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Past, Present and Future of Naval Air Defence Technologies:

Anti-Air Warfare Frigates and
Destroyers in the 21st Century
While the anti-air warfare (AAW) platforms of the worlds leading navies have seen
significant conceptual changes since the end of World War Two, investments
in these platforms are still continuing today (As a note, the platforms covered
in this article include the frigates, destroyers and cruisers of NATO countries and
allies.) With the end of the Cold War, these platforms, dubbed metal eaters
by the Soviet leader Khrushchev [1], have seen profound changes in their warfare
capabilities. Initially designed for attack, many of these massive platforms have
been converted to war machines that primarily serve an air defence role. This
article mainly examines the air defence capabilities of these platforms, making
comparisons between them and sharing opinions and predictions for the future.
M. Kubilay TOK /

o better understand Basic Tasks of AAW n Serving as flagships. n High firepower and
how the AAW capa- Platforms The main features that ren- large weapons
bilities and means The basic tasks expected der these platform indis- magazines and
of these platforms will be from these platforms can be pensable include: n Vast range
shaped in the future, one summarized as follows: n High survivability and of command
must first examine pres- n Providing AAW support the ability to operate and control
ent-day threats, as well as to ensure sea control, at sea for long periods, capabilities, network
the factors that influence n Acting as the primary n Ability to provide centric warfare
the current AAW capabili- AAW element for power effective air defence support.
ties of these platforms. projection, within a radius of at
These enormous AAW plat- n Providing area least 150 km,
forms continue to form the air defence support, n Compatibility with
prime air defence force of n Providing ballistic the concept of layered
navies which, according to missile defence, defence,
the classification concept n Providing command &
Eric Grove and Michael control support at sea,
Morris used for naval forces n Providing AAW support in
across the world [2], rank joint operations, and
between the first
and fourth cate-
gories. These plat-
forms are units that
essentially provide the
AAW capabilities need-
ed for sea control.

The United Kingdom

entrusts its naval
air defence to Type 45
class destroyers.

40 - March 2017
Current AAW the basis of their AAW capa- l American Arleigh
Platforms bilities. As such, these plat- Burke Class Flight-III
A review of the AAW plat- forms can be categorised as (4+6)
forms that have served, and follows (number of existing n Platforms equipped with
are still serving, in the na- platforms indicated within APAR Weapon System [5]:
vies of NATO countries and parenthesis): l Germanys Sachsen
allies over the past 30 years n Platforms equipped with class (3)
reveals that these platforms AEGIS System [4]: l Netherlands De Zeven
are categorised primarily l Australia Hobart Provincien class (4)
according to the name of the class (3) l Denmarks Iver
combat system that forms l Japanese Atago Huitfeldt class (3)
class (2) n Platforms equipped
l Japanese Kongo with Principle Anti-Air
class (6 + 2) Missile System (PAAMS)
l Norwegian Fridtjof and Surface-to-Air
Nansen class (5) Anti-Missile (SAAM) [6]:
l Republic of Korea l Italian Horizon
KDX-III Chungmugong class (2)
Yi Sun-sin class (6) l French Horizon
l Republic of Korea class (2)
KDX-III King Sejong l British Type-45
class (3 + 3) class (6)
l Spanish lvaro de
Bazn class (5) Firepower of
l American Ticonderoga NATO Platforms
class (22) AAW frigates equipped with
l American Arleigh the AEGIS and APAR combat
Burke Class systems are mostly armed
Flight-I/II (76) with the American Standard
Missile (SM) series [7], par-
ticularly the medium and
long range SM-2, SM-3 and
SM-6 missile systems. In
addition to these, these plat-

