Primăvara Arabă

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Table of contents
1. Blint Arab: Arab and Arab American Women in the United States............................................................... 1
2. The Arab "Feminist" Spring?........................................................................................................................ 2
3. United States Security Interests, the Arab Spring, and Iran......................................................................... 5
4. Is the Arab Spring Israel's Winter?............................................................................................................... 6
5. The Arab Spring............................................................................................................................................ 12
6. Paradox of Neoliberalism: Arab Spring's Implications on North Korea........................................................ 23
7. Arab Fall or Arab Winter?............................................................................................................................. 34
8. Turkey and the Arab Spring.......................................................................................................................... 35
9. Arab Public Opinion and NATO after the International Military Operations in Libya.................................... 42
10. The Arab Spring Is No Facebook Revolution............................................................................................. 44
11. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS MAKING SHARIA "A" OR "THE" CHIEF SOURCE OF

LEGISLATION: WHERE DID THEY COME FROM? WHAT DO THEY MEAN? DO THEY MATTER?......... 46
12. The Arab Spring Two Years On: Reflections on Dignity, Democracy, and Devotion................................. 72
13. Review Essay: After the Arab Spring......................................................................................................... 83
14. Arap Bahari (The Arab Spring)................................................................................................................... 93
15. THE ARAB SPRING: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS................................................................................. 96
16. Sustainable Democracy and the Paradox of the Arab Spring: The Egypt Experience............................... 109
17. AN ARAB WINTER: THREATS TO THE RIGHT TO PROTEST IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES, SUCH
AS POST-ARAB SPRING EGYPT.................................................................................................................. 111
18. You Say You Want a Revolution: the Arab Spring, Norm Diffusion, and the Human Rights Regime........ 130
19. Palestine After the Arab Spring.................................................................................................................. 147
20. THE IMPACT OF THE ARAB SPRING ON THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD IN THE MIDDLE EAST: JORDAN AS A CASE STUDY.................................................... 148
Bibliography...................................................................................................................................................... 164
07 November 2016 ii ProQuest

Document 1 of 20
Blint Arab: Arab and Arab American Women in the United States
Author: Bamia, Aida A
ProQuest document link
Abstract:
Bamia reviews "Blint Arab: Arab and Arab American Women in the United States" by Evelyn Shakir.
Full text:
Shakir, Evelyn. Blint Arab: Arab and Arab American Women in the United States. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.
226 pp.
Blint Arab, is reality told as stories. Its author weaves an impressive tapestry of women's lives displaying the
extraordinary accomplishments and contributions of the early Syrian immigrants to the United States. While the
primary aim of the author is to center her study on the Syrian immigrants (present Lebanon and Syria), she
branches out to other Arab women, particularly Palestinian.
The book dispels two major misconceived notions: the weakness of Arab women and the concept of unity
through a shared religion. It proves through examples taken from real lives, the role of women as the strength
behind men's success in the New World. Furthermore, examples of friendship between women from the
Christian and Muslim Syrian communities reveal the strong ties that bind people belonging to a common culture
and go beyond religious differences.
The Syrian women immigrants discovered their true potential once outside the control of the male members of
their families. Many of them moved to the US, alone, often accompanied by their children, leaving behind a
reluctant husband. The solo trip and difficult beginnings in a new land and culture sharpened in most cases their
hidden potential. They succeeded in securing jobs and even starting their own business, encouraging other
family members to immigrate.
The first waves of women immigrants arrived in the middle of the nineteenth century as the Ottoman repression
of Christians in Lebanon grew. They expected to be welcomed by their Christian brethren in America in a show
of brotherhood based on a shared religion. They assumed, wrongly, that a shared religion superseded ethnic
and cultural differences. They soon discovered their mistake, a position that strengthened and, in some cases,
kindled their sense of Arab identity.
Shakir's decision to compile and write a book on Arab women immigrants to the US was motivated by various
factors. Primarily, it was a way to fill the gap created by other books on the subject (Gregory Orfalea's Before
the Flames: A Quest for the History of Arab Americans, 1998, and Alixa Naff s Becoming American: The Early
Arab Immigrant Experience. 1985) which did not stress the role of Arab women immigrants. Moreover, she
wanted to set the record straight and correct the biased and distorted portrayal of Arab women in the American
media. Having long felt that as Christian, she was not concerned by the stereotyping of Muslim Arab women,
she finally realized that public opinion did not differentiate between Christian and Muslim Arabs. This awareness
led her and many of the other women she interviewed, to revisit their Arab roots and heritage, a position few
expected to adopt while planning to leave behind their country of origin.
Relating one's life to others is in itself a challenging endeavor. Making it interesting is a task that required great
skills in order to avoid the pitfalls of the banal and the superficial. It is those qualities that give Blint Arab a
special edge and great appeal. The personal accounts of the women are placed in the pertinent historical and
socio-political context. She allows their word to run freely, conserving thus the authenticity and the natural flavor
of the women's voices, a significant factor in itself. Shakir manages to provide an interdisciplinary approach in
her work, giving the reader an insight into Arab customs and traditions, and into the women's intimate
consciousness. Being inside and outside the field she studies, herself the daughter of Syrian immigrants, Shakir
07 November 2016 Page 1 of 165 ProQuest

approached her subjects with great awareness and remarkable compassion. The book is a valuable reference
on the America society seen through Arab women immigrant's eyes. Yet, while being a book on immigrants
Blint Arab is a reflection of American society at a specific period of its formative years.
It is with great joy and interest that I read this book!
AuthorAffiliation
Aida A. Bamia University of Florida
Subject: Nonfiction; Women; Arabs; Arab Americans; Immigration;
Location: United States US
Publication title: Journal of Third World Studies
Volume: 17
Issue: 1
Pages: 285-286
Number of pages: 2
Publication year: 2000
Publication date: Spring 2000
Year: 2000
Publisher: Association of Third World Studies, Inc.
Place of publication: Americus
Country of publication: United States
Publication subject: Political Science--International Relations
ISSN: 87553449
Source type: Scholarly Journals
Language of publication: English
Document type: Book Review-Favorable
ProQuest document ID: 233190571
Document URL: http://search.proquest.com/docview/233190571?accountid=142386
Copyright: Copyright Association of Third World Studies, Inc. Spring 2000
Last updated: 2014-05-26
Database: Political Science Database
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Document 2 of 20
The Arab "Feminist" Spring?

Author: Khamis, Sahar
Abstract:
"Just like there is no giving up on the call for freedom, democracy, and human rights in the Arab world, there is

also no giving up when it comes to calling for women's rights, political representation, and equal participation in
all walks of life," remarks Nawara Negm, a wellknown Egyptian political activist and blogger who played a
leading role in the Egyptian revolution, both online and offline.
Full text:
MANY OBSERVERS HAVE INTERPRETED the selection of Tawakkul Karman for the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize
as a nod to both the "Arab Spring" in general and to the particular role that Arab women played in it. Karman,
now known as the "mother of the revolution" in Yemen, has been a symbol for thousands of women who
stormed the streets in many Arab nations, risking their lives and exposing themselves to harm in their quest for
dignity, freedom, liberty, and democracy. Observers of this massive wave of political revolt cannot help but
notice the visible and remarkable role that women are playing in it. And it is a range of women: young and old,
Muslim and Christian, religiously conservative and liberal, veiled and unveiled, rich and poor. This range of
women signifies a new moment of unity, solidarity, and cohesion, mirroring the egalitarian, grassroots
movement that they have come out to support.
However, this golden moment of unity in struggle, which led to actual political change in some Arab countries,
such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and which is still playing out in other Arab countries such as Syria, Yemen,
and Bahrain, has also been followed by division of opinion on what comes next and which direction political
change and democratic reform should take. The issue of women's rights and the role women could play in
rebuilding their nations and reshaping their future is a key part of this debate. There is much disagreement in
countries such as Egypt on the potential implications of the Arab Spring on the future of Arab feminist
movements and its expected gains for Arab women at large.
On the one hand, there are the optimists who count on Arab women's resilience and determination for change
and consider them to be the best protection against any possible backlash against women's rights. This camp is
generally constituted of the younger generation of women activists, who perceive women's rights as only one
component of the broader issue of human rights. "Just like there is no giving up on the call for freedom,
democracy, and human rights in the Arab world, there is also no giving up when it comes to calling for women's
rights, political representation, and equal participation in all walks of life," remarks Nawara Negm, a wellknown
Egyptian political activist and blogger who played a leading role in the Egyptian revolution, both online and
offline.' "However, women's rights have to be contextualized within the broader frame of human rights. In other
words, Arab women will enjoy their full rights as citizens only when every Arab citizen, regardless of gender, is
guaranteed these rights," she adds. Another young Egyptian political activist, Dalia Ziada, who declares her
interest in becoming the "future president of Egypt" when she turns forty (the legal age required to run for that
office), agrees with this position.2 These young women reflect the pulse of a new generation of women activists
who see no limits to women's achievement in the rapidly changing Arab world.
On the other hand, there are those who are less optimistic. This camp is generally comprised of the older
generation and those who prefer to single out women's rights as a separate issue that should be highlighted
and struggled for, aside from the general call for political reform and democratization in the region. When the
famous Egyptian feminist Nawal Al Saadawi went to Tahrir Square in an effort to raise awareness about the
necessity of having a parallel fight for women's rights in Egypt, that move was not welcomed by many in the
square, who considered it either inappropriate or at least badly timed. One of the women representing this
position, Samia Sade (a journalist with Rose Al Youssef magazine), recalls incidents such as the failed
International Women's Day march in Tahrir Square in March 2011: "This march, which was supposed to attract
a million women to rally for women's rights, only managed to get five hundred women out to the square. They
were shouted at by some men who told them to 'go back to the kitchen.'" 3 She also highlights the fact that the
number of women who are nominating themselves in the upcoming parliamentary elections in Egypt is fewer
than the number of women who were nominated in the last parliamentary election under Mubarak. "This is not
an encouraging sign. We need to see more women, not fewer women, running for elections and nominating

themselves for political positions in Egypt," Sadek adds. Women who endorse this position generally fear for
women's progress and gains after the success of a revolution or a transition to a new political order, and they
worry about women being pushed out of the public sphere of political participation and social visibility and
forced back into the private, domestic sphere.
It would be reasonable, however, to adopt a middle-ground of "cautionary optimism" that takes into account the
overall picture in this rapidly changing region, with all its political, economic, and social challenges and
uncertainties, as well as its unprecedented breakthroughs and victories in support of human rights and political
freedom, when it comes to forecasting the possible future of feminist movements in this part of the world. The
mere fact that women in some of the most conservative Arab societies such as Yemen, and to a lesser degree
Bahrain, have rallied in large numbers for many months under threatening and dangerous conditions signals a
new era in the history of feminism in this region. That is not to say that if the popular uprisings in these countries
were to succeed, they would automatically put an end to all forms of discrimination, inequality, or injustice
toward women. Rather, it means that Arab women today are much more willing to openly and bravely fight for
their rights and are much more capable of defending themselves against these negative practices. The prolific
online and offline political activities of Arab women over the last several months have contributed a new chapter
to the history of both Arab feminism and the region. Just as there is no turning back in the political history of this
region, it is also safe to predict that there is no turning back for Arab feminists. They have known the road to
freedom, and they are determined to continue walking on it. It is safe to say that the Arab feminist spring is well
under way.
Footnote
NOTES
1. Nawara, Negm (2011) personal interview, August 20, 2011, Cairo, Egypt.
2. Dalia, Ziada (2011) Skype participation in the event "Revolution and Women's Rights: The Case of Egypt" at
the Middle East Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, June 15, 2011, Washington,
DC
3. Samia, Sadek (2011) personal interview, October 23, 2011, Washington, DC
AuthorAffiliation
SAHAR KHAMIS is an assistant professor of communication and an affiliate professor of women's studies at the
University of Maryland, College Park. She is an expert on Arab and Muslim media and the former head of the
department of mass communication and information science in Qatar University. She can be contacted at
skhamis@umd.edu.
Subject: Women; Nominations; Feminism; Activists; Politics; Political representation; Political activism; Grass
roots movement;
Publication title: Feminist Studies
Volume: 37
Issue: 3
Pages: 692-695,748
Number of pages: 5
Publication date: Fall 2011
Year: 2011
Section: news and views 2

Publisher: Feminist Studies
Place of publication: College Park
Publication subject: Political Science--Civil Rights, Women's Studies, Women's Interests
ISSN: 00463663
CODEN: FMSDA2
Document type: Commentary
Copyright: Copyright Feminist Studies Fall 2011
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Document 3 of 20
United States Security Interests, the Arab Spring, and Iran

Author: Anon., Anon.
Abstract: In the annals of history the Arab Spring will be remembered as one of the great surprises of the first
decade of the twenty-first century. No one knows when the upheaval will end and its ultimate outcome -- an
Arab Summer, an Arab Winter, or continuation of the status quo. Foreign policy, as a rule, is conducted
between authorities of legally and stably constituted entities of sovereign states; in the absence of such, the
validity of relations becomes dubious and their sustainability uncertain. The United States finds itself in this
predicament vis-a-vis countries immediately affected by the Arab Spring. Adapted from the source document.
Subject: United States of America; Iran; Foreign Policy; Records (Documents); Security;
Classification: 9063: international relations; international relations
Correspondence author: Anon., Anon.
Publication title: American Foreign Policy Interests
Volume: 34
Issue: 1
Pages: 52-53
Number of pages: 2
Year: 2012

Publisher: Taylor & Francis, Philadelphia PA
ISSN: 1080-3920
Document type: Journal Article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2012.653722
Update: 2012-12-01
Accession number: 201232365
Database: Worldwide Political Science Abstracts,Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
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Document 4 of 20
Is the Arab Spring Israel's Winter?

Author: Klein, Menachem
Abstract: Only 17% of Palestinians think Israel's aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the
territories occupied in 1967; and 38% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain some or
all of the territories conquered in 1967. [...] Israelis and Palestinians find themselves trapped between what is
unachievable today - the two-state solution - and what can never be achieved - a unitary non-ethnic democracy
based on the principle of oneman one-vote. [...] they do not want to provide the government with spin meant to
tag their protest as "extreme dovish/left," which in Israeli political discourse means cooperating with the enemy,
and unworthy of being considered seriously.
Full text: In early August 2011, on the same day that Hosni Mubarak - once president of Egypt, now convicted
for conspiring to kill protesters during the demonstrations that led to his ouster - was lying on a hospital bed in a
Cairo court cage, Israeli Labor Member of Knesset Benjamin Ben-Eliezer revealed an amazing secret. He told
the media that he and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu had offered Mubarak political asylum. The offer
came shortly after Feb. 10, 201 1, the day when Mubarak transferred his authorities and left Cairo to go to his
Sharm al-Sheikh palace. Sharm al-Sheikh is not far from Eilat, the city where Israel offered him asylum.i
Had Mubarak accepted this offer, Israel would clearly have put itself in the position of being the Arab people's
enemy, perhaps not far behind Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president, and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya.
Mubarak's rejection rescued Israel from a very unpleasant situation, yet the proposal shows that Israel prefers
the old order. Whereas many people around the world see mostly hope for this region, Israel sees risks. The
Arab Spring is Israel's winter. No one has expressed this idea more eloquently than the skillful orator (in
American English) Netanyahu.
The Arab Spring as a Threat
In his speech to the joint session of the U.S. Congress on May 24, 2011, Netanyahu described the Middle East
as "unstable", "a region of shifting alliances" in which "an epic battle is now unfolding... between tyranny and

freedom." He spoke about the Arab Spring positively, as if he stood shoulder to shoulder in solidarity with the
Egyptian demonstrators. "Now this historic moment holds the promise of a new dawn of freedom and
opportunity. Millions of young people are determined to change their future. We all look at them. They muster
courage. They risk their lives. They demand dignity. They desire liberty.""
But here comes the twist that exposes where Israel really stands vis--vis the Arab Spring. What seems so
bright and promising can be a mirage, argued Netanyahu. "These extraordinary scenes in Tunis and Cairo
evoke those of Berlin and Prague in 1989. Yet as we share their hopes, we must also remember that those
hopes could be snuffed out as they were in Tehran in 1979. The brief democratic spring in Iran was cut short by
ferocious and unforgiving tyranny. This same tyranny smothered Lebanon's democratic Cedar Revolution and
inflicted on that long-suffering country the medieval rule of Hizbullah." Given his conservative anti-Arab
worldview, Netanyahu does not compare the Arab Spring with the fall of the Berlin Wall or the Velvet Revolution
in Prague. In his mind, the Arab road will not lead westward, to Berlin and Prague, but eastward, to the Teheran
of 1979. The mass demonstration phenomena should not mislead us, he says. The Arabs are not Westerners.
What we see is not what we will get at the end of the day. The nice face demanding democracy can be the
mask of the IranianHizbullah demon uses to take over Egypt. And if we are not careful enough its local arm,
Hamas, will also take over the West Bank after having gained control of Gaza.
It seems clear that Israel welcomes the Arab Spring with a very cold shoulder, Israel has traditionally preferred
to maintain close relations with non-democratic monarchs and dictators, rather than communicating with the
people. Israel's security, according to this view, is assured first by its own force, and second by strong Arab
leaders who agree to cooperate secretly or openly with Israel.
"Them" and "Us": Israel's Perception of the Arab "Other"
Netanyahu's deep suspicions about the authenticity of the Arab masses' awakening are accompanied by a
sharp division between "us" (Israel) and "them" (the Arab masses). According to Netanyahu, Israel has always
embraced democracy, but the Arabs have not yet. "Israel stands out. It is different," exclusive and without doubt
better. "Israel is not what is wrong about the Middle East. Israel is what is right about die Middle East." The
dichotomy between right and wrong is, according to Netanyahu, the same as between Israel and the Arabs.
"While we hope and work for the best, we must also recognize that powerful forces oppose this future. They
oppose modernity. They oppose democracy. They oppose peace." Again, on one side stands Israel; a pillar of
modernity, democracy and peace. And on the other side stand the Arabs. Indeed, these words recall
Orientalism'", but with two differences. First, they represent a society that is located in the East, yet perceives
itself as a progressive Western society. Second, unlike classical colonialism and Orientalism, Israel does not
pretend to educate the Arab East and "Israelize" it. Netanyahu puts it more elegantly that his minister of
defense, Ehud Barak, who once said that Israel is "a villa in the jungle," but on substance they are the same.
However, and unsurprisingly, the Israel Defense Forces chief of staff has asked to expand the military budget.
Recent regional regime changes, he argued, create instability and growing security threats to Israel." It looks
like the Arab Spring, but it can also be a radical Islamic winter" warned IDF Major General Eisenberg in early
September. Referring to what he characterized as the possibility of a "radical Islamic winter," Eisenberg said:
"This increases the likelihood of an all-out, total war, with the possibility of weapons of mass destruction being
used."iv
On the same day that the Arab Spring achieved one of its great accomplishments - namely when the Libyan
opposition entered Tripoli and Gaddafi 's headquarters - former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens wrote,
"This is not the time to throw caution to the wind. . . it is a time to think how we are going to assure the security
of Israel's citizens. . . it may be the time for those demanding 'social justice' for 'the middle classes' to fold their
tents."v
Not only is the Arab Spring unrelated to what seems to be its Israeli counterpart, but Israeli demonstrators are
acting against the state security interest regarding what the Arab Spring might bring.

TV reports about angry Egyptian protesters storming the Israeli embassy in Cairo on Sept. 1 0, and the threat
faced by six Israeli security men who were trapped for hours inside, recalled for many Israelis nightmare
scenarios of a lynching by an Arab mob. A hurried airlift of the ambassador and nearly all of his staff members
to Israel, achieved after U.S. President Barack Obama's intervention, showed the average Israeli citizen that his
or her state is a safe haven surrounded by deep-seated hatred. In short, the Arab Spring pushes Israel into a
self-defensive bunker mentality, which perceives events as existential threats, rather than as circumstances
created partially by Israel.
Israel's Social Protest and the Arab Spring
Moreover, the Israeli public denies the Arab Spring's impact on its own protest. In July- August 2011 waves of
protests for socioeconomic justice flowed through Israeli cities. It began with young students calling their
Facebook friends to live in tents in the main city boulevards and parks to demonstrate against the high price of
rental housing. The spontaneous protest movement that began in Tel Aviv, immediately followed by young
Jerusalemites, soon spread all over the country from north to south. It did not take more than few days to
become a mass movement against the high cost of living in general - from nurseries and education to basic
shopping and senior citizens' pensions. After many years of public silence, hundreds of thousands of low- and
middle-class citizens demonstrated against Netanyahu's neoliberal policy. They demanded no less than shifting
the neoliberal system to social democracy. In July and August Saturday nights tens and hundreds of thousands
of people turned out shouting "The people want social justice."
Interestingly, when the Israel Democracy Institute asked in February about the chances that the Israeli public
would also go out and demonstrate in the streets, starting a civil revolt like in Egypt and other Arab countries,
almost 90% of the Jewish public saw the odds as moderately low or very low, with 78.4% defining their overall
personal situation as fairly good or very good. This positive perspective came together with the view of 63.6%
who assessed the government policy of improving standards of living as not so successful or not successful at
all. Moreover, 82.7% said that Israel is not so successful or not successful at all in achieving economic and
social equality.vi The root of the summer 2011 Israeli mass demonstrations lies in these figures. It happened
when the public was ready to close the gap between statements about a good personal situation and no
motivation to demonstrate, and the hard reality of the high cost of living.
Objective observers connected these mass demonstrations with the Arab Spring, and one can rightly argue that
Israeli demonstrations followed those in Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Libya. They look very similar despite minor
local differences, and they all demand comprehensive change rather than reforming the system. The young
generation initiated protest movements through new media, and they succeeded in mobilizing a broad range of
age and social groups around a very general goal, thus bypassing their different agendas. In all countries it is
an ongoing phenomenon, and although the protesters succeeded in achieving unimagined gains, no one can
conclude how the spring will end in each of the countries.
What looks quite obvious to observers is denied by the majority in Israel. Israelis distance themselves from the
Arab Spring. A July 20 1 1 public opinion poll by the Israel Democracy Institute shows that 78% of the Jewish
public affirms that this protest is an authentic Israeli protest, with only 13% seeing an influence of the Arab
Spring. Most probably, this 13% is made up of Arab Israelis (Israeli citizens of Palestinian origin).vii
From an Ethnic Conflict to a Border Struggle and Back
There is no doubt that Israel perceives itself as belonging to the West and not to the Arab East. Even Jews with
Arab origins, who speak Arabic as their first or second language, call themselves Oriental or Mediterranean
Jews, and not Arab Jews. Obviously Arab-Israeli wars, and more than 100 years of animosity, created this
chasm. In addition, the Zionist movement was founded in Europe and got much help from Great Britain. When
Britain lost its superpower status, the United States became Israel's chief protector. And finally, about 1 .5
million immigrants from former Soviet states, who comprise almost 20% of Israeli citizens, strongly reject any
identification with the East.

It should be stressed that the Israeli self-divide from the Arab world is created by social and historical, rather
than substantial or existential, circumstances I wish to suggest a more nuanced perspective. This began to
change, but then shifted back(TM)'. The peace with Egypt in 1979, following President Anwar Sadat's journey to
Jerusalem in November 1 977, stood for 14 years as an exception, an agreement made between two states
isolated from their neighboring societies. The Oslo Accords of 1 993 opened the way for Jordan to sign its
peace with Israel a year later, and reformulated the central role of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the region.
The Oslo agreement set in motion a transformation of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict from an ethnic conflict into a
border struggle.'" Alttiough it changed the pattern of the conflict in a limited way, the agreement had the
potential to evolve into a comprehensive change. It was moving slowly toward the establishment of a
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This promised to turn the dispute into a border conflict rather
than an existential struggle between two forces, each of which denied die other's right to the land between the
Jordan and the Mediterranean.
However, me number of Israeli operations since 1993, and in particular, after the outbreak of the second intifada
in 2000, created a qualitative change. Israel continued to build and increased settlements construction speedily
and extensively even after the Oslo Accords were signed, thus creating a paradox. The aim of the settlements
was to impose a border to Israel's liking on the emerging Palestinian state. By the time the Camp David
negotiations of 2000 failed and me second intifada broke out, the ground had already been laid for Israeli rule
over the entire land between the Jordan and the Mediterranean. In 2001-2 Israel re-occupied the Palestinian
territories and de-facto destroyed its autonomy. Israel, with American consent, then confined a powerless Arafat
to his Ramallah compound, and turned his successor, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas,
into a subcontractor.
Israeli settlement expansion, its security operations since 2000 and the failure of any third party to intervene,
have returned the conflict to its ethnic origins.
To a great extent, this shift of the conflict was facilitated by regime changes in Israel, the U.S., and the PA. In
Israel, right and center-right coalitions led by Prime Ministers Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert and Netanyahu
replaced the left and center-left governments of Ehud Barak, Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin. And in the PA,
Abbas replaced Arafat, while in the Legislative Council Hamas won 2006 elections and achieved a majority. In
the U.S. President Bill Clinton's Democratic administration was replaced by the neo-conservative administration
of G.W Bush, and that was followed by the liberal administration of President Barack Obama. Unfortunately,
President Obama did not translate his outstanding Cairo speech to a coherent policy. He distanced himself from
mediating between Israel and the Palestinians, and as it stands in December 201 1 he also does not function as
caretaker or facilitator.
Israel enjoys superiority in this ethnic conflict and uses different security measures in order to manage the
conflict and keep the Palestinians weak and divided. The Israeli regime is based on maintaining die superiority
of the Jewish ethnic group through security measures taken against the Palestinians. For Israel security is much
more than a mere technique. It is a civil religion which some would define as an obsession. The 201 1 Summer
Protest's call to change national priorities and budget allocations challenges this state of affairs. The
demonstrators ask implicitly to cut security expenses dramatically and move funds to social affairs and
education.
Meanwhile, settlement expansion with higher financial investments involves more individuals, families,
communities, state agencies, political activists and civil society members in the project. The cost of turning the
wheel back to withdraw to the 1967 borders is rising. Under certain circumstances, the evacuation of most
settlements, ending the unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem and finding a compromise to the 1 948
refugees issue may lead to a civil war and with divided army units. Moreover, greater investment in settling
beyond the 1967 line is accompanied by religious radicalism. This is not good news for a future agreement or
for the current state of the conflict.

For many in Israel and Palestine the conflict is an ethno-religious one: a clash between Jewish and Islamic
civilizations. The ethnic foundation of Judaism is increasingly used to justify the system of Israeli control.
Growing numbers of Jews interpret the concept of a Jewish state in exclusively ethnic terms, rejecting any
obligation to respect minority rights.
Almost No Hope for Spring or Peace
Joint public opinion polls in June 2011 by Prof. Jacob Shamir of the Harry S. Truman Institute for the
Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and by Dr. Khalil Shikaki from the Palestinian
Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, found that majorities on both sides regard the chances for
the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years as
nonexistent or low: 53% on the Israeli side and 62% on the Palestinian side. Twenty-nine percent and 30%,
respectively, regard these chances as medium, and only 14% of Israelis and 6% of Palestinians regard these
chances as high. Moreover, and perhaps more depressing, is the following finding: The level of tiireat on both
sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. Sixty percent of Palestinians think
that Israel's goals are to extend its borders to cover all me area between the Jordan River and the
Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 21% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while
denying political rights to the Palestinians. Thirty-seven percent of Israelis believe mat the Palestinians'
aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in
Israel; 1 8% think the goal of the Palestinians is to conquer the State of Israel. Only 17% of Palestinians think
Israel's aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967; and 38% of
Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain some or all of the territories conquered in 1967."
Thus, Israelis and Palestinians find themselves trapped between what is unachievable today - the two-state
solution - and what can never be achieved - a unitary non-ethnic democracy based on the principle of oneman
one-vote. At present a single undemocratic regime that includes Israel proper and the Palestinian territories
constructs this problematic reality.xi
Most Israelis consider a resolution of the conflkt as irrelevant to their daily life and immediate future. It is off thdr
agenda The distance they fed from peace win the Palestinians goes hand m hand with building psychological
barriers with the Arab Spring, ethno-centrism and the construction of a physical wall in the occupied West Bank
to separate "us" and "them". The combined result is that Israeli demonstrators put at the forefront only
socioeconomic demands with no relation to peace with Palestinians. Tactically they are afraid, first, that their
rank and file will split along well-established left/dove-right/hawk lines and their protest will lose momentum and
fade away. Second, they do not want to provide the government with spin meant to tag their protest as "extreme
dovish/left," which in Israeli political discourse means cooperating with the enemy, and unworthy of being
considered seriously. However, I argue that beyond these tactical considerations lies the strategic shift in the
Israeli approach. The Israeli public makes a division between the conflict with the Palestinians and the
socioeconomic protest. Whereas the former is unsolvable at least in the near future, the latter calls for
immediate radical transformation. According to its current approach, the Israeli public sees the two fields as
hardly linked. Moreover, the Israeli public categorizes the Arab Spring in the same rubric where it puts the
Palestinians. Both are seen through an ethno-security lens as almost a lost cause.
This article is based on a paper presented at a conference devoted to "Transformation of the Arab World-
Where is it heading to?" at the University of Zurich in October 2011.
Sidebar
It seems clear that Israel welcomes the Arab Spring with a very cold shoulder. Israel has traditionally preferred
to maintain close relations with non-democratic monarchs and dictators, rather than communicating with the
people.
Sidebar
Most Israelis consider a resolution ofthe conflict as irrelevant to their daily life and immediate future. The

distance they feel from peace with the Palestinians goes hand in hand with building psychological barriers with
the Arab Spring.
Footnote
Endnotes
1 Haaretz, Aug. 3, 2011: http;//www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/mk-beneliezer-israel-offered-
political-asylum-to-mubarak-1. 376721.
ii http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Governmenl/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2011/Speech_
PM_Netanyahu_US_Congress_24-May-20 1 1 .htm.
iii See Said, Edward W. (1978) Orientalism. London: Pantheon Books.
iv Ynet, Sept. 5, 2011: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4118220,00.html
v Haaretz, Aug., 23, 2011: http://www.haaretz.corn/print-edition/opinion/israel-mustadjust-to-a-changing-middle-
east-1.380154
vi http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.aspx?num=202.
vii http://www.peacemdex.org/indexMonthEng.aspx?num=207#anchor234.
ix For further analysis see my book The Shift - Israel Palestine from Border Struggle to Ethnic Conflict (London
C. Hurst and New York: Columbia University Press 2010).
x http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/201 l/p40ejoint.html.
xi Full analysis of this regime can be found in my book, The Shift, ibid.
AuthorAffiliation
Menachem Klein
Dr. Menachem Klein, a professor of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University, is currently visiting scholar at Leiden
University, Holland.
Subject: Democracy; Peace; Political asylum; Arabs;
Ethnicity: Arab, Middle Eastern
Publication title: Palestine - Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture
Volume: 18
Issue: 1
Pages: 26-33
Number of pages: 8
Publication date: 2012
Year: 2012
Publisher: Middle East Publications
Place of publication: East Jerusalem
Country of publication: Israel
Publication subject: Arab/Middle Eastern, Political Science, History--History Of The Near East
ISSN: 07931395

Document type: Feature
Copyright: Copyright Middle East Publications 2012
_______________________________________________________________
Document 5 of 20
The Arab Spring

Author: Jones, Peter
Abstract (Abstract):
Certain regimes seem more likely to experience a revolution or an uprising. It is not absolute, but a trend does
seem to emerge. First, monarchies have thus far been somewhat less likely to be at risk of rapid change than
non-monarchies. Of the monarchies, only Bahrain has experienced an uprising, while several "republics" have.
Interviewees were not able to give firm reasons for this trend, but noted that monarchies tend to have
maintained societies where more traditional notions of a "social contract" between rulers and ruled still hold
sway, and they have been able to channel funds to the people when required to "buy them off" with greater
effect. This is especially true in the case of the Gulf monarchies, which have the funds to do so, and there has
been a marked increase in social spending in several of these countries since the Arab Spring began.
Moreover, monarchies, by definition, are places where a ruler is supposed to be there for life and to pass the
crown to his son. Autocratic republics, which feature the trappings of republicanism but are in reality governed
by "presidents for life" who seek to pass on their positions to their sons, may stick in the throat of their publics in
a way that monarchies do not.2
The technical and social changes that have contributed to the Arab Spring are intertwined and feed off each
other. The ability of underemployed, educated, and frustrated urban youth to communicate in real time and to
organize themselves, via social media, has, in the words of one interviewee, "revolutionized the collective
imagination of what is possible" across the region. Though the Egyptian and Tunisian "revolutions" were
different, people in Egypt would not have imagined that they could topple Mubarak had they not seen what
happened in Tunisia. In this context, many interviewees made particular mention of the satellite TV channels in
the region, of which Al Jazeera is most prominent. These have broken the stranglehold of regimes on
information and have permitted people around the region, and especially the young, to see and hear criticism
and debate that they could not even have imagined a few years ago. It is still too early in the region's new
media age to assess the exact impact of all this, but all interviewees were convinced that it has been a
significant factor and that regional governments will be less and less able to control the message. While we in
the west may instinctively applaud this opening up of the media, several interviewees cautioned that some of
the messages it will "let out of the bottle" will be damaging to the causes of peace and stability in the region.
That said, a majority of the interviewees believed that "there is no going back" in terms of the region's emerging
media reality.
Seventh, and very importantly for Canada, diasporas are important but tricky. The diasporas in western
countries are well informed and sometimes have considerable access to certain segments of life in their

countries of origin, but parts of them can be seen as partial to specific views and agendas. The extent to which
western governments should identify with their diaspora communities in developing policy at this time is a very
sensitive issue. Many of those interviewed in the region took a skeptical view of the prospect of the rich cousins
arriving home with "the answer" when they have not lived through the hard times or shared in the uncertainties
of the revolutions. Moreover, one Canadian leader of the Arab diaspora noted that there can be a "reverse
prejudice" issue whereby people in the region want to speak with a "real Canadian" rather than a diaspora
member. Though this can be disquieting to our notions of Canadian citizenship as a universal and
indistinguishable thing, it is a reality on the ground. Thus, though diaspora communities can have an impact on
domestic politics in places like Canada, it was widely believed to be important to try to separate them from
Canadian policy in the region. At the very least, efforts should be made to separate them from the perception in
the region of Canada's policies.
Full text:
Headnote
Opportunities and implications
The so-called Arab Spring is one of the most significant sets of events in the Arab Middle East since the end of
World War Two. It is likely to unfold over several more years and feature significant realignments within and
among all of the countries of the region. It will also dramatically affect relations between regional countries and
extra-regional powers with interests in the Middle East.
At the outset, any article that seeks to understand the situation and what it may mean must begin with
recognition of the fact that the "experts" all missed the Arab Spring. Thus, explanations of why this happened
and prognostications on where it might be going must be undertaken with humility. As with other momentous
events, such as the end of the Cold War, experts failed to anticipate when and how the Arab Spring might
happen, even though they knew something was fundamentally rotten with most regional regimes. Why was it
such a surprise? To some extent, the problem has to do with the very nature of experts and of "expertise." By
definition, experts become deeply steeped in the nuances and intricacies of the present order. They become
very good at seeing the trees but often lose sight of the forest, and particularly those events that may cause the
forest to be suddenly cut down. Rapid, paradigm-shifting events are rare and one can generally, and especially
if one is an expert, come up with a myriad of good reasons why they are not likely to happen at any given
moment. Such expert prognostications are generally correct, but when they are not, the experts are caught flat-
footed.1
As one interviewee suggested, one could liken the western analysis of what has happened in the region to at
least some aspects of the financial crisis. Subprime mortgages were not sustainable over the longer term;
everyone knew this. But in the immediate and year-to-year term, it was in no one's interest to stop or correct the
situation or even to allow information to flow to investors who might alert them to the dangers they faced. In the
Middle East and north Africa, one saw much the same situation. The model of governance was going to fail at
some point. The drivers were not a surprise: these have been well known for some time. Everyone has known
that the combination of authoritarian regimes, the rhetoric of democracy, and a high number of relatively
educated but unemployed and powerless youth is a recipe for trouble. What surprised everyone, as in the
financial crisis, was the trigger for the events, the rapidity of developments, and the connections between events
in one country and those in others.
It was generally acknowledged by interviewees that the Arab Spring has launched a set of changes in motion
that will fundamentally alter the region's course. But it is also true that one needs to take a cautious approach to
predicting where this will go. There have been uprisings in the region in the past that have, at least as yet, come
to little or nothing in terms of stimulating long-term systemic change. Lebanon in 2005 and Tehran in 2009 are
examples. Moreover, we do not as yet know where the countries that have experienced recent change will go.
In both Egypt and Tunisia, we have seen changes of the top echelons of the governing regimes, but we have

not yet seen fundamental regime change in the sense of the sweeping away of the wider elites and the systems
of government and economic control that they have created. Only in Libya does this seem to have happened -
at least thus far. Syria remains very much in play. Just as we missed the Arab Spring, so too we must recognize
that no one really knows where it is going.
This article will explore three main questions: what is happening and why; who the main players are and what
they want; and what the implications are for the west.
WHAT IS HAPPENING AND WHY?
My interviewees attempted to identify the countries that are most at risk of rapid destabilization and the reasons
for this. Essentially, there was agreement that the elements of vulnerability include a lethal combination of
poverty, lack of economic opportunity, and a repressive and disliked regime. The lack of economic opportunity
is a relative indicator: people in one country may be better off than people in another, but what matters is their
perception of their own poverty, not the relative reality of it.
The identification of specific countries that may be at greatest risk has proved difficult. Events are moving too
quickly. Moreover, there was widespread agreement that one should avoid such ideas as "domino effects."
While there is an obvious correlation between what is happening in one country and the others, and while new
forms of media make it more likely that those seeking change can be influenced and motivated by events in
other Arab countries, there is no automaticity to the spread of unrest around the region or the form it will take in
any particular country.
Certain regimes seem more likely to experience a revolution or an uprising. It is not absolute, but a trend does
seem to emerge. First, monarchies have thus far been somewhat less likely to be at risk of rapid change than
non-monarchies. Of the monarchies, only Bahrain has experienced an uprising, while several "republics" have.
Interviewees were not able to give firm reasons for this trend, but noted that monarchies tend to have
maintained societies where more traditional notions of a "social contract" between rulers and ruled still hold
sway, and they have been able to channel funds to the people when required to "buy them off" with greater
effect. This is especially true in the case of the Gulf monarchies, which have the funds to do so, and there has
been a marked increase in social spending in several of these countries since the Arab Spring began.
Moreover, monarchies, by definition, are places where a ruler is supposed to be there for life and to pass the
crown to his son. Autocratic republics, which feature the trappings of republicanism but are in reality governed
by "presidents for life" who seek to pass on their positions to their sons, may stick in the throat of their publics in
a way that monarchies do not.2
Second, among non-monarchies, those countries that have tried to transcend dan-based politics and to create a
more "modem" sense of nationalism (Egypt and Tunisia) have tended to experience less violent and more
outwardly successful transitions, at least thus far. The elites are sufficiently widespread that large portions of
them recognize when the game is up for a particular leader and dispatch that specific ruler in hopes of
maintaining some of their privileges in the new order.3 The elites of both Egypt and Tunisia are very much ships
that refused to go down with their captains. On the other hand, rulers who have maintained power by exploiting
clan or ethnically based differences within what are essentially tribal societies (Libya, Yemen, and Syria) have
nowhere to go when the trouble starts and the elites around them perceive no way to maintain power but to fight
for it.
Most interviewees agreed that the present events are the result of a combination of immediate grievances
specific to each country, the social and technological changes sweeping the region, and broader historical
trends. But the story is quite different in each country. The immediate grievances are largely tied up with the
profound lack of economic opportunity that exists in many Middle Eastern countries, particularly for the
burgeoning young population, and growing disgust with corrupt and repressive regimes. Even in those countries
that we think of as having undergone the beginning of economic liberalization in the last few years, what
emerged in most cases was a kind of crony capitalism that was seemingly secure for western investments but

did not spread significant economic growth beyond a small elite class.
More systemically, the Arab world underperforms all other regions of the world on virtually all social, political,
and economic indices, and has done for many years.4 But the distinctions and nuances among the economies
of the regional countries are important. In Egypt and Tunisia, for example, the period preceding the uprisings
saw solid, if not spectacular, economic growth, which helped to create, especially in the cities, a lower middle
class with expectations. It was, however, the profoundly uneven distribution of the wealth, as noted above, that
was the primary source of frustration for those who supported the revolution. There was growth, but the bulk of
the people did not think it was going to benefit them and so did not feel personally invested in it. Calls not to
rock the boat of economic growth meant nothing to people who believed that the only crew members benefiting
from the status quo were a very small elite tied to the regime.
Many interviewees noted that the debate over the economic future of these countries will be a difficult one and
the ability of the west to influence these discussions will be limited. Traditionally perceived "western" economic
formulas for success, such as privatization of the enormous state-controlled economic sector, will be seen as
suspect by populations that have seen such privatizations result in the transfer of state assets to a limited circle
of regime friends at fire-sale prices. As one interviewee put it, "traditional IMF formulas for long-term success
will ring hollow in these contexts."
And yet there was general agreement that these very policies are most needed if the economies of the region
are to achieve the growth rates required to meet their growing populations' expectations. Moreover, the
subsidies with which most regimes in the region have tried to buy the loyalty of their populations are not
sustainable. But these are precisely the economic tools that fledgling governments, which are newly sensitive to
public opinion and trying to establish their legitimacy, will be most reluctant to cut. The new Egyptian
government, for example, has renewed subsidies for basics and brought even more people into the
government's already swollen workforce. All of this portends difficulty ahead, given that most interviewees
believed that the success of reform will hinge on whether the broad mass of people, most of whom were not in
Tahrir Square, believe that the revolution has resulted in an increase in their economic fortunes.
The technical and social changes that have contributed to the Arab Spring are intertwined and feed off each
other. The ability of underemployed, educated, and frustrated urban youth to communicate in real time and to
organize themselves, via social media, has, in the words of one interviewee, "revolutionized the collective
imagination of what is possible" across the region. Though the Egyptian and Tunisian "revolutions" were
different, people in Egypt would not have imagined that they could topple Mubarak had they not seen what
happened in Tunisia. In this context, many interviewees made particular mention of the satellite TV channels in
the region, of which Al Jazeera is most prominent. These have broken the stranglehold of regimes on
information and have permitted people around the region, and especially the young, to see and hear criticism
and debate that they could not even have imagined a few years ago. It is still too early in the region's new
media age to assess the exact impact of all this, but all interviewees were convinced that it has been a
significant factor and that regional governments will be less and less able to control the message. While we in
the west may instinctively applaud this opening up of the media, several interviewees cautioned that some of
the messages it will "let out of the bottle" will be damaging to the causes of peace and stability in the region.
That said, a majority of the interviewees believed that "there is no going back" in terms of the region's emerging
media reality.
The final trend is a much broader historical matter which has to do with the end of the regional order that was
established in the wake of the First World War from the remnants of the Ottoman empire. States were
established across the region, and regimes put in place to rule them, largely by the European powers of the era
and for their convenience.5 Borders were drawn, many of which had little to do with the realities of ancient tribal
relations on the ground. Many of those states, and some of the regimes, have survived to this day, but all but a
few have had difficulty establishing deep legitimacy. There are across the region a variety of regime types, from

more-or-less successful monarchies to republics based on either modern notions of civic nationalism or along
clan lines. It is still not clear what will replace the current regional model and it will take time for this to clarify.
Policymakers should thus think of this as both a paradigm shift that will play out over time and a set of short-
term dislocations in specific countries.
There had been some thought that the so-called "Turkish model" might provide a basis for a soft landing in
several countries. This idea was largely dismissed by many interviewees, especially those in the Arab countries.
They pointed out that, while the Turkish model may today feature a welcome degree of democracy and stability
- though even that is being called into question by some due to recent events - it took over 50 years and much
unrest and military rule. By and large, most interviewees felt that Turkey is a unique case, due to its
membership in NATO and association with the EU, for example, and will not provide much of a model for most
Middle Eastern countries, other than broadly showing that a relatively secular Muslim state is possible. This is
important in principle, but most regional interviewees believed that, while Turkey provides a broad outline of a
possible destination for their societies, it does not provide a roadmap of how to get there that is relevant in their
contexts.
The lack of a broadly agreed set of societal goals to which Arab states and their peoples can aspire is a key
problem. In this sense, the situation in the Middle East is quite different from that in central and eastern Europe
in 1989, even though pundits often speak of the Arab Spring as a "1989 moment." After the collapse of
communism in Europe, the former communist states were in many ways little better off than the states of the
Arab world are today. Indeed, to the extent that capitalism has been allowed into many of the states of the
Middle East - albeit a form of capitalism that has played second fiddle to overwhelming state control of the
economy and a prevailing kleptocracy of the elites - it could be argued that many Arab states have a better
platform to launch reform than the eastern Europeans did.
But the former communist countries had something that the Arab countries lack - an agreed-upon goal that
united the spectrum of political and economic actors and served as a rallying cause for action at an otherwise
chaotic moment. In all former Warsaw pact countries save Russia, the broad majority of the elites and public
quickly united around the goals of NATO and European Union membership. Mainstream political life in these
countries became a debate over how best to get there, but the destination was accepted by just about
everyone. Moreover, the institutions of NATO and the EU imposed some discipline over the process in the form
of a set of political and economic targets that these countries had to meet so as to be admitted. No such
agreed-upon goals exist in the Middle East, and, obviously, no such agreed targets for reform. There is a sense
of drift with regard to what the destination of these revolutions should be. Such a vacuum can be filled by
undesirable forces.
Interviewees identified two broad possibilities if the process goes badly and "strong men" again attempt to take
over under the guise of big ideas: a renewal of what one called "political Arabism" or the rise of political Islam.
The latter will be discussed in the next section, but political Arabism was identified by some interviewees as a
renewal or update of generally discredited pan-Arab nostrums and ideals that were a powerful unifying force in
the region at the time of Nasser. While the ideas around which a renewal of political Arabism might gel would
probably look different to those of the Nasser era, a strong theme of Arabs trying to throw off the yoke of outside
domination would undoubtedly be part of this narrative. Most interviewees felt that the region is long past these
ideas as a motivating force. Some, however, admitted that secular regimes, looking for a big idea with which to
stay in power and deflect attention from their internal failings but reluctant to embrace Islam, might in
desperation try to stimulate rhetoric around a revival of political Arabism. Such an attempt will probably fail, but
it is a trend to be watched for.
WHO ARE THE MAIN PLAYERS AND WHAT DO THEY WANT?
Many interviewees dwelt at length on the role of political Islam in the unrest across the region. Indeed, it was
noted that one of the reasons many in the west missed the Arab Spring was because they were looking in the

wrong place for signs of trouble - at political Islam - whereas the role of political Islam in these events was
limited at the outset, and Islamist groups were caught as much by surprise as anyone else. In addition, some
interviewees expressed the view that political Islam represents a serious problem that is generally
underappreciated by the West. Some of these interviewees linked their concerns to what they regard as Iran's
ongoing attempts to exert influence across the region. Several others were particularly skeptical of the idea that
the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in Egypt but also across the region more generally, will evolve into a group
of moderate religious political parties that will be content to compete for power in a pluralistic system of give and
take.
Others, while agreeing that political Islam generally, and the Brotherhood in particular, represent a serious
potential problem, argued that it is not a monolithic movement. 6 There are more moderate elements that can
be engaged and there are other forces in the region that will move to counteract the extreme version of political
Islam. The Mubarak regime may be gone in Egypt, for example, but powerful interests remain in charge, most
notably the army, and they will move decisively if necessary to prevent extreme Islamist forces from taking over.
In this context, several interviewees attempted to define the key challenges facing the Brotherhood as it seeks
to transform itself from a semi-banned opposition movement to a political force. These may be broken down into
three broad challenges:
First is the challenge of specificity. The Brotherhood will have to make hard choices in such key areas as the
rights of Copts and women, personal expression, and lifestyle freedoms. Second is the challenge of
accountability. If the Brotherhood is to play a role in government, it will have to move away from outrageous
slogans that play well to its base but do not put bread on any tables. If it does not, it will be seen as ineffective
and will alienate the broader mass of voters. And third is the challenge of political reform, as it will have to
operate in a political arena of give and take.
Some mentioned the fact that Islamist groups have a generally good reputation in terms of "service delivery" in
matters like health care and education as compared with many regional governments. Others noted that this
reputation has often been earned by delivering well a small percentage of the overall needs of the society -
running a few hospitals in poor areas, for instance, as opposed to running the overall healthcare system.
Running the system as a whole, and dealing with the bureaucratic politics of large systems, will prove a much
greater challenge. In cases where Islamist parties have taken power, they have generally performed poorly at
such large-scale problems.
Those interviewees who see the Brotherhood as the greatest threat were not reassured by any of this, and
noted that evolutions towards popular sovereignty carry their own logic, which can be difficult to stop. The
danger is not so much of an immediate "takeover" by political Islam, but of a longer-term game of infiltrating the
very institutions that are regarded as the guardians of the secular order, such as the army, and then subverting
them over time. A minority of interviewees felt that the Brotherhood has the patience and vision to do this, or at
least to make a serious effort, and the international community should be alert to this.
Meanwhile, it was noted by some that we in the west frequently miss the fact that there are other extremist
movements in the region, including the growing influence of extremist movements in Israel, which have an
impact on regional security and stability. There is a danger that extremist movements on both sides of the Arab-
Israeli divide could feed off each other in a kind of symbiotic relationship.
As a final point on political Islam, all of those interviewed agreed that we are going to have to learn about it and
understand it much better than we do now. For better or worse, political Islam is part of the political scene in the
region and we must approach it without simplistic stereotypes. Western governments will have to invest much in
developing a sophisticated and multidimensional understanding of this phenomenon, across the region and also
within each national context. Above all, one-size-fits-all approaches must be avoided.
In this context it was noted by one expert that, although there are chapters of the Brotherhood in many regional

countries, there is no real multinational structure to the movement. Instead, each national group is quite
independent, though they do keep in touch and trade ideas. Most interviewees felt that attention should be
devoted over the next few years to watching the relationship among the various national chapters of the
Brotherhood across the region. Are they influencing each other towards moderation and an acceptance of the
rigours and compromises of genuine democracy, or are they influencing each other down more extremist
paths?
Another subject much discussed by virtually all interviewees is the potential impact on the Middle East peace
process. It was generally agreed that the uprisings in the Arab countries have not been about the Palestinian
issue, but have rather been about issues of "bread and liberty" in each country. However, it was also widely
agreed that the situation will have an impact on the peace process. The new regional governments that emerge
will have to appear more sympathetic to popular opinion in their countries.
What this will mean in practical terms will vary from situation to situation. For many Arab countries, there will
remain a desire at the elite level to avoid an overt confrontation with Israel over the Palestinian issue. All of the
significant Egyptian parties in the current elections process, for example, have stated that the Egyptian- Israeli
peace treaty will remain in force should they win, though some have recently spoken in unspecified terms of the
need for it to be reviewed in some ways. Thus, Israel can no longer count on automatic, if quiet, cooperation
from several Arab countries to quell challenges. The partial opening of the Gaza border by Egypt is a case in
point, and we should expect this to be the new norm in Arab-Israeli relations. As one interviewee noted, the
peace process to date has involved deals between the elites of the Arab countries and the elite of Israel. The
public, especially in the Arab world, has not been consulted or brought along. We may now be moving into an
era where peace will have to be more overtly seen to be made between the peoples of the region if it is to be
credible. This will introduce another layer of difficulty to an already overloaded peace process.
Most interlocutors, and especially those in Israel - including those who are part of the "peace camp" - believed
that the probable reaction in Jerusalem will be to reinforce a cautious approach to the peace process. The issue
of the perceived threat from Iran also plays into this, and all the Israelis interviewed argued that movement on
the peace process is unlikely until the situation in the Arab countries has settled into a more established pattern.
Meanwhile, the situation in Libya represents a case of direct western intervention in an Arab uprising. As such,
most interviewees commented on it as the study unfolded. A significant majority of those interviewed believed
that it represents a unique confluence of factors which is unlikely to be repeated, including a people who
became fed up with repression and were emboldened by events in other regional countries; tribal leaders who
were increasingly fed up with the central government and saw their moment; other Arab leaders who had had
enough of Qaddafi and were prepared to accept the idea of outside military intervention to get rid of him -
something that they would ordinarily oppose; and a geographical location that made aerial intervention by
NATO seem relatively easy, and, apparently at least, relatively low-cost. These factors are not likely to be
present in their entirety in other regional countries, such as Syria. Therefore, in the view of most interlocutors,
similar types of interventions in other countries are unlikely.
Finally, several interviewees raised the question of resources and how the unrest in the region will affect such
issues as o. Most interviewees took the view that oil supplies from the region will not be seriously affected by
the unrest in the long term, even though prices will fluctuate in the short term due to perceived uncertainty.
Whoever governs after the dust settles will have an interest in selling o. Moreover, there are important
differences between the countries across the region, which are of critical importance to the oil question. The
Gulf states, for example, are generally more stable, which will work to stabilize o prices over the long term,
even if events in places such as Libya raise prices temporarily. Tensions over the Iranian nuclear program, and
the resulting confrontation with the international community, will have a much greater impact on o prices than
the Arab Spring. Some interviewees noted that Canada's o sands are a beneficiary of the high oil prices

