capacity strengthening and remedial technical
assistance at the enterprise level by government and non-government organizations in
both ASEAN and China. The surveyed results are also indispensable as an input in
the formation and deepening of inter-firm linkages and networking for enhanced
collective efficiency and hence competitiveness.

Entrepreneurship Training and Inter-firm Networking


Traditionally, entrepreneurship is regarded as an inherent personality trait, a cultural
characteristic, or a normal response to the presence of a profit-making opportunity.
However, (cross-sectional and cross-border) behavioural research on successful
entrepreneurship has indicated that entrepreneurial attributes are latent and widely
distributed (Timmons 1990: 161-176). Many of these attributes can be identified,
developed and enhanced as their supplies are not relatively fixed at any given place
and time. Yet, training in entrepreneurship development has not been pursued on a
sustained basis for the promotion and incubation of a culture of entrepreneurship,
18

innovation and networking among GMS economies -- namely ASEAN-4 plus


Thailand and Yunnan (China) -- and within ASEAN for that matter.21

PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 NEAR HERE

Meanwhile, SMEs and by extension, all business firms have to manage growth
and change in a new and more challenging development context. As noted
previously, there are the intensified global and regional competition, the rapid pace of
technological advances and their equally rapid incorporation in production processes
and products, and the more sophisticated and constantly changing consumer and
market demands. Table 4 below contains an overview of the various output
categories from a pilot project proposal firstly, to train 3,500-4,000 GMS
entrepreneurs over a three-year period; secondly, to create a local capacity for the
most cost-effective replication of training activities in entrepreneurship development
and inter-firm networking among the GMS economies and elsewhere in South-East
Asia; thirdly, to assist in the formulation of bankable business plans by the trained
entrepreneurs, one of the perennial barriers to SMEs in accessing credit and finance;
and lastly, to promote inter-firm linkages and networking among the GMS economies
as well as between GMS enterprises and those from outside the subregion.22

VII. Concluding Remarks


It can now be reiterated that firstly, there are great potential and opportunities for
wider and deeper relationships in trade and investment between ASEAN-6 plus China
on the one hand, and ASEAN-4 on the other. Secondly, such potential and
opportunities can be charted, nurtured and operationalized with good commercial
returns in support of income growth, structural transformation and modernization,
poverty alleviation and social advancement across the region. Thirdly, the whole
process can be facilitated and accelerated through a co-operative mobilization of the
synergies between external investment and local resources – as mediated by the
gradual evolution of regional trade flows and the consequent relocation of trade-
related FDI and technologies to sectors, industries and enterprises in various areas
within ASEAN and China.
This is the famous “flying geese” pattern of collective development as
demonstrated by the interaction of trade and investment among East and South-East
Asian economies over the past 40 years. The pattern itself is conditioned and
facilitated firstly, by the mutual liberalization of trade and investment and the
19

associated standardization and simplification of procedures and regulations, including


via PTAs and FTAs; secondly, by the mutual transformation, diversification and
upgrading of sectors, industries and enterprises among the interdependent economies
and enterprises concerned; thirdly, by the collaborative establishment and deepening
of various cross-border linkages and inter-firm partnering; and lastly, by the formation
of a common position in commercial diplomacy and in negotiating forums within and
outside the region.
However, the co-operation and integration process will be less than smooth
sailing; this has been amply demonstrated by the long experience so far gained in the
implementation of a variety of PTAs, FTAs and multilateral trade accords. The
potential and opportunities for durable economic growth, structural transformation
and social development through the proposed ASEAN-China FTA are both exciting
and significant. But to sustain co-operation and enhance integration, both sides
clearly will have to manage – effectively, timely, flexibly and in a forward-looking
manner -- the many challenges from trade and investment liberalization as well as
from their own competition in third-country markets. This will be one of the greatest
tests to economic commitment and political will for mutual and equitable growth and
development in East and South-East Asia.
20

