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Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1896 Filed 11/28/16 Page 1 of 13

1 Charles J. Cooper*
Michael W. Kirk*
2 Harold S. Reeves*
COOPER & KIRK, PLLC
3 1523 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
4 Telephone: (202) 220-9600
Fax: (202) 220-9601
5 ccooper@cooperkirk.com
mkirk@cooperkirk.com
6 hreeves@cooperkirk.com
7 * Admitted pro hac vice
8 John T. Masterson, Bar #007447
Joseph J. Popolizio, Bar #017434
9 Justin M. Ackerman, Bar #030726
JONES, SKELTON & HOCHULI, P.L.C.
10 40 North Central Avenue, Suite 2700
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
11 Telephone: (602) 263-1700
Fax: (602) 200-7846
12 jmasterson@jshfirm.com
jpopolizio@jshfirm.com
13 jackerman@jshfirm.com
14 Attorneys for Defendant Joseph M. Arpaio
and non-party Movants Gerard Sheridan and
15 Joseph Sousa
16
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
17
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
18
Manuel de Jesus Ortega Melendres, et al., NO. CV 07-02513-PHX-GMS
19
Plaintiffs, REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
20 EMERGENCY MOTION TO
v. SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS
21 PENDING RESOLUTION OF
Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., MOVANTS’ MOTION FOR
22 RECUSAL OF THE COURT AND
Defendants. ITS MONITOR
23
24
25
26
27
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Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1896 Filed 11/28/16 Page 2 of 13

1 The oppositions to Movants’ emergency motion suffer from three dispositive
2 defects. First and most importantly, neither Plaintiffs nor the United States have cited a
3 single case in which a federal judge has been permitted to continue to sit on a case in which
4 he has had substantive ex parte communications concerning contested merits issues with a

5 subordinate judicial officer who was in turn authorized to have such ex parte

6 communications with the parties. Plaintiffs and the United States simply ignore the uniform
federal appellate authority holding that a federal judge in such circumstances must recuse
7
himself, and cannot continue to exercise judicial power in the interim before he decides the
8
recusal motion. Second, Plaintiffs and the United States have failed to explain why this
9
Court should diverge from its prior practice in this case of suspending proceedings pending
10
resolution of a recusal motion. They argue only that when the Court suspended proceedings
11
in connection with the first recusal motion, it was obligated to do so under 28 U.S.C. § 144.
12
But this argument is plainly inconsistent with the text of Section 144 and is expressly refuted
13 by the Court’s prior decisions. Third, neither Plaintiffs nor the United States have identified
14 any prejudice they would suffer from a brief suspension of proceedings by the Court and
15 the Monitor while the Court resolves the recusal motion. Both attempt to manufacture
16 prejudice by falsely equating a brief suspension of judicial action by the Court and the
17 Monitor with a stay of the injunctions previously entered by the Court, but Movants have
18 repeatedly represented that they do not seek a stay of extant remedial orders and, indeed,

19 the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office will continue to work diligently to implement all of

20 the Court’s orders while the recusal motion is litigated. Neither Plaintiffs nor the United
States has submitted any evidence to the contrary, and at the November 23 status
21
conference, counsel for all parties and the Monitor all confirmed that implementation
22
activities have proceeded apace over the last several weeks after the recusal motion was
23
filed.
24
For these reasons and those more fully set forth below, Movants respectfully request
25
that the Court suspend proceedings pending resolution of the recusal motion. Movants will,
26
of course, continue to fully comply with the Court’s injunctions pending resolution of the
27 recusal motion.
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1 A. Movants Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits of the Recusal Motion.
2 Plaintiffs and the United States all but ignore the central question raised by both the
3 emergency motion to suspend proceedings and the underlying recusal motion: may a federal
4 judge continue to exercise judicial power in a case in which he has substantive ex parte

5 communications concerning contested merits issues with a subordinate judicial officer who

