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History of the Human Sciences

Intellectual history and cultural history: the inside and the outside
Donald R. Kelley
History of the Human Sciences 2002 15: 1
DOI: 10.1177/0952695102015002123

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© 2002 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) pp. 1–19
[0952-6951(200205)15:2;1–19; 024123]

Intellectual history and cultural
history: the inside and the

What is the relationship between intellectual and cultural history? An
answer to this question may be found in the area between the two poles
of inquiry commonly known as internalist and externalist methods. The
first of these deals with old-fashioned ‘ideas’ (in Lovejoy’s sense) and
the second with social and political context and the sociology and
anthropology of knowledge. This article reviews this question in the
light of the earlier historiography of philosophy, literature and science,
and debates over the role of context in determining historical meaning.
Within the horizon-structure of experience and interpretation the short
answer is that cultural history is the outside of intellectual history and
intellectual history the inside of cultural history. Ideally, historians
ought to work both sides of the historical street.
Key words contextualism, cultural history, externalism,
intellectual history, internalism


What is the relationship between these two fields of study – between intel-
lectual and cultural history or, as it would have been put a generation or two
ago, between the history of ideas and the social history of ideas? There is no

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nationality. place and environ- ment. and so presumably thoughts. in a different way. Put differently. the problem is that of hermeneutics according to the famous formula of Dilthey.5 The first is the old belief – going back to Vico. The second is the newer belief that knowledge is shaped or even determined by the conditions – limitations as well as possibilities – of a society and questions of power relations. and factors of gender. social and cultural environment. or is able humanly to make. that is. class struc- ture. 2010 .3 For historians this intellectual project has been carried on between two poles of inquiry which have been commonly known as internalist and exter- nalist – or the ‘intellectualist’ and ‘contextualist’ – methods. the foreignness of the country being by IGNACIO MAZZOLA on September 20. For history this takes the following form: on the one hand tracing ideas in terms of an inner dynamic. of historical agents.1 Essentially. It is not a question of memory but of historical meaning that must somehow be conveyed from one subject or context that is past and forever lost to another that is still present but soon to be past. without assuming continuities of meaning. can Jean Bodin’s Republic. whose views are derived from Schleiermacher – how to find the ‘I’ in the ‘Thou’. theories and other intellectual creations. inherited or learned practice. and so. The dilemma is not unlike that of the early explorers or modern anthropologists. and this implies a meeting of minds across the ages through ideas. Hobbes and indeed Plato – that one is able to understand only what one has made. Montaigne’s Essays can be read as the reflections of a critical intellectual or as evidence for the moral and political climate of the 16th century. the contrast is between a phenomenological view which takes ideas on their own terms. as mental phenomena. The ‘inside’ of history treats the words. if perhaps not quite understand. or familiar logic. and cultural sur- roundings. the second in collective behavior. The contrast I have been making also has an epistemological aspect. the presently intelligible in the historically Other. Obviously the same source can serve both purposes.sagepub. while the ‘outside’ deals with political. From an internalist point of view Montaigne and Bodin can Downloaded from hhs. but posing it in a straightforward way may give some form and direction to this article. and a reductionist or constructivist view which treats them as Something Else – or at least as derivative of particular cultural context. etc.2 that is.01Kelley (bc/d) 5/9/02 10:14 AM Page 2 2 HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15(2) simple answer to this question.4 The first of these polar positions is located in individual psychology and mental phenomena. similar to what the 18th century called ‘reasoned’ or ‘conjectural’ history. which is between what has been called ‘maker’s knowledge’ and the social or cultural construction of know- ledge. Note that the I–O distinction refers not to questions of subjectivity and objectivity but to the way of employing sources. race. and on the other hand trying to place ideas in the context of their own particular time. whose choice is to ‘take possession’ of the foreign terrain and impose names and meaning on it. whose subject is how to make sense of the thought and behavior of that foreign country that is the past. or else to ‘go native’ and accept. economic.