TABLE 1
ASEAN-China trade and investment interaction, 1995 and 2000

_____________________________________________________________________

1995 2000

China
GDP (US$ billion) 700.2 1 079.8
GDP per head (US$) 342 853
Merchandise trade (US$ billion) 281.1 474.3
- Trade with ASEAN (%) 7.1 8.1
Tourist arrivals (million) 10.2 13.1
- ASEAN tourists in China 1.1 1.7
FDI inflows (US$ billion) 35.8 47.0
FDI outflows 2.0 3.4

ASEAN-10
GDP (US$ billion) 652.5 579.9 a
GDP per head (US$) 1,359 1,105 a
Merchandise trade (US$ billion) 675.6 781.7
- Trade with China (%) 2.9 4.2
Tourist arrivals (million) 29.7 37.8
- Chinese tourists in ASEAN 0.8 1.9
FDI inflows (US$ billion) 24.7 12.9
FDI outflows b 8.2 7.5

Cambodia
GDP (US$ billion) 3.3 3.4
GDP per head (US$) 361 259
Merchandise trade (US$ million) 1,930 2,547
- Exports 357 1,123
To China (%) 1.4 2.1
To ASEAN (%) 63.3 6.8
- Imports 1,573 1,424
From China (%) 3.6 7.9
From ASEAN (%) 38.6 38.9
Tourist arrivals (thousand) 262.9 264.2
- From China (%) 14 12
- From ASEAN (%) 16 21
FDI inflows (US$ million) 1,909.6 160.2
- From China (%) 0.1 17.7
- From ASEAN (%) 80.4 32.3
21

_____________________________________________________________________

1995 2000

Lao People’s Democratic Republic


GDP (US$ billion) 1.8 1.7
GDP per head (US$) 382 330
Merchandise trade (US$ million) 900 1,077
- Exports 311 392
To China (%) 2.9 1.5
To ASEAN (%) 55.0 42.1
- Imports 589 685
From China (%) 3.7 5.5
From ASEAN (%) 56.2 78.2
Tourist arrivals (thousand) 346.5 614.3
- From China (%) 1 3
- From ASEAN (%) c 75 73
FDI inflows (US$ million) 802.9 33.9
- From China (%) 1.1 15.6

Myanmar
GDP (US$ billion) d 10.4 14.2
GDP per head (US$) 280 300
Merchandise trade (US$ million) 3,432 5,171
- Exports 1,198 2,117
To China (%) 11.3 5.4
To ASEAN (%) 30.3 19.9
- Imports 2,342 3,054
From China (%) 29.0 17.9
From ASEAN (%) 45.6 45.1
Tourist arrivals (thousand) 120 246
- From China (%) 0.1 0.1
- From ASEAN (%) 10.3 7.0
FDI inflows (US$ million) 688.2 184.3
- From China (%) n.a. e 15.7
- From ASEAN (%) 66.2 23.0

Viet Nam
GDP (US$ billion) 20.7 30.3
GDP per head (US$) 283 391
Merchandise trade (US$ million) 13,980 30,118
- Exports 5,621 14,482
To China (%) 6.4 10.6
To ASEAN (%) 19.8 18.1
- Imports 8,359 15,638
From China (%) 3.9 9.0
From ASEAN (%) 28.4 28.5
Tourist arrivals (thousand) 1,351.3 1,907.7
- From China (%) 5 33
- From ASEAN (%) 2 3
FDI inflows (US$ million) 2,336 2,081
22

Sources: Various issues of IMF, Direction of Trade Yearbook and CD-


ROM, October 2002 (Washington, DC); UNCTAD, World Investment Report (New
York); World Tourist Organization, Yearbook of Tourism Statistics; ASEAN website:
http://www.aseansec.org/menu/tourism statistics; IMF, Myanmar – Recent
Development Report, September 1999; and Central Statistical Office, Selected
Monthly Indicators – May-June 2001, Yangon.