caused by the regional unrest.
THE VIEWS OF TWO NON-ARAB MUSLIM REGIONAL COUNTRIES
Two non- Arab regional Muslim countries will be deeply affected by, and will themselves affect, the Arab Spring:
Iran and Turkey.
The Arab spring is a largely negative development for Iran, despite rhetoric to the contrary. Iranian leaders know
that this is not the next phase of the 1979 Iranian revolution and they know that their society offers no model for
the region. They also face the possible loss of their only "friend" and policy ally in the region - Syria. This is true
even though most Syrians and Iranians have long realized that this was a marriage of convenience rather than
love. Indeed, Tehran's initial support for the Syrian regime, and subsequent lukewarm support for change in that
country, contrasts very poorly with its early enthusiasm for events in Egypt and elsewhere, and this has not
gone unnoticed, either in Iran or in the Arab world. For all their rhetoric to the contrary, the Iranian leadership is
probably a loser in the Arab spring and they know it.
More deeply, Iran's unpopular leaders know that their own people want more or less exactly what the people of
Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya appear to have won for themselves, and what other Arabs are striving for. This was
made abundantly clear after the 2009 presidential election in Iran. The only inspiration the Iranian government is
drawing from the Arab spring is from those Arab governments who are trying to stamp it out, whereas the
Iranian people are drawing exactly the opposite inspiration from the Arab peoples agitating for more
accountable governments.
Some concerns have been expressed that Tehran may try to influence events through the sponsorship of
extremist elements and other groups associated with political Islam. While this is possible, and may cause
difficulties in specific cases, several interviewees felt that it is not ultimately likely to succeed. Citizens in Arab
countries are extremely sensitive to "outside" interference in Arab affairs. While we in the west usually associate
this with sensitivity to western interference, it also extends to interference by any non- Arab country; there
remains a residual and sometimes powerful schism between Arabs and Persians. Moreover, the Sunni-Shi'ite
split cannot be overlooked. Thus, though Tehran may attempt it, we should avoid the tendency to see
mainstream and relatively moderate political Islam groups through the lens of Iranian influence. To do so can
only risk alienating them into this orbit.
Finally, one Israeli interviewee made the point that the longer-term trend of the Arab Spring holds the potential
to seriously undermine Iran's soft power - the attraction that the Iranian regime has, up to now, held for many
people on the so-called Arab street. To this point, many Arabs, and especially the young, have looked to Tehran
with a certain, if at times grudging, admiration. They have seen a relatively new regime (as opposed to their
ageing leaderships), which had at least some democratic aspects (as opposed to their societies), and which
stood up to the US and Israel in the name of a noble cause (however misguided it might seem from the west),
instead of toadying to Washington and Jerusalem as their governments were widely perceived to do. If at least
some Arab countries are able to navigate the Arab Spring to become societies that are more democratic and
economically fair - a big if, of course - it may not be long before Iranian youth look to Egypt, Tunisia, and others
as emerging models of fair, democratic, and just societies that their own aged, corrupt, and autocratic
leadership would do well to emulate. There is no certainty that this will be the outcome, but it is at least feasible,
and would deal a serious blow to an Iranian regime that is already rapidly losing its legitimacy. Of course, the
youth of those Arab countries that do not experience change will also be similarly affected, which has obvious
consequences for a country like Saudi Arabia.
Turkey, on the other hand, occupies a more ambiguous position. As noted, there had been some thought that
the so-called Turkish model might provide a basis for a soft landing in several countries. This idea was largely
dismissed by most interviewees in the Arab countries, but several interviewees believed that Turkey's possible
role as a facilitator of change and dialogue could be considerable if Ankara wants to play this role and commits
the resources to do it well, as it appears to have done in some cases to date. The recent cooling of its relations

with Israel, though a cause of great concern in Jerusalem, adds to this credibility in many Arab eyes. Other
interviewees believed that a more assertive Arab diplomatic reality will emerge over time and this may call into
question Turkey's ability to play this role. It is simply too soon to say. One final trend to watch for concerns what
may become a growing rivalry between Tehran and Ankara for influence in the Arab world as the Arab Spring
plays out. Most interviewees in the Middle East felt that Turkey is poised to get the better of any such rivalry.
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA AND THE WEST?
Based on the interviews, seven broad lessons have emerged: First, Egypt is the big prize. There was
widespread agreement among those consulted for this project that the fate of reforms and change in Egypt will
be particularly important in setting the tone for the rest of the region. Egypt is the most populous Arab country
and has a disproportionate influence on the politics and culture of the Arab world. While all the regional
countries are important and must be approached on their own terms, special care must be taken by western
countries to get messaging and policy right on Egypt. Egypt's revolution is far from over and there will be bumps
along the way. It will be noisy and uncomfortable, but most interviewees felt that a long-term vision of a
legitimate (if not always entirely democratic) Egyptian government is possible. This will have to include the
participation of political Islam, however uncomfortable that may be. Signals of trouble to watch for include any
emergence of a set of policies and positions framed around a blame-theoutsiders narrative on the part of the
Egyptian elite, possibly as a prelude to an attempt to resort to leadership of an emerging strain of political
Arabism, much as Nasser did.
Second, there were mixed views among interviewees on the future influence of the US in the Middle East. Most
agreed with the proposition that US influence is at a historically low ebb at this point, due to a combination of
perceived US helplessness in the face of Israeli intransigence over the peace process and a widespread
perception in the region that the US had propped up many of those deposed in the Arab spring, only to then
abandon them ungracefully. But opinion was evenly divided over whether this loss of US prestige and influence
is a temporary or a more permanent phenomenon. If US influence in the region is permanently diminished,
interviewees were relatively unanimous in the view that no other regional power of similar stature, from either
within or outside the region, will emerge in the foreseeable future.
Third, there seems to be general agreement that it is not possible for the west to steer these events and that it
would be fatal to try, even though we have vital interests at stake and have intervened in specific cases such as
Libya, at the invitation of the Arab League. The history of outside intervention in the region is so murky that
attempts to intervene now would be very badly received, especially by the very people we want most to
influence - the young and civil society leaders. This is especially true of any ideas that even smack of
clandestine intervention. It should be noted that a reluctance on the part of the west to intervene is not the same
thing as western governments outlining and defending their views and aspirations in dialogues and
consultations. Thus, we should not be afraid to engage but we should be reluctant to intervene.
Fourth, the west should refrain from inserting Israel into the equation. This is not about Israel. Thus far, the
popular uprisings have not been overly concerned with Israel, though we may expect that future regional
governments, if they are more representative of their populations, will be cool towards Israel. This may not be
pleasant, but it should not necessarily lead to an increased threat to Israel and we should not overplay this
question, or succumb to the likely tendency of some Israeli politicians and interest groups to do so - either out of
genuine fear or because they want to use the uncertainty of the moment to further their own political or religious
agendas. This will be especially important for Canada, which is already perceived in the region as being overly
supportive of Israel. It will also be very hard to do, and the Israelis themselves will not be above inserting
themselves into this as part of a penchant for seeing events in the region through their own prism. But the
majority of interviewees believed that the greatest friendship a country like Canada could show at this time
would be to try to calm such fears, although our actual capacity to do so is very limited, for all of the rhetoric
about a special relationship.

Fifth, there is a great need for humility in our messaging and activities. Extreme care must be taken to avoid any
sense that we have the answer or to compare what is happening in the region with other historical events, such
as Europe in 1989, as this will be badly received. Where western countries do have advantages to share, in
such areas as electoral, governance, and constitutional reform, quiet offers to make this available, rather than
brash and widely touted programs to lay out what should be done in the region, would be most effective.
Moreover, we should recognize that other countries around the world have relevant expertise in making
significant political transitions - eastern Europe, Brazil, South Africa, and so on. Perhaps Canada could play a
brokering role in helping to make these experiences available. Another suggestion made by some regional
interviewees was that Canada can play a role in terms of nurturing civil society groups in order to play a role as
the "fourth leg" of a stool composed of the army, the business elite, and political Islam. This nurturing role will
have to be undertaken very carefully, however, as too overt a western footprint can discredit the very NGOs we
might wish to help.
Sixth, democratic development is important, but genuine and visible economic development is what will really
make people's lives better in the short to medium term. The west is associated in people's minds with the kind
of crony capitalism that has enriched elites but helped to create the setting for the current unrest. Moreover,
there is a sense in the region that, despite our fine-sounding words, we in the west are not entirely comfortable
with what is happening, as it may threaten our interests, and that we are essentially comfortable dealing with the
westernized elites who perpetuate crony capitalism. We must be sensitive to this in our messaging and in our
economic activities in the region. In terms of ways to invest in the Arab spring that will bring the quickest results,
getting economies moving may be more important in the next year than helping to rewrite constitutions: people
need to have a sense that things are going in the right direction and that there is hope if they are going to
endure the hardships of the coming years and not yield to the siren song of extremists. Small-scale, but widely
spread and, above all, rapidly delivered assistance programs in the villages and the countryside could be one
way forward if ways can be found around cumbersome aid rules. Again, this is something that may prove very
difficult for Canada's development assistance bureaucracy, given reduced budgets and the growing mania in
government for complex and cumbersome accountability regulations.
Seventh, and very importantly for Canada, diasporas are important but tricky. The diasporas in western
countries are well informed and sometimes have considerable access to certain segments of life in their
countries of origin, but parts of them can be seen as partial to specific views and agendas. The extent to which
western governments should identify with their diaspora communities in developing policy at this time is a very
sensitive issue. Many of those interviewed in the region took a skeptical view of the prospect of the rich cousins
arriving home with "the answer" when they have not lived through the hard times or shared in the uncertainties
of the revolutions. Moreover, one Canadian leader of the Arab diaspora noted that there can be a "reverse
prejudice" issue whereby people in the region want to speak with a "real Canadian" rather than a diaspora
member. Though this can be disquieting to our notions of Canadian citizenship as a universal and
indistinguishable thing, it is a reality on the ground. Thus, though diaspora communities can have an impact on
domestic politics in places like Canada, it was widely believed to be important to try to separate them from
Canadian policy in the region. At the very least, efforts should be made to separate them from the perception in
the region of Canada's policies.
CONCLUSION
The current upheavals in the region are not going to be over soon. The Arab Spring is a long-term realignment
of regional societies and the politics that serve and define them. This does not necessarily mean, of course, that
we will necessarily see large-scale upheavals in the streets for years to come. But it does mean that we are
unlikely to see a settled regional order out of all this soon: it will take time. While there is a broad set of ideas
and grievances that are motivating the so-called Arab Spring, the situation will play out differently in each
country based on specific conditions there. There can be no one-size-fits-all response to the region. We may

anticipate, for example, that regional governments, if not necessarily democratic in many cases, will have to be
more responsive to what they perceive as public opinion in their countries. For the first time in the recent history
of the region, the people have effected change on a large scale and they are not likely to accept the kinds of
governments they had before. What this means in practice will vary greatly across the region and over time.
For western countries such as Canada, carefully calibrated and nuanced strategies, both diplomatic and public,
are going to be required. But one point is clear: at least for next few years in most countries of the region, the
path to access, influence, and opportunity is no longer going to be solely about getting on the right side of
entrenched ruling elites. In this respect, we must also recognize that we in the west are not associated in the
minds of most in the Middle East as having been on the side of the people, as we were in eastern Europe in the
wake of the collapse of the Berlin Wall. We have ground to make up.
Footnote
1 For more on the tendency of experts to miss paradigm shifts, see John Lewis Caddis' famous essay on why
the political science subfield of international relations missed the end of the Cold War entirely. See J. L Caddis,
"International relations theory and the end of the Cold War," International Security 17, no. 3 (winter 1992-93): 5-
58.
Footnote
2 They also stick in the throat of other elites, as well. It was Mubarak's son's attempts to woo the business elite
of Egypt as his ticket to succession, ratherthan the army, that may have cost that regime the military's support
at the critical moment.
3 The "civic nationalism" of a place like Egypt has been more of a myth than a reality as large minorities were
excluded from many aspects of state life. Still, it was strongly felt and was a factor in bringing together various
groups during the uprising itself, such as when Muslims protected Copts in Tahrir Square, for example. Whether
this sense of civic brotherhood will survive into the next phase of the revolution is not yet clear, though recent
events around the elections do not bode well for interfaith relations.
Footnote
4 See the Arab human development reports, a series of analyses by regional experts on the social, economic,
and political development of the Arab world, sponsored by the United Nations development program, www.arab-
hdr.org.
Footnote
5 The best single source on this period is David Fromkin, A Peace to End AU Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman
Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1989; new edition 2009).
Footnote
6 See Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "The Muslim Brotherhood after Mubarak," Foreign Affairs, "Snapshot,"
February 201 1, www.foreignaffairs.com. Wickham was interviewed for the present study.
AuthorAffiliation
Peter Jones is associate professor in the graduate school of public and international affairs at the University of
Ottawa. This article is based on the results of a research project conducted in 2on. Over jo senior officials, think-
tank leaders, and academics were interviewed, individually and in roundtables, under Chatham House rules.
Interviewees were from, in alphabetical order, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, the European Union, France, Germany,
India, Israel, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. The list of their names has been withheld to protect confidentiality but has
been seen by the editors of this journal. The author remains solely responsible for the contents of the article.
Subject: Middle Eastern history; Cold War; Political power; Economic indicators; Economic growth;
Location: Middle East

Publication title: International Journal
Volume: 67
Issue: 2
Pages: 447-463
Number of pages: 17
Year: 2012
Publisher: Sage Publications Ltd.
Place of publication: Toronto
Country of publication: United Kingdom
ISSN: 00207020
Document feature: References
Copyright: Copyright Canadian International Council Spring 2012
_______________________________________________________________
Document 6 of 20
Paradox of Neoliberalism: Arab Spring's Implications on North Korea

Author: Lee, Sang-soo
Abstract:
This article focuses on the implications for North Korea of the Arab democratic uprising. To better appreciate the
context of the implications, the article analyzes the characteristics of the Arab democratic uprising in connection
with neoliberalism, reviews the current situation of the democratic movement in North Korea, and examines the
ripple effect of the Arab Spring on the North Korean elite. Emphasizing the negative impact of the Arab Spring
on the North Korean regime succession, this article concludes that North Korea's democratization can become
possible by empowering the grassroots population in order to make the North Korean regime negotiate with
them.

Full text:
Headnote
Biographical Statement
Sang-soo Lee is a research fellow at the Research Institute for National Security Affairs (RINSA) within the
Korea National Defense University(KNDU). He received his Ph.D. in politics from the Academy of Korean
Studies (AKS). His major research interests are political and security issues in Northeast Asia. He has recently
published several articles, including "The Six-Party Talks at the Crossroads: Implications from Eight Years of
Experience"(The Korean Journal of Security Affairs, 2011) and "A New Option for Development in Human
Security in East Asia: Reforming the ASEAN Regional Forum" (The Journal of Peace Studies, 2011). This
article represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of RINSA or
KNDU.
Headnote
Abstract
This article focuses on the implications for North Korea of the Arab democratic uprising. To better appreciate the
context of the implications, the article analyzes the characteristics of the Arab democratic uprising in connection
with neoliberalism, reviews the current situation of the democratic movement in North Korea, and examines the
ripple effect of the Arab Spring on the North Korean elite. Emphasizing the negative impact of the Arab Spring
on the North Korean regime succession, this article concludes that North Korea's democratization can become
possible by empowering the grassroots population in order to make the North Korean regime negotiate with
them.
Keywords: Arab Spring, North Korea, neoliberalism, ripple effect, democratic movement
Introduction
The Arab Spring suggests a transition to a new social order, a new phase of modern capitalism. The Arab
states sit at a critical moment in which old institutions are frail, and what they do over the next few years will lay
the groundwork for the next generation's institutionalized "rule of capitalism."1 It is clear that Arab regimes were
deeply unpopular and faced serious demographic, economic, and political problems.
The young Egyptian university graduate who burned himself to death yearning for democratization triggered
democratic uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. The democratic wind has been blown by the Arab youth who
attempted to topple dictators. The democratic movement in Tunisia has bestowed a momentum to the Egyptian
democratic uprising. The winds have swept through to Iran, Libya, and Bahrain in the wake of the Tunisian
democratic movement. In spite of the brutal crackdown by the authoritarian regimes, the independent
democratic movement of the Arab states has gained support from democratic society. "People all over the Arab
world feel a sense of pride in shaking off decades of cowed passivity under dictatorships that ruled with no
deference to popular wishes."2 The kind of collective actions most likely to change the existing social structure
are likely to be triggered by members of disadvantaged groups.3 The state's failure to meet the needs of the
people and to represent their will may cause class struggle where rival class forces fight to control the vital
political organs that wield immense power.4 North Korea as a failed state has considerable potential to be
overthrown by mass collective action. Robert I. Rotberg has classified political goods in five categories-safety
and security, rule of law and transparency, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity,
and human development. Failed states are those states that fall below a threshold of political goods and fail to
satisfy the safety and security minimums.5 "Given the scarcity of food supplies in North Korea, given its lack of
human capital and other human capacities, and given the long poverty of internal discourse within the state, the
removal of state security will plunge the otherwise failed state straight into true failure and, likely collapse."6 A
nation-state fails when citizens finally perceive that its rulers are running the state as a criminal enterprise to
their own advantage and the state no longer cares about most of its inhabitants.
Against this backdrop, the feasibility of a democratic movement in North Korea is on the rise. Conditions for a

democratic uprising in North Korea are growing gradually. There are many cautious predictions that a
democratic movement can happen in North Korea eventually. The democratic movement in North Korea might
be somewhat different from the Arab democratic movement.
This article briefly reviews the feasibility of the democratization of North Korea. Drawing on this understanding,
the article focuses on the implications of the Arab democratic uprising for North Korea. To better appreciate the
context of the implications, the article analyzes the characteristics of the Arab democratic uprising, reviews the
current situation of the democratic movement in North Korea, and examines the ripple effect of the Arab Spring
on the North Korean elite. Emphasizing the negative impact of the Arab Spring on the North Korean regime
succession, this article concludes that North Korea's democratization can become possible by empowering the
grassroots population in order to make the North Korean regime negotiate with them.
The Feasibility of the Democratization of North Korea
The Arab democratic uprising presents a frightening prospect to the North Korean regime. The collapsed
Mubarak regime was a so-called brother state of North Korea. North Korea introduced the Egyptian mobile
company Orascom for its telecommunications. Now, approximately more than one million North Koreans have
mobile phones run on Orascom's 3G platform. Thus, people have the minimum condition of spreading
information among the users of mobile phones; this has been a catalyst for the Arab Spring.
The Arab world and North Korea are different in the important aspect that one is a neoliberal economy and the
other is a socialist economy. However, it is remarkable that North Korea has begun to introduce a limited market
economy in rural markets like the Jangmadang (flea market). This unofficial rural market in the far northern
region of North Hamgyong province has been occupied by North Korean women, almost 80 percent of whom
use mobile phones. Most of them have overseas experiences. According to a special report of the United States
Institute of Peace, international food aid has stimulated private markets in North Korea. In December 1996, Kim
Jong-il publicly attacked these markets as unsocialist, but he tolerates them because they are essential to the
survival of the cities.7 This implies that even though the North Korean society is tightly sealed and largely
evades the influence of ization, has begun to infiltrate North Korea.
Human Rights Watch has given North Korea its lowest score for almost forty consecutive years. It will be very
difficult to realize the democratization of North Korea because its regime has adopted a closed leadership
succession. Under the circumstances, the elite class of North Korea is reluctant to accept the reality of the Arab
democratic movement. The elite group in North Korea tries to control its people in every segment of life and
does its best to indoctrinate its socialist ideology that demands blind loyalty to the North Korean regime.
However, the North Korean regime may have a feeling of uneasiness, for its current leadership succession
might be destroyed amidst the Arab Spring. In the process of democratization, China may exercise great
political influence on the North Korean regime because the regime is heavily dependent on China's support.
China itself is not a full-fledged democratic state and the regime advocates communist ideology except for the
introduction of the market economy. Amid the Arab Spring, China has tried to ward off any democratic
movement from the outside by restricting access to Google and controlling civil activity. This tendency may have
a negative effect on North Korea's democratization process in the near future.
However, as a positive sign, North Korea has agreed to establish an Associated Press news agency in
Pyongyang and Reuters is set to add North Korean video to its existing text and picture news services.8 The
North Korean regime's initiative to accept international capital can be seen as demonstrating a positive will to
opening up their society. But we need to wait to see if this represents a tactical shift.
I will analyze the Arab impact on North Korea using the theory of economic neoliberalism that emphasizes
market mechanisms.9 Since the 1980s, neoliberalism has come to dominate the world. neoliberalism and the
so-called free market it preaches brought devastating effects to the world in many aspects of life.
Subcomandante Marcos characterizes it as "a new war," that is, "the Fourth World War against humanity."10
Advocates for a free market and neoliberalism have preached that economic liberalism and neoliberalism

promote political democracy. For instance, Milton Friedman argues, "Economic freedom is an indispensible
means toward the achievement of political freedom" and history "speaks with a single voice on the relations
between political freedom and a free market."11
Neoliberalism is a label for the market-driven approach to economic and social policy based on neoclassical
theories of economics that stress the efficiency of private enterprise, liberalized trade, and relatively open
markets, and therefore seeks to maximize the role of the private sector in determining the political and
economic priorities of the state.12 I will analyze the Arab impact on North Korea using the theory of
neoliberalism because within the Arab world, Tunisia and Egypt are the exemplary states executing
neoliberalistic economic policy13 in the region. While the people of Tunisia and Egypt have successfully
removed the U.S.-backed dictators that ruled their respective countries, the path to real democracy is still long
and precarious. Three characteristics of economic neoliberalism in international political economy are as
follows.14
* First, it is seen as necessary to design and establish institutions and practices that are market-based and
market-led, both domestically and globally.
* Second, it is seen as crucial to instill a culture of individualistic, marketoriented behavior in people of all social
classes.
* Third, barriers to international trade and capital flows should be progressively dismantled.
The objectives of neoliberalism are incompatible with the maintenance of U.S. hegemony.15 A major concern of
neoliberalism is that failure of the invisible hand may occur as the result of market impediments. These
impediments can be overregulation, political interference in the market processes, protectionism, inadequate
legal frameworks, or the lack of constituent structures like property rights.16 Among neoliberal policies, the
aggressive attempt to remove any obstacles to the free movement of goods and capital across borders is
especially prominent.17 Economic history came to be seen as the process whereby the logic of the market
gradually triumphs by lifting impediments to market operation. Neoliberalism's defense of individual liberties
protects democratic rule from corrupt state practices.18 A sudden influx of neoliberal capitalism to the Arab
states let them disregard the most basic democratic and human rights.19
In the next section I will specify the impact of the Arab democratic uprising on North Korea.
The Impact of the Arab Democratic Uprising on North Korea's Regime Succession
The Arab democratic movement clearly demonstrates that the desire for democracy cannot be explained by
differences of culture. Rather, it is strongly based upon human nature; excessive repression may trigger mass
opposition in authoritarian regimes as soon as opportunities occur. With Tunisia's Ben Ali and Egypt's Mubarak
falling after just weeks of protests, there was a sense that "it could happen anywhere- and just as quickly."20
The Characteristics of the Arab Democratic Uprising
"The notion that the struggle of the Arab people for democracy and freedom is inseparable from the struggle
against imperialism, Zionism and neoliberalism was articulated in the declaration of the Fourth Cairo
Conference"21 in 2006. The Arab uprisings aim at transforming the unequal socioeconomic and political
relations that have helped to sustain authoritarianism, Zionism, and imperialism in the Arab world for more than
six decades. Until this year, the Arab world boasted a long list of such leaders. Muammar al-Qaddafi took
charge of Libya in 1969; the Assad family has ruled Syria since 1970; Ali Abdullah Saleh became president of
North Yemen (later united with South Yemen) in 1978; Hosni Mubarak took charge of Egypt in 1981; and Zine
el-Abidine Ben Ali ascended to Tunisia's presidency in 1987.22
President Hosni Mubarak resigned after eighteen days of mass protest by ordinary Egyptians across the
country. He was forced out by the overwhelming commitment of the Egyptian people to demand real political
change. The significant achievement by the Egyptian democratic movement was "the overthrow of a thirtyyear
old authoritarian regime inherited from President Sadat and the beginnings of a new, more open politics."23
In Jordan, King Abdullah moved swiftly in the face of popular protest in the streets of Amman to promise

"significant reforms," largely as a measure to preempt pressure for more radical change. In Syria, President
Bashar al-Assad recognized that he needed more change after the mass protests began in Tunisia and Egypt.
In Yemen, protesters were able to wring some important concessions from President Ali Abdullah Saleh,
including a promise that he would not stand again for the presidency after the end of his present term and that
his son would not succeed him, as well as some economic reforms. In Libya, despite horrendous retaliation by
the Qaddafi regime, the people have successfully toppled the regime with the assistance of U.S. and NATO
allied forces. The motive for the Arab democratic revolution is people's abhorrence of long-term corrupt
dictatorship. The democratic movement is gaining momentum due to high unemployment and inflation, the gap
between the rich and poor, sectarian strife within Islam, and complaints about the rigid Islamic ruling system
under corrupt authoritarian regimes.
The Arab democratic movement has a different nature compared to other revolutions in history. The Arab
democratic uprising has been initiated by mass populations without heroes, such as Mao, who led the
communist revolution in China, or Che Guevara, the Cuban revolutionist. Suffering from long-term dictatorship,
the corruption of the ruling group, extreme financial difficulties caused by skyrocketing unemployment rates and
consumer prices, and authoritarian regimes that suppressed basic human rights such as freedom of expression,
the peoples in the Arab world are expressing their anger and this affects neighboring countries in a sort of
domino effect. The history of the Arab democratic movement is similar to the Eastern European history of
overcoming communism in that pro-democracy citizens are trying to get out of authoritarian regimes without
transforming Islamic fundamentalism. Social network services such as Twitter and Facebook, which spread
democratization information, have played an important role for the Arab democratic movement. It is uncertain
whether the Arab democratic movement will succeed or not. The Arab democratic movement is accompanied
by huge bloodshed but there is no case of a successful democratization so far. The Arab Spring can be
described as a civil revolution against the authority of patriarchy in Islam.
Tunisia and Egypt executed neoliberalistic economic policies in the Arab world. In this regard, the Arab Spring is
a resistance to the neoliberalism that brought about the unemployment of youth, the collapse of the middle
class, and the expansion of the gap between the rich and poor.
The upheaval sweeping through the Arab world in spring 2011 was a repudiation of capitalism even more
sweeping than the repudiation of communism which swept through Eastern Europe beginning in 1989. One of
the protesters in Cairo held up a yellow sign upon which was written: "Egypt supports Wisconsin workers: one
world one pain." The only thing that Egypt and Wisconsin have in common is capitalism, which is failing in both
places.24 Neoliberalism, which emphasizes an individual's competitive edge, has impoverished the
marginalized, including unemployed persons, women, and children.
The current situation in all Arab countries pushes unemployed youth, who think profoundly that they have the
right to live like anyone in a similar situation in the world, to despair and at times revolt. There will be long and
difficult days ahead of the Arab world in realizing democracy. It may take a long time to consolidate Western-
style democracy in Arab society even though the Arab Spring may bring relief from autocracy.
Current Situation of the Democratic Movement in North Korea
There is no full-fledged anti-government movement in North Korea due to tight control. So-yeol Kim writes,
"Democratization in the Middle East has proven possible due in large part to the existence of opposition forces
which have been able to oppose their government; however as is well known, North Korea is a society which
does not even allow the seeds of opposition to be cultivated."25 However, time and again there is news of an
uprising in the wake of failed hard currency reforms or excessive control of the market, but these kinds of
protest are confined to livelihood-style demonstrations. Conflict over stall fees in Sinuiju and the murder of a
notorious former public security chief in Chongjin are among the most recent cases in point. But nobody knows
how the livelihood-style protests might develop in North Korea. A small protest can trigger a mass anti-regime
movement. In this respect, the influx and spreading of outside information is essential to realize the

democratization of North Korea. The Hosni Mubarak regime that attempted a father-to-son leadership
succession has been collapsed by the demand of civil protesters who want to realize democratization. This may
play as a catalyst for North Korea.
There is a high possibility that the middle class may realize North Korea's democratization. The third generation
leadership succession in North Korea is likely to create fissures in its own elite, and could be a key opportunity
to spur change. Voices of complaint are already coming from North Korean military officials who say that Kim
Jong-un does not know what he is doing.26 North Korean middle-class intellectuals are different from high-
ranking officials; they have the chance to access outside information and they have the ability to analyze it. Only
the middle-class intellectual can spread outside information to the grassroots. North Korea is such a closed
society that its people live their daily lives worshiping the regime. The North Korean regime is so fearful of the
Arab democratic movement that it tries to block all outside information that flows into North Korea. So-yeol Kim
writes, "In North Korea, any sort of demonstration is deemed to be anti-regime; the government will hunt down
and punish every single one of those who participated."27
The North Korean people who do not know the outside world are following the leadership with obedience and
loyalty. Unlike the democratic movement in Arab countries, North Koreans find it very difficult to access social
network services by computer or smartphone. Therefore, they may need a leader who is open to outside
information. Accordingly, it is very important to send balloons over the border carrying leaflets and little
necessities or to send outside information through radio broadcasts to accelerate the democratization of North
Korea. Someday, the democratic wind may blow into North Korea. So far, hard-line strategies of confrontation
and containment have proven dangerously incorrect and have contributed to the further aggravation of relations
with North Korea. In dealing with North Korea, humanitarian aid combined with engagement can help prepare
for Korean unification by winning over the hearts and minds of the North Korean people.28
A Ripple Effect of Arab Spring on the North Korean Elite
Currently North Korea is in a situation similar to that of the Arab countries where the democratic movement
unfolded. North Korea is a socialist state under continuing dictatorship, and is suffering from food shortages just
like the Arab states mentioned above. The Arab Spring reflects the importance of public sentiment. It reminds
us of the fact that no matter how strong a regime may appear, it could be fragile if it does not have public
support.
Some say that North Korea may be struck by a democratic movement soon because of its persistent food
shortage. If a democratic movement arises in North Korea, the protesters may be students of Kim Il-sung
University or North Korean students studying abroad. In a certain aspects, David Seddon writes, the Arab
democracy movement gave confidence to the North Korean elite classes that "they also can succeed in the
democratic revolution. The Arab democratic movement can be considered as a half success. There have been
many Middle East democratic uprisings conducted by those who oppose prolonged one-man rule. Arab
dictators have doubled their efforts, growing both more stubborn and more emboldened in their efforts to
preserve power."29 The Tunisian and Egyptian cases were successful because the protesters ousted the
dictators. Hence, first, the impact of the Arab Spring on North Korea is that such a successful democratic
revolution in the Middle East may give some confidence to the North Korean elite classes to win
democratization in the future.
Another impact is that the Arab Spring may fuel the democratic revolution that is in the mind of the elite classes
in North Korea. North Korea's successor Kim Jong-un took leadership lessons from his late father by
accompanying him to state events. The elite class has complained about kind of leadership succession pattern.
North Korean elites have taken to calling Kim Jong-un a "little boy." In North Korea, the term "little boy"
connotes a superior who is incompetent. This reflects the idea that the North Korean elite's loyalty to Kim Jong-
un is very low. Unlike Kim Jong-i l's leadership succession, Kim Jong-un's leadership inheritance may hit a
snag. Opposition figures are now being purged in North Korea in order to prevent a military coup.30 The North

Korean regime took preventive measures to ward off a military coup by purging those who had experienced a
Western lifestyle. There are several rumors of a purge within the cadres' world, including by Yong Hun Kim:
"Kim Yong Sam, the Director of Railways, Ryu Kyung, the vice Director of the National Security Agency and Ju
Sang Sung, Director of the People's safety Ministry, who heads of two vital organs protecting the Kim Jong Il
regime, were purged."31
Due to the economic difficulties, the regime's authority is growing weak, and as the rationing system has
crumbled, some hungry soldiers have deserted the military.32
The Application of Neoliberalism to North Korea
The neoclassical theory of economics stresses the efficiency of private enterprise, liberalized trade, and
relatively open markets, and therefore it seeks to maximize the role of the private sector in determining the
political and economic priorities of the state.33 Now, in the midst of the "Arab Spring," it has become apparent
that the West's theory of neoliberalism spreading openness and democracy has utterly failed. The wave of
protests that are sweeping the Arab world may have many causes, but protesters in every country have
mentioned some kind of economic woes as at least a partial reason for their protest.34 Autocracy, poverty,
unemployment, and lack of economic security are all cited as reasons that protests have broken out. North
Korea may be an example of a country that will not go down this route because it knows that control of every
form of economic and political protest is the key to regime survival.
In this section, I will analyze the Arab Spring's impact on North Korea in terms of stressing the efficiency of
private enterprise, liberalizing trade and opening markets, and maximizing the role of the private sector.
Stressing the Efficiency of the Private Sector
Just as in the Arab states, North Korea is faced with a situation of autocracy, power succession, and corruption.
As the health of Kim Jong-i l gets worse, there appears to be confusion in the decision making process; the elite
class is complaining about the power succession issue. The heir-apparent does not have the charismatic
capability of his father and only causes confusion in state affairs by wielding excessive political power. It seems
that just as the ruling classes in the Arab states are not yet ready to rule, North Korea's hereditary succession
seems to be not quite ready to assume power. Since the failure of currency redenomination, middle-class
people in North Korea, who used to play the role of supporters of the regime, have become those who have a
grudge against Kim Jong-un's leadership. The deceased North Korean leader Kim Jong-il made an all-out effort
to consolidate hereditary succession system before his death so as not to fail the hereditary succession. At the
moment, North Korea is controlling internal news dissemination about the Arab Spring. Furthermore, it is cutting
off outside information by suspending mobile phone rental service. The use of the Internet is authorized only for
the privileged classes and it is almost unimaginable to use social network services such as Twitter or Facebook.
Even though the general public may know about the Arab democratic movement via information accessed on
their mobile phones, public resistance may be almost impossible because the North Korean regime has already
begun a purge campaign against anti-Jong-i l figures or potential figures.35 It may become polemic over the
ripple effect of the Arab Spring. However, North Korea may still stress the governmentcentered, planned
economy instead of stressing the efficiency of the private sector in order to keep its regime stable.
Liberalizing Trade and the Open Market
Long-term mismanagement and international sanctions have pushed the North Korean economy to the brink of
collapse. In the wake of the North Korean regime's failure of hard currency, the North Korean government has
allowed small-scale free trade in the local market, but such activity is limited. The North Korean regime is afraid
of opening up its market further because the regime has witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and
believes this was caused by the opening of its market.
An open market may cause an influx of outside information that the regime tries to block. The emergence of a
comprador class in North Korea might enlarge liberal trade and the open market in the future. However, the
North Korean regime tries to check the economic prosperity of the middle classes in order to prevent them from

standing against the regime.
It may be difficult for the democratic wind to land in North Korea due to the regime's tight control of its people
and outside information. Anti-government sentiment could erupt on a marginal scale in North Korea, but it would
be very difficult to vent it on a large scale due to the lack of an organizational basis. The impact of the Arab
Spring on the North Korean regime may be limited because North Korea has strengthened its surveillance of its
people and enterprises. According to the perspective of the North Korean regime, the best strategy is to keep
outsiders out.
Maximizing the Role of the Private Sector
North Korea may not maximize the role of the private sector because it might trigger more demonstrations, as
occurred in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. The North Korean regime will stick to its own way
of socialism and try to minimize the role of the private sector.
North Korea may draw the following lessons from the Arab democratic movement.36 First, any anti-government
revolts need to be quashed as quickly as possible. The longer the democratic movement continues, the harder
it becomes for outsiders to ignore it and the louder the calls for external intervention become. Second, to
safeguard its regime, they may strengthen the Songun (Military First) policy. Egypt, Yemen, and Libya's rebels
have overwhelmed their regimes as the militaries fractured. Third, the North Korean regime may cherish the
postcolonial ideology of its unique socialism. Fourth, as North Korea has actively manufactured nuclear
weapons in return for cash, it may seek new weapons clients. Fifth, North Korea may increase cooperation with
China because China is Pyongyang's last hope as the moral cover of fellow autocracies fades. Sixth, the
surrender of nuclear weapons would be a huge mistake, because the easiest way to deter Responsibility to
Protect (R2P) interventions is to possess weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). If North Korea gives up its
nuclear program today, it will be more open to democratic pressure and aircraft attack tomorrow.
The desirable direction for North Korea's democratization can be encouraged by empowering free transaction
for the grassroots in order to make the North Korean regime negotiate with them, just as neoliberalism argues.
The Arab Spring can be also described as a civil revolution against the ization of In the last three decades, Ben
Ali in Tunisia and Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt abandoned the more egalitarian and
welfareoriented policies of their predecessors in favor of economic opening and deregulation.37 The
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have touted Egypt and Tunisia's economic reforms as regional
cases of globalization's success.38
In this regard, the Arab Spring is a resistance to the neoliberalism that brought about the unemployment of
youth, the collapse of middle class, and the expansion of the gap between the rich and poor. Observers wrote in
2011: "The Egyptian and Tunisian phenomenon is not about the ousting of a president; it is about the collapse
of the Western-colonial model of globalization."39 The contradictions of the unfolding process of global
expansion and accumulation have brought to the fore new political realities: renewed repression at home and
abroad to control an increasingly frustrated working class in the imperial heartland, and a militant and
revolutionary mass of workers and underprivileged people.40 Willis wrote, "In the Arab countries, the model of
globalization consisted of abandoning the Arab-Muslim character of the state, responsible for providing
wellbeing to its society."41 In North Korea, the impact of neoliberalism is marginal and there is no room for
mass protest against the regime. Paradoxically, if we call the Arab Spring a resistance against neoliberalism,
then North Korea is under favorable conditions to rule its people by continuing its policies of low unemployment,
maximizing the role of public sector, and maintaining a government-centered, closed economy that may cut off
neoliberalism.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have analyzed the impact of the Arab Spring on North Korea in connection with neoliberalism. As
seen above, the Arab Spring can be also described as a civil revolution against the globalization of
neoliberalism. Arab states including Tunisia and Egypt are the adherents of the neoliberal economic policy in

the region. In North Korea, the impact of neoliberalism is marginal and there is no room for mass protest against
the regime. Paradoxically, if we call the Arab Spring a protest against neoliberalism, then North Korea is under
favorable conditions to rule its people by continuing its policies of low unemployment, maximizing the role of the
public sector, and maintaining a government-centered, closed economy that may cut off neoliberalism.
Therefore, the possibility for the democratization of North Korea is slim at the moment. The North Korean
regime is poised to prevent any domestic uprising. In a certain aspect, the Arab democratic movement gave
confidence to the North Korean elite classes that they also can succeed in the democratic revolution. Another
impact is that the Arab Spring may fuel the democratic revolution that is in the mind of the elite classes in the
North Korea.
We could draw three findings in connection with neoliberalism as follows:
First, North Korea may still stress the government-centered, planned economy instead of stressing the
efficiency of the private sector in order to keep its regime stable.
Second, the impact of the Arab Spring on the North Korean regime may be limited because it has strengthened
its surveillance system over its peoples and enterprises. States like Burma (Myanmar) and Turkmenistan
escape the label of failed states only because they as nation-states fully monopolize all legitimate uses of
violence.42 From the perspective of the North Korean regime, the best strategy is to keep outsiders out.
Third, North Korea may not maximize the role of the private sector because it may trigger more demonstrations,
as took place in Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. The North Korean regime will stick to its own
way of socialism and try to minimize the role of the private sector.
South Korea and the United States have very few options, and the obvious lesson of the Arab democratic
movement for outsiders is that internal change is more meaningful and legitimate without foreign intervention.
North Korea's hereditary succession system seems to be successful at the moment but we need to wait and
see.
After all, the lesson of Tunisia and Egypt is that dictators sometimes fall despite, not because of, U.S. help or
outside assistance. The ideal way to realize the democratization of North Korea may be domestic change at the
hands of its people. North Korea's democratization can be possible by empowering free transactions for the
grassroots population to force the North Korean regime to negotiate with the people.
Sidebar
Research Fellow of Research Institute for Security Affairs at Korea National Defense University, 205 Susaek-
Dong Eunpyung-Ku Seoul 122-875, ROK, +82-2-300-4231, Mobile: +82- 010-4200-4328, Fax: +82-2-309-9878;
david1@daum.net
Footnote
Notes
1. Miguel A. Centeno and Joseph N. Cohen, Global Capitalism: A Sociological Perspective (Cambridge, MA:
Polity Press, 2010), p. 206.
2. Rashid Khalidi, "The Arab Spring," The Nation, accessed March 3, 2011, available at
http://www.thenation.com/print/article/158991 /arab- Spring.
3. Stephen C. Wright and Linda R. Tropp, "Collective Action in Response to Disadvantage," in Iain Walker and
Heather J. Smith, eds., Relative Deprivation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 228.
4. Berch Berberoglu, Class and Class Conflict in the Age of Globalization (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2009), p. 70.
5. Robert Rotberg, "State Failure and North Korea: A Conceptual Framework," Working Paper Series (Seoul:
Ilmin International Relation Institute, 2010), p. 2.
6. Ibid., p. 5.
7. Andrew Natsios, "The Politics of Famine in North Korea," U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report, accessed
August 18, 2011, available at http://www.usip.org.

8. "North Korea accepted Coca Cola and KFC which is a symbol of Capitalism," accessed July 14, 2011,
available at http://media.daum/nms service/news. "The new agreement will provide Reuters access to news
video from North Korea via satellite for timely distribution to broadcasters and publishers around the world. The
Reuters News Agency will be the first international news organization to have a full time satellite dish in North
Korea, delivering clean news video content." As a result of the agreement, AP and Reuters both now have a full
presence in Pyongyang, joining Xinhua and Itar-Tass. Chris Green, "Reuters Beefs Up Pyongyang Presence,"
The Daily NK, accessed July 15, 2011, available at http://www.dailynk.com/english.
9. Philip G. Cerny, Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010), p. 130.
10. Subcomandante Marcos, "The Fourth World War Has Begun," in Tom Hayden, ed., The Zapatista Reader
(New York: Nation Books, 2001), p. 271.
11. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 8-9.
12. Ravi K. Roy, Arthur Denzau, and Thomas D. Willett, Neoliberalism: National and Regional Experiments with
Global Ideas (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 27.
13. "Neoliberalism proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property
rights, free markets, and free trade." David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005), p. 2.
14. Cerny, p. 135.
15. Grard Dumnil and Dominique Lvy, The Crisis of Neoliberalism (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press,
2011), p. 327.
16. Ioannis Glinavos, Neoliberalism and the Law in Post-Communist Transition: The Evolving Role of Law in
Russia's Transition to Capitalism (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 26.
17. Emlyn Nardone and Terrence McDonough, "Global Neoliberalism and the Possibility of Transnational State
Structures," in Terrence McDonough, et al., eds., Contemporary Capitalism and Its Crises: Social Structure of
Accumulation Theory for the 21st Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 169.
18. Peter Kingstone, The Political Economy of Latin America: Reflections on Neoliberalism and Development
(London: Routledge, 2010), p. 46.
19. Allan Engler, Economic Democracy (Black Point, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 2010), p. 17.
20. Shadi Hamid, "The Arab Spring: Protest, Power, Prospect," Brookings Institution. Accessed July 14, 2011,
available at http://www.brookings.edu/opinions. "The collapse of Ben Ali and his government is not only the
collapse of an authoritarian regime, but rather of the globalization model of finance capitalism and imperialism
for Third World countries." Abdul Ilah Albayaty, Hana Al Bayaty, Ian Douglas, "Failure of the Globalization
Model: The Arab Spring of Democracy," accessed July 18, 2011, available at http://theglobalrealm.com.
21. "The Cairo Conference began in December 2002 in the run-up to the US-led invasion of Iraq. Initially, it was
an attempt to build international alliances against the Iraq war and to insert Egypt into the global justice
moment. It was held annually and evolved into a key platform not only for forging links between Egyptian and
international activists, but also for building discursive alliances between different political and ideological trends
(principally socialists and Islamists). At its height, in 2008, the conference welcomed more than 1000 Egyptian,
Arab and international activists to debate and discuss the struggle against imperialism, Zionism, Neoliberalism
and despotism." Nicola Pratt, "Egypt: Left Debates the Arab Spring, Democracy and Imperialism," accessed
July 18, 2011, available at http://www.links.org.au/node/2387.
22. F. Gregory Gause III, "Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring." Accessed July 25, 2011, available
at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67932 /f- gregory- gause-
iii/whymiddleeaststudiesmissedthearabSpring.
23. David Seddon, "The Democracy Movement in the Arab World," One World Column, accessed July 14,

2011, available at http://oneworldcolumn.blogspot.com.
24. E. Michael Jones, "Culture of Death Watch," accessed July 18, 2011, available at http:// www.
culturewars.com.
25. Kim so Yeol, "Whither North Korean Democratization?" The Daily NK, accessed August 1, 2011,
http://www.dailynk.com.
26. Ibid.
27. So Yeol Kim, "Experts Reject Riot Gear Claim," The Daily NK, accessed August 1, 2011, available at
http://www.dailynk.com.
28. Suk-Hi Kim, "The Survival of North Korea: Essays on Strategy, Economics, and International Relations,"
accessed August 18, 2011, available at http://www.nautilus.org.
29. David Seddon, "The Democracy Movement in the Arab World," One World Column, accessed July 14,
2011, available at http://oneworldcolumn.blogspot.com.
30. Seok Young Lee, "Border Investigators Turned on Soldiers," accessed August 1, 2011, The Daily NK ,
available at http://www.dailynk.com.
31. Yong Hun Kim, "There Is Still a Possibility of Uprising in North Korean Society," The Daily NK, accessed
August 1, 2011, available at http://www.dailynk.com.
32. Seok Young Kim and Chris Green, "Popular Uprising: Hard but Not Impossible," The Daily NK, accessed
August 1, 2011, available at http://www.dailynk.com; Seok Young Lee, "Border Investigators Turned on
Soldiers," The Daily NK, accessed August 1, 2011, available at http://www.dailynk.com.
33. Roy and Willett, p. 27.
34. Nader Atassi, "Neoliberalism and the 'Arab Spring,'" accessed July 18, 2011, available at
http://bpr.berkeley.edu.
35. In North Korea more than 300,000 people have a mobile phone at the moment.
36. Robert E. Kelly, "The Impact of Arab Spring on North Korea," RINSA FORUM (Seoul: Research Institute for
National Security Affairs), p. 5.
37. Eric Stoner, "The Neoliberal Threat to the Arab Spring," accessed July 18, 2011, available at
http://wagingnonviolence.org.
38. Ibid.
39. Albayaty, Bayaty, and Douglas.
40. Berch Berberoglu, Class and Class Conflict in the Age of Globalization (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2009), p. 81.
41. "While the definitions of globalization are very diverse, the majority share the basic premise that
'globalization' involves the increasing interconnectedness of different parts of the world, such that physical
distance becomes less of a barrier to exchanges and movements of ideas, goods, people and money." Katie
Willis, Theories and Practices of Development (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 196.
42. Robert Rotberg, "State Failure and North Korea: A Conceptual Framework." Working Paper Series (Seoul:
Ilmin International Relation Institute 2010), pp. 5-6.
Subject: Dictators; Cellular telephones; Capitalism; Market economies; Neoliberalism;
Location: Tunisia Egypt
Publication title: North Korean Review
Volume: 8
Issue: 1
Pages: 53-66

Number of pages: 14
Year: 2012
Publisher: McFarland & Company, Inc.
Place of publication: Jefferson
Publication subject: History--History Of Asia, Political Science--International Relations
ISSN: 15512789
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.1.53
Copyright: Copyright McFarland & Company, Inc. Spring 2012
_______________________________________________________________
Document 7 of 20
Arab Fall or Arab Winter?