Crown copyright

March 2017 - 41

forms also use medium and

short-range missile systems Italy and France use the Horizon class air defence destroyers they jointly developed.
such as the Evolved Sea
Sparrow Missile (ESSM) and
the Rolling Airframe Missile
(RAM). Some of these plat-
forms also possess ballistic
missile defence (BMD) ca-
pability. On the other hand,
platforms with the PAAMS
and SAAM combat systems
are generally equipped with
the ASTER-15 and 30 mis-
sile systems.
The general features of
Marina Militare

these American and Euro-

pean weapon systems, as
gleaned from publicly avail-
able sources, are present-
ed in Table 1. Table 2 also
shows the weapon loads protect against ballistic mis- the SM-3 missile system [8]. Basic Criteria
that sets the firepower of siles that enter the atmo- This number is expected to Affecting the
these AAW platforms. sphere, as they descend into reach 50 by the year 2020. Combat System
their terminal phase. In addition, the fitting of Performance of
Ballistic Missile As of 2014, platforms capa- four Congo class destroyers Platforms
Defence ble of defending against tac- with SM-3 Block-1A based Before analysing the combat
Some of the platforms fitted tical and intermediate range BMD has also commenced, performance of AAW plat-
with AEGIS and APAR combat ballistic missiles include the and the number of ves- forms, it would be useful to
systems are also equipped 5 Ticonderoga class cruisers sels with these systems is first recall the general con-
with SM-2 Block-IIIA/B and and 25 Arleigh Burke class expected to become eight cepts regarding the use of
IV air defence missiles to destroyers equipped with by 2020. these systems.

Table 1. General Features of US and European AAW Weapon Systems

Missile System Primary Task Guidance System Effective Range/ Altitude (km) Speed (Mach) Warhead
American Systems
Short Range AAW Fire-and-Forget Blast
RAM Block-II* 10+ / 3 >2
IR / Passive RF Fragmentation
ESSM Block-I S / X-band data link, 40+ / 5 >3 Blast
Short / Intermediate Range AAW
semi-active radar, ICWI** Fragmentation
ESSM Block-II *** Short / Intermediate S / X-band data link, dual-mode, 40+ / 5 >3 Blast
Range AAW the active radar and IR ICWI Fragmentation
SM-2 Block-III, IIIA, IIIB Intermediate Range S / X-band data link 100+ / 25 >2 Blast
Regional AAW, Regional BMD semi-active radar / IR (IIIB), ICWI Fragmentation
SM-2 Block-IV Long Range Regional AAW S / X-band data link, 180-350 / 50+ >3 Blast
and BMD (endoatmospheric) semi-active radar, ICWI** Fragmentation
SM-3 Block-IA BMD (exoatmospheric) S-band data link / IR 300 / 80 >8 Kinetic
SM-3 Block-IIA BMD (exoatmospheric) S-band data link / IR 500 / 160 >10 Kinetic
Intermediate Range S-Band data network / Blast
SM-6 350 / 50+ >3,5
Regional AAW, Regional BMD dual mode (active and passive RF) Fragmentation
European Systems

ASTER-15 Short / Intermediate Range AAW Data link and active RF 25 / 10 3 Kinetic
Short / Long Range Data link and active RF 75+ / 20 >4 Kinetic
Regional AAW, Regional BMD
* Produced by an American-German partnership.
** ICWI: Interrupted Continuous Wave Illumination
*** Currently under development.

42 - March 2017

1. Multi-Layer Integrated
Air Defence Concept
The air defence concept of
heavy tonnage AAW plat-
forms rest on a multi-layer
integrated air defence prin-
ciple to protect themselves
and the task force to which
they belong [9]. Under this
concept, the main princi-
ple is to engage enemy air
planes, helicopters and mis-
siles as much as possible at
long range, corresponding
to ranges of 80 to 150 km; at
medium range, correspond-
ing to ranges of 20 to 50 km;
and at short range, corre-
sponding to ranges of less
than 10 km. Different mis-
sile systems are deployed
for each one of these range
layers. In general, weapons
systems such as the SM-2,
SM-6 and ASTER-30 mis-
siles are used as the main
firepower at long range,
while the SM-2, ESSM and
ASTER-15 missiles are used
at medium range, and the
LANX are used at short

2. Weapon Guidance
Depending on the type of
weapons they use, AAW sys-
tems are classified as having:
n Fire-and-forget,
n Semi-active or
n Active
guidance systems. Missile
systems that operate with
the fire-and-forget princi-
ple, such as RAM, are fired
after the uploading of the
target data, after which
these missiles guide them-
selves to the target inde-
pendently from, and without
any connection to, the firing
In semi-active guidance,
missiles acquire target data
through a data link with an
illuminating sensor onboard
the AAW platform, and the
missile is guided to the target
using methods such as the
Home-All-the-Way (HAW) or

44 - March 2017
Mid Course Guidance (MCG).