6 is authorized to have ex parte communications with the parties? Movants have not found,
and neither Plaintiffs nor the United States have cited, a single case, regardless of the
7
timeliness of the recusal motion, in which a judge has been permitted to continue to preside
8
over an ongoing case after the judge has engaged in unauthorized ex parte communications
9
concerning the merits.
10
It is not that the Federal Reports are silent on the question. To the contrary, the cases
11
uniformly hold that a district judge must be disqualified on a going-forward basis when it
12
engages in improper merits-based ex parte communications. Neither Plaintiffs nor the
13 United States denies that the Monitor Order Authority prohibits ex parte communications
14 between the Court and the Monitor, or that counsel for the Defendants objected on multiple
15 occasions to merits-based ex parte communications. See Sheriff Arpaio, Chief Deputy
16 Sheridan, & Lieutenant Sousa’s Motion For Recusal of the Court and Its Monitor at 14–16
17 (Nov. 10, 2016), Doc. 1878 (“Motion for Recusal”). And neither Plaintiffs nor the United
18 States attempts to distinguish the authority that Movants have cited recognizing that recusal

19 is mandatory when a court engages in ex parte communications on the merits with its

20 appointed advisors. See id. at 8–14; In re Brooks, 383 F.3d 1036, 1043–44 (D.C. Cir. 2004);
In re Kensington Int’l, Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 318 (3d Cir. 2004) (Kensington II); Edgar v.
21
K.L., 93 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Guenther v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 758, 762
22
(9th Cir. 1991) (ex parte communications about the merits of a case trigger mandatory
23
recusal so that the matter will be heard before “a judge who has not been exposed to ex
24
parte communications”).
25
Neither Plaintiffs nor the United States can deny that the Court has had ex parte
26
communications with the Monitor concerning the merits of contested issues before the
27 Court. Instead, both have limited their defense of the propriety of the Court’s actions to a
28
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1 one-sentence conclusory assertion that “it is appropriate for a court to supervise and
2 communicate with its duly-appointed compliance monitor.” United States’ Opposition to
3 Emergency Motion at 6 (Nov. 22, 2016), Doc. 1892 (“U.S. Response”); see also Plaintiffs’
4 Opposition to Emergency Motion at 6–8 (Nov. 22, 2016), Doc. 1893 (“Plaintiffs’

5 Response”) (Movants have not shown “any impropriety or even the appearance thereof

6 through these communications”). None of the cases they cite supports the proposition that
the Court may continue to sit notwithstanding these communications.
7
Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 742 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2014), merely
8
held that ex parte communications concerning “routine administrative matters do not raise
9
any inference of bias.” Id. at 1220 (emphasis added). The Court expressly held that Blixseth
10
had failed to provide any evidence suggesting that the ex parte communications addressed
11
the merits of his claim, see id., and the Court supported its holding with a citation to
12
Kensington II, 368 F.3d at 305, in which the Third Circuit held that ex parte
13 communications concerning the merits of contested issues require recusal even as it
14 acknowledged that communications concerning administrative matters do not.
15 Plaintiffs also cite In re Brooks, 383 F.3d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2004), while the United
16 States invokes the District Court decision below in Cobell v. Norton, 237 F. Supp. 2d 71
17 (D.D.C. 2003), but those decisions both emphatically endorsed the merits/administrative
18 line drawn in Blixseth and Kensington II. The D.C. Circuit held that the District Court need

19 not be removed from the case only because the trial court had “described ‘the nature of the

20 ex parte contacts,’ and stated unequivocally that those contacts were of a procedural and
not a substantive nature.” Brooks, 383 F.3d at 1044. But both the D.C. Circuit and the
21
District Court made clear that had the ex parte communications been of a “substantive
22
nature,” id., recusal would have been required. See also Cobell, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (“if
23
the [Monitor] had conveyed information he had obtained in an investigatory capacity to the
24
Court during these consultations, it would be a different situation,” and recusal would be
25
warranted).
26
Finally, Plaintiffs cite United States v. Yonkers Board of Education, 946 F.2d 180
27 (2d Cir. 1990), but that decision too stands only for the proposition that ex parte
28
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1 communications that do not concern the merits of contested issues are not disqualifying.
2 The Second Circuit emphasized that the challenged communications concerned a subject
3 that “could not reasonably be contested,” and “the communications did not relate to
4 ‘disputed [merits-related] evidentiary facts.” Id. at 184. Moreover, the parties had all