‘so the manner of treating it must be suited to that division. most obviously and most par- adigmatically. in their own temporal and less tangible way. etc. Questions not only of society. Kant’s ‘starry heaven above and moral law within’. ceremony. skepticism in Montaigne’s case and absolutism in Bodin’s. institutions and politics but also of lan- guage.8 Downloaded from hhs. has fallen out of by IGNACIO MAZZOLA on September 20. 2010 . heresy. This funda- mental dualism was reinforced by the Christian dualisms of body-and-soul and letter-and-spirit.01Kelley (bc/d) 5/9/02 10:14 AM Page 3 INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND CULTURAL HISTORY 3 be set in traditions of thought and ideology. II The earliest sites of this ‘inner–outer’ distinction have been the histories of religion and of philosophy. apparently because he believes that the latter. perhaps. where the dualism of body and soul still prevails. theories. mentality and associated traditions involve. in Plato’s distinction between the true (and inner) world of ideas and the false (and outer) world of appearances.’ he remarked. paradigms. ‘As the history of the church is External or Internal.6 For some scholars this internalist–externalist distinction. secular learning and major events. A distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ will persist until there is an end to asking ques- tions about the history of concepts. In the mid-18th century J. In particular there are not only synchronic contexts but also diachronic con- texts. from an externalist standpoint they appear against the background of the French religious wars. Of course these two approaches cannot be separated. and Nietzsche’s rejection of Platonic ideas for the ‘truth in appearances’. for their writings can be read in several contexts. and other decontextualizable epiphenomena which have occupied thinkers for centuries in many contexts and hermeneu- tical conditions. thematic origins of scientific thought. as well as the Cartesian distinction between res extensa and res cogitans. internalist terrain. Mosheim organized his ecclesiastical history (1867[1755]) according to just this division. no matter how many rocks we may kick or what our context or historical vantage point. ‘contexts’ and what Gadamer has called the ‘experience of tradition’ – the latter occupying. discourse. In fact the opposition between internal and external is deeply embedded in western thought and languages. which was restored to currency a generation ago in the wake of debates provoked by Thomas Kuhn.7 But such Angloid revisionism (Dr Johnson’s kicking the stones of vain philosophy) is hardly the last word on the subject. revolutions. Steven Shapin has recently rejected it as ‘silly’ and unworthy of discussion. L. in general. and the internal history matters of the spirit – doctrine.sagepub.’ The external history of the Church included matters of government. Nor do I think that either history or language allows us to evade this conventional structure of thought. constructivist approach has prevailed and assimilated the naive inter- nalist view.

Heumann beginning in 1715. doxogra- phers were interested only in external matters such as anecdotes about Pythagoras’ father.’12 The result was to emphasize the doctrinal and what I would like to call the propositional conception of the history of philosophy and of ideas. displays a similar structure. ‘The essential connection between what is apparently past and the present state reached by philosophy. 2010 . ‘Philosophers are made. reversing the condition of the poet (nascitur non fit).01Kelley (bc/d) 5/9/02 10:14 AM Page 4 4 HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15(2) The history of philosophy. ‘but the Becoming of ourselves and of our own knowledge.sagepub. Heumann also went on to wonder if bastards had a special talent and whether women or castrati were capable of philosophy.’ he added. ‘is not one of the exter- nal considerations which might have attention in the history of philosophy but expresses instead the inner nature of its character. Beyond psychological factors. and historical periods. but the ideas and theories which produced common ground between Plato and Leibniz and which permitted the discussion of ‘perennial ques- tions’ by a philosophical ‘we’ without regard to the limits of 17th-century Downloaded from hhs. nationality. or Aristotle’s son. ‘The course of history does not show us the Becoming of things foreign to us. Ephraim Gerhard. At first this took the form of doxography in the style of the classic (but also trivial and untrustworthy) work of Diogenes Laertius on the ‘lives and opinions of philosophers’. since. In sharp contrast to this vulgar externalism was the work of such thinkers as Jacob Thomasius. As the historian of philosophy. wisdom and life-style of Diogenes. climate. being. non nascuntur). You will give us the history of philosophy [historia philosophica]. Not the wit. Plato’s mother. by IGNACIO MAZZOLA on September 20. nature. which had emerged as a new discipline in the 17th century. in the physical condition or temperaments of philosophers.. the Acta Philosophorum edited by C.’ For Hegel this inter- nalist history had nothing to do with an alien Thou and everything to do with the philosophizing I. ‘Most others are skilled rather in antiquity than in science and give us lives rather than doc- trines. a historian of ideas – tracing con- cepts of God.’11 In the terminology used by Leibniz (and given new cur- rency in our time by Thomas Kuhn). as Heumann aphorized. not born’ (Philosophi fiunt. ante litteram. we may say.10 Following Augustine. not of philosophers. the stars. or his intellectual com- munity. or in the later fortuna of their writings.’ he wrote. Heuman considered the influence of environ- ment. who was. from the ancient schools down to his own age. exemplified the old doxography as expanded by new scholarship. A. race. Heumann himself believed that philosophical self-understanding required not merely inward-looking speculation but also inquiry into the human conditions of philosophizing. Thomasius revealed not the outside but the inside – not the body but the soul – of the history of philosophy. As his former student Leibniz wrote to Thomasius in 1669.9 The very first periodical devoted to the history of philosophy. complained in 1711. The internalist view came to full flower in Hegel’s concept of Philoso- phiegeschichte.