In the HAW method, the tar-
get is illuminated from the
beginning of engagement
to the end with the Continu-
ous Wave Illumination (CWI)
method, while for the MCG
CWI and MCG ICWI (Inter-
rupted Continuous Wave Il-
lumination) [10] methods,
the missile is locked on to
the target by illumination at
the terminal phase. Weapons
systems such as the ESSM
and SM-2 operate according The air defence missiles
of the Turkish Naval
to this principle. The guid- Forces includes SM-1s
ance methods of the CWI installed in Gabya class
and ICWI, two technologies frigates.
that are widely used in this
classification, are explained the extremely limited AAW system radar is one of the geous compared with oth-
conceptually in Figures 1, 2 radar time budget can be basic factors that affects er guidance and engage-
and 3. used far more effective- the maximum number of si- ment methods, particularly
In the MCG ICWI method, ly compared with the MCG multaneous engagements, with regards to the maxi-
the target is illuminated for CWI method, in which the which is arguably the most mum number of simulta-
very short intervals, through target has to be illuminat- important criterion of AAW neous engagements. Ac-
sampled homing at the ter- ed throughout the entire platforms combat perfor- cording to openly available
minal phase of the missiles terminal phase. The time mance. This is why the MCG sources, platforms such
flight. With this method, management of the AAW ICWI technology is advanta- as the LCF and F-124 that

March 2017 - 45

Table 2. Certain AAW platforms and weapons loads without requiring the
Mk.99 illumination radar.
AAW Platform Missile System Launcher n APAR Radar Systems:
ESSM This system, used in
AEGIS Arleigh Burke Flight II Class Destroyers 2xMk.41 (48 cells)
SM several countries across
ESSM Europe, basically has
Ticonderoga Class Cruisers 2xMk.41 (61 cells) two radars operating
in different frequency
Ticonderoga Class Cruisers SM 2xMk.41 (48 cells) bands. These include
ESSM an APAR MFR operating
De Zeven Provincien Class Frigates Mk.41 (40 cells)
SM in the X frequency band
ESSM and with an active phase
Sachsen Class Frigates Mk.41 (32 cells) array; and a SMART-L
radar operating in the
KDX-III Class Frigates SM Mk.41+K-VLS
L band and capable of
ASTER-15 large volume search.
Horizon Class Frigates Sylver A50
ASTER-30 APAR can, as necessary,
ASTER-15 utilise any one of the
Type 45 Daring Class Frigates Sylver A50
MCG ICWI methods
utilise MCG ICWI technolo- siles are capable of be- scanning, large volume to guide missiles and
gy are capable of engaging ing used either actively or search and target illuminate targets.
16 targets simultaneously. semi-actively whenever tracking, and performs Owing to its distinctive
Again, according to other required, depending on the data link processing at ICWI technology, it is,
widely available sources, operational requirements. the S frequency during together with its
platforms such as the Type- target engagement. On ESSM / SM missiles,
45 that utilise PAAMS tech- 3. Radar System Concepts the other hand, during more advantageous
nology are similarly capable A look at the radar ystems engagement, it uses the than other radar
of engaging 16 targets si- of AAW platforms shows that HAW or MCG CWI method systems in terms of the
multaneously. there are three main groups: for missile guidance, number of simultaneous
In the active guidance sys- n AEGIS Radar Systems: allocating a separate engagement and the
tem, the missile flies to- These systems consist Mk.99 CWI radar for maximum number of
wards the target by receiv- of an SPY series multi each target until the engagements.
ing information through function radar (MFR) end of engagement. n PAAMS Radar Systems:
its data link with the AAW operating in the S With this radar system, PAAMS systems, which
platform, until it reaches the frequency band and with the maximum number are used in different
predicted point of impact a passive phase array of simultaneous variants by the United
with the target. However, (or active phase array engagements is limited Kingdom, France and
after approaching the target in newer versions); and by the number of Mk.99 Italy, are also equipped
down to a certain distance, it of three or four Mk.99 fire control and CWI with a dual radar system
will activate its own sensors variant fire control radars onboard of the as well. The British
to track, pursue, lock and and illumination platform. Type-45 platforms house
then strike the target. radars operating in Meanwhile, development an S band SAMPSON
Certain missiles also pos- the X frequency band. work on the SPY series MFR, along with an L
sess a dual operation mode; The system uses the radars is also continuing. band S1850 long range,
in other words, these mis- SPY MFR for horizon First of all, an SPY-3 large volume search
X-Band MFR with active radar; while the Horizon
The RAM covers short range air defence needs. phase array technology class ships of the French
has been developed. and Italian naval forces
Currently, there are are equipped with a C
also studies for the band MFR and an L band
development of a radar S1850 long range, large
Specialist 3rd Class Petty Officer Caleb Strong
U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication

