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IN THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL APPEAL: EA/2017/0019

GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER


(INFORMATION RIGHTS)

BETWEEN:

Appellant
and

THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER


Respondent

EXHIBIT A-1
Information laid to begin a private prosecution
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Yyyyy Xxxxx
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE

LIST OF EXHIBITS

No DATE DESCRIPTION FILE

1 8 March 2016 Magistrates Courts Act, s 1 (Information) Exhibit 1

2 12 Nov 2015 Email from Humb Police Exhibit 2

3 12 Nov 2015 Email to Humb Police Exhibit 3

5 13 Nov 2015 Email from Humb Police Exhibit 4

5 2 Dec 2015 Evidence supporting allegations Exhibit 5

6 8 Dec 2015 Humb Police confirming recording of complaint Exhibit 6

7 13 Jan 2016 Humb Police outcome of complaint Exhibit 7

8 25 Jan 2016 Appeal against outcome of complaint Exhibit 8


9 19 July 2013 Costs suspended until outcome of proceedings Exhibit 9

10 October 2015 Councils Witness Statement Exhibit 10

11 Nov 2013 Screen shots of internet forum posts Exhibit 11

12 October 2015 Councils Exhibit (NELC12) Exhibit 12

13 20 Nov 2013 Original letter to Administrative Court Exhibit 13

14 25 Nov 2013 Original letter from Administrative Court Exhibit 14

15 15 Jan 2014 Email Read Receipt from Council Exhibit 15

16 14 Feb 2014 Email Read Receipt from Council Exhibit 16

17 23 April 2014 Email Read Receipt from Council Exhibit 17

18 10 Jan 2014 Letter to the Justices Clerk (query delivery of case) Exhibit 18

19 13 Feb 2014 Letter to the Justices Clerk (query delivery of case) Exhibit 19

20 22 April 2014 Letter to the Justices Clerk (requesting certificate) Exhibit 20

21 S 26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 Exhibit 21

1. This statement and the above listed provides evidence to support the information laid on
8.3.16 [Exhibit 1].

2. On 12.11.15, Humberside Police (HP) responded by stating that a reported crime (one
punishable as an offence whether occurring in criminal or civil proceedings), was a civil
matter [Exhibit 2].

3. An email expressing dissatisfaction with HPs response was sent 12.11.15 stating that a
complaint would be submitted about whoever within the force made the decision. A
request was made for the matter to be escalated for the attention of the Chief Constable
so dissatisfaction of a subsequent decision would be subject to external scrutiny rather
than the force investigating itself. [Exhibit 3].
4. HP made contact on 13.11.15, advising that all evidence should be collated to support
the allegations [Exhibit 4]. HP confirmed in a letter dated 23.11.15 that the Professional
Standards Branch was in receipt of the complaint. The advice was acted on regarding
the evidence and a statement produce dated 2.12.15 [Exhibit 5]. A number of
supporting documents were indexed but withheld awaiting assurance that they would be
considered but the documents were never asked for.

5. A letter dated 8.12.15 from HP confirmed that the matter had been formally recorded
(CO 461/15) and enclose a copy of the complainant report [Exhibit 6]. The letter
(outcome) in relation to the complaint was sent on 13.1.16 [Exhibit 7] stating that
unless a request comes from the court, HP do not investigate allegations of perjury and
was a matter to be argued with the court.

6. On 15.1.16 Grimsby Magistrates court was forwarded HPs outcome letter and asked if
it would confirm that the North East Lincolnshire Council (the Council) had in fact
produced a false witness statement and inform HP (the court had been forwarded the
statement [Exhibit 5] on 11.12.15). The court replied in this matter on 26.1.16 stating
that it would not be taking any action regarding the allegations of perjury.

7. An appeal against the outcome of local resolution was submitted on 25.1.16 [Exhibit 8]
but to date there has been no update in relation to any progress made.

Exhibits supporting false statement

8. In summary, the council applied to the Magistrates' court to obtain a Council Tax
liability order relating to the 2015/16 tax year. Payments were made in sufficient
amount to meet the legal obligation to pay the sums set out on the demand notice and so
the account was never in arrears.

9. The Council engineered a 'non-payment' scenario, by allocating monies to a disputed


sum which related to a previous year's account that was under appeal to the High Court.
That sum was suspended [Exhibit 9] pending the court's decision which has yet to be
concluded. The Council allocate monies to the wrong account attributing that decision
to believing that the sum was no longer disputed because the appeal had been withdrawn
(paras 69 & 73 of the Councils Witness Statement submitted for Council Tax liability
hearing 30.10.15 [Exhibit 10]).
10. Evidence held supports that this claim was untrue, not on account of the appeal never
being withdrawn (though it hasn't), but specifically because it is beyond all reasonable
doubt that the council knew it had not been withdrawn. The Council posted monies to
the suspended account on the premise that it believed the appeal had been withdrawn
and therefore did so fraudulently.

11. It is beyond reasonable doubt that two internet forum posts [Exhibit 11] were the source
of one of the Councils exhibits (NELC12) referred to in its Witness Statement for
Council Tax liability hearing 30.10.15 [Exhibit 12]. These were two letters on which
the Council sought to rely in justifying having no further reason to believe that the
costs were being disputed because the application for the Judicial review of the costs'
had been withdrawn.

12. The original letters one dated 20.11.13 [Exhibit 13] was in response to the
Administrative Court's recommendation to withdraw the judicial review claim as the
process had prompted the Magistrates to produce a draft case and deemed there no
longer a need for further action on their part as the process of stating a case was
underway.

Note: The judicial review claim, which was a separate matter from the application to
state a case for an appeal challenging the costs, was merely the vehicle used to get the
Magistrates' court to comply with the procedure. The judicial review claim therefore
was for a mandatory order, not a 'review of the costs' and so the case stated appeal
challenging the summons costs had not been withdrawn.

The other letter dated 25.11.13 [Exhibit 14] was the Administrative Court's response to
confirm that the letter to withdraw had been accepted and the Court file closed.

13. The letters contained in the Councils submission had been redacted and matched the
entries that were posted on the public forum. The forum is the only place from which
those letters could be sourced in that form. The characteristics (redaction, formatting
etc.) of the letters which the Council submitted to the court were identical to the forum
posts [Exhibit 10].

14. The Council had for some reason not sought the original letters and made use of the
website where every correspondence connected with the matter (albeit redacted) could
be conveniently accessed. It is likely that if the Council had made use of the forum to
produce its submission, it would have been informed from the regular updates posted
that the case stated appeal was still being pursued. Even if the forum was not regularly
viewed it was enough that it did once to source content to be certain that it knowingly
made a false statement. The crux of the matter is that one of the posts from which the
content was sourced [Exhibit 11] (though omitted) had the following commentary
accompanying it which reinforced the matter in itself:

Back almost to square one.

Although the judicial review claim for mandatory order was not entirely
successful in mandating the Magistrates' Court to state the case (other than the
draft), it would never have been known there was a possibility to negotiate the
terms of a recognizance at the hearing. It took this process to prompt a response
from the Justices at Grimsby Magistrates' Court.

The next move then will be to arrange to appear before the Magistrates' Court to
agree terms of a recognizance.

Receipt of correspondence acknowledged after judicial review claim withdrawn

15. The Council had acknowledged receiving letters (email attachments) by way of 'read
receipts' returned on 15 January [Exhibit 15], 14 February [Exhibit 16] and 23 April
2014 [Exhibit 17] in respect of letters dated 10 January [Exhibit 18], 13 February
[Exhibit 19] and 22 April 2014 [Exhibit 20]. Those letters, which were copies of
correspondence sent to the Justices' Clerk concerned matters that left no doubt that the
high court appeal was still being pursued, and sent after the judicial review claim for
mandatory order was withdrawn.

16. The appropriation of monies was supported by the Council on the basis that it believed
the appeal had been withdrawn, and on that basis alone. The council officer had
therefore wilfully made a statement material in the proceeding, which he knew was
untrue. As a consequence the Council now has a court order enabling it to enforce a
fraudulently obtained sum, which is likely to accumulate because of additional costs
which will over time to be sufficient in amount so the council will claim justification in
taking measures such as bankruptcy, charging order or applying for a custodial sentence.
Improper exercise of police powers and privileges

17. HPs decision not to act, especially in light of the indisputable evidence must amount to
improperly exercising police powers under subsections (5) and (6) of Section 26 of the
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 [Exhibit 21] as clearly the failure to exercise a
power is to the detriment of another person.

18. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dated this 25th day of April 2016

Signed:
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxxx Yyyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 1
Information laid
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES 8 March 2016
MAGISTRATES COURT (Code 1940)

STARTING A PROSECUTION IN A MAGISTRATES COURT


(Magistrates Courts Act, s 1)

STATEMENT OF OFFENCE

Failure under subsections (5) and (6) of Section 26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act
2015 to exercise a power for the purpose of achieving the detriment of another person

PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE

On 11 November 2015, an officer serving with Humberside Police, Gillian Morley, 9614
improperly exercising police powers in responding to a reported offence of perjury to defraud,
by stating that the matter did not concern the Police as it was civil.

STATEMENT OF INFORMANT

1. On 8 November 2015 the following report was submitted to Humberside Police:

North East Lincolnshire Council produced a false witness statement (thereby


committing perjury) with regards a council tax liability hearing at Grimsby
Magistrates' Court. The District Judge (Daniel Curtis) was aware that the
evidence surrounded a false and corrupt statement, but nevertheless granted the
council a liability order to enforce a fraudulent sum which presently stands at
120.00. This sum is likely to increase if the council appoints its criminal firm of
bailiffs, Rossendales. My allegations are that the council has committed perjury
with the intent to fraudulently obtain money from me by the use of Grimsby
Magistrates court and that Judge Daniel Curtis has perverted the course of justice
by being complicit to that crime.
2. On 11 November 2015, Humberside Police responded by wrongly stating that the
reported crime (one punishable as an offence whether occurring in criminal or civil
proceedings), was a civil matter, thereby improperly exercising police powers.

With regards to your report that was submitted to Humberside Police on


08/11/2015.....please be advised that this is not a Police matter and is civil which
I suggest you seek further advice from a solicitor/legal advisor.

3. The crime report followed proceedings instituted by North East Lincolnshire council
(NELC) to enforce council tax liability at Grimsby Magistrates' Court. The original
hearing 2 October 2015 identified issues and so the matter adjourned to 30 October.

4. NELC diverted payment intended to reduce the indebtedness of the current years
liability to a sum which was outstanding from the 2012/13 tax year thus engineering
default. The outstanding sum was disputed court costs which are under appeal to the High
Court. NELC had suspended the sum pending the court's decision so there was no
justification for engineering default by allocating payment to that sum as the case has yet
to be determined. The appeal has never withdrawn and consequently the costs still
disputed.

5. On 16 October, NELC served court papers by electronic transfer on the Defendant and
the Magistrates court in respect of the 30 October court hearing. The Witness Statements
content caused the Defendant to suspect a deliberate intent to deceive the court. That
matter was specifically documented in the Defendants representations dated 29 October
where it was also contended the statement made by NELC that it had no further reason to
believe that the costs were being disputed.

6. NELC had supported its decision to allocate payment to the disputed costs based upon its
claim that it believed the High Court appeal had been withdrawn therefore the suspension
to collect the costs lifted. It is inconceivable that NELC honestly believed this which is
backed up by the exhibits supporting its Witness statement. The Defendants current
council tax bill (exhibit 1) itemised the sum as a separate balance from the current
liability and describes it as a sum subject to court proceedings. NELC had
simultaneously submitted an item of evidence to the court claiming it had no reason to
believe that the costs were still being disputed and another implying that they were
suspended until the outcome of the proceedings. The Council Tax bill expressed this in
the following terms:
Memorandum Note
Your instalments for 2015/16 do not include your 2014/15 account balance
As at 27-FEB-2015 your 2014/15 Council Tax account balance is 60.00
60.00 of the total is subject to court proceedings

7. On serving the court papers by electronic transfer, NELC had only been able to
successfully transfer to the Defendant, nine of the fourteen files which made up the
complete set of documents. It was apparent from the context of the 'Witness Statement'
which was successfully transferred that the missing content could be sourced elsewhere,
and NELC therefore informed.

8. A missing exhibit was identified in the Witness Statement to be a letter on which NELC
relied to justify having no further reason to believe that the costs were being disputed
[because the Defendant had withdrawn the] application for the Judicial review of the
costs'. It was verified by email records that a copy, which was a letter sent to the
Administrative Court Office dated 20th November 2013 had been sent to NELC and
acknowledged by way of a 'read receipt' on 22 November 2013.

9. There was no obvious disadvantage to not having received this exhibit. The letter,
however did not give any cause to lead NELC to believe that the High Court appeal (case
stated) challenging the summons costs had been withdrawn. The letter was in response to
the Administrative Court's recommendation to withdraw the judicial review claim as the
process had prompted the Magistrates to produce a draft case and deemed there no longer
a need for further action on their part as the process of stating a case was underway. The
judicial review claim, which was a separate matter from the application to state a case for
an appeal challenging the costs, was merely the vehicle used to get the Magistrates' court
to conform. The judicial review claim therefore was for a mandatory order, not a 'review
of the costs' and so the case stated appeal challenging the summons costs had never been
withdrawn.

10. It is clear from the context of that letter alone that it was only the judicial review claim
for a mandatory order that was withdrawn and that the High Court appeal challenging the
summons costs was still being pursued.

11. NELC had acknowledged receiving letters (email attachments) by way of 'read
receipts' returned on 15 January, 14 February and 23 April 2014 in respect of letters dated
10 January, 13 February and 22 April 2014. Those letters, which were copies of
correspondence sent to the Justices' Clerk contained hard evidence that the high court
appeal was still being pursued, and sent after the judicial review claim for mandatory
order was withdrawn.