the young scholar Charles Trinkaus found his neglect of ‘the social determinants and conse- quences’ of this idea to be ‘a serious omission’. Trinkaus added. These disciplines have all been scenes of I–O conflicts. which was homologous to the gradation of social and political ranks. since the concept of cosmic by IGNACIO MAZZOLA on September 20.’13 So the external history of philosophy was overshadowed by an internal. At this point. Having criticized Lovejoy for his own departures from logic. then it must be a history of mental processes. and I draw on each for perspective on the past and insight into the present state of the question. ‘not only reflected the structure of class society but also appears to have been used to justify and strengthen class domination’. and he was taken to task by the philosopher Ernest Nagel for his assumptions. . In fact the most important advances in intellectual history in this century have been made not in history as such but rather in some of these overlapping disciplines. but on one point Lovejoy and his critics were in agreement – the need for an interdisciplinary approach. of natural science. and of literature.01Kelley (bc/d) 5/9/02 10:14 AM Page 5 INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND CULTURAL HISTORY 5 cultural horizons or indeed of language in general. which is a paradigm of the internalist history of ideas. that the ‘temporalization’ of the great chain and evolutionary ideas coincided chronologically with ‘the advent of progres- sive bourgeois capitalism’ and its attendant hierarchies. This illustration concerns the history of ideas in its classic and innocent state. at least not without evidence that Trinkaus had failed to offer. which was a metaphor that neither explained nor predicted anything. spiritual history which produced a rational. III One classic example of this polarity in the intellectual history itself appears in the critical reactions to Arthur O. Trinkaus himself later turned to the most purely internalist sort of intellectual history. especially in the history of philosophy. . becom- ing a leading historian of Renaissance moral (and conspicuously not political) thought. he was following a Marxist model of externalist history.sagepub. in particular the notion of ideas being a ‘reflec- tion’ of social conditions. himself torn between philosophy and sociology. Downloaded from hhs.14 The next year. in the ‘Marxian Quarterly’. Science & Society. Attempts to reconstruct the physical conditions responsible for the peculiarities of historical events do not alter this fact. . however. Nor was it sur- prising. 2010 . ‘If history is not a mere puppet show. triumphalist and ‘Whiggish’ narrative of the progress of reason down to the present – or rather. put it. the history of ‘our’ reason down to ‘our’ times. Lovejoy’s The Great Chain of Being of 1936. Nagel applied the same internalist rigor to the contextualist suggestions ventured by Trinkaus. As Georg Simmel.

’20 This line of protest was summed up in Marcel Proust’s Contre Sainte-Beuve. was to shift attention from the creative artist to another self (un autre moi) that appeared not in the published oeuvre but rather in letters. and each of these is nicely represented by a French master of the last century. 2010 .21 In other words he sees the outside but not the inside of the artist. who regarded Sainte-Beuve (as Proust remarked) as a predecessor in the discovery of the scientific method formulated more rigidly by Taine by IGNACIO MAZZOLA on September 20. or reductionism. while the internalist path was followed by capital-C ‘Critics’. the Lundis. ‘the work is everything.01Kelley (bc/d) 5/9/02 10:14 AM Page 6 6 HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15(2) IV The war between internalism and externalism has left its mark on the study of literary history (historia literaria). this was associated especially with the younger French literary critic and historian Hippolyte Taine. originality and the ‘classical’ status of texts. not merely of philosophers – not merely old-fashioned doxography – so Friedrich Schlegel wanted a history of Literature.18 (‘Recall that Sainte-Beuve was himself the victim of such anec- dotalism as a result of his affair with Victor Hugo’s wife.16 In general the externalist road was taken by historians of litera- ture. was the specialty of the great critic Sainte-Beuve. This externalist impulse also underlay Sainte-Beuve’s monumental study of 17th- century intellectual history. ‘a delicious morsel for the ultra-biographical school.’)19 To literary artists and historians who championed the internalist values of aesthetics this attention to gossip and character seemed a violation of the autonomy of art and the privileges and the genius of the artist.17 In literary history constructivism is of two sorts. said the externalist scholar Irving Babbitt. As Leibniz wanted a history of Philos- ophy. Psychological constructivism. another discipline that emerged in the 17th century. ‘The man is nothing. social gossip. it was’. As for the social version of constructivism. and the perceived ‘character’ inferred from the context of salon culture. What he did in his weekly column. which denounced the critic on the grounds that he ‘sees literature under the category of time’ and follows a method which ‘consists in not separating the man from his work’. opinions and interactions of all the members of the monastery of Port-Royal and by the changing social context.22 Taine’s Downloaded from hhs. ‘Literature is an expression of society’.15 Histories of literature have been divided generally between undiscriminating surveys of authors and books or else critical and opinion- ated studies of capital-L ‘Literature’. who treated questions of aesthetics. Jansen and Pascal but by the lives. not merely a sequence of authors. whether or not this scandal shed light on the literary practice of either. according to the famous aphorism of Bonald. one psychological and the other social.’ Flaubert told George Sand. which was defined not merely by the ideas of Arnauld. For the historians.sagepub. For critics literature is the offspring of individual genius and risks being spoiled by analysis and considerations of climate and context.