Author: Wiarda, Howard J
Abstract: Criticizing the concept of an "Arab Spring," the author is pessimistic about democracy and
development in the Arab countries that have recently overthrown authoritarian leaders. Overthrowing a
dictatorship is much easier than building a functioning democracy and a stable society to replace it. Few of the
countries in the Arab Middle East have the requisite level of civil society, institutions, middle class, political
culture, level of socioeconomic development, and proximity to other developed democracies (the mentoring
factor) to support democracy. Reviewing the literature on democracy and development, the author
systematically assesses the Arab Middle East in light of its democratic prospects. His prognosis is pessimistic-at
least in the short run. He also distinguishes between countries at different levels of development. As for U.S.
policy, the author recommends greater realism and less romance and wishful thinking. Adapted from the source
document.
Subject: Democracy; Democratization; Middle East; Economic Development; Civil Society; Middle Class;
Dictatorship; Political Culture; Arab Countries;

Identifier / keyword: "Arab Spring" "clash of civilizations" democracy Egypt Gulf states prerequisites
Correspondence author: Wiarda, Howard J
Publication title: American Foreign Policy Interests
Volume: 34
Issue: 3
Pages: 134-137
Number of pages: 4
Year: 2012
Publisher: Taylor & Francis, Philadelphia PA
ISSN: 1080-3920
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2012.686723
Update: 2013-02-01
_______________________________________________________________
Document 8 of 20
Turkey and the Arab Spring

Author: Kaya, Karen
Abstract: Turkish security forces, trained by the U.S. Army, have begun to train other armies (such as Syria and
Jordan in the Middle East and many in Central Asia and Eastern Europe). [...]U.S. lessons on civil-military
relations or the laws of war will, in turn, be taught to the these countries. Turkey's democratic transition began in
2002, and the EU was the main catalyst for Turkish democracy, forcing it to improve its human rights record and
establish civilian control of the military.\nS. assistance and training, and is full of Westernized officers.
[...]Turkey's current position provides an opportunity.
Full text: THE ARAB SPRING is a complex, rapidly unfolding phenomenon of uprisings, revolutions, mass
demonstrations, and civil war, a diverse set of movements with diverse instigators and aspirations, including
freedom, economic opportunity, regime change, and ending corruption. It started in Tunisia in December 2010

and spread to the rest of the Middle East throughout 2011. Although it is the most significant event to happen in
the Middle East in recent history, we do not yet understand its trajectory and cannot predict its outcome. Despite
the fact that the process is apparently advancing the values of freedom, justice, and democracy, it can still
produce less desirable outcomes, requiring alternate approaches to standard diplomatic and economic
approaches with a long-term view.
Does the Arab Spring have a Turkish model? Countries in the Middle East are looking to Turkey whose
conservative social and cultural outlook, but liberal political and economic program, stand out as a model of
Islamic liberalism. For the U.S. Army, this presents a long-term opportunity. Turkish security forces, trained by
the U.S. Army, have begun to train other armies (such as Syria and Jordan in the Middle East and many in
Central Asia and Eastern Europe). Thus U.S. lessons on civil-military relations or the laws of war will, in turn, be
taught to the these countries. Given its current popularity, America could use Turkish help as it maps out the
future of the Arab Spring.
All this might mean a change in the nature of the U.S. Army's engagement with Turkey. The U.S. Army's former
engagement with Turkey mostly entailed military relations through NATO, but did not address the profound
transformation of Turkish society, Turkey's new foreign policy, and the end of the Cold War. In addition,
Turkey's democratization process has led to civilian control of the military and reduced the military's previously
unique authoritative role.1 Thus, if we assess them accurately, the changing dynamics in the region may
present a long-term opportunity for the U.S. Army. This requires a comprehensive analysis of the so-called
Turkish model. What aspects of it can Arab Spring countries aspire to, and what features of it are not
applicable?
The Destination
Turkey's current state of affairs is the result of an evolutionary process, not rapid development, but it has the
ability, through its example today, to serve as a model for what some of the Arab spring countries might want to
emulate. Turkey as a destination point features a democratically elected, moderate Islamic party in charge of an
economic boom. Turkey can make a real and visible, if not decisive, difference in the Arab Spring's changing
societies.2 The Turkish experience shows that Middle Easterners do not have to choose between authoritarian
government and an Islamist regime. Turkey shows that there is a third option: Islamic liberalism. With its
conservative social and cultural outlook, but liberal political and economic program, Turkey's Justice and
Development Party (JDP) is a model of this. It seems to demonstrate that Islamic identity does not contradict
democracy, and that there is no inevitable clash between the two.
Some also argue that under JDP leadership, Turkey, in developing political, economic and cultural relations with
all the countries in its region, has played a role in the emergence of the Arab Spring. By lifting visa restrictions,
developing trade and cultural relations, and exporting its television programs, Turkey exposed Arabs to new
ways of thinking about Islam, modernism, and elections.
Not the Journey
Turkey's non-Arab identity and the process it followed to get to its current end state are features that do not
quite apply to the Arab Spring countries. The Turkish military's historically unique role, its membership in NATO
and relations with the European Union (EU), its capitalist economy, and its evolutionary process are impossible
to duplicate exactly. There are various versions of the Turkish model.
Military control model. The first is the pre-2002 Turkey in which the military controlled the secular state, and the
country modernized under military control before democratically bringing Islamic actors into politics. This
Turkish model's militarycontrolled transition period instilled secular and Western values in Turkish society before
Islamist politics arrived. The military firmly defended a secular constitution to deter any imposition of Islamic
rule.
However, this narrative does not tell the whole story. The Turkish military certainly had a role to play in the
country's modernization, but many claim it actually inhibited the democratic process.3 Some experts even claim

that democratic change occurred in Turkey not because of the military, but despite it.4 Therefore, to say that
Turkey is a model of modernization because of its military overlooks the fact that the military intervened in
politics five times by staging three military coups, one "postmodern coup" that forced the government to resign,
and one "e-coup" that issued an online statement threatening action. The military was not a force for democracy
or progressive political change.
In addition, Kemalism, the principle the military authoritatively enforced, that Turkey should be secular and
Western, cannot be a model for the region because it was authoritarianism and lack of democracy that triggered
the Middle East's uprisings in the first place.5 The Arab people no longer want authoritarianism.6
Islamic power model. The second version of the Turkish model is that Turkey represents the consolidation of
Islamic power in a formerly secular system. This model demonstrates the possibility of a party with an Islamic
pedigree coming to power through democratic means, via free and fair elections. Furthermore, this model
shows that such a country can be a powerful actor in the Middle East while defying, or at least openly criticizing
Israel's policies. This is the Turkey of 2002 to the present, an independent country with ties to Western
institutions, yet determined to stand up to Israel and pursue its own national interests.
This narrative is also incomplete. Turkey's democratic transition began in 2002, and the EU was the main
catalyst for Turkish democracy, forcing it to improve its human rights record and establish civilian control of the
military. The Customs Union agreement with Europe helped its economic development. Since none of the Arab
Spring countries have any prospects of EU membership, this narrative does not apply. Turkey's proximity to
Europe and its membership in NATO created dynamics that do not exist in the Arab world. Furthermore, Turkish
democracy still has a ways to go. Turkey's infamous Kurdish question remains unresolved, and Turkey ranks
poorly in freedom of the press, with a high number of journalists in prison.
The youth model. The third version of the Turkish model is the one adopted by the people and youth who are
protesting in the streets of the Middle East. They look at Turkey's open society, strong economy, rule of law,
and liberal and tolerant interpretation of Islam. This group is attracted to Turkey because of the liberal life its
citizens can lead and is too young to consider Turkey's long history under military rule.7
This narrative, which sees Turkey as a free, open, capitalist society, is also hard to replicate for the Arab Spring
countries. Contrary to many Arab countries, Turkey does not have any oil, so it needs genuine economic
growth. As such, it is the most capitalist country in the Islamic world. The EU market and Turkey's Customs
Union agreement with the EU allow Turkish capitalism to thrive, and necessitate an open society. These
circumstances are not present in the Arab Spring countries.8
Turkey's economic and democratic reforms took place over a period of 80 years, with many setbacks along the
way. Some problematic aspects still remain. Turkey is unique in that it has a long history of secularism. In
addition, it was never colonized, so it lacks the post-colonial syndrome that the Arab Spring countries have.
Turkey has come to its current state after a long evolutionary process, whereas the Arab Spring countries are
experiencing rapid change. Plus, for many Muslims in the Middle East, including the youth who look at the
Turkey of today and want democracy, Turkey's unique past "militant secularism," such as the headscarf ban,
would be unacceptable.
What the Arab Spring lacks is an Arab model of liberalization, democracy, and economic development. Egypt,
not Turkey, may play this role in the long-term. Egypt is an Arab country that has long been the center of Arab
entertainment and culture. Its language is the commonly understood dialect throughout the region, more so than
modern standard Arabic. Therefore, Egypt may be a more relevant model for the rest of the Arab world.
Currently Turkey offers hope as a co-religionist with a functioning economy. However, in the longterm, its
regional location and its religious status may not be enough to bridge the gap. It is possible that Turkey and
Egypt (and possibly Iran) will eventually emerge as leaders in the region, with Egypt taking the lead due to its
Arab culture and language. A case in point is that, despite Turkey's efforts to mediate Middle Eastern issues, it
was Egyptian mediation that brought Hamas and Fatah together in April 2011, which, at the time, was a historic

achievement for the Palestinians.9
The Diversity of the Arab Spring Countries
The Arab Spring is not a homogeneous social movement or set of national events. The people in each country
are calling for something different. Some want to overthrow their government, while others are simply calling for
an end to corruption or for increased economic opportunities. The countries involved are witnessing different
outcomes. The internal dynamics between each country's military and political leadership, as well as between
the military and society in general, may explain the diverse outcomes.
For example, in Tunisia, people demanded political change after a single event (Muhammad Bouazizi, a young
vendor, set himself on fire outside his local municipal office when the police arbitrarily confiscated his cart). In
Egypt, people demanded the fall of the regime, starting out with a peaceful demonstration that turned into social
unrest. In Yemen, mass peaceful protests demanding an overthrow of the regime turned into demonstrations,
unrest, and violence. In Bahrain, the protests centered on the lack of economic opportunity and political
freedom, and eventually became a sectarian dispute between a Shi'ite majority and a Sunni minority. In Syria,
people called for political change after a history of repression, with events leading to a brutal crackdown on
disaffected citizens. Libya experienced civil war.
Other countries did not experience such dramatic events. Kuwait experienced political turmoil not necessarily
related to the Arab Spring. Oman faced demonstrations as part of the Arab Spring, but they have not threatened
the regime. Demonstrators confronted the government, but did not call for the resignation of Sultan Qaboos.
Instead, they demanded a strong legislature to serve as a counterweight to monarchical power. Their main
demands and frustrations had to do with a lack of economic opportunity.
It would be too hard for countries with such diverse histories, cultures, motivations, and trajectories to adapt the
Turkish model exactly. Different groups would embrace different versions of it, rejecting the other aspects,
creating disagreement. As such, the best model will be different for each country and each country's political
development will happen according to its own political history, sociology, and motivations.
Ironically, some in the "Arab street" see Turkey as a model because of its Muslim identity, its democratic
government, its successful economy, and its relations with the West, while others say that it cannot be a model
because it is not Muslim enough, not democratic enough, and not distant enough from Israel and the West. This
is illustrated clearly in research done by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation.10 The research
obtained data from 2,267 respondents from Egypt, Iran, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and
Iraq. The study found that 66 percent saw Turkey as a model. The most cited reasons were its Muslim identity
(15 percent), its economy (12 percent), its democracy (11 percent), and its advocacy of the rights of
Palestinians and Muslims (10 percent).
However, a paradox emerged when it came to the cited reasons to reject Turkey as a role model. This time
Turkey's secular political structure was seen as a negative aspect (12 percent). The view that Turkey is not
Muslim enough came second (11 percent). A perception of Turkey's Muslim identity having been "watered
down" because of its democratic process and its abolition of the Caliphate in the early 20th century probably
help to fuel these perceptions. The third factor weighing against Turkey was its relations with the West and
Israel (10 percent), and the fourth, the assumption that a model was not needed for the region at all (8
percent).11
The Arab Spring's Effects on Turkey
The Arab Spring revealed a lot about Turkey. Until then, many in the Arab world admired Turkey's ability to
stand up to the West by establishing good relations with countries such as Syria, Iran, and Libya while criticizing
Israel. Before the Arab Spring erupted, the JDP, which came to power in 2002, had been following a new
foreign policy called the "zero problems with neighbors" policy, in which Turkey pursued "proactive peace
diplomacy" in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Gulf.
This new policy claimed that Turkey needed to be at peace with its diverse Muslim, Ottoman, European, and

Central Asian background and take advantage of its multifaceted identity. The idea was that Turkey could talk to
Damascus and Jerusalem, Tehran and Washington, and be an effective arbiter and peacemaker. In fact, when
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan made his victory speech after winning the elections for the third time in a row,
he said, "Believe me, Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul; Beirut won as much as Izmir; Damascus won as
well as Ankara; Ramallah, Neblus, Jenin, the West Bank; Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir."12
The policy also called for improving trade relations between Turkey and its neighbors, thereby creating more
economic interdependence to promote peace. Turkey improved relations with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, along with
all its other neighbors, causing some concern in the West that Turkey was "turning east." In fact, this was more
a case of Turkey diversifying its foreign policy based on calculations of hard national interests, just like any
major power.13 Turkey claimed this multifaceted identity made it the best candidate for regional leader in the
Middle East and among Arab nations, due to its common history, religion, and familiarity with them. Turkey also
claimed this unique position enabled it to be a mediator between East and West. For example, it offered to
mediate between the United States and Iran, and tried to bring Syria and Israel together to hold direct talks in
2008. Turkey also ventured into Israeli-Palestinian and intra-Palestinian negotiations and tried to mediate the
Georgian-Russian conflict. The JDP's aim in all this was to increase its stature and visibility in the world.
All this changed with the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring caught Turkey off-guard, just as it did other countries. In
the case of Tunisia and Egypt, where the protestors were calling for an end to authoritarian secularist policies,
the JDP was able to stand with the pro-democracy movements protesting conditions similar to those the JDP
had fought.
This was not the case for Libya and Syria, where events tested Turkey's "zero problems" policy. It was harder
for the JDP to criticize Muammar Gaddafibecause Libya was one of Turkey's major trading partners, with
billions of dollars invested and 25,000 citizens living there when the crisis began. Thus, Turkey initially hesitated
joining the NATO operation against Gaddafi, but eventually carried out its obligations as a NATO member,
called on Gaddafito step down, and supported the Libyan opposition.
When events in Syria erupted, after failed diplomatic attempts calling on the regime to implement reforms, the
Turkish prime minister harshly criticized the Syrian president, supported the opposition, and demonstrated that
he stood by the Syrian people (and the West), as opposed to pursuing normal relations with the Syrian
government for its own interests.
Turkey's criticism of Syria also soured relations with Iran, bringing the whole "zero-problems" policy into
question. Iran warned that if Turkish officials insisted on their "contradictory behavior" and continued on their
present path, Iran would choose Syria over Turkey. In short, the Arab Spring exposed the contradiction between
pursuing good relations with all neighbors, including such undemocratic rogue states as Syria and Iran, while
advocating democracy and values that the people demanded.14 When faced with this dilemma, Turkey realized
that its values were incompatible with a policy of befriending Syria and Iran. The two countries were in opposing
camps. Syria was close to Iran, while Turkey has historically been in the Western camp as a member of
NATO.15
U.S. Military Considerations
What made Turkey a hero in the Arab street was its harsh rhetoric against Israel, its increased self-confidence
and independence from the West, its open society, successful economy, and Prime Minister Erdogan's success
in reining in the military. When Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Libya in July 2011, crowds in
Tahrir Square chanted, "Thank you, Turkey," and "Erdogan, Turkey, Muslim!" When Prime Minister Erdogan
took his Arab Spring tour, which included visits to Egypt and Tunisia, thousands of adoring supporters at Cairo's
airport received him like a rock star.16
Turkey's military approach in the region reflects its popularity and self-confidence. It has sent officers abroad to
Arab military schools and hosted exchange students at home. Turkish military expertise (gained from the United
States and NATO) has also been sought in other states, as demonstrate d by joint exercises and programs with

Pakistan. Turkish security forces are training other armies in the region as well. Lessons they have learned and
will learn through U.S. training programs will, in turn, be taught to these countries through their own exchanges.
In fact, Turkey has taken the lead in training the security forces of many countries. It has been a key contributor
in training local police and military forces in Afghanistan, having recently taken the lead within the NATO training
mission to train 15,000 Afghan police officers over the next decade. Turkey has also trained the forces of
Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tunisia, Turkmenistan,
Jordan, and Syria under its "Guest Military Personnel Program."17 Turkey leverages its close relationships and
cultural and religious ties to advance military-to-military relations with those countries.
Despite all the talk about Turkey "turning east," the fact remains that the Turkish military has had decades of
U.S. assistance and training, and is full of Westernized officers. Thus, Turkey's current position provides an
opportunity. The U.S. Army can leverage its decades-old relations with its NATO ally to influence the Middle
East through increased military training programs. Increased U.S. Army training of Turkish forces via exchange
programs, coupled with Turkey's initiative to take the lead in training the security forces of other Muslim
countries, could enable the United States to guide the military training and education of security forces in those
countries.
This is important because Arab countries in the Middle East also look at Iran. Iran represents the Muslim world's
defiance of the West, but more precisely, the ability to develop without Western assistance and in spite of
Western resistance. Turkey represents a model of Muslim democracy, a legitimate political system, and a
popular actor in the Middle East. Turkey is leading Iran by a wide margin, but it must be ensured that it remains
the more attractive end state.18
The desire to assume a leadership role has created competition between Iran and Turkey for influence in the
region. Egypt is also a rival, due to its Arab culture and language. There are also the Saudis, who have tried to
contain Iran while viewing Turkey's ambitions with suspicion.19 Saudi Arabia is a huge power in the Gulf, with
the largest population (27 million), the greatest wealth, and a wide influence.
The Middle East may be heading toward a future in which countries will adopt variations or syntheses of a
Turkish model (secular democracy), an Iranian one (Islamic dictatorship), an Egyptian one yet to be determined,
or a Saudi Arabian one. The long-term future of the Middle East may therefore depend on what happens in
Turkey, Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, and the relationship among these countries and their policies toward the
rest of the region.20
The U.S. Army's support to Turkey in its efforts to further its democratization process and become the influential
Middle Eastern player that it wants to be should ensure Turkey becomes a more attractive model than the
alternatives. As the effort to train and equip the Turkish Armed Forces matures, the U.S. Army might consider
bolstering its support to the Turkish forces to counter Turkey's long-time terror problem with the Kurdistan
Workers' Party, a problem that undermines Turkey's attractiveness to the Arab Spring countries. However,
these efforts could remain in the background and be jointly coordinated such that they do not to play into
narratives that see U.S. involvement as a negative factor or the United States as controlling Turkey. A Turkey
that benefits from U.S. Army engagement resources would be even more attractive in terms of local and
grassroots acceptance in the Middle East. A shiftfrom strictly military relations within NATO to a relationship that
entails increased training and exchanges may be more beneficial than weapons programs for the United States,
Turkey, and the Middle East.MR
Sidebar
PHOTO: Tunisians demonstrate support for current Tunisian interior minister Al Laaridh in front of the Interior
Ministry in Tunis, Tunisia, 11 January 2012. (AP Photo/Hassene Dridi)
Turkey is unique in that it has a long history of secularism. In addition, it was never colonized, so it lacks the
post-colonial syndrome that the Arab Spring countries have.
Members of the Union of Turkish Youths stage a rally in support of Syrian President Bashar Assad in front of

the Syrian embassy in Ankara, Turkey, 1 June 2012. (AP Photo)
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates walks with Turkish Lt. Col. Zafer Ali Ozsoy in Istanbul, Turkey, 4
February 2010.
Footnote
NOTES
1. Soli zel, "The Unraveling," World Affairs Journal Blog (March 2010), <http://
www.worldaffairsjournal.org/new/blogs/ozel> (26 January 2010).
2. Henri Barkey, "Turkish Foreign Policy and the Middle East," Center for International Studies and Research
Papers No.10, 6 June 2011, <http://www.ceri-sciencespo. com/ressource/n10_06062011.pdf> (6 June 2011).
3. Henri Barkey at "Turkey: A Model for the New Middle East?" The Brookings Institution, 28 February 2011.
4. Steven Cook at "Egypt and the Middle East: A Turkish Model of Democracy," Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, 25 February 2011.
5. Kemalism is the ideology promoted by Mustafa Kemal Atatrk after the creation of the Republic of Turkey. Its
basic tenets are the rule of law, a representative democracy, staunch secularism and the abolishment of the
Caliphate, a nation state composed of "Turkish people" where every Turkish citizen is considered a Turk,
regardless of ethnicity, belief, or gender.
6. Alper Dede, "The Arab Uprisings: Debating the "Turkish Model," Insight Turkey vol. 13, no. 2 (2011): 23-32.
7. Burhanettin Duran and Yilmaz Nuh, "Whose Model? Which Turkey?" Foreign Policy Middle East Channel, 8
February 2011.
8. Ibid.
9. The two sides have since failed to agree on a government that would preside over a transition period towards
elections that could lead to a reunification of the West Bank and Gaza.
10. Mensur Akgn, Sabiha Gndogar, Jonathan Levack, and Gke Perinoglu, "The Perception of Turkey in
the Middle East 2010," The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, 2 February 2011.
11. Kadri Grsel, "Who Really Wants a Muslim Democracy?" Turkish Policy Quarterly vol. 10, no 1 (2011): 96.
12. Mustafa Akyol, "Turkey's Maturing Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs Online, 7 July 2011,
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67974/mustafa-akyol/turkeysmaturing- foreign-policy> (10 July 2011).
13. Ibid.
14. Semih Idiz, "Iran Konusunda Gzler Ailiyor (Eyes are Starting to Open on the Issue of Iran)," Milliyet
(Nationality), 8 August 2011, <http://dunya.milliyet.com.tr/ iran-konusunda-gozler-
aciliyor/dunya/dunyayazardetay/08.08.2011/1423870/default. htm> (8 August 2011).
15. Nuray Mert, "Another Empire? No, Thanks!" Hrriyet Daily News, 24 July 2011, available at
>http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=another-empire-nothanks- 2011-07-24>.
16. Rania Abouzeid, "Why Erdogan is Greeted like a Rock Star in Egypt," Time, 13 September 2011,
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2093090,00. html> (13 September 2011).
17. Trk Silahli Kuvvetlerinde Egitim Grms ve Halen Egitim ve gretimleri Devam Eden Misafir Askeri
Personel Bilgileri (Information Regarding the Guest Military Personnel who has been or is being trained by the
Turkish Armed Forces). Website of the Turkish Armed Forces,
<http://www.tsk.tr/4_ULUSLARARASI_ILISKILER/4_7_
TSK_Askeri_Egitim_ve_Isbirligi_Faaliyetleri/konular/Misafir_Askeri_Personel_Bilgileri. htm> (3 October 2011).
18. Semih Idiz, "Arabs Look to Turkey, not Iran, says poll," Hurriyet Daily News, 28 July 2011,
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=arabs-look-to-turkey-notiran- says-poll-2011-07-28> (28 July
2011).
19. Barkey. Ibid.
20. Muhammed Ayyob, "Beyond the Democratic Wave in the Arab World: The Middle East's Turko-Persian
Future," Insight Turkey vol.13, no.2 (2011): 57.

AuthorAffiliation
Karen Kaya is an analyst on Middle East and Turkey at the Foreign Military Studies Office. She provides military
analysis and is responsible for writing and publishing on Middle East security issues from open sources and
foreign language media, including Turkish. She has an M.A. from Brandeis University, and is a published author
in both Turkish and English.
Subject: Armed forces; Democracy; Military training; Politics; Secularism; Muslims; Rebellions; Liberalism;
Location: Turkey United States--US Middle East
Company / organization: Name: North Atlantic Treaty Organization--NATO; NAICS: 928120; Name: Army-US;
NAICS: 928110;
Publication title: Military Review
Volume: 92
Issue: 4
Pages: 26-32
Number of pages: 7
Publication date: Jul/Aug 2012
Year: 2012
Publisher: Department of the Army Headquarters
Place of publication: Fort Leavenworth
Publication subject: Military, History, Political Science--International Relations
ISSN: 00264148
Source type: Trade Journals
Document feature: Photographs References
Copyright: Copyright Department of the Army Headquarters Jul/Aug 2012
_______________________________________________________________
Document 9 of 20
Arab Public Opinion and NATO after the International Military Operations in Libya
1 1
Author: Saddiki, Said International Relations at Al-Ain University of Science and Technology (UAE) and
University of Fez (Morocco)

Abstract: Although, NATO has always taken into account public opinion in its member states, the emergence of
new Information and Communication Technologies and the extension of its out-of-area operations have given
NATO a new impetus to extend the space of communication beyond the Alliance countries. With regard to the
NATO's partnership with Arab countries, the Arab spring uprisings have created a new political atmosphere in
which many signs of a positive perception of NATO and its members states have been expressed, and can be
flourished with more support to new governments arising from this unprecedented political and social mobility in
the region. So, giving the growing influence of Arab public opinion on the region countries' foreign policies, in
the post-Arab spring era, getting public support is one of the fundamental preconditions for the success of the
NATO cooperation initiatives in the Arab world. The article aims to give an approximate picture of the current
Arab public's perception of NATO. It deals with the vision of the Arab elites and public opinion on the Alliance
after its participation in overthrowing the Gaddafi regime, surveys the opinion of some segments of Moroccan
public opinion, and explores some possible kinds of relations between Arab countries and NATO viewed by the
Arab public. Adapted from the source document.
Subject: International Organizations; Public Opinion; Telecommunications; Arab Countries; Alliance; Political
Communication; Morocco; International Cooperation; Foreign Policy;
Identifier / keyword: NATO Libya Arab public opinion perception
URL: http://www.alternativesjournal.net/
Correspondence author: Saddiki, Said
Publication title: Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations
Volume: 11
Issue: 2
Pages: 78-89
Number of pages: 12
Year: 2012
Publisher: Fatih University, Istanbul Turkey
ISSN: 1303-5525
Peer reviewed: Yes
Number of references: 25
Update: 2014-11-01

_______________________________________________________________
Document 10 of 20
The Arab Spring Is No Facebook Revolution

Author: Krauthammer, Charles
Abstract:
Nasser also fiercely persecuted Islamists- as did his nationalist successors, down to Egypt's Hosni Mubarak
and die Baathists, Iraqi (Saddam Hussein) and Syrian (die Assads)- as the reactionary antithesis to Arab
modernism. [...]die self-styled modernism of the Arab-nationalist dictators proved to be a dismal failure. [...]the
Arab Spring, serial uprisings that spread east from Tunisia in early 2011.
Full text:
Headnote
Amid the ruins of secular nationalist pan-Arabism, the Muslim Brotherhood is rising to solve the conundrum of
Arab stagnation and marginality.
W ASHINGTONPost-revolutionary Libya appears to have elected a relatively moderate pro-Western
government. Good news, but tentative because Libya is less a country than an oil well with a long beach and
myriad tribes. Popular allegiance to a central national authority is weak. Even if the government of Mahmoud
Jibril is able to rein in the militias and establish a functioning democracy, it will be the Arab Spring exception.
Consider:
Tunisia and Morocco, the most Westernized of all Arab countries, elected Islamist governments. Moderate, to
be sure, but Islamist still. Egypt, the largest and most influential, has experienced an Islamist sweep. The
Muslim Brotherhood didn't just win the presidency. It won nearly half the seats in parliament, while more openly
radical Islamists won 25 percent Combined, they command more than 70 percent of parliamentenough to
control the writing of a constitution (which is why the generals hastily dissolved parliament).
As for Syria, if and when Bashar al-Assad falls, the Brotherhood will almost certainly inherit power. Jordan could
well be next And the Brotherhood's Palestinian wing (Hamas) already controls Gaza.
What does this mean? That the Arab Spring is a misnomer. This is an Islamist ascendancy, likely to dominate
Arab politics for a generation.
It constitutes the third stage of modern Arab political history. Stage I was the semicolonial-monarchic rule,
dominated by Britain and France, of the first half of the 20th century. Stage II was the Arab nationalist
erasecular, socialist, anti-colonial and anti-clerical- ushered in by the 1952 Free Officers Revolt in Egypt.
Arab nationalism failed
Its vehicle was military dictatorship and Gamal Nasser led the way. He raised the flag of pan-Arabism, going so
far as changing Egypt's name to the United Arab Republic and merging his country with Syria in 1958. That
absurd experiment- it lasted exactly three years- was to have been die beginning of a grand Arab unification,
which, of course, never came. Nasser also fiercely persecuted Islamists- as did his nationalist successors, down
to Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and die Baathists, Iraqi (Saddam Hussein) and Syrian (die Assads)- as the
reactionary antithesis to Arab modernism.
But die self-styled modernism of the Arab-nationalist dictators proved to be a dismal failure. It produced

dysfunctional, semi-socialist bureaucratic, corrupt regimes that left the citizenry (except where papered over by
oil bounties) mired in poverty, indignity and repression.
Hence the Arab Spring, serial uprisings that spread east from Tunisia in early 2011. Many Westerners naively
believed the future belonged to the hip, secular, tweeting kids of Tahrir Square. Alas, this sliver of
Westernization was no match for the highly organized, widely supported, politically serious Islamists who
effortlessly swept them aside in national elections.
This was not a Facebook revolution but the beginning of an Islamist one. Amid the ruins of secular nationalist
pan-Arabism, die Muslim Brodierhood rose to solve the conundrum of Arab stagnation and marginality. "Islam is
die answer," it preached and carried the day.
But what kind of political Islam? On that depends the future. The moderate Turkish version or die radical Iranian
one?
To be sure, Recep Erdogan's Turkey is no paragon. The increasingly authoritarian Erdogan has broken the
military, neutered die judiciary and persecuted die press. There are more journalists in prison in Turkey than in
China. Nonetfieless, for now, Turkey remains relatively pro-Western (though unreliably so) and relatively
democratic (compared to its Islamic neighborhood).
For now, die new Islamist ascendancy in Arab lands has taken on die more benign Turkish aspect. Inherently so
in Morocco and Tunisia; by external constraint in Egypt where the military sees itself as guardian of the secular
state, precisely as did Turkey's military in die 80 years from Ataturk to Erdogan.
Genuinely democratic rule mayyet come to Arab lands. Radical Islam is the answer to nothing, as demonstrated
by me repression, social backwardness and civil strife of Taliban Afghanistan, Islamist Sudan and clerical Iran.
As for moderate Islamism, if it eventually radicalizes, it too will fail and bring on yet another future Arab Spring
where democracy might actually be tile answer (as it likely would have been in Iran had the mullahs not
savagely crushed die Green Revolution). Or it might adapt to modernity, accept the alternation of power with
secularists and thus achieve by evolution an authentic Arab-Islamic democratic norm.
Perhaps. The only thing we can be sure of today, however, is that Arab nationalism is dead and Islamism is its
successor. This is what the Arab Spring has wrought The beginning of wisdom is facing that difficult reality.
Sidebar
President-elect Mohammed Morsi talks to his supporters at Tahrir Square during his speech in Cairo, Egypt,
June 29.
AuthorAffiliation
Charles Krauthammer is a nationally syndicated cotumunist and Fox News contributor.
Subject: Islamism; Social networks; Secularism;
Location: Syria Libya Tunisia Morocco Egypt Turkey
Publication title: Human Events
Volume: 68
Issue: 26
Pages: 26
Number of pages: 1
Publication date: Jul 16, 2012
Year: 2012

Section: 2ND OPINION
Publisher: Human Events Publishing, Inc.
Place of publication: Washington
Publication subject: Political Science
ISSN: 00187194
CODEN: HUEVAU
Source type: Magazines
Document type: Commentary
Document feature: Photographs
Copyright: Copyright Human Events Publishing, Inc. Jul 16, 2012
_______________________________________________________________
Document 11 of 20
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS MAKING SHARIA "A" OR "THE" CHIEF SOURCE OF

LEGISLATION: WHERE DID THEY COME FROM? WHAT DO THEY MEAN? DO THEY MATTER?
Author: Lombardi, Clark B
Abstract:
Many constitutions drafted or amended in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring of 2011 are likely to include
such sharia-as-source-of legislation (SSL) provisions. This article will examine the history of SSL clauses in the
Arab world. It will discuss how such clauses came to be included in Arab constitutions in the first place and how
different clauses have been interpreted over the years. It will demonstrate that Arab understandings of these
clauses have evolved over time. Part I will provide background necessary to understand why Arabs, starting in
the 1950s, began to adopt provisions describing sharia as a "source" of legislation. Parts II and III will survey all
the Arab countries that adopted SSL provisions from 1950 to the start of the Arab Spring-discussing countries in
the order that they adopted a clause. Part IV goes on to argue that conventional wisdom may exaggerate the
impact that constitutional prohibitions of un-Islamic legislation have on the viability of the liberal legal order.
Full text:
Since 1950, a large number of Arab countries have enacted constitutions containing provisions that declare
Islamic norms to be a source of legislation. The wording of these provisions varies in subtle but significant ways.
Arab constitutions use different terms to describe the Islamic norms that serve as a source of law. Some refer to
"fiqh," others to "sharia," and still others to "the principles of sharia." Furthermore, these constitutions
characterize the role of Islamic norms differently. Most clauses describe Islamic norms either as "a chief source

of legislation" (masdarun raisiun li'l tashri') or as "the chief source of legislation" (al-masdar al-raisi li'ltashri'), 1
although a few use slightly different formulations.2 Many constitutions drafted or amended in the wake of the so-
called Arab Spring of 2011 are likely to include such sharia-as-source-oflegislation ("SSL") provisions.
Where did SSL provisions come from, and what do they accomplish? Today, most academics and policy
makers seem to accept that the impact of an SSL provision will depend on its wording. Provisions making
Islamic norms "a chief source" of legislation have never been understood to require that state legislation be
consistent with sharia norms; conversely, constitutions making sharia norms "the chief source" or "the only
source" of legislation have always been understood to create such a requirement.3 The distinction is important,
they believe, because a constitution that requires legislation to respect Islamic law is inconsistent with liberal
values. Working from these assumptions, the U.S. government in 2004 worked hard to prevent the government
of occupied Iraq from drafting a constitution that made Islam "the chief source" of legislation.4 More recently,
media accounts of constitutional deliberations in Arab countries have followed closely the debates about
whether to make Islamic norms "the chief source of legislation." These accounts have implicitly assumed that
the role of Islam in the legal system will be determined largely by the outcomes of these debates.5
This article will examine the history of SSL clauses in the Arab world. It will discuss how such clauses came to
be included in Arab constitutions in the first place and how different clauses have been interpreted over the
years. It will demonstrate that Arab understandings of these clauses have evolved over time. If we focus on the
way in which SSL clauses have recently been interpreted and applied, the conventional wisdom of many
Western academics, policy makers, and journalists is partly correct. In some ways, however, it may need to be
revised.
Part I will provide background necessary to understand why Arabs, starting in the 1950s, began to adopt
provisions describing sharia as a "source" of legislation. Parts II and III will survey all the Arab countries that
adopted SSL provisions from 1950 to the start of the Arab Spring-discussing countries in the order that they
adopted a clause. For each country, this article will look at the circumstances under which the country decided
to adopt its SSL provision and why that country chose to phrase the SSL clause in the way that it did. It will then
briefly explore how courts in these countries have to date interpreted and applied the national SSL provision.
Part IV will explore the conclusions that we can draw from the history of SSL clauses.
Part IV begins by arguing that, if we focus on the way in which SSL clauses are interpreted today, the
conventional wisdom about their meaning needs to be refined. When they first appeared, SSL clauses, no
matter how they were worded, were thought to be ambiguous about whether the state can legislate in a way
that violates sharia principles. After decades of debate about the meaning of these clauses, Arabs have taken a
large step toward the positions described above. Provisions stating that Islamic law is the chief source of
legislation are generally understood today to mean that states are constitutionally barred from enacting un-
Islamic legislation. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom. The conventional wisdom may be wrong,
however, to say categorically that constitutions containing weaker SSL provisions (or contain no SSL provision
at all) will be interpreted to create no judicially enforceable constitutional bar on un-Islamic legislation. Under
certain circumstances, a constitution that does not make Islamic law the chief source of legislation will be
interpreted to prohibit un- Islamic legislation.6 Part IV goes on to argue that conventional wisdom may
exaggerate the impact that constitutional prohibitions of un-Islamic legislation have on the viability of the liberal
legal order. The article will conclude with some brief thoughts about the possible policy implications of my
findings.
I. BACKGROUND
SSL clauses first appeared in the 1950s, when a new Syrian constitution declared that "Islamic fiqh [traditional
scholarly interpretations of Islamic law] shall be the chief source of legislation."7 At the time, this clause was not
understood to require that all state law be derived from fiqh. To understand what the drafters of the Syrian
constitution and the Syrian public thought the clause meant, it is helpful to have some background about the

evolution of Islamic legal and political theory.
In the pre-modern era, some states recognized an obligation to ensure that all laws applied in their courts were
(a) consistent with a handful of core scriptural rules that the traditional class of religious scholars, known as the
fuqaha', recognized as unambiguous and (b) did not harm what the fuqaha' recognized as the legitimate
interests of Muslim society.8 Nathan Brown and Adel Omar Sherif have demonstrated that a number of
nineteenth-century Arab constitutions, along with some constitutions in the Persian world, implicitly seemed to
recognize that principle.9 In the early twentieth century, however, the rulers of Arab states began to challenge
the idea that their laws would be illegitimate if they contradicted the traditional religious scholars'
understandings of Islamic law. Accordingly, Arab constitutions during this period ceased to include any
provisions indicating that the state was obliged to respect Islamic legal principles.10
States could stop recognizing the traditional principle of siyasa shar'iyya because Muslim society itself was
coming to question the value of traditional interpretations of Islamic law. Muslims maintained their conviction
that human salvation rested upon compliance with the fuqaha''s interpretation of Islamic law and that states
must therefore respect this interpretation of Islamic law as well.11 Many, however, did not. Some simply moved
toward a secularist position.12 Others struggled to develop an alternative, "modern" understanding of Islamic
law that Muslims should obey and that would inform the law of a modern Islamic state.13 Over time,
constitutions would come to be drafted in a way that reflected this new understanding of an Islamic state. The
rise of SSL clauses and the evolution of the public's understanding of these clauses resulted from efforts to
constitutionalize a new understanding of sharia and its role in the state.
In the early twentieth century, the Syrian-born Islamic thinker Rashid Rida influenced the thought of many
Muslims around the Arab world and beyond, including most notably the early leaders of the Muslim
Brotherhood. Like the traditional fuqaha', Rida argued that the state should apply law that was consistent with
the clear scriptural principles and that served the public interest.14 Unlike them, he used a new, distinctly
modern method of identifying clear scriptural principles, and he embraced an untraditional method of
determining whether a state law advanced the public welfare. Rida's younger contemporary, the great Egyptian
lawyer, legal theorist, and code-drafter, Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri, departed even more radically from the
traditional theory of siyasa shar'iyya.15 Inspired by European nationalist legal theory, Sanhuri argued that a
handful of principles, consistently followed at all times and places, could be identified as common to all the
competing interpretations of Islamic law that traditional scholars had proposed over the centuries. For Sanhuri,
the law of a modern Islamic state must be consistent both with those implicit principles and with the public
interest.16 Many of these non-derogable principles were extremely general, and Sanhuri concluded that most
rules found in modern European codes (codes that had been transplanted into the Arab world during the
colonial era) were consistent with them.17 More controversially, he suggested that the public interest might
actually require modern Arab states to apply (or continue applying) many of these transplanted European rules
even though, in some areas, the government might reasonably decide instead to take a rule directly from the
fiqh tradition.18
As Arab nations began to break free of colonial control in the midtwentieth century, the fuqaha' continued to
push unsuccessfully for the state to reform its laws so that they were consistent with the traditional theory of
siyasa shar'iyya. Many of the most important Islamist political factions, however, allied themselves instead with
modernist theories, and as Arab states began to de-colonize after World War II, modernist Islamist factions,
particularly those who embraced Sanhuri's theory of Islamic law, strongly influenced the course of mid-century
Arab legal reform. Sanhuri was commissioned to draftthe new 1949 Civil Code for Egypt.19 Not surprisingly,
this code retained a significant number of colonial-era rules.20 Although the fuqaha' and Islamists associated
with the Brotherhood criticized the code as only pseudo-Islamic,21 the code was widely celebrated in the Arab
world and beyond as a successful attempt to harmonize Islamic with European law. In short order, many of the
Arab states then emerging from colonial domination decided to adopt Sanhuriinspired codes.22 By doing so,

they could indigenize national legal systems, as well as ensure that the legal system remained consistent with
essential elements of the transplanted European legal codes under which legal relationships had already been
formed.23 All of the so-called "Sanhuri codes" resembled the 1949 Egyptian Code. Thus, each arguably used
Islamic law as a "source" of law in two different ways. First, each code assumed that embedded in the fiqh
tradition were a limited number of extremely general principles induced from the fiqh tradition as a whole.
Second, each code incorporated some actual rules from the fiqh tradition.
The Sanhuri codes recognized that the code might have "gaps"- meaning that a judge might face legal
questions that could not be answered by reference to the rules in the code. The Sanhuri codes clarified that, in
such a case, judges were supposed to fashion new rules using roughly the same method Sanhuri had used to
select rules for inclusion in the code.24 Different codes, however, took different views about whether, when
looking for rules to fill the gaps, judges should look first to try and find a rule from the fiqh literature that was
both consistent with overarching principles and consistent with the public interests. Then, only if they failed to
find such a rule, they should look to other sources. The Egyptian code was ambiguous on this point. When Syria
adopted a Sanhuri code in 1949, it specifically instructed judges to look first to Islamic fiqh when filling gaps in
legislation.25 Shortly thereafter, Syria adopted the Arab world's first SSL clause.
II. THE FIRST SSL CLAUSE: ARTICLE 2 OF THE SYRIAN CONSTITUTION OF 1950
After independence in the mid-1940s, the Syrian government engaged in a series of legislative reforms
culminating with the decision in 1949 to adopt a Sanhuri code.26 One year later, a new military government
began to draftSyria's first post-independence constitution.27 Islamists, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, pushed
vigorously for the new constitution to contain a clause declaring Islam the official religion of the new state,28
and in 1950 the Constituent Assembly produced a draftconstitution establishing Islam as Syria's official
religion.29 Syria's religious minorities were horrified, and after a period of occasionally violent contest,30 the
provision was dropped. Apparently to mollify the disappointed Islamists, the final draftof the constitution included
a provision carving out a role for Islamic law in the state. This provision did not explicitly require all state laws to
be consistent with Islamic legal principles. Instead, it said only: "Islamic fiqh shall be the chief source of
legislation (al-fiqh al-Islami hu al-masdar al-raisi li'l tashri')."31
What did this mean? In a 1952 article about the constitution, Majid Khadduri suggests strongly that Syrians
believed that this provision would have little practical impact-less than a provision making Islam the official
religion of the state and less than one requiring state law to respect Islamic law.32 Indeed, it seems to have
been intended simply to describe the legal regime then in force in Syria- where the civil code had been drafted
using Sanhuri's distinctive method and where the family laws applicable to Muslims were drawn largely from
fiqh. It was apparently not understood to create any requirement that going forward all laws be "consistent with
fiqh." Otherwise, Syria's numerous non-Muslim minorities would have been likely to protest the provision, and
they seem not to have done so.33
The 1950 Syrian constitution was short-lived. After a short period of political turmoil, Syria joined with Egypt,
which was then under the authoritarian rule of General Gamal Abd al-Nasir. The united entity, called the United
Arab Republic (U.A.R), adopted a 1958 constitution that did not mention Islamic law as a source of law. Syria
seceded from the U.A.R. in 1961 and was governed by a provisional constitution. In 1973, Syria enacted a new
permanent constitution, which again, pointedly, did not make Islam the official religion of the state. It also
demoted Islamic fiqh from "the chief source of legislation" to "a chief source of legislation." This clause survived
in the 2012 constitution recently adopted by the embattled Assad regime in response to the uprisings after the
Arab Spring.34 The decision to demote fiqh from "the" to "a" chief source of legislation reflects the evolution of
Arab thinking about SSL clauses during the 1960s and '70s. By 1972, there was still debate about how to
interpret clauses making Islamic norms "a" or "the" chief source of legislation. Nonetheless, it was considered
safer for a country that did not want to constitutionally conform its laws to Islamic norms to describe those
Islamic norms as "a" rather than "the" chief source of legislation.

III. THE SPREAD OF ISLAMIC "SOURCE" CLAUSES: KUWAIT AND BEYOND
It was not until 1962 that a country other than Syria decided to drafta constitution that included an SSL clause.
Thereafter, however, a growing number of Arab governments began to adopt them.
A. KUWAIT
For the first half of the twentieth century, the Emirate of Kuwait was effectively controlled by the British.35 In the
late 1950s, while still under effective British control, Kuwait had Sanhuri draftcodes of legislation.36 Shortly
thereafter, in 1961, it achieved independence and was admitted into the United Nations.37 At that point, it
began to drafta constitution for the new state with the assistance of Egyptian advisors, among whom was
apparently Sanhuri himself.38 The constitution that the Emir developed with their assistance was reviewed and
modified by a constituent assembly of both elected and appointed members.39 The final constitution was
ratified and published in 1962,40 along with an official "explanatory memorandum."41 It proved extremely
influential in the Gulf region.42
Kuwaiti society was highly traditional and steeped in a conservative Muslim ethos. Non-Muslim minorities were
small. Article 2 of the new Kuwaiti constitution made Islam the official religion of the state and also declared "the
Islamic sharia is a chief source of legislation" (al-sharia al-islamiyya masdarun raisiun li'l tashri').43 There
appears to have been some concern that in this overwhelmingly Muslim society, a constitutional choice both to
establish Islam and to make Islam "the chief source of legislation" might be read in combination to suggest a
justiciable requirement that all Kuwaiti law respect Islamic principles. This probably explains why the Kuwaiti
drafters departed from the wording of Syria's 1950 SSL clause in two ways.
First, Article 2 referred to sharia rather than fiqh as a chief source of legislation. Although some Muslims have
used the term sharia as a synonym for fiqh, many do not. Given the influence of Sanhuri on the Kuwaiti
constitution, the Kuwaiti drafters may have been signaling that the government had not and did not expect the
legislature to refer directly to rules of fiqh when it drafted future laws. Rather, the government would draw upon
the universal principles of sharia that modern scholars like Sanhuri induced from the fiqh. Second, the Kuwaiti
constitution made sharia "a" rather than "the" chief source of legislation. The implication of this change was
unclear. On its face, it seemed to be that laws would need to be consistent not only with the universal principles
of sharia but with other principles as well. Alternatively, it could be understood to say that the constitution
permitted the state to adopt laws inconsistent with sharia-although they were consistent with some other "chief
source."
The constitution was published with an explanatory note that the courts were to use as official guidance. The
note did not completely resolve the issue. It states that the legislature and executive can regulate society
according to rules that are not drawn directly from fiqh and implies that they can adopt laws inconsistent with
fiqh.44 It is ambiguous about whether the state must always respect the fundamental principles of sharia.45 As
a practical matter, however, this ambiguity proved to be unimportant. Even if Article 2 required the government
to legislate in accordance with the essential principles of Islamic law, leading scholars seem to have believed
that courts would have no power to hear cases challenging the legislature's judgment that they had complied
with that requirement.46 In keeping with this body of scholarly interpretation, Kuwait's Constitutional Court has
consistently held that Article 2 does not give it the duty or power to strike down laws that it deems inconsistent
with sharia norms.
In 1992, the Constitutional Court heard a case challenging the provisions of the Kuwaiti Civil Code that allow for
the charging of interest.47 The defendant argued that these provisions were inconsistent with sharia and should
therefore be declared void under Article 2. The Court, echoing the explanatory memorandum, held that Article 2
made sharia "a source" and not "the only source" of law.48 As such, the court held, the government could adopt
rules such as this one irrespective of the fact that they are inconsistent with traditional interpretations of Islamic
sharia.49 In this opinion, the Court did not make clear whether it was denying the petitioner's assertion that
Article 2 barred the state from enacting un-Islamic legislation or whether it was merely holding that states had

no power to enforce the requirement.50 More recently in Nashi v. Dashti, the Kuwaiti court again refused to
overturn laws widely thought un- Islamic.51
Distressed by the implications of the memo and by the court cases just described, conservative Islamists in
Kuwait have regularly called for Article 2 of the Kuwaiti Constitution to be amended. Some have suggested that
the Islamic sharia should be made the chief source of legislation.52 Against the backdrop of Sanhuri's theory
and the experience of Syria as described above, however, many Islamists seem to believe that even this clause
might not be interpreted to require state legislation to conform to sharia either.53 Thus, many have more
dramatically called for sharia to be listed as the only source of legislation."54 The most recent major push for
such an amendment took place this past year.55
B. SUDAN
During the 1960s, Islamists in Sudan had been pushing for the state to adopt an "Islamic" constitution.56 In
1968 a constituent assembly with Islamists in leadership positions proposed such a constitution. Article 113 of
the proposed constitution said, "the principles of the Islamic Sharia are the chief source of legislation."57 Clearly
fearing that this clause might by itself be insufficient to establish the principle that all law must respect Islamic
principles, they also included in Article 114 a provision stating, "Every legislation passed after the adoption of
this constitution in contravention with the provisions of kitab and sunnah (i.e., Qur'an and the [hadith literature])
should be void, provided that such contravention did not in essence previously exist."58 As a result of ongoing
political turmoil and a military coup, this draftof the constitution was scuttled.59 Eventually in 1973, a new
president enacted a new constitution that ambiguously made both the Islamic sharia and custom ('urf)
simultaneously "the two chief sources of legislation" [al-Sharia al-Islamiyya wa'l-'urf masdaran ra'isian li'l-
tashri'].60 Because the courts never had an opportunity meaningfully to construe this provision, we cannot
speculate about how it was interpreted.61
In the 1980s a series of military regimes in the Sudan decided to compensate for their lack of democratic
legitimacy by reaching out to Islamists. They revised statutes to make them conform to Islamic law. In 1998, the
second of these regimes drafted a new constitution that reflected the concern that provisions making Islamic
norms "a chief source" or "the chief source" continued to be ambiguous on the key question of whether all state
law would have to respect those norms. The 1998 Constitution, like the earlier 1968 Constitution, declared
Islamic law to be one of "the sources" of legislation and then stated explicitly that no law could be inconsistent
with Islamic law or any of these other sources.62 Importantly, the Constitution explicitly denied the courts the
power to enforce this provision- leaving the question of whether the law was consistent with Islam to be
resolved by the political branches. To the best of my knowledge, there is no record of how the existence of the
clause has affected the actual process of legislation.
C. YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC
After the overthrow of the imamic monarchy in 1962,63 the Yemen Arab Republic imposed a series of
temporary constitutions, many of which proposed Islam as the only source of law and at least one of which
contained an explicit repugnancy clause requiring that no law contravene sharia principles.64 In 1970, however,
Yemen finally formed a constituent assembly that was tasked with the job of drafting a new constitution that
reflected the popular will. As they carried out their work, the drafters debated the role of Islam. Interestingly, it
appears that younger politicians who were considered relatively secular suggested that sharia be made merely
"the chief source of legislation" on the grounds that this would allow the state to enact laws that were not drawn
from fiqh.65 It is unclear whether they thought such a provision would permit governments to adopt laws that
were inconsistent with the narrower range of principles that Islamic modernists would recognize as the essential
principles of sharia. In response, hard-line Islamists demanded successfully that the 1970 Constitution make
Islam "the source of all legislations" (al-sharia al-islamiyya masdar jami' al-tashri'at).66 This language was
included in Article 3 and in the 1991 Constitution that is currently in force.67
More scholarship needs to be done into the courts' interpretation and application of Yemen's SSL clause. The

clause is embedded in a constitution that indicates through all sorts of other provisions a desire to create a
justiciable requirement that law respect sharia principles as understood by Islamic scholars.68 Published
reports confirm that the court does, in fact, review laws for consistency with Islamic principles.69 There has
been no systematic study, however, of its case law. More studies would need to be undertaken before we could
speak with any confidence about the method that the courts are using.
D. EGYPT
Egyptian legal advisors assisted in the drafting of many of the Arab constitutions that made sharia norms a chief
source of legislation. Ironically, Egypt itself came late to the ranks of countries that adopted a sharia source-of-
law clause. Egypt's 1923 Constitution made Islam the religion of the state, but it did not declare Islamic law a
"source" of legislation.70 In 1952, a military coup led to the dissolution of the 1923 Constitution.71 For almost
thirty years thereafter, a government led by Jamal Abd al-Nasir governed Egypt under a series of temporary
constitutions that did not include an SSL clause.
By the late 1960s, however, Nasir's government had begun to face serious popular discontent, including
discontent from Islamists.72 After the death of President Nasir in 1971, Egypt's new president, Anwar Sadat,
decided to drafta new constitution that would reach out to a wide variety of constituencies in Egypt, including
Islamists.73 In appealing to Islamists, Egypt's constituent assembly decided to adopt an SSL clause.
Bruce Rutherford, who did exhaustive work on the drafting of the Constitution, reports that the decision to adopt
an SSL clause was uncontroversial.74 A member of the Constitutional Drafting Committee proposed to include
a provision stating, "the principles of the Islamic sharia are a chief source of legislation." He added that such
language was consistent with Article 1 of Sanhuri's 1949 Civil Code and was similar to constitutional provisions
that had already been incorporated into the constitutions of other countries.75 The SSL clause was adopted
without any further discussion.76
Interestingly, when the draftwas made public, a public discussion erupted about the choice of wording-one that
would shape Egyptian views about the meaning of SSL clauses and ultimately would shape views around the
Arab world. The debate began when someone wrote a letter to the editor arguing that it would be preferable to
say that the principles of Islamic sharia were "the" rather than "a chief source of legislation."77 A leading
member of the committee felt obliged to respond. He argued that this would limit the flexibility of the legislature
and force it to legislate in accordance with classically trained 'ulama.78 This argument would seem to overstate
in many ways the importance of the proposed change. The experience of Syria, Sudan, and Yemen makes
clear that a clause making Islam "the chief source of legislation" could plausibly be interpreted not to create a
justiciable requirement that all state law conform to sharia norms.79 Furthermore, most Egyptians who wanted
the constitution to create a justiciable requirement that the law respect sharia principles were modernists who
did not necessarily expect courts to rely on the fuqaha's interpretation of sharia and indeed most likely expected
lay judges to interpret and apply the principles themselves using modernist methods of reasoning.80
Whatever the shortcomings of this response, it inspired a new raftof letters to the editor in major Egyptian
newspapers.81 The ensuing debate seems to have nurtured a popular perception among Egyptians that a
provision making sharia "a" chief source of legislation did not create a justiciable requirement that legislation
conform to sharia principles, whereas a provision making sharia "the chief source" of legislation would create
such a requirement. Thus, as Islamism grew in Egypt during the 1970s, Islamists sought to amend the
Constitution to make the principles of the Islamic sharia the chief source of Egyptian legislation-fully expecting
such a provision to be interpreted as one that would require courts to void any law inconsistent with sharia.
In 1980, in an attempt to reach out to Islamists, the Egyptian government decided to signal a new commitment
to ensuring that its legislation was consistent with Islam. To signal this commitment, it amended Article 2 of the
Constitution and made the principles of the sharia "the chief source of legislation." At roughly the same time, a
new constitutional court was established, and in a seminal 1985 ruling, the new court held that Article 2 as
amended created a partially justiciable requirement that law conform to Islamic principles.82 Challenges to the