12. Acknowledgement of letters being read, regarding the 10 January and 14 February emails
concerned letters sent to the Justices Clerk, querying the failure to deliver the final
signed case stated. The email regarding the 22 April concerned a letter sent to the
Justices Clerk, requesting a certificate to state that the application had been refused.

13. The missing court papers were requested again on 2 November 2015 (after the court
hearing) in readiness for escalating the matter. NELC was successful in transferring them,
and on viewing the exhibit concerning the Administrative Court it was obvious that
contrary to the initial view, not having all the papers was a disadvantage.

14. The exhibit, provided additional evidence that NELC had wilfully made a statement
material in the proceeding, which was known not to be true. The letters were not copies
of the original; it can be confirmed beyond reasonable doubt that the contents were
obtained from the same source that recorded publicly everything relevant to the matter.
The source was a public help forum dealing with council tax issues, the same forum
which NELC had sourced the contents of another of its exhibits.

15. The letters contained in the exhibit (revealed 2 November) had been redacted and
matched the entries that were posted on the public forum. The forum is the only place
from which those letters could be sourced in that redacted form. The characteristics of the
letters which NELC submitted to the court were identical to the forum posts.

16. NELC had not sought the original letters and had presumably as a short cut referred to the
website where all correspondence connected with the matter (albeit redacted) where
conveniently in one place. It is likely that if NELC had made use of the forum to produce
its Witness Statement, it would have been informed from the regular updates posted that
the case stated appeal was still very much being pursued. Whether the forum was
regularly consulted by NELC would not be the deciding factor in determining that it
knowingly made a false statement; it would however reinforce the allegations. The crux
of the matter is that the post from which the content was sourced was accompanied with
some commentary (below) which reinforced the matter in itself:
Back almost to square one.

Although the judicial review claim for mandatory order was not entirely
successful in mandating the Magistrates' Court to state the case (other than the
draft), it would never have been known there was a possibility to negotiate the
terms of a recognizance at the hearing. It took this process to prompt a response
from the Justices at Grimsby Magistrates' Court.

The next move then will be to arrange to appear before the Magistrates Court to
agree terms of a recognizance.

17. NELC had made a statement (material in the proceedings) that was known to be false
with the intention of misleading the court to justify misallocating payment to a disputed
sum thereby engineering default for the current year enabling a further court application
for the purposes of fraudulently attaching a claim of costs.

18. It is a matter of public importance that a summons be issued directed to the police officer
to appear before the magistrates' court to answer the information for an offence of
improperly treating perjury as a civil matter.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH

The information of: Mr , of Grimsby

I believe the statement contained in this information is true to the best of my knowledge and
belief

Dated this 8th day of March 2016

Signed:
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT (Code 1940)
Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxx Yyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 2
Email from Humberside Police

Xxxx

From: "Morley, Gillian 9614" <Gillian.Morley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>


To: <xxxxxxxxxxx@gmail.com>
Sent: 12 November 2015 00:21
Subject: Crime Reporting Submission

Mr Yyyyy

With regards to your report that was submitted to Humberside Police on 08/11/2015 as
follows:

North East Lincolnshire Council produced a false witness statement (thereby committing
perjury) with regards a council tax liability hearing at Grimsby Magistrates' Court. The District
Judge (Daniel Curtis) was aware that the evidence surrounded a false and corrupt statement,
but nevertheless granted the council a liability order to enforce a fraudulent sum which
presently stands at 120.00. This sum is likely to increase if the council appoints its criminal
firm of bailiffs, Rossendales. My allegations are that the council has committed perjury with
the intent to fraudulently obtain money from me by the use of Grimsby Magistrates court and
that Judge Daniel Curtis has perverted the course of justice by being complicit to that crime.

Please be advised that this is not a Police matter and is civil which I suggest you seek further
advice from a solicitor/legal advisor.

Command Hub
Humberside Police
Internet Email should not be treated as a secure means of communication. To ensure
regulatory compliance Humberside Police monitors all.....
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxxx Yyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 3
Email to Humberside Police

Xxxx

From: "Xxxx" <xxxxxxx@gmail.com>


To: "Morley, Gillian 9614" <Gillian.Morley@humberside.pnn.police.uk>
Sent: 12 November 2015 10:48
Subject: Re: Crime Reporting Submission

Dear Ms Morley

I am in disbelief that Humberside police have arrived at the conclusion that fraud is not a police matter. I have not
heard such an absurd statement since the force said the same with regards bailiff firms defrauding council
taxpayers.

Your suggestion that I am put to the expense of enriching the legal profession when I am in any event contributing
to fund the police out of the very tax which the council wishes to defraud from me has some irony to it.

I am left obviously with no option than to submit a complaint about whoever within the force made this decision.
However, I would much prefer the person against whom I make the complaint to be the Chief Constable so that
any investigation will not be conducted by the force itself in the hope of removing the 'sham' element which is
associated with these matters. Therefore, please escalate this matter for the attention of the Chief Constable.

Yours sincerely

X. Yyyyyy
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxxx Yyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 4
Email from Humberside Police

Xxxxx

From: "Smithey, Graeme 1226" <Graeme.Smithey@humberside.pnn.police.uk>


To: <xxxxxxxxg@gmail.com>
Sent: 13 November 2015 19:04
Subject: RECENT CORRESPONDENCE WITH HUMBERSIDE POLICE

Xxxx,

I write with regard to your recent correspondence with Humberside Police. I have brought the
matter to the attention of our Professional Standards Branch that are based at Priory Road in
Hull. Someone will be in touch in due course.

I would advise that you collate all evidence and intelligence that would support the claims
you are making against the court.

Yours sincerely,

Graeme Smithey
Police Sergeant

Internet Email should not be treated as a secure means of communication. To ensure


regulatory compliance Humberside Police monitors all.....
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxxx Yyyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 5
Evidence submitted to Police
2 December 2015
IN THE MATTER OF ALLEGATIONS OF Ref: / /
PERJURY TO COMMIT FRAUD AND
PERVERTING THE COURSE OF JUSTICE

IN THE GRIMSBY MAGISTRATES COURT


CIVIL JURISDICTION

STATEMENT

Below is the list of supporting documents (SD) which accompany this statement. It is
important that all are to hand, and a copy requested in the case of any missing document. SDs
#1 to #24 relate directly to this matter and those which are relevant but not specifically
referred to are a numbered #25 to #31 in the list and relate to previous concerns raised with
Humberside police on a similar theme.

LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (SD)

No # DATE DESCRIPTION FILE NAME

1 1 Oct 2015 Defendants representations proof of Defendants Grounds of


payment; summons costs Appeal.pdf

2 6 May 2015 High court Judgment in the matter of an R (on the application of
appeal of Council Tax court summons costs Reverend Nicolson) v
Tottenham Magistrates.doc

3 22 July 2013 Draft case stated for appeal to the high court Case stated Draft.pdf

5 16 Oct 2015 NELC (Claimant) - Witness Statement Alan French - Witness


Statement.pdf

5 16 Oct 2015 Claimants Exhibit 1 (Defendants 2015/16 NELC1.pdf


Council Tax bill)

6 16 Oct 2015 Claimants Exhibit 2 (Council Tax reminder) NELC2.pdf

7 16 Oct 2015 Claimants Exhibit 3 (Council Tax second NELC3.pdf


reminder)
8 16 Oct 2015 Claimants Exhibit 4 (Council Tax final NELC4.pdf
notice)

9 16 Oct 2015 Claimants Exhibit 5 (Council Tax summons) NELC5.pdf

10 16 Oct 2015 Claimants Exhibit 6 (Peters v Anderson - NELC6.pdf


case law)

11 16 Oct 2015 Claimants Exhibit 7 (Devaynes v Noble - NELC7.pdf


case law)

12 16 Oct 2015 Claimants Exhibit 8 (Cory Brothers & Co - NELC8.pdf


case law)

13 16 Oct 2015 Claimants Exhibit 9 (Defendants email to NELC9.pdf


Claimant)

14 16 Oct 2015 Claimants Exhibit 10 (Extract from Bailiff NELC10.pdf


help forum)
15 16 Oct 2015 Claimants Exhibit 11 (Extract from Legal NELC11.pdf
Beagle forum)
16 16 Oct 2015 Claimants Exhibit 12 (Contents of letters to NELC12.pdf
and from Admin Court Office at Leeds)
17 16 Oct 2015 Claimants Exhibit 13 (Leeson v Leeson - NELC13.pdf
case law)

18 29 Oct 2015 Defendants representations appropriation Defendants (Supplementary)


of payments; evidence of costs appealed Grounds of Appeal.pdf

19 Chronology (case bundle draft document - Case Stated Chronology


high court application) draft.pdf

20 Consent order (case bundle draft document - Case Stated Consent order
high court application) draft.pdf

21 Grounds of appeal (case bundle draft Case Stated Grounds of


document - high court application) appeal draft.pdf

22 Skeleton Argument (case bundle draft Case Stated Skeleton


document - high court application) Argument draft.pdf

23 2 Sept 2014 Complaint to Advisory Committee Judicial complaint 2 Sept


(Magistrates / Justices Clerks conduct) 2014.pdf

24 7 Nov 2015 Complaint to Judicial Conduct Investigations 7 Nov 2015 ocj-complaint-


Office(Judges conduct) 0913.pdf

25 2 Aug 2011 Concerns about the automated procedure of Fake court Summons 2
issuing council tax summonses en masse August 2011.doc
26 31 Aug 2011 Concerns about the automated procedure of Fake court Summons 31
issuing council tax summonses en masse August 2011.doc

27 20 March 2012 Concerns about the automated procedure of Fake court Summons 20
issuing council tax summonses en masse March 2012.doc

28 5 Sept 2013 Business Rates (NNDR) summons fraud Business Rates summons
fraud 05 Sept 2013.pdf

29 25 Oct 2013 Highlighting effects of benefit reforms on cost FOI data 25 October
income / inappropriately funding council tax 2013.pdf
admin
30 First document referred to in FOI data 25 Total Cost of CT Admin.pdf
October 2013.pdf

31 Second document referred to in FOI data 25 FOI costs letters.pdf


October 2013.pdf

INTRODUCTION

1. The issues raised here will no doubt be considered by the police to be civil rather than
criminal matters because of the association with the recovery of council tax, for which
the recovery of such debt falls under the Civil Jurisdiction and Procedure of the
Magistrates Courts Act 1980. Perjury however is punishable as an offence whether it
occurs in criminal or civil proceedings and the consequences are in this case that a false
statement was made in order to commit an act of fraud.

2. The seriousness of the matter is compounded by the obvious knowledge by the judge
that a false and corrupt statement had been made but nevertheless proceeded to find in
the councils favour.

3. Because of a conflict of interest which exists if Humberside police were to deal with this
matter, it is suggested that another police force does so (see below para 68).

BACKGROUND

4. North East Lincolnshire council (NELC) essentially instituted court proceedings to


enforce council tax liability even though payments were made in sufficient amount to
meet the legal obligation to pay the sums set out on the demand notice relating to my
2015/16 Council Tax liability. Ironically, at various times the account was in credit due
to over payment, but at all other times the account was up to date.
5. A billing authority is able to exploit its council tax processing system which allocates
payments to the earliest debt (if one exists) where payments are unspecified.

Note: A specified payment, for the purpose of NELC's processing system, is a payment
that matches exactly the instalment amount or an arranged payment plan.

6. A billing authority is advantaged by the costs generated for making complaint to the
Magistrates' court for engineering a non-payment scenario, by making a decision not
to re-allocate a payment which a taxpayer obviously intends reducing the indebtedness
of the current year's liability.

7. NELC exploited its processing system in exactly this way in my case to divert a sum
obviously intended to reduce the indebtedness of the current years liability to a sum
which was outstanding from the 2012/13 tax year and so engineered default. The
criminal implications are clear as in the context of R v Ghosh [1982] EWCA Crim 2 (the
test of honesty), there is no doubt that even if the council held genuine belief that its
actions were morally justified, it must have realised that ordinary people would consider
them dishonest.

Disputed sum outstanding from previous year

8. The sum outstanding from 2012/13 related to court costs for a similar matter involving
NELC making complaint for non payment of council tax. That sum was disputed (the
costs) and an application to state a case for an appeal to the High Court was submitted.
That sum was suspended pending the court's decision (yet to be determined) so under no
circumstances was it permissible for NELC to exploit its processing system for
engineering default by allocating payment to that sum. A letter dated 19 July 2013 sent
by NELCs Legal Department in connection with the claim for a mandatory order, to
which will be referred later, contains the following (emphasis added):

Yourself v Grimsby Magistrates Court & NELC

I write further to the legal proceedings issued by yourself at Leeds High Court
against Grimsby & Cleethorpes Magistrates Court, naming North East
Lincolnshire Council as an interested party. The papers have been passed to me
upon Mrs Conolly's departure from employment with the Local Authority.

The purpose of my writing to you is to inform you that the 60 court costs, which
you dispute, will be suspended until the outcome of the proceedings. At the
completion of those proceedings, dependent on the Court's decision, the fee will
either be withdrawn from your account or will remain outstanding to the Local
Authority.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the Leeds High Court for their information.

Yours sincerely
for Group Manager Legal & Democratic Services

9. Even if the costs were not suspended, the sum (court costs) did not form part of any
year's council tax liability for which its system would have a parameter set to accept
specific payment (paras 4752, SD #18). Moreover, if NELC had lifted the
suspension, it could not simply be recovered by diverting payments made on the current
year's council tax because the sum then would be under enforcement. In those
circumstances, a decision about which one of a range of enforcement measures
empowered by the liability order would have had to be made to enforce the sum and
communicated to me. Despite NELC stating in a number of correspondence that I would
be notified if and when it were to resume enforcement, it never at any point conveyed
this to me (paras 7479, SD #18).