designated as SPY-6, volume search radar.

which is envisaged The 2000-2001 issue of the
to operate at the S Technical Digest published
frequency bands (dual by the US Navy, Naval Sea
band) [11]. With the Systems Command, Na-
SPY-6, it will be possible val Surface Warfare Centre
to illuminate targets Dahlgren Division, shared
solely with the HAW certain important findings
and MCG CWI methods, concerning the radar and

46 - March 2017

missile guidance systems n The ICWI technology is n Supersonic missiles simultaneous salvos or con-
of AAW platforms, which are necessary for diving steeply from secutive launches by the
given below as a reference: maximising the number high altitudes, enemy renders the situa-
n To obtain the desired of simultaneous n Combat aircraft, tion even more complicated
level of performance engagement with ESSM n Unmanned Aerial from an air defence stand-
in an environment of and SM missiles. Vehicles (UAV) point, forcing the limits of
constantly evolving n Complex threats AAW system engineering.
threats, AAW systems 4. Present-Day consisting of a The potential threats com-
need to be equipped Air Threat Analysis combination of the piled from publicly available
with radar systems Over the past 20 years, both abovementioned threats. sources [9] are shown in Fig-
that incorporate the the characteristics and vol- Today, the speed of anti-ship ure 4. Cruise missiles fired
advantages of more than ume of the air threats tar- cruise missiles (ASCMs) has against ships are gradually
one frequency band. geting task forces or groups reached Mach 5 to 6, while becoming faster, flying low-
n The backbone of these defended by AAW platforms their range has reached the er, and presenting smaller
systems should be the cost of which varies level of almost 500 km. The radar cross-sections. More-
made of MFR systems depending on their class to types of ASCM that fly at low over, they can even be ca-
operating in the X somewhere between $0.5 altitudes, in particular, rep- pable of confusing defence
band frequency and billion to $1.5 billion have resent for AAW platforms platforms by using dynamic
possessing an active seen significant advanc- the threats that are the most algorithms while cruising.
phase array technology. es. These threats are listed difficult to defend against. Furthermore, hypersonic
The basic functions of below: Using the AAW radar sys- (speed> Mach 8-10) missiles
this radar should include n Supersonic missiles tems, the general features with scramjet technology
horizon search, precision flying at very low altitude, of which are described are also expected to pose a
tracking sensitive enough n Subsonic missiles flying above, these very low fly- considerable threat to ships
to support engagement, at very low altitude, ing types of threats can, in the near future.
creating data links with on average, be detected at As shown in the relevant
its own missiles, kill a range of 20 to 25 km at figure, air threats have now-
assessment, and target the earliest depending on adays become more signif-
illumination. the radar sensors perfor- icant, especially in terms
n A secondary radar with a mance. Assuming that the of range and speed. As a
lower operating threat missile has a Mach 4 natural result of this devel-
frequency (S or L band) speed, from this distance it opment, the level of threat
should perform large will take 18 to 20 seconds at AAW platforms have to
volume scanning at long most for the missile to reach confront is growing dramat-
range and cover the area the platform. The firing of ically.