com by IGNACIO MAZZOLA on September 20.’ Sainte-Beuve wrote in a critique of Taine’s method.24 How can one distinguish between authors living in the same century and ‘moral climate’? ‘One can indeed show all the relations they have with the time in which they are born and live .29 Downloaded from hhs.23 What Taine seemed to disregard was the large distance between document and artistic work (according to the distinction of Heidegger) – between ‘tra- dition and the individual talent’ (in the phrase of T. S. ‘The masterpiece no longer has any significance except as a historical document’.28 Diverted by biographical details and irrelevant context – ‘Shake- speare’s laundry lists’ was the scornful phrase – some literary critics and historians tended to lose sight of what Wellek and Warren called the ‘intrin- sic study of literature’ and ‘modes of existence of the literary work of art’. Constructivism is associated with another sort of distraction from auth- orial autonomy. ‘but one cannot tell in advance that [the age] will give birth to a particular kind of individual or talent. Eliot). Flaubert complained.01Kelley (bc/d) 5/9/02 10:14 AM Page 7 INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND CULTURAL HISTORY 7 method was expressed most famously in the contextualist trinity of ‘race. 2010 .27 The notoriously opinionated Leavis demurred. editors and some interpreters to establish. and F. is improved and enriched by such dissemination.26 A classic debate over this issue was staged two generations ago between the Cambridge critic F. pressures of the natural environment. . but once set down the word takes flight among the vulgar and the predisposed. R. For Leavis in any case ‘social’ was an invidious term which should not be allowed to contaminate the high art of Literature. It is the aspiration of philologists. The inside–out conceit conceals another problem of intellectual history. and periods of cultural development. Bateson of Oxford. which relate literary creations to the external dispositions of national character. which goes by the name of contextualism. W. arguing that the idea of placing a poem back into ‘total context’ was nonsense and that ‘social context’ was an illusion arising involuntarily ‘out of one’s personal living’ (inevitably situated in the 20th century). moment. It is only making the best of this hermeneutical predicament to add that meaning. posing as the champion of scholarship and what he called ‘the disci- pline of contextual reading’ (as exemplified by Rosamond Tuve). .sagepub. or to divine. Taine’s ‘fatalism’ was no less objectionable than Sainte-Beuve’s psychologism. To literary artists like Flaubert. and even the original author cannot be trusted to reconstruct the creative moment. milieu’. and such pretensions to scholarship suggested an inability to read poetry and to make the sort of intuitive aesthetic judgments that were the office of the critic. the creative spirit underlying texts (on the analogy of fundamentalist biblical critics). which in any case transcends the meaners and their intentions. For Taine. Why Pascal rather than La Fontaine?’25 These are ques- tions which seem to be ignored by externalist interpretations. and this is the semantic gap between authorial intention and the reception by later readers and critics. speaking as the ‘Responsible Critic’. Leavis.