10. An additional concern is why it is that one of the exhibits NELC1 (copy of my current
council tax bill) itemises the sum as a separate balance from the current liability and
describes it as a sum subject to court proceedings. NELC has at the same time as
claiming to have no reason to believe that the costs were being disputed, submitted an
item of evidence to the court that states that they are. This was additional to being
highlighted in my initial representations (para 20, SD #1) which the judge missed or
ignored. The Council Tax bill states as follows:

Memorandum Note
Your instalments for 2015/16 do not include your 2014/15 account balance
As at 27-FEB-2015 your 2014/15 Council Tax account balance is 60.00
60.00 of the total is subject to court proceedings

Missing papers

11. On 16 October 2015, NELC served court papers by electronic transfer on myself and the
Magistrates court in respect of the 30 October 2015 court hearing. Fourteen files made
up the complete set of documents but only 9 of those which included a 'Witness
Statement' (SD #5) and exhibits 'NELC1' to 'NELC7' and 'NELC9' were successfully
transferred. Exhibits 'NELC8' and 'NELC10' to 'NELC13' were not transferred. Shortly
after NELC sent an email explaining it was having difficulty serving the court papers
and provided a link and instructions about how to download the files from an
account which NELC had created on its system which required me to log on with details
it provided after which I needed to change the password to one of my choice in order to
access the information.

12. I was suspicious about why it was, that only certain files could not be served, and not
happy about entering sensitive information that might get into the wrong hands, it had
after all been able to transfer most of the papers by email attachment. I identified the 5
missing files and asked if those could be emailed but made it clear I was not willing to
create an account to access the files in the way suggested.

13. On 19 October, NELC replied and explained it was having difficulties accessing the
electronic file and wanted to arrange a visit to my home so the paper files instead could
be handed over.

14. I was suspicious about why a simple task was causing such difficulties and it crossed
my mind that there might be something NELC wanted to propose (off the record) in
view of the compelling evidence against it, or if not that some other ulterior motive to
make contact. In any event, it was pretty obvious from the context of the 'Witness
Statement' that the missing content could be sourced elsewhere, for example where the
content related to case authority. NELC was therefore informed that it was unnecessary
to deliver the case bundle in paper form.

15. Exhibit 'NELC12' was identified in paragraph 69 of the Witness Statement to be a letter
on which NELC relied to justify having no further reason to believe that the costs were
being disputed [because I had withdrawn my] application for the Judicial review of the
costs'. As it was indicated to be the letter sent to the Administrative Court Office dated
20th November 2013 my email records verified that NELC had been sent a copy and
acknowledged by way of a 'read receipt' sent 22 November 2013.

16. I was satisfied that not having exhibit 'NELC12' would cause no disadvantage. The
letter, however (Annex C [C-6], SD #18) does not give any cause to lead NELC to
believe that the High Court appeal (case stated) challenging the summons costs had
been withdrawn. The letter was in response to the Administrative Court's
recommendation (Annex C [C-5], SD #18) to withdraw the judicial review claim as the
process had prompted the Magistrates to produce a draft case (SD #3) and deemed there
no longer a need for further action on their part as the process of stating a case was
underway. The judicial review claim, which was a separate matter from the application
to state a case for an appeal challenging the costs, was merely the vehicle used to get the
Magistrates' court to conform. The judicial review claim therefore was for a mandatory
order, not a 'review of the costs' and so the case stated appeal challenging the summons
costs has never been withdrawn.

17. It is clear from the context of that letter alone that it was only the judicial review claim
for a mandatory order that was withdrawn and that the High Court appeal challenging
the summons costs was still being pursued (draft bundle, SD #19 to #22). It is
inconceivable that the judge would have had difficulty understanding this, therefore the
reason he refused to, reinforces the assertion that he was biased in the favour of NELC.

18. The bias toward NELC was made plain from the way the judge turned the matter from
being a question of whether the appeal had been withdrawn to whether evidence could
be produced to support the appeal was still live. The appropriation of monies was
supported by NELC on the basis that it believed the appeal had been withdrawn, and on
that basis alone. Upon realising that NELC had made a false and corrupt 'Witness
Statement', the judge offered assistance (as a way of justifying granting a liability order)
by introducing a defence for those actions, on which NELC had not sought to rely,
thereby seeking to pervert the course of justice. The question of whether the case was
live was not a factor in NELC's decision making to engineer court proceedings; the
decision upon which NELC misappropriated payment was based on its false claim that
it believed the appeal was withdrawn.

19. When asked if I could provide evidence that the appeal was still live (as opposed to not
being withdrawn) the judge prevented me raising the matter that NELC had
acknowledged receiving letters (email attachments) by way of 'read receipts' returned on
15 January, 14 February and 23 April 2014 in respect of letters dated 10 January, 13
February and 22 April 2014. Those letters, which were copies of correspondence sent to
the Justices' Clerk contained hard evidence that the high court appeal was still
being pursued, and sent after the judicial review claim for mandatory order was
withdrawn (Annex C [C-8], [C-9] and [C11], SD #18).

20. Acknowledgement of letter being read, sent to the Justices Clerk, querying the failure
to deliver the final signed case stated sent on 10 January (Annex C [C-8]):
From: Mike (Gov Connect)
To: xxxx
Sent: 15 January 2014 11:50
Subject: Read: Re: Representations on Draft Case - CrimPR 64.3 (6)

Your message

To: Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)


Subject: Re: Representations on Draft Case - CrimPR 64.3 (6)
Sent: 10 January 2014 15:09:48

was read on 15 January 2014 11:50:32.

21. Acknowledgement of second letter being read, sent to the Justices Clerk, querying the
failure to deliver the final signed case stated sent on 13 February (Annex C [C-9]):

From: Mike (Gov Connect)


To: xxxx
Sent: 14 February 2014 11:29 AM
Subject: Read: Case Stated - Recognizance (re, North East Lincolnshire Council)

Your message

To: Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)


Subject: Case Stated - Recognizance (re, North East Lincolnshire Council)
Sent: 13 February 2014 16:18:48 (UTC) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London

was read on 14 February 2014 11:29:00.

22. Acknowledgement of letter being read, sent to the Justices Clerk, requesting certificate
stating that the application has been refused sent on 13 February (Annex C [C-11]):

From: Mike (Gov Connect)


To: xxxx
Sent: 23 April 2014 15:44
Subject: Read: Re: Certificate of Refusal to state a case - s.111(5) MCA 1980 (re, North
East Lincolnshire Council)

Your message

To: Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)


Subject: Re: Certificate of Refusal to state a case - s.111(5) MCA 1980 (re, North East
Lincolnshire Council)
Sent: 22 April 2014 14:48:32 (UTC) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London

was read on 23 April 2014 16:44:20.

23. The judge's argument in favour of NELC was apparently based on the length of time
elapsing since the Justices' Clerk gave an undertaking to set out in writing the position
regarding the appeal and advising on the next steps which were never acted on (Annex
C [C10], SD #18).

24. The judge ironically exploited the Magistrates Court's failure to comply with the
relevant procedure rules, thus preventing/delaying the case coming before the high
court, in order to justify granting an order for which NELC fraudulently applied. In a
twist of fate, had the appeal proceeded, it is completely rational the high court would
have made similar judgment as in a case raising the same issue (see Nicolson v
Tottenham Magistrates, SD #2) and found the Magistrates Court's granting of the costs
unlawful. Crucially, had the Magistrates' court not sought to pervert the course of justice
in that appeal (SD #23), the disputed costs would never have been incorporated into my
council tax account (suspended or otherwise) to enable NELC to fraudulently allocate
payment to, in order to engineer a further recovery cycle (and costs) for recovering the
sum.

25. It was conveyed to the judge that the matter in need of addressing surrounded the issues
raised in the argument he had made in support of NELC, which was the misconduct of
the Justices' Clerk that has led to wasting three years of my time. The efforts set out in
the representations (paras 715, SD #18) to ensure that the case advanced leaves no
doubt that the delay or prevention of the appeal coming before the court was in any way
my responsibility.

OBTAINING MISSING PAPERS

26. The missing court papers were requested again on 2 November 2015 (after the court
hearing). I was considering the options to take the matter further and wanted the files in
preparation for providing as evidence for whichever route was decided upon. NELC was
able to transfer them on this occasion and on viewing them it was obvious (especially
with regard to exhibit NELC12), that contrary to my initial view, I was disadvantaged
by not having all the papers.

27. Exhibit NELC12, which contained my letter withdrawing the claim for a mandatory
order and another from the Administrative Court acknowledging that instruction,
provided additional evidence that NELC had wilfully made a statement material in the
proceeding, which was known not to be true. The letters were not copies of the original;
it can be confirmed beyond reasonable doubt that the contents of that submission were
obtained from the same source that recorded publicly everything relevant to the matter
(Annex B, SD #18). The source was a public help forum dealing with council tax issues,
the same forum which NELC had sourced the contents of another of its exhibits
NELC11.

28. The letters contained in exhibit NELC12 had been redacted and matched the entries
that were posted on the public forum (Annex B, SD #24). The forum is the only place
from which those letters could be sourced in that redacted form. The characteristics of
the letters which NELC submitted to the court were identical to the forum posts.

29. Clearly NELC had not sought the original letters and had presumably as a short cut
referred to the website where all correspondence connected with the matter (albeit
redacted) where conveniently in one place. It is likely that if NELC had made use of the
forum to produce its submission, it would have been informed from the regular updates
posted that the case stated appeal was still very much being pursued.

30. Whether NELC did refer generally to the forum is not the deciding factor that would
determine that it knowingly made a false statement; it would however reinforce the
allegations. The crux of the matter is that the post from which the content was sourced
(NELC12) was accompanied with some commentary (see below) which reinforced the
matter in itself:

Back almost to square one.

Although the judicial review claim for mandatory order was not entirely
successful in mandating the Magistrates' Court to state the case (other than the
draft), it would never have been known there was a possibility to negotiate the
terms of a recognizance at the hearing. It took this process to prompt a response
from the Justices at Grimsby Magistrates' Court.

The next move then will be to arrange to appear before the Magistrates' Court to
agree terms of a recognizance.

31. Contents of exhibits NELC10 and NELC 11 where also sourced from public forums
but were produced from screen shots and included information such as the date to
indicate when the websites were accessed. The content in exhibit NELC12 was not
obviously produced from screen shots, but although possible it is much more likely that
the text would simply have been copied and pasted, retaining the same formatting.
32. These exhibits where referred to in paragraphs 66 and 67 of NELCs Witness Statement
to make the point known to the court that I was aware about the need to make an
election of payment and that I had knowledge about how the Northgate system works.

33. It is with disbelief that NELC could make the assumption that I intended to allocate
monies to the oldest sum (and the judge agree) when it is self evident from those
exhibits that my disputes, past and present, surround my objection to monies being
allocated that way. Clearly NELC has incriminated itself by submitting material which
fully supports it knowingly misallocating monies to a sum against my express wishes.

34. The remaining missing court papers all provided the case authority on which NELC
sought to rely in its Witness Statement. Though it was anticipated sourcing these cases
would not cause undue difficulty, the complete judgments were not found, only
references in other cases, which though time consuming, provided an outline of the
issues and enough to piece together a response (paras 4873, SD #18).

35. Exhibit NELC8 which is referred to in paras 60 and 61 of NELCs Witness Statement
relies on the case; Cory Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Owners of the Turkish Steamship
"Mecca" 1897 AC 286. In para 61 (Witness Statement) the partial sentence on which
NELC sought to rely was this: When a debtor pays money on account to his creditor
and makes no appropriation to particular items, the creditor has the right of
appropriation and may exercise the right up to the last moment, by action or otherwise.

36. However, on viewing the exhibit after obtaining it post court hearing, there are several
references to the case which it relied on in exhibit NELC7: Devaynes V Noble 1816
merivale 529 (the Clayton case). NELC relied on that case to defend that its Council
Tax processing system allocates payments correctly if no election is made, i.e., the
earliest debts are paid first (paras 58-59, SD #5).

37. Returning to exhibit NELC8, it is revealed in the paragraph from which NELC quoted
in part, that the rule in Clayton's case does not apply to a case where there is no
account current between the parties:

When a debtor pays money on account to his creditor and makes no appropriation
to particular items, the creditor has the right of appropriation and may exercise the
right up to the last moment, by action or otherwise, the application of the money is
governed, not by any rigid rule of law, but by the intention of the creditor,
expressed implied or presumed. The rule in Clayton's case, (1816) 1 Mer. 585
does not apply to a case where there is no account current between the parties, nor
where from an account rendered or other circumstances, it appears that the creditor
intended, not to make any appropriation, but to reserve the right.

38. The judgment in exhibit NELC8 further clarifies the kind of account which the rule in
the Clayton case does not apply to in a reference to Sir W. Grant Master of the Rolls
judgment in Clayton where he distinguished one debt and account type from another:

They were all cases of distinct insulated debts, between which a plain line of
separation could be drawn. But this is the case of a banking account, where all the
sums paid in form one blended fund, the parts of which have no longer any
distinct existence.

39. The case authority, on which NELCs software supplier bases its allocation rules with
regard to allocating unspecified payments to the oldest debt, cannot apply in a system
whereby the accounts relate, as they do in council tax, to distinct insulated debts,
between which a plain line of separation could be drawn.

40. Exhibit NELC13 which is referred to in para 72 of NELCs Witness Statement relies
on the case; Leeson v. Leeson (1936) 2 K.B. 156. The context of that case is not clear
from what is detailed in its statement which is limited to the following: an
appropriation of a payment cannot be inferred from an intention in the mind of the
debtor un-communicated to the creditor. It can only be inferred from circumstances
known to both parties.

41. Again, after obtaining the exhibit and viewing the judgment, it is clear that the authority
on which NELC sought to rely should not have been any assistance as it is obvious from
the circumstances, to which sum payment was intended. Despite not having the exhibit
NELC13, some relevant information was sourced (paras 5361, SD #18).