Notes: a Falling value due to the financial and economic crisis plus the lower
exchange rates (to the US dollar) in several ASEAN member countries since July
1997.
b. From Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand
c. Thailand accounted for 233.8 and 356.1 thousand tourists
respectively for 1995 and 2000.
d. Estimate.
e. Less than 0.1 per cent
23

TABLE 2.
Major suppliers of China’s imports by product groups, 1999
(Percentage)

________________________________________________________________________________________

Product groups United European Hong Kong Latin


States Union Japan (China) Asiaa America Africa
________________________________________________________________________________________

All products 11.8 14.8 20.5 4.1 34.4 1.8 1.3

Food, beverages
And oils 21.3 10.8 4.2 1.0 19.4 17.8 1.3

Agricultural goods 12.1 8.6 6.8 1.0 34.6 4.9 5.1

Manufactured goods 12.2 l6.8 23.7 4.9 33.1 0.4 0.2

Chemicals 14.6 10.0 18.7 2.7 42.4 0.4 0.5

Machinery and
transport
equipment 14.1 23.8 25.7 3.9 25.3 0.2 0.1

Other
manufacturesb 7.6 8.4 23.3 7.8 41.3 0.8 0.4
________________________________________________________________________________________

Source: UNCTAD (2002: 164)

a Excluding Hong Kong SAR of China, Japan and West Asia.


b Categories 6 and 8, less 68 of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).
24

TABLE 3.
S&D provisions for developing economies and LDCs
under the Uruguay Round Agreements and WTO

_________________________________________________________________________________

Recognizing Requiring fewer


Giving longer Providing
their interests obligations
adjustment technical
time frame assistance
_________________________________________________________________________________

WTO DPC DPC DPC


Balance of payments DPC/LDC DPC
Safeguards DPC DPC
Anti-dumping duties DPC DPC
Subsidies/counter-
vailing duties DPC DPC/LDCb DPC/LDCb
TRIMs DPC/LDC DPC DPC/LDC
Import licensing DPC/LDC DPC DPC
Customs valuation DPC DPC DPC DPC
Preshipment inspection DPC DPC
Technical barriers DPC DPC DPC/LDC DPC/LDC
Sanitary/phyto-sanitary DPC/LDC DPC/LDC DPC
Agriculture DPC/LDC DPC/LDC DPC LDCc
Textiles and clothing LDC LDCd
Services DPC/LDC DPC DPC/LDC DPC/LDC
TRIPS DPC DPC/LDC DPC/LDC
Dispute settlement DPC/LDC DPC
Trade policy review
mechanism DPC/LDCb
_________________________________________________________________________________

Source: Weston (1995: 65)

a DPC = developing countries (those with GDP per capita of less than $1,000).
LDC = least developed countries as categorized by the United Nations.
b Including smaller developing-country exporters.
c LDCs plus net food importing developing countries.
d Smaller producers granted more rapid removal of restraints in importing countries.
25

TABLE 4.
Overview of various output categories of a GMS training project
in entrepreneurship development and enterprise networking

Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of


GMS GMS (3- GMS GMS inter-firm
entrepreneurs person) trainers enterprise linkages
trained training teams certified business plans promoted
graduated overseas assisted
Cambodia 300-350 1 80-100 20-30

Lao PDR 150-200 1 40-50 15-20

Myanmar 400-450 1-2 120-150 35-50

Thailand 1 350-1 500 3 2-3 260-300 80-100

Viet Nam 900-1 000 3 2-3 175-200 50-70

Yunnan, China 400-500 1-2 125-150 40-50

Project total 3 500-4 000 10-12 4-6 800-950 240-320

Source: Lam and Wattanapruttipaisan (2001a: 20).


26

NOTES

I am grateful to the two anomymous referees for their useful comments and
suggestions on an earlier draft of this article. The draft paper was presented at the
Regional Seminar on Advantages and Challenges of the ASEAN-China Free Trade
Area, Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam, 20-21 June 2002.