5 consented to ex parte communications with the Court’s advisor because they had all

6 “indicated that they understood the [advisor’s] role” as allowing the ex parte
communications. Id. And unlike in this case, uncontroverted affidavits were submitted
7
“flatly den[ying] the allegation” that the court’s advisor was used “as a conduit for
8
[communicating] improper material” to the court. Id. 1
9
Unable to persuasively argue that the Court may continue to sit notwithstanding the
10
ex parte communications discussing the merits of contested issues, Plaintiffs and the United
11
States argue at length that the motion is unlikely to succeed because it is untimely. Here too
12
they simply ignore the many cases Movants cited in their Motion for Recusal recognizing
13 that timeliness cannot bar a request for disqualification on a going-forward basis. See
14 Motion for Recusal at 3–7; Kensington, 368 F.3d 289 at 316–17; United States v. Furst, 886
15 F.2d 558, 581 (3d Cir. 1989); Bradley v. Milliken, 426 F. Supp. 929, 931 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
16 see also California v. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal., 104 F.3d 1507, 1521 (9th Cir. 1997);
17 United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 785 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1986), Waggoner
18 v. Dallaire, 649 F.2d 1362, 1370 (9th Cir. 1981). 2

19
1
Yonkers Board of Education is abrogated to the extent it suggests that ex parte
20 communications cannot provide the basis for recusal under Section 455(b)(1) because a
judge makes those communications in his “judicial capacity.” See Yonkers Bd. of Educ.,
21 946 F.2d at 184. In Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551, 554 (1994), the Supreme
Court rejected the argument that Section 455(b)(1) applies only to information that a judge
22 learns outside of a judicial proceeding. At least since Liteky, information learned by a judge
during improper ex parte communications may provide a basis for recusal under Section
23 455(b)(1). See also, e.g., Edgar, 93 F.3d at 259 (holding that, after Liteky, off-the-record ex
parte communications provide a basis for recusal under Section 455(b)(1)).
24
2
For the reasons well stated by Judge Shedd in Kolon Industries, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont
25 de Nemours & Co., 748 F.3d 160, 180–84 (4th Cir. 2014) (dissenting opinion); see also
Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 867 F.2d 1415, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1989); SCA Services
26 v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 117 (7th Cir. 1977), we respectfully submit that recusal motions
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 may not be rejected on timeliness grounds even in
27 cases in which retrospective relief is sought. We acknowledge that this Court is bound by
the Ninth Circuit’s contrary view, see United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377, 1382 (9th
28
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Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1896 Filed 11/28/16 Page 6 of 13

1 The timeliness cases that Plaintiffs and the United States do cite are all
2 distinguishable for reasons previewed in the Motion for Recusal: those cases do not involve
3 requests for forward-looking relief based on unauthorized ex parte merits communications.
4 In Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 410 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), for

5 example, the only claims remaining alive following the Ninth Circuit’s decision had been

6 transferred from the district court to the Court of Federal Claims. Id. at 511. Skokomish did
not authorize a judge who had engaged in improper ex parte merits communications to
7
preside prospectively; rather it involved the likely insubstantial argument that the district
8
court judge’s retrospective ruling should be vacated because he may have been a ratepayer
9
of the utility company defendant.
10
Kolon Industries, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 748 F.3d 160 (4th Cir.
11
2014), provides an even sharper illustration of the distinction between prospective requests
12
for disqualification and purely retrospective requests seeking vacatur of rulings already
13 made. In Kolon, the case had been bifurcated into an antitrust claim and a trade secrets
14 claim. “The district court [had] denied Kolon’s motions . . . for recusal and disqualification
15 in both the antitrust and trade secrets cases.” Id. at 164. In the antitrust case, in the course
16 of affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant (thus bringing
17 the antitrust case to a close), the Fourth Circuit affirmed, on timeliness grounds, the denial
18 of the recusal motion. Id. at 164–72. In the trade secret case, however, the same panel of

19 the Fourth Circuit vacated the jury verdict, remanded for further proceedings, and exercised