48 - March 2017

5. Parameters Affecting
the Performance of AAW
Combat Systems
By taking into consider-
ation the basic concepts de-
scribed above and the pres-
ent-day threat environment,
the main criteria affecting
the performance of naval air
defence systems at sea have
been listed below. In open
publications, technical stud-
ies and data on this subject
are either limited due to
security reasons, or have
not been updated according
to the present-day threat
environment. The doctoral
thesis published by Dr. Or- that the missiles and threats, and the use tioned above, the result will
han Karasakal in 2004 [12] weapons systems of of these capabilities in be calculated as:
is a reliable source that fur- the platform (i.e. its coordination with weapon Pk = P1x P2x P3x P4.....x Pn [18]
ther clarifies some of these firepower) can display systems (hard-kill and or the result may be ex-
points. during engagement, soft-kill coordination), pressed as
The criteria in question can n The maximum number n The use of Cooperative Pleakage = 1- Pk , in terms of
be listed as follows: of missiles stored in a Engagement Capability the threats probability of
n Enemy attack scenario: ships magazine; the (CEC) that plans and leakage.
Simultaneous attacks of Probability of Hit (Ph) and applies engagement On the other hand, the Psurv
a known or predictable the Probability of Kill (Pk) at fleet or task force probability of the defended
number; consecutive of the missiles against level [14]; and the use platform expresses its prob-
attacks of an unknown or the threat missiles; the of systems such as ability of avoiding enemy
unmeasurable number; successive firing rate of the Naval Integrated missile strikes in an attack/
or mixed attacks that are the weapon magazines; Fire Control-Counter threat environment consist-

a combination of these and the multi-layer Air (NIFC-CA) [15] that ing of N number of threats.
two. air defence system integrate, over a single Psurv = target
n The AAW radar system architecture against network, the fire control =0
capabilities, and enemy missile leakage, capability of the task Pl = probability of n leakers
the Probability of n The ability of the Combat force or fleet, and also PSM = probability of
Detection (PD), which Management System supports over-the- success of hostile missiles
is determined by using (CMS), which is the horizon targeting, Ntarget = total number of hos-
the former; these two brain of the entire AAW n During the air defence tile missiles (targets)
reflect the degree of performance, to create planning of the task The Psurv value will be cal-
early and accurate a tactical picture; its force, the suitable culated by taking into ac-
detection, tracking and engagement planning allocation to different count the attack scenarios
classification of the speed; and the minimum sectors of platforms to which the task force will
threat under all weather CMS reaction period, equipped with different be exposed. For example,
conditions. corresponding to the sensors and weapon to have an AAW platform
n Missile guidance time from the moment of systems [16]. with an 80 percent survival
methods that allow initial target detection to Essentially, these factors probability (Psurv) under cer-
the engagement of the launch of the weapon are vitally important to opti- tain scenario, there will be
the threat, as well as from the magazines, mise two basic probabilities selection process to choose
the maximum number n The Threat Evaluation regarding the defence of the appropriate sensor con-
of simultaneous Weapon Assignment the platform and task force figuration, command and
engagement that the Sensor Allocation units: control and combat man-
platform can perform (TEWASA) algorithms, n Probability of Kill (Pk)[17] agement system architec-
against mixed attacks. the optimal decision of the incoming missile ture, weapon and sector
n The highest speed, support models [13] n Survival of the protected allocation algorithms (de-
longest range, highest and the widely-used unit(s) (Probability of pending on the operational
altitude, agility against engagement doctrines, Survival / Psurv) scenario), and the neces-
highly manoeuvrable n Possession of electronic When a probability Pi is as- sary weapons and magazine
threats, and resistance warfare capabilities signed to each one of the types. Development projects
to electronic jamming against missile performance criteria men- will then be designed and