1
Merchandise exports to or through Singapore were down from US$ 182 to 18
million between 1999 and 2000; the figures for exports to or through Viet Nam being
US$ 392 and 19 million respectively. On the other hand, exports to the United States
expanded from US$ 236 to 740 million, in a large part due to the higher garment
quota given to Cambodia from May 2000.
2
Hong Kong SAR has been an important trade and investment partner of
ASEAN. In 2000, for example, the share of ASEAN’s trade with this SAR was
equivalent to 4.4 per cent of the total ASEAN’s foreign trade; the corresponding ratio
of ASEAN’s trade being 8.5 per cent of the foreign trade value (US$ 412.4 billion ) of
Hong Kong SAR. Also in 2000, the gross domestic product (GDP) of Hong Kong
SAR reached US$ 162.6 billion, equivalent thus to almost US$ 24,000 per head of
resident. During the same year, there were almost 1.1 million Hong Kong tourists
visiting ASEAN while the number of ASEAN tourists going to Hong Kong SAR was
estimated at around 1.5 million in 2000.
3
It is worth noting the growing attraction of China as the host economy for
FDI. Such inward investment averaged just under US$ 14 billion a year during 1989-
1994. The annual flow reached almost US$ 41 billion over 1995-2000. Some 400 of
the Fortune 500 biggest corporations have invested in over 2000 projects in China.
As a whole, inward FDI from all sources in ASEAN has not been expanding and
diversified that fast.
4
On the other hand, GDP in several ASEAN countries contracted, quite
severely in 1998 -- with total production down by 7.5 per cent in Malaysia, 10.2 per
cent in Thailand and 13.2 per cent in Indonesia. In the global economic downturn of
2001, Singapore’s GDP fell by 2.0 per cent (compared to an expansion of almost 10
per cent in 2000). The corresponding figures for Malaysia are 0.4 and 8.3 per cent
respectively.
5
During 2001, for example, income per head of population reached almost US$
23,000 in Singapore and about US$ 12,900 in Brunei Darussalam. It was in the range
of US$ 3,700 to US$ 1,800 in Malaysia and Thailand; US$ 900 to US$ 670 in
Philippines and Indonesia; and around US$ 400-260 in ASEAN-4.
6
OECD (2002: 761), UNCTAD (2002: 144), Ianchovichina and Martin, (2001:
Table 5), and JP Morgan (1999: 6).
7
There are tariff peaks on both agricultural and industrial products in China
and, for that matter in virtually all other trading economies. For example, the specific
tariff rates on individual agricultural goods are in the range of 0 to 65 per cent, with
an average of 15 per cent. However, tariff rates become much higher for (out-of-
quota) agricultural imports – for example, 65 per cent on rice, wheat and sugar; and
15 per cent on palm oil. Those on industrial products are from 0 to 47 per cent, with
an average of 8.9 per cent; the higher rates are on photographic films, automobiles
(falling from 80-100 per cent to 25 per cent) and auto parts (10 per cent by 2006).
8
These barriers typically include import quotas, import prohibitions and
restrictions, the imposition of variable levies (based on price and/or quantity) on
imports, the introduction of minimum import prices or volumes, discretionary import
27