Islamicness of legislation enacted prior to 1980 were non-justiciable, while challenges to legislation enacted
thereafter were not. The court thereafter began to perform Islamic review of new legislation. In subsequent
years, the court developed the Arab world's most expansive body of Islamic review jurisprudence. This
jurisprudence made clear that the constitution did not require the government to legislate in line with the ulama's
interpretation of Islamic law; rather, it only had to legislate in line with universal principles identified through a
modernist-inspired method of interpretation-one that clearly drew heavily on the work of thinkers like Rashid
Rida and Sanhuri.83 The state was thus constrained by only a limited number of rules and principles, most of
which were quite general. Among them was a principle that the state had to act in the public interest. In applying
this theory, it leftthe legislature considerable discretion to act in the public interest. To the extent that Islam
restrained the state, the court found that it did so in a way that was consistent with liberal values-a development
that allowed Egyptians as a whole to grow comfortable with the idea of Islamic review, but leftsome political
Islamists unsatisfied.
E. UAE (1971)
Egypt was not the only country to adopt a constitution in 1971 with an SSL clause. Article 7 of the United Arab
Emirates' ("UAE's") 1971 Constitution, which is still in force, says that sharia shall be "a chief source of
legislation." At the time this clause was drafted, people in many countries believed such a provision was
insufficient, by itself, to create a justiciable requirement that legislation conform to sharia norms. In the UAE,
however, this provision has been read in light of other constitutional provisions and in light of state practice. As
such, it has been interpreted arguably, though not definitively, to create such a requirement.
A number of emirates in the Gulf asked Sanhuri in 1969 to drafta constitution for a proposed new federation to
be called the United Arab Emirates.84 After accepting and beginning, illness prevented the aging Sanhuri from
continuing. The task of drafting thus fell to Dr. Wahid al-Ra'fat, an expert on the Kuwaiti legal system, on the
understanding that his proposal would be reviewed by a committee of experts.85
Some UAE citizens wanted the constitution to contain an SSL clause exactly like Article 2 of the Kuwaiti
Constitution, which, as we have seen, made sharia "a" chief source of legislation. Islamists, however, pressured
the court to make Islamic sharia the only source of legislation-for which Islamists in Kuwait had also been
pushing. As a compromise, Dr. Ra'fat initially proposed making the Islamic sharia the chief source of
legislation.86 This wording would clarify, he thought, that the UAE would operate in the manner that the Sanhuri
codes proposed: legislators would be required to respect general principles of Islamic law that had been
deduced from the various interpretations of Islamic law that had been proposed over the centuries. When
determining what specific rules to adopt, however, legislators would be able to draw from any number of
sources-including European civil and commercial codes.87 In the UAE as in Egypt, however, some apparently
worried that people reading a clause making sharia "the chief source of legislation" might interpret this as a law
requiring the government to codify and apply traditional fiqh rules. (That this fear should be shared in the two
countries must surely reflect the influence in both countries of a cadre of Egyptian jurists.) Ultimately, the
committee chose not to make sharia "the chief source of legislation." Instead, it followed the Kuwaiti
constitution. Article 7 of the UAE Constitution said, "The Islamic Sharia is a chief source of legislation" (al-Sharia
al- Islamiyya masdarun raisiun li'l tashri').
After the adoption of the UAE constitution, some argued that, notwithstanding its relatively mild language, Article
7 required legislators to legislate in accordance with sharia and required judges to void legislation that did not
conform to sharia.88 Intriguingly, as the new state began to operate under the 1971 Constitution, the
government behaved in a manner that suggested agreement with the idea that the state is required to respect at
least the core principles of Islamic law. Most important, the government in 1978 enacted legislation instructing
the Supreme Court, when exercising cassation jurisdiction over court decisions, to treat as void legislation that
did not "conform to the Islamic Sharia."89
In such an environment, the courts began to exercise Islamic review. It remains unclear whether they do so only

because the UAE's statutes require such action or whether they might do so in the absence of a statute-on the
ground that the Constitution's SSL clause requires them to do so. In the 1985 Junatta Bank case, the UAE's
highest court followed the view of Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court in 1985.90 It held that it could not strike
down laws permitting interest because the laws were enacted prior to 1978.91 Nevertheless, the court declared
that, with respect to all new government actions and new laws, the courts must treat as void any law that the
court finds to be inconsistent with the general principles of sharia.
Subsequently, courts have consistently examined laws enacted after 1978 for consistency with the general
principles of Islam and have treated non-conforming laws as void. Interestingly, the jurisprudence suggests that
courts void un-Islamic legislation not merely because Law No. 10/1973, Article 33 instructs them to do so, but
because Article 7 of the Constitution requires them to do so. A series of Supreme Court cases from the early
1980s appear to hold that Article 75 of Law No. 10/1973 reflects the original understanding of what Article 7
required.92 Two leading scholars of the UAE legal system paraphrase the holdings in the last of these cases as
follows:
[A]lthough it may appear from Article 7 of the Constitution that Shari'a is to be on equal terms with other sources
of Law because it is referred to as "a main source" instead of "the main source" of Law, the doubt has been
removed by Article 75 in which the legislature has explained the intention from Article 7 of the Constitution that
Shari'a is to have a paramount position that makes it prevail over other sources of law. . . . [T]he jurisprudential
disputes over the interpretation of the said Constitutional Clause which exist in another country, was not
envisaged in the UAE, especially after the promulgation of Article 75.93
In short, even if Article 75 was repealed, courts might interpret Article 7 of the Constitution to say that they still
have to strike down newly enacted legislation that is inconsistent with the essential principles of Islam.
F. QATAR
The Emirate of Qatar was at one point expected to join the United Arab Emirates.94 Ultimately, it decided not to
join and, instead, to become an independent nation.95 In 1972 it drafted a provisional Constitution of 1972,
Article 7 of which said, ". . . the Islamic Sharia is the chief source of its legislation" (al-Sharia al-Islamiyya
almasdar al-raisi li'l tashri'ha').96 As Ballantyne noted, the 1972 Constitution was unusually autocratic, even by
the minimalist democratic standards of the Gulf region.97 The 1972 Constitution thus lacked a provision for
judicial review of legislation.98 Indeed, in 1997, Nathan Brown reported that after extensive research in the
region, "not a single Qatari judge or lawyer could name one case in the history of the courts that had a
constitutional dimension."99 In such an environment, Article 7 obviously did not create a justiciable requirement
of state respect for Islamic law because no constitutional question was justiciable. In the 2000s, a cautious
program of constitutional reform began. In 2004, Qatar adopted a new constitution, and by 2008 a constitutional
court with the power of judicial review was finally created.100
Strikingly, the 2004 Qatari Constitution demoted the role of sharia from "the" to "a" chief source of
legislation.101 This probably does not reflect a changing view of the government's obligations. More likely, it
reflects the fact that, between 1971 and 2004, Arabs were coming to understand SSL clauses making sharia
"the chief source" of legislation differently than they had in 1972. In 1972, these clauses were considered
ambiguous. It was not at all clear that they barred a state from enacting laws inconsistent with sharia.
Furthermore, there was no judicial review. Thus, the Qatari government, when it drafted a constitution with this
type of SSL clause, did not think it was committing itself to legislate in accordance with sharia-and certainly not
to legislate in accordance with an independent court's interpretation of sharia. By 2004, however, discourse in
Egypt and elsewhere had convinced most Arabs that SSL clauses making sharia "the chief source" of
legislation did commit the state to legislate in accordance with sharia, and a court stood ready to enforce this
provision.
Against this backdrop, Ballantyne plausibly suggests that the drafters of the Qatari constitution wanted to
indicate that Qatari judges, unlike their Egyptian counterparts, had no power to strike down legislation

inconsistent with sharia norms.102 If that was their goal, it remains to be seen whether courts will nevertheless
assert the power of Islamic review. UAE jurisprudence suggests that they could, in theory, argue that under
certain circumstances, an SSL clause making Islamic law "a chief source" of legislation can give courts the
power of judicial review. The circumstances that led UAE courts to assert the power of Islamic review are not
present in Qatar and, to date, the Qatari courts have not asserted this power.
G. BAHRAIN
Like Qatar, Bahrain considered joining the United Arab Emirates. When it finally decided not to do so, it drafted
its own constitution. Article 2 of Bahrain's 1973 Constitution says, "Islamic Sharia is a chief source of
legislation."103 Article 2 of the 2002 Constitution repeats this language.104
H. IRAQ
After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, Iraqis drafted a
series of new constitutions. The debates about the role of Islam tell us much about the way in which SSL
language had by that time come to be understood. Iraq's new constitutions did, ultimately, adopt
idiosyncratically worded SSL clauses.
After the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the government hastily drafted, without significant public input, a
Transitional Administrative Law ("TAL"), which functioned as a temporary constitution.105 The TAL had
somewhat idiosyncratic provisions. Instead of referring to sharia norms as "a" or "the" chief source of legislation,
Article 7 of the TAL said that Islam itself "is to be considered a source of legislation" (yu'id masdar al-tashri'). It
continued to say, "It shall not be permitted to enact a law conflicting with the settled tenets of Islam that have
been agreed through consensus" (la yajuz sann qanun yata'arrad ma' thawabit al-Islam al-mujma' 'alayha). As
Intisar Rabb has pointed out, the SSL provision was unique among Arab constitutions and was, in fact,
extremely unclear.106
Thereafter, the Transitional Administration tasked a constituent assembly, which was supposed to be broadly
representative of Iraq's diverse population, with the job of drafting a constitution that would be widely acceptable
to the Iraqi people. There was also an implicit understanding that the draftconstitution would have to be
acceptable to the occupying forces as well. The new constitution was to include its SSL provision in Article 2.
According to U.S. officials stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq during the drafting period, participants debated
the wording of this provision.107 Their published account of the negotiations tells us much about the evolution
of popular understanding about the implications of SSL clauses among Arabs and non-Arabs alike. Negotiators
from powerful Shiite Islamic parties wanted the new provision to describe some set of sharia norms as "the chief
source of legislation." Echoing the position imputed in this paper to the drafters of the 2004 Qatari Constitution,
participants associated with secular parties argued against this. They complained that such a provision would
create a justiciable requirement that law respect those norms. With the strong support of U.S. officials, they
succeeded in getting the provision to say instead that Islam rather than sharia would be recognized as a "basic
source of legislation" (masdar asas li'l tashri').108 Having won the battle, however, they lost the war. Article 2
went on specifically to note, "Enacting a law conflicting with the settled rulings of Islam is not permitted."109
This addition would seem to accomplish exactly what the secularists had wanted to avoid. It created a
justiciable requirement that law conform to a subset of sharia norms. So long as a judge could (a) determine
what the constitution means when it refers to the "settled rulings of Islam," or "thawabit ahkam al-Islam," which
is not a common phrase in Islamic thought and (b) carry out the Islamic legal interpretation necessary to
determine whether a law contravened these settled rulings of Islam, then the court should be able to exercise
Islamic review of legislation.
Given this clear textual provision authorizing judicial review, it is fascinating that the Federal Supreme Court of
Iraq seems recently to have decided not to carry out Islamic review. After a 2010 case in which the court
appeared ready to perform Islamic review,110 the justices backtracked. In two cases decided over the past two
years, the court appears to have taken the position that the question of whether a law violates the constitutional

command to respect the settled rulings of Islam is a political question. It can only be resolved confidently by a
legislature with access to expert advisors.111
The courts of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen have all declared themselves competent to
determine, on their own, whether new state legislation is consistent with sharia norms (or, more precisely, with
those sharia norms that their respective constitutions have made non-controvertible). The courts have thus
performed what might be described as a form of Islamic review. The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court's apparent
decision to avoid performing Islamic review on the grounds that it is ill-equipped to do so is unusual. It is likely
due to a confluence of factors that exist in Iraq but not in other countries. First, Iraq is a majority Shi'ite country.
Although a majority of Sunnis in majority Sunni countries like Egypt and the UAE appear to reject the idea that
the traditionally trained fuqaha' have unique authority to interpret God's law, a majority of Shi'ites in Iraq may
continue to believe that traditional training is a prerequisite to Islamic interpretive authority and thus may not
respect the interpretation of Islamic law developed by a court whose judges are not traditionally trained.112
Second, notwithstanding this fact, most judges do not have traditional training.113 The Supreme Court may well
worry that rulings on questions of Islamic law, and particularly Shiite Islamic law, will not be respected.
IV. SSL CLAUSES TODAY: WHAT DO THEY MEAN? DO THEY MATTER?
The history of SSL clauses that is recounted above suggests that the conventional wisdom about SSL clauses
should be refined. Conventional wisdom holds that constitutions with SSL clauses making sharia "the chief
source of legislation" create a constitutional obligation that all state legislation be measured against Islamic
legal norms; others do not. Furthermore, it suggests that when a country adopts a constitution that requires
state respect for Islamic law, this creates a barrier to the rule of law. The historical survey of SSL clauses above
suggests that there is a kernel of truth in the conventional wisdom, but also that the conventional wisdom still
needs to be revised in significant ways.
To begin, there may not be as rigid a distinction as people think between SSL clauses that make sharia "the
chief" or "the only" source of legislation and those that make sharia merely one chief source among many.
When SSL clauses first appeared in 1950, and for almost two decades thereafter, they were understood to be
ambiguous on the key question of whether the legislation inconsistent with sharia was void. Courts interpreted
each SSL clause in light of the circumstances in which they were adopted and in light of the broader
constitutional and legislative scheme into which the clauses were embedded.114
Early SSL clauses were interpreted in ways that were inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that SSL
clauses making sharia "the chief source" of legislation are the only clauses that require states to legislate in
accordance with sharia. In the 1950s and '60s, some strong SSL clauses making sharia "the chief source of
legislation" seem not to have been read as requiring all state legislation to respect sharia.115 On the other
hand, in the UAE, courts concluded that in adopting an SSL clause making sharia merely "a chief source of
legislation," the Emirati government had promised not to enact legislation inconsistent with sharia.116 Since the
1970s, however, Arab understanding of these clauses seems to have evolved and now corresponds, in part, to
the conventional wisdom. Today, most importantly, Arab academics and the public at large increasingly
embrace the idea that SSL clauses making sharia "the" chief source of legislation are best interpreted to prohibit
un-Islamic legislation.117 If, today, an Arab government adopts a new constitution including an SSL clause that
makes Islamic norms "the" chief source of legislation (or revises a constitution to include such a phrase), courts
will most likely assume that drafters intended the provision to require that the state always respect those norms.
Thus far, the conventional wisdom seems to correspond with contemporary reality. It is not clear, however, that
a clear consensus has yet emerged about the implications of a government's decision not to enact a strong SSL
clause and instead to enact a weaker clause making sharia merely "a" chief source of legislation.
It might seem logical to assume that a decision to adopt an SSL clause making sharia something less than "the
chief source" indicates an intention not to be bound by any firm prohibition on legislation inconsistent with
sharia. Indeed, some governments seem to be counting on courts to adopt this position.118 It is not absolutely

certain, however, that governments will actually be able to insulate themselves from Islamic review simply by
favoring constitutional language that makes sharia merely "a" rather than "the" chief source of legislation.
SSL clauses are interpreted contextually. Going forward, SSL clauses making sharia "a chief source" of
legislation will be situated in constitutions that make Islam the official religion of the state and may contain
provisions instructing courts to permit regulations that are necessary to preserve morality or public order-words
that can be read, if one wants to, as a proxy for Islamic legal values. These factors create opportunities for
courts, if they are so inclined, to follow the lead of the UAE courts and interpret a clause making Islamic law
merely "a chief source" to require the state to respect Islamic law and also to respect all other chief sources of
legislation.119 While this seems unlikely in the short term, there continues to be a strong trend toward
increased piety in the Muslim world, and the political power of the Islamic political factions appears to be
growing. Courts may increasingly be staffed by judges who have Islamist sympathies or who may feel pressure
to increase their legitimacy in the eyes of an Islamizing public, or they may simply wish to reinforce their power
by adding a new ground for judicial review. It seems unwise categorically to preclude the possibility that down
the line courts will interpret at least some weak SSL clauses to require that legislation be measured for
consistency with Islamic values.
This brings us to the important question: Does it really matter if an SSL clause is interpreted to require state law
to respect sharia? As noted, it is commonly assumed that it does matter. Policy makers and journalists seem to
believe that, if Arab courts review state law for consistency with Islamic norms, they are likely to void legislation
that contravenes classical interpretations of Islamic law. In the process, they will strike down important laws
reflecting liberal commitments to equality and individual rights. (Some worry as well that it will cause them to
strike down laws essential to the functioning of a modern economy).120 However, if we look at the history of
SSL clauses described above, it is striking that, to date, most SSL clauses, including clauses that are
understood to require state law to respect sharia, have had surprisingly little direct impact on the legal system at
all. Quite simply, courts have proven unable or unwilling to use them aggressively to reshape national legal
systems.
As we have seen, some SSL clauses have been drafted in countries that did not give courts any power of
judicial review.121 In other countries, the constitution has singled out the SSL clause as unique and has barred
courts only from exercising Islamic review.122 In yet other countries, judges have creatively interpreted the
constitution or exercised prudential powers and have held that disputes about the Islamic-ness of legislation
should be treated as partially or wholly non-justiciable. For example, in both Egypt and the UAE, the courts
creatively interpreted their country's SSL clause to be partially nonjusticiable. They have the authority only to
void un-Islamic legislation enacted after the enactment of the constitutional SSL provision-a ruling that leaves in
place a great deal of controversial existing legislation, such as the legislation permitting interest.123 More
dramatic still, Iraqi courts seem recently to have taken the position that the question of whether a law is
consistent with Islam is one that only the political branches are qualified to answer.124
In countries where courts do exercise Islamic review,125 these courts seem to apply the law in a manner that is
quite deferential to legislative judgment that their law is consistent with Islam. That is true of the jurisprudence of
the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court referenced briefly above. It develops a jurisprudence that adopts a
modernist approach to Islamic legal interpretation. That is to say, it holds that sharia imposes upon
governments only a handful of requirements-most of which are very general. Provisions that require the state to
legislate in accordance with Islam are thus understood to leave government considerable discretion to legislate
in the public interest. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss Islamic constitutional
jurisprudence outside the context of Arab SSL clauses, it is worth noting that courts outside the Arab world
seem to interpret constitutional prohibitions on un-Islamic legislation in a similar way.
That courts set few limits does not mean that they set no limits. Interestingly, however, the limits that are set are
not invariably inconsistent with liberal values. Clearly, courts in some countries tend to interpret Islamic

constraints on legislative discretion in a way that precludes the state from enacting laws that realize liberal
values of equality and individual rights.126 However, courts in some other countries do not. Courts in Egypt
(and, it is worth noting, courts in Pakistan as well) have embraced a modernist view that not only tolerates the
liberal rule of law, but seems to support it.127
To make sense of this, it is important to remember that Muslims in the modern world disagree deeply about
fundamental issues: who can interpret Islamic law, what method interpreters should use, and, ultimately, what
laws an Islamic state is required or permitted to impose on its citizens. In almost every majority Muslim country,
illiberal Islamic voices contest fiercely with liberal ones. In countries where people agree that the government
commit to respecting sharia, people may disagree about who should police compliance. It is not universally
accepted that secular judges are better qualified than the political branches to wade through the competing
interpretations of Islam and determine which interpretation should guide the state. This may explain the large
number of cases in which constitutional courts are explicitly denied the power to enforce an SSL clause and the
large number of cases in which courts with the power of Islamic review have been reluctant to enforce it
carefully. It also explains why judiciaries themselves can come to such different understandings of the
constraints that Islam requires.
In short, when looking at countries where the constitution requires the state to respect Islam, the liberal-ness of
the state's laws seems to depend primarily on choices by the political branches. To the extent that courts
exercise Islamic review at all, they tend to do so in a way that is highly deferential to the legislature. In those
countries where the courts are willing to apply SSL clauses in a way that places significant substantive
constraints on legislative discretion, the impact on the liberal rule of law varies. Ultimately, history suggests
therefore that it is hard to generalize about the impact of SSL clauses requiring the state to respect Islam, and it
is particularly hard to generalize about the impact they have on the liberal rule of law. The conventional wisdom
needs to be revised to ask whether a clause will have an impact at all and, if so, to say that what sort of impact
it will have depends on contextual factors that will differ from country to country and that may themselves evolve
in future years: the jurisdiction of constitutional courts, the degree to which constitutional judges embrace a
policy of judicial restraint, and whether the constitutional judiciary tends to prefer an illiberal (or liberal)
interpretation of Islam.
V. CONCLUSION
The popular and judicial understanding of SSL clauses in the Arab world has evolved over the decades, and it
may continue to change in the future. If a country today drafts a constitution containing an SSL clause making
Islamic norms "the" or "the only" source of legislation, this clause will probably be understood to require state
laws to respect Islamic norms-though there is the possibility that it will be interpreted to be non-justiciable. Yet,
depending on the context of its drafting and on the other provisions of the constitution, an SSL clause making
Islamic norms "a chief source" of Islamic law might also be interpreted to require that law respect sharia norms.
At the same time, a constitutional provision requiring state law to respect Islamic law may not adversely affect
laws dealing with liberal principles of equality and human rights.
Conversely, the absence of SSL clauses does not mean that Islam will be marginalized. Even if they are not
constitutionally required to Islamize their legal systems, governments can choose to do so. The absence of SSL
clauses probably provides less safety than some may hope. If the champions of an illiberal interpretation of
Islam control the political branches, they are likely voluntarily to try and establish a putatively Islamic regime that
reflects their understanding of Islam.
Those who wish to predict or influence the trajectory of democracy and liberalism in the Arab world should not
focus myopically on the question of how the SSL clause is worded or even on the question of whether national
constitutions contain provisions requiring state law to respect Islam. They should focus at least as hard (and
perhaps harder) on other questions of constitutional design and of social context. Does the constitution create a
genuinely representative government, such that conservative Islamists who are currently powerful will be unable

to entrench themselves in power? Does the constitution create the conditions for a free and active civil society?
Does it empower the judiciary to protect liberal rights? Are civil society and judges actually vested in the liberal
constitutional project? Are important figures in each group familiar with and sympathetic to theories of Islamic
law that reconcile Islamic law and liberal values? With respect to ensuring that this last answer is yes, they
might pay attention to constitutional provisions or laws that regulate the educational institutions and religious
institutions that help to shape the public's understanding of Islam and Islam's relationship to liberal values.
Footnote
1. See, e.g., DUSTUR JUMHURIYYA AL 'ARABIYYA AL-SURIYYA [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 24, 2012, art. 3
(Syria), available at http://www.sana.sy/ara/ 369/2012/02/24/400634.htm, translated at
http://www.sana.sy/eng/337/2012/02/ 23/401178.htm (providing that Islamic norms will be "a chief source of
legislation"); DUSTUR [CONSTITUTION] July 13, 1999, art. 1 (Qatar), translated at
http://english.mofa.gov.qa/details.cfm?id=80 (stating that Islam and sharia law will be "a chief source" of
legislation). The word I translate here as "chief" (raisi) is often translated as "principal." For an explanation of
why I prefer the term "chief," see Clark B. Lombardi, Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt:
The Constitutionalization of the Sharia in a Modern Arab State, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 81, 87 (1998)
(explaining that "[t]he rai'is of something is usually its leader or most important part").
2. A few describe the role of sharia norms in other ways, for example, as "the source" or as "a foundation
source of legislation." Such alternate renditions are, however, outliers. See, e.g., DOUSTOUR JOUMHOURIAT
AL-IRAQ [CONSTITUTION] OF 2005, art. 2, sec. 1 (Iraq), translated at www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_
constitution.pdf (stating that Islam is "a foundation source of legislation").
3. This position is sometimes asserted within the Arab world itself and is extremely common among non-Arab
observers. See, e.g., Ashley S. Deeks &Matthew D. Burton, Iraq's Constitution: A Drafting History, 40
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 5-11 (2007) (noting that, during the drafting of the Iraqi Constitution, Shia Islamists
advocated for inclusion of a provision making Islam "the" chief source of legislation, while the United States,
Kurds, and other secular Iraqis feared that making Islam "the" chief source rather than "a" chief source would
result in Iraq becoming a strictly Islamic state to the exclusion of rights, protections, and secular influences).
4. See Gihane Tabet, Women in Personal Status Laws: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, at 10 UNESCO
SHS (SHS Papers in Women's Studies/Gender Research Paper Series 10 No. 4, 2005) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SHS/pdf/Women_in_P
ersonal_Status_Laws.pdf (reporting that, in 2004, U.S. Transitional Administrator Paul Bremer stated that, in
occupied Iraq, "Islam is the official religion of the Iraqi State and one of the sources of the law," but clarified that
Islam is "not . . . the main source of the law" and insisted that he would veto any draftconstitution for an
independent Iraq that made Islam the chief or principal source of legislation). One year later, U.S. figures had
not changed their view on the implications of adopting a constitution that made Islam "the" chief source of
legislation. In an August 14, 2005, CNN interview, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad opined: "The difference
between 'the' and 'a' source, or a principal source, is that there are other sources that also have to be respected
and taken into account. That's the principles of democracy, principles of human rights, and we do not want to
see a hierarchy of sources. And I believe that ultimately, the answer will be 'a', not 'the', and that these other
sources will also have to be recognized as important sources of laws in this new Iraq." Interview by Wolf Blitzer
with Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Ambassador to Afg. (Aug. 14, 2005), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/0512/11/le.01.html.
5. See, e.g., Kareem Fahim, Tunisia Says Constitution Will Not Cite Islamic Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/world/ africa/tunisia-says-constitution-will-not-cite-islamic-law.html (noting
that, when Tunisia's main Islamist party said in 2012 that it would accept a constitution that did not mention
Islamic law as a source of legislation, it was "signaling a forceful break with ultraconservatives who have been
demanding an Islamic state"); Edyer Peralta, Interim Leader Says Sharia Law Will Guide Libya, NAT'L PUB.

RADIO THE TWO-WAY BLOG (Oct. 24, 2011, 6:26 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/the two-
way/2011/10/24/141668281/interim-leader-says-sharia-law-will-guide-libya (reporting that the decision by
Libya's transitional government in 2011 to enact a transitional constitution designating Islamic law as the "main
source" of legislation "will place Libya alongside Arab nations such as Egypt and Iraq that ensure that no laws
contradict the tenets of Islam").
6. This may be because courts believe that a weak SSL clause must be interpreted in light of other
constitutional provisions and state practice and that, in context, it implies a ban on un-Islamic legislation.
Alternatively, it may be because the constitution contains other provisions that can be interpreted as
establishing an independent bar on un-Islamic legislation. Constitutions whose SSL clauses make sharia
something less than "the chief source" of legislation may still be interpreted to require state respect for sharia
principles.
7. AL-DUSTUR AL-SURI [CONSTITUTION] Sept. 5, 1950 (Syria).
8. See Frank Vogel, Siyasa, Part III (In the Sense of Siyasa Shari'a), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 695 (3d
ed.) (locating the origins of siyasa sharyya in works from the eleventh century of the Common Era). The
concept is most famously associated, however, with the work of the thirteenth- to fourteenthcentury scholar Ibn
Taymiyya, who wrote a book called al-Siyasa al-Sharyya, and that of his disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, who
wrote extensively on the concept. See generally IBN TAYMIYYA, AL-SIYASA AL-SHAR'IYYA FI IsLAH ALRA'I
WA AL-RA'IYYA repr. (1988); IBN QAYYIM AL-JAWZIYYA, THE LEGAL METHODS IN ISLAMIC
ADMINISTRATION (Ala'eddin Khorfa trans., 2000). For analyses of Ibn Taymiyya's thought, see generally ANN
S. LAMBTON, STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM 143-51 (1981) (noting that Ibn Taymiyya's
work centered on the central role that sharyya and service to God should play in modern governments); HENRI
LAOUST, ESSAI SUR LES DOCTRINES ET POLITIQUES DE TAKI-D-DIN AMAD B TAIMIYA 278-318 (1939);
ERWIN ROSENTHAL, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM 51-61 (1958) (explaining that Ibn
Taymiyya focused more on the ideal Muslim community governed by sharyya under Muslim prophets and
lawmakers, rather than the political realities of the time). Among legal historians, there is some debate about
whether early theorists of siyasa sharyya, such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, believed rulers
must defer to the judgment of the lama' on the crucial questions of when the scriptures clearly required
something or on whether a law served the public interest. Compare Vogel, supra, with Barber Johansen, A
Perfect Law in an Imperfect Society: Ibn Taymiyya's Concept of "Governance in the Name of the Sacred Law,"
in THE LAW APPLIED: CONTEXTUALIZING THE ISLAMIC SHARIA, 259-94 (Peri Bearman et al. eds., 2008)
(arguing that Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya saw the legal analysis of the ulama as merely
"interpreted laws" that are "respectable products of qualified human reasoning but as such . . . cannot command
general obedience and do not, therefore, qualify as the law that should be applied by the political authorities").
This appears to have been accepted in some of the important empires and provided a model going forward.
Such an interpretation of the principle became fully institutionalized and bureaucratized in the Mediterranean
during the period of the Ottoman Empire.
9. See Nathan J. Brown &Adel Omar Sherif, Inscribing the Islamic Shari'a in Arab Constitutional Law, in
ISLAMIC LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF MODERNITY 57-59 (Yvonne Haddad &Barbara Stowasser eds.,
2004) (noting, for example, the use of "Islamic political vocabulary" in the 1861 Tunisian Constitution and the
institutionalization of Islam as the state religion in the 1876 Ottoman Constitution). On the incorporation of the
principle into the Ottoman Constitution, see HASAN KAYALI, ARABS AND YOUNG TURKS: OTTOMANISM,
ARABISM, AND ISLAMISM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1908-1918 23 (1997) (describing the "Young
Ottoman" movement of 1876, contemporaneous with the 1876 Constitution, which attempted to harmonize
modern constitutional principles with Islamic law); see also Brown &Sherif, supra, at 59 (explaining that the
1876 Ottoman Constitution granted the sultan, who had absolute authority, the duty to execute sharia law). On
the incorporation of an analogue of this principle into the 1906 Persian Constitution and Afghan Constitutions,

see Supplementary Fundamental Laws of Persia of Oct 7, 1907, arts. 1-2 (Iran), translated in EDWARD G.
BROWNE, THE PERSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905-1909 372-73 (1910) (establishing Islam as the official
religion of Persia and providing that the laws of Persia may not "be at variance with" Islamic principles and law);
NIZAMNAMAH-YE-ASASI-E-DAULAT-E-ALYAHE- AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 9, 1923, 20 Hamal
1302, arts. 21, 72 (Afg.) (M.A. Ansri, trans.), available at http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/constitution_ 1923-
1302_english_nizamnamah-ye-asasi-e-daulat-e-aliyah-e-afghanistan.pdf (providing that court cases will be
decided "in accordance" with sharia law and sharia law will be given "careful consideration" in the legislative
process). All of these constitutions were drafted in countries that had no tradition of constitutional review, and
they were clearly not designed to be enforced by courts. They do, however, reflect a public admission by the
ruler of a constitutional monarchy that his legitimacy depended on his acting in a manner that is consistent with
Islamic principles.
10. See generally NATHAN BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC
LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 35-66 (Shahrough Akhavi &Said Amir
Arjomand eds., 2002). It is not entirely clear why majority Muslim nations shied away from adopting
constitutional Islamization clauses for much of the twentieth century. With respect to the Arab world, Brown has
suggested that Arab constitutions for much of the twentieth century were simply not designed to be
"constitutionalist" documents. Arab elites during this period consistently drafted constitutions with an eye to
giving the executive maximum flexibility to rule as it chose. The drafters of such constitutions had little appetite
to promise in constitutional texts that they were bound to respect Islamic norms. While it was sometimes
impossible to avoid making some gestures toward the protection of liberal rights provisions, such provisions
were coupled with other provisions that allowed the government to define the scope of those rights or to avoid
scrutiny of any violations of those rights. See id. at 63-66.
11. See id. at 165 (explaining that even as Arab governments in the twentieth century ceased deferring to the
fuqaha' and traditional interpretations of sharia law, modern intellectuals, such as Rashid Rida, envisioned new
government structures and constitutional orders that would still be based on sharia law and would rely heavily
on consultations with the fuqaha').
12. See id. at 163 (noting that many Muslim intellectuals in the mid-twentieth century began to look toward
Western scholars and models of government for inspiration).
13. See id. (remarking on the rise, during the mid-twentieth century, of modern Islamic intellectuals who
criticized traditional Islamic scholars for their overly rigid approaches to sharia law).
14. HAMID ENAYAT, MODERN ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT 78-81 (1982) (noting that Rashid Rida sought
an Islamic state both grounded in sharia law and able to address problems through dynamic interpretations of
sharia law).
15. See Guy Bechor, The Sanhuri Code, and the Emergence of Modern Arab Civil Law (1932 to 1949), in 29
STUDIES IN ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY 1, 2 (Ruud Peters &A. Kevin Reinhart eds., 2007) (arguing that
Sanhuri's Egyptian Civil Code should be viewed "as part of the social discourse and historical context of its
period," rather than as an isolated and individualistic attempt at legal reform). The literature on Sanhuri is
enormous and growing. In English, the first major study was a two-part article by Enid Hill. See generally Enid
Hill, Al-Sanhuri and Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law in the Life and Work of 'Abd al-
Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 1895-1971, 3 ARAB L.Q. 33 (1988) [hereinafter Hill, Pt.
I] (reviewing Sanhuri's legal theories, his place in Egyptian legal history, and his early academic life); Enid Hill,
Al- Sanhuri and Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law in the Life and Work of 'Abd al-Razzaq
Ahmad al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 1895-1971, 3 ARAB L.Q. 182 (1988) [hereinafter Hill, Pt. II]
(providing an overview of Sanhuri's participation in political life and contributions to Egypt's Civil Code); Amr
Shalakany, Between Identity and Distribution; Sanhuri, Genealogy, and the Will to Islamise, 8 ISLAMIC L.
&SOC'Y 201 (2001) (providing a "genealogical study" of Sanhuri's contributions to the Islamization and

modernization of Egyptian law).
16. See Shalakany, supra note 15, at 204 (noting Sanhuri's goals in modernizing Egyptian law were two-part, in
that he hoped both to follow Islamic principles and promote social justice).
17. See id. at 228 (remarking that some readings of Sanhuri's contributions to the Egyptian Civil Code focus on
"how his functionalist selections of Islamic law were made to coincide with modern European legislation").
18. See id. at 234 (recalling an Egyptian Senate meeting in which Sanhuri was criticized for advocating for the
codification of Egyptian case law, similar to codification in European states, to which he responded that
codification would conform with Islamic law because Egyptian case law already conforms with Islamic law).
19. See Hill, Pt. II, supra note 15, at 182 (explaining that Sanhuri drafted the new civil code "using comparisons
of more than 20 modern codes, the jurisprudence of the Egyptian courts, and the Islamic Shari'a").
20. See id. at 187 (noting that the new civil code included provisions from previous legislation relating to
inheritance, gifts, ownership of units in a building, building on leased property, risks and defects in purchases,
and disposition of property during illness).
21. See FARHAT J. ZIADEH, LAWYERS, THE RULE OF LAW, AND LIBERALISM IN MODERN EGYPT 139
(1968) ("The utilization of shari'ah as only a supplement to other sources was unacceptable to the traditional
groups, particularly those trained in shari'ah law."). For western commentary consistent with these criticisms,
see, for example, HERBERY J. LIBESNY, THE LAW OF THE NEAR &MIDDLE EAST 95 (1975) (distinguishing
between the Egyptian Civil Code, which compelled judges, in the absence of an applicable statute, to apply
custom first and then sharia law, and the civil codes of Syria and Iraq, which compelled judges to prioritize
sharia law over custom). But see Hill, Pt. II, supra note 15, at 189 (arguing that, due to the correlation between
custom and sharia law in Egypt, the practical difference between the Egyptian Civil Code and the civil codes of
Syria and Iraq is likely "negligible").
22. See Hill, Pt. I, supra note 15, at 39-40 (explaining that, with Sanhuri's assistance, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and
Kuwait adopted civil codes similar to Egypt's, which were then used as models for legal reform in Qatar, Jordan,
Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates).
23. See id. (noting that the Sanhuri codes combined secular elements, a commitment to Islamic law, and a
degree of indigenization specific to each state's legal history).
24. See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1 (Egypt), translated in LIBESNY, supra note 21 (providing that, in the
absence of an applicable statute, Egyptian judges should bridge the gap by applying custom, sharia law,
principles of natural law, and rules of equity, in that order). Another feature of the new code, according to
Sanhuri, is "flexibility." The new code, he says, "substituted 'flexible standards' in place of 'inflexible rules,' so
that 'solutions can change when conditions change.'" Article 1 of the Egyptian code thus suggested that judges
should develop rules that were consistent with custom-but Sanhuri seems to have understood that in Egypt,
custom is fiqh as interpreted within that country over the centuries. On this point, see Hill, Part II, supra note 15
at 188-90. Some other countries wanted to stress more explicitly that judges who developed new laws to fill
"gaps" in the code should begin with fiqh-as-historically-interpreted-and-applied-within-a-particularcountry.
When Kuwait adopted a new Civil Code with a provision identical to the Egyptian code, the official explanatory
memorandum published alongside the code made clear that the "custom" to which judges should look first only
referred to custom consistent with sharia. "[T]he learned commentator on the Civil Code regards the latter as
already being the correct view of Kuwaiti law, even on the present wording of the Constitution. His Commentary
is a learned piece of analysis which we must study in some detail because of its relevance not only as far as
Kuwait is concerned (it is published with the Code and thus has legal force), but because it expounds on
general principles which are important for other Arab countries as well." See William M. Ballantyne, ESSAYS
AND ADDRESSES ON ARAB LAWS 62 (2000).
25. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1 (Syria), translated in LIBESNY, supra note 21.
26. Nabil Saleh, Civil Codes of Arab Countries: The Sanhuri Codes, 8 ARAB L.Q. 161, 161 (1993).

27. See generally Majid Khadduri, Constitutional Development in Syria: With an Emphasis on the Constitution of
1950, 5 MIDDLE E. J. 137, 151 (1951) (providing a history of Syrian constitutions through 1951).
28. JORANAES REISSNER, IDEOLOGIE UND POLITICK DER MUSLIMBRUDER SYRIENS 379-91 (1980).
29. Khadduri, supra note 27, at 152.
30. RADWAN ZIADEH, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY 5 (1973),
available at https://www.csidonline.org/9th_annual_conf/ Radwan_Ziadeh_CSID_paper.pdf.
31. AL-DUSTUR AL-SURI 9/5/1950 [Syrian Constitution of September 5, 1950] Arabic Version, reprinted in
YUSUF Q. KHOURY, AL-DUSATIR FI'L LAM AL- RABI 1839-1987: NUSUS WA TDILAT [THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE ARAB WORLD 1839-1987: TEXTS AND AMENDMENTS] 259-71 (1989), available
at http://www.righttononviolence.org/mecf/wp-content/uploads/1950/09/1950Syria .pdf. Translation by author.
Note that some secondary sources from the 1950s translate this provision into English as "Islamic law shall be
the main source of legislation," thus rendering "al-fiqh Islami" as "Islamic law" rather than Islamic fiqh and "al-
masdar al-raisi" as "main source" rather than "chief source." See, e.g., Fauzi M. Najjar, Islam and Modern
Democracy, 20 REV. OF POL. 164, 169 (1958) (emphasis added) ("Islamic Law shall be the main source of
legislation."); Khadduri, supra note 27, at 153 (emphasis added) ("Islamic Law shall be the main source of
legislation.").
32. See Khadduri, supra note 27, at 152-53 (noting that this provision was likely included to appease the
hardline Muslims after the removal of the provision establishing Islam as the state religion).
33. See id. at 152 (describing the violent uprising of Syria's minorities in response to the provision establishing
Islam as the state religion, and implying that the alternate decision to establish Islam as the source of legislation
was seen as a compromise that would prevent further violence).
34. See DUSTUR JUMHURIYYA AL 'ARABIYYA AL-SURIYYA [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 24, 2012, art. 3 (Syria),
available at http://www.sana.sy/ara/369/2012/ 02/24/400634.htm, translated at
http://www.sana.sy/eng/337/2012/02/23/ 401178.htm (providing that Islamic norms will be "a chief source of
legislation"). Translation by author. The cited document was a "draft" that was put to referendum on February
26, 2012. According to the government, voters approved the new Constitution. See Syria Says New Constitution
Approved, AL-JAZEERA (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/02/2012227
132547956907.html.
35. Ahmed Al-Suwaidi, Development of the Legal Systems of the Gulf Arab States, 8 ARAB L.Q. 289, 289
(1993).
36. See Hill, Pt. II, supra note 15, at 202 ("In 1959 [Sanhuri] went to Kuwait, where he decided against providing
a civil code, but included much of what had constituted other civil codes in the Kuwaiti commercial code,
provided a maritime law, a law of compensation, and a law establishing the primary courts."); see also William
Ballantyne, Paper Delivered to Middle East Association, 2 (Dec. 9, 2008),
http://www.serlecourt.co.uk/Members/Article.aspx?MemberID=16&ArticleID=43 (noting that, unlike Sanhuri's
civil codes, the commercial codes, including Kuwait's, largely do not contain references to sharia law).
37. See Majid S. Hussain, A Critical Study of Constitutional and Judicial Development in Kuwait, 61-62 (June
2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne), available at
http://www.academia.edu/19 21861/A_critical_study_of_constitutional_and_judicial_development_in_Kuwait.
38. Ballantyne reports that the Kuwaiti constitution was drafted largely by Sanhuri. However, Nathan Brown
reports that the Emir apparently worked with a number of Egyptian legal advisors to develop a constitution that
drew upon the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 as a model but contained numerous provisions that reflected
Kuwait's unique history. See NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS IN
EGYPT AND THE GULF 165-67 (Charles Tripp ed., 1997) [hereinafter BROWN, COURTS IN EGYPT AND
THE GULF] (noting that the "chief drafter" of the Kuwaiti Constitution was Uthman Kalil Uthman, an Egyptian
colleague of Sanhuri); BROWN, supra note 10, at 54-57 (providing the context for and details of the drafting

process of the Kuwaiti Constitution).
39. BROWN, COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF, supra note 38, at 165-66.
40. See DUSTUR DAWLAT AL-KUWAIT [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 11, 1962 (Kuwait), reprinted in YUSUF Q.
KHOURY, AL-DUSATIR FI'L LAM AL-RABI 1839-1987: NUSUS WA TDILAT [THE CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE ARAB WORLD 1839-1987: TEXTS AND AMENDMENTS] 409-418 (1989), available at
http://www.righttononviolence.org/mecf/wp-content/uploads/1962/11/1962 Kuwait.pdf, translated at
http://www.kuwaitconstitution.org/kuwaitconstitution english.html. Another online copy of the Kuwaiti constitution
as amended to date can be found at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=181002 (last visited May 27,
2012). As can be seen, there have been no significant amendments.
41. See KUWAITI COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, POLITICAL ORGANIZATION,
http://www.da.gov.kw/eng/kuwaitinfo/political.php (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) ("The constitution of the State of
Kuwait includes (183) articles and an explanatory memorandum.").
42. See William M. Ballantyne, The Constitutions of the Gulf States: A Comparative Study, 1 ARAB L.Q. 158,
158 (1986) (noting that, when the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain emerged as independent states in
the early 1970s, they used the Kuwaiti Constitution as a model); cf. BROWN, supra note 10, at 59-61
(explaining that each of these countries modified the Kuwaiti Constitution in significant ways).
43. DUSTUR DAWLAT AL-KUWAIT [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 11, 1962, art. 2 (Kuwait), translated at
http://www.kuwaitconstitution.org/kuwaitconstitution english.html; see also Said Amir Arjomand, Islamic
Constitutionalism, 3 ANN. REV. L. &SOC. SCI. 115, 123 (2007).
44. Hussain, supra note 37, at 138 (characterizing the explanatory note as saying that Article 2 gave "the
legislature an Islamic framework within which to include other sources of legislation wherever there was a void
in Islamic jurisprudential legislation. In this case, it would be better to improve or develop legal provisions to be
compatible with the necessities of environmental development").
45. See Saba Habachy, A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law: Constitutional Government in Kuwait, 3
COLUM. J. TRASNAT'L L. 116, 116-18 (1963) (reporting that, when the draftconstitution was presented for final
approval of the emir, it was accompanied by a letter, which may have been the "explanatory note," which stated
that the constitution was supposed to bring the principle of democracy to Kuwait in a manner that reflected the
"factual situation in Kuwait." However, Article 2 provides that the "factual situation" informing the way in which
the principle of democracy was applied is defined by Kuwait's commitment to Islamic law. In other words, it was
a descriptive statement about Kuwait rather than a prescriptive statement about what Kuwait would have to do
in the future). See Mohammad al-Moqatei, Introducing Islamic Law in the Arab Gulf States: A Case Study of
Kuwait, 4 ARAB L.Q. 138, 142-43 (1989) (summarizing the concern of those who opposed an amendment to
Article 2 making Islamic law "the chief source of legislation," rather than "a chief source of legislation," namely
that such an amendment would invalidate several statutes and lead to "constitutional controversy," in spite of
the fact that Article 2 imposes a positive obligation on lawmakers to consider Islamic law).
46. Hussain, supra note 37, at 138 (noting that Article 2 grants legislators some discretion in their consideration
of Islamic law); cf. Al-Moqatei, supra note 45, at 142-44 (1989) (recalling a proposal in 1984 to amend Article 2,
proponents of which argued that the Explanatory Note to the Constitution unambiguously required the
legislature to adopt Islamic law).
47. Ballantyne, supra note 36, at 3 (citing Case No. 8/1992/Constitutional Court, at 5 (Kuwait)).
48. Hussain, supra note 37, at 297-98 (citing Case No. 8/1992/Constitutional Court, at 5 (Kuwait)).
49. Ballantyne, supra note 36, at 3 (citing Case No. 8/1992/Constitutional Court, at 5 (Kuwait)).
50. Many observers interpret this court opinion to say that Article 2 of the Kuwaiti constitution makes sharia only
one source of law among many and does not bar the state from adopting laws inconsistent with sharia. See
Hussain, supra note 37, at 297-98 (finding that the court held that "the constitutional text does not prevent the
ordinary legislator from using other sources that he sees it suitable, without causing a constitutional

contradiction"); cf. Ballantyne, supra note 36, at 3 (characterizing the Constitutional Court's decision as allowing
the code in question to "evade" sharia law). It is possible, however, that it is saying something slightly different.
Although Islamic jurists in the pre-modern world did not permit contracts charging interest, there is within the
modern world a debate about whether the ban was correct. Many continue to argue that the traditional ban is
correct. However, some leading Islamist thinkers have argued that there are no clear scriptural principles that
categorically preclude it and Sanhuri too was not able to induce an "essential" sharia principle precluding it. The
court might thus be read to be reserving an opinion as to whether the law was inconsistent with sharia. In
essence, it would be saying that the state is barred from enacting laws inconsistent with sharia but that cases of
non-compliance with sharia are non-justiciable.
51. Jill Goldenziel, Veiled Political Questions: Islamic Dress, Constitutionalism, and the Ascendance of Courts,
61.1 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 35-36 (forthcoming Jan. 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2061928 (citing Al-Nashi v. Dashti et al., Constitutional Court of Kuwait (2009)) (holding that Law 17
(2005), which required women "in their candidacy and after election to comply with the rules and provisions
adopted in Islamic Law," did not require female government officials to wear headscarves because the
legislature may consider various interpretations of sharia law and various sources outside of sharia law in
upholding the public interest and, if the legislature is at all bound by sharia law, it is only bound by those tenets
it expressly adopts in legislation).
52. See Al-Moqatei, supra note 45, at 142 (describing the 1984 proposal to amend Article 2).
53. See discussion supra Part II.
54. See Al-Moqatei, supra note 45, at 141-44 (citing the arguments of the National Assembly members who
proposed to amend Article 2, including that the Explanatory Note to Article 2 compelled the legislature to derive
all of its laws from sharia).
55. See Ismail bin Matt, Toward an Islamic Constitutional Government in Sudan (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.amss.org/pdfs/35/ finalpapers/IsmailbinMatt.pdf (noting that thirty-one out of fifty
members of Parliament support changes to the Constitution making sharia "the only source" of law in Kuwait);
B. Izzak, Amir Rejects Proposal to Amend Constitution - Islamists' Sharia Bid Thwarted - MP to Grill Social
Affairs Minister, KUWAIT TIMES (May 17, 2012), http://news.kuwaittimes.net/2012/05/17/islamists-shariabid-
thwarted-mp-to-grill-social-affairs-minister-amir-rejects-proposal-to-amendconstitution/ (reporting that the Amir
rejected a request by Islamist members of Parliament to amend Article 79 of the Constitution to require that all
laws comply with sharia law); Al-Rai, Islamist MPs to Go Ahead with Constitutional Amendments, KUWAIT
TIMES (May 19, 2012), http://news.kuwaittimes.net/ 2012/05/19/islamist-mps-to-go-ahead-with-constitutional-
amendments/ (reporting that, in spite of the Amir's rejection of their Article 79 amendment, Islamist members of
Parliament will continue in pursuit of "Islamization of laws" and will eventually propose another Article 2
amendment).
56. See Ali Suleiman Fadall, Constitution Making in the Sudan, 4-6 (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/ UNMIS/Constitution-
making%20Symposium/110524_Ali%20Suleiman_paper_ dft2.pdf (describing Sudan's attempts to draftan
"Islamic" constitution from independence in 1953 until the adoption of a draftIslamic constitution in 1968).
57. See bin Matt, supra note 55 (citing DRAFT CONSTITUTION, 1968, art. 113 (Sudan)) (emphasis added).
58. See id. (citing DRAFT CONSTITUTION, 1968, art. 114 (Sudan)).
59. Fadall, supra note 56, at 5-6 (recalling that the 1968 DraftConstitution was substantially revised before
formal adoption in 1973).
60. See THE PERMANENT CONSTITUTION OF THE SUDAN, 1973, art. 9 (Sudan) available at
http://www.righttononviolence.org/mecf/wp-content/uploads/1973/01/ 1973Sudan.pdf, translated at
http://www.righttononviolence.org/mecf/wp-content/ uploads/2012/01/Constitution-Sudan-1973-+-amendment-
1975.pdf.