20 its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to instruct that “all further proceedings on remand be
conducted before a different district judge.” Kolon Industries, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de
21
Nemours & Co., 564 Fed. App’x 710, 716 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Kolon Industries, 748
22
F.3d at 184 n.11 (Shedd, J., dissenting).
23
Most of the cases that Plaintiffs and the United States cite likewise involve requests
24
that the court of appeals vacate prior district court rulings, under circumstances where no
25
further proceedings were contemplated before the same district court judge. See Omega
26
27
Cir. 1997), but we nevertheless press the point here to preserve it so that the Supreme Court
28 of the United States or the en banc Ninth Circuit may address this conflict in the circuits.
5
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1 Eng’g, Inc. v. Omega, SA, 432 F.3d 437, 448 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Rogers, 119
2 F.3d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1997); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280,
3 1295 (9th Cir. 1992); Molina v. Rison, 886 F.2d 1124, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 1989); see also
4 Miles v. Ryan, 697 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 2012) (motion to recuse circuit judge filed

5 after panel had already decided the appeal). Many of the other decisions relied upon by

6 Plaintiffs cite lack of timeliness but then nevertheless proceed to address the merits,
recognizing that substantial recusal motions should be resolved on the merits when
7
additional proceedings before the same judge are pending. See White v. National Football
8
League, 585 F.3d 1129, 1141 (8th Cir. 2009); 3 Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 941
9
F.2d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 1991); Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d at 183–84. 4 In sum, none of
10
the cases cited by Plaintiffs or the United States permits a district court judge who should
11
have been disqualified to continue to sit on the case going forward simply because the
12
recusal motion was untimely.
13 B. This Court Has Already Held That Proceedings Should Be
14 Suspended Pending Resolution of a Recusal Motion.

15 As Movants explained in their Emergency Motion, this Court has already ruled that

16 related proceedings before the Court should be suspended during the pendency of a recusal

17 motion, and there is no reason the present recusal motion should be treated any differently.

18 See Emergency Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending Resolution of Movants’ Motion

19 For Recusal of the Court and Its Monitor at 2–3 (Nov. 11, 2016), Doc. 1879 (“Emergency

20 Motion”). In response to this seemingly basic, noncontroversial proposition, Plaintiffs and

21 the United States can offer only the speculation that “[i]t appears that the reason the Court

22 stayed further proceedings in response to the First Recusal Motion was because Section 144

23 required it.” U.S. Response at 3; see also Plaintiffs’ Response at 6. This argument rests on