32 Reviewing what he called ‘intellectual evolution’ and the ‘progress of the human spirit’ Auguste Comte spoke of the difference between doctrinal and historical advance. between la marche dogmatique and la marche historique. advocated a less ideological (or anti-ideological) and more linguistic attention to historical context in order to avoid anachro- nism and to understand original authorial intention and meaning.35 The former preserved logical sequence and demonstrable truth. experiments. the circulation of journals. Ian Hacking sums up the issue in this way: External history is a matter of by IGNACIO MAZZOLA on September 20. by Karl Marx and Lewis Namier. Internal history is the history of indi- vidual items of knowledge.sagepub. Quentin Skinner. V The I–O distinction has become especially heated among historians of science. ‘but the chain of truths is not the order of their discoveries’. the funding of insti- tutes. Skinner.33 On the one hand one could analyze the successive conceptual achievements of scientific disciplines. 2010 . the latter depicted what Comte called ‘the effective development of the human spirit’.31 And he adds that ‘We have no good account of the relationship between external and internal history’. which had been suffering from the same sort of contempt for history that Leavis had displayed with regard to literature. Again. noting that they were by no means identical. however. and all the social circumstances that are external to knowledge itself. who invoked Bateson and his ‘contextualist reading’ against Leavis and transported the arguments into the ‘context’ of political theory. perhaps. the latter admitted not only the existence but even the heuristic value of error and the blind alleys as well as the high and Whig- gish road to Scientific Correctness.34 The former explained disciplinary progress. as Comte’s colleague Cournot did in 1868 in his Considerations on the March of Ideas and Events in Modern Times. there is little new in this distinction. as Emile Boutroux did six years later in his provocative book on The Contingency of the Laws of Nature. on the left and right respectively. On the other hand one could trace the complex and serendipitous pattern of history. As Jean-Sylvain Bailly wrote about the ‘chain of truths’ that constitute science. focusing in particular on social background.30 The vulgar and socially reductionist versions of contextualism were represented. they studied history and behavior but were looking for Some- thing Else. refutations. economics. In this old debate the basic question was again the issue of inside and Downloaded from hhs. conjectures.01Kelley (bc/d) 5/9/02 10:14 AM Page 8 8 HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15(2) This debate was revived a generation later by another Cambridge scholar.

found striking correlations between the ‘extrinsic factors’ of Puritan belief and interest in science. who. perhaps. and here a methodological consensus can never be reached. including family background. S. while Latour turned attention to the debates. a wide range of extra-scientific ‘influences’. In 1873 (less than a decade after the appearance of Taine’s History of English Literature) Alphonse Candolle published a ‘History of the Sciences and of Men of Learning’. as David Bloor put it. The ‘c’est la faute de Voltaire’ theory of the origins of the French Revolution may be discred- ited. through statistics and quantitative researches. especially by philosophers. Merton. what has been called the ‘strong thesis’ of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK in the trade) has been widely accepted as grounds for plotting the story of western science. It is such lines of questions that underlie what G. and especially heredity.37 Soon these objects of research were to be further relativized by association with the idea of mentalité which was given cur- rency by Lucien Levy-Bruhl and adopted by younger historians of science such as Abel Rey. which studied.’39 As in literary history one crucial question is the role of individual genius. religion.38 The suggestive results of such pioneering forays into the sociology of science were reinforced by more dogmatic Marxist views of the role of material factors. and despite the decline of Marxist influence.41 Husserl based his view on an account of Galileo’s motivations from a presentist standpoint. ‘Can the sociology of knowledge’. expressed most strikingly. 2010 . Externalism has returned with a nominalist and localist vengeance in recent works. gender.40 Contrast this with the radical minimalizing of the role of the heroic discoverer by Bruno Latour in his virtuoso account – a sort of counter-epic – of the ‘pasteurization of France’. the first investigating not just the history of truth but The Social History of Truth and the second not just contingency but ‘messy contingencies. in those of Shapin and Andrew Pickering. To the fundamental work of Galileo in the ‘math- ematization of nature’ Edmund Husserl traces not only this revolution but also the 20th-century ‘crisis of European sciences’.com by IGNACIO MAZZOLA on September 20. following the line of Weber. In the 20th century in the Anglophone world the debate centered on the pioneering work of Robert K. Latour’s story is an Odyssey with Odysseus left out.01Kelley (bc/d) 5/9/02 10:14 AM Page 9 INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND CULTURAL HISTORY 9 outside – of pure scientific thought and its social and institutional conditions. Rousseau and Roy Downloaded from hhs. ‘investigate and explain the very content and nature of scientific knowledge?’36 This is the issue defined by the seminal and polar books of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper – The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and The Logic of Scientific Discovery – but again there is a longer history to the debate. Gaston Bachelard and Alexandre Koyré. language. and natural selection. geography. cultural climate and political environment of proto-bacteriology and the 19th-century hygiene movement in which Pasteur was a mainly symbolic figure. but analogous views of the Scientific Revolution are still accepted.sagepub.