61. This is for two reasons. First, the government enacted reforms that greatly limited the ability of the judiciary
to exercise judicial review. See Fadall, supra note 56, at 6 (noting that, after another attempted military coup,
the constitution was amended to increase the power of the president to the point that "the constitution became
what the president thought it should be"). At the same time, whether or not courts thought it was required to, the
military government began a process of radical legislative Islamization-one that obviated the need for Islamists
to bring cases arguing that the government was acting in a manner inconsistent with Islam. For the process of
Islamization in the Sudan, see generally 13 CAROLYN FLUEHR-LOBBAN, ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY IN
THE SUDAN (1987) (providing an overview of the role of Islam in Sudanese society based on anthropological
research conducted in the 1970s); Olaf Kndgen, Sharia and National Law in the Sudan in SHARIA
INCORPORATED: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF TWELVE MUSLIM
COUNTRIES IN PAST AND PRESENT 181 (Jan Michiel Otto ed., 2010) (mapping the application of sharia law
in Sudan from the sixteenth century to 2010 and arguing that, after more than twenty years of increasing
Islamization, the threat of war with South Sudan has eclipsed Islamization as the government's highest priority);
AHARON LAYISH &GABRIEL R. WARBURG, THE REINSTATEMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW IN SUDAN UNDER
NUMAYRI (Rudd Peters &Bernard Weiss eds., 2002) (analyzing the methods used by President Muhammad
Ja'far Numayri to reinstate sharia law in Sudan in 1983 and the results of this "experiment" for Sudanese
society); Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Islamization in Sudan: A Critical Assessment, 44 MIDDLE E.J. 610 (1990)
(examining the parallel between the rise of Islamization in northern Sudan and the rise in conflict between
northern Sudan and southern Sudan, culminating in both the imposition of sharia law and the outbreak of civil
war in Sudan).
62. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN art. 65, translated in THE NAME OF GOD,
THE GRACIOUS, THE MERCIFUL: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN (Max Planck
Inst. for Comparative Public Law &International Law, 1998) ("Islamic law and the consensus of the nation, by
referendum, Constitution and custom shall be the sources of legislation; and no legislation in contravention with
these fundamentals shall be made; however, the legislation shall be guided by the nation's public opinion, the
learned opinion of scholars and thinkers, and then by the decision of those in charge of public affairs.").
63. See generally PAUL DRESCH, A HISTORY OF MODERN YEMEN 89-119 (2000) (providing a history of
Yemen and a discussion of the overthrow of the Imamic regime).
64. See Al-Tayib Zain al-Abidin, The Role of Islam in the State: Yemen Arab Republic 1940-1972, 108-14
(1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University) (on file with author).
65. See id. at 118.
66. PERMANENT CONSTITUTION OF THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC, Dec. 28, 1970, art. 3, translated in
Translation: Constitution of the Yemen Arab Republic, 25 MIDDLE E. J. 389 (1971).
67. Id.
68. See id. (highlighting the fact that Article 8 insists that fundamental rights shall be only be interpreted and
enforced as permitted by sharia and by legislation; that Article 79 requires the heads of the executive branch to
swear before the parliament that they will respect God and his law; that Article 155 declares that all the
members of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall be "Shari'ah scholars of high qualifications"; and that Article
156 requires judges to swear before parliament that they will follow the book of God and the law of his Prophet).
See generally BROWN, supra note 10, at 87-89.
69. See generally Chibli Mallat, Recent Judgments from the Yemen Supreme Court, 2 ISLAMIC L. J. 71 (1995)
(describing a particular case where the court used a method of reasoning that included reviewing the laws for
consistency with Islamic principles).
70. See Mohamed Abdelaal, Religious Constitutionalism in Egypt: A Case Study, 37 THE FLETCHER F. OF
WORLD AFF. 35, 36 (2013) (noting that, while Article 149 of Egypt's 1923 Constitution inserted Islam as the
religion of the state, Islamic law was not inserted as a source of legislation until President Mohamad Anwar el-

Sadat assumed power in 1970 and proposed to add the phrase into the Permanent Egyptian Constitution of
1971).
71. See Kristin A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System, 36 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 695, 722 (2004) (recounting that the current constitution of Egypt is its fourth constitution since
the 1952 military coup that ended the monarchy and dissolved the 1923 Constitution).
72. Clark B. Lombardi, The Constitution as Agreement to Agree: The Social and Political Foundations (and
Effects) of the 1971 Egyptian Constitution, in THE SOCIO-POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS
(Dennis Galligan &Mila Versteeg eds., forthcoming 2013).
73. Bruce Rutherford, The Struggle for Constitutionalism in Egypt: Understanding the Obstacles to Democratic
Transition in the Arab World 246-48 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (providing details
on the involvement of several members of the Islamic religious establishment on the committee responsible for
drafting the new constitution, including their attempts to get elements of Islamic constitutionalism in the new
constitution).
74. Id. at 249-50.
75. Id. at 249.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Joseph P. O'Kane, Islam in the New Egyptian Constitution: Some Discussions in "al-Ahram," 26
MIDDLE E. J. 137, 141 (1972) (relaying the committee members' opinion that, similar to Kuwait's constitution,
recognizing "shar[ia] as a principal source of legislation" allows legislators to adapt to changing circumstances
in society if need be by allowing them to reference sources other than sharia while still generally imposing an
Islamic orientation); see also Rutherford, supra note 73, at 250 (arguing that making sharia the sole source of
legislation would impose unacceptable restrictions on legislators especially regarding the economy and
personal status legislation). See generally CLARK B. LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN
EGYPT (Rudd Peters &Bernard Weiss eds., 2006) (using the example of Egypt's inclusion of an SSL clause in
Article 2 of its 1971 Constitution to discuss the effect that "constitutional Islamization" has on the legal system
already in place and attempts by a country to modernize, particularly in terms of human rights or financial legal
issues).
79. See discussion supra Parts II, III(B), (C).
80. See generally LOMBARDI, supra note 78, at 117-18.
81. See O'Kane, supra note 78, at 138 (dividing the positions taken by the authors of the letters into three
categories: those who wanted to see Islam declared the state religion; those requesting that Islam at least be
recognized as a source of legislation, if not the only source; and those seeking an improvement in the status of
women and the modernization of laws regarding marriage and family life). Compare LOMBARDI, supra note 78,
at 117-18 (analyzing the debate of whether sharia should be "a" source of legislation versus "the" source of
legislation), with Rutherford, supra note 73, at 250 (providing details of the position held by the most influential
member of the constitutional drafting committee and his belief that making sharia the source of legislation would
severely hamper the ability of the legislators to create laws helping Egypt on its path toward democratic
government).
82. See Clark B. Lombardi &Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring Adherence to Shari'a Threaten
Human Rights? How Egypt's Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of law, 21 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 379, 392 (2005) (describing the court's 1985 ruling that resolved the threshold question of
justiciability as "politically ingenious" by holding that the SCC had jurisdiction to hear challenges to legislation
enacted after Article 2 was adopted).
83. See LOMBARDI, supra note 78, at 118-19; Lombardi &Brown, supra note 82, at 393 n.34 (discussing the
similarity in thought between Rashid Rida and Sanhani regarding how Islamic legislation should be checked

against universal aspects of Islamic law that promote social utility).
84. See Hadif al-Rashid al-Owais, The Role of the Supreme Court in the Constitutional System of the United
Arab Emirates: A Comparative Study 50-51 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Durham),
available at http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/786/ (stating that the first resolution of the first successful meeting of the
Supreme Council declared that Sanhuri should be entrusted with drafting the "full and permanent charter of the
Union").
85. See id. at 51-52 (noting that, although Dr. Ra'fat was originally selected to review the draftof the constitution
produced by the legal experts, he eventually decided it was necessary to drafta complete revision of his own
rather than just commenting on the legal experts' draft).
86. See Wahid al-Ra'fat, Op-Ed, Wafd Party Figure Protests Misinterpretation on Islamic law, AKHIR SA'AH
(Egypt), May 18, 1984, at No. 2581, translated in NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT 6-7 (Joint Publications
Research Serv., 1984), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTR
Doc.pdf&AD=ADA338094 (quoting his own memorandum, which read, "One of the provisions which the
amendment deals with is the stipulation in Article Four of the draftpermanent constitution, that Islamic law is the
main source of legislation, in place of the expression 'Islamic law is a main source of legislation' as stated in
Article Seven of the temporary constitution," and continuing to note that "[t]his latter statement puts Islamic law
on an equal footing with other sources of legislation . . . which is the contrary of what would have been the case
had it said 'Islamic law is the only source of legislation' . . . [i]t was considered that that should not be adopted,
in defense against the suspicion of fanaticism or extremism which conflicts with our tolerant Islamic law, which
is open to all new things as long as they do not conflict with its principles and its valid provisions").
87. Id.
88. See Butti Sultan Ali al-Muhairi, The Position of Shari'a Within the UAE Constitution and the Federal
Supreme Court's Application of the Constitutional Clause Concerning Shari'a, 11 ARAB L.Q. 219, 226-31 (1996)
(explaining that observers fall into two camps, Liberal and Islamist, with the latter arguing that a law is
unconstitutional when it violates the sharia).
89. Id. at 232.
90. See discussion supra Part III(D) (providing that Egypt's new court ruled that the SSL provision in Egypt's
constitution created only a partially justiciable requirement that new laws conform with Islamic law); see also al-
Muhairi, supra note 88, at 235-37 (describing the decision of the UAE court that found the SSL provision of
UAE's constitution to also be only a partially justiciable requirement that new laws conform with Islamic law).
91. See al-Muhairi, supra note 88, at 235-37 (noting that laws passed before the new constitution became
operable in 1978 remained in force as long as no amendment occurred and they were not expressly abolished);
cf. Omer Eltom, The Emirates Law in Practice: Case Law Study, 100 LEGAL ISSUES 5 (2009) (discussing later
cases).
92. See Case No.1, Year 8 (1982) published in 100 UAE OFFICIAL GAZETTE 45-49 (1982);), Case No.1, Year
10 (1983) published in 129 UAE OFFICIAL GAZETTE 102-07 (1984); and Case No.4, Year 9 (1984) published
in 135 UAE OFFICIAL GAZETTE 83-93 (1984); see also al-Owais, supra note 84, at 346-51 (explaining that
Article 7 requires that sharia be given paramount consideration compared to other sources of law); al-Muhairi,
supra note 88, at 239-43 (providing that Case No. 1/Year 8 was the first time the UAE Supreme Court
announced that measures that fail to comply with sharia would be disregarded).
93. See al-Muhairi, supra note 88, at 242 (discussing Case 4, Year 9 (1984)).
94. See Ballantyne, supra note 42, at 158 (noting that until a late stage Qatar and Bahrain were planned to be
part of the United Arab Emirates until protracted negotiations interfered with this intended result).
95. Id. at 158.
96. Al Jaridah al Rasmiyah (Qatar Official Gazette) No. 5, 22 April 1972; see W.M. Ballantyne, The States of the
GCC: Sources of Law, the Shari'a and the Extent to Which It Applies, 1 ARAB L.Q. 3, 9 (1985-86) (stating that

the Qatari Constitution prescribes sharia as the main source of law, which is a much stronger declaration than in
other constitutions of nearby states); see also Ahmed al- Suwaidi, Developments of the Legal Systems of the
Gulf Arab States, 8 ARAB L.Q. 289, 296 (1993) (explaining that Article 7 of Qatar's first Provisional Constitution
was replaced by the Amended Provisional Constitution of 1972, which in Article 7 declares that "the religion of
the State is Al-Islam" and that the "Islamic Shari'a is the principle source for its legislation"). Published in al-
Jaridah al-Rasmiyah (Qatar Official Gazette) No. 5, 22 April 1972. Ballantyne and Suwaidi each report that the
constitution makes sharia, "THE chief source of its legislation." See Ballantyne, supra, at 9; al-Suwaidi, supra, at
296.
97. See Ballantyne, supra note 42, at 161-62 (translating and interpreting several articles of the 1972
Constitution to illustrate its autocratic nature).
98. See Jill Crystal, COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS 2004 - QATAR (2004),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/473868f264.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2013) (claiming that a judicial agency
has not been established for judicial review even though Article 140 of the Constitution states, "the law shall
define the judicial agency that is authorized to settle disputes related to constitutional validity of laws and
regulations").
99. BROWN, supra note 10, at 183 n.66.
100. See United Nations Development Programme, Program on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR),
Judiciary: Qatar, http://www.undp-pogar.org/ countries/theme.aspx?t=9&cid=15 (last visited June 10, 2012).
101. Dustur [Constitution] July 13, 1999 (Qatar), translated at http://www.mofa.gov.qa/details.cfm?id=206 (last
visited Jan. 15, 2013).
102. See Ballantyne, supra note 36, at 4.
103. CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN Sept. 6, 1971, art. 2 (emphasis added), available at
http://www.bahrain.bh/pubportal/wps/wcm/connect/
ae5e35804b96f82b80808713d8048f0c/bhDostoor1973.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
104. CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN Feb. 14, 2002 (as amended through June 2012),
available at http://www.shura.bh/LegislativeResource/ Constitution/Pages/default.aspx. Unfortunately, I am not
aware of any study that focuses on the drafting of this provision or on the way it has been interpreted.
105. See Intisar A. Rabb, "We the Jurists": Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 527, 539
n.24 (2008) (citing the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period).
106. See generally id. at 539-41 (2008) (pointing out that the precise meaning of Islamic constitutionalism in
Iraq will not be clear until the government shows what form it will give the terms "Islam" and "settled Islamic
(legal) rules").
107. See generally Deeks &Burton, supra note 3, at 5-6 (recounting that debates regarding the wording of the
sharia provision were among some of the most contentious of the entire constitution-writing process, not so
much due to substantive disagreements, but more due to different interpretations of Islam among different
people).
108. See id. at 7-10 (reporting that the approved draftused the term "masdar asasi," meaning "basic source,"
which differed from the version that was presented for approval, which included the term "masdar asas,"
meaning "foundation source," for unexplained reasons, perhaps even just a drafting error). But see Rabb, supra
note 105, at 539 (translating "masdar asas" as "basic source," suggesting that there is no real difference
between the two terms and they both translate to "basic source"). Agreeing with Rabb about the proper
translation, I translate it as "basic source."
109. See Deeks &Burton, supra note 3, at 7 (citing Article 2(A) as stating, "No law that contradicts the
established provisions of Islam may be enacted").
110. Federal Supreme Court of Iraq, decision No. 60 of December 21, 2010, available at
http://www.iraqja.iq/view.738/. See generally Haider al-Hamoudi, Religion and Law in Iraq: A Noteworthy

Federal Supreme Court Opinion, JURIST (Feb. 10, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/02/religion-and-law-in-
iraq-anoteworthy- federal-supreme-court-opinion.php (describing how the court showed itself willing to
challenge the views of the Iraqi clerics in interpreting Islamic law, but suggesting that doing so would be much
more dangerous on issues outside of commerce, such as women's right to divorce, for example).
111. See Federal Supreme Court of Iraq, decision No. 61 of January 31, 2012, available at
http://www.iraqja.iq/viewd.933/; Federal Supreme Court of Iraq, decision No. 59 of November 21, 2011,
available at http://www.iraqja.iq/ viewd.886/; Haider al-Hamoudi, Judicial Review of Islamic law Under Iraq's
Constitution, JURIST (Apr. 26, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/04/haiderhamoudi- iraq-islam.php.
112. See, e.g., CHIBLI MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW: MUHAMMAD BAQAR AS-SADR, NAJAF
AND THE SHI'A INTERNATIONAL 38 (Roger Owen ed., 1993) (describing how muqallids, or laymen, are
devoid of knowledge of the fiqh and, therefore, their acts are usually considered void unless they act in
accordance with a fatwa or a recognized mujtahid, or person with proper training in the fiqh); Rabb, supra note
105, at 550-55 (commenting on Resolution 137, which would have put family law issues firmly in the hold of
Islamic jurists, and suggesting that some supported the resolution because existing codified law was "not the
output of a proper Islamic legal interpretive process").
113. Al-Hamoudi, supra note 110 (highlighting the court's lack of authority to challenge the jurists on matters of
sharia as family law).
114. In at least one case, courts also drew insight from a pattern of state practice that indicated, to the courts,
that the government understood the SSL clause to prohibit legislation inconsistent with sharia.
115. Syria's 1950 Constitution and Sudan's (never-enacted) draftIslamic constitution of 1968 each contained a
provision making Islamic norms "the chief source" of legislation, but neither seems to have been understood as
a provision barring legislation that was inconsistent with these norms. See discussion supra Parts I, II, III(B).
116. See discussion supra Part III(E).
117. See discussion supra introduction.
118. As noted above, Syria and Qatar each appear to be afraid that their constitutional judiciaries will interpret
sharia in a manner that is inconsistent with that of the political branches and might thus be inclined to strike
down legislation. To limit the likelihood of this happening, they have amended their SSL clauses to make Islamic
law today merely "a chief source of legislation," rather than "the chief source," as it was before. See discussion
supra Parts II, III(F).
119. Alternatively, they may, like courts in the UAE, argue that other factors- particularly the state's conduct
after the adoption of the clause-suggested that the clause might require the state to respect the principles of
Islamic sharia. See discussion supra Part III(E).
120. At the urging of secularist Iraqi political groups, the United States insisted that the 2004 Iraqi constitution
not contain an SSL provision making sharia "the" chief source of Iraqi legislation. See discussion supra Part
III(H). This was not merely because the United States thought such a provision would require state law to
conform to sharia. Americans also thought that this provision would lead the courts to strike down the type of
liberal social and economic legislation that the United States expected Iraqi parliaments to enact. Similar fears
drove secular liberal Tunisian groups after the Arab Spring to successfully fight against the inclusion of an SSL
provision making Islamic norms "the" chief source of legislation.
121. See discussion supra Parts III(B) n.61, III(F).122. Suda n's draftconstitution of 1968 did envision a
constitutional court, but, intriguingly, it explicitly said that the SSL provisions were not justiciable. See discussion
supra Part III(B).
123. See discussion supra Part III(D), III(F).
124. See discussion supra Part III(H).
125. See Clark B. Lombardi, Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court: Managing Constitutional Conflict in an
Authoritarian Aspirationally 'Islamic' State, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

(Andrew Harding &Peter Leyland eds., 2009) [hereinafter Lombardi, Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court]
(arguing that the claim that secular judges can interpret Islamic law is consistent with much modern Islamic
legal and political theory and noting that some judges clearly believe that they have a constitutional duty and
perhaps a moral duty to exercise this power and that claiming the right of Islamic review gives them
considerable power); see also MARTIN LAU, THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF PAKISTAN
209 (2006) (stressing that judges in Pakistan exercised Islamic review as a way to embark on judicial
explorations of previously untested areas of Pakistani law).
126. The constitutions in Iran and Saudi Arabia do not have SSL clauses, per se. Each, though, has a
procedure by which courts can review laws for consistency with Islam and requires courts to treat non-
conforming laws as void. The courts responsible for Islamic review seem at times to embrace a traditionalist
view of Islam's restraints on state discretion-one that is inconsistent in key respects with modern liberal values.
127. See LOMBARDI, supra note 78 (concluding that Egypt has refused to strike down liberal legislation that is
inconsistent with traditional Islamic law and sometimes uses Islam's putative commitment to justice as a
justification to protect un-enumerated liberal rights); see also LAU, supra note 125 (stating that, in a few rare
cases, Pakistani courts have struck down illiberal, putatively "Islamic" legislation on the grounds that it
misunderstands Islam and noting the most famous case as being the Hazoor Baksh case, in which the court's
decision led to a backlash against the court); Lombardi, Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court, supra note 125,
at 241 (mentioning the court's use of Islamic law to support liberal decisions on questions of property law and
human rights law); Lombardi &Brown, supra note 82, at 380 (commenting on the creative version of Islamic law
that the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt has used to find sharia norms consistent with aspects of human
rights norms, as well as liberal economic policies employed by the government).
AuthorAffiliation
CLARK B. LOMBARDI*
* Associate Professor of Law &Adjunct Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Washington
School of Law; Adjunct Associate Professor, Jackson School of International Studies. The author thanks Nathan
Brown, Jonathan A.C. Brown, Bruce Rutherford, David Fontana, and the participants in the George Washington
University Comparative Constitutional Law Roundtable for comments on a different version of this paper. He
dedicates this piece to Charles Raskob Robinson and Barbara Paul Robinson for a lifetime of friendship and
support. The opinions expressed and all remaining errors are the author's.
Subject: Islamic law; Clauses; Constitutional law; Arabs; Manycountries;
Classification: 4300: Law
Publication title: American University International Law Review
Volume: 28
Issue: 3
Pages: 733-774
Number of pages: 42
Year: 2013
Publisher: American University

Publication subject: Law--International Law
ISSN: 1520460X
Copyright: Copyright American University 2013
_______________________________________________________________
Document 12 of 20
The Arab Spring Two Years On: Reflections on Dignity, Democracy, and Devotion
Author: Hashemi, Nader
Abstract:
The Arab Spring of 2011 is widely viewed today as one of the great historical moments of political
transformation. Comparisons have been made to the European revolutions of 1848 and the post-cold war
democratic transitions in Eastern Europe, while some have spoken of a possible "fourth wave" of
democratization. These analogies make sense given that longstanding dictators who seemed impervious to
political change, in a region known for persistent authoritarianism, were suddenly toppled by largely nonviolent
protesters invoking the universal themes of political freedom, dignity, and social justice. From the outset,
however, the Arab Spring was met by a small chorus of criticism and contempt from prominent intellectuals,
writers, and politicians. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Full text:
(ProQuest: ... denotes non-US-ASCII text omitted.)
Review Essay
The Arab Spring of 2011 is widely viewed today as one of the great historical moments of political
transformation. Comparisons have been made to the European revolutions of 1848 and the post-cold war
democratic transitions in Eastern Europe, while some have spoken of a possible "fourth wave" of
democratization. 1These analogies make sense given that longstanding dictators who seemed impervious to
political change, in a region known for persistent authoritarianism, were suddenly toppled by largely nonviolent
protesters invoking the universal themes of political freedom, dignity, and social justice. From the outset,
however, the Arab Spring was met by a small chorus of criticism and contempt from prominent intellectuals,
writers, and politicians.
Reflecting on the uprisings soon after they began, the Princeton historian Bernard Lewis argued that they had
little to do with democracy; what he found striking in the Arab Spring was what he called "the sexual aspect of

it." Focusing on the critical role that young people were playing, he explained that "in the Muslim world, casual
sex, Western-style, doesn't exist. If a young man wants sex, there are only two possibilities--marriage and the
brothel. You have these vast numbers of young men growing up without the money, either for the brothel or the
bride price, with raging sexual desire. On the one hand, it can lead to the suicide bomber, who is attracted by
the virgins of paradise--the only ones available to him. On the other hand, sheer frustration." 2
In a similar vein, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu famously described the Arab Spring as an "Islamic,
anti-Western, anti-liberal, anti-Israeli, and anti-democratic wave."3Veteran Middle East analyst Aaron David
Miller, who was an adviser to six U.S. secretaries of state, has argued that, as far as the Arab Spring is
concerned, "one inconvenient and politically incorrect truth stands out: the Arabs are much better at acquiring
and fighting over power than they are at sharing it." 4More recently, Nobel Laureate V. S. Naipaul recalled his
initial reaction to the Arab Spring: "I thought it was nothing, really. It would come and go, and we'll be back
where we started. . . . Chaos, one-man rule, which is how these things usually end in the Muslim world." 5
This cynicism and pessimism about the future of the Arab-Islamic world seems to be shared by an increasing
number of Americans. An October 2012 Pew Research Poll revealed that nearly 60 percent of Americans do
not believe that recent changes in the Middle East will lead to lasting improvements for the people of the region,
and a majority of Americans (54 percent) believe that it is more important to have stability (read: pro-Western
dictatorship) in the Arab World, even if there is less democracy. 6
What these sentiments fail to appreciate, however, is that the Arab Spring is not a single event but rather a
long-term process of political change. Its precipitating factors were both political and economic; and while
history has yet to render its ultimate judgment, fundamental questions remain about how best to understand the
nature, character, and trajectory of the Arab revolts. What are the key historical reference points, the optimal
analytical framework, and the most salient political themes that can help us make sense of the Arab Spring?
These questions are extremely pertinent today given the perception that the Arab Spring seems to be coming
apart at the seams--from Tunisia, where the government has resigned following the assassination of a
prominent opposition figure; to Egypt, a country plagued by a constitutional crisis; and on to Libya, which is
awash in renegade militias and regional rivalries and which possesses a weak central government. How can we
best approach this subject?
Three recent books on the Arab Spring offer different points of entry. Roger Owen's The Rise and Fall of Arab
Presidents for Life provides an accessible historical account of the rise, persistence, and eventual demise of
Arab authoritarianism during the twentieth century; Hamid Dabashi, in The Arab Spring, deals with the themes
of interpretation, bias, and knowledge production in the study of non-Western societies; while Tariq Ramadan,
in Islam and the Arab Awakening, provides a thoughtful meditation on how Islam, reinterpreted, can contribute
to the political development of the Arab-Islamic world. Writing during the early days of the Arab Spring, all three
authors are optimistic about the political transformations that have taken place and about the future democratic
prospects and political trajectory of the region.
Dignity and the Arab Awakening
The concept of karama (dignity) is useful in understanding the recent events in the Middle East.7We do not
typically associate the theme of dignity with struggles for democracy. In previous uprisings against dictatorial
rule in other parts of the world, this issue hardly surfaced in the way it has recently. It was a core theme,
however, of the Arab uprisings, which united Arabs from Morocco to Oman. This subject remains poorly
understood in the West.
The theme of dignity, or its converse, indignity, and its relationship to modern Arab politics is a multidimensional
phenomenon. It exists both at the level of the individual and the collective. Recall the story of Mohammed
Bouazizi. This 26-year-old street vendor from a small town in central Tunisia struggled to feed his family, for
which he was the primary breadwinner. One day his weighing scales were confiscated by a member of the
police force because he failed to pay a bribe. When he tried to resist he was slapped and spat upon. He

complained to the local authorities, but his protests went unheard and he was reportedly further mocked. With
nowhere left to turn, no means of making a living, and full of frustration, desperation, and fury, he stood in the
middle of traffic outside the governor's office and killed himself in an act of self-immolation. This event triggered
the Tunisian Revolution and the wider Arab Spring, rendering Bouazizi's life and martyrdom the stuff of legend. 8
Arabs across North Africa and the Middle East immediately identified with Bouazizi's story on a personal level.
His economic plight was theirs. His frustration, humiliation, and anger resonated and touched a deep personal
chord. Copycat self-immolations soon followed, and the region quickly erupted in revolution. Around the same
time a similar event involving the death of a young man, Khaled Sa'id, close in age to Bouazizi, galvanized
Egyptians and led to the toppling of Hosni Mubarak. But the theme of "Arab indignity" also exists on a collective
level, and it is associated with a set of common historical experiences, which partly explains why it is such a
potent force in the politics of the region. For the Arab-Islamic world the twentieth century was an extremely bitter
one. European colonialism and imperialism thwarted the aspirations of millions of Arabs for self-determination.
The desire to create one pan-Arab state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire's Arabic-speaking provinces was
dashed at the altar of British and French ambition. The state system that emerged after World War I reflected
the economic and geostrategic interests of London and Paris more than it did popular preference on the streets
of Cairo or Damascus. The birth of the modern Arab world thus left behind bitter memories and poisoned
relations between Muslim societies and Western ones. This was compounded by Western support for the
national rights of Jewish settlers in Palestine over those of the indigenous Palestinian population--the legacy of
which continues to afflict the region and our world.
The aftermath of World War II saw the gradual loosening of European control of the Arab world and the
emergence of a brief moment of optimism. Many thought that an opportunity had finally arrived for the
realization of meaningful self-determination. But this opening did not last long. The region soon found itself
awash in nationalist military coups, single-party states, and authoritarian monarchies, the latter of which were
supported by the West. Within the span of a couple of decades a new postcolonial elite came to power and a
familiar political landscape took shape. Yes, the new rulers were native to the soil and had Muslim names, but
they started to behave in ways that were eerily familiar. A new chasm between state and society developed that
replicated the old colonial one, only this time the ruling elites were Arabs instead of Europeans. The term
neocolonialism is an apt description for this state of affairs.
In this context the Syrian writer Rana Kabbani has used the phrase "internal colonialism" to describe the
authoritarian rule of postcolonial elites in the Arab world. With respect to Syrians, she explains that forty-two
years of one-family rule was "much like the external colonialism of the past, [it] has robbed them and bombed
them and impeded them from joining the free peoples of the world." 9The Syrian human rights activist and
opposition leader Radwan Ziadeh has similarly argued that we "need a second independence in Syria. The first
was from the French and the second will be from the Assad dynasty."10These sentiments are widely felt and
apply to Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and beyond.
Commenting on this core feature of Arab political life, the historian Ilan Papp has referred to the Arab Spring
as the "second phase of decolonization." What recent events have demonstrated, he notes, is the collective
"assertion of self-dignity in the Arab world" after decades of humiliation, despotism, and despair. 11
In The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life, the distinguished Middle East historian Roger Owen picks up
on the link between the colonial and postcolonial Arab state. The structures and processes of political rule
retained a particular authoritarian continuity that over time generated deep resentment, he observes.
"Domestically, the response of the new independent regimes was to try to augment their hold over their own
populations using institutions and techniques, notably an increasing emphasis on policing, security, and the
management of elections, borrowed directly from the practices of their former colonial masters" (p. 15). In highly
accessible prose, Owen chronicles the origins and mechanisms of control that the Arab "presidential

monarchies" used to maintain political power. The two key regime imperatives were survival and legitimation.
Modern Arab politics "became a matter of personality, of personal character, and of family relationships in which
questions of temperament, age, physical and mental health, and individual political skills stood . . . at the center
[of] political life" until the Arab Spring shook the foundations of the Arab world's authoritarian order (p. 6).
The strength of this book lies in the connections that Owen makes between the political, economic, and historic
contexts of the modern Arab world on the one hand, and the behavior of individual leaders on the other. This is
best demonstrated in his discussion of the question of "Arab exceptionalism"--referring to a widespread and
longstanding view in Western intellectual circles that maintains that somehow the Arab-Islamic world is
civilizationally and culturally different (and not in a good way) from the rest of the world (especially the West),
and that this explains why democracy has been absent, turmoil persists, and authoritarianism has prevailed.
This perspective has been popular in the West partly because it reinforces widespread stereotypes about
Muslims, but also because prominent Western scholars such as Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington, and Ernest
Gellner have given this perspective an academic stamp of legitimacy. Owen engages with this thesis by
acknowledging that a "case can be made for a type of Arab exceptionalism between 1970 and 2010 . . . [but]
this is best explained by what I call an 'Arab demonstration effect' stemming from developments in the specially
close ties that have united the Arab world since at least the end of World War II" (p. 153). Jettisoning an
Orientalist explanation about an alleged enduring Arab or Muslim cultural essence, Owen unpackages,
historically and comparatively, the debate on Arab exceptionalism. He focuses his attention on the unique
regional history of the Arab world during the twentieth century by identifying a set of internal and external
influences that shaped the political landscape of the region. In his reading, the demonstration effect of the
Nasser and later Sadat models of government and management in Egypt were of paramount influence to other
states in the region, as were the geostrategic policies of Western states toward the Middle East. Owen
concedes that nothing in his argument is really new, but that there has been a lack of emphasis on, "the way in
which both internalist and externalist influences helped to shape the emergence of strong presidential
monarchies sustained by a common set of structures and practices concerned with security and
postrevolutionary legitimation" (p. 160).
The Arab Spring and Interpretation
The foregoing narrative is easy for most Western readers to digest. The travesties and tragedies of authoritarian
rule in the Middle East are well known, even if the extent of Western support for this regional order may not be.
At a much deeper intellectual level, however, beyond basic questions of dictatorship and democracy, the Arab
Spring has generated new debates over interpretation. How best can we understand these revolts and which
analytical framework is most helpful? This is where Hamid Dabashi's The Arab Spring: The End of
Postcolonialism makes a contribution.
Dabashi, who holds a chair in Iranian studies and comparative literature at Columbia University, is
fundamentally concerned with upending what he calls the "regime of knowledge production" that has distorted
our understanding of the world. As he sees it, the famous slogan from the Arab Spring, " ash-sha'b yurid isq
an-nizm" (the people want to topple the regime), is a metaphor for overthrowing both dictators and conceptual
categories, as well as the political terminology and intellectual frames of reference that are fundamentally
Eurocentric in nature and the byproduct of a colonial mindset.
In many ways Dabashi's book is not about the Arab Spring at all. He simply uses this event as a foil for a radical
critique of existing intellectual paradigms and concepts. Instead, he calls for a more inclusive universalism that
incorporates the historical and political experiences of the non-Western world, and that is not based on Western
history and terms of reference. This is where the Arab Spring fits into his narrative. He sees it as an "open-
ended" revolution with transnational potential that can lead to greater human understanding, including an
appreciation for the "cosmopolitan worldliness" of Muslim societies (p. 39).
Dabashi is a postcolonial critical theorist, which means that his book is filled with academic verbiage that is

almost unintelligible. For example:
Imperialism has always been an Empire, and Empire imperialist, if we simply recognize that capitalism never
had a center, and the civilizational manufacturing of boundaries was a heuristic mechanism to sustain the
autonormativity of instrumental reason as the heteronormativity of benevolent progress (p. 37).
Passages such as this one abound in the text. But if one can get beyond his jargon (and anger) the book
provides food for thought on how to see and think about the world and its problems in global terms, especially
from a non-Western perspective. In calling for a more inclusive universalism, Dabashi echoes the writings of the
Indian writer Pankaj Mishra. In his latest book, Mishra argues that it is misleading to think that the most
important events of the twentieth century were the two World Wars and the cold war. This was certainly the
case for the Western world, but "the central event of the last century for the majority of the world's population,"
Mishra argues, "was the intellectual and political awakening of Asia and its emergence from the ruins of both
Asian and European empires." 12It is for this reason that the Arab Spring is such an important and monumental
event. The Arab Spring is the continuation of a longer struggle and quest by the Arab-Islamic world for self-
determination from both external and internal authoritarian forces. To fully understand and appreciate the moral
and political significance of the Arab Spring we must see things from the perspective of the people in the region
and from their own historical experience, not from the perspective we in the West frequently use to relate to the
Middle East (oil, Israel, "fundamentalism," "stability," "security," "war on terror," and so on).
Islam and the Arab Spring
For a Western audience, one of the most bewildering and alarming developments of the Arab Spring has been
the rise to power of Islamist-based parties. This was not how it was supposed to be. One reason why the Arab
Spring was initially widely celebrated in the West was because the demands of the protesters were decidedly
secular. Moreover, we were repeatedly reassured that this was not about Israel or the West but rather about
internal Arab despotism; Islamist parties and actors played no role in instigating the revolts and they only joined
the protests at a much later stage. But the fear of another 1979 Iranian Revolution and religious takeover
loomed in the background; and these fears have been heightened with the electoral victories of Islamist parties
in Tunisia and Egypt and their rise to prominence in Syria.
Such concerns are certainly legitimate, but two years after the start of the Arab Spring, a discernible set of
political trends involving religion-based actors confirm an argument I made four years ago. While developing a
new political theory for Muslim societies, I argued that the road to democracy, whatever twists and turns it might
make along the way, "cannot avoid passing through the gates of religious politics." 13What I meant by this was
twofold. First, the role of religion in politics needed to be democratically negotiated in emerging Muslim
democracies, and political secularism had to be earned and not assumed (as it often is in much of the media
and intellectual debate about Muslim politics in the West). In other words, it was a fallacy to presuppose that
Muslim societies had long grappled with the deeply emotional and divisive issue of the normative role of religion
in politics and that a broad democratic consensus exists on the topic. Stated differently, Western history is not
universal history, and it is analytically flawed to assume that the Muslim world has had the same historical
experience as the West with respect to negotiating the proper role of religion in government. This process is just
beginning as a result of the Arab Spring.
Second, I argued that religion-based parties and religious intellectuals could play a critically important role in the
democratization of their countries, provided they reconciled their political theologies with universal standards of
human rights and the modern demands of democracy. This latter development is taking place--gradually, to be
sure, but its manifestation is undeniable. For example, the prominent role played by the Ennahda party in
leading Tunisia's democratic transition clearly demonstrates that forms of religious politics and democratic
development are indeed compatible. While the case of Egypt and religion-based parties is far more complex, a
similar trend is visible there as well.
In Islam and the Arab Awakening, Tariq Ramadan explores these themes with considerable insight, optimism,

and clarity. While cautiously optimistic about the future, he acknowledges that "the outcome is unclear . . . more
time will be needed before the past can be forgotten and open, pluralistic, democratic societies can emerge."
The key challenges and political battles that lie ahead will include debates on "the nature of the state, the role of
religion, the basic principle of equal rights for all citizens, [and the] equality of women and men" (p. 3).
The early parts of the book are problematic. Ramadan comes dangerously close to suggesting that the Arab
Spring is a Western conspiracy to dominate the Islamic world. The evidence and arguments he advances are
unconvincing and, frankly, disappointing, coming as they do from a leading Muslim intellectual who was born
and raised in the West, and from whom one would expect more nuance and depth of understanding in
deciphering Western policy toward the region. His quasi-conspiratorial claims are especially disturbing given the
prevalence of conspiracy theories in Muslim societies, to which, sadly, Ramadan contributes.
Ramadan is on stronger ground when he warns about the pitfalls and dangers of unregulated neoliberal
economics dominating the region after the fall of dictators. "There can be no true democratization," he writes,
"unless it is accompanied by the striving for greater social equality and economic justice." He laments that
"critical, creative economic thinking appears to have deserted the Arab political debate" and notes how "sad it
would be if ultimately the 'Arab Awakening' amounted to nothing more than the uprising of a leisure class of
young people who enjoy access to the Internet and to social networks, who demand political freedom, but who
have forgotten the poor and the downtrodden in their own societies who also claim one basic freedom: that of
living (and not just surviving) over that of speech" (p. 115).
The most insightful chapters in Islam and the Arab Awakening explore the role of Islam and its potential in
promoting democratic transitions in the Arab world. Ramadan's primary concern is with Islamic ethics, and he
lays out a progressive vision for the future while also identifying a set of political trends that provide a hopeful
prognosis. For example, he notes that the future of democracy in the Middle East and North Africa will be
deeply intertwined with the ability of Islamic-oriented political actors to develop and indigenize a form of political
secularism that is compatible with their cultural traditions. This is already happening, according to Ramadan,
with the development of a new concept, championed today by mainstream Islamists, of a "civil state" as
opposed to an "Islamic state." This is a form of Islamic secularism, he argues, because its proponents endorse
"the existence of two distinct authorities: one political, the other religious" (p. 105).
Ramadan's description of the trajectory of Muslim politics bodes well for the future of democracy in the Arab-
Islamic world. This can be better appreciated if we lower our expectations and take the long view of history. In
reading him one is reminded of Alfred Stepan's groundbreaking thesis on religion and democracy. 14According
to Stepan, in order for democracy to co-exist with the forces of religion, "twin tolerations" need to be cultivated:
both state institutions/actors and religious institutions/actors need to respect certain minimum boundaries of
freedom of action that do not violate the autonomy and integrity of the other. Stated differently, in order for
democracy to survive in a religious milieu there must be a clear distinction and mutual respect between political
authorities and religious bodies, and this needs to be negotiated democratically, over time, based on an
evolving consensus. In the Arab context, achieving this consensus will be difficult, partly because this process is
inherently conflict-ridden but also due to the brutal legacy of the postcolonial secular state in the Arab-Islamic
world, which has left societies polarized and deeply distrustful of one another, as we are seeing today in Tunisia
and Egypt.
Today in Syria, for example, the Assad regime justifies its rule partly in the name of secularism. At the same
time it has responded to pro-democracy protests with such extreme brutality that Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch, and the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria have all charged the
Syrian regime with pursuing a policy of state-sanctioned war crimes and crimes against humanity. As a
consequence, the challenges facing Syrian democrats in the aftermath of the demise of the secular dictatorship
in Damascus will be formidable, especially in terms of reconstituting an authentic form of Islamic secularism on
the ruins of a rapacious regime that has killed, according to the United Nations, over 70,000 people.

Ramadan recalls an intriguing event that highlights the challenges facing the Arab-Islamic world with respect to
the development of political secularism. In September 2011, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
whose country is viewed by mainstream Arab Islamists as something of a political model, travelled to Egypt,
where he was hailed as a hero, in part due to his defense of Palestinian rights. Thousands of people, mostly
supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, came out to catch a glimpse of the Turkish leader. When they saw him
they cheered: "Erdogan! Erdogan! A real Muslim and not a coward," and "Turkey and Egypt, a single fist. The
blockade [of Gaza] will be broken." 15
As part of his media blitz, Erdogan was interviewed on the popular Egyptian talk show 10 O'Clock, where he
confidently defended the concept of secularism. "Don't be wary of secularism. I hope there will be a secular
state in Egypt," he stated. He went on to clarify that to "Egyptians who view secularism as removing religion
from the state, or as an infidel state, I say you are mistaken. It means respect to all religions. . . . If this is
implemented, the entire society will live in safety." 16
The reaction to these comments from the Muslim Brotherhood was revealing. Their passion and enthusiasm for
the Turkish Prime Minister quickly soured. He was suddenly accused of interfering in Egypt's internal affairs and
seeking to dominate the region. New questions were raised about Erdogan's status as a hero and to what
extent Turkey could be a role model for the Arab world.
Muslim unease with secularism is partially rooted in the different legacies of modernization that Muslim societies
have experienced during the twentieth century. The Turkish experience with secularism and democracy has
been qualitatively distinct from that of the Arab world. In the Arab context the concept of secularism today is a
conversation stopper, in part because it is understood as a synonym for atheism and associated with the failed
policies of the secular postcolonial state. In Turkey, by contrast, secularism has coexisted with multiparty politics
and has facilitated the gradual democratization and economic development of the country (albeit with setbacks
and conflict over the years).
Today in the Arab world there is no consensus on the meaning of secularism or how it might relate to such key
issues as minority rights, gender, the nature of the legal system, and the separation of powers. All these issues
are currently "under political construction" and are being vigorously debated in society for the first time in the
modern history of the region. This is a very healthy development. The opening of political space, the
development of a new public sphere, and the flourishing of multiparty politics will inevitably provide clarity on
these issues.
To the extent that Tunisia is a harbinger of what an Islamist-led "civil state" might look like, there are grounds for
optimism. In many ways Tunisia represents a bright spot in the Arab Spring, particularly in terms of reconciling
the tensions between Islam, secularism, and democracy. Rashid Ghannouchi, the intellectual leader and
founder of Ennahda, has been leading the way; and through a series of interviews and lectures he has begun
the process of reconciling the tensions between secularism and Islamic political thought.
In a visit to Turkey in December 2011, Ghannouchi gave an interview in which he stated: "We need democracy
and development in Tunisia, and we strongly believe in the compatibility between Islam and democracy,
between Islam and modernity. So we do not need secularism in Tunisia." 17He has repeatedly rejected and
condemned the application of secularism to Tunisia, but in the same breath he has also stated that "we provide
guarantees for all Tunisians, whether secular or Islamic. We believe the state is based on the principle of
citizenship. People, despite their differences and attitudes, men and women, should enjoy equal rights in
Tunisia. All are equal before the law regardless of their beliefs." 18
What Ghannouchi seems to be saying is that he accepts the important values that flow from political secularism
(as understood in the Western tradition) and which modern democracies require (popular sovereignty and
equality of citizenship), yet he rejects the word "secularism" because of its negative association with the
ravages of the postcolonial state in the Islamic world. In other words, political secularism is fine as long as we
call it by another name.

Looking Forward
Reflecting on the Arab Spring, the Hoover Institution scholar Fouad Ajami observed that the year 2011 "is to the
Arabs what 1989 was to the Communist world. The Arabs are now coming into ownership of their own history
and we have to celebrate."19Ajami is correct in terms of the historical and moral significance of the Arab
uprisings for the people of the region, but his comparison with Eastern Europe is misleading. The problem with
his analogy is that it establishes a false expectation for measuring political development. It suggests that Europe
is the gold standard, with the implication being that transitions to democracy in the Arab world should be
smooth, peaceful, and uneventful--and if they are not, then something is wrong with the fundamental character
of the Arab-Islamic world. Are Bernard Lewis and V. S. Naipaul right after all?
The obvious needs to be stated: The Middle East is not Eastern Europe. The historical experiences of the two
regions have been qualitatively different, both in the pre-modern and modern eras. The indices that social
scientists typically use to measure the prospects for stable democratic transitions and consolidations vary by a
significant degree when judged by levels of socioeconomic modernization (for example, industrialization,
literacy, or mass communications), class structure (the existence of a sizeable middle class), and a suitable
political culture (democracy-enhancing cultural norms, habits, and values). In other words, the social conditions
that provided for relatively smooth transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe do not exist in the case of the
Arab-Islamic world. Stormy waters and different democratic pathways lie ahead for the Middle East. We need a
new analytical framework, and the long view of history is our best guide.
Looking forward, a comparative study of modernization processes across the Islam-West divide is instructive in
terms of understanding the future trajectory of the Arab Spring. In this context, the Princeton historian L. Carl
Brown has observed that the vertiginous convulsions and social upheavals that accompany the process of
modernization--when traditional societies are transformed and reshaped by modern socioeconomic and political
forces--seem more pronounced and qualitatively different in the case of Muslim societies than in the West.
Underlying the changes in Reformation Europe were increased literacy, the rise of printing, and the early stirring
of exploration and entrepreneurship that would lead to capitalism. A case can be made that the Muslim world
today is seized with the equivalent of all such factors plus more. Not only are the increases in literacy,
publications, rural to urban migration, and economic interdependence greater for today's Muslims than for
Europeans of the Reformation period . . . [but] the time involved [is] squeezed down for today's Muslims to a few
decades as opposed to at least a century and a half, if not more, for Reformation Europe.20
While Brown was referring to the general process of modernization and its concomitant destabilizing effects, the
Arab-Islamic world is simultaneously experiencing--within a short span of time--three simultaneous destabilizing
processes. The first is democratization. The struggle to transfer power from old ruling elites to the people and
their representatives is inherently disruptive, as we are seeing in Tunisia and Egypt. The old guard of the
ancien rgime is still present and serves as a complicating factor in these democratic transitions. Removing a
dictator is one thing; overhauling a corrupt political system replete with nepotism, cronyism, and patron-
clientelism is a far greater challenge. It will take years before new rules of the political game are established and
before all the key players and stakeholders accept that popular sovereignty--and not elite sovereignty--is the
only game in town.
The second inherently destabilizing process facing the Arab-Islamic world today is the struggle for political
secularization. By this I mean the difficult process of democratically negotiating the normative role of religion in
politics. This process is always conflict-ridden, first because religion is an emotionally-charged subject
connected to issues of personal and group identity, but also because different political constituencies have
vastly different ideas on the role religion should play in political life. Generating a democratic consensus on this
topic will take time and will inevitably produce conflict and tension, as we have already seen in the constitutional
debates in Tunisia and Egypt.
Finally, the Arab-Islamic world is being destabilized by globalization. Social scientists have long recognized a

deep connection in the late twentieth century between the rise of particularist ideas, doctrines, and groups and
the increasing globality of our planet. Based on fundamental changes in technology from the media age to the
information age, globalization has greatly heightened awareness among previously segmented and isolated
populations. The concept of "identity" is, after all, relational, in that individuals and groups define themselves in
relation to other individuals and groups in society. The more we are aware of the plurality of groups and
societies in our world, the more this forces the question: What is distinct about me and my community in a
globalized world? Benjamin Barber, in his popular Jihad vs. McWorld, argued precisely this point, noting that the
rise of ethno-religious nationalism in the late twentieth century is a direct reaction to the increasing political,
economic, and cultural interdependence of our planet.21In short, the rise of particularist identities is a natural
concomitant to globalization. Post-Arab Spring societies are deeply affected by this phenomenon of identity
politics; and, as a result, this process will complicate future transitions to democracy.
On the plus side, however, the Arab Spring has opened up new opportunities that were previously
inconceivable. Two years ago, the very thought of a post-Mubarak Egypt or post-Qaddafi Libya or post-Ben Ali
Tunisia was unimaginable; today these are realities. The demise of long-standing dictators has shaken the
foundations of authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa. The ripple effects of these developments
will resonate far and wide.
NOTES
1 Leon Neyfekh, "Is This 1848?: What History Can Teach Us About Arab Revolutions," Boston Globe, March
27, 2011; Larry Diamond, "A Fourth Wave or a False Start? Democracy After the Arab Spring,"
ForeignAffairs.com, May 22, 2011; www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67862/larry-diamond/a-fourth-wave-or-false-
start.
2 David Horovitz, "A mass expression of outrage against injustice," Jerusalem Post, February 25, 2011;
www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=209770.
3 Barak Ravid, "Netanyahu: Arab Spring pushing Mideast East backward, not forward," Haaretz, November 24,
2011.
4 Aaron David Miller, "The Stalled Arab Spring," The National Interest, June 6, 2012;
nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-stalled-arab-spring-7014.
5 Isaac Chotiner, "V. S. Naipaul on the Arab Spring, Authors He Loathes, and the Books He will Never Write,"
The New Republic, December 7, 2012; www.newrepublic.com/article/110946/vs-naipaul-the-arab-spring-
authors-he-loathes-and-the-books-he-will-never-write.
6 Pew Research Center, "On Eve of Foreign Debate, Growing Pessimism about Arab Spring Aftermath,"
October 18, 2012; www.people-press.org/2012/10/18/on-eve-of-foreign-debate-growing-pessimism-about-arab-
spring-aftermath/.
7 The economic and development factors that led to the Arab Spring are essential to a comprehensive
understanding of the topic. In this essay I focus only on a few of the political and historical variables.
8 Kareem Fahim, "Slap to a Man's Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia," New York Times, January 21, 2011. He was
posthumously awarded the Sakharov Prize and the Tunisian government has honored him with a postage
stamp.
9 Rana Kabbani, "From the Turks to Assad: to us Syrians it is all brutal colonialism," The Guardian, March 29,
2011; www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/30/turks-assad-colonialism-family-mafia.
10 Liam Stack, "In Sometimes Deadly Clashes, Defiant Syrians Protest," New York Times, April 17, 2011.
11 Ilan Papp, interview by Frank Barat, "Reframing the Israel-Palestine Conflict," New Internationalist, April 1,
2011; newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2011/04/01/palestine-israel-interview-pappe/. See
Rami Khouri , "The Long Revolt ," Wilson Quarterly (Summer 2011 ), pp. 43 -46
.
12

Pankaj Mishra , From the Ruins of Empire: The Intellectuals Who Remade Asia (New York : Farrar, Straus and
Giroux , 2012 ), p. 8
.
13
Nader Hashemi , Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies
(New York : Oxford University Press , 2009 ), pp. 1 -3
.
14
Alfred Stepan , "Religion, Democracy, and the 'Twin Tolerations,' " Journal of Democracy (October 2000 ), pp.
37 -57 10.1353/jod.2000.0088
.
15
Marc Champion and Ayla AlBayrak , "Erdogan Gets Warm Welcome in Cairo ," Wall Street Journal , September
13, 2011
.
16
Marc Champion and Matt Bradley , "Islamists Criticize Turkish Premier's 'Secularist' Remarks, Wall Street
Journal , September 15, 2011
and "Analysis: Erdogan Presents Turkey as Model for Arabs," Today's Zaman, September 14, 2011.
17 Ipek Yezdani, "No Need for Secularism in Tunisia: Ghannouchi," Hurriyet Daily News, December 24, 2011.
18 Rashid Ghannouchi, interview by Adell Dellal, "Post Revolution Politics in Tunisia," Euronews, January 13,
2012; www.euronews.com/2012/01/13/post-revolution-politics-in-tunisia/.
19 Tim Lister, "Gadhafi's Demise and the Arab Spring," CNN.com, October 21, 2011;
www.cnn.com/2011/10/21/world/gadhafi-arab-spring.
20 Emphasis added.
L. Carl Brown , Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics (New York : Columbia University Press ,
2001 ), p. 137
.
21
Benjamin Barber , Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy (New York : Ballantine Books , 1995
)
.
Footnote
1 Leon Neyfekh, "Is This 1848?: What History Can Teach Us About Arab Revolutions," Boston Globe, March
27, 2011; Larry Diamond, "A Fourth Wave or a False Start? Democracy After the Arab Spring,"
ForeignAffairs.com, May 22, 2011; www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67862/larry-diamond/a-fourth-wave-or-false-
start.
2 David Horovitz, "A mass expression of outrage against injustice," Jerusalem Post, February 25, 2011;
www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=209770.
3 Barak Ravid, "Netanyahu: Arab Spring pushing Mideast East backward, not forward," Haaretz, November 24,
2011.
4 Aaron David Miller, "The Stalled Arab Spring," The National Interest, June 6, 2012;
nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-stalled-arab-spring-7014.
5 Isaac Chotiner, "V. S. Naipaul on the Arab Spring, Authors He Loathes, and the Books He will Never Write,"
The New Republic, December 7, 2012; www.newrepublic.com/article/110946/vs-naipaul-the-arab-spring-
authors-he-loathes-and-the-books-he-will-never-write.