24
3
Plaintiffs mistakenly state that White was decided by the Ninth Circuit. See
25 Plaintiffs’ Response at 6.
4
26 Another case that Plaintiffs cite concluded that the recusal motion was timely and
then required recusal, and so the Court had no occasion to rule on when a motion may be
27 barred as untimely, Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 733 (9th Cir. 1991), while still
another did not even involve a recusal question, First Interstate Bank of Arizona, NA v.
28 Murphy, Weir & Butler, 210 F.3d 983, 988 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000).
6
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1
a plainly incorrect reading of both Section 144 and this Court’s prior orders.
2
Neither of the Court’s two suspension orders even cites Section 144, nor did either
3
order even suggest, let alone hold, that a suspension of proceedings was required under that
4
statute. See Order (May 22, 2015), Doc. 1120; Clarification Re Documents 1117 & 1120
5
and Vacating Evidentiary Hearing of June 16–19; 23–26, 2015 (June 1, 2015), Doc. 1141.
6
And the Court’s actions make clear beyond all doubt that Section 144 could not have
7
provided the basis for the suspension. Section 144 provides:
8
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a
9
timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is
10 pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any
adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge
11 shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
12 28 U.S.C. § 144. The statute contains a condition precedent that a party file a “timely and
13 sufficient affidavit.” When that occurs, two conditions subsequent must take place: the
14 judge “shall proceed no further therein,” and “another judge shall be assigned to hear such
15 proceeding.”
16 Plaintiffs and the United States claim that, under Section 144, the Court had a duty
17 to “proceed no further” the moment the 2015 recusal motion was filed. But the Court’s
18 order denying the recusal motion expressly rejected this argument, holding instead that
19 “[t]he court has a duty to ‘proceed no further’ and assign the motion to another judge for a
20 determination of the merits only after it determines the affidavit is legally sufficient.” Order
21 Denying Motion for Recusal or Disqualification at 13 (July 10, 2015), Doc. 1164 (emphasis
22 added). Because this Court concluded that “Movants’ affidavit is legally insufficient,” id.
23 at 37, the requirement to “proceed no further” never kicked in—and so it could not possibly
24 have provided the basis for the Court’s decision to suspend proceedings in the first place.
25 Any doubt that the suspension was not based on Section 144 is removed by the fact that
26 another judge was not assigned to hear the recusal motion.
27 This Court’s prior suspension rulings were thus based instead on the basic,
28
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1
noncontroversial, and well-established principle that, to protect the integrity of the judicial
2
process and eliminate prejudice to the moving party, courts should suspend judicial
3
proceedings pending the resolution of a substantial recusal motion. See also In re
4
Kensington Int’l, Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 216 (3d Cir. 2003) (Kensington I); In re Martinez-
5
Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 217 (1st Cir. 1997).
6
C. A Brief Suspension of Proceedings Will Not Stay Compliance With This
7
Court’s Orders or Otherwise Prejudice Plaintiffs or the United States.
8 Plaintiffs and the United States persist in making the knowingly false argument that
9 “Movants are, in effect, seeking to stay the Court’s first and second supplemental
10 injunctions.” Plaintiffs’ Response at 5 n.3; see also U.S. Response at 2 (casting Emergency
11 Motion an effort to “escape the watchful eye of the Court” and avoid compliance with this
12 Court’s orders). But Movants have repeatedly made clear that they “do not request that the
13 Court stay the duty of Movants and Maricopa County to comply with any of this Court’s
14 remedial orders.” Emergency Motion at 2. Movants stated then, and they repeat again here,
15 that they will continue to be bound by and “fully intend to continue their thorough and
16 diligent efforts to comply in full with this Court’s injunctions. Movants seek only that the
17 Court and its Monitor suspend their activities during the pendency of the recusal motion.”
18 Id. (emphasis added).
19 Because Movants intend to fully comply with this Court’s injunctions, neither
20 Plaintiffs nor the United States will suffer any prejudice by a brief suspension of
21 proceedings. In contrast, if the Court and the Monitor continue to take judicial action during
22 the pendency of the Motion for Recusal, Movants’ constitutional and statutory rights to
23 litigate before judicial officers who have not engaged in unauthorized ex parte
24 communications will be violated. Wholly apart from prejudice to Movants, the prejudice to
25 the public and the integrity of the judicial system will be great absent a brief suspension of
26 proceedings. A disqualified judge’s failure to withdraw “undercuts the integrity and
27 reputation of the judicial process and seriously affects the fairness of judicial proceedings.”
28
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1
United States v. Bosch, 951 F.2d 1546, 1557 (9th Cir. 1991) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting)
2
(alterations, citation, and quotation marks omitted). As this Court implicitly recognized just
3
last year, suspending proceedings preserves the integrity and reputation of the judicial
4
process by ensuring that ongoing proceedings will not be conducted by a potentially
5
disqualified judge, and by guaranteeing that the Court’s adjudication of the recusal motion
6