50 - March 2017
U.S. Navy photo by Leah Garton
initiated based on these re- New Approaches
quirements. Towards AAW
Whether the system has the Combat Systems
desired level of survivability This section presents infor-
against the certain attack mation regarding the tech-
scenarios in question can nological options in the field
be tested prior to the critical of AAW systems and the
design phase by using com- trends for the future.
bat system effectiveness
analysis environments [18], 1. AAW Weapons Systems
such as SADMTM, which are of the Future
based on realistic simula- It is reported that the SM-2
tion models. missile system, which is
General factors affecting the still the main AAW missile
Psurv value include: system of many NATO coun-
n Detecting the hostile tries, will be modernized
missile as early as under the US Navys new
possible, project, becoming equipped
n Having weapons with an active warhead
with a high Pk value, similar to that of the ESSM
n Having the highest Block-II missile.
possible number of On the other hand, to take
engagements with advantage of the very long SM-3 leaving its launcher.
the threat, range capabilities of active
n Having a layered air guidance missiles such as as UAVs and AWACS, that and engagement coordina-
defence capability, and the SM-3 and SM-6, there possess the necessary tech- tion. To this end, there is an
n Using network-centric is certainly need for satel- nological infrastructure for emphasis on concepts such
warfare capabilities. lites or air platforms, such over-the-horizon targeting as Distributed Lethality and

SM-3, lanerini terk ediyor.

March 2017 - 51

Commonwealth of Australia 2017

Navantia continues its success in the field of air defence frigates with
its new design designated as Hobart class, which has been selected by Australia.
NIFC-CA, being developed ities (especially against sal- LENS (Joint Land Attack main reasons for this need
by the US. vos) which missile systems Cruise Missile Defense are presented below:
The Block-II version of the could never match in terms Elevated Netted Sensor). n It is well-known that
ESSM missile, which is the of engagement number. These can support while long range ASCMs,
main medium and short NIFC-CA and the CEC such as the Brahmos,
range AAW weapon of the 2. Engaging ASCMs capabilities currently cost $2-3 million, a hit
US and various NATO coun- with Over-the-Horizon found on the AEGIS to from only one or two of
tries, is expected to enter Range provide over-the-horizon these missiles can lead
service around 2020. With The capabilities of cur- engagement support to to significant damage
its X-band active radar, the rent AAW platforms enable missiles such as in highly valuable AAW
ESSM Block-II missile will the detection of low-flying the SM-6. platforms.
continue to be the principal cruise missiles only within These technologies aim to n Under the concept
weapon of AAW at medium horizon ranges. There is, as reliably deliver and guide de- of layered air defence,
range. such, a tremendous need fensive missiles over longer the first measure against
At short range, on the oth- for supporting technologies ranges, and to ensure the this type of ASCM
er hand, the Block II ver- that enable the detection, destruction of threat mis- threats should be to
sion of the widely used RAM tracking and engagement of siles at longer ranges and counter with long-range
missile system has already these missiles immediately earlier stages. air defence missiles.
been developed and put into after launch. The technol- Depending on the firing
service. The RAM Block-II ogies that are being devel- 3. Configuring AAW doctrine, at least two
missile system has been oped to this end are briefly Platforms for Attack long range missiles
rendered more agile against described below: Purposes need to be fired against
high speed and manoeu- n Data transfer Nearly all Western AAW an incoming Brahmos.
vrable missile threats, and capabilities which, platforms have been devel- Given that a missile
its engagement capability through the Joint oped for defensive purpos- such as the SM-6 costs
has also increased in range Universal Weapons es, with their weapon load at least $6-8 million,
for certain engagement Link (JUWL) weapon being largely accommodat- defence against a single
scenarios. data link, will enable ed for this role. According to Brahmos can amount
There is also ongoing work the launch of SM series the new concepts being dis- to $12-16 million, which
for the development of new missiles over longer cussed [9], there are plans is a disproportionate
weapons, including elec- ranges [19], to provide these platforms cost. In case of salvo
tromagnetic rail guns and n Air platforms capable of with capabilities in addition attacks, it is certain that
directed energy weapons over-the-horizon relay to their air defence systems this cost will increase
such as lasers. Lasers in and of detecting and that would enable them to tremendously, reaching
particular are expected to transferring targets, search and destroy hostiles an unreasonable cost
provide countering capabil- such as the AWACS and at very long ranges. The level.