6 Pew Research Center, "On Eve of Foreign Debate, Growing Pessimism about Arab Spring Aftermath,"
October 18, 2012; www.people-press.org/2012/10/18/on-eve-of-foreign-debate-growing-pessimism-about-arab-
spring-aftermath/.
7 The economic and development factors that led to the Arab Spring are essential to a comprehensive
understanding of the topic. In this essay I focus only on a few of the political and historical variables.
8 Kareem Fahim, "Slap to a Man's Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia," New York Times, January 21, 2011. He was
posthumously awarded the Sakharov Prize and the Tunisian government has honored him with a postage
stamp.
9 Rana Kabbani, "From the Turks to Assad: to us Syrians it is all brutal colonialism," The Guardian, March 29,
2011; www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/30/turks-assad-colonialism-family-mafia.
10 Liam Stack, "In Sometimes Deadly Clashes, Defiant Syrians Protest," New York Times, April 17, 2011.
11 Ilan Papp, interview by Frank Barat, "Reframing the Israel-Palestine Conflict," New Internationalist, April 1,
2011; newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2011/04/01/palestine-israel-interview-pappe/. See
Rami Khouri , "The Long Revolt ," Wilson Quarterly (Summer 2011 ), pp. 43 -46
.
12
Pankaj Mishra , From the Ruins of Empire: The Intellectuals Who Remade Asia (New York : Farrar, Straus and
Giroux , 2012 ), p. 8
.
13
Nader Hashemi , Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies
(New York : Oxford University Press , 2009 ), pp. 1 -3
.
14
Alfred Stepan , "Religion, Democracy, and the 'Twin Tolerations,' " Journal of Democracy (October 2000 ), pp.
37 -57 10.1353/jod.2000.0088
.
15
Marc Champion and Ayla AlBayrak , "Erdogan Gets Warm Welcome in Cairo ," Wall Street Journal , September
13, 2011
.
16
Marc Champion and Matt Bradley , "Islamists Criticize Turkish Premier's 'Secularist' Remarks, Wall Street
Journal , September 15, 2011
and "Analysis: Erdogan Presents Turkey as Model for Arabs," Today's Zaman, September 14, 2011.
17 Ipek Yezdani, "No Need for Secularism in Tunisia: Ghannouchi," Hurriyet Daily News, December 24, 2011.
18 Rashid Ghannouchi, interview by Adell Dellal, "Post Revolution Politics in Tunisia," Euronews, January 13,
2012; www.euronews.com/2012/01/13/post-revolution-politics-in-tunisia/.
19 Tim Lister, "Gadhafi's Demise and the Arab Spring," CNN.com, October 21, 2011;
www.cnn.com/2011/10/21/world/gadhafi-arab-spring.
20 Emphasis added.
L. Carl Brown , Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics (New York : Columbia University Press ,
2001 ), p. 137
.
21
Benjamin Barber , Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy (New York : Ballantine Books , 1995

)
.
Subject: Revolutions; Democracy; Authoritarianism; Transitions;
Publication title: Ethics & International Affairs
Volume: 27
Issue: 2
Pages: 207-221
Number of pages: 15
Publication date: Summer 2013
Year: 2013
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Place of publication: New York
Publication subject: Education--Teaching Methods And Curriculum, Political Science--International Relations,

Philosophy
ISSN: 08926794
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0892679413000099
Copyright: Copyright Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs 2013
_______________________________________________________________
Document 13 of 20
Review Essay: After the Arab Spring

Author: Terrill, W Andrew
Abstract:
To be engaged partners, US Army personnel must be informed partners, and the Arab uprisings are perhaps
the most important set of events to occur in this region since at least the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. [...]a

strong understanding of the regional trends will help US Army leaders provide valuable and relevant advice to
the civilian leadership on when and how the use of landpower options is a reasonable idea and when it may be
especially problematic. [...]the Egyptian public had a number of pent-up grievances now moving to the fore
including decades of corruption and repression.
Full text:
In a speech delivered on 19 May 2011, President Obama identified the following US "core interests" in the
Middle East: (1) "countering terrorism," (2) "stopping the spread of nuclear weapons," (3) "securing the free flow
of commerce and safeguarding the security of the region," and, (4) "standing up for Israel's security and
pursuing Arab-Israeli peace."1 The US military and intelligence presence in this region are designed to support
these objectives and to reassure US allies while deterring potential adversaries such as Iran. Currently, it is not
clear if the changes brought about by the Arab Spring uprisings will require the US military to find new ways to
protect these interests or what adjustments to US basing and other military activity may be required. The
ongoing civil war in Syria and the still unfolding political results in Arab nations that have successfully
overthrown the despots that once ruled them add to the uncertainty. Understanding the development and
evolution of the Arab Spring is, therefore, an important prerequisite for addressing some key aspects involving
future US national security requirements. Fortunately, there are a number of excellent works on the subject that
can be useful for US Army professionals and others seeking to do so.
In examining these books, this essay seeks to help address an ongoing concern of US Army Chief of
StaffGeneral Raymond Odierno, who in March 2012 stated, "We have learned many lessons over the last 10
years, but one of the most compelling is that-whether you are working among citizens of a country, or working
with their governments or Armed Forces-nothing is as important to your long term success as understanding the
prevailing culture and values."2 Tremendous insight into these cultural issues and values can be gained by
examining the history, and especially the recent history, of the countries we view as partners and also those we
view as potential adversaries. At this time, it is particularly important to consider the goals and aspirations of the
Arab publics that participated in the Arab Spring and to find ways in which the US national interest can be
advanced while respecting the concerns and values of Arab populations. To be engaged partners, US Army
personnel must be informed partners, and the Arab uprisings are perhaps the most important set of events to
occur in this region since at least the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Moreover, a strong understanding of the
regional trends will help US Army leaders provide valuable and relevant advice to the civilian leadership on
when and how the use of landpower options is a reasonable idea and when it may be especially problematic.
How the Arab Uprisings Developed, Succeeded, and Sometimes Failed
One of the most important studies addressing recent events in the Middle East is The Arab Uprising by Marc
Lynch. This work presents an interesting and insightful overview of the Arab uprisings which began in Tunisia
in December 2010 and spread to a number of other Arab states. Lynch examines the origins and development
of these uprisings with special attention given to how the actions in various countries influenced other Arab
states. Lynch views the Arab uprisings beginning with Tunisia as part of a process evolving regionwide and
defines the Arab Spring as the span of time in which that process began and moved forward. While Lynch
speaks of a unified narrative among protestors, he does not overgeneralize and is careful to highlight the
differences among the numerous countries involved with the Arab uprisings. As an expert in Arab media, Lynch
also examines the ways citizens were able to access information and coordinate protest activities. In doing this,
he avoids the trap of viewing these struggles as the result of social media, which he instead treats as an
enabling technology. In examining the role of technology, he remains alert to the possibility that activists using
social media may not be good representatives of the mainstream of their societies. Lynch is also attentive to
the importance of the Pan-Arab media, with a special focus on the role of the Qatari-based al Jazeera television
station in influencing the events of the Arab uprisings.
Lynch maintains the main reason people came out to demonstrate in authoritarian Arab countries after the

Tunisian revolution was a newfound belief their actions could actually make a difference as had occurred in
Tunisia. Other Arab publics were stunned when a 23-year- old police state was defeated in less than a month
by an enraged public, and the Tunisian example strongly indicated such success was possible elsewhere.
Lynch also notes improved communications and new sources of information frequently allowed the public of one
state to identify with and applaud the actions of protestors in other states confronting and seeking to oust
undemocratic regimes. Here the role of al Jazeera television appears to have been especially important. Al
Jazeera's talk show guests overwhelmingly sympathized with the revolutionaries, and the station characterized
the fall of Tunisia's Ben Ali as an "unmiti- gated good." As the effect of the Tunisia uprising became apparent,
the increasingly worried Egyptian government jammed al Jazeera's signal, but the news of the Tunisian
revolution was too big and exciting to minimize. Moreover, the Egyptian public had a number of pent-up
grievances now moving to the fore including decades of corruption and repression. Lynch notes the fait
accompli of the president's son Gamal Mubarak's expected succession to the presidency helped "galvanize
unusual levels of popular outrage," since Gamal was broadly viewed as an unacceptable choice to lead the
country.
Lynch also examines the importance of the US military role in maintaining "near-constant" dialogue with the
Egyptian army, pressing it not to fire on unarmed demonstrators. This dialogue reinforced the army's self-image
as the protector of Egypt's citizens rather than its oppressor. This viewpoint was already deeply ingrained since
the Egyptian military is composed of a largely depoliticized professional officer corps, indoctri- nated to help
minimize the danger of a military coup. Correspondingly, and following the Tunisian example, the Egyptian
military remained unwilling to move outside its traditional role to help the Mubarak regime survive. This restraint
encouraged Egyptian demonstrators to act more assertively in demanding the end of the regime, sometimes
using the slogan, "the army and the people are one hand." Without military backing, Mubarak had only the
hated security police and various paid thugs between his regime and the popular will. This situation led to the
fall of his government in January 2011. While at least 840 protestors were killed in the Egyptian revolution, this
number could have been much higher had the army backed the president, and the regime may then have
limped along until a more radical solution was undertaken.
Lynch moves on to what he refers to as "the second phase of the Arab uprising." This phase followed the quick
and relatively easy ousters of long-standing dictators in Tunisia and Egypt. This new environment included
much tougher problems faced by protestors including grinding struggles with security forces and failures to
overturn unpopular governments. Some protest movements faded quickly due to government suppression.
Others, in places like Bahrain and Yemen, became protracted struggles which sometimes appeared as
stalemates in which the security forces and sometimes the army emerged as tough adversaries against
revolutionary forces. States with access to wealth also fared differently. Oman, for example, experienced the
largest demonstrations of its modern history but was able to calm the situation with the aid of money provided
by the richest of the Gulf Arab states.
The third phase of the uprising began in March 2011, a point in time Lynch identifies as a high point of
counterrevolution and the use of force. He considers Saudi Arabia as an important leader of the counter-
revolution, although he also indicates that the scope and extent of this leadership has often been exaggerated.
He further designates two March 2011 events as key pivot points from the second to the third phase of the Arab
uprisings. These are the Saudi-led military intervention in Bahrain and the beginning of NATO operations
against regime forces in Libya. Also in March 2011, Yemeni President Saleh sharply escalated violence against
demonstrators seeking his ouster. This brutality was so severe it led to the fragmentation of Yemen's army into
pro-Saleh and pro- demonstrator camps that deployed against each other and occasionally engaged in armed
skirmishing with casualties on both sides. In this stalemated environment, Yemen's president Ali Abdullah Saleh
was able to remain in office until early 2012 despite a prolonged struggle to remove him. Also in March 2011,
the Syrian uprising began to catch fire in response to especially horrific regime bloodshed including violence

directed at children in the southern town of Deraa.
Lynch calls Bahrain "the first great battlefield of counterrevolution." He solidly identifies with the demonstrators
and is aghast at the repressive measures employed by the Bahraini government and its Gulf allies. Although
generally pleased with the Obama administration's polices toward the Arab uprisings, he is unsparing in his
criticism of US policy toward the Bahrain struggle. Yet, this anger is not solely directed against US policy. He
also states that al Jazeera surrendered its previously heroic Arab Spring role by ignoring the Bahraini
intervention in apparent response to the foreign policy priorities of the Qatari government, which views Bahrain
as an ally. He calls the security campaign against Bahraini demonstrators the first clear cut victory for
repression in the course of the Arab uprisings. Lynch does acknowledge that many Sunni Bahrainis truly believe
the demonstrations were part of a larger Iranian plot, although he considers such beliefs totally unfounded.
Turning to Libya, Lynch is more upbeat. He praises the remarkable Arab League consensus in favor of Western
military intervention to help the Libyan people. He also states that the mostly united Arab opposition to the
Syrian regime's brutal crackdown indicates a new norm whereby regimes would lose their region-wide
legitimacy when they pushed forward to an unacceptable level of domestic violence.
Lynch comments extensively on US foreign policy in the Middle East throughout the work and especially at the
end. Unsurprisingly, he sees strong reasons to avoid Americanizing Middle East problems with military
interventions in pursuit of unclear goals. He does, however, see an occasional need for force and strongly
agrees with the US-supported NATO intervention in Libya. In considering Libya, Lynch presents a strong case
that intervention represented a low- cost/low-risk decision to prevent a bloodbath in Benghazi with virtually no
down side. He is particularly unsparing of leftist critics of the Libyan intervention, whom he views as so
hopelessly mired in anti-imperialist ideology they can no longer make the easy choice to avert a massacre at
almost no cost. Conversely, Lynch also asserts that a quick US response to the Syrian uprising would have
been "propaganda gold" for the Assad regime in its effort to blame the uprising on an American-Israeli plot.
Indeed, strong US relations with Israel, which Lynch does not disagree with, would make it devilishly difficult for
the United States to become deeply involved in Syria without appearing to be doing so on behalf of a larger pro-
Israeli agenda. Without this intervention, Assad's efforts to blame foreign plots for the uprising have largely and
correctly been dismissed as propaganda.
Consequently, if Lynch has any disagreement with the Obama administration it is not over Syria or Libya. He
asserts the United States acted with reasonable speed and agility on giving support to Egyptian demonstrators
seeking the fall of Mubarak (in a view that sometimes contrasts with the assertions of the Egyptian activists
who maintain Obama was too slow). Rather, as noted, Lynch takes the strongest exception to the Obama
administration's policy over Bahrain, which he often returns to throughout the book. Still, one wonders how
strongly the United States should have asserted itself on this issue since Bahrain has less than a million
citizens, and it is at least possible that many of the protestors' grievances might be partially addressed by
aggressive antipoverty measures should the wealthy Arab states wisely choose to provide money for such
projects. Furthermore, if the United States had a complete break with Bahrain, it would only lead to Manama's
almost total dependence on Saudi Arabia, which would hardly improve the human rights situation there.
Nevertheless, Lynch addresses objections such as these by asserting that the United States' unwillingness to
denounce the March intervention badly damaged its regional credibility by establishing a double standard for the
actions of allied states as opposed to states such as Syria and Libya. Lynch is also worried about the changing
narrative from populations struggling for freedom to sectarian populations fighting each other. Indeed, this
problem already seems to be intensifying in Bahrain, Syria, and potentially Iraq.
The Arab Uprisings in Context and Aftermath
An excellent companion volume for the Vx Lynch work is Adeed Dawisha's The Second A.rab Awakening,
which is the newest of the books considered in this essay. In this work, W il* the author adds considerable
perspective on how the Arab uprisings unfolded by placing them in a larger context beginning with the rise of

Arab nationalist regimes in the 1950s and 1960s. He makes a case that many of these earlier regimes and their
leaders started out well in efforts to address problems of social and economic justice, making strides in
education, fighting illiteracy, and helping impoverished citizens improve their prospects for a better life. Yet
these regimes also contained a tragic flaw because they were unwilling to open up the political system in any
meaningful way. This lack of freedom festered in the Arab political psyche and became more troubling as once-
promising nationalist regimes became increasingly self-serving, less interested in social and educational
progress, and more grandiose, incompetent, and reckless in their decisionmaking. Regimes that had never
been free managed to plunge their citizenry into deepening poverty and unmerciful exploitation by government
officials, thereby undermining any social or economic justifications for continuing the dictatorships. As regime
legitimacy declined, repression and public alienation in these states correspondingly increased, and some
leaders, including Saddam Hussein and Hafez and Bashar Assad, descended into barbarism.
The Arab uprisings were one potential response to increasingly intolerable conditions in many states.
Nevertheless, important as these uprisings have been, they are not universal in the Arab World, and some
governments (particularly monarchies) may still be able to reform sufficiently or at least provide a decent
enough life for their citizens to accept their continued rule. In considering the future, Dawisha also provides
comprehensive analysis of the aftermath of the ouster of the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes and the ways in
which these countries have evolved since the end of their dictatorships including their potential for success. The
electoral process in Tunisia including the role of political parties, campaigns, and voting outcomes are
scrupulously analyzed with special emphasis on how the Islamist Ennahdha party was able to connect with the
voters using a number of tactics including promises of moderation. Turning to Egypt, Dawisha examines a
number of instances of conflict and confrontation between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)
and the activists who originally challenged the Mubarak regime. He then considers Egypt's elections which were
characterized by the almost complete marginalization of the activists who led the uprising. Young people who
brilliantly organized protests showed no interest in acting as political operatives contesting elections until much
too late in the game. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, by contrast, built on years of organizational skills and long-
standing relationships with key segments of the public, won both the parliamentary and presidential elections.
Moreover, hard-line Islamists, known as salafis, finished in a strong second place in the race for parliament in a
complicating factor for liberal policies and perhaps economic recovery.
Dawisha also considers Yemen and Libya where uprisings occurred, but the strongman was able to retain
power for some time before he was ousted. Dawisha has strong praise for the Libyan opposition leaders who
led the effort against the Qadhafi dictatorship and were able to assemble a coherent opposition leadership
structure in the Transitional National Council (TNC). The TNC was able to coordinate the political, economic,
and military support revolutionary forces received from a number of countries and present a reasonable and
mature face of the Libyan Revolution to the outside world. Dawisha also agrees with Lynch that without NATO
intervention, the revolution would have been crushed by heavily-armed government forces in a bloodbath
directed against anti-Qadhafi rebels and probably anyone else in areas controlled by anti-government forces. As
the war turned around, Qadhafi broadcast increasingly hysterical radio rants that could hardly have bolstered
the morale of his supporters. When his forces were defeated and he was summarily killed, the TNC then faced
the challenge of organizing a government in a country with at least 40 large and powerful militias that had
participated in the destruction of the old regime but were not usually willing to give up much of their power.
Under these conditions, and without any strong government institutions, Libya had an urgent need for elections
to fortify a new national government. When these elections occurred, the Islamists did surprisingly poorly. While
huge problems with order and stability remain in Libya, Dawisha suggests that its small population, great
wealth, and commitment to "finishing the job properly," may give Libya at least some chance of becoming a
peaceful, prosperous state.
Dawisha further indicates Yemen faces tremendous problems as it recovers from a president who remained in

power for 33 years without doing much for the country. Throughout his time in office, President Saleh engaged
in both force and extensive political maneuvering to stay in power, although he was ultimately unable to do so.
Unfortunately, Yemen could not easily afford the final power struggle, which lasted for over a year and ravaged
the already weak economy. Yemen now faces both deepening poverty and intensified regional tension between
the central government and the northern and southern regions of the country. It will, correspondingly, need
intense international help to remain a politically viable state.
While Yemen's revolutionaries eventually removed that country's strongman from office, other examples
Dawisha considers in this work include countries where uprisings occurred but were either co-opted, crushed, or
fizzled out. Like Lynch, Dawisha worries that the Bahraini crackdown has deeply discredited Shi'ite moderates
who had been able to work with the king, making reconciliation appear as a distant dream. He also quotes the
fact-finding commission led by American international lawyer and scholar Cherif Bassiouni that there was no
compelling evidence linking Iran to the unrest in Bahrain. Dawisha, like Lynch, nevertheless notes that Bahraini
Sunnis are convinced of this link. He shows little optimism for Bahrain predicting that the schisms there will
become even deeper and more entrenched without intense and serious attention to Shi'ite grievances.
Dawisha is also deeply concerned about Syria, where civil war has now been raging for over 2 years. This
portion of the book is not pleasant reading due to his vivid description of the measures the regime has taken to
remain in power. Dawisha notes that Assad, like Qadhafi, has no compunction about butchering his own people.
Unlike Qadhafi, he also has the means to do so on a much larger scale. Dawisha quotes a number of witnesses
to the fighting who make some truly chilling statements. One Western reporter smuggled into the country is
quoted as saying, "There are no targets. It's a pure systematic slaughter of a civilian population." Other
witnesses include medical professionals from international organizations and "citizen journalists" who have sent
reports of their plight often with video footage to the outside world. Dawisha describes the plight of the
destruction of the Homs neighborhood of Baba Amr as particularly poignant. Baba Amr was considered an
important rebel stronghold by the Assad regime, which singled it out for special punishment with intense shelling
and bombing followed by house to house advances by government troops in which thousands of civilians were
slaughtered. Baba Amr had a population of around 50,000 people before the rebellion, but it was reduced to a
depopulated wasteland by these regime actions.
Turning to the governments that have survived the Arab Spring, Dawisha maintains the monarchies of both
Morocco and Jordan had enough legitimacy to convince significant portions of their publics that these systems
can be reformed from within. Dawisha has some particularly interesting insights on Morocco where the
reasonably popular King Mohammad VI managed to preempt a revolution by undertaking what at least for now
appears to be promising change. In Jordan, similar efforts to open the political system are also occurring,
although they are less dramatic and more gradual. Dawisha also discusses Lebanon and Iraq. He suggests that
the Iraqi public has shown increasing political maturity over time in a series of elections. In particular, Dawisha
maintains many Iraqis want a more nonsectarian government and have been moving toward less divisive
candidates in successive elections. Unfortunately, he cannot be optimistic about Iraq due to the polarizing and
increasingly authoritarian government of Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki as well as the development of a timid and
ineffectual parliament. Dawish also notes the Lebanese political system, despite numerous shortcomings, is far
from the suffocating authoritarianism found in many other Arab states. He states all of Lebanon's major political
factions and parties, including Hezbollah, are struggling to prevent the Syrian civil war from spilling over into
Lebanon.
Chief Losers of the Arab Spring: The Arab Presidents for Life
In another useful book, Harvard's Roger Owen considers the Arab uprisings by dissecting the types of regime
challenged, and in some cases overthrown, in the Arab Spring. It is hardly secret that the Arab world has
historically been filled with undemocratic governments, but Owen highlights subtle changes in how these
dictatorships have organized themselves over time. In the post-World War II era, monarchs and revolutionary

autocrats dominated the region, although the strategies for maintaining these regimes in power were
continuously adjusted through trial and error. Many of these early "republics" were established by military
coups, and they remained vulnerable to being overthrown by new cliques of ambitious officers leading some
Arab states to become chronically unstable and coup-ridden. This system eventually changed with new and
often more powerful strongmen and with the development of what Owen calls the Arab "presidential security
regime," which came to dominate a number of Arab states and carry the process of nonmonarchical autocracy
to a new level of presidential dominance. Owen traces the history of how these systems of military autocrats
evolved into presidential security regimes by considering the examples of a number of Arab countries that have
developed largely coup-proof regimes. Various dictators have accomplished this through tools such as parallel
armed forces, multiple and competing internal security forces, sham elections, and expanded cults of
personality, which in more recent times can include the leader's family. Once Arab rulers have foreclosed the
possibility of losing power to a new coup by rising military officers, the temptation to establish oneself as
president for life often seems irresistible.
Owen also states that Arab leaders have learned from each other's systems of regime maintenance causing
monarchies to borrow the legiti- mizing institutions of the revolutionary republics such as weak or even rubber-
stamp parliaments. Also, over time, the self-described republican states have in many instances acquired key
elements of monarchy. Two of the monarchical features that are most interesting to the presidents for life have
been: (1) the establishment of a ruling dynasty, and (2) the previously noted expectation that the president will
rule as long as he is physically able to do so. The concept of a republican president for life who then passes
power to a favored son while viewing neighboring monarchies with condescension clearly seems a bit odd. It
took considerable time to reach this point since some strong Arab presidents retained at least the vestiges of
republican principles for years after taking power. Many powerful Arab strongmen, such as Egypt's Anwar Sadat
and Tunisia's Habib Bourguiba, probably expected to hold office indefinitely, but these leaders never seemed to
have considered their sons might succeed them. More recently, emulating key aspects of the monarchies has
often been poorly received by the public of these states, which often consider themselves to be part of more
politically developed systems. Yet, on the eve of the Arab uprisings, father/son succession had already occurred
in Syria and seemed to have been planned or at least considered by the presidents of Egypt, Libya, and
Yemen. Saddam Hussein also seemed intent on having his younger son Qusay eventually succeed him, but
any steps in this direction became moot when he was removed from power by the US-led invasion in 2003.
Some presidents for life who do not have sons who could succeed them have turned to other relatives. In
Algeria, President Abdulaziz Bouteflika's younger brother was, at least for awhile, the front-runner to take power
when the current president leaves office. In Tunisia, former president Ben Ali's son-in-law seemed to be carving
out a role as heir apparent until the events of 2010-2011 swept the regime away.
Owen also contrasts the presidential security regimes with other systems of government in the Middle East. In
doing this, he suggests reasons why Lebanon and post-Saddam Iraq have not developed presidents for life.
He maintains that, in these cases, there is a diffusion of influence throughout their respective political systems
that makes it difficult for a president to accumulate the kind of authority found in security regimes. This
analysis clearly has relevance for Lebanon, although in the case of Iraq one needs to be more careful about
drawing premature conclusions concerning the still-evolving political systems there. Turning to the
monarchies, he suggests some of these states have adopted features of the presidential security regime
beyond simply maintaining a king who is the functional equivalent of a president for life, albeit with a more
straightforward form of legitimacy and none of the staggering level of hypocrisy of the presidential security
regimes. Still, Owen stresses monarchical legitimacy is often too weak to guarantee the survival of any
government without strong security institutions as well. Other regime maintenance strategies borrowed from the
republics included managed elections for those countries with elected parliaments and large and powerful
domestic security establishments. One cannot help noticing that, whatever their shortcomings, the Arab

monarchs have done a much better job of maintaining themselves in power than the presidents for life. The
Bahraini monarchy came the closest to collapse, but its fortunes dramatically changed following Saudi-led
military intervention.
Owen contends the Middle Eastern uprisings have now largely ended the era of the Arab presidents for life, with
only Syria having a limited chance of maintaining such a system. He maintains the era ended with "an almost
complete rejection of this form of semimonar- chical government" by "populations no longer able to stomach
either the personal sense of humiliation this method of rule involved or the way in which it alienated them from
their fellow citizens." Owen, like Dawisha, strongly asserts the systems of Arab presidents for life did little to
compensate people for their existence under brutal repression. No sterling economic achievements stand to
justify the leader's time in office in any of these countries. Corruption flourishes, unemployment, and especially
youth unemployment, are astronomical, and collapsing or underfunded educational systems challenge the
future leaders of these states. The ugly legacy of the presidents for life, therefore, remain for future
governments to address in what can only be seen as a herculean struggle where a positive outcome is by no
means guaranteed.
The Ongoing Nightmare in Syria
Moving from the entire region to an extremely important case study, longtime Syria watcher, David Lesch has
made a valuable contribution to the literature on the Arab uprisings by examining what is probably the most
heartbreaking and complicated country experiencing serious unrest and fighting. Unlike the relatively easy
victories in Tunisia and Egypt, the struggle to rid Syria of its dictator has been long, miserable, and incredibly
bloody. In late 2010 and early 2011, both the Damascus government and most informed observers considered
Syria to be a stable country and unlikely to experience significant upheaval. Syrian officials arrogantly stated
that the Arab Spring found fertile ground in Egypt and Tunisia due to their governments' subservient relationship
to the United States, their unwillingness to provide significant support to the Palestinians, and their rule by
elderly, out-of-touch autocrats in contrast to the much younger Bashar. Left unstated was the repressive
apparatus of the Syrian state which was significantly more brutal, comprehensive, and intimidating than those of
Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, or even Libya. When the Arab Spring revolts first broke out, Assad felt comfortable
enough with the situation to praise the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in the comfortable belief that they had no
implications for his regime. Then things changed in ways the regime's leadership never expected.
Lesch has met with Bashar Assad on numerous occasions prior to the civil war as part of his ongoing research
into Syrian politics. Partially based on this experience, Lesch maintains it "is almost certain that Bashar al-
Assad was absolutely shocked when the uprisings in the Arab world started to seep into his country in March
2011" after earlier Syrian demonstrators had failed to gather any kind of critical mass of supporters in January
and February. In a country with 70,000 security officials, and a program of systemically applying intimidation
and preemptive fear, this seemed unbelievable. In asking how this could happen, Leach explores the theme of
citizens coping with arbitrary repression on a daily basis and presents a portrait of a police state where unflinch-
ing oppression is both casual and reflexive. Lesch notes that Syrians have consistently been forced to swallow
the brutality of the regime, but sometimes a line is crossed and outrage gushes forth. Just such a transgression
occurred in the southern city of Deraa when a number of school children were apprehended by security forces
for writing anti- regime graffiti on various buildings. These children, possibly including some as young as 9, were
beaten, imprisoned, and reportedly tortured for an offense any humane political system would have treated as
childish mischief. Spontaneous demonstrations occurred over the brutalization of the Deraa school children with
Syrian authorities responding with virtually automatic violence as the crisis escalated and protests spread to
other parts of the country. The Syrian leadership was caught off- guard by the rapidly increasing intensity of the
protests and continued to make a police and military solution the centerpiece of the government response.
Later, as it became clear that peaceful opposition could not defeat the Syrian regime, an armed opposition
emerged, which obtained weapons wherever it could.

Assad's violent response to the initially peaceful uprising was characteristic of his regime. Afraid any loosening
on the reins of power would lead to the beginning of a process of ending the political dominance of his minority
Alawite sect, the president was prepared to offer little in the way of actual democratic reform. Instead, he offered
cosmetic changes and endless propaganda about foreign hands guiding the opposition. Regarding foreign
plots, Bashar is quoted as saying, "They will say that we believe in the conspiracy theory. In fact there is no
conspiracy theory. There is a conspiracy." The alleged conspiracy was supposed to involve an effort to weaken
and dismember Syria because it is "the last obstacle facing the Israeli plans." Such talk clearly indicated the
regime's unwillingness to seek any kind of meaningful compromise and instead engage in an effort to
demonize the opposition. Indeed, Lesch suggests the Syrian leadership may have believed the confused and
vacillating efforts to compromise with the opposition led to the fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes by
showing weakness when resolve was needed.
Lesch also makes a number of important points about the resilience of the Syrian regime and the Syrian
dictator's drive to stay in power seemingly at all costs. He states that Bashar has evolved into a much more
confident and cynical leader over his almost eleven years in office prior to the outbreak of civil war. While
Bashar was initially surrounded by powerful old-guard ministers when he took office in 2000, by 2011 his
authority had been completely established. Lesch also notes that, "the Assads have skillfully played the minority
card over the years" and in doing so have usually been able to guarantee at least a 20-30 percent loyal base of
regime supporters. In this regard, it would surprise no one the Alawite community is largely in Assad's camp,
but other minorities have some difficult choices in assessing what kind of government will best serve their
interests. The Assads have been aware of these concerns and are portrayed by Lesch as reaching out to
Syria's Druze and Kurdish communities in an effort to generate more internal support. More importantly in
terms of numbers, the regime has consistently manipulated the insecurities of the over 2 million Syrian
Christians about their possible future under a Sunni-dominated or perhaps even Islamist government. Although
the Syrian regime has usually been skillful in such efforts, one has to wonder how much manipulation is really
necessary after the terror unleashed against Iraq's Christians following the ouster of Saddam Hussein. The rise
of the al Qaeda affiliated al Nusra Front within the Syrian opposition occurred after this book was published but
certainly stands as another key factor terrifying Syria's Christians.
Lesch notes the Syrian regime's excessive and reflexive use of violence squandered opportunities to damp
down the unrest. He also discusses the nature and development of the opposition including the local activists
who have often worked within the framework of Local Coordination Committees. He notes that these local
activists have made considerable use of social media and the internet just as their counterparts did in Tunisia
and Egypt. This activity has caused the regime to respond by creating a special unit of computer experts called
the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA). Other sources are less certain the SEA is actually controlled by the regime,
though all sources understand it is virulently pro-Assad.3 Lesch, however, is almost certainly correct in that a
centralized regime such as the one in Syria would seek to maintain direct control over its propaganda message.
Moreover, the role of the Internet in the Arab Spring has been so prominent it seems impossible Assad (a self-
described computer enthusiast) would delegate his strategy for defeating the online protesters to a band of
loosely affiliated well-wishers.
Lesch also expertly delineates a number of compelling reasons to expect the Syrian regime will resist a future
diplomatic settlement. These reasons include Assad's concern that a number of his closest collabora- tors,
including his pitiless younger brother, Maher, may be subjected to revolutionary justice even if he escapes it.
Basher appears to believe he has a good chance of outlasting the opposition. The Syrian leader appears
doubtful the United States and other Western powers will intervene in Syria with ground troops given the
recent US experience in Iraq. Lesch suggests a key factor inhibiting Western intervention is the cost of
rebuilding Syria, which will probably be greater than the cost of rebuilding Iraq since at least Iraq has
substantial oil reserves. Additionally, this scenario for rebuilding assumes the civil war will actually end with the

defeat of the regime, which Lesch acknowledges is by no means certain since the opposition is deeply divided
and may be unable to maintain even a fragile unity once the regime is no longer a threat. Lesch thus describes
an escalating conflict that has continued to escalate since the publication of his book. Bashar remains unwilling
to make serious reform or to take steps toward actual power sharing. The regime will either fall or prevail, but it
does not appear it will compromise. Given this situation, one hopes an updated edition of this book will be pos-
sible since the situation in Syria is changing rapidly and Lesch's insights will continue to be of tremendous
value, including after the regime's probable fall.
Conclusion
The full meaning of the Arab Spring is still unfolding. The com- plexity of the problems that exist in this part of
the world defy easy solutions, but there are times when US involvement can play an important role in helping
friendly states without Americanizing their conflicts. The professionalism shown by the Tunisian and Egyptian
armies during peak times of crisis was clearly encouraged by their longstanding relationship with the US
military as well as their willingness to listen to US Army officers who spoke to them as friends during the
upheaval. It is also interesting that some Arab sensitivities about cooperation with the West can be set aside
briefly in a time of crisis such as when the Arab League supported the establishment of a NATO-enforced no-fly
zone in Libya. Such action should not be taken as a green light for all sorts of interventions, but it does indicate
more potential for expanded US Army activities in some countries in times of urgent need. The current deploy-
ment of US Special Forces units and some headquarters personnel from the 1st Armored Division to Jordan to
help prevent a widening of the Syrian civil war may be a useful example of how to support a regional ally. On a
more limited scale, the US Army's efforts to help reorganize and train some units of the Yemeni army are clearly
useful in supporting the country's efforts to recover from the scars of President Ali Abdullah Saleh's 33-year
rule.
All the books reviewed reveal the grinding attrition of the Syrian civil war, which is now in its third year. No
feeling person can be without sympathy for the Syrian population, but increasing US involvement in this crisis
could be foolhardy if good intentions are allowed to wish away the a full consideration of the potential problems
of such action. President Assad has been unyielding in his insistence that the uprising against him is the result
of foreign powers acting in the interests of the Israelis. While such assertions are absurd, this does not mean
they cannot gain traction should the United States widen its involvement in ways that include ground troops.
These propaganda tools will almost certainly not be confined to the Assad government but could also be taken
up by Syrian Islamist radicals in the struggle for control in post- Assad Syria. Such reasoning is one indication
that ground troops should be used in Syria under only the more dire circumstances and in ways that will not
cause them to become bogged down so withdrawal is difficult later. The United States especially does not want
to become an occupation force in such circumstances.
Above all, the Arab Spring and its aftermath should be viewed as a time of tremendous transition in the Middle
East, where well-informed US Army leaders may be called upon to find ways to help friendly forces in useful
and creative ways. In doing so, the US Army should seek to provide helpful options to the US civilian leadership
in ways that offer reasonable rewards for wise rather than massive commitments.
Footnote
1 Office of the White House Press Secretary, "Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa,"
May 19, 2011, www.whitehouse.gov.
2 General Ray Odierno, Chief of Staffof the Army, "Regionally Aligned Force: A New Model for Building
Partnerships," Army Live: Official Blog of the United States Army, March 22, 2012.
3 Sarah Fowler, "Who is the Syrian Electronic Army?" BBC News, April 25, 2013. www. bbc.c.o.uk/world/news-
middle-east, accessed April 25, 2013.
AuthorAffiliation
W. Andrew Terrill is the Strategic Studies Institute's Middle East specialist. He served with the Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory and US Air War College. Dr. Terrill has published in numerous academic
journals on a wide range of topics, including nuclear proliferation. He has participated in the Middle Eastern
Track 2 talks, part of the Middle East Peace Process.
Subject: Leadership; Armed forces; Civil war; Presidents; Rebellions;
Location: Tunisia Syria United States--US Middle East
Publication title: Parameters
Volume: 43
Issue: 2
Pages: 103-115
Number of pages: 13
Year: 2013
Section: AFTER THE ARAB SPRING
Publisher: U.S. Army War College
Place of publication: Carlisle Barracks
Publication subject: Military, Political Science
ISSN: 00311723
Document type: General Information
Copyright: Copyright U.S. Army War College Summer 2013
_______________________________________________________________
Document 14 of 20
Arap Bahari (The Arab Spring)

Author: Turhan, Muhammet Bumin
Abstract:
The organisers and protestors garnered their support from different opposition political parties, civil society,
legal and professional trade associations and student groups. Yet, the author points to the reaction of Turkish

Prime Minister Erdo?an at Davos on the Israeli occupation of Gaza as one of the most significant external
factors of the Arab Spring (p. 113).
Full text:
Arap Bahari (The Arab Spring)
By Turan K??lak?
Istanbul: ?limyurdu Yay?nc?l?k, 2011, 248 pages, ISBN: 9786055793494.
History has been a witness to many revolutions that have integrated every society and left an impression on
world politics. In the Arab world, society has faced the same challenges under dictatorial regimes. The recent
uprisings that have rapidly transformed into revolutions have differentiated the Arab Spring from previous
revolutions. There is one common voice coming from all Arab societies, saying such slogans as "The people
want the regime to fall" and "The people want the dictators to fall." The author, Turan K??lak?, examines the
formation of the Arab World, its societies that are longing for regime change, the atmosphere the streets and the
causes of the uprisings.
This book is not written in an academic style, and is more journalistic. K??lak? has clearly tapped into his
journalist background. He has extensively written analyses on the Arab Spring in Turkish, Arabic and
international media. He has included columns by Arab journalists in his book, and has also made use of Turkish
publications.
K??lak? divided his book into four main parts: the history of rebellions in Arab societies, the background of the
revolutions, people's reflections on the rebellions and the distinctive features of the Arab Spring. Under these
four main categories, the book focuses on issues such as the situation of the Arab countries after they seceded
from the Ottoman Empire, and how the maps of these countries were drawn.
The author first explains development of revolutions (p. 57). As an example, he argues that the US's
interference in the Arab World during the first Gulf crisis was a reason for the Arab people to have a critical
outlook towards their leaders. This made it possible for people to realise that their futures were bleak. However,
in the early 2000s, Arab societies re- evaluated and saw in the Second Intifada a potentially brighter future.
Then the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq squashed these hopes. The Arab people waited for the right
time, as if the Gulf crisis and the Second Intifada had never happened. Hezbollah defeated Israel in 2006, and
this victory was followed by Hamas's success against Israel in 2008. Relief workers for Gaza become a beacon
of hope in 2010. The world lapsed into silence for a while, but the uprisings demonstrated that Arab societies
were willing to take the risk to build "a new world" and that change is possible.
Arab societies sought to explore their identity after the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate (pp. 63-65). In
searching for their identity, educated youths lead the opposition movements and demanded regime changes.
This led to the downfall of a number of dictatorships across the Arab world. K??lak?'s remarks about the
background of these revolutions and the period of change offer relevant examples in the second part of the
book. These uprisings have been civil rebellions that are seeking a new identity on the basis of Islam. The
protests in Egypt and Tunisia initially were met with resistance or repression by their authoritarian leaders. But
the protestors pushed back and resisted. In Cairo, Tahrir Square transformed into a tent city, where protestors
slept, ate and lived. This created a social foundation to the revolution. All of Egyptian society, including
Christians, participated in the Tahrir protests. A spirit of community emerged, which took on a social dimension
of its own, as if Tahrir Square had its own soul (p. 68). A common trait in Tunisia and Egypt was the anger
against the opulence and luxury in which these dictators' families lived. The streets' distress came from the gap
between the rich and poor, which became untenable for both Tunisian and Egyptian societies. Young university
graduates led these revolutions and they used the internet and social media as effective means of organisation
and communication during the uprisings (p. 80). The graduates could no longer tolerate the despotism of the
political systems of their countries. The organisers and protestors garnered their support from different
opposition political parties, civil society, legal and professional trade associations and student groups.

The book depicts the atmosphere and developments of the revolutions, and aims to explain the causes of
revolutions, the symbols encouraging all Arabs to rebel and the role of opposition groups in international forums.
The book divides the causes of the rebellions into several categories: political, social, economic and extrinsic
parameters. Political and social causes include the lack of political participation and disenfranchisement of the
younger generations, delayed reforms on the part of new Arab regimes, fraudulent elections, unemployment
and the proliferation of bribes and corruption. The economic causes were high taxes and the high costs of social
services. Yet, the author points to the reaction of Turkish Prime Minister Erdo?an at Davos on the Israeli
occupation of Gaza as one of the most significant external factors of the Arab Spring (p. 113). The book lists a
number of other important factors, such as Islamic movements, blog writers and women's organisations for the
revolutions (p. 117).
When it comes to symbols of the Arab Spring, there have been two important symbols. One is when the young
Tunisian man Buazizi immolated himself, which then became the symbol and "call to arms" for the Jasmine
Revolution in Tunisia. The second was in Egypt when Khalid Said was tortured by the Egyptian authorities and
became the symbol of its revolution. The most interesting feature of the Arab Spring is that the rebellions are
without a significant leader and an ideology. What's more, they have been attended by all groups and classes.
In Tahrir Square, people carried pictures of Che Guevara, and at the same time they chanted "Allahu Akbar."
K??lak? argues that the Western powers had no direct influence on the Arab Spring. However, they made
many indirect efforts to steer the protestors towards their long-term interests. The book also debates the
relationship between Turkey and the Arab World, and possible scenarios about what will happen in the next
decade in Libya, Syria and Yemen (pp. 193-218).
Turan K??lak? supports a union of Arab societies that would take a common peaceful position against Israel,
develop common access to natural resources and draft new constitutions. In his analysis, the author draws a
picture of people- centred revolutions and he tends to take an optimistic view of the final outcomes. However,
one criticism is that there is also no detailed analysis on the international aspects of the Arab Spring, which
would have enriched his analysis.
AuthorAffiliation
Muhammet Bumin Turhan,
International University of Sarajevo
Subject: Books; Society; Revolutions; Journalists;
Location: Gaza Strip Israel United States--US Tunisia Egypt
Publication title: Perceptions
Volume: 18
Issue: 2
Pages: 200-202
Number of pages: 3
Year: 2013
Section: Book Reviews
Publisher: Center for Strategic Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Place of publication: Balgat

Country of publication: Turkey
Publication subject: Political Science
ISSN: 13008641
Document type: Book Review-Favorable
Copyright: Copyright Center for Strategic Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Summer 2013
_______________________________________________________________
Document 15 of 20
THE ARAB SPRING: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Author: Korotayev, Andrey V; Issaev, Leonid M; Malkov, Sergey Yu; Shishkina, Alisa R
Abstract:
The quantitative analysis of the Arab Spring events is a rather difficult task. Respective difficulties are related to
the variety of factors affecting social instability, and to individual peculiarities of historical, cultural, socio-
economic, and political processes in the region. As a result of the research, we found out that the processes of
social and political destabilization in the countries of Arab Spring were caused by a complex set of factors. The
most significant factors that tended to reduce the scale of sociopolitical destabilization during the Arab Spring
have turned out to be the following: the ability of the government to reduce social tensions and the presence of
"immunity" to internal conflicts. However, such indicators as structural and demographical characteristics and
external influences turned out to be less significant in the context of the Arab Spring. It should be mentioned
that the significance of the external influences indicator notably increases when the model is used to account for
the death toll resultant from anti-government protests. We also discuss the possibility of applying the developed
model of sociopolitical destabilization to forecast sociopolitical upheavals in future.
Full text:
Headnote
Abstract: The quantitative analysis of the Arab Spring events is a rather difficult task. Respective difficulties are
related to the variety of factors affecting social instability, and to individual peculiarities of historical, cultural,
socio-economic, and political processes in the region. As a result of the research, we found out that the
processes of social and political destabilization in the countries of Arab Spring were caused by a complex set of
factors. The most significant factors that tended to reduce the scale of sociopolitical destabilization during the
Arab Spring have turned out to be the following: the ability of the government to reduce social tensions and the
presence of "immunity" to internal conflicts. However, such indicators as structural and demographical
characteristics and external influences turned out to be less significant in the context of the Arab Spring. It
should be mentioned that the significance of the external influences indicator notably increases when the model
is used to account for the death toll resultant from anti-government protests. We also discuss the possibility of

applying the developed model of sociopolitical destabilization to forecast sociopolitical upheavals in future.
Keywords: Arab Spring, social instability, elite conflict, Middle East, demographics, forecasting, poverty,
inequality, quantitative analysis
(ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.)
The goals of this research is to contribute to the development of methodological tools for the assessment and
forecasting of sociopolitical instability level in the Arab world, as well as for the assessment of the effectiveness
of measures to reduce social tensions in the Arab countries.
The specific tasks of the research are as follows:
Selection of main factors of sociopolitical destabilization;
Quantitative assessment of importance of destabilization factors;
Development of a specialized index to assess the current state and forecast social instability levels in the Arab
world.
This is mainly an exploratory analysis.1 The purposes of exploratory analysis are as follows: the maximum
"penetration" into the data, identification of major structures, choice of the most important variables, detection of
deviations, verification of main hypotheses, and development of initial models.2 In this regard, it is important to
note that the preliminary study of data is only the first step in the process of analysis, since the results should be
confirmed in other samples or independent sets of data.
Methodological Issues
We would like to start our assessment of the methodological issues with an analysis of the research results
produced by the Political Instability Task Force-a research project that was created in 1994 with the support of
the US government. The main aim of its work was to create a database of key internal conflicts that could have
lead to state failure, and analysis of political instability indicators from 1955 to 2005. Over time, the working
group began to study not only the cases of "failed states," but also ethnic conflicts, the facts of genocide, and
radical regime changes and issues of democratic transition modeling. The explanatory variables used in the
project include the following: economic indicators (gross domestic product (GDP), inflation, foreign trade, etc.,
as well as indicators related to the environment), social and demographic (population growth, mortality, etc.),
and political (ethnic discrimination, the level of democracy, etc.) variables. Thus, one of the experts' conclusions
is the assertion that partial democracies with low involvement in international trade and high infant mortality are
the most prone to sociopolitical upheavals and regime change.3 In this framework, a few interesting fundings
were made and some predictive models (in particular, the Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability by
Jack Goldstone) were developed.
Jack Goldstone, the Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University, and a group of his colleagues,
analyzing the emergence of political instability in various countries around the world from 1955 to 2003, have
developed a model for forecasting political instability, which, according to the authors, makes it possible to
predict destabilization with two years lead time and 80 percent accuracy.4 Goldstone notes that previous
quantitative approaches to the study of civil wars causes (Fearon, Laitin, Regan, Norton et al.) have focused
mainly on the economic resources available for government and insurgents: in particular, P. Collier and A.
Hoeffler stressed that the insurgents are able to provide themselves with necessary resources by looting; J.
Fearon and D. Laitin considered the ability of states to finance an army in comparison with the possibility of
insurgents to take an advantage of much of the population, rough terrain, and the situation of political instability.
Some researchers (Ross, Dunning, etc.) have focused on the state control of natural resources. Recent trends
in the study of revolutions have moved in a different direction adopting, however, a state-centered approach that
focuses on the political structures and elite relationships as the most important factors in determining the time
and place of the revolution.
Goldstone's model includes just four independent variables: the type of regime that defines the models present
in the process of executive recruitment and competitiveness of participation in the political life of the country;

infant mortality, which is logged and normalized to the global average in the year of observation; and conflict-
ridden neighborhood, an indicator showing whether there are cases of four or more bordering states with major
armed civil or ethnic conflict, as well as a binary measure of State-Led Discrimination. The model has been
developed by comparing the cases of instability onset to a matched sample of control cases, and by testing the
ability of variables to distinguish, in binary fashion, between the country-years when instability was imminent,
from those followed by a period of stability.
It is noteworthy that this model uses multiple variables and a simple specification. The model shows accurate
results in forecasting violent civil wars and non-violent democratic changes as well, suggesting the presence of
common factors in both types of changes. While the type of regime is as a rule measured using linear or binary
indicators of democracy/autocracy derived from the 21-point Polity scale, the model uses a nonlinear measure
of regime type with five categories based on the components of state structure. At that, when the model takes
into account characteristics of political regime, the majority of other economic, political, social, or cultural
characteristics of countries under study in the represented sample did not have a significant impact on the
results of research. Moreover, the replacement of binary and categorical measurements by their continuous
counterparts has not led to an increase in accuracy of the model. Such a method of measuring the type of
regime acts as the most powerful predictor of instability onsets. In view of this, it could be concluded that the
political institutions, but not economic conditions, demographics, and geography are the most important
predictors of political instability.
Russian economist and historian Sergey Tsirel has developed a simple mathematical model5 of the
transformation of a revolutionary situation into a revolution, showing the threshold nature of such transition.
Noting that a revolutionary situation is an unstable condition in which a small impetus can bring no influence on
the situation, or can cause an avalanche, Tsirel concludes that such signs and conditions of revolutionary
situation as delegitimization of power, availability of alternatives to the current regime, and weakness of
government or the presence of "combustible material" (i.e., people who are ready to go into the streets and take
part in revolutionary activities), are not able yet to give a more or less accurate picture of where and when a
revolutionary situation can turn into a revolution, or at least into mass protests.
On the basis of theory described above a set of variables describing the intensity of revolutionary actions in the
Arab world for analyzing the Arab Spring events has been offered.6 Thus, the legitimacy of political regime acts
as a main variable (the correlation coefficient between the rank of political regime in the degree of legitimacy
and scope of revolutionary actions is 0.88). Important factors are also the proportion of unemployed young
people with higher education, the youth unemployment rate, and the percentage of discriminated national and
religious groups, as well as the intensity of riots and wars that have taken place in recent decades and
contributed to "burnout of revolutionary combustible material." The resulting multiple regression with four
independent variables explains 93.5 percent of intensity dispersion in the revolutionary events in the Arab world,
which could be a good confirmation of the developed theory. Our own multiple regression analysis7 has found
rates of statistical significance of regression parameters that are quite similar to those arrived at by Tsirel
(though not entirely identical).
The Analysis of Instability Factors and Their Relative Importance
A considerable number of studies8 that have analyzed the events that took place in different countries at
different times are devoted to empirical and theoretical study of social instability factors. The most important
factors of instability detected by those studies include the following:
1. Presence of ethnic (interconfessional, interclan, intra-elite) contradictions and conflicts;
2. Instability of political order;
3. Uneven distribution of socio-economic and sociopolitical benefits;
4. High level of poverty;
5. Presence of structural and geographical risks (e.g., a "youth bulge");