will be conducted wholly independent of any ancillary merits-related proceedings. Section
7
455 also “reflects Congress’s view that the adjudication of a case by a judge with an actual
8
or apparent bias is an ‘abuse of judicial power,’ ” and the statute ensures that “judges do
9
not adjudicate cases that they have no statutory power to hear . . . .” In re School Asbestos
10
Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 778 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S.
11
21, 31 (1943)). In light of the seriousness of a recusal motion, a Court should not conduct
12
merits-related proceedings while its very “power to hear” the case is at issue.
13
For the foregoing reasons, a suspension of proceedings is particularly warranted
14
where, as here, (1) a party requests only forward-looking relief and (2) the dispute concerns
15
ongoing ex parte communications with the Court. Those are the facts not only of the present
16
motion but also of the recusal motion in Kensington, where the Third Circuit suspended all
17
proceedings pending resolution of a claim that the District Court should be disqualified in
18
light of its ex parte communications with court-appointed advisors. See In re Kensington
19
Int’l, Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 317 (3d Cir. 2004) (Kensington II) (stating that the party sought
20
only forward-looking relief); Kensington I, 353 F.3d at 216 (stating that the court suspended
21
all affected proceedings pending resolution of the motion).
22
Plaintiffs do not even cite, much less attempt to distinguish, Kensington (or, for that
23
matter, In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997), which also involved a
24
suspension of proceedings pending adjudication of a recusal motion based in part on private
25
communications between the Court and counsel for one of the parties). The United States
26
argues in a footnote that the Court should ignore these decisions because they are “not
27
controlling in the Ninth Circuit,” U.S. Response at 5 n.1, but the United States cites no
28
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1
authority from any jurisdiction to the contrary. The United States also attempts to
2
distinguish Kensington and Martinez on the ground that they involved a “pre-judgment
3
phase of litigation” rather than “post-trial orders.” Id. But the United States never explains
4
why this distinction matters. In any event, this case is precisely like the pre-judgment
5
posture of In re Kensington, for here, too, judicial proceedings are ongoing and future
6
judicial decisions are contemplated that indisputably implicate and may prejudice Movants’
7
legal rights.
8
Plaintiffs cite a few cases where courts refused to suspend proceedings pending
9
resolution of a recusal motion, but those cases are distinguishable because (1) none of those
10
cases involved ex parte merits communications with the Court, and (2) each of those cases
11
apparently involved requests for retrospective relief, such that if the moving party prevailed,
12
all prejudice could be remedied by complete vacatur. See Kolon Industries, 748 F.3d at 164
13
(motion to recuse a district court, for reasons other than ex parte communications, from a
14
case that had already reached a jury verdict); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 410
15
F.3d 506, 519 (9th Cir. 2005) (party argued that the district judge was biased, and thus
16
remedy would presumably have included vacatur of prior decisions); In re Int’l Bus. Machs.
17
Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 934 (2d Cir. 1980) (motion to recuse a district court, for reasons other
18
than ex parte communications, where the remedy would be “[t]erminating this trial at this
19
point before judgment and starting anew”); In re Spirtos, 298 B.R. 425, 427 (C.D. Cal.
20
2003) (party argued that the bankruptcy judge’s prior decisions were biased, and thus
21
remedy would presumably have included vacatur of those decisions).
22
Movants also emphasize that any claimed burden on Plaintiffs of a brief suspension
23
of proceedings is principally due to Plaintiffs’ own request for an extraordinary 51 days just
24
to file their response to the Motion for Recusal. This 51-day period is longer than the entire
25
period it took to brief and decide the first recusal motion in 2015. Indeed, that 51-day period
26
is even a full three weeks longer than parties have to file response briefs on the merits in
27
the Supreme Court of the United States. See SUP. CT. R. 25(2).
28
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1
CONCLUSION
2
For the foregoing reasons, Movants respectfully request that the Court suspend all
3
proceedings and the Monitor’s operations pending resolution of Movants’ pending Motion
4
for Recusal of the Court and its Monitor.
5
6 DATED this 28th day of November, 2016.
7
COOPER & KIRK, PLLC
8
9
By Charles J. Cooper
10 Charles J. Cooper*
Michael W. Kirk*
11 Harold S. Reeves*
COOPER & KIRK, PLLC
12 1523 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
13
* Admitted pro hac vice
14
15 JONES, SKELTON & HOCHULI, P.L.C.
16
17 By John T. Masterson
John T. Masterson
18 Joseph J. Popolizio
Justin M. Ackerman
19 40 North Central Avenue, Suite 2700
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
20
Attorneys for Defendant Joseph M. Arpaio
21 and non-party Movants Gerard Sheridan
and Joseph Sousa
22
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Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1896 Filed 11/28/16 Page 13 of 13

1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2 I hereby certify that on this 28th day of November, 2016, I caused the foregoing

3 document to be filed electronically with the Clerk of Court through the CM/ECF System

4 for filing; and served on counsel of record via the Court’s CM/ECF system.

5
/s/ Charles J. Cooper
6
Charles J. Cooper
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