and the poles are not only far apart but also. without common ground between them.43 Indeed Euclidean geometry and Cartesian analysis appear. but Swerdlow nonetheless concludes that the major question is ‘not whether. which has extended its horizons into the cultural context and has radically reduced the role of ‘hard’ history of science in historical under- standing.sagepub. such as the manifesto by Noel Swerdlow published in the Journal of the History of Ideas on behalf of what he calls ‘the technical content of science’. which he finds ‘repetitious and sterile’ as well as also anti-scientific. it accommodates external as well as internal history – the sociology as well as the logic of scientific discovery. the Copernican revolution serving as the target and para- digm of such questions of method. from this externalist standpoint. Renaissance humanism.42 The work of David Lachterman and Joan Richards shows that even mathematics – which in any case has in this century lost its absolute foundations and universal claims – has a rhetorical form and social dimen- sion associated with the language of members of a community at a particular by IGNACIO MAZZOLA on September 20. who finds the eurekan key to Copernicus’ conceptual break- through in the so-called ‘Tusi couple’. which had been developed by the 14th- century Arabic astronomer Ibn-al-Shatir as a geometrical model to account for rectilinear motion within the framework of circular movement. At one extreme we see defenses of the integrity of pure science. ecclesiastical politics. But the debate continues. to be classic examples of the demonstrations of math- ematics as human ‘constructions’. and other considerations that concern not merely the intentional Downloaded from hhs. Another aspect of current views of the history of science is the emphasis placed by scholars on rhetoric as a constituent of scientific theory as well as a means of dissemination. the scientific community and attendant context of intel- lectual debate.01Kelley (bc/d) 5/9/02 10:14 AM Page 10 10 HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15(2) Porter have celebrated as an irreversible new ‘revolution in the history of science’. No historical evidence has been offered for this connection. nor did Copernicus hint at such influence (although he did admit ancient predecessors). where.’ he continues. neo-Platonism. and according to Pera. The strong internalist thesis is offered by Swerdlow. it seems.44 The upshot is ‘a game with three players’. ‘if we confine ourselves to fashionable issues of philos- ophy or social studies of science?’45 The major figures in the revolution of modern science are favorite loci for internalist debates. ‘How can we ever come to understand earlier science in its own terms and free of the prejudices and preconceptions of our own age. but when. 2010 . literary and other contextualist concerns. Marcello Pera’s recent book. as opposed to social.46 Copernicus has also been studied in the context of late medieval cosmo- logical speculation. proposes a new ‘scientific dialectics’ which expands the old Bacon- ian or Cartesian paradigm of the solitary inquirer interrogating nature by adding a third party. and in what form’ this transmission occurred. The Discourses of Science.

but communication and dialogue give it external form subject to interpretation and criticism. Rather it is more correct to insist that he participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him.) Here the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ meet in a common medium – lexicographically if not spiritually. no doubt. intellectual history can be seen as defining a large spectrum ranging from the most restricted sort of history of ideas (the Tusi couple in Copernicus. For Hans Blumenberg. In short (and to return to the original analogy) parole occupies the center of the horizons of understanding (in the Saussurean formula). the topoi studied by Ernst Curtius) to the most expansive and Downloaded from hhs. a thinker without an effect’. What Emile Durkheim said of religion applies also.sagepub. 2010 .01Kelley (bc/d) 5/9/02 10:14 AM Page 11 INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND CULTURAL HISTORY 11 point. when. ‘Strictly speaking it is incorrect to say that the single mind thinks. and even more fundamentally. ‘sentiments’ and ‘thinking’. united. Internal history explains the meaning of Copernicus’ achievement but does not reach its larger mean- ings. for it is in the effort of writing in particular that the subject – philosopher. and combined their ideas and sentiments. to make them. to language: Collective representations are the result of an immense co-operation. such as why his reception took so long – or indeed why he ‘did not become the Aristarchus of the sixteenth century.’49 In these days of the linguistic and textualist turns one should substitute ‘writing’ for ‘ideas’. scientist.48 Or as Karl Mannheim put it. while langue fills up the rest. in what context. Here intellectual and cultural history intersect – and the internalist–externalist dilemma retreats into the realm of pure epistemology. where it will cause less trouble for the research agenda of intellectual and cultural historians.47 VI The one accessible place where internalist and externalist concerns seem to intersect is language. which is internalized in individuals but which is also the object of science and which can be analyzed in terms both of maker’s know- ledge and of social construction. and how understood. the historian of science must address the broader preconditions that made Copernicus’ discovery possible and the postconditions that deter- mined its reception and effects (Wirkungsgeschichte). To shift from the horizon analogy to a more linear model. the Merton rule in by IGNACIO MAZZOLA on September 20. which stretches not only into space but into time as well. (This is the case with technical as well as ordinary languages. the eurekan moment of discovery or conceptualization. The author’s thought is already a cultural construction. a multitude of minds have associated. literary artist – ventures out into the surrounding cultural space and perhaps historical notice. but also the questions of why.