52 - March 2017
U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Shonna Cunningham
n Moreover, in platforms,
long range air defence
missiles take up a
substantial portion of
weapon magazines. In the
event that these missiles
are consumed during the
real engagements, the
inability to resupply at sea
can disrupt the mission.
For these reasons, it might
soon become mandatory for
AAW platforms to support
offensive sea control, and
to thus be equipped with The Netherlands De Zeven Provincien class
long range surface warfare frigates harbours systems considered as an
weapons capable of detect- alternative to the AEGIS.
ing and destroying hostiles.
A review of the weapon load performing a kill assessment Conclusion and (X, S, L) and having fixed
of these platform, as shown in order to increase the tar- Discussion antenna, but also with
in Table 2, reveals that a get kill probability the setup The need for AAW platforms infrared sensors that
significant portion of their mentioned above would rep- continues to remain signifi- enable a multi-spectral
magazines is actually allo- resent a medium range en- cant. A review of the devel- perception of the
cated for defence. gagement capability against opments in the West reveals operational environment.
According to this new concept, 60 Brahmos-like ASCMs. The the following outstanding n The most important
if a magazine with 48 cells of remaining 18 cells could be issues: criterion of air defence
Mk.41 vertical launcher were fitted with missiles, such as n Existing AAW platforms at sea continues to be
to have 30 of its cells equipped the currently-under-develop- are still equipped with the maximum number
with ESSM, this would also ment Long Range Anti-Ship weapon loads more of simultaneous
allow for the loading of 120 Missile (LRASMs) that have a suitable for defensive engagements. Therefore,
ESSM missiles. Considering 350 km range. These will en- sea control. However, in it is essential for the
the shoot-shoot-look doc- able the destruction of hostile light of current trends, design phase of AAW
trine widely used in NATO platforms over long ranges, discussions have begun platforms to involve the
which consists of sending two before they can even fire their on whether part of this selection, procurement
salvos to the target and then ASCMs. weapon load should or development of
consist of weapons, such sensors and weapons
Japan is one of as LRASMs, that can that allow the maximum
the countries
support offensive sea number of simultaneous
that entrust their
naval air defence control. engagements. ICWI
to the AEGIS. n The use of ASCM technology and active
missiles, such as the air defence missiles
Brahmos, in potentially with modern data
hostile navies is becoming links appear to be the
more common. For this best combination with
reason, the complex regards to this criteria.
and highly expensive However, to further
AAW platforms of navies raise the maximum
around the world, which number of simultaneous
are essential for power engagements, one other
projection, are faced option would be to have
with a very serious and two separate weapon
disproportionately costly magazines on board the
threat. ship, one at the bow and
n To provide them with the other at the stern.
the most effective target This approach might
detection capabilities, also provide advantages
it is imperative for AAW for the integration of
platforms of the future to indigenous and
US Navy

be equipped not only with NATO compatible

radar systems covering weapon systems into
multiple frequency bands platforms.

March 2017 - 53

U.S. Navy photo by Ensign Danielle E. Abad

The AEGIS system was first used in Ticonderoga class cruisers of the United States Navy.

n The most vital load of the past, also considers [8] Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile [14] CEC: Sensor Netting with
AAW platforms is their force level coordination. Defense (BMD) Program: Integrated Fire Control
weapon magazines. While Background and Issues for Conrad J. Grant, Johns
still being a theoretically REFERENCES Congress, Ronald ORourke, Hopkins APL Technical
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