42. Not withstanding his reliance on a statement which he knew to be false, the judge acted
outside his powers by granting the order. The regulations governing council tax liability
do not give the court authority to make an order when the defendant has proved that
there is no outstanding debt. No discretion in such cases is given to impose a penalty
(especially not for ones own perverse gratification) which is what the judge did in this
case by allowing the application and granting costs, based on his own opinion differing
from mine about how, and in what manner bills are paid.

43. He made this obvious by raising irrelevant matters which were no ones business but my
own concerning the number of transactions, in what sum those payments were made and
the method used for paying council tax instalments. He implied that using the
enforcement process as punishment was legitimate for not paying the way NELC
preferred by the concern, which drove him to the point of enquiring if I held a bank
account and why payments werent made by standing order like everyone else.
Evidently, it was for my objection to Direct Debit as a means of paying bills that the
judge viewed it warranted for NELC to exploit its dysfunctional council tax processing
system as a means of defrauding me.

44. The bias could not have been more obvious when the judge referred to previous
maladministration (Annex J, SD #1), similarly in respect of misallocated payments, for
which 27 days was taken by NELC to respond and resolve the matter, by which time
reminders and a summons were wrongly issued. The facts were distorted out of all
recognition and portrayed in the courtroom to be my fault for NELCs gross error. The
judge was again noticeably irked to the point that he was motivated to make a spurious
statement which was that NELC, as a consequence, had a right to remove the statutory
instalment entitlement for subsequent years liability and demand the full sum up front.

45. The order was not made because there was a legal obligation, but for what appeared to
be the assistance that imposing a financial penalty might provide in coercing me into
conceding and making payments in line with the NELC's preferred method.

TURNING BLIND EYE TO REPRESENTATIONS CONTESTING COSTS

46. The Magistrates court has no discretion in the amount of costs it orders in respect of a
complaint made to the justices in the matter of council tax liability. The regulations
restrict the level so that no more than the expenditure incurred by the applicant in
respect of instituting the complaint is rechargeable to the defendant. The breakdown
(Annex F, SD #1) contained indisputable evidence that the vast majority of the costs
claimed were not incurred by NELC in respect of instituting the complaint in my case.

47. It was explained to him (the judge) that the costs itemised referred largely to council
resources dealing with enquiries, rescheduling and monitoring payment plans etc. and
subsidising bad debt for which none could be attributable to the issue of my summons.
A detailed analysis in this regard had in any event been submitted in the written
evidence (paras 67 and 27117, SD #1) to support that the summons costs as applied
on making complaint could not have been incurred by NELC, as set out in its
breakdown (Annex F, SD #1), therefore fraudulent.

48. The judge approved the level from a brief glance of the breakdown. There was nothing
in that calculation that could remotely satisfy the court that the expenditure attributed to
its standard costs was referable to the court application at the prescribed time, neither in
my individual case nor as an average of those against whom complaint was made.
However, the spreadsheet is indicative of a breakdown of NELCs expenditure for
council tax enforcement and recovery (paras 6772, SD #1) which would incorporate
impermissible costs. The application, for which NELC may claim costs, simply involves
a process to obtain the courts permission to enforce payment and nothing more. There
is no vehicle through which NELC may lawfully recharge expenditure it incurs to the
defendant beyond that process.

49. The law further restricts costs with the provision for incrementally applying them, first
in a sum for making complaint and the further amount (if required) on making the
application. Singly applying standard costs in respect of making complaint would be
lawful only if the authority were to forfeit the element of expenditure it incurs
subsequently in respect of the court application.

50. It is noted that the judge allowed NELC to succeed in pulling the wool by convincing
him that the costs had been incurred and therefore permissible but with no justification
that the expenditure was referable to the relevant legislation. It is without doubt that the
ignorance displayed by the judge was a show put on as a means to impress on the court
that the fraudulent claim was legitimate. It is alleged that the charade was to avoid being
the judge responsible for the inevitable uncovering of the massive scale fraud committed
nationally by local authorities and enabled by Her Majestys Court Service.

51. His acquiescence was expressed first by the way the figures, though irrelevant, appeared
to him to be comprehensively set out. It is obvious however that the elaborate
presentation was for duping anyone having to scrutinise and endorse the figures. NELC
had even prided itself on the accounts having authenticity in regard their lawfulness by
attaching auditor approval when in fact the figures were not subject to audit and
NELCs external audit contractor (KPMG) was not willing to have a reference to
District Audit on the Councils website. However, it is clear that had the figures been
subject to audit (and it is not seen why they are not) the evidence was such that NELC's
claims were not reasonable in the context of the relevant law which governs costs. It
would therefore have been appropriate that KPMG apply to the court for a declaration
that an item of account is contrary to law under section 17(1) of the Audit Commission
Act 1998.

52. In another demonstration of over willingness to accept the figure, the judge attributed
justifying the costs on the basis of the materially irrelevant fact that the cost per
summons which on the breakdown presented to him had been rounded down from
63.05 to 60.00. He had, it appears, purposely allowed this to divert attention from the
relevant matter which was that the majority of the costs were impermissible under the
regulations. The judge did not, or it appears he did not read or account for the
representations that showed without any doubt that the vast majority of costs were
unlawful (paras 73115, SD #1).

Inflating the standard costs to factor in bad debt element

53. NELCs breakdown provided the required data to determine the amount of bad debt
arising from waived or unrecoverable costs that was added to the standard sum. At least
42% of taxpayers against whom complaint was made were summonsed without costs
applied which had the effect of inflating the standard summons costs by around 25 for
those who did have them applied (paras 7982, SD #1).

54. The breakdown also provided information to inform the person scrutinising it that the
gross recoverable costs under the Council Tax budget was attributable to resources
taken up dealing with queries relating to the recovery. The amount was taken (budget
figure around 0.8m) as a ratio of calls arising from summonses to calls arising from
reminders that do not result in a summons. Based on the Councils computing method,
this adds 18 to the cost per summons. None of this was lawfully incurred by NELC in
respect of my summons simply because the calculation was founded on assumptions
that each person against whom complaint was made had taken up resources by engaging
with staff in some way in matters connected with the summons (paras 8386, SD #1).

55. Similarly the element attributed to the standard sum from the recoverable costs under
the Debt Recovery budget adds a sum (31) which has been determined unlawfully.
Assumptions are made that each person against whom complaint is made gives cause
for recovery staff to carry out their various functions. In my case no resources were
called upon to negotiate or re-schedule any payment plan and the whole element of costs
relevant to the Debt Recovery budget can not be lawfully justified (paras 87102, SD
#1). The same goes for the Control & Monitoring budget which accounts for around
10 of the standard costs. As a consequence of having no re-scheduled payment plan, it
is fraudulent to claim costs for monitoring one (paras 103111, SD #1).

Costs to be no more than that incurred by the authority in any individual case

56. The amount claimed by way of costs in any individual case must be no more than that
reasonably incurred by the billing authority (para 51, SD #1). Therefore, if NELC
wanted to take advantage of streamlining the administration process by applying a
standard sum in all cases (paras 4751, SD #1), in order for it to be done lawfully, it
would need to forfeit each element of expenditure it incurs that is not common to every
application (the majority of costs which are accounted for in its breakdown).

57. In other words, a standard sum could not exceed that incurred by the authority in a case
where the least expenditure is attributed, which would in practice relate to a taxpayer
settling his outstanding debt on receipt of a summons without contacting the council on
any issue. Deriving a figure therefore from the Gross Recoverable costs which is split
between an estimated number of summons, can not be lawful; even less so if the number
of summons is reduced to factor in an estimate for those withdrawn, waived and those in
respect of unrecoverable costs. The least cost case is the only basis on which to
determine a standard sum if the aim is to eliminate the administrative burden of
calculating the costs in each case, whilst at the same time complying with the
regulations which require that the costs be no more than that incurred by the authority in
any individual case.

If the Regulations were applied lawfully, the consequences would be that the majority of
Council Tax (191,730), Debt Recovery (327,480) and the Control & Monitoring
costs (109,380) would not be permissible in respect of re-charging expenditure for
instituting the complaint. What is set-out above should have been enough to alert the
judge that NELC's claims were not reasonable in the context of the relevant law and
should therefore have, as legally required, sought to award lower costs accordingly. The
number of taxpayers summonsed in relation to the monthly council tax liability hearing
held on 2 October 2015 totalled 942. If the standard 60 costs were applied in each case
there would have been raised in excess of 56k which would account for approximately
10 times an amount had they been properly referable to the law governing them.
Unquestionable Bias

58. Representations submitted to the court argued a case in the context of the relevant
enforcement power which was ignored in its entirety by the judge who made his
decision in favour of NELC from briefly viewing a copy of irrelevant accounts relating
to its council tax enforcement and recovery budget.

59. The ease with which the judge was swayed in favour of NELC was demonstrated with
the statement that implied that the costs must be reasonable from a reference made to
other authorities standard costs, and that the ruling in Nicolson v Tottenham
Magistrates (SD #2) had not determined that the level was unlawful. From that it is
clear that he had not read/understood (or pretended not to have) the judgment provided
as a supporting document, which at paragraph 57 said; looking to see whether the costs
were broadly in line with costs being charged by other local authorities was all well and
good, but it was not enough to discharge the courts obligations (paras 4751, SD #1).
And in the judgment the distinction was clear at para 52 that establishing that the costs
were reasonably incurred is not the same thing as establishing that the costs were
reasonable in amount.

60. It is obvious from the comment referring to the Nicolson case that the point had been
missed as the issue did not exclusively revolve around the level. What was provided in
that judgment regarding the relevant regulations was some general guidance as to their
interpretation and scope (para 36, SD #2). The degree to which that guidance and
interpretation extended is evident in the judgment from paragraph 33 onwards. There
was nothing in that breakdown which would suggest anything other than that it being an
account of its expenditure incurred in connection with council tax enforcement and
recovery.

Costs set at levels for improper purposes

61. It was summarised (paras 118130, SD #1) how NELC historically manipulated costs
unlawfully in order to generate income to meet a number of different objectives. The
apparent blind eye the judge turned to this can not give the public confidence in the
justice system. It is one thing having local authorities operating fraudulently but quite
another when the Magistrates court blatantly endorses it.

62. In 2001/02 court costs had been set with the admitted intention of encouraging prompt
payment (as well as generating additional income) that came with the threat of a more
severe financial penalty. It is well established that costs should be awarded as
compensation, not as punishment. In R v Highgate Justices ex parte Petrou [1954] 1
ALL ER 406 it was held that costs should not exceed the proper costs incurred and
should not be a penalty.

63. Another summary set out that in 2002/03 summons costs were increased by 50% in
order to raise additional revenue to meet funding to pay for additional staff to ensure a
backlog of work that had arisen due to changes in the IT system were addressed. In
Attfield v the London Borough of Barnet [2013] EWHC 2089 (Admin), it was held that a
local authority must not attempt to raise revenue where there is no clear statutory power
to do so. In the present case, the statutory power expressly limits costs that may be
claimed to the expenditure incurred by the Council in connection with instituting the
complaint. The decision to increase summons costs did not arise because of an increase
in the cost of instituting the complaint, rather for the clear intention of funding
additional resources to overcome the backlog of work that had arisen in the
administration of Council Tax etc., due to delays in implementing a new IT system.

64. Another summarised how NELC manipulated court costs to provide additional income
as an alternative to charging for non-statutory services. The summons costs were
increased in preference to an alternative proposal of introducing a charge for garden
waste collections. Summons costs were therefore increased disproportionately, with no
statutory power to do so, in order to plug a gap in its finances for the purposes of
offsetting expenditure for waste services.

65. Finally the existence of a budgeted income stream for court costs was highlighted which
was evident from published reports showing outturn variances for this income. A report
relating to the 2004/05 financial year indicated that the costs were set at a level such that
a significant surplus was achievable, which in that year amounted to 0.125 million. The
Council had therefore raised revenue for an improper purpose, namely to prop up other
budgets. Apart from being fundamentally unlawful, the whole approach suggests that
the system is clearly open to abuse with income targets unquestionably creating a
perverse incentive to summons.

CONCLUSION

66. What has been allowed to happen, with the court as an accomplice can only be
described as daylight robbery committed with arrogant impunity by NELC. There is no
doubt that the judge had acted with intent to pervert the course of justice as he had
before him indisputable evidence that a false and corrupt statement had been made.
Granting an order therefore made him complicit in NELC's criminal actions that sought
to exploit a complaint to the court for the purposes of defrauding me with an attached
claim of costs.

67. The criminally obtained court order was not the only issue, as the costs awarded were
fraudulent in amount. The only logical reason for the judge denying existence of the
representations contesting them is because had they been considered, its not seen how
they could have been feasibly challenged. The judges responsibility entailed overseeing
the full transfer of 56,000 from defendants to NELC in respect of that one hearing no
matter how fraudulent the claim. A proper consideration of the evidence therefore
would have made that job impossible and why it was ignored. The crucial role played by
Grimsby Magistrates court in ensuring the income generated for NELC continues at
current levels would explain why in respect of the High Court application appealing
these costs the court has prevented proceedings for three years through means of lies
and deception.