culture. and (one would infer) the far-seeing critic. and so to cultural criticism and action. social base. disciplinary. A third (and these days more fashionable) possibility would be a decen- tered horizon-structure. 2010 . inter- connections. whether designated spirit. or even unconscious). and so they are the offspring of their time and place. somehow. VII In any case this is one way of answering the question posed at the beginning of this article: cultural history is the outside of intellectual history. and intel- lectual history is the inside of cultural history. or ‘universe of dis- course’. ideology. mentality. A philosophical argument. tradition. The surrounding space encompasses contexts of the subject of study – preconditions. The center of this intellectual space locates the historical subject (conscious. paradigm. and effects involving other fields of cultural activity.51 The point is not to privilege one sort of interpretation as Ideologically or Methodologically Correct. some measure of wisdom – the self-knowledge that comes not only from reflection on the ‘I’ but also from the many alien ‘Thous’ that are encoun- tered in the study of intellectual and cultural history. This version of the paradigm. etc. resonances. intentional. the socially conscious agent. with this vicarious experience. Think of the I–O duality as contrasting or complementary forms of inquiry undertaken within a horizon-structure of experience. – which can be (and for centuries have been) put to use by historians. a ‘eurekan’ discovery of science are all putative creations of individual genius. climate of opinion. Here meaning is not something registered by a stable subject or an intelligent analyst but rather an illusion or a Derridean ‘ghost’ (as Allan Megill calls it) which resists definition in the infinite and indeter- minate free-play of signs. This is a counsel not so much of relativism as of complementarity and a reminder of the enduring concern. Weltanschauung. the author. which is not final closure but continuing inquiry into the ups and downs – and ins and outs – of history. or con- ceptualization – a pure phenomenological moment that becomes a target of historical examination. Yet they are also.50 There are many contexts – diachronic. synchronic. And beyond the edge of the circle we may imagine the transition from intellectual and cultural history to future ideals. and ‘climate of opinion’.sagepub. a literary creation. practice. or perhaps an act of discovery. pro- fessional.01Kelley (bc/d) 5/9/02 10:14 AM Page 12 12 HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15(2) theoretical efforts to relate human efforts to a larger collective reality. however. states of disciplinary questions. the products of intellectual tradition and cultural incubation. invites not Downloaded from by IGNACIO MAZZOLA on September 20. rhetorical. possibilities. which is implied by notions of the death of the con- scious subject. influences. or creation. and perhaps. a thinking subject.

5 Pérez-Ramos (1988) and Hacking (1999). Marx (or vulgar Marxists anyway) proceeded by identifying the ideal with ideology and rendering it a function of material reality. This essay is a byproduct of my forthcoming book. the New Historicism. goals. The Descent of Ideas: The History of Intellectual History. Historians do not have a metalanguage to bring about explanatory closure. and Golinski (1998). Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann.). Downloaded from hhs. intentions. 6 Gadamer (1982: 310ff. do not have the luxury of settling down into such comfortable theories. Kelley. 7 Shapin (1996).’ as he put it. in different ways.01Kelley (bc/d) 5/9/02 10:14 AM Page 13 INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND CULTURAL HISTORY 13 historical inquiry nor even historical skepticism but only silence – which may be a sort of wisdom but which is not what historical writing is about. on this side of the grave. human as well as natural. Critical Theory. to place external factors at the center of historical analysis. and to seek connections with external con- ditions. 2 Dilthey (1927: 191): ‘Das Verstehen ist ein Wiederfinden des Ich im Du. Butts and Brown (1989). and so they must continue both to reflect and to scan the horizons of experience – both to essay retrospective mind-reading to assess motives. Cultural Materialism. and other more or less reduc- tionist methods have sought. in phenomenological terms. Anthony Pagden. ‘ist aussen. Of historical questions there can be no end. Historians. paradoxically. or indeed to define exhaustively its own field of operations.). and Georges Gusdorf performed the prodigious feat of writing a history of all the sciences. also Kelley (1990a). Heidegger and Cassirer have also sought to join subject and object.’ 3 Kelley (1997: 275–93). and certainly no final answers – nor is there. claim to have found a privileged view from the outside. 4 See Smocovitis (1996: 73–96). Social theorists have approached the question from the opposite – an external – standpoint. Geertz (1994: 93).sagepub. NOTES 1 For recent discussions in an international context see Donald R. etc. values. Pierre Bourdieu’s fields of cultural and literary production.’ In various ways Husserl. and sociobiology all. any way to evade the Inside and the Outside of our common hermeneutical predicament. however. Since Hegel (if not Nicholas of Cusa) philosophers and social theorists have tried to resolve the I–O problem. Hegel pretended to do this by identi- fying the ideal and the real – ‘was innen ist. forces and parallels. inside and outside. History is still (as it has been since Herodotus) a critical art of inquiry which must question such resolutions as well as its own pro- cedures. Foucauldian archeology. Vilfredo Pareto’s residues. in a single field of cognition. Edoardo Tortarolo and John Christian Laursen (1996) in the first annual newsletter of the International Society for Intel- lectual by IGNACIO MAZZOLA on September 20. lines of argument. Hesse (1980: 27ff. 2010 .