licensing, NTBs and other opaque practices maintained by or through state trading
enterprises, the requirement of voluntary restraints by import suppliers and so on.
9
For a sample of more recent discussions on the complexities involved in
model specifications and in making realistic and workable assumptions in the case of
China, and on the estimated results, see OECD (2002: 118-121 and 151-156);
UNCTAD (2002: 141-174); Ianchovichina, Martin and Fusake (2000); Walmsley and
Hertel (2000); Huang, Chen and Rozelle (1999: 1-36); Wang (1999: 379-405); and
Anderson (1997: 749-772). OECD (2002: 76l-783) contains an extensive survey of
the results from major research papers and publications on the impact of China’s
WTO accession.
10
Simulation results carried out on the basis of the Global Trade Analysis
Project (GTAP). They do not cover Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR and
Myanmar which are not included in the GTAP database. For further details, see
ASEAN (2001: 21-22, 30-31, and 145-153)
11
For a detailed discussion on PTAs and FTAs, and related issues in structural
and policy adjustments, see Asian Development Bank (2002: 157-196), Pomfret
(2002), and WTO (1995: 25-62). Further references on this subject can be found in
the extensive bibliography contained in the first two pieces of work
12
In global terms, however, it is clear that the industrialized economies and
region will continue to be the most important trade markets, sources of investment
finance, and origins of cutting-edge technologies and innovative services for both
ASEAN (a s a group) and China for a considerable time to come. In particular, the
EU, Japan and the United States absorbed together 48 and 38 per cent of exports from
China and ASEAN respectively in 2000.
13
Namely Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
14
In particular, China has been and will remain the dominant supplier of textiles
and clothing to Japan, with a relative share rising from 44 to 62 per cent between
1993 and 1999.
15
This is a transformation both facilitated and fostered by the speedy progress in
information, communication and transportation technologies and, on the other hand,
by more fundamental forces and attitudes of a non-economic nature as well. For
further details, see Wattanapruttipaisan (2002) and the references cited therein.
16
Outstanding issues in S&D treatment are discussed at length in UNCTAD
(2002: 42-45) and (1988: 65-87); and Weston (1995: 64-85).
17
In business management terminologies, competitiveness at the national level is
normally understood as the degree to which the domestic environment in its totality is
deemed conducive to entrepreneurship, innovation, and business initiatives and
activities. Industry-level competitiveness refers to the extent to which an industry or
sector has the potential for growth and/or to generate an attractive return to direct
and/or other forms of investment. Meanwhile, firm-level competitiveness is the
effectiveness and efficiency in the production and delivery of goods and services at
lower costs than those of competitors, or at a price premium because of superior or
differentiated quality and design, and more timely delivery.
18
Some of these forces and influences -- in particular, a development State and
the prevailing socio-cultural values and norms -- have proved to be highly contentious
both before and after the publication of a comprehensive study by the World Bank
(1993) on the East Asian economic miracle.
19
Efficient firms, for example, make it possible for other enterprises to purchase
inputs more cheaply. Dynamic and innovative firms induce others to keep up with the
latest technologies in production, management and organization. Flexible enterprises
speed up the capabilities to respond quickly in other firms which have forward or
28

backward linkages to them. Indeed, the recent attention on national and industrial
competitiveness reflects a growing appreciation that competitive advantage is
systemic in nature. See, Porter, Sachs and Mcarthur (2001: 17-23); Esser and others
(1999: 62-85); and the references cited by them.
20
The overall environment in which the (sampled) SMEs operate is
quantitatively approximated as “Nature and readiness of firm” (with 12 questions and
a relative weight of 12.5 per cent). “Entrepreneurial characteristics” (13 questions
and 20 per cent) are the driving force of firms, whether they are large companies or
small and medium-sized enterprises. The 10 questions each in “Capabilities” and
“Competitiveness” (each with 12.5 per cent relative weight) are indicative, by and
large, of the initial conditions and circumstances of the SMEs concerned. The
category “Production organization” (11 questions and 15 per cent) is a proxy of the
potential for productivity upgrading and competitive growth through innovation-led,
learning-based and investment-driven transformation of the activities of the pertinent
enterprises. There are 11 questions each in “Finance” (15 per cent of relative weight)
and “Human resource development” (12.5 per cent). See Wattanapruttipaisan (2002a)
for a detailed discussion of the justification and methodologies involved.
21
There have been a large number of programmes for business training and
human resource development at the enterprise level within the GMS – funded by both
multilateral agencies (including the Asian Development Bank and UNDP) and
bilateral donors, notably Japan. But most of these programmes have concentrated on
the generation of skills in (formal) management, finance and marketing.
22
See Lam and Wattanapruttipaisan (2001a) for further details on the
methodologies and sequencing of training and networking activities, and the
estimated costs of various components of project activities over a three-year period.