68. There are a number of correspondence itemised in the list of supporting documents
relating to previous concerns raised with Humberside police on a similar theme which
were never properly investigated then (SD #2531). The same can be said for concerns
relating to bailiff fraud (not included). Humberside polices Economic crime unit has,
over a number of years, concentrated its effort into challenging the evidence gathered to
avoid dealing with the allegations thus protecting the accused and enabling them
without consequence to continue their criminal activity. It would therefore be reasonable
to suspect that Humberside police, along with Grimsby Magistrates court and NELC is
complicit in the fraudulent raising of revenue through unscrupulous means. In light of
that, it would seem a conflict of interest if Humberside police were to deal with these
allegations and so it would seem a reasonable suggestion for another police force to do
so. This is especially the case with it being my intention to pursue action against all
those officers who have been party to the misconduct, cover-ups, negligence and lies
etc. There is in any event, no reason to have confidence that the matter would be
properly dealt with by Humberside polices Economic crime officers as Ive found to
my cost from several years being fobbed off by them.
69. The allegations which point to a criminal conspiracy between NELC and the court are
summarised below:

NELC for committing;

a. Perjury by making a statement (material in the proceedings) that was


known to be false with the intention misleading the court to justify
misallocating payment to a disputed sum

b. Fraud by engineering default for the current year enabling a further court
application for the purposes of attaching a claim of costs and potential
bailiff charges which have been threatened already in a letter dated 8
November 2015

c. Fraud by claiming a level of costs both in my individual case and in


general which are not provided for under the Council Tax (Administration
and Enforcement) Regulations 1992

District Judge Daniel Curtis for;

a. Perverting the course of justice knowing that before him was evidence
that a false and corrupt statement had been made

b. Complicity in NELCs fraudulent application for liability order by,

i) granting the order knowing that a false statement had been made

ii) ignoring evidence contesting payment allocation laws were breached

ii) ignoring evidence contesting costs (level) breaching the Council Tax
(Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992

70. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dated this 2nd day of December 2015

Signed:
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxxx Yyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 6
Confirming recording of complaint
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

Humberside Police
Professional Standards Branch
Police Headquarters
Priory Road HU5 5SF
Tel No: 01482 578133
Fax No: 01482 305004
Switchboard: 101

This matter is being dealt with by:

Caseworker - Mr T Walmsley

psb@humberside.pnn.police.uk
www.humberside.police.uk

CO/00461/15/TMW/LAW 8 December 2015

Mr X Yyyyy
XX Yyyyy XXXX
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
XX00 0YY

Dear Mr Yyyyy,

May I refer to the complaint received on 12 November 2015 about the conduct of
an officer(s) from this Force.

This matter has been formally recorded under the Police Reform Act 2002 as
amended by the Police Reform & Social Responsibility Act 2011. I enclose a copy
of the complaint as it has been recorded for your information.

The file has been passed to a caseworker who will do some initial evidence
gathering in relation to your complaint before it is forwarded to an investigating
officer. You will be informed in due course as to who the investigating officer will be.
This process would normally be completed within 28 days however if there is any
further delay you will be updated accordingly.

Should you change your address before the completion of the enquiry, I would ask
you to notify this office at the above address as soon as possible, to enable us to
keep you updated with the progress of the enquiry.

Yours sincerely,

Craig SCAIFE
Detective Chief Inspector

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED


Professional Standards Branch

Complainant Report

Case Reference CO/00461/15 Case Recorded 08/12/15

COMPLAINANT
Title Mr Address
Surname Xxxxxx
Forenames Yyyy

ALLEGATION(S)
No 1
Recorded 08/12/15
Type Other neglect or failure of duty
Location The Hub
Allegation The complainant alleges that an officer has wrongly informed him that a matter
Allegation Result which he wanted to report is a civil matter, when he believes it to be a criminal
matter

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED


GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(sI Magistrates' Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES' COURT

(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 7
Complaint outcome letter
NOT PROTECfIVELY MARKED

Local Resolution Process." Thisdocumenf explains ..howyou


.
mayappealitothe
Humberside Police Appeal Body .in. respect of the outcome of the \Local ResolutiQn
process.

The appropriate appeal <body is the. Humberside Police Appeal BodyiiasYotJr


complaint does not relate to the conductofaseniorofficer,. hasnot been referred to
the IPec. does not justify Climinal ..ormisconductproceedingsand .doesnotCiris~
from the same incident as. a complaint Where the IPCCwouldhave to deal with any
appeal.

You have 29 days from the


dateofthis.letter.within which. to make your appeal .You
are advised to post your appeal in good time to ensure it reaches the HUlnbersidE!
Police Appeal Body before the.end of the 29th day. < The 29th day is 1.1 February
2016. Appeals received after 29 days may not be allowed <unless there are
<

exceptional circumstanCes.

You might. want. to consider using guaranteed .next-daydelivery. postservicetd


ensure that your appealisreceivedwithintime.

Yours sincerely

\OD
I AllanHARVEY
Inspector 5521

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED


GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxxx Yyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 8
Appeal complaint decision
APPEALS AGAINST THE OUTCOME OF LOCAL RESOLUTION

For Internal Use Only

We must receive your complaint within 29 days of the date of the letter telling you about the
outcome of the complaint. This includes the time your appeal spends in the post.

Please tick the appropriate box: Mr Mrs Miss Ms Other (please specify)

First name: (Please write clearly) Surname: (Please write clearly)

Santa....................................... Claus

Your address:
...................273 C St. Nicholas Drive

...................90 degrees North latitude

...................North Pole

PostcodeAK 9975..

Daytime telephone number Evening telephone number

None.. None

Email address: electaddofsantac@aol.com.

_______________________________________________

Date you made on your complaint Reference number (if known)

12/11/15.. CO 461/15 ...

If you have received a letter about the outcome of the local resolution of your complaint,
please give the date of that letter: 13/01/16.

1
Section 2: Would you like someone to act on your behalf?
Please tick as appropriate:

Yes I would like someone to act on my No, I dont want someone to act on my
behalf: behalf:

If you selected yes, please provide the contact details of the person acting on your behalf
:
Personal details:

Title:

First name:

Surname:

Date of birth

Address details:

House/flat number:

House/building name:

Street:

Town:

County:

Postcode

Contact details:

Email address:

Main contact number:

Alternative contact number:

2
Do you agree with the outcome of the local resolution? Tick one box only.

Yes No

If your answer is no, please provide further information, continuing on a separate sheet if
necessary.

I dont consider that the complaint was suitable for Local Resolution. This was made
clear in a number of emails which were never addressed as I have set out below.

Request that complaint escalated to the Chief Constable ignored

After being advised on 11.12.15 that the crime I had reported was not a Police matter but
civil, I made it categorically clear that the person against whom the complaint was
directed should be the Chief Constable so that any investigation would not be undertaken
by the force itself (see the following):

From: Xxxx
To: Morley, Gillian 9614
Sent: November 12, 2015
Subject: Re: Crime Reporting Submission

Dear Ms Morley

I am in disbelief that Humberside police have arrived at the conclusion that fraud is not a police
matter. I have not heard such an absurd statement since the force said the same with regards
bailiff firms defrauding council taxpayers.

Your suggestion that I am put to the expense of enriching the legal profession when I am in any
event contributing to fund the police out of the very tax which the council wishes to defraud from
me has some irony to it.

I am left obviously with no option than to submit a complaint about whoever within the force made
this decision. However, I would much prefer the person against whom I make the complaint to be
the Chief Constable so that any investigation will not be conducted by the force itself in the hope of
removing the 'sham' element which is associated with these matters. Therefore, please escalate
this matter for the attention of the Chief Constable.

Statement produced and request that complaint be investigated by another force

On being advised to collate all evidence to support the allegations by Police Sergeant
Graeme Smithey (email 13.11.15), a significant amount of work was undertaken to
produce a statement. The document, which referred to and listed around 30 other files,
was sent under cover of an email dated 2.12.15 but the supporting documents withheld

3
awaiting further notification. Presumably the police did not intend seriously considering
the evidence as the other files were never asked for and consequently never sent. The
email (see below) suggested that another police force dealt with the matter for the
reasons highlighted in paragraph 68 of the statement I had attached:

From: Xxxx
To: Smithey, Graeme 1226
Sent: December 02, 2015
Subject: Re: RECENT CORRESPONDENCE WITH HUMBERSIDE POLICE

Dear Mr Smithey

I have a letter dated 23 November 2015 from DCI Andy Oliver explaining that the Professional
Standards Branch is in receipt of my complaint.

It strikes my that this matter is now consigned to the complaints process which from my experience
will entail a number of years being fobbed off until it can go no further and will be told to F. off
unless I want to try my luck in the casino justice system and challenge the decision in the High
Court.

I have acted on your suggestion by collecting all the evidence etc. and produced a statement. I
have explained in the document (attached) that because of a conflict of interest which exists if
Humberside police were to deal with this matter, it is suggested that another police force does so
(see para 68 for details).

There are a significant number of documents accompanying the statement and will withhold those
until I'm informed further about the matter.

Key facts: local resolution

The information sheet, Key facts: local resolution stated that the person dealing with the
complaint would consider my representations if it was strongly believed that the
complaint should not be dealt with by local resolution. In an email (see below) sent to the
officer allocated the complaint, I expressed my believe that the matter was not suitable to
be dealt with by this process as, among other reasons, perjury was punishable as an
offence whether occurring in criminal or civil proceedings. The consequences were that I
was a victim of Fraud committed by North East Lincolnshire Council (NELC) in
presenting a false witness statement to the court. Again the statement (minus the
supporting files) was attached.

4
From: Xxxx
To: Allan.Harvey@humberside.pnn.police.uk
Sent: December 20, 2015
Subject: Perjury to commit fraud - CO 461/15

Dear Mr Harvey

I have a letter dated 17 December 2015 regarding case reference CO 461/15 which was recorded
8 December 2015. I'm aware that the issue has been considered suitable for Local Resolution and
the file forwarded to yourself to deal with. The matter concerns a complaint about an officer
wrongly informing me that a crime I have reported is a civil matter.

I have read through the information document "Key facts: local resolution" and strongly believe that
this matter is not suitable to be dealt with by this process.

In the period between making my complaint and it being recorded I have done a significant amount
of work putting together a statement after being advised by Police Sergeant Graeme Smithey in an
email 13 November 2015 which contained the following:

"I would advise that you collate all evidence and intelligence that would support the claims
you are making against the court."

For the avoidance of doubt, it might be helpful if I stressed that allegations of perjury were levelled
against North East Lincolnshire Council for presenting a false witness statement, this is additional
to the allegations made about Grimsby Magistrates' Court for perverting the course of justice. As
set out in the introduction of the attached statement, the association with the Civil Jurisdiction.. of
the Magistrates Courts Act, does not make the matter civil. Perjury is punishable as an offence
whether it occurs in criminal or civil proceedings and the consequences are in this case that a false
statement was made in order to commit an act of fraud.

The process described in the 'Key facts' document will not get the result I intend to achieve.
However, the attached statement (and supporting documents) provide the evidence required to
justify that a full investigation is carried out in order to satisfy the Crown Prosecution Service that a
successful conviction could be secured.

Further discussion to draw up an action plan is unnecessary and a waste of recourses in the light
of the evidence already produced. The process in any event will be a back covering exercise which
would continue, for example, if the right exercised to appeal a negative outcome.

Even in the unlikely event that the complaint is upheld, none of the consequences set out in the
key facts document appear to hold the force accountable in the way I require, which is to consider
the allegations a police matter for which a proper investigate is undertaken.

The Inspectors subsequent correspondence (below) suggested that my representations


where not considered and the process as originally proposed would be carried out
regardless. The documents referred to in the statement were not asked for.

5
From: "Harvey, Allan 5521"
To: Xxxx
Sent: December 30, 2015
Subject: FW: Complaint CO/461/15

Mr Yyyyy,

I have received the above from Humberside Police Professional Standards branch to respond to
you as the resolving officer. The matter has been determined to be one concerning neglect of duty,
but suitable for the local resolution process.

I am unable to speak to you regarding your complaint as your phone line is unobtainable.

In an effort to progress this matter the investigation plan I propose is:

Deal with the matter as a Local Resolution


Review contents of complaint file
Discuss the matter with Humberside Police Force Solicitors
Seek any relevant response from staff concerned
Instigate any service recovery identified
Write to the complainant with the outcome of the enquiry.

If this is agreeable to you, then can you e-mail me to advise that this is acceptable. As part of the
Local Resolution Process, you have right of appeal of the outcome to the Humberside Police
Appeal Body.

It was assumed that the Inspector had not received my representations and so the
following email sent to express this. The seriousness of the matter was conveyed as well
as the consequences of the police failing to investigate.

From: Xxxx
To: Harvey, Allan 5521
Sent: December 30, 2015
Subject: Re: Complaint CO/461/15

Mr Harvey

It is my understanding from your correspondence today that the email (and attachment) which I
have confirmation was forwarded to you on 21 December 2015 was not received.

In that correspondence I set out my concerns about the complaint not being considered suitable for
Local Resolution. A statement was attached which provides evidence to support my allegations. A
table itemising around 30 supporting documents is contained in that statement which need to be
considered by the person undertaking any review/investigation. Neither the statement nor the
supporting documents have been referred to which concerns me.

6
The seriousness of these allegations cannot be over stated nor the consequences if the
Council/Court are allowed to resort to such criminal actions without being challenged.

Action needs taking sooner rather than later to ensure that the immediate consequences of the
fraud is remedied. This will not be achieved by having to complete complaint and subsequent
appeal procedures which guarantee nothing at the end. The appropriate level of investigation can
be evaluated after the immediate risk of the consequences of the crimes have been removed.

The consequences do not stop at the fraudulently obtained court cost. Unnecessary enforcement
measures will follow, incurring additional costs which will accumulate over time to be sufficient in
amount that the council will achieve its vindictive aim and be able to take insolvency, bankruptcy or
custodial action.

Will you let me know if you require the correspondence re-sending (with attached statement) which
was originally dated 20 December 2015.

The email elicited no response but another sent on 12.1.16 did (the next day) to inform
me that I should be receiving his response from the Professional Standards Department
imminently. That response was sent on 13.1.16 and was the final outcome of the local
resolution process, not a reply to any of my representations. Clearly all my
correspondence had been ignored and the local resolution process completed with the
decision indicating that the force was ignorant or did not have any regard for the Criminal
Justice and Courts Act 2015 (the 2015 Act).