6. Excessive government corruption;
7. Availability of attractive alternative to the existing political regime and others.
In this case, the basic mechanisms and important factors of social instability are dependent on the type of
countries, and specific historical and sociopolitical situation. Statistics by historical precedents are necessary to
identify the factors of social and political upheavals in Arab countries, to determine their relative importance, and
to form a quantitative index. Arab Spring events in 2011 and afterward provide rich materials for the analysis of
sociopolitical destabilization in modernizing countries with strong clan traditions. The analysis of Arab Spring
events allows speaking about following internal instability factors common to the countries of this type.
1. Objective factors of instability in modernizing societies:
a) Political preconditions:
Type of political order;
Presence of intra-elite conflict;
Unefflcient power transfer tools;
b) Social preconditions-the presence of internal social, religious, ethnic, and tribal conflicts;
c) Demographic factors-the presence of "combustible material," which is based on the demographic component
(e.g., a "youth bulge," youth unemployment, etc.);
d) External factors-the presence of a significant destabilizing/stabilizing external factor that influences the
development of a situation in the country;
e) Historical background-the presence of large-scale conflicts that led to the burnout of "combustible material" in
the near past;
f) Islamist factor-presence/absence of the legal basis for the functioning of the Islamist-oriented opposition.
2. Subjective (psychosocial, cultural, and historical) factors of instability arising in a given period of time:
a) Crisis of unfulfilled expectations of modernization;
b) Presence of an attractive (though perhaps imaginary) alternative to the existing regime.
Below we will discuss those factors in some detail.
a) The transitional nature of political regime. The second half of the twentieth century saw the start of an
intensive transition from authoritarianism to democracy in the majority of countries of Latin America, Asia, and
Eastern Europe. In view of this, the area of authoritarianism prevalence narrowed down to three main regions:
the Arab world, Central Asia, and Tropical Africa. Authoritarianism, originated in pre-industrial times when it was
the dominant type of political system in the form of absolute monarchy; afterward it underwent significant
changes and remained in its original form only in one country of the world, Saudi Arabia.9 In all other countries,
it has been modified in two main forms: the constitutional monarchy and the imitative republic. Thus, by the
early twenty-first century, while generally moving toward democratic political structures, several Arab political
regimes transformed themselves into so-called transition ones.10 Powell and Almond wrote in the 1950s and
1960s about the transitional nature of many authoritarian regimes. This type of political regime is much less
stable in the course of social and political upheavals than consistently authoritarian or democratic regimes,
since the former (authoritarian) mechanisms of its functioning are being destructed, and the new democratic
tools are not developed enough.
b) The presence of intra-elite conflict. As the events of the Arab Spring have shown again, one of the most
destabilizing factors is the conflict within political elites. Obvious examples of this is Egypt (where there has
been a conflict between the "old guard" led by the top of the military, and the young reformers led by Gamal
Mubarak), Tunisia (with conflicts between the army and the security forces whose numbers exceeded the
military several times, and also between military and civil-first of all, party-bureaucracy"), and of course, Yemen
and Libya (where tribal conflicts played a crucial role during the Arab Spring and in Libya even led to a
temporary state breakdown).
c) Inefficiency of power transfer tools. Among the main features of authoritarianism, two should be specially

highlighted: national consolidation and primary modernization. However, with the process of modernization and
the transition from pre-industrial to industrial societies (and the rejection of socialist experiments in all the Arab
countries), there has been a shift toward the establishment of democratic institutions and first of all the
institution of general elections. However, while in monarchic states there has been development of real
interparty competition (e.g., in Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain, party systems emerged with winning
parties having the right to form a government), in Arab republics, the institute of elections had an imitative
nature: in Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria, dominant parties existed, and in Yemen, there had been a reliance on army
and tribal alliances. Algerian experience of democracy building in the late 1980s led to the landslide victory of
Islamists and the ensuing civil war, after which the President Abdelaziz Bouteflika returned to the authoritarian
patterns typical for Arab republics. In Iraq and Libya, competitive multi-party elections were not possible at all
due to the ideological component of Saddam Hussein and Jamahiriya regimes.12 All this has led to the fact that
the republican authoritarian regimes in the Arab world have lost effective power transfer tools (this point was
critical for the regimes of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and Ali Abdullah Saleh in
Yemen), in contrast to monarchies whose system implies a legitimate transition of power from father to son.
d) The presence of internal social conflicts. Being extremely heterogeneous in several aspects: religious, ethnic,
clan, etc., Arab countries are vulnerable to social split in several areas. Thus, the infringement of the rights of
the opposition in the Arab countries during the period of authoritarianism (e.g., suppression of an uprising in
Hama in 1982, extermination of Shiites and Kurds by Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and so on) only aggravated the
situation by putting a number of Arab States during the Arab Spring events to the threat of their territorial
integrity loss. Violation of the rights of the Shiite population in Bahrain, the majority of country population, from
the ruling house of al-Khalifa related to Sunni Islam, has led to the long-running conflict in the country that has
not ceased to the present time. The situation is similar in Syria, where the contradictions between the Sunnis,
on the one hand, and the Alawites, on the other, have led to the full-scale civil war with the threat of state
collapse. A rivalry between Jordan Palestinians and supporters of the Royal Family is also the major factor of
destabilization in Jordan, which significantly complicates the process of urgent political reforms;'3 the traditional
division between the North and the South has been displayed with a new strength during the Arab Spring, again
actualizing a problem of the need to separate the state.14 Sharp clan differences, especially on the
redistribution of power and economic resources, have clearly declared themselves in Libya which is threatened
of split into three parts: Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan. We should not forget about the traditional ethno-
national conflicts in some Arab countries (mainly in Algeria and Morocco) between Arabs and Berbers.15 In
addition, a strong destabilizing factor is the Kurd issue, which has displayed particularly acute after the fall of
Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq16 and deteriorating of the situation in Syria in 2011-12.17
e) "Combustible material. " The beginning of sustainable escape from the "Malthusian trap"18 by definition
means reduced mortality and, therefore, a sharp acceleration in population growth. The beginning of
sustainable escape from the "Malthusian trap" tends to be accompanied by particularly strong decrease in infant
and child mortality. All this has led to a sharp increase in the proportion of young people in the population in
total and adult population, in particular (the so-called phenomenon of "youth bulge").19 As a result, there occurs
a sharp rise in the proportion of that very segment of population that is most prone to violence, aggression, and
radicalism, which itself is a powerful factor in political destabilization.
The rapid growth of the youth population requires a radical increase in the number of new jobs, which is a very
difficult task. Explosive increase in youth unemployment can have particularly powerful politically destabilizing
effect, since it creates an army of potential participants ("combustible material") for all political (including
revolutionary) shocks.
This is confirmed by the studies of Mller and Goldstone. In particular, the latter states that
the rapid growth of youth can undermine existing political coalitions, creating instability ". Young people played
a major role in political violence throughout recorded history, and the presence of "youth bulge" is historically

correlated with the periods of political crisis. Most major revolutions happened ... where there were particularly
significant youth bulges.20
f) Burnout of "combustible material. " The presence of a recent large-scale conflict can be considered as one of
the major deterrent factors of social and political upheavals. As the events of the Arab Spring have shown,
those Arab countries which experienced recent major shocks, have managed to avoid a significant
transformation of political system during the events of 2011-12. Huge death toll produced by sociopolitical
destabilization in Algeria (during the civil war of the 1990s), in Sudan (especially, during the confrontation with
rebels from Southern Sudan21), Iraq (especially, after the invasion of coalition forces in 2003), Lebanon
(especially, during the protracted civil war22), and Palestine markedly reduced the protest activity in these
countries during the Arab Spring events.23 Indeed, against such a background, the population of a respective
country is becoming increasingly interested in the maintenance of stability and the existing status quo, rather
than in the radical changes.
g) The legal basis for the functioning of Islamist-oriented opposition. In many ways, the total suppression of
Islamists in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya ultimately led to the point that Islamist forces played a very important role
in the Arab Spring protest movements, whereas afterward they became main contenders in the struggle for
power. Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Libya, and al-Nahdah in Tunisia were under complete prohibition and
had almost no opportunity to conduct legal political struggle. However, Ben Ali, Mubarak, and al-Qaddafi, being
fully confident in the complete elimination of the Islamist threat in the countries, in fact, were disoriented by their
rapid rise.24 On the contrary, continued participation of Islamists in the political life allows authorities to adapt to
their political position, requirements, and a format of political activity. In such cases, Islamists are in constant
dialog with the government, and the government considers them as a political rival, which allows it to
adequately assess their challenges. This is clearly seen on the Algerian case. Since the transition to a multi-
party system in 1989, the Islamists have begun to play a key role in the political life of the country, which
resulted in open confrontation with the army. However, as the practice of the early 2000s showed, Abdelaziz
Bouteflika managed to deal with the Islamist threat and achieved in this area greater success, giving them a
possibility to act within the legal framework. In the elections to the National People's Assembly in 2007, the
"Green Algeria Alliance" consisting of "Movement for Peaceful Society" (Hamas), "Islamic Renaissance
Movement" (al-Nahdah), and "The Movement for National Reform" (al-Islah) received 6.22 percent of votes and
got 47 seats in the lower house of the parliament.25 Relatively low results were also achieved by Islamists in
Sudan and Yemen, where they also had access to the legal struggle for power through participation in the
elections.
h) The crisis of modernization unfulfilled expectations. This factor is subjective (psychological), but, despite this,
it is very important. The fact is that modernization usually generates high expectations in society that are fueled
by the government's promises (the latter gives inflated promises to secure the support of society). But sooner or
later, after a period of steady growth of life quality in a country, one tends to observe sooner or later its certain
decline; this may lead to a certain emotional distress, bring public discontent, and even provoke riots. Moreover,
the higher the economic successes of the country, the stronger the frustration in the case of some recession or
significant slowdown. The more opportunities people had, higher were their expectations, and greater the
disappointment in case of the Government's failure to satisfy those expectations.26
i) Availability of an attractive alternative. The probability that the unfulfilled expectations can lead to social and
political destabilization increases if there are forces in the country actively offering a more attractive alternative.
In fact, this alternative may be totally imaginary, or even false, but during the period of frustration and
disappointment it has a real chance to attract attention, to form a protest movement, and to undermine the
existing regime.
Description of the Methodology
This section is devoted to the presentation of methodology for our quantitative analysis of the Arab Spring

events. The basis of methodology is the development of a specialized instability index which takes into account
the cumulative impact of the described above factors and reflects the overall potential of instability. Note that we
consider a potential, i.e., the objective possibility of social and political instability of a certain level (scale).
Subjective and conjunctive factors are attached to the particular situation and should be considered in a
separate way in assessing the probability of protests.
The task is to form a composite index which takes into account the most important factors of social and political
instability and could be calculated on the basis of statistical data and expert assessments and would allow
estimating the potential social instability and its possible scale. The values of this instability index have been
compared to that how really stable Arab regimes turned out in the conditions of the Arab Spring. The estimation
of sustainability of Arab sociopolitical systems to the wave of destabilization of 2011 that was actually
demonstrated during the events of the Arab Spring is introduced using a numerical scale. In the construction of
multiple regression equation, the scale of actual destabilization has been chosen as a dependent variable.
However, when we studied the correlation between the potential (systemic) instability and the actual
destabilization amplitude, we have detected a power-law relationship between the instability index developed by
us and the scale of actual destabilization. That is why we decided to invert the scale of the actual destabilization
index, which resulted in an index of actual resistance to destabilizing impulses 1^ (Table 1).
Since, as was noted above, the index of potential political instability reflects the accumulated potential of
instability in the society, then the objectively existing conditions of instability (political, social, demographic,
economic, etc.), as well as such important characteristics as "historic immunity" and the presence of Islamists
within the legal framework, which have a damping effect, should be considered. According to this, the index of
potential instability is reasonable to be presented in the form of a multiplicative convolution of indicators
reflecting the following:
Internal contradictions (indicator/!);
Structural and demographical characteristics (indicator/2);
Ability of the government to reduce social tensions (indicator /3);
Presence of "immunity" to internal conflicts (indicator/4).
Therefore, instability index/ has the form:
...(1)
where the exponents . reflect the relative significance of relevant factors and are determined by calibration of
index on the real events.
The methodology of quantitative assessment of indicators, as well as calibration of the index is necessary for
the index proposed above to be used as a tool to assess the level of sociopolitical instability. This methodology
is based on the analysis of Arab Spring events of2011.
Sampling and Quantitative Assessment of Indicators
a) Conflict potential index 7;.
Here, we have included the following from the instability factors listed at the beginning of this work:
Presence of intra-elite conflict;
Presence of ethnic, interconfessional, intertribal, and interclan contradictions;
Uneven distribution of socio-economic and sociopolitical benefits;
High level of poverty;
Excessive government corruption.
We excluded the last two factors from this list. This is due to the fact that, contrary to popular opinion about their
important role in the emergence of the Arab Spring, the results of the quantitative analysis of these parameters
were not statistically significant. In particular, the correlation coefficient (7?) of the poverty level with the scale of
actual destabilization of the Arab Spring countries is about -0.05, and the coefficient of determination (7?2) is
equal to 0.003 (i.e., it explains less than 1% of dispersion). Similar results were obtained with respect to

corruption (7? = -0.04, 7?2=0.002, accordingly). Quantitative calculations are confirmed by purely empirical
analysis of the situation. None of the Arab countries has the poverty level exceeding 20 percent, in contrast to,
e.g., India, Indonesia, and countries of sub-Saharan Africa. And the level of corruption in the Middle East
countries is almost the same as nearly all the other developing countries.27
As for the uneven distribution of socio-economic benefits, this indicator in the Arab world and is at a good level
and is comparable with that in the developed and developing countries, while being at the level of some
Western European countries (UK, Spain, etc.) and lower than in the USA. In addition, however, this figure is
rather similar in all Arab countries, so the use of it to detect differences in the Arab world does not make much
sense.
In addition, we eliminate the ethnic diversity of the Arab countries from the number of indicators that make up
the first indicator (7,). This is due to the fact that this indicator did not play any destabilizing role in anti-regime
performances in 2011. So, the Arab Spring was "Arab"-its main driving force included representatives of the
Arab nation.
Designating a combination of factors-tribal and interconfessional heterogeneity and the presence of intra-elite
conflict-the components of the first indicator (/,), we should lead the qualitative assessment to the quantitative
parameters. For such a purpose, we resort to their scale.
b) Indicator of the presence of social "combustible material " f.
The "combustible material" of social instability is, as a rule, disadvantaged social groups, and the youth is the
most active in the protest movements. Since the possibility of social aggression in general has been taken into
account in the preceding paragraph (the contradictions in the economic, political, and socio-cultural spheres in
most cases are the result of the presence of a significant segment of the population dissatisfied with their
status), this index is appropriate to reflect a potential of the youth factor directly as a "combustible material" of
conflict escalation.
Due to the fact that Arab countries are mostly modernizing, the phenomenon of "youth bulge" is rather typical
for them as is generally characteristic for countries having a risk to get into the "trap at the escape from the
trap."28 Accordingly, while assessing the presence of the "combustible material," one should proceed from the
data which show the influence of the "youth bulge" on the overall level of instability.
On the basis of our analysis of the Arab Spring data, the following scheme has been detected. Itself, the "youth
bulge" as a demographic phenomenon is (more or less) present in all countries of the Arab Spring, and about
equally significant.29 We should also assess youth unemployment rates, the proportion of unemployed young
people in the total adult population, and the proportion of unemployed people with higher education among
youth.
A grade scale (rather similar to the one described in the previous section) has been also introduced here, but
only the indicator of "share of unemployed people with higher education among the youth" (due to a lack of
statistical data) was estimated on the basis of the expert monitoring, the rest two had direct quantitative
characteristics.
A high level of correlation30 (r= 0.661) between the presence of "combustible material" (/2) and the conflict
potential index (/,) brings down the statistical significance of /2 in our multiple regression, as this factor is
shadowed by the conflict potential index due to the multicollinearity effect.
c) Indicator of political order sustainability (the ability of the government to reduce social tension) f.
Previous studies have demonstrated that this index is essentially dependent on the type of political order.31 At
the same time, the analysis of historical events has shown that the most stable regimes are either consolidated
democracies (because of their strong institutional mechanisms that are able to ease social tension), or absolute
monarchies and autocracies (due to their having the lever of direct impact on the social environment-the
authority of the monarch, authoritarian leader, or fear of repressions). The least stable are transitional regimes.
On this basis, an evaluation grade scale (Table 2) has been introduced.

In addition, as has been noted above, a special role is played by the legitimate tools of power transfer. In this
case, the least protected are authoritarian states with a republican (rather than monarchical) form of
government. Moreover, the most prone to sociopolitical shocks are those formally republican states where the
perspective to transfer the power within a family is maturing. On this basis, an evaluation grade scale has been
developed (Table 3).
d) Indicator of the presence of "immunity " to internal conflicts f.
Finally, we should consider the fourth indicator (/4), which is a combination of two factors: the presence of a
large-scale conflict (we considered as large-scale conflicts the ones in which the death toll has exceeded 10
thousand people) in the recent past and the participation of Islamists in the political process. The first indicator
appears in the countries that have endured civil war and unrest. The following should be noted.
First, this indicator can be evaluated in a manner close to the so-called "soft" ranking (i.e., the indicator is
assigned a value of either "1" if it is the case, either "0," in its absence). At the same time, in our case, we can
hardly talk about the possibility of assigning a value "0" since the "absolute immunity" to social unrest is a
theoretical abstraction. Score scaling is therefore advisable.
Second, taking into account that one of the most common (especially in the Middle East and North Africa)
factors affecting immunity to internal conflicts is the presence of prolonged internal conflicts in the recent past,
as well as the presence of Islamist-oriented opposition within the legal framework of Arab States, this element
should be considered more carefully. In particular, in the case of the Arab Spring, Algeria, Lebanon, Palestine,
and Iraq were assigned with a score corresponding to an "almost absolute immunity."
Calibration of the Index
Potential instability index (1) should be calibrated using historical data to be used in practical assessments. The
subject of calibration is the selection of the exponents . and the correlation of the index with the events scale.
Analysis of the Arab Spring events of 2011 had been used for the calibration.
Using nonlinear regression method, we have calculated values of exponents (, = 0.8; 2 = 1; 3 = 0.7; 4 =
0.6), in view of which the results of the calibration of potential instability index took the following form:
...(2)
It should be noted that another important additional factor-namely, the external influence-has been also taken
into account during the calculations. This was done through the calculation of the external influence index Iy,
according to the following scale:
0.1-limited distorted media coverage;
0.2-limited distorted media coverage, presence of some information on financing of the opposition forces from
abroad, and some calls to resign from abroad;
0.3-large-scale distorted media coverage, connections of the foreign state actors with the opposition parties,
strong pressure in the form of calls to resign;
0.4-information attack, reliable information on the funding of the opposition forces from abroad, and external
pressure in the form of possible sanctions;
0.5-all previous points, as well as military intervention.
Using the same method of nonlinear regression, we have estimated the value of exponent 5 to be equal to 1.0.
Moreover, we note that taking into account this indicator is important primarily to account for the number of
human casualties in the course of social and political upheaval. In the case of the evaluation of actual
destabilization scale, its importance is greatly reduced.
As we remember, both factors (the presence of "combustible material" /2 and external influences /5) have low
statistical significance in the construction of multiple regression equation, and have shown themselves
substantially less important than the other three in the construction of the equation of nonlinear regression.
However, the complete removal of these variables from the equation of nonlinear regression (Fig. 1) leads to a
significant reduction of its predictive power (from R2= 0.91 and R2 = 0.82).

Thus, the final formula for calculating the index of instability (Ims7) takes the following form:
...(3)
An example of calculation of instability index and its comparison with the index of resistance (see Table 1)
during the Arab Spring in 2011 is shown below (Table 4 and Fig. 2).
The diagram (Fig. 2) clearly shows a significant distance of Lebanon from the trend line. This is primarily due to
the fact that Lebanon takes the first place in the world by local ethnic and religious diversity of society, which,
throughout the history of Lebanon, led to the growth of social and political instability. Therefore, despite the fact
that Lebanon is an example of a successful developing country with stable democratic institutions, the factor of
ethno-religious fragmentation of society can cause serious conflicts (close to a civil war) against the background
of successful economic, political, and demographic development.32 If we compare the index of instability and
the resistance index in the period of the Arab Spring of 2011, excluding Lebanon from the list of the countries
(Fig. 3), a significant improvement in the correlation becomes obvious (R2 = 0.93).
Conclusion
Therefore, we have identified a set of factors that allow evaluating the current state of social and political
destabilization in the countries of the Arab Spring. These factors of instability act in long and medium term
creating grounds for discontent with the existing situation among the population and elites. With respect to the
Arab Spring, the most significant factors have turned out to be the following: the ability of the government to
reduce social tensions, the presence of "immunity" to internal conflicts, and the internal contradictions level.
Such indicators as structural and demographical characteristics and the external influences appear to be less
significant as predictors of the actual level of the sociopolitical destabilization within particular Arab Spring
countries in 2011. However, the demographic structural factors turn out to be very important if we consider
fundamental factors of the Arab Spring in general.33 It should be also mentioned that the significance of the
external influences indicator notably increases while accounting for the death toll that resulted from the
destabilization in respective countries.
Note also that some trigger is necessary for the latent discontent to grow in overt protest actions. Moreover, this
trigger should affect the widest possible range of social groups so that the response to it would be not local, but
universal, which dramatically reduces the ability of the government to monitor the situation. In the context of
Arab Spring, the role of such a trigger was played by the following factors:
Sharp and rapid increase in the world food prices. The second wave of agflation that preceded the Arab Spring
of 201134 and significantly deteriorated economic position of a rather broad strata of citizens;
"The effect of Al-Jazeera. " It should be kept in mind that during the last 10-15 years in the Arab world, a media
revolution took place which expressed in the appearance of super professional television satellite channels
such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. We are talking about unconditional world-class television journalism and
about television channels that had already got an immense popularity all over the Arab world by the beginning
of the Arab Spring;35
The rapid growth of the number of Internet users in the first decade of the twenty-first century in all Arab
countries which enabled political activists to use social media resources in organizing protest activity and
deprived (in conjunction with the activities of the satellite TV) authoritarian regimes of the power of effective
information control possibility.
Implementation of the "domino effect" that leads to the accelerating rise of instability and its spread on new
social strata and areas is necessary for most effective triggering of destabilization. Because of the "domino
effect," social instability may go beyond one country and be imported into the neighboring (as it was during the
Arab Spring of 2011), but this is only possible within regional systems with relatively homogenous prerequisites
to instability. Therefore, IUNST gives only an idea of the potential and possible scope of sociopolitical
upheavals, but it cannot be used to predict the level of an actual destabilization in a particular region in a
specific time period.

On the other hand, note that if we had calculated ImsT, e.g., for Egypt and Tunisia in 2000, the scores that we
would get (13.23 and 13.83 accordingly) would rather correspond to the situation in 2011 in Yemen and Jordan.
Indeed, 10 years ago, the fact that the regimes of Mubarak and Ben Ali would have fallen so fast, seemed
unlikely, more likely, it can be argued that a slight advantage after all was on the side of the ruling regimes. And
the scores that equation (2) produces correspond to this point rather well.
Acknowledgements
The study was implemented in the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research
University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2013.
Footnote
Notes
1. Tukey, J., "Exploratory Data Analysis," Quarterly of Applied Mathematics 30 (1972), 51-65; Tukey, J.,
"Exploratory Data Analysis," American Statistics 34 (1980), 23-25.
2. Kotz, S., Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences, Vol. 3 (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley &Sons, Inc., 2005), 2151-
2154.
3. Goldstone, J., "Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," Annual Review of Political Science 4
(2001), 139-187.
4. Goldstone, J. and Epstein, D., "A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability," American Journal of
Political Science 54:1 (2010), 190-208.
5. Tsirel', S. V., "Usloviya vozniknoveniya revolyutsionnyh situatsiy v arabskih stranah," in A. V. Korotayev, Y. V.
Zin'kina and A. S. Khodunov, Red., Sistemnyy monitoring global'nyh i regional'nyh riskov: Arabskaya vesna
2011 (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo LKI/URSS, 2012), 162-171.
6. Tsirel', "Usloviya vozniknoveniya revolyutsionnyh situatsiy v arabskih stranah," 162.
7. Korotayev, A. V., Issaev, L. M., Maikov, S. Yu. and Shishkina, A. R., "Toward the Development of Methods of
Estimation of the Current State and Forecast of Social Instability," Central European Journal of International and
Security Studies 7:4 (2013), 247-283; Maikov, S. Yu., Korotayev, A. V., Isaev, L. M. and Kouzminova, E. V., "O
Metodike Otsenki Tekushchego Sosotoyaniya i Prognoza Sotsial'noi Nestabil'nosti: Opyt Kolichestvennogo
Analiza Sobytii Arabskoi Vesny," Polis: Politicheskie Issledovaniya 4 (2013), 103-127.
8. See, e.g., Goldstone, J., Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1991); Goldstone and Epstein, "A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability," 190;
Korotayev, A. V., Zinkina, J., Kobzeva, S., Bogevolnov, J., Khaltourina, D., Maikov, A. and Maikov, S., "A Trap
at the Escape from the Trap? Demographic-Structural Factors of Political Instability in Modem Africa and West
Asia," Cliodynamics: The Journal of Theoretical and Mathematical History 2:2 (2011), 276-303; Korotayev, A.
and Zinkina, J., "Egyptian Revolution: A Demographic Structural Analysis," Entelequia. Revista Interdisciplinar
13 (2011), 139-169; Zin'kina Yu. V., "Tendentsii politico-demograficheskoy dinamiki i perspektivy sohraneniya
politicheskoy nestab'nosti v stranah Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka i Vostochnoy Afriki s tochki zreniya
strukturno-demograficheskoy teorii," in A. V. Korotayev, D. A. Khalturina and Yu. V. Zin'kina, Red., Sistemnyy
monitoring global'nyh I regional'nyh riskov (Moskva: LKI/URSS, 2011), 141-283; Goodwin, J., No Other Way
Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Grinin,
L. E., "Mal'tuziansko-marksova "lovushka" i russkie revolyutsii," in L. E. Grinin, A. V. Korotayev and S. Yu.
Maikov, Red., Oprichinah russkoy revolyutsii (Moskva: LKI/URSS, 2010), 198-224.
9. Truevtsev, K. M., God 2011-novaya demokraticheskaya volna? (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo VSHE, 2011).
10. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World; Goldstone J., "Population and Security:
How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict," Journal of International Affairs 56:1 (2002), 3-22.
11. Isaev, L. M. and Shishkina, A. R., Egipetskaya smuta XXI veka (Moskva: Librokom, 2012).
12. Truevtsev, God 2011.
13. Demchenko, A. V, "Zatyanuvshayasya "vesna" v Iordanii," in A. V. Korotayev, L. M. Isaev and A. R.

Shishkina, Red., Sistemnyy monitoring global'nyh I regional'nyh riskov: Arabskiy mir posle Arabskoy vesny
{Moskva: Lenand, 2013), 85-106.
14. Isaev, L. M., "Plemennaya revolyutsiya po-yemenski," Neprikosnovennyy zapas 4 (2012), 178-187; Isaev, L.
M. and Truevtsev, K. M., "Yemen: konets epohi Saleha," in A. V. Korotayev, L. M. Isaev and A. R. Shishkina,
Red., Sistemnyy monitoring global'nyh I regional'nyh riskov: Arabskiy mir posle Arabskoy vesny {Moskva:
Lenand, 2013), 138-167.
15. Suhov, N. V, "Politicheskaya vesna v Morokko," in A. V. Korotayev, L. M. Isaev and A. R. Shishkina, Red.,
Sistemnyy monitoring global'nyh i regional'nyh riskov: Arabskiy mir posle Arabskoy vesny (Moskva: Lenand,
2013), 237-266; Dolgov, B. V, "Alzhirskiy opyt Aabskoy vesny," in A. V. Korotayev, L. M. Isaev and A. R.
(Moskva: Lenand, 2013), 21-39.
16. Truevtsev, God 2011.
17. Shishkina, A. R., "Transformatsiya sotsial'no-politicheskogo prostranstva v kontekste sobytiy 2011-2012 v
Sirii," in Sotsiologiya i obshchestvo: global'nye vyzovy i regional'noe razvitie. Materialy IV Ocherednogo
Vserossiyskogo kongressa sotsiologov (Moskva: ROS, 2012), 1581-1589; Shishkina, A. R., "Siria: sekrety
stoykosti regima," in A. V. Korotayev, L. M. Isaev and A. R. Shishkina, Red., Sistemnyy monitoring global'nyh i
regional'nyh riskov: Arabskiy mir posle Arabskoy vesny {Moskva: Lenand, 2013), 323-353.
18. See: Artzrouni, M. and Komlos, J., "Population Growth through History and the Escape from the Malthusian
Trap: A Homeostatic Simulation Model," Genus 4X3-4 (1985), 21-39; Kgel, T. and Prskawetz, A., "Agricultural
Productivity Growth and Escape from the Malthusian Trap," Journal of Economic Growth 6 (2001), 337-357;
Komlos, J. and Artzrouni, M., "Mathematical Investigations of the Escape from the Malthusian Trap,"
Mathematical Population Studies 2 (1990), 269-287; Steinmann, G., Prskawetz, A. and Feichtinger, G., "AModel
on the Escape from the Malthusian Trap," Journal of Population Economics 11(1998), 535-550; Korotayev,
Zinkina, Kobzeva, Bogevolnov, Khaltourina, Maikov and Maikov, "A Trap at the Escape from the Trap?" 276.
19. Mller, H., "Youth as a Force in the Modem World," Comparative Studies in Society and History 10 (1968),
238-260; Goldstone, "Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," 137; Goldstone, "Towards a
Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," 139; Goldstone, Population and Security," 3; Korotayev, A. V.,
Khodunov, A. S., Burova, A. N., Maikov, S. Yu., Khalturina, D. A. and Zin'kina Yu. V., "Sotsial'no-
demograficheskiy analiz Arabskoy vesny," in A. V. Korotayev, Yu.V. Zin'kina and A. S. Khodunov, Red.,
Sistemnyy monitoring global'nyh i regional'nyh riskov: Arabskaya vesna 2011 (Moskva: LKIAJRSS, 2012), 128-
161; Korotayev, A. V, Khalturina, D. A., Kobzeva, S. V. and Zin'kina Yu. V., "Lovushka na vyhode iz lovushki? O
nekotoryh osobennostyah politico-demograficheskoy dimaniki moderniziruyushchihsya sistem," in A. A. Akaev,
A. V. Korotayev, G. G. Malinetskiy and S. Yu. Maikov, Red., Proekty i riski budushchego. Kontseptsii, modeli,
instrumenty, prognozy (Moskva: Krasand/URSS, 2011), 45-88; Korotayev, A. V., Bozhevol'nov Yu. V., Grinin, L.
E., Zin'kina Yu. V. and Maikov, S. Yu., "Lovushka na vyhode iz lovushki. Logicheskie i matematicheskie modeli,"
in A. A. Akaev, A. V. Korotayev, G. G. Malinetskiy and S. Yu. Maikov, Red., Proekty i riski budushchego.
Kontseptsii, modeli, instrumenty, prognozy (Moskva: Krasand/URSS, 2011), 138-164; Korotayev, Zinkina,
Kobzeva, Bogevolnov, Khaltourina, Maikov and Maikov, "A Trap at the Escape from the Trap?" 276; Korotayev
and Zinkina, "Egyptian Revolution," 139.
20. Goldstone, "Population and Security," 3; Korotayev, Zinkina, Kobzeva, Bogevolnov, Khaltourina, Maikov and
Maikov, "A Trap at the Escape from the Trap?" 276; Korotayev and Zinkina, "Egyptian Revolution," 139;
Korotayev, Bozhevol'nov, Grinin, Zin'kina and Maikov, "Lovushka na vyhode iz lovushki. Logicheskie i
matematicheskie modeli," 138; Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World', Mller, "Youth
as a Force in the Modem World," 238.
21. Polyakov, K. I. and Sigalyov, M. V., "Arabskaya vesna i Respublika Sudan," in A. V. Korotayev, L. M. Isaev
and A. R. Shishkina, Red., Sistemnyy monitoring global'nyh i regional'nyh riskov: Arabskiy mir posle Arabskoy

vesny (Moskva: Lenand, 2013), 354-377.
22. Korotayev, A. V. and Isaev, L. M., "Livan: ray na vulkane," in A. V. Korotayev, L. M. Isaev and A. R.
(Moskva: Lenand, 2013), 187-213.
23. Demchenko, "Zatyanuvshayasya "vesna" v Iordanii," 85.
24. Isaev, L. M., "Faktory destabilizatsiy arabskih respublikanskih rezhimov v hode Arabskoy vesny," in
Sotsiologiya i obshchestvo: global'nye vyzovy i regional 'noe razvitie. Materialy IV Ocherednogo Vserossiyskogo
kongressa sotsiologov {Moskva: ROS, 2012), 1467-1477.
25. Isaev, "Faktory destabilizatsiy arabskih respublikanskih rezhimov v hode Arabskoy vesny," 1467.
26. Davies, J., "Toward a Theory of Revolution," in B. McLaughlin, ed., Studies in Social Movements: A Social
Psychological Perspective (New York: Free Press, 1969), 85-108.
27. Korotayev, Zinkina, Kobzeva, Bogevolnov, Khaltourina, Maikov and Maikov, "A Trap at the Escape from the
Trap?" 276; Korotayev and Zinkina, "Egyptian Revolution," 139; Korotayev, A. V. and Zin'kina Yu. V.,
"Demograficheskie komi Egipetskoy revolyutsii," Demoskop, March 21-April 3, 2011, Number 459A60,
http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2011/0459/tema01.php; Korotayev, A. V. and Zin'kina Yu. V., "Egipetskaya
revolyutsiya 2011 g," Aziya i Afrika segodnya 6:647 (2011), 10-16; Korotayev, A. V. and Zin'kina Yu. V.,
"Egipetskaya revolyutsiya 2011 g. Struktumo-demograficheskiy analiz," Aziya i Afrika segodnya 7:648 (2011),
15-21 ; Korotayev, A. V., Zin'kina Yu. V. and Khodunov, A. S., (eds.), Arabskaya vesna 2011 goda. Sistemnyy
monitoring global'nyh i regional'nyh riskov (Moskva: LKI/URSS, 2012); Isaev and Shishkina, Egipetskaya smuta
XXI veka', Isaev, L. M. and Shishkina, A. R., Siriya i Yemen: neokonchennye revolyutsii (Moskva: Librokom,
2012).
28. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," 85.
29. Korotayev, Zinkina, Kobzeva, Bogevolnov, Khaltourina, Maikov and Maikov, "A Trap at the Escape from the
Trap?" 276; Korotayev and Zinkina, "Egyptian Revolution," 139; Sadovnichiy, V. A., Akaev, A. A., Korotayev, A.
V. and Maikov, S. Yu., Modelirovanie i prognozirovanie mirovoy dinamiki (Moskva: ISPI RAN, 2012).
30. Note that there are grounds to maintain that the high level of correlation in this case is entirely coincidental.
31. Tsirel', S. V., "Revolyutsii, volny revolyusiy i Arabskaya vesna," in A. V. Korotayev, Yu. V. Zin'kina and A. S.
Khodunov, Red., Sistemnyy monitoring global'nyh i regional'nyh riskov: Arabskaya vesna 2011 (Moskva:
LKI/URSS, 2011), 128-161; Goldstone, J., Gurr, T., Harff, B. , Levy, M., Marshall, M., Bates, R., Epstein, D.,
Kahl, C., Surko, P., Ulfelder, J., Unger, Jr. and Unger, A., State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings
(McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), 2003); Truevtsev, God 2011.
32. Korotayev and Isaev, "Livan: ray na vulkane," 187.
33. See, e.g., Korotayev, Zinkina, Kobzeva, Bogevolnov, Khaltourina, Maikov and Maikov, "A Trap at the
Escape from the Trap?" 276; Korotayev and Zinkina, "Egyptian Revolution," 139; Korotayev, Zin'kina and
Khodunov, (eds.), Arabskaya vesna 2011 goda.
34. See, e.g., Korotayev and Zinkina, "Egyptian Revolution," 139; Korotayev, Zin'kina and Khodunov, (eds.),
Arabskaya vesna 2011 goda', Isaev and Shishkina, Egipetskaya smuta XXI veka', Isaev and Shishkina, Siriya i
Yemen.
35. Korotayev, Zin'kina and Khodunov, (eds.), Arabskaya vesna 2011 goda\ Isaev and Shishkina, Egipetskaya
smuta XXI veka', Isaev and Shishkina, Siriya i Yemen.
AuthorAffiliation
Andrey V. Korotayev, Senior Research Professor, Higher School of Economics, National Research University,
Moscow, Russia.
Leonid M. Issaev, Lecturer, Higher School of Economics, National Research University, Moscow, Russia.
Sergey Yu. Maikov, Senior Research Fellow, Higher School of Economics, National Research University,
Moscow, Russia.

Alisa R. Shishkina, Junior Research Fellow, Higher School of Economics, National Research University,
Moscow, Russia.a
Subject: Revolutions; Conflicts; Poverty; Demographics; Inequality;
Publication title: Arab Studies Quarterly
Volume: 36
Issue: 2
Pages: 149-169
Number of pages: 21
Year: 2014
Publisher: Pluto Journals
Place of publication: London
Country of publication: United Kingdom
Publication subject: Arab/Middle Eastern, Ethnic Interests
ISSN: 02713519
Document feature: Tables References Graphs
Copyright: Copyright Pluto Journals Spring 2014
_______________________________________________________________
Document 16 of 20
Sustainable Democracy and the Paradox of the Arab Spring: The Egypt Experience
1 1
Author: Laz, Etemike Department of Political Science, Delta State University,P.M.B 1 Abraka, Delta State.
Nigeria etemikelaz@yahoo.com
Abstract: The Arab spring began with an uprising in Tunisia and subsequently spread to Egypt, Bahrain,
Morocco, Libya, Yemen and Syria. The protest has been referred to as the Arab spring and for others the Arab
democratic revolution. Despite the substantial variants of the revolt it explains a component of a great collective

shift from long tenure and authoritarian rule. The aftermath of the transition from authoritarianism to democracy
should have been the establishment of independent democratic structures. This is the only way that a
sustainable democracy can be guaranteed. This is where such factors as religion (Islam), monarchies, military
and fundamentalism, come to be a crucial factor in analysing and assessing the success or failure of the Arab
democratic revolution. This paper is of the opinion that a sustainable democracy within the Arab world cannot
be guaranteed, in view of the above contesting variables for political/state power and influence. Each of these
variables is not only anti democratic but present a contradiction in democracy. Egypt experience is instructive.
What is thus needed is a frame work to manage and structure these diversities toward providing sustainable
democratic political institutions that are in consonance with democratic tenets without radically changing the
norms, values and nuances of the Arab society. Adapted from the source document.
Subject: Democracy; Religion Politics Relationship; Egypt; Authoritarianism (Political Ideology); Revolutions;
Values; Contradictions; Arab Countries; Democratization;
Identifier / keyword: Arab Spring Democratization Democracy Islam Fundamentalism
URL: http://www.alternativesjournal.net/
Correspondence author: Laz, Etemike
Author e-mail address: etemikelaz@yahoo.com
Publication title: Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations
Volume: 13
Issue: 1-2
Pages: 41-51
Number of pages: 11
Year: 2014
Publisher: Fatih University, Istanbul Turkey
ISSN: 2146-0809
Update: 2016-02-01
_______________________________________________________________

Document 17 of 20
AN ARAB WINTER: THREATS TO THE RIGHT TO PROTEST IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES,

SUCH AS POST-ARAB SPRING EGYPT
Author: Vassefi, Tara
Abstract:
The initial victory of the Arab Spring was entrenched within the people's right to protest. Article 21 of the
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that "the right to peaceful assembly shall
be recognized" barring certain enumerated restrictions. This comment will first provide background by focusing
on Egypt's domestic and international laws at the time of the freezing point. Subsequently, it will look closely at
the language and interpretations of article 21 of the ICCPR and consider the unique significance of democracy
to the legal right to freedom of assembly. Then, this comment will consider two elements within article 21 of the
ICCPR: its basis in democracy and the impact of a transitional state's legal obligations. The analysis section will
consider how these two elements intertwine and apply them to Egypt's recent history to determine whether
Egypt violated article 21. Finally, after concluding that Egypt did in fact violate international law, this comment
will offer recommendations for holding Egypt accountable for its violations.
Full text:
I. INTRODUCTION
"O great people of Egypt, dear citizens standing here in the Revolution square, in freedom square, in Tahrir
Square, in martyrs' square, and all citizens standing in all liberty squares across the homeland, Egypt, in
villages, towns and cities, in all governorates of Egypt . . . . I came to talk to you today, because I believe that
you are the source of power and legitimacy. . . . I say it with full force 'No authority is over or above this power'.
You are the source of power. You are the owners of the will. You grant power to whomsoever you choose, and
you withdraw power from whomsoever you choose."1
- President Mohamed Morsi, Inaugural Speech in Tahrir Square, June 29, 2012
The initial victory of the Arab Spring2 was entrenched within the people's right to protest.3 When the first round
of masses came onto the streets, the world watched as millions living under the rule of authoritarianism were
able to bring about monumental change through protests.4 Even in the murky and volatile post-Arab Spring
world, the newfound right to protest remains at issue. In international law, the right to protest, or freedom of
assembly as it is referred to in the legal context, is paramount for the legal rights of citizens within democratic
societies. Article 21 of the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") provides that "the right
to peaceful assembly shall be recognized" barring certain enumerated restrictions.5
Egypt presents an interesting case for article 21 of the ICCPR because the country recently began its
democratic process.6 Since Egypt signed the ICCPR in 1981, it was not previously privy to a key element of
article 21 of the ICCPR as "the focus of freedom of assembly is clearly on its democratic function in the process
of forming, expressing and implementing political opinions."7 Therefore, it is clear that at least prior to the ouster
of President Hosni Mubarak, and the decades of authoritarianism under his rule, Egypt did not qualify as a
democracy in light of article 21's emphasis on freedom to assemble as an essential democratic function.8
However, democracy is a process rather than a definitive point.9 Egypt, along with a few other post-Arab Spring
countries, has embarked on the democratic process, and the codified right to protest within the post-revolution
2012 Constitution has been a great victory in this regard.10
Following the ratification of the 2012 Constitution, leaders have repeatedly violated their international obligation
to ensure their citizens the right to protest. Egypt's first violation occurred when the Muslim Brotherhood-led
parliament passed restrictive laws regarding the notification requirement prior to a protest.11 Egypt's second

violation occurred during the military-led government's violent crackdown on pro-Morsi protests during and after
the July 2013 turmoil that resulted in President Morsi's ouster.12
As is unsurprising in post-revolutionary turmoil, Egypt's post- Arab Spring unrest resulted in a violation of
international law, especially the legal right to freedom of assembly.13 However, there are two unique elements
to an analysis of post-revolutionary events in Egypt. First, Egypt falls within a gap in international legal
discourse such that it is unclear if it is bound by the ICCPR's right to freedom of assembly during its period of
transition into democracy.14 Second, Egypt presents an inimitable case study in this neglected area of
international law because Egypt's democratic transition was not brought on by war or civil conflict.15 Unlike
other post-Arab Spring transitional countries such as Libya and Syria, Egypt's civil society-legal and government
institutions-remain largely intact following the 2011 revolution.16 Therefore, there is a basis from which to
evaluate both Egypt's domestic and international legal obligations to upholding its citizenry's right to protest.17
Egypt violated article 21 of the ICCPR in two general instances. As events in Egypt are fluid and likely to
change, this comment will freeze analysis at the time of the military's violent suppression of demonstrations, just
before the military declared a state of emergency on August 14, 2013. This comment will first provide
background by focusing on Egypt's domestic and international laws at the time of the freezing point.18
Subsequently, it will look closely at the language and interpretations of article 21 of the ICCPR and consider the
unique significance of democracy to the legal right to freedom of assembly.19
Then, this comment will consider two elements within article 21 of the ICCPR: its basis in democracy and the
impact of a transitional state's legal obligations. The analysis section will consider how these two elements
intertwine and apply them to Egypt's recent history to determine whether Egypt violated article 21.20Finally,
after concluding that Egypt did in fact violate international law, this comment will offer recommendations for
holding Egypt accountable for its violations.21
II. BACKGROUND
This section begins by breaking down the relevant elements of the ICCPR article 21, including its explicit and
implicit permissible restrictions to freedom of assembly. Then it provides a brief timeline of events in Egypt as
well as the domestic law regarding the right to protest. Finally, it briefly discusses the gap in international law
regarding a country's international obligations as it embarks on the process of democratic transition.
A. EGYPT: A BRIEF TIMELINE
Egypt's transition toward democracy began in January 2011, with the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak.22 By
June 2012, President Mohamed Morsi became the country's first democratically elected leader in its long
history.23 Shortly thereafter, the Egyptian Assembly adopted its new Constitution in December 2012.24
In what was seen as a great victory of the Arab Spring,25 the Constitution granted Egyptians the right to
freedom of assembly, giving their citizens the right to peaceful demonstrations and gatherings with the
requirement of prior notification.26 The Constitution does not provide details or limits to the notification
requirement.27 However, the Egyptian parliament has stipulated a three-day, detailed notification
requirement.28
Despite these developments, like many other post-revolutionary countries, Egypt's transition continued and still
continues to experience vicissitudes. From around February to June 2013, the people's dissatisfaction with
President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood gained traction. New rounds of protests erupted against President
Morsi, some of them escalating to violence.29
In the months leading up to President Morsi's July 2013 ouster, a campaign emerged with the objective of
holding Morsi accountable for the country's economic and cultural stagnation.30 By June 2013, a campaign
known as Tamarod (rebellion) collected over thirty million signatures demanding President Morsi's resignation
on the one-year anniversary of his election for what many Egyptians saw as his failure to effectively govern the
country, improve the economy, and follow through on his campaign promises.31
The Tamarod campaign culminated in a mass protest against President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood on