REFERENCES

Anderson, Kim. “On the Complexities of China’s WTO Accession”. The World
Economy 20, no. 6, September (1997): 749-773.
ASEAN. “Forging Closer ASEAN-China Economic Relations in the Twenty-First
Century”. Report of the ASEAN-China Expert Group on Economic Cooperation
(2001), mimeographed.
Asian Development Bank. Asian Development Outlook 2002. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002.
Esser, Klaus and others. “Systemic Competitiveness – New Challenges to Business
and Politics”, Economics. 59 (1999): 62-85.
Huang, Jikun, Chunlai Chen and Scott Rozelle. “Trade Liberalization and China’s
Food Economy in the 21st Century: Implications to China’s National Food
Security”. Paper presented in a conference on China’s Agricultural Trade and
Policy: Issues, Analyses, and Global Consequences, San Francisco, 25-26 June
(1999), mimeographed.
Ianchovichina, E., Will Martin and Emiko Fusake. “Assessing the Implications of
Merchandise Trade Liberalization in China’s Accession to the WTO”.
Washington, DC: World Bank, July (2000), mimeographed.
Ianchovichina, E. and Will Martin. “Trade Liberalization in China’s Accession to the
WTO”.(Washington, DC: World Bank. May (2001), mimeographed.
JP Morgan. “China’s Reform to Take another Costly Decade”. Global Data Watch,
29 October (Hong Kong), 1999: 9-29.
29

Lam, N.V. and T. Wattanapruttipaisan. “Entrepreneurship Training for SME


Development and Networking among GMS Economies – A Project Proposal”.
Bangkok: Foundation for International Human Resource Development, January
(2001a), mimeographed.
Lam, N.V. and T. Wattanapruttipaisan. “The New WTO Round and Concerns of the
Least Developed Countries and Economies in Transition of Asia: Bridging the
Gap?” Paper presented at the Joint ICTSD/CEE/HBF Regional Dialogue for
Governments and Civil Society, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 29-30 March (2001b),
mimeographed.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. China in the World
Economy – The Domestic Policy Challenges. Paris: OECD Centre, 2002.
Pomfret, Richard. The Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002.
Porter, Michael E,, J.D. Sachs and J.W. Mcarthur. “Executive Summary:
Competitiveness and Stages of Economic Development”,
<www.cid.harvard.edu/cr/pdf/CGR0102%20Exec%Summary.pdf> (2001).
Timmons, Jeffrey A. New Venture Creation – Entrepreneurship in the 1990s. Third
edition, Boston, Massachusetts: Irwin, 1990.
UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report 1994. Geneva and New York: United
Nations, 1994.
UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report 2002. Geneva and New York: United
Nations, 2002.
Walmsley, Terrie L. and Thomas W. Hertel. “China’s Accession to the WTO: Timing
Is Everything”. Centre for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University,
September (2000), mimeographed.
Wang, Zhi. “The Impact of China’s WTO Entry on the World Labour-intensive
Export Market: A Recursive Dynamic CGE Analysis”. The World Economy 22,
no. 3, May (1999): 379-405.
Wattanapruttipaisan, Thitapha. “ASEAN-China Economic Relationships and Co-
operation in Trade and Investment: Patterns and Potential”. Paper presented at
the Symposium on ASEAN-China Entrepreneur Exchanges, Chengdu, China,
22-23 October (2001), mimeographed.
Wattanapruttipaisan, Thitapha. “SMEs Subcontracting as Bridgehead to
Competitiveness: Framework for an Assessment of Supply-Side Capabilities
and Demand-Side Requirements”. Asia-Pacific Development Journal 9, no. 1,
June (2002): 65-87.
Weston, Ann. “The Uruguay Round: Unravelling the Implications for the Least
Developed and Low-Income Countries”. UNCTAD, International Monetary
and Financial Issues for the 1990s – Volume VI, Geneva and New York: United
Nations 1995: 61-98.
World Bank. The East Asia Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
World Trade Organization. Regionalism and the World Trading System. Geneva:
WTO, 1995.

Thitapha Wattanapruttipaisan is Senior Officer in the Industrial Services Unit,


Bureau of Economic Co-operation, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia. The
views expressed in the paper are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect
those of the ASEAN Secretariat.