Corrupt or other improper exercise of police powers and privileges

An officer commits an offence under subsections (5) and (6) of Section 26 of the 2015
Act by failing to exercise a power for the purpose of achieving the detriment of another
person. There has clearly been a failure in exercising police powers by wrongly advising
that the matter does not concern the Police as it is civil. Had the force exercised its
powers and investigated the crime (an open and shut case) NELC would not be entitled
to the fraudulent proceeds, which may potentially be added to with further fraudulent
sums. The failure to exercise its power to investigate has therefore caused me a financial
loss which is likely to continue to my detriment and intensify in the passing of time.

7
The suitability test for local resolution

Independent Police Complaints Commissions (IPCC) published practical guidance on


handling complaints etc., includes a test for establishing whether a complaint is suitable
for local resolution or investigation. The relevant part of the test for assessing suitability
for local resolution, as quoted from the August 2014 issue (Focus), is as follows:

The suitability test


A complaint is suitable for local resolution if the appropriate authority is satisfied:

a. the conduct being complained about, even if proven, would not justify criminal or disciplinary
proceedings against the person being complained about...

Applying the IPCC test correctly should have determined the local resolution process
unsuitable and a full investigation carried out instead, because failure to exercise a police
power, combined with that failure causing a financial loss, would justify criminal
proceedings under Section 26 of the 2015 Act. The guidance also states. if there is
doubt about a complaint being suitable for local resolution, err on the side of caution and
conduct an investigation. The following provides clarification:

The test is whether the conduct complained about, even if proven, would not justify criminal or
disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, when considering if the conduct would justify the bringing of
proceedings, there should be no consideration of the strength of the evidence, whether the
complaint is likely to be upheld, or the likeliness of prosecution.

When assessing a complaint using the suitability test, the complaint should be taken at face value,
focusing on the substance of the conduct being complained about. The decision should not be
based on the wording of the complaint alone (the relevant appeal body test is applied in this way).
It also should not be based on reviewing the evidence available and exploring the likely outcome
(the special requirements test on investigations is applied in this way).

The person assessing the complaints seriousness should consider contacting the complainant to
better understand their complaint and to get further information. A mini-investigation to assess the
strength of evidence for the complaint (such as getting custody records, incident logs, speaking to
the officers concerned, etc) should not be conducted. If the evidence does not support the
complaint then the complaint is not upheld following an investigation, it does not make it any more
suitable for local resolution.

It is possible for a complaint that uses exaggerated language to be locally resolved, but the right of
appeal is to the IPCC. It is also possible for a complaint to be deemed unsuitable for local
resolution, but then the appointed investigating officer, upon reviewing the evidence, does not
apply special requirements to the subsequent investigation.

8
Do you feel the outcome was a proper outcome?

This means that, for example, you believe the outcome was not appropriate to the
complaint, or the outcome did not reflect the evidence available. Tick one box only.

Yes No

If your answer is no, please provide further information, continuing on a separate sheet if
necessary.

The outcome was wholly inappropriate as the investigating officer based his response
solely with regard to the court case being that the judges determination was to grant a
liability order. In doing so, the fraudulent application for the liability order made by NELC
which is a criminal allegation in isolation from the judges conduct has been allowed
to avoid scrutiny. The evidence provided is conclusive and to be overlooked strongly
suggests that Humberside police engages in a practice which overlooks its duty to the
taxpayer in favour of shielding the local authority from justice.

The outcome has also wrongly been determined on advice obtained from the Force
Solicitors. That advice was based on the assumption that the issues may be appeal
points that could be raised at any subsequent appeal hearings. The proceedings
involved defending NELCs application for a liability order for non-payment of Council
Tax. In that regard the opportunity exists for the defendant to appeal a decision to the
High Court either by way of a case stated or judicial review. Both are in any event
unreasonable procedures for an ordinary taxpayer to have to embark upon with it likely
taking years (if ever) to succeed in having the case brought before the Queens bench.
Moreover any such appeal would involve civil proceedings and concern a challenge to
the relevant legislation governing Council Tax administration and/or enforcement,
therefore, representations involving criminal law would not be considered appeal points
that could be raised in those proceedings.

.
If you have any documents that support your appeal please list below or attach to them
to this form when submitting your appeal
.
Perjury to Commit Fraud - 2 Dec 15.pdf
............................................................................................................................
_______________________________________________

9
Signature of the person making this appeal: Date:

................................... . 25 /01 / 2016

All public bodies are obliged to record the ethnicity of people using its service. Being able
to identify the ethnicity of complainants helps us to check it is reaching all sections of
society. Please describe your ethnicity using the boxes below:

WHITE MIXED
White British White and Black Caribbean
White Irish White and Black African
Any other White background White and Asian
Any other mixed background

ASIAN OR ASIAN BRITISH BLACK OR BLACK BRITISH


Indian Caribbean
Pakistani African
Bangladeshi Any other Black background
Any other Asian background

CHINESE OR OTHER ETHNIC GROUP NOT STATED


Chinese
Any other ethnic group

Where to send this form


Please print this form and post to:

Humberside Police Appeals Body


Professional Standards Branch
Police Headquarters
Priory Road
Hull
HU5 5SF

Or Email to: PSBAdmin@humberside.pnn.police.uk

Or complete and send via: www.humberside.police.uk

10
Guidance
If you made a complaint about the police that was dealt with using local resolution and
you are not happy with the outcome you may be able to appeal.

The exception to this is when the complaint was about a direction and control issue.
Direction and control means the overall policies of a police force, for example police
resources and policing standards.
You can appeal if:

you do not agree with the outcome of the local resolution


you think that the outcome of the local resolution of your complaint was not a
proper one. This means that, for example, you believe the outcome was not
appropriate to the complaint, or the outcome did not reflect the evidence available.

You cannot appeal against the way in which the local resolution was handled. This
means that you cannot appeal because you are unhappy with the process followed to
locally resolve your complaint.

Additional notes:

.................................................................................................

11
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
MAGISTRATES' COURT (s1 Magistrates' Courts Act 1980)

(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 9
Costs suspended until outcome letter
Your ref:
Our ref: ERS/011

If telephoning or calling please ask for: Mrs E K Richardson-Smith


Tel:
e-mail:
(01472) 324159
eve.richardson-smith@nelincs.gov.uk
E A s'r \
NORT~
LINCOLNSHIRE
COUNCIL
www.nelin cs. 9 QV. Uk
strategic Director Governance & Transformation
Rob Walsh BA (Hons) Solicitor
Group Manager Legal & Democratic Services,
Tony Maione, Solicitor, LL.B. (Hons), LL.M., Solicitor

19th July 2013

Dear Mr I

Yourself v Grimsby Magistrates Court & NELC

I write further to the legal proceedings issued by yourself at Leeds High Court
against Grimsby & Cleethorpes Magistrates Court, naming North East Lincolnshire
Council as-_an interested party_-Thepapers have been passed to me upon Mrs
ConoHy's departure from employment with the Local Authority.

The purpose of my writing to you is to inform you that the 60 court costs, which you
dispute, will be suspended until the outcome of the proceedings. At the completion of
those proceedings, dependent on the Court's decision, the fee will either be
withdrawn from your account or will remain outstanding to the Local Authority.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the Leeds High Court for their information.

Yours sincerely

for Group Manager Legal & Democratic Services

Municipal Offices, Town Hall Square, Grimsby, North East Lincolnshire, DN31 1HU
Telephone (01472) 313131 Fax (01472) 324022, DX 13536, Grimsby 1
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxxx Yyyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 10
Councils Witness Statement
Grimsby Magistrates Court

Claimant
North East Lincolnshire Council

Defendant
Mr Xxxx Yyyyy

Application for Liability Order

1. North East Lincolnshire Council application for Liability Order:

2. The person who is liable to pay Council Tax in respect of any chargeable dwelling
and any day, is the person who falls within the first paragraph of subsection (2) below
to apply, talking paragraph (a) of that subsection first, paragraph (b) next, and so on.

(2) A person falls within this subsection in relation to any chargeable dwelling and
any day if, on that day

(a) He is a resident of the dwelling and has a freehold interest in the whole or any part
of it;

(b) He is such a resident and has a leasehold interest in the whole or any part of the
dwelling which is not inferior to another such interest held by another such resident;

(c) He is both such a resident and a statutory [F1, secure or introductory tenant]of the
whole or any part of the dwelling;

(d) He is such a resident and has a contractual licence to occupy the whole or any part
of the dwelling;

(e) He is such a resident; or

(f) He is the owner of the dwelling.


Section 6, Paragraph (1) & (2) of the Local Government Finance Act 1992.
3. The Secretary of State may make regulations containing such provisions as he sees fit
in relation to the collection and recovery of amounts persons are liable to pay in
respect of Council Tax; Paragraph 1, Schedule 2 to the Local Government Finance
Act 1992.

4. (1) Regulations under paragraph 1(1) above may provide that

(a) The authority concerned may apply to a magistrates court for an order (a
liability order) against the person by whom the sum is payable;
(b) the magistrates court shall make the order if it is satisfied that the sum has
become payable by the person concerned and has not been paid.
Paragraph (1)a & b Section 6, Schedule 4 to the Local Government Finance Act
1992.

5. On the 9th March 2015 the Defendant was issued with a Council Tax Bill (NELC1) for
the period 01st April 2015 to the 31st March 2016 for the property known as xx xxxxxx
xxxxxx xxxx.

6. The amount charged for the period being 907.91

7. At this juncture it is also important to point out that the defendant had a further
amount of 60.00 outstanding in regards costs relating to a Liability order application
granted on the 2nd November 2012.

8. 2.(1) This paragraph applies where the demand notice is issued on or before 31st
December in the relevant year, but has effect subject to paragraph 3 below.

(2) The aggregate amount is to be payable in monthly instalments.

(3) The number of such instalments

(a)where the notice is issued before the beginning of the relevant year or at any time in
the period beginning on the first day of that year and ending on 31st May of that year,
shall be 10;

(a)where the notice is issued before the beginning of the relevant year or at any time in
the period beginning on the first day of that year and ending on 31st May of that year,
shall be 10;
Paragraph 2, Part 1, Schedule 1 to The Council Tax (Administration and
Enforcement) Regulations 1992

9. The 10 month statutory instalments where set out as so:

10. First Payment 1st April 2015 88.91


9 Payments due thereafter on the first of every month 91.00
11. The made payment of 88.91 on the 10th April 2015 and a further payment of 91.00
on the 22nd April 2015. Both payments being for the correct amounts and in adherence
to the first two statutory instalments set out on the Defendants Council Tax Bill.

12. The Defendants next payment was received on the 29th May 2015 for an amount of
85.00. This amount was not the amount of the statutory instalment on the Council
Tax Bill. Due to this the payment was allocated by North East Lincolnshire Councils
Council Tax database (Northgate) as follows:

13. 60.00 allocated to the 60.00 costs outstanding from the Liability Hearing in
November 2012.

14. 25.00 allocated to the Current years Council Tax Bill for the period 01st April 2015 to
31st March 2016.

15. As of the 1st June 2015 25.00 had been paid to the 91.00 statutory instalment,
leaving a 66.00 to be paid.

16. On the 2nd June 2015 a further 7.00 was paid by the defendant, leaving a further
59.00 still to be paid to the statutory instalment for June 2015.

17. 23.(1) Subject to paragraph (2), where

(a) a demand notice has been served by a billing authority on a liable person, .

(b) instalments in respect of the council tax to which the notice relates are payable in
accordance with Part I of Schedule 1 or, as the case may be, a Part II scheme, and .
(c) any such instalment is not paid in accordance with that Schedule or, as the case
may be, the relevant scheme, .
the billing authority shall serve a notice (reminder notice) on the liable person
stating
(i) the instalments required to be paid,
(ii) the effect of paragraph (3) below and .
Part 5, Regulations 23, Paragraph 1 to the Council Tax (Administration and
Enforcement) Regulations 1992

18. (3) If, within the period of 7 days beginning with the day on which a reminder notice
is issued, the liable person fails to pay any instalments which are or will become due
before the expiry of that period, the unpaid balance of the estimated amount shall
become payable by him at the expiry of a further period of 7 days beginning with the
day of the failure.
Part 5, Regulations 23, Paragraph 3 to the Council Tax (Administration and
Enforcement) Regulations 1992
19. In accordance with the regulations a reminder notice for 59.00 was sent to the
Defendant on the 12th June 2015. The reminder notice sent to the defendant can be
seen as (NELC2).
20. No communication was received from the Defendant.

21. A further payment of 90.00 was paid by the defendant on the 2nd July 2015.

22. This payment cleared the 59.00 arrears on the Reminder notice and allocated a
further amount of 31.00 to the 1st July 2015 statutory instalment.

23. The amount left outstanding for the 1st July 2015 statutory instalment was 60.00.

24. 23.(1) Subject to paragraph (2), where

(d) a demand notice has been served by a billing authority on a liable person, .

(e) instalments in respect of the council tax to which the notice relates are payable in
accordance with Part I of Schedule 1 or, as the case may be, a Part II scheme, and .
(f) any such instalment is not paid in accordance with that Schedule or, as the case
may be, the relevant scheme, .

the billing authority shall serve a notice (reminder notice) on the liable person
stating

(i) the instalments required to be paid,


(ii) the effect of paragraph (3) below and .
(iii) where the notice is the second such notice as regards the relevant year, the
effect of paragraph (4) below.
Part 5, Regulations 23, Paragraph 1 to the Council Tax (Administration and
Enforcement) Regulations 1992

25. (4) If, after making a payment in accordance with a reminder notice which is the
second such notice as regards the relevant year, the liable person fails to pay any
subsequent instalment as regards that year on or before the day on which it falls due,
the unpaid balance of the estimated amount shall become payable by him on the day
following the day of the failure.
Part 5, Regulations 23, Paragraph 3 to the Council Tax (Administration and
Enforcement) Regulations 1992

26. The 2nd Reminder notice in accordance with the regulations was sent to the Defendant
on the 14th July 2015 for the amount of 60.00. The 2nd Reminder sent to the
defendant can be seen as (NELC3)

27. No Contact was received from the Defendant.

28. Two separate payments were made by the defendant on the 31st July 2015. The first
payment being for 7.00 and the second for 85.00.