also in Leibniz (1969: 93). 45 Swerdlow (1993: 315). 15 Morhof (1688–92: I. and Lehman (1962: 79). letter to George Sand (December 1875). Dear (1991). 30 Tully (1988: 69). 2v). 22 Proust (1954: 124). 12 Hegel (1995: 4). 46 Huff (1993: 54).). 26 Hacking (1999). 9 Gerhard (1711: 2). and cf. 43 Lachterman (1989). 17 Bonald (1829: II. 172). 213). 34). 44 Pera (1994: 189). 36 Bloor (1991: 3). 13 Simmel (1979: 39). 40 Husserl (1970). and interpres non fit. 21 Proust (1954: 127). sed nascitur. citing the formulas Criticus non fit. Leibniz’s preface (‘non philosophorum. cf. Cohen (1994: 229). Cohen (1990: 145–50). 47 Blumenberg (1987: 124. sed nascitur. 16 Behler (1991: 12). 37 Candolle (1885[1873]). and see David (1989: 53–68). and see Leibniz (1993). 38 I. and Stolles (1728). attributed to David Ruhnken. 23 Cited by Wellek (1965: IV. Pozzi (1993) and Lacombe (1906). and Eliot (1950: 3–11). 14 Trinkaus (1937). 2010 . 29 Wellek and Warren (1949: 139). Pickering (1995). 35 Comte (1949: I. 24 Heidegger (1971: 17ff. 19 Babbitt (1913).com by IGNACIO MAZZOLA on September 20. also Leger (1993). 18 Sainte-Beuve (1959: IX. 10 Heumann (1715: 567–656). referring to Taine’s preface to his L’Intelligence. 32 Bailly (1785: vi). 31 Hacking (1991: 191). 41 Latour (1988). 25 Sainte-Beuve (1932: III. 28 Anna Karenina and Other Essays (1967: 195). H. Heumann (1718).sagepub. 39 Hesse (1980: 29). 42 Rousseau and Porter (1980: 1). 2). Cournot (1922). 11–12). 33 Comte (1949: I. 27 Leavis (1968: II. Boeckh (1986: 139). also Wellek (1965: III. LaCapra (1983: 30). 167). Reimann (1709). 9 March 1857. 145). 48 Durkheim (1965[1915]: 29).). Ringler (1941: 497–504). 20 Flaubert (1953: 249). and cf. F. 280ff. 11 Nizolio (1670: fol. Downloaded from hhs. B.01Kelley (bc/d) 5/9/02 10:14 AM Page 14 14 HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15(2) 8 Mosheim (1867). on ‘non-Euclidean geometry and math- ematical truth’. and his Lundi. 29 August 1852. Richards (1988: 61). sed philosophiae historia’). 123). 223). 34 Boutroux (1874). letter to Renan.

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The Human Measure (1990). Among his many publications are History. [email: dkelley@rci.rutgers. Rutgers. Law and the Human Sciences (1984). 2010 . the State University of New] Downloaded from hhs. USA.01Kelley (bc/d) 5/9/02 10:14 AM Page 19 INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND CULTURAL HISTORY 19 BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE DONALD R. NJ 08901-8542. Tel: 732/932- 1227 or 1228. 88 College Avenue. The History of Ideas: Canon and Variations (1990). Faces of History: Historical Inquiry from Herodotus to Herder (1998) and The Descent of Ideas: The History of Intellectual History (forthcoming) by IGNACIO MAZZOLA on September 20. Fax: 732/932-8708. New Brunswick. KELLEY is James Westfall Thompson Professor of History at Rutgers University and editor of the Journal of the History of Ideas. Address: Department of History.