29. The 7.00 reduced the 60.00 arrears to 53.00.


30. 53.00 of the further 85.00 payment was cleared the outstanding amount of the
arrears.

31. The 32.00 was then allocated to the 1st August 2015 statutory instalment. Leaving an
overdue amount of 59.00.

32. No further payment was received in August 2015.

33. 33.(1) Subject to paragraph (3), before a billing authority applies for a liability
order it shall serve on the person against whom the application is to be made a notice
(final notice), which is to be in addition to any notice required to be served under
Part V, and which is to state every amount in respect of which the authority is to make
the application.

(2) A final notice may be served in respect of an amount at any time after it has
become due.

(3) A final notice need not be served on a person who has been served under
regulation 23(1) with a reminder notice in respect of the amount concerned.
Part VI, Regulations 33 to the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement)
Regulations 1992.

34. A Final Notice was sent to the defendant on 12th August 2015. The Final Notice
sent to the defendant can be seen as (NELC4)

35. The amount outstanding being 514.00.

36. As per the statutory Final Notice the Full Amount wholly or partially paid becomes
payable in full.

37. No Contact was received from the Defendant.

38. A further payment was paid by the defendant on the 2nd September 2015 for 90.00.

39. The payment reduced the outstanding amount of 514.00 to 424.00.

40. 34.(1) If an amount which has fallen due under regulation 23(3) or (4) is wholly or
partly unpaid, or (in a case where a final notice is required under regulation 33) the
amount stated in the final notice is wholly or partly unpaid at the expiry of the period
of 7 days beginning with the day on which the notice was issued, the billing authority
may, in accordance with paragraph (2), apply to a magistrates' court for an order
against the person by whom it is payable.

(2) The application is to be instituted by making complaint to a justice of the peace,


and requesting the issue of a summons directed to that person to appear before the
court to show why he has not paid the sum which is outstanding.

41. Complaint was laid before the Clerk to the Justices on the 9th September 2015 and
subsequently Summons were issued. The Summons sent to the defendant can be seen
(NELC5).
42. The Summons states the amount outstanding of 424.00 and 60.00 Summons Costs,
equalling 484.00. It also made the defendant aware there would be a liability hearing
on the 2nd October 2015 at the Grimsby Magistrates Court.

43. No Contact was received from the Defendant.

44. A further payment of 91.00 was paid by the defendant on the 30th September 2015.

45. Therefore the application for a liability order including costs was for 393.00.

46. The defendant alleges that the recovery notices and subsequent Final Notice and
Summons have occurred due to misallocation of his payments.

47. It is North East Lincolnshire Councils contention that there has been no misallocation
of payments in this case.

48. A person who is indebted to another on two several accounts, may, on paying him
money, ascribe it to which account he pleases.And his election may either be
expressed, Or may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. But if
the payer does not. pay specifically on one account, the receiver may afterwards
appropriate the payment to the discharge of either of the accounts that he pleases.
And if he sue on each account, semble that he thereby declares his election, and the
Defendant cannot, by a subsequent notice of set-off, elect to which account he will
ascribe the payment.
Peters v Anderson 1814, 823 paragraph 1

49. The defendant makes reference to the above case however it is noted that the
defendants quote from the Peters V Anderson case is paraphrased and does not
include the full description as set out in the original text. Original text of Peters and
Anderson can be seen as (NELC6)

50. It clearly states that if the payer does not pay specifically The Northgate system is
set up as per the Peters V Anderson case. It asks for a specific payment is made so
that the allocation can be made correctly. If payment is made as per the statutory
instalment due, the payment will allocate to that instalment plan.

51. This allocation system also helps if there are further debts owing on the account.

52. If a person was to have a current years bill of 100 per month and arrangement on a
previous years amount for 30 per month then as long as the Debtor makes the correct
payment of the 100.00 and 30.00 the amount will be allocated to the debts which
the Debtor makes his election by the expressed payments made.

53. The fail-safe of this system is if the payments are not made as per the regulations a
Reminder notice is sent to the payee.

54. At this point it would be reasonable, as it is the defendants liability, for him to contact
the Council and express his election that the payment be allocated differently.
55. The defendant made no attempt to make his election after receiving notices in June
July and August and subsequently the Summons and as per Peters V Anderson the
receiver of the payment, North East Lincolnshire Council, appropriated the monies
paid.

56. Further case law establishes that Northgate allocates unspecified payments correctly.

57. The case of Peters V Anderson 1814 is one of the earliest cases that deals with the
appropriation of payments, further case laws sets somewhat of a precedent for the
appropriation of payments for creditor and debtors.

58. The case of Devaynes V Noble 1816 merivale 529 (Claytons Case), it established the
basic rule of 'first-in, first-out'. In further terms payments are presumed to be
appropriated to debts in the order which the debts are incurred. If no election is made
the earliest debts are paid first (NELC7).

59. It is the first item on the debit side of the account, that is discharged, or reduced, by
the first item on the credit side. Devaynes V Noble 1816 merivale 529 *608

60. This point is further carried forward in the case of Cory Brothers and Company,
Limited Appellants; V The Owners of the Turkish Steamship "Mecca" Respondents.
The "Mecca" 1897 A.C. 286.(NELC8)

61. When a debtor pays money on account to his creditor and makes no appropriation to
particular items, the creditor has the right of appropriation and may exercise the right
up to the last moment, by action or otherwise; Cory Brothers and Company, Limited
Appellants; V The Owners of the Turkish Steamship "Mecca" Respondents. The
"Mecca" 1897 A.C. 286

62. Again it is clear that it is the creditor / payee that should make their election clear at
the point of making payment.

63. In the case brought before you today the defendant had 3 months to make his election
clear however he did not.

64. It is also noticeable that on the 16th October 2014 the defendant sent an email to the
Council with regards to expressing his election on a payment made to an earlier Bill
which due to not paying the specific amount was allocated to the earlier amount
outstanding. The email can be seen on as (NELC9).

65. On that occasion the amount was allocated on the defendants request.

66. This is also shown by the extract from the 'Bailiff Help' forum, 20th April 2013 to 21st
May 2013,(NELC10) clearly showing an awareness of the need to make an election
of payment .

67. Further evidenced by 'Legalbeagle' post on 2nd October 2015 (NELC11). This shows
that the defendant is well aware of how the Northgate system works and that he is
aware that he needs to make his election if the payment made is not specifically as set
out in the statutory instalment scheme.
68. The Council is aware that the defendant has taken matters further with regards to
disputing the 60.00 costs incurred from November 2012.

69. Correspondence received from the defendant as of 20th November 2013 stated
that he had withdrawn his application for the Judicial review of the costs (NELC12)

70. Given this the Council no longer held action in attempting to recover the outstanding
amount.

71. Thus in October 2014 when the defendant made a non-specific payment the amount
was allocated to his costs until the defendant contacted the Council and made his
election clear.

72. An appropriation of a payment cannot be inferred from an intention in the mind of the
debtor un-communicated to the creditor. It can only be inferred from circumstances
known to both parties. Leeson V Leeson 1936 K.B156 (NELC13).

73. As of the letter from the Defendant regarding his withdrawal of the Judicial review
North East Lincolnshire Council had no further reason to believe that the costs were
being disputed and the allocation of unspecified amounts was made in accordance
with Peters V Anderson.

74. It is on these authorities that North East Lincolnshire Council would state that the
monies, have, due to the defendants non-election or expression, been allocated
correctly and that North East Lincolnshire Council, have adhered to the Local
Government Finance Act 1992 and the Council Tax (Administration and
Enforcement) Regulations 1992 in issuing recovery notices and applying for a
Liability Order.

75. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signed:

On Behalf of North East Lincolnshire Council


GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxxx Yyyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 12
Councils exhibit NELC12
Grimsby Magistrates Court

Claimant
North East Lincolnshire Council

Defendant
Mr Neil Gilliatt

This is exhibit NELC12 as referred to in the


Application for Liability Order
Administrative Court Office at Leeds
Leeds Combined Court
1 Oxford Row
Leeds

Your ref: CO/7281/2013

20 November 2013

Dear Sir/Madam

Re: The Queen on the application of [.................................................. .......] v GRIMSBY MAGISTRATES COURT

I'm asked to advise the court whether I will be withdrawing this judicial review claim as it deems there
to be no longer a need for further action on the part of the High Court.

Representations have been made upon the draft case though I've neither entered into a recognizance
nor since been asked to. The purpose of the judicial review claim was, I believed, to mandate the
Justices to state the case without being subject to terms of a recognizance.

I had viewed that agreeing such terms would pose risks, potentially greater than subjecting myself to
forfeiture of the proposed sum if, for example, to avoid a penalty the appeal was prosecuted
knowing that the stated case omitted the points in law I was questioning. In terms of successfully
appealing the decision I would be disadvantaged from the outset and disproportionately exposed to
the financial risks of incurring costs. It could be argued that in these circumstances, requiring
recognizance would either be denying my access to justice or unduly burdening me financially, as
presently I'm in receipt of no income.

Although the claim prompted service of the draft case, it still remains that delivery of the final signed
case has, in accordance with CrimPR Part 64, rule 64.3(7), overrun by approximately two months.
Presumably then, the agreement detailed in the acknowledgement of service was only to serve the
draft case.

I am therefore in the same position now as I was before the claim for a mandatory order as it seems
the Justices will unlikely deliver the signed case unless recognizance is entered into.

However, where my queries with the Magistrates' court went unanswered, the judicial review process
succeeded in drawing from the Clerk that if I had appeared before the court to enter into a
recognizance, its appropriateness and/or the amount could have been considered. This is exactly the
information I was seeking and would never have obtained had I not proceeded with this claim for
judicial review.

Knowing as I do now, that a possibility exists to negotiate terms which are mutually acceptable, it
seems arranging to appear before the court to enter into a recognizance is now appropriate.
In light of the Justices expressing regard for the Administrative Court's time and public money, it
would also seem appropriate, if, whilst appearing before the Magistrates' Court to agree terms of a
recognizance, I also seek agreement to terms of an order that the court consider the matter on the
papers and that there be no order as to costs, as the case involves a matter of general public
importance.

After considering the options that appear available to me now, please take this as formal notice that I
am withdrawing this judicial review claim.

HM Courts & Tribunals Service

Administrative Court Office at Leeds


Leeds Combined Court
1 Oxford Row
Leeds
West Yorkshire
LS1 3BG

25 November 2013

Our ref: CO/7281/2013


Your ref:

Dear Sir/Madam

Re The Queen on the application of [.................................................. .......] versus GRIMSBY MAGISTRATES


COURT

I am writing to inform you that your letter in the above case was received by this office on 22/11/2013.

Unless you hear from us within four weeks from the date of this letter, you can assume that your letter
to withdraw has been accepted and the Court file has been closed.

Please note that all copy documents in the above matter will be destroyed immediately following the
closure of the case, unless you have already notified the court that you would like them returned.

If you require any further information, please contact the Administrative Court Office General Office on
0113 306 2578.
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxxx Yyyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 13
Original letter to Administrative Court
Administrative Court Office at Leeds Xx Yyyyyy Xxxx
Leeds Combined Court Grimsby
1 Oxford Row North East Lincolnshire
Leeds
West Yorkshire
LS1 3BG

Your ref: CO/7281/2013 20 November 2013

Dear Sir/Madam

Re: The Queen on the application of XYXY XYXYXYX v GRIMSBY MAGISTRATES COURT

I'm asked to advise the court whether I will be withdrawing this judicial review claim as it deems
there to be no longer a need for further action on the part of the High Court.

Representations have been made upon the draft case though I've neither entered into a
recognizance nor since been asked to. The purpose of the judicial review claim was, I believed, to
mandate the Justices to state the case without being subject to terms of a recognizance.

I had viewed that agreeing such terms would pose risks, potentially greater than subjecting myself
to forfeiture of the proposed sum if, for example, to avoid a penalty the appeal was prosecuted
knowing that the stated case omitted the points in law I was questioning. In terms of successfully
appealing the decision I would be disadvantaged from the outset and disproportionately exposed
to the financial risks of incurring costs. It could be argued that in these circumstances, requiring
recognizance would either be denying my access to justice or unduly burdening me financially, as
presently I'm in receipt of no income.

Although the claim prompted service of the draft case, it still remains that delivery of the final
signed case has, in accordance with CrimPR Part 64, rule 64.3(7), overrun by approximately two
months. Presumably then, the agreement detailed in the acknowledgement of service was only to
serve the draft case.

I am therefore in the same position now as I was before the claim for a mandatory order as it
seems the Justices will unlikely deliver the signed case unless recognizance is entered into.
However, where my queries with the Magistrates' court went unanswered, the judicial review
process succeeded in drawing from the Clerk that if I had appeared before the court to enter into
a recognizance, its appropriateness and/or the amount could have been considered. This is exactly
the information I was seeking and would never have obtained had I not proceeded with this claim
for judicial review.

Knowing as I do now, that a possibility exists to negotiate terms which are mutually acceptable, it
seems arranging to appear before the court to enter into a recognizance is now appropriate.
In light of the Justices expressing regard for the Administrative Court's time and public money, it
would also seem appropriate, if, whilst appearing before the Magistrates' Court to agree terms of a
recognizance, I also seek agreement to terms of an order that the court consider the matter on
the papers and that there be no order as to costs, as the case involves a matter of general public
importance.

After considering the options that appear available to me now, please take this as formal notice
that I am withdrawing this judicial review claim.

Yours sincerely

X. Yyyyy
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates' Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES' COURT

(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXIllBIT14

Original letter from Administrative Court



HM Courts &
Tribunals Service
Administrative
Leeds Combined
1 Oxford Row
Leeds
West Yorkshire
LS13BG

OX 703016
Court Office at Leeds

Leeds 6

T 0113 306 2578


Court

F 0113 306 2581


PROTECT E administrativecourtoffice.leeds
@hmcts.x.gsi.gov.uk
N
3 www.justice.gov.uk
(
r E
r

Our ref: CO/7281/2013 25 November2-Ot3


Your ref:

Dear Sir / Madam,

Re The Queen on the application r versus GRIMSBY


MAGISTRATES COURT

I am writing to inform you that your letter in the above case was received by this office
on 22/11/2013.

Unless you hear from us within four weeks from the date of this letter, you can assume
that your letter to withdraw has been accepted and the Court file has been closed.

Please note that all copy documents in the above matter will be destroyed immediately
following the closure of the case, unless you have already notified the court that you
would like them returned.

If you require any further information, please contact the Administrative Court Office
General Office on 0113 306 2578.

r '
V
Yours tV/fullY

Miss G Downing
For Court Manager

The Administrative Court Office will not accept service via email. When using the above email address it should be
noted that mail sent after 4.30 p.m. may not be opened until 9.00 a.m. on the following working day. Court users should
not send confidential or restricted information over the public Internet.
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxxxx Yyyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 15
Email Read Receipt

Confirming North East Lincolnshire Council received email with copy attached of letter sent
to the Justices Clerk querying the failure to deliver the final signed case stated sent on 10
January 2014.

Letter file name (Doncaster CrimPR 64.3(6) 10 January 2014.pdf) [Exhibit 18]

Xxxx

From: "Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)" <Mike.Raven@Nelincs.gcsx.gov.uk>


To: "Xxxx" <xxxxxxxx@btopenworld.com>
Sent: 15 January 2014 12:50
Attach: ATT00122.txt
Subject: Read: Re: Representations on Draft Case - CrimPR 64.3 (6)
Your message

To: Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)


Subject: Re: Representations on Draft Case - CrimPR 64.3 (6)
Sent: 10 January 2014 15:09:48 (UTC) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London

was read on 15 January 2014 11:50:32 (UTC) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London.
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxxx Yyyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 16
Email Read Receipt

Confirming North East Lincolnshire Council received email with copy attached of letter sent
to the Justices Clerk querying the failure to deliver the final signed case stated sent on 13
February 2014.

Letter file name (Recognizance 13 February 2014.pdf) [Exhibit 19]

Xxxx

From: "Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)" <Mike.Raven@Nelincs.gcsx.gov.uk>


To: "Xxxx" <xxxxxxx@btopenworld.com>
Sent: 14 February 2014 12:29
Attach: ATT00131.txt
Subject: Read: Case Stated - Recognizance (re, North East Lincolnshire Council)
Your message

To: Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)


Subject: Case Stated - Recognizance (re, North East Lincolnshire Council)
Sent: 13 February 2014 16:18:48 (UTC) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London

was read on 14 February 2014 11:29:00 (UTC) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London.
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxxx Yyyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 17
Email Read Receipt

Confirming North East Lincolnshire Council received email with copy attached of letter sent to the
Justices Clerk requesting certificate stating that the application has been refused sent on 22 April
2014.

Letter file name (Cert - refusal to state case 22 April 2014.pdf) [Exhibit 20]

Xxxx

From: "Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)" <Mike.Raven@Nelincs.gcsx.gov.uk>


To: "Xxxx" <xxxxxxx@btopenworld.com>
Sent: 23 April 2014 16:44
Attach: ATT00140.txt
Subject: Read: Re: Certificate of Refusal to state a case - s.111(5) MCA 1980 (re, North East Lincolnshire
Council)
Your message

To: Raven, Mike (Gov Connect)


Subject: Re: Certificate of Refusal to state a case - s.111(5) MCA 1980 (re, North East Lincolnshire Council)
Sent: 22 April 2014 14:48:32 (UTC) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London

was read on 23 April 2014 16:44:20 (UTC) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London.
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxxx Yyyyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 18
Letter to the Justices Clerk (query delivery of case)
Justices' Clerk for Humber & South XX Yyyy Xxxx
Yorkshire Grimsby
Doncaster Magistrates Court North East Lincolnshire
PO Box 49
The Law Courts
College Road
Doncaster DN1 3HT

10 January 2014

Dear Mrs Watts

Re: North East Lincolnshire Council V Xyxy Xyxyxy


Grimsby and Cleethorpes Magistrates' Court - 2 November
2012 Application to State a Case

I refer to the draft case received 30 July 2013 and the 21 day time limit from receipt of the draft
case to submit any written representations upon its content.

May I bring it to your attention that on 19 August 2013, representations were served together with
letter advising the Court it had (from the latest day on which representations may be made) 21
days to state and sign the case in accordance with rule 78 of the Magistrates' Courts Rules 1981.

Accordingly, the final signed case was expected on or before 10 September 2013 (overrun by 4
months). I would therefore like to know why the justices have decided against complying with the
relevant rules.

Yours sincerely

X. Yyyyyy
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxxx Yyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 19
Costs suspended until outcome letter
Justices' Clerk for Humber & South YY Xxxxx Yyyyy
Yorkshire Grimsby
Doncaster Magistrates Court North East Lincolnshire
PO Box 49
The Law Courts
College Road
Doncaster DN1 3HT

13 February 2014

Dear Mrs Watts

Re: North East Lincolnshire Council V Xyxy Yxyxyx


Grimsby and Cleethorpes Magistrates' Court - 2 November
2012 Application to State a Case

Further to there being no response to my letter of 10.1.14, I am left not knowing why the justices
did not state the case in accordance with rule 78 of the Magistrates' Courts Rules 1981.

It must be assumed that the court only gave an undertaking to serve the draft case, re
acknowledgement of service (Judicial Review 8.7.13) and not intended delivering the case stated
until recognizance had been agreed.

As a consequence of the judicial review claim, I understand that despite a sum (500) being
stated in your letter (24.1.13), the appropriateness and/or the amount may be considered on
agreeing recognizance. It would appear that if this appeal is to be progressed it will be conditional
on entering into recognizance. I therefore ask that arrangements are made for this to take place
and await your response.

Yours sincerely

X. Yyyyyy
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES COURT
(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Xxxxx Yyyy
Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXHIBIT 20
Letter to the Justices Clerk (requesting certificate)
Justices' Clerk for Humber & South YY Xxxxx Yyyyy
Yorkshire Grimsby
Doncaster Magistrates Court North East Lincolnshire
PO Box 49
The Law Courts
College Road
22 April 2014
Doncaster DN1 3HT

Dear Mrs Watts

Re: North East Lincolnshire Council V Xxxx Yyyyyy


Grimsby and Cleethorpes Magistrates' Court - 2 November
2012 Application to State a Case

Thank you for your email of 6 March 2014 in which you stated:

I will have written communication with you either later today or first thing tomorrow
setting out the position with your case and advising you on next steps.

I did not receive the aforementioned communication, neither have subsequent calls to your office
made 19 and 28 March prompted a response. The net result being that the case, for which the
Magistrates owe a legal duty to state for the opinion of the High Court, has not been stated.

As no contact has been made regarding my 13 February 2014 letter to agree recognizance and
every attempt to proceed with the appeal has drawn a blank, it appears the court is refusing to
state the case.

Pursuant to section 111(5) of the MCA 1980, a magistrate can refuse to state a case, but must
consider the application 'frivolous'. The meaning of the term was considered by the Civil Division of
the Court of Appeal in (R v Mildenhall Magistrates' Court, ex p Forest District Council). The then
Lord Chief Justice in considering the meaning of 'frivolous' was of the view that in the context, the
Court should consider the application to be futile, misconceived, hopeless or academic. He went on
to say that such a conclusion was not one to which the justices can properly come simply because
they consider their decision to be right or immune from challenge.

Presuming the application is not considered 'frivolous' (a draft has been produced) there is no
obvious reason why the court has not stated the case as legally required. However, as the court
may only refuse on these grounds then I require a certificate stating that the application has been
refused (section 111(5) MCA 1980) setting out the reasons why, so I may under section 111(6)
seek a second mandatory order from the Administrative Court requiring the case to be stated.

Yours sincerely

X. Yyyyy
GRIMSBY AND CLEETHORPES Application to start a prosecution
(s1 Magistrates' Courts Act 1980)
MAGISTRATES' COURT

(Code 1940) Listed: 26 April 2016

Prosecution
v

Humberside Police
Defendant

EXIllBIT21
Section 26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015
Status: This is the original version (as it was originally enacted).

Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015


2015 CHAPTER 2

PART 1

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Offences involving police or prison officers

26 Corrupt or other improper exercise of police powers and privileges


(1) A police constable listed in subsection (3) commits an offence if he or she--
(a) exercises the powers and privileges of a constable improperly, and
(b) knows or ought to know that the exercise is improper.
(2) A police constable guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on
indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).
(3) The police constables referred to in subsection (1) are--
(a) a constable of a police force in England and Wales;
(b) a special constable for a police area in England and Wales;
(c) a constable or special constable of the British Transport Police Force;
(d) a constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;
(e) a constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;
(f) a National Crime Agency officer designated under section 9 or 10 of the Crime
and Courts Act 2013 as having the powers and privileges of a constable.
(4) For the purposes of this section, a police constable exercises the powers and privileges
of a constable improperly if-
(a) he or she exercises a power or privilege of a constable for the purpose of
achieving-
(i) a benefit for himself or herself, or
(ii) a benefit or a detriment for another person, and
(b) a reasonable person would not expect the power or privilege to be exercised
for the purpose of achieving that benefit or detriment.
2 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 (c. 2)
PART 1- Criminal Justice
Docwnent Generated: 2016-01-27
StIItus: This is the original version (as it was origina[ly enacted).

(5) For the purposes of this section, a police constable is to be treated as exercising the
powers and privileges of a constable improperly in the cases described in subsections
(6) and (7).
(6) The fIrst case is where--
(a) the police constable fails to exercise a power or privilege of a constable,
(b) the purpose of the failure is to achieve a benefit or detriment described in
subsection (4Xa), and
(c) a reasonable person would not expect a constable to fail to exercise the power
or privilege for the purpose of achieving that benefit or detriment.
(7) The second case is where--
(a) the police constable threatens to exercise, or not to exercise, a power or
privilege of a constable,
(b) the threat is made for the purpose of achieving a benefit or detriment described
in subsection (4Xa), and
(c) a reasonable person would not expect a constable to threaten to exercise, or
not to exercise, the power or privilege for the purpose of achieving that benefit
or detriment

(8) An offence is committed under this section if the act or omission in question takes
place in the United Kingdom or in United Kingdom waters.
(9) In this section-
"benefit" and "detriment" mean any benefit or detriment, whether or not in
money or other property and whether temporary or permanent;
"United Kingdom waters" means the sea and other waters within the
seaward limits of the United Kingdom's territorial sea.
(10) References in this section to exercising, or not exercising, the powers and privileges
of a constable include performing, or not performing, the duties of a constable.
(11) Nothing in this section affects what constitutes the offence of misconduct in public
office at common law in England and Wales or Northern Ireland.
Julie Collins
Courts & Tribunal Manager
Humber & South Yorkshire Area

A Watts
Clerk to the Justices
Grimsby Magistrates Court
Victoria Street
Grimsby
North East Lincolnshire
DN31 1HN
Mr ,
, ,
T 01472 320444
Grimsby
Minicom VII not available
(Helpline for the deaf and hard of
hearing)
www.justice.gov.uk

Our ref: GT
28 April 2016

Dear Mr ,

I write to inform you that your application to commence criminal proceedings was
considered by Deputy District Judge Hayles on Tuesday 26 April 2016.

Having considered all your documentation the Judge refused to issue a summons.

I have attached a copy of his reasons for your information.

Yours sincerely,

Graeme Townell
Legal Team Manager
Grimsby Magistrates Court

Page 1
Mr

Application by an individual to commence criminal proceedings by


issue of summons.

This is an application by to lay an information for the issue of a summons


alleging an offence under section 26. Criminal Justice & Courts Act 2015 against
Gillian Morley of the Humberside Police.

1). Mr has been invited to attend Grimsby Magistrates Court for an ex parte
private hearing and has declined the invitation.

2). I have read statements of evidence by Mr dated 2nd December 2015 and
th
25 April 2016, together with those exhibits which were sent to the Clerk to the
Justices.

3). I find that Mr is aggrieved at a decision of the Grimsby Magistrates Court in


October 2015 making or confirming a liability order in respect of allegedly unpaid
council tax. He complains that the order was achieved because a Local Authority
officer gave perjured evidence. He is aggrieved as well that the District Judge
(Magistrates Court) hearing and making the liability order was complicit in the perjury
and thus himself was guilty of perverting the course of justice.

4). I am told that no appeal has been lodged.

5). Mr invited the Police to investigate the alleged perjury. The Police declined
to. On 11th November 2015 Gillian Morley informed Mr that the matter did not
concern the police as it was a civil matter.

6). Mr complained that the decision of the Police not to investigate was an
improper exercise of a power in accordance with section 26 of Criminal Justice &
Courts Act 2015, and that that failure to investigate triggers his current application.

7). Mr has made a complaint to the Police. That has been rejected and Mr
is aggrieved by that.

8). I have referred myself to Stones Justices manual; and to R v West London
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Khan (1979) and in particular to the
explanation to the approach to issuing a summons by Lord Widgery C.J.

9). I have a discretion whether or not to issue a summons. I do not issue a summon
because the application is vexatious
(a) Mr seeks to proceed on an offence that is not designed for this type
of circumstance. Further the application overlooks the reasonable person test
in sections 26(4)(b) and 26 (5)(c).
(b) His grievance is really about the October 2015 order and the evidence of
the Local Authority.
(c) He has had the opportunity to appeal the October 2015 decision but he
has chosen not to.
(d) He appears to be using this application as a collateral attack to (b) above.

N P Hayles
Deputy District Judge (MC)
26/04/2016