June 30, 2013.32 Just a few days later, on July 3, the Egyptian military followed through on its ultimatum
against the President after he failed to effectively placate the protesters.33 On that day, the military suspended
the 2012 Constitution, and thus also suspended the people's right to protest. Before August 14, 2013, when the
military declared a state of emergency, the interim Egyptian government suppressed dozens of peaceful
retaliation protests and sit-ins carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood, leaving hundreds of fatalities.34
Though Egypt continues to experience turmoil in its transition to democracy, the events implicating article 21 of
the ICCPR for the purposes of this paper focus on the period from the Muslim Brotherhood-led government to
the military-led ouster of President Morsi up until the declaration of an emergency state, since this period serves
as a model for impending transitions and difficulties moving forward.
B. ARTICLE 21 OF THE ICCPR
1. Language Specific to Article 21
Article 21 of the ICCPR explicitly protects a citizen's right to peaceful assembly:
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right
other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.35
This background section considers first, the Convention's deliberate focus on democracy; second, the definition
of a "democratic society" for the purposes of the ICCPR; and, third, the restrictions permitted by the language of
article 21 and the Human Rights Committee's ("HRC") interpretation of this language.
2. Article 21's Roots in Democracy
Article 21 is one of a few articles in which drafting states deliberately included the language of democracy.36
The right set out in article 21 is not only necessary to attain a certain purpose but also a contingency of
democratic society.37 Drafting states ultimately concluded that any limitation of the right to freedom of assembly
must be implemented in accordance with "certain minimum democratic principles" to effectively protect this
right.38 Therefore, article 21 of the ICCPR and its restrictions clause implicate a threshold of democratic
principles that the government in question must meet.39
3. The Definition of Democracy in International Law and the ICCPR
International law does not provide a recognized, singular definition of democracy.40 Nonetheless, it has come
to narrow the meaning of democracy to the process of popular sovereignty.41 Specifically, article 25 of the
ICCPR codifies the right to political participation through free and fair elections.42 This indicates that the extent
of a state's compliance with certain minimum democratic principles under international law is generally judged,
perhaps to the extent of oversimplification, by the presence of free and fair elections.43
C. RESTRICTIONS TO FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND OTHER SIMILAR ARTICLES OF THE ICCPR
The ICCPR's list of acceptable restrictions is similar to those found in other international conventions providing
for the right to freedom of assembly.44 There are several key issues in the restrictions paragraph that require
further attention. First, it is necessary to clarify the definition of assembly. Second, in looking at perhaps the
most pertinent element of justified restrictions, the HRC has narrowed the scope of what impingements on the
right to freedom of assembly can be justified in the interests of national security. Third, the implied restrictions
on the right to freedom of assembly (those not codified in article 21) provide useful background to the scope and
range of such restrictions: those restrictions are the commonly utilized notification requirement and the use of
force in response to assemblies.
1. Restriction Through the Definition of Assembly
There is a degree of ambiguity as to what qualifies as an "assembly."45 In the HRC case Kivenmaa v.
Finland,46 the plaintiff, a Finnish citizen, was charged with violating the country's Act on Public Meetings by
holding what the Finnish government considered to be a public meeting without the requisite notification.47 In
response to a visit from a foreign head of state, the plaintiffand twenty-five members of her organization

gathered across from the Presidential Palace amid a larger crowd.48 The plaintiffsuccessfully argued that her
presence at the Presidential Palace, being amid a larger crowd of people, did not fall under Finland's definition
of a public meeting that would require an advance notification of at least six hours. At the same time, the court
held that Finland had violated article 21 of the ICCPR by charging the plaintiffwith a violation of Finland's protest
law.49 Therefore, Kivenmaa established that a gathering that fails to meet a state's definition of assembly might
still be protected by article 21 of the ICCPR.50
2. Explicit Restrictions to Freedom of Assembly in Article 21
The second noteworthy element of article 21 of the ICCPR is that it allows restrictions based on national
security interests.51 The HRC and other sources narrow the definition of interest of national security. In Kim v.
Republic of Korea,52 the court held that South Korea's national security claims vis--vis North Korea did not
render the suppression of an assembly organized by the National Coalition for Democratic Movement
permissible because the state's claimed national security interest was insufficient.53 There, the plaintiffprepared
and distributed documents that criticized the South Korean government, and argued for reunification with North
Korea at the Movement's inaugural meeting of 4000 participants.54 Subsequently, the plaintiffwas arrested and
tried under the National Security Law, the Law on Assembly and Demonstrations and the Law on Repression of
Violent Activities for "anti-state" activities.55 Addressing South Korea's national security concerns with their
northern neighbor, the Committee nonetheless held that the influence of national security implications on public
order in South Korea should not be overestimated.56
Analogizing the HRC's clarification of national security restrictions with respect to freedom of expression in Kim,
it seems that national security interests cannot be used as a blanket justification for state action against the right
to freedom of assembly.57 Indeed, the national security and public order restrictions require narrowing the
limiting of acts to those that are truly dangerous for state security.58
3. Implicit Restrictions to Freedom of Assembly in Article 21
Although article 21 does not explicitly specify the acceptable methods for restricting the right to freedom of
assembly, states commonly require prior notification to organizing a protest or demonstration.59 In Kivenmaa
the HRC held "that a requirement to notify the police of intended demonstration in public place six hours before
its commencement may be compatible with the permitted limitations laid down in article 21 of the Covenant."60
While six hours may be acceptable, the HRC has not provided an explicit upper limit for what is considered an
acceptable notification requirement.61 Furthermore, the notification should not be used to quell assembly, but
rather should invoke a positive duty to ensure that citizens can exercise their right to freedom of assembly.62
Therefore, while the notification requirement is a legitimate restriction to freedom of assembly, it is meant to be
a tool used by the state in fulfilling its duty to protect its citizenry's right to freedom of assembly.
Finally, on the general issue of use of force, the ICCPR requires restraint both on the part of the protesters and
the state. The right to freedom of assembly only covers peaceful protests. Under article 21 of the ICCPR,
protests that use any form of violence are not protected.63 Any response or restriction to the right to freedom of
assembly implies a "principle of proportionality" that requires that the means were absolutely necessary to
achieve the end.64 Coleman v. Australia65 addressed the issue of proportionality in force with respect to a
similar right under freedom of expression in article 19 of the ICCPR.66 There, the plaintiffgave a fifteen to
twenty minute speech at a shopping mall in Australia and was subsequently convicted for giving a public
address without a proper permit from the town council.67 The plaintiffwas fined $300 and held in custody for five
days even though, as the court explained, the plaintiff's address was not threatening or unduly disruptive.68 The
HRC held that the plaintiff's peaceful presence in a shopping mall did not justify the state party's
disproportionate restriction of the plaintiff's rights (by charging him with violating a local law) even if he did not
adhere to the permit law.69 Therefore, while the HRC has yet to establish an explicit test regarding
proportionality of laws limiting the right to freedom of assembly, permissible restrictions implied in the practical
applications of article 21 of the ICCPR (that is, notifications and use of force against protestors) are subject to a

consideration of proportionality.
III. ANALYSIS
A. EGYPT'S TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO DEMOCRACY MAKES IT UNCLEAR
HOW ARTICLE 21 OF THE ICCPR APPLIES
If the basis for evaluating a state's democratic character relies on the presence of free and fair elections, then
Egypt's newfound (post- Arab Spring) status meets the criteria.70 However, given that international law does
not provide a clear definition of democracy71 from which to determine Egypt's definitive status, it is necessary
to evaluate its violations in further detail, especially in the context of its tumultuous transition.
1. International Law Applies to Transitional States
The volatile situation in Egypt evokes a fascinating question of what happens to a country's international legal
obligations to the right to freedom of assembly when a transitional state is faced with swiftand unpredictable
changes in their democratic functions. These obligations are clear when a country has established democratic
institutions that can ensure their citizen's right to freedom of assembly.72 The obligations are perhaps even
clearer when countries without any semblance of democratic functions violate international law.73 However, it is
unclear how international legal obligations that are rooted in principles of democracy74 apply to transitional
societies.
Egypt was still bound to the ICCPR, at least until the military declared a state of emergency on August 13,
2013.75 First, unless a successive regime or ruler proclaims public emergency or the country's membership is
suspended by a certain international organization or convention, the state is still bound to those international
obligations even in periods of democratic transitional turmoil.76 For example, following what the African Union
characterized as a coup d'etat in Egypt, the African Union suspended Egypt's membership until Egypt restored
constitutional order.77 Therefore, since Egypt's membership to the ICCPR was not suspended, it was still
bound by the Covenant, including article 21.
Aside from this bright line rule regarding suspension of membership, there is a dearth of legal principles
regarding what happens to a country's international legal obligations as it experiences transition.78 While the
law of state succession governs transitioning states, as well as some other legal principles, these legal
principles do not fully answer the question of the ICCPR article 21's application to a transitional state like post-
Arab Spring Egypt.79 There is one similar HRC case that provides an example of a transitional society
grappling with ratification of the article on freedom of assembly. The plaintiff's arrest in Kim v. Republic of Korea
occurred in 1989 when South Korea was in a period of transition.80 In 1987 the authoritarian government
decided to open the political process.81 The HRC held South Korea to its legal obligation to the ICCPR,
regardless of the country's status as having recently transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy.82
Therefore, from the one example provided by the HRC thus far, it would seem that countries transitioning into
democracy are still obligated to their ratification of the ICCPR. Therefore, Egypt is still bound by the Covenant
since its membership was not suspended and the ICCPR applies to states transitioning from authoritarianism to
democracy like South Korea during the late 1980s.
B. EGYPT'S POST-ARAB SPRING LAWS AND EVENTS UNDER THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD-LED
GOVERNMENT VIOLATED ARTICLE 21 OF THE ICCPR
First, this subsection considers events and laws in Egypt prior to the July 2013 suspension of the Constitution;
then it analyzes the military's actions following the suspension of the Constitution.
1. Egypt's Post-Arab Spring Notification Requirement is More Restrictive Than the ICCPR Intends
While Egypt's 2012 Constitution provided the basis for the right to protest, its proposed and adopted laws
regarding the restriction in the notification requirement went beyond the intention of the drafters of the ICCPR
and the HRC's interpretation of this restriction. If in Kivenmaa the HRC would only go so far as to say that
Finland's sixhour notification requirement "may be"83 within the confines of article 21 of the ICCPR, Egypt's law
regarding the notification requirement went beyond this standard.84 The proposed law required demonstration

organizers to provide specific details about the time, route, and demands of the protest at least three days in
advance.85 Additionally, the law placed unrealistic restrictions on avoiding government buildings, which are
scattered throughout many cities and difficult to recognize.86 Human rights groups in Egypt repeatedly
denounced this blatant extension of the notification requirement as the proposed law gained approval in Egypt's
lower house of parliament and then the cabinet.87
Egypt's interest in the notification requirement is both for national security or public order and for the state's
fulfillment of its duty to ensure citizens' right to freedom of assembly.88 Therefore, the purpose of the
notification requirement is to allow Egyptian authorities to prepare for facilitation of the demonstrations, rather
than to have notice to impede the demonstrations.89 Foreign governments, including the United States, also
stressed this positive obligation to protect the right to protest on the part of the state.90
The stipulation of the protest law's constitutional outline was far more restrictive than the ICCPR's intent of the
restrictions. Hence, Egypt's protest laws before the July 2013 suspension of the Constitution violated article 21
of ICCPR.
2. The Military's Suppression of Pro-Morsi Demonstrations Following the July 2013 Suspension of the
Constitution Violated Article 21 of the ICCPR
Egypt was still bound by its international obligations under the ICCPR between July and August 2013 for the
following three reasons: (1) Egypt's obligations under the ICCPR were not suspended (unlike its African Union
membership);91 (2) the Egyptian military had not declared a state of emergency until August 14, 2013;92 and
(3) even countries experiencing democratic transitional turmoil are bound by their international obligations.93
a. Egypt Had Legitimate National Security Interests in Restricting Freedom of Assembly
Indeed, the Egyptian military and interim government did have national security and public order imperatives in
suppressing the pro- Morsi protests following the President's ouster on July 3, 2013. However, the precedent
set by Kim would suggest that, like South Korea during its period of transition from authoritarianism to
democracy in the late 1980s, Egypt's transitional status does not relieve it of its international legal obligations.94
This requirement is especially true considering the significance of article 21 in the context of democracies and
democratizing societies.95 Furthermore, Kim established that a demonstration's danger to national security and
public order is more narrowly defined than merely relying on what the state decides is a national security
interest.96 Restrictions on the right to freedom of assembly in interests of national security are limited to serious
cases of political or military threat to the country as a whole.97
Regardless of the Egyptian military's reasons for restricting demonstrations, its excessive use of force in
quashing a number of the peaceful post-July 2013 protests violates article 21.98 Egypt's use of force was
excessive because reports clearly indicate that the military opened fire on peaceful sit-ins and unarmed
protestors.99 Therefore, there are several strong instances of the military's actions following suspension of the
Constitution violating article 21 of the ICCPR.100
3. Egypt's Transitional Status Falls Within a Gap in International Law's Application of the ICCPR's Article 21
The Egyptian military stated that it was acting in an effort to avoid civil conflict101 and in some instances
protestors escalated the demonstrations and disrupted public order, justifying a proportional use of force by the
military.102 The military's actions were also vindicated because of the gap in international law with regard to
transitional societies. Although Kim sets a precedent, there are many differences between Egypt's post-Arab
Spring democratic transition and South Korea's political situation during Kim.103 The context of governmental
transitions brought on by the Arab Spring, the mobilizing forces of globalization, social media, and
empowerment of non-state actors makes for a vastly different case for maintaining public order and national
security in Egypt.104
There are other international legal principles that govern a state's transitional period. In looking closer at the
legal implications of a state's transition, the law of succession of states governs this period in Egypt's history.
Succession of states law stems from the international relations theory concerning the recognition and

acceptance of newly created sovereign states.105 Though its roots stem farther back, the U.N. General
Assembly codified the concept in 1978 through the U.N. Conference on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties.106 However, as the succession of states theory was born out of a context of colonialism and "newly
independent" states,107 it is not particularly applicable to previously existing states that have merely
experienced a transition in regimes or governments.108
Therefore, post-Arab Spring states such as Egypt suffer from a Goldilocks complex: the East Asian transitional
period serves as too mild a model, as there was not the same rapid turning of events in South Korea during the
late 1980s. Governments experiencing newly independent succession, transitional justice, or Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration-relevant turmoil, are dealing with more fundamental state-formation
issues.109 International law fails to provide an option that is somewhere in between.
Nonetheless, while it is unclear that the ICCPR should govern such a transitional period, if it did apply, then it is
clear that Egypt has repeatedly violated article 21 of the ICCPR in its post-Arab Spring transitional period.110 It
is indisputable that Egypt violated article 21 by first, stipulating law that was counter to the ICCPR's intentions in
restrictions to freedom of assembly, and second, by quashing peaceful protests during and after President
Morsi's ouster and suspension of the constitution. In the first instance, it is clear that the government under the
leadership of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood was attempting to limit Egyptians' right to freedom of
assembly out of a primary concern for the state's interests.111 Indeed, prohibiting demonstrations or making
them logistically impossible violates article 21 of the ICCPR.112 Additionally, such abuse of the restriction
clause goes against an important and unique element of the whole right in that it is counter to basic democratic
principles, which Egypt has been trying to pursue and attain following the end of President Mubarak's reign.113
Furthermore, following President Morsi's ouster and the suspension of the Constitution, no amount of
justifications can excuse the Egyptian military's gross response to peaceful pro-Morsi protests.114 In the
violence that erupted following what critics called a coup d'etat by the Egyptian military, the violations of article
21 of the ICCPR are blatant, regardless of Egypt's transitional status.115 The ICCPR does not explicitly allow
room for transitional societies to ignore their international legal obligations either in its text or through
interpretations by the HRC.116
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Egypt has not signed or ratified the Second Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, which gives the HRC jurisdiction
over signatories of the ICCPR.117 Therefore, methods of litigation and enforcement through the HRC, such as
those in Kim and Kivenmaa, are not options moving forward in Egypt's case.118
A. EGYPT SHOULD SIGN THE SECOND OPTIONAL PROTOCOL OF THE ICCPR
First, this comment recommends that Egypt sign the Second Optional Protocol, as other countries have done, to
ensure that there are adjudication methods for the principles that Egypt signed on to when it ratified the ICCPR.
If Egypt were to sign on to the Second Optional Protocol then it would send a clear message of its commitment
to human rights and democratic principles in the transitional period after President Mubarak's thirty-year
authoritarian rule.119 This would benefit Egypt both in the short and long term as it builds its influence in the
global arena,120 in addition to providing Egyptian rights groups with a forum for adjudicating violations to the
ICCPR's article 21 and other articles.
B. FUTURE ITERATIONS OF EGYPT'S CONSTITUTION AND PROTEST LAWS SHOULD MODIFY THE
PREVIOUS PROTEST LAWS UNDER THE 2012 CONSTITUTION BY REMOVING EXCESSIVE
RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO PROTEST THROUGH A PROHIBITIVE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
Until Egypt signs the Second Optional Protocol, the international community must rely on alternative methods to
hold Egypt accountable for its violations of article 21. Regarding the pre-July 2013 suspension of the
Constitution, President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood will likely not be held accountable internationally and
domestically for the laws that were passed limiting the right to protest beyond their removal from power by the

military.121 However, the analysis used to indicate their impingement on the right to protest is useful for future
leaders who attempt to implement a notification requirement or some other pre-demonstration restriction.122
Currently, Egypt is in the process of determining who is to lead its future government and a committee has been
put in place to rewrite the entire Constitution.123 Regarding future versions of the protest law, this comment
recommends that Egypt strike a better balance between maintaining order and allowing for freedom of
assembly.
It is necessary for any democratic or democratizing society to maintain this balance by keeping the contours of
its notification requirement but removing its excessively restrictive qualities.124 This balance can be achieved
by lowering the amount of time required by the notification requirement from three days to something closer to
Finland's six-hour requirement that the HRC considered.125 Furthermore, the previous protest law required that
demonstrations avoid government buildings, making them logistically impossible.126 While security and public
order are legitimate concerns for the government, this restriction of movement extends beyond the intent of
article 21 of the ICCPR.127 As previously mentioned, the right to protest imbues the state with a positive
obligation.128 Future iterations of the protest law should remove this excessive restriction on movement rather
than making it logistically impossible for organizers of demonstrations to legally exercise their right to protest.
The next iteration of laws dealing with the right to protest seems more restrictive than those under President
Morsi and the 2012 Constitution. In late November 2013 after authorities lifted the threemonth state of
emergency, Egypt's interim President, Adly Mansour, signed into law new rules regarding the right to
protest.129 Adding to the three-day notification requirement under the previous law before the July 2013
suspension of the Constitution, the most recent draftlaw allows the police to deny a public gathering of more
than ten people without justification or a court order.130 Though the country has seen near-daily protests since
President Morsi's resignation and the state has a legitimate interest in maintaining order, it is clear that these
measures aim to stifle the Egyptian people's right to protest by providing officials more authority to deny and
break up protests.131 Many rights groups warn that these protest laws are reminiscent of Mubarak-era
policies.132 Egypt should not, therefore, allow these restrictions on the right to protest as it transitions into
democracy.
V. CONCLUSION
The democratic function is at the heart of article 21 of the ICCPR, the right to freedom of assembly. As post-
Arab Spring societies, such as Egypt, continue through the challenges of the democratic process, the people's
right to protest likewise continues to oscillate between a civil rights victory and state-interest limitations. Though
it is not completely clear how an ICCPR article that relies so heavily on democratic principles applies to a
society in the throes of achieving democracy, it is clear that Egypt's actions in its post-Arab Spring transitional
period violated the ICCPR's article 21 in two general instances. First, through the implementation of a
notification requirement that impinged on the people's right to freedom of assembly, and second, in the military's
clampdown on demonstrations following the President's ouster and suspension of the Constitution in July 2013.
While Egypt cannot be held accountable for violations of article 21 of the ICCPR through a complaint submitted
to the HRC, there are many alternatives to utilize international law relating to the right to protest as a tool to
guide societies that are transitioning through the democratic process. Holding Egypt accountable by some
means is of paramount importance in the context of the greater Middle East because of the significance of
Egyptian politics as a model and catalyst for other transitional societies, such as Tunisia133 and beyond the
post-Arab Spring context.
Footnote
1. Mohamed Morsi, President of Egypt, Inaugural Address in Tahrir Square (June 29, 2012), translated in
President Mohamed Morsi's Speech in Tahrir Square, Friday June 29, 2012, Ikhwan Web (June 30, 2012),
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30153.
2. Compare Roger Hardy, Egypt Protests: An Arab Spring as Old Order Crumbles?, BBC (Feb. 2, 2011),

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 12339521 (providing an example of "Arab Spring" as a means of
referring to the protest movement in question), with The Arab Awakening, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH (Feb. 22,
2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/2011/02/ 2011222121213770475.html (demonstrating an
example of "Arab Awakening" as an alternative designation for the same movement). The term "Arab Spring"
refers to the sweeping protests throughout several Middle Eastern and North African countries. Though the term
is rather definitive, and the word "Spring" connotes a positive end that has yet to come into fruition. This paper
will use the term "Arab Spring" as opposed to Arab Awakening or Arab Rising for its familiarity.
3. See Sudarsan Raghavan, Inspired by Tunisia and Egypt, Yemenis Join in Anti-Government Protests, WASH.
POST (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/27/
AR2011012702081.html (demonstrating that citizens of Arab states felt more empowered in their right to protest
as the Arab Spring continued, thereby furthering its success in increasing the number of protesters and
organized protests).
4. Id. (discussing the burgeoning threat to extant Arab regimes posed by protests even at an early point in the
Arab Spring movement).
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 21, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178, available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/ Volume%20999/volume-999-I-14668-English.pdf [hereinafter
ICCPR] (providing that restrictions may be permitted "in conformity with the law," and if they are "necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection
of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others").
6. See Egypt Crisis: President Hosni Mubarak Resigns as Leader, BBC (Feb. 12, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12433045 [hereinafter Mubarak Resigns] (reporting on the ouster,
clarifying that though his title was President and Egypt had the faade of a democracy, Mubarak "ruled for 30
years, suppressing dissent and protest, and jailing opponents.").
7. See Manfred Nowak, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS COMMENTARY 481, 490 (2d
rev. ed. 2005) (emphasis added) (comparing the unique quality of article 21 of the ICCPR to similar articles in
other conventions such as the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as to other articles within the
ICCPR).
8. Cf. William J. Dobson, THE DICTATOR'S LEARNING CURVE: INSIDE THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR
DEMOCRACY (2013) (writing about how Mubarak began slightly opening the political process before the 2011
Revolution though ultimately the country had an authoritarian governing structure).
9. Many in the transitional justice field feel that the democratic process itself is the goal, and there is no point at
which we stop striving for that ideal. See Collette Rausch, Democracy Is a Process - and a Journey, U.S. INST.
PEACE (July 12, 2011), available at http://www.usip.org/olivebranch/democracy-process-andjourney.
10. See generally Faith Lemon, The Uncertain Future of Human Rights in the Arab Spring, RTS. NEWS (Nov.
2011), available at http://hrcolumbia.org/rightsnews/nov2011/uncertain_future (cautioning that while rhetoric
surrounding the Arab Spring movements highlights positive changes and optimism, "a summative evaluation of
the Arab Spring as an impetus for durable democracy or improved human rights conditions in [The Middle East
and North Africa] remains elusive.").
11. See New Egyptian Protest Law Threatens Right to Protest: NGO, AHRAM ONLINE (Mar. 27, 2013),
available at http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/ 64/67865/Egypt/Politics-/New-Egyptian-protest-law-
threatens-right-to-protes.aspx [hereinafter New Egyptian Protest Law] (explaining that the post-Arab Spring
protest law in Egypt "obligates demonstration organisers to give an official notice to the authorities about the
time, route and demands of any protest three days in advance," and characterizing such obligations as
"stringent and unrealistic restrictions").
12. See Jeffrey Fleishman, Death Toll in Egypt Hits 638; Morsi Supporters Vow to Keep Protesting, L.A. TIMES
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/ world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-egypt-crackdown-toll-

20130815,0,1160232.story (describing the violence including a climbing death toll following the July ouster of
President Morsi, and its use in quashing protests by the Egyptian public).
13. See discussion infra Part III (explaining Egypt's violations of the ICCPR's article 21 guarantees of freedom
of assembly).
14. See discussion infra Part III.C (categorizing Egypt's Goldilocks Complex in falling in the gap of governing
international law regarding transitional societies).
15. Hosni Mubarak Resigns as President, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 11, 2011),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201121125158705862.html (explaining that Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak resigned his office without being violently overthrown or removed).
16. See Sharif Abdel Kouddous, What Led to Morsi's Fall - and What Comes Next?, NATION (July 5, 2013),
http://www.thenation.com/article/175128/what-ledmorsis- fall-and-what-comes-next# (explaining that "the
[Muslim] Brotherhood kept intact most institutions of the Mubarak regime").
17. See also Sreeram Sundar Chaulia, The Turmoil in Egypt Underscores Just How Fragile the Post-Arab
Spring Situation Is, TIMES INDIA (Nov. 26, 2012), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-11-
26/editpage/ 35347560_1_president-morsi-mubarak-regime-hosni-mubarak (warning against the instability of
regime changes and the attendant risks posed to the right of protest by new leaders - such as Morsi -
attempting to consolidate power).
18. See discussion infra Part II.A (detailing events in Egypt following the ouster of President Mubarak that led to
violations of article 21 of the ICCPR through August 2013, when Egypt declared a state of emergency).
19. See discussion infra Part II.B (expounding upon the various nuances of article 21 of the ICCPR).
20. See discussion infra Part III (considering the implications of international law on post-Arab Spring events in
Egypt).
21. See discussion infra Part IV (listing four recommendations for responding to Egypt's post-Arab Spring
violations of article 21 of the ICCPR).
22. Mubarak Resigns, supra note 6 (discussing the reaction to President Mubarak's departure from members of
the Egyptian political community, as well as from the protesters whose demonstrations had precipitated
Mubarak's resignation).
23. Kouddous, supra note 15.
24. See Stephanie McCrummen, Egyptian Assembly Rushes to Vote on New Constitution, WASH. POST (Nov.
29, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/amid-political-crisis-
egyptsconstitutional- assembly-prepares-to-vote-on-draft-document/2012/11/29/1aa3f2a2- 3a20-11e2-9258-
ac7c78d5c680_story.html (describing the push to adopt a new Constitution as President Morsi's government
attempted to transition to normal governance); Peter Beaumont, Mohamed Morsi Signs Egypt's New
Constitution Into Law, GUARDIAN (Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/ dec/26/mohamed-
morsi-egypt-constitution-law.
25. See Samantha Stainburn, Egypt Protest Restrictions: Rights Groups Criticize New DraftLaw, GLOBAL
POST (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middleeast/ egypt/130214/egypt-
protest-restrictions-rights-groups-criticize-ne (writing that the codified right to protest in Egypt's new 2012
Constitution was a great victory as it was previously not a right provided to the Egyptian people by law).
26. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 50, Nov. 29, 2012, as ratified Nov. 29, 2012,
translated in Nivien Saleh, The 2012 Constitution of Egypt, Translated by Nivien Saleh, with Index, NIVIEN
SALEH, http://niviensaleh.info/constitution-egypt-2012-translation/#ch-two-2 (last visited May 2, 2014).
27. Id. (stating only that the right to protest "requires a notification as stipulated by law," leaving the details to be
decided upon by parliament).
28. See New Egyptian Protest Law, supra note 11 (showing the excessive limitations on protests through a long
prior notice requirement as well as prohibitive restrictions on the demonstrations' movement); see also Hend

Kortam, EIPR Rejects Limitations on Right to Protest, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (May 3, 2013), available at
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/05/03/eipr-rejects-limitationson- right-to-protest/ (writing that the human
rights organization Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) rejected the substance and the philosophy
behind the new protest law, arguing that "[p]rotests need protection, not legal limitations. What needs regulation
and legal limitations is the authority's intervention in peaceful gatherings").
29. Chaulia, supra note 17 (describing the turmoil in the immediate aftermath of Morsi's election in response to
his political maneuvers, "Morsi has unexpectedly ignited a war in domestic politics. His declaration on
November 22 arrogating extraordinary powers to the office of the president over the judiciary and other public
institutions blocking the revolution has triggered mass unrest across Egypt and kick-started a cycle of
confrontation and realignment among different political factions. Massive crowds hailing from different
ideological camps chanting, 'Morsi is the new Mubarak' . . . and that the 'revolution is incomplete' are
demonstrating that nothing is settled yet").
30. See Egypt's Tamarod Protest Movement, BBC (July 1 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
23131953 (describing the movement, Tamarod, as being motivated by concerns over Egypt's perceived
socioeconomic collapse during Morsi's presidency).
31. Id. (discussing the Tamarod's demands, and describing it as "a new grassroots protest movement in Egypt
that . . . was founded in late April by members of the Egyptian Movement for Change - better known by its
slogan Kefaya (Enough) - which pushed for political reform in Egypt under former president Hosni Mubarak in
2004 and 2005. Although Kefaya joined in the mass protests that forced him to resign in 2011, it did not play a
prominent role.").
32. Id. (describing the June 30, 2013 protest as having been attended by "millions of people" in Cairo and
elsewhere).
33. See Abigail Hauslohner et al., Egyptian Military Ousts Morsi, Suspends Constitution, WASH. POST (July 3,
2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013- 07-03/world/40336012_1_president-mohamed-morsi-
wednesday-night-morsi-rally (providing an in-depth timeline of events from the build-up before the military's
ouster of President Morsi and the detailed and quick succession of events after the military intervened on July 3,
2013); see also Sarah Lynch, Egyptians Celebrate in the Streets, but Instability Remains, USA TODAY (July 3,
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/07/03/egypt-morsi-deposedmilitary/ 2488057/
(elaborating on the emergency procedures established by the military following Morsi's sidelining).
34. See Warren Murray et al., Egyptian Military Government Declares Month- Long Emergency - As it
Happened, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/14/egypt-clear-cairo-
sitins-live (describing the brutal tactics utilized by the Egyptian military to clear out camps and other
demonstrations, leaving 278 PEOPLE DEAD ON ONE DAY).
35. ICCPR, supra note 5, at 171 (emphasis added to highlight elements of article 21 that will be expounded
upon for the purposes of this comment).
36. See Nowak, supra note 7, at 490 (contrasting article 21 to the limitation clauses in article 12 freedom of
movement, article 18 freedom of thought, and article 19 freedom of expression).
37. Id. (explaining that "interference with the rights set out in . . . [article 21] . . . must be not only necessary to
attain a certain purpose but also 'necessary in a democratic society'").
38. Id. (elaborating on the role of the United Nations in setting these principles, particularly inasmuch as they
should be devised in accord with the principles of the "the U.N. Charter, the [Universal Declaration of Human
Rights] and the two Covenants.")
39. Id. at 482 ("It has been generally recognized in human rights theory and case law in many countries that the
State is under a special duty of protection in the general interest of ensuring the functioning of a democratic
process of forming, expressing and implementing political opinions and decisions."). Cf. JACK L. GOLDSMITH
&ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 127, 131 (2006) (sparking a debate on the cost-

benefit analysis proposed by the authors regarding why states, both liberal-democratic and authoritarian, ratify
international treaties such as the ICCPR, concluding that "[f]or most states, the costs of ratifying the ICCPR are
low because" of a lack of enforcement mechanisms and thus authoritarian states that "do not generally act in
accordance with the treaty can ratify the treaty at little cost" in spite of its basis in democratic principles).
40. See Andreas Auprich, The Democratic Entitlement and the Militancy or Not of the Austrian Legal Order, in
THE 'MILITANT DEMOCRACY' PRINCIPLE IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 37, 38-39 (Marcus Thiel ed., 2009)
(indicating through a collection of several sources that "there is no universal democratic concept, as democracy
depends on particular sociocultural, structural and ethical preconditions").
41. See Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, in DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 48, 49-50 (Gregory H. Fox &Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) (defining
popular sovereignty as "the notion of citizen consent to the exercise of coercive power within a state," which
international law has modestly interpreted with a focus on the electoral process).
42. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 21 (stipulating that "[e]very citizen shall have the right and the opportunity . . . (b)
To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors"); see also Gregory H. Fox,
The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE L.J. 539, 552-53 (1992) (arguing that the right
to political participation is concrete, binding, and enforceable since it is derived from specific treaty language in
the ICCPR and other international treaties that set a minimum criteria for elections to be considered free and fair
- namely, that they be by universal, equal suffrage, by secret ballot, at reasonable and periodic intervals, and
not discriminatory against voters or candidates).
43. Cf. U.N. Secretary-General, Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Government to Promote
and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies, 29-30, U.N. Doc. A/52/513 (Oct. 21, 2997) [hereinafter U.N.
Efforts to Promote New Democracies] (acknowledging that while concentration on observing elections has been
the U.N.'s focus in reviewing a state's democratic process, moving forward "the observation of elections alone
will . . . not suffice as a yardstick for measuring democratization").
44. Compare ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 22 (enumerating language limiting restrictions on the freedom of
assembly such that "[n]o restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others"), with Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art
11(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 ("No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other
than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others."), and OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981), reprinted in 21
ILM 59 (1982) ("Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. The exercise of this right
shall be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by law in particular those enacted in the interest of
national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others.").
45. See Human Rights Committee Commc'n 412/1990, Kivenmaa v. Finland, 50th Sess., Mar. 31, 1994, U.N.
Doc. A/49/40, para. 9.2, available at
http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/1994.03.31_Kivenmaa_v_Finland. htm. (adjudicating a dispute
over whether a group of individuals qualifies as a demonstration versus an assembly for the purposes of article
21 of the ICCPR); see also Nowak, supra note 7, at 484-86 (clarifying the discussion and intent of the HRC in
word choice and comparing the language in the ICCPR to other international conventions, concluding "the type
of assembly has to do with the permissible or necessary measures for its protection or limitation").
46. H.R. Comm. Commc'n 412/1990, supra note 45.
47. Id. para. 2.1.

48. Id. paras. 2.1, 2.3 (focusing on the plaintiff's argument that "she did not organize a public meeting, but only
demonstrated her criticism of the alleged human rights violations by visiting head of State . . . amid a larger
crowd" in contrast to the state's argument that the plaintiff's group of twenty-five persons and their specific
behavior were "distinguishable from the crowd and could therefore be regarded as a public meeting [when] no
other group or subgroup which could be characterized as demonstrators, distributing leaflets or displaying
banners" like the plaintiffwere present).
49. Id. para. 9.2 ("Insofar as the State party contends that displaying a banner turns [the plaintiff's] presence into
a demonstration, the Committee notes that any restrictions upon the right to assemble must fall within the
limitation provisions of article 21 . . . . [T]he application of Finish legislation on demonstrations to such a
gathering cannot be considered as an application of a restriction permitted by article 21 of the Covenant.").
50. Id. para. 9.2. But see id. para. 2.5 (Herndl, J., dissenting) (questioning the seemingly contradictory logic that
if the gathering of people at the Presidential Palace for the purpose of publicly denouncing the presence of a
foreign head of state "does not constitute a demonstration, indeed a public gathering within the scope of article
21 of the Covenant, what else would constitute a 'peaceful assembly' in that sense?").
51. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 21.
52. Human Rights Committee Commc'n 574/1994, Kim v. Republic of Korea, 64th Sess., Nov. 3, 1998, U.N.
Doc. A/54/40, paras. 12.4-12.5, available at
http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/1998.11.03_Kim_v_Republic_of_ Korea.htm.
53. See id. paras. 12.4-12.5 (reasoning that in South Korea's case, national security was not a viable excuse for
quelling Kim's expression).
54. Id. para. 2.1 (bringing Kim's case forward as a freedom of expression case rather than a freedom of
assembly case as would seem more appropriate since passing out documents was a byproduct of his initial aim
of bringing together 4000 participants in an assembly).
55. Id. para. 2.3 (focusing the complaint on article 7, paragraphs 1 and 5 of the Republic of Korea's National
Security Law proving that "any person who assists an anti-State organization by praising or encouraging the
activities of this organization shall be punished" and that "any person who produces or distributes documents,
drawings or any other material(s) to the benefit of an anti-State organization, shall be punished").
56. Id. para. 3.3 (referring to the Comments of the HRC following South Korea's report on measures adopted
pursuant to being a new signatory of the ICCPR that "[a]lthough the particular situation in which the Republic of
Korea finds itself has implications on public order in the country, its influence ought not to be overestimated.
The Committee believes that ordinary laws and specifically applicable criminal laws should be sufficient to deal
with offences against national security").
57. Id. paras. 12.4-12.5 (stressing the importance of specificity in establishing domestic legal justifications for
state action in pursuit of national security interests, the court found that South Korea's National Security Law in
Kim included vague terms that allowed for broad interpretation).
58. Id. para. 12.4; see also Nowak, supra note 7, at 491-92 (concluding that "[a]s in comparable provisions of
the Covenant (Arts. 12, 13, 14, 19 and 22), restrictions on freedom of assembly to protect national security are
permissible only in serious cases of political or military threat to the entire nation").
59. H.R. Comm. Commc'n 412/1990, supra note 45, para. 8.3; Human Rights Committee Commc'n 1157/2003,
Coleman v. Australia, 87th Sess., Jul. 17, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/40, para. 7.3, available at
http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/2006.07.17_Coleman_v_Australia. htm (considering Australia's
notification requirement through a permit system where the Committee held that "[e]ven if a State party may
introduce a permit system aiming to strike a balance between an individual's freedom of speech and the general
interest in maintaining public order in a certain area, such a system must not operate in a way that is
incompatible with [the Covenant]").
60. See H.R. Comm. Commc'n 412/1990, supra note 45, para. 9.2 (emphasis added) (suggesting that the court

seems reluctant to offer a bright line rule of what is an acceptable amount of time to require notification prior to a
protest or demonstration, and that here even six hours was not definitively within acceptable time constraints).
61. See, e.g., id.
62. See Nowak, supra note 7, at 487-88 (clarifying that this positive duty is to ensure that the notification
requirement be utilized by the state to guarantee individuals are "protected against all kinds of interference with
the exercise of their freedom of assembly").
63. Id. at 486-87 (defining a peaceful protest as an assembly with the absence of violence and weapons and
evaluating peacefulness by focusing on the conduct of the protesters as opposed to the content of their
message).
64. Id. at 491 (expounding on what is meant by proportionality: "The prohibition and forceful breaking up of an
assembly may therefore ultima ratio come under consideration only when all milder means have failed. When
there is danger of clashes, the organizers of an assembly are primarily responsible for preventing disturbances.
. . Even the arrest of isolated, violent extremists may be a milder means than the collective prohibition of the
entire assembly").
65. H.R. Comm. Commc'n 1157/2003, supra note 59.
66. Id. para. 7.3.
67. Id. para. 2.1 (describing plaintiff's actions as an act of individual speech protesting government policy, which
was penalized as a violation of a public address ordinance).
68. Id.
69. Id. para. 7.3 (holding that such a serious response to a peaceful and undisruptive public address by one
man was incompatible with the ICCPR's intent).
70. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (listing the criteria for democracy as first, by universal, equal suffrage;
second, by secret ballot; third, at reasonable and periodic intervals; and fourth, not discriminatory against voters
or candidates).
71. See U.N. Efforts to Promote New Democracies, supra note 43, at 29-30 (explaining that even these
criteria is an insufficient "yardstick" for measuring democracy).
72. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH &POSNER, supra note 39, at 109 (explaining that both democratic and
authoritarian states sign on to the ICCPR because the cost of doing so outweighs the benefits even though
most democratic states naturally comply with most aspects of the ICCPR and most authoritarian states do not
always or even generally act in accordance with the ICCPR, at little cost).
73. Id. at 112 (arguing that human rights compliance is often based on cooperation and concern by one state for
another state's adherence to human rights norms).
74. Nowak, supra note 7, at 482, 488 (noting that this right requires "stiffer duties," such as providing access to
assembly rooms or police protection at events, which might not be necessarily feasible in a transitional state).
75. State of Emergency: What Does It Imply?, AHRAM (Aug. 14, 2013),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/79036/Egypt/Politics-/State-ofemergency- What-does-it-imply-
.aspx (explaining the impact of declaring a state of emergency on what the state is legally allowed to do for the
purposes of security including allowing the President or interim leader to arrest citizens without court order as
well as prohibiting public gatherings, restricting movement through curfews and other means, and increasing
surveillance on citizens).
76. See International Community Urges Egyptian Authorities to Respect Rule of Law and Human Rights, Amid
Mixed Reactions to President's Ouster, INT'L JUST. RES. CTR. (July 15, 2013), available at
http://www.ijrcenter.org/2013/07/15/ international-community-urges-egyptian-authorities-to-respect-rule-of-law-
andhuman- rights-amid-mixed-reactions-to-presidentsouster/# sthash.ApbrP8GN.2KDLG1Yp.dpbs [hereinafter
International Community Urges Respect Rule of Law and Human Rights].
77. African Union Communiqu, para. 6, July 5, 2013, PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXXIV), available at

http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ psc-384-com-egypt-05-07-2013.pdf ("[B]y the relevant AU instruments,
Council decides to suspend the participation of Egypt in the AU's activities until the restoration of constitutional
order.")
78. See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (noting that the HRC found that the restriction of freedoms for the purposes
of national security was not a sufficient reason to suspend the right to assemble, but failing to articulate a clear
standard for when such rights may be derogable).
79. See id.
80. See History of South Korea: The Transition, LIBR. CONGRESS, available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+kr0038%29 (last updated June 1990) (detailing the troubled history of
South Korea and its regime changes that precede the 1989 case).
81. See HEEMIN KIM, KOREAN DEMOCRACY IN TRANSITION: A RATIONAL BLUEPRINT FOR
DEVELOPMENT SOCIETIES (2011), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780813129952; see also Jerome
A. Cohen, Law in Political Transitions: Lessons from East Asia and the Road Ahead in China, N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
&POL. 423, 436-37 (2005).
82. H.R. Comm. Commc'n 574/1994, supra note 52, para. 3.3.
83. See H.R. Comm. Commc'n 412/1990, supra note 45, para. 9.2 (showing no bright line rule of what is an
acceptable amount of time to require notification prior to a protest or demonstration).
84. See New Egyptian Protest Law, supra note 11 (writing that the law dictates that protests cannot come within
200 meters of state buildings, government offices, ministry headquarters, and prisons while many of these
buildings are scattered all across major cities and are not always clearly distinguishable).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Stainburn, supra note 25 (articulating the concerns of the Association for Freedom of Thought and
Expression and Human Rights Watch; both organizations decry the law as "imposing restrictions on the right to
demonstrate" and as "designed to actually increase restrictions" on the right to assembly); Tom Perry &Paul
Taylor, Egyptian Cabinet Backs Bill on Protests Critics Cry Foul, REUTERS, Feb. 13, 2013, available at
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/ thomson-reuters/130213/egyptian-cabinet-backs-bill-protests-critics-
cry-foul (noting the concerns of Human Rights Watch and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights,
Michael Posner who called on Egypt to "respect international principles of free assembly and association and
the critical role civil society plays in any democratic society").
88. See discussion supra Part II.C.3 (determining that while a notification requirement can be legitimate
restriction to freedom of assembly, it is meant to be used in the state's positive duty in protecting its citizens'
right to freedom of assembly).
89. See Nowak, supra note 7, at 482 ("The controversy surrounding the legal formulation and practical
application of this important political liberty can be reduced to the following conflict: on the one hand,
assemblies are able to contribute to fortifying and maintaining democracy only when they are also, or primarily,
staged against the interests of State power holders (who altogether too often identify themselves with 'the
State'); on the other hand, effective exercise of critically oriented freedom of assembly is dependent on the
State's protection.").
90. See Murray et al., supra note 34 (adding that the international community argued that security forces should
be compelled to preserve the safety of protestors from attempts to attack them or disperse the demonstration or
transform it from being peaceful).
91. See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (showing that Egypt's membership to the ICCPR was not suspended).
92. See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (arguing that at least until Egypt declared a state of emergency, it was
bound by the ICCPR).
93. See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (comparing the situation in South Korea in the 1980s to Egypt in 2013 and

finding that given the strong similarities between the situations, and given that the HRC found that South Korea
was still bound under ICCPR article 21, Egypt is still similarly bound to protect the right to peaceful assembly).
94. See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the HRC's holding that South Korea's external security threat
from and volatile relationship with North Korea did not justify the charges brought against Kim).
95. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (stressing the unique language in article 21 as compared with other articles
in the ICCPR).
96. See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (acknowledging that while Kim was uniquely brought forward as a freedom
of expression case, the facts were much more in line with a freedom of assembly violation, the HRC's holding
on what national security interests justify a suppression of a democratic right is indicative of a more narrow
definition of actions that are truly dangerous the security of the state).
97. Nowak, supra note 7, at 491 (arguing that, in accordance with articles 12, 13, 14, 19, and 22, only situations
that threaten the whole nation, such as "a demonstration calling for violent overthrow of the government in an
atmosphere of political unrest or disseminating propaganda for war . . . may be prohibited by criminal law and
broken up").
98. See id. at 491 (clarifying that forceful breaking up of an assembly may be considered only when "all milder
means have failed"); see also Murray, supra note 34 (reporting on the events and aftermath of the Egyptian
military's declaration of emergency on the night August 14, 2013, and specifically focusing on suggestions that
protesters in Cairo and Port Said had breached the curfew, Egypt's vicepresident, Mohamed El-Baradei
resignation in protest against the crackdown with first seeking peaceful options for ending the political crisis, as
well as reports of dozens of bodies from witnesses at Rabaa al-Adawiya, photographs showing more than 40
dead laid out on the ground and reports of snipers firing on crowds of people despite the interior ministry denial
of the live rounds).
99. David Kirkpatrick, Hundreds Die as Egyptian Forces Attack Islamist Protestors, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/world/middleeast/egypt.html?_r=0 (reporting that the ferocity of the
military's response to pro-Morsi assemblies "far exceeded the Interior Ministry's promises of a gradual and
measured dispersal," which would have served as Egypt's milder means of breaking up assemblies as preferred
in ICCPR language).
100. See International Community Urges Respect Rule of Law and Human Rights, supra note 76 (citing Human
Rights Comm. Gen. Commt. 29, States of Emergency, art. 4, para. 2, Aug. 2, 2001, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11) (explaining that "[a]bsent the necessary declaration of a qualifying public
emergency, Egypt is obligated to respect and ensure all the rights enshrined in the ICCPR," and noting that the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has requested "'military and law enforcement officials to show utmost
restraint and make sure that they comply at all times with international human rights obligations and
international standards on policing, including the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the UN
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials'").
101. See Lally Weymouth, Rare Interview with Egyptian Gen. Abdel Fatah al- Sissi, WASH. POST (Aug. 3,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ middle_east/rare-interview-with-egyptian-gen-abdel-fatah-alsissi/
2013/08/03/a77eb37c-fbc4-11e2-a369-d1954abcb7e3_story.html (quoting the head of the Egyptian military
General Abdel Fatah al-Sissi as taking action to prevent civil war and had done so with a mandate from the
people of Egypt).
102. See Egyptians Rally in Huge Numbers as Violence Escalates, VOICE OF AM. (July 26, 2013),
http://www.voanews.com/content/egypts-morsi-detained-oncharges- of-conspiring-with-hamas/1710421.html
(reporting that videos showed Muslim Brotherhood supporters firing at other demonstrators who support the
military's actions and the interim government, and creating clashes that potentially rise to the level of
permissible military interference under the ICCPR).
103. See Cohen, supra note 81, at 436 (distinguishing China's potential modernization to meet international

legal standards from South Korea's exceptionally smooth transition into democracy after "rapid social,
economic, and educational progress" paved the way for political circumstances to lead to a democratic legal
system).
104. Without the tools of instant communication outside control of the state, the ability of the citizens to build
and organize a revolution grew much more rapidly in Egypt than it did in South Korea. See L. Gordon Crovitz,
Egypt's Revolution by Social Media: Facebook and Twitter let the people keep ahead of the regime, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 14, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703786804576137980252 177072
(highlighting the significance of social media in Egypt's quick political transition out of authoritarianism as well as
Egypt's poverty, education, and political realities).
105. Konrad G. Buhler, State Succession and Membership in International Organizations, LEGAL ASPECTS
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, Vol. 38, 164, (Martinus Nijhoff).
106. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 22, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1488, pmbl.
(stating that "the present convention applies to the effects of succession of States in respect to treaties between
States").
107. Id. at 1499.
108. In addition to state succession, two other international legal principles govern transitional states. First,
transitional justice deals with state's emerging from serious conflict and prescribes methods for addressing past
abuses. See Louis Bickford, Transitional Justice, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY 1045, 1045 (Dinah L. Shelton ed., 2004) (defining transitional justice as "a field of activity and
inquiry focused on how societies address legacies of past human rights abuses, mass atrocity, or other forms of
severe social trauma, including genocide or civil war, in order to build a more democratic, just or peaceful
future"). While there are elements of transitional justice that could and do apply to post-Arab Spring transitional
societies, with regard to specific countries such as Egypt, that did not experience serious civil conflict or war at
the inception of their transition (unlike Syria or Libya), this is not particularly pertinent. For countries like Egypt,
and South Korea in the late 1980s, the focus on a possible violation of article 21 of the ICCPR is not so much
toward the previous regime's accountability but rather the current and perhaps ever-changing regime's
accountability. Second, in further looking at conflict zones that are going through transition, reconstruction in
transition often relies on what the United Nations refers to as Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
("DDR") efforts. See Shana Tabak, False Dichotomies of Transitional Justice: Gender, Conflict and Combatants
in Columbia, 44 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. &POL. 104, 108 (2011) (distinguishing DDR as separate from transitional
justice in that it is concerned primarily with former combatants and security alone "whereas transitional justice
incorporates a wider spectrum of individuals, may take years to implement after conflict, and is concerned with
accountability, truth-seeking and redress for past wrongs"). However, since DDR is primarily concerned with
combatants and security imperatives, this theory again falls short of addressing the issues of something like a
right to freedom of assembly within a more stable and controlled transitional society where the government is
organically moving from authoritarianism to democracy.
109. See generally Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1990).
110. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 99 (reporting on brutal tactics used by military to quash pro-Morsi protests);
Sarah Leah Whitson, Letter to Egyptian Justice Minister on Demonstration Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 25,
2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/25/letter-egyptian-justice-ministerdemonstrations- law.
111. See New Egyptian Protest Law, supra note 11 (writing the rights groups' perspective that in addition to
obligating "demonstration organi[z]ers to give an official notice to the authorities about the time, route and
demands of any protest three days in advance," the protest law puts unrealistic restrictions by prohibiting the
route of protests and demonstrations to go near government buildings which are ubiquitous in Egypt's major
cities, especially Cairo).

112. Whitson, supra note 110 (arguing that Egypt has an obligation to confirm with the requirements of article
21 of the ICCPR by re-drafting the demonstration law to include protections for civilians and de-criminalizing the
right demonstrate).
113. See discussion supra Part III.B.1 (articulating that states may not impose undue restrictions on the right to
freedom of assembly).
114. Though it is conceded that there were violent pro-Morsi protests as well, the protests that are at issue for
the purposes of the ICCPR are the peaceful ones. See Liz Sly &Sharaf al-Hourani, Egypt Authorizes Use of
Live Ammunition Against Pro-Morsi Protesters, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/scores-dead-in-egypt-after-security-forceslaunch- assault-on-protesters-
camp/2013/08/15/563c95a0-0575-11e3-a07f- 49ddc7417125_story.html.
115. See Murray, note 34 (reporting on the Egyptian military's excessive use of force).
116. See ICCPR, supra note 5, pmbl.; H.R. Comm. Commc'n 574/1994, supra note 52, para. 12.4-12.6
(applying the same standard as other countries on South Korea regardless of its newly established democratic
transition and in spite of the fact that "the particular situation in which the Republic of Korea finds itself has
implications on public order in the country").
117. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition
of the Death Penalty, Dec. 15, 1989, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414, 414 (creating the HRC which has jurisdiction over
state parties to the ICCPR and allows individuals to bring complaints of violations to the Committee).
118. See H.R. Comm. Commc'n 574/1994, supra note 52, para. 3.3 (holding that by becoming a state party to
the Second Optional Protocol, Korea "has recognized the competence of the Committee to determine whether
there has been a violation of the Covenant or not and that, pursuant to article 2 of the Covenant, the state party
has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized
in the Covenant and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy"); see also H.R. Comm. Commc'n
412/1990, supra note 45, para. 9.1 (using similar language as Kim to establish jurisdiction over the case).
119. See GOLDSMITH &POSNER, supra note 39, at 131 (explaining why ratification of human rights treaties is
especially important for a state transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy in that not doing so "sends an
unambiguous and believable signal that it is not committed to human rights, and thus (perhaps) is not deserving
of collateral benefits that might flow to a human rights-respecting state, such as recognition and trade").
120. Id. (noting that the non-ratification is often "viewed as evidence of unreliability on the issue.").
121. See, e.g., Amro Hassad, Egypt's Morsi Stands Trial on Charges of Espionage and Terrorism, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 16, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/ 2014/feb/16/world/la-fg-wn-morsi-trial-20140216 (listing the charges
that Morsi is facing: Espionage, terrorism, and disclosing military secrets to a foreign state, and not mentioning
the protest law).
122. See discussion supra Part III.B.1 (comparing Egypt's restrictive protest law with that of Finland's as
considered by the HRC in Kivenmaa).
123. See Fady Ashraf, Constituent Assembly to Write New Constitution Moussa, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Oct. 2,
2013), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/10/02/ constituent-assembly-to-write-new-constitution-moussa/
(reporting that a committee originally tasked with amending the Constitution chose to write a new Constitution
because of the magnitude of changes originally proposed).
124. Compare H.R. Comm. Commc'n 412/1990, supra note 45, para. 9.2 (concluding that a six hour prior
notification requirement may be consistent with international legal right to freedom of assembly as enshrined
within article 21 of the ICCPR), with New Egyptian Protest Law, supra note 11 (reporting in March 2013 on the
protest law, which included a three day prior notice requirement as well as impracticable restrictions on the
location of demonstrations).
125. H.R. Comm. Commc'n 412/1990, supra note 45, para. 9.2.
126. See New Egyptian Protest Law, supra note 11 (reporting on concerns of the Independent Association for

Legal Support that the proposed demonstration law's requirement that protests remain at least 200 meters from
state buildings made it nearly impossible for protesters to be sure that they are not violating the protest
restrictions and giving ample opportunity for officials to prohibit a demonstration if they wanted).
127. See id.; see also discussion supra Part II.B.2.
128. See Nowak, supra note 7, at 487-88 (clarifying that a positive duty may be fulfilled through a notification
requirement to be utilized by the state in ensuring that demonstrations are protected against interference so
they may exercise their right to freedom of assembly).
129. See Gregg Carlstrom, Egypt Passes Law Restricting Public Protests, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 25, 2013),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/ egypt-passes-law-restricting-public-protests-
2013112413847867334.html.
130. See Kristen Chick, Twilight in Tahrir: Egypt Law Aims to Sharply Curb Protest, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/ World/Security-Watch/2013/1124/Twilight-in-Tahrir-
Egypt-law-aims-to-sharplycurb- protest (reporting that 20 Egyptian rights organizations issued a joint statement
warning that the law "would serve as the legal basis for the reestablishment of the police state seen in Egypt
prior to January 25, 2011, when numerous exceptional policies and laws had given free reign to the security
apparatus to violate the rights and freedoms of citizens in the name of 'countering terrorism'").
131. See Protest Law Bans Sit-ins, Allows Harsh Security Measures, MADA MASR (Oct. 17, 2013),
http://www.madamasr.com/content/protest-law-bans-sitins- allows-harsh-security-measures (reporting that
security forces are required to disperse demonstrations that violate the detailed restrictions by firing water
cannons, tear gas, beating protesters with batons and "if required for legitimate self-defense and protection of
assets, more force would be authorized").
132. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013: EGYPT (Jan. 2013), available at
http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/egypt (noting the increase of laws that restrict freedom
of expression from the Mubarakera, as well as the continued application of "the repressive Mubarak-era law 84
on associations").
133. See, e.g., Tunisia's Tamarod Steps Up Campaign to Dissolve Parliament, EGYPT INDEP. (July 14, 2013),
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/tunisia-stamarod- steps-campaign-dissolve-parliament (reporting on a
copycat Tamarod (rebel) campaign gaining traction in Tunisia, and noting the "strong ties" between Egypt and
Tunisia).
AuthorAffiliation
TARA VASSEFI*
* Tara Vassefiis a 2016 J.D. candidate at the American University Washington College of Law. Prior
publications include Perceptions of the 'Arab Spring' Within the Jihadi Movement, in STUDIES IN CONFLICT
AND TERRORISM, The Forgotten History of Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations, in the YALE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, A New Middle East: The Weakening of the Nation-State, in the DIPLOMATIC
COURIER, and Somalia's Drought, America's Dilemma, in THE ATLANTIC. She would like to thank her dear
mentor Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Professor Shana Tabak for their invaluable help and expertise.
Subject: International law; Freedom of assembly; Violations; Democracy; Studies;
Location: Egypt
Classification: 9130: Experiment/theoretical treatment; 9177: Africa; 4300: Law; 1210: Politics & political
behavior
Publication title: American University International Law Review
Volume: 29

Issue: 5
Pages: 1097-1128
Number of pages: 32
Year: 2014
Publisher: American University
Publication subject: Law--International Law
ISSN: 1520460X
Copyright: Copyright American University 2014
_______________________________________________________________
Document 18 of 20
You Say You Want a Revolution: the Arab Spring, Norm Diffusion, and the Human Rights Regime
Author: Harrelson-stephens, Julie; Callaway, Rhonda L
Abstract:
We discuss how the Arab Spring is a reflection of the resiliency of the human rights regime. In order to
accomplish this, we explore the extent to which the Arab Spring represents norm diffusion among Middle East
and North Africa (MEAN) states. Specifically, we examine the cases of Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain and
consider how economic and demographic changes created space for human rights discourse in these
countries. We find that, in the case of MEAN states, the Arab Spring represents significant pressure from below.
Access to new forms of social media allowed civil society to organize, publicize, and protest relatively efficiently.
Social media expanded the potential role of individuals and created newly empowered latent human rights
activists who emerged as leaders of the norm diffusion process. The resulting diffusion of human rights norms in
the Arab region represents one of the most significant expansions of the human rights regime since the
regime's inception.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

Full text:
Hum Rights Rev (2014) 15:413431
DOI 10.1007/s12142-014-0315-5
Julie Harrelson-Stephens &Rhonda L. Callaway
Published online: 16 April 2014# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
Abstract We discuss how the Arab Spring is a reflection of the resiliency of the human rights regime. In order to
accomplish this, we explore the extent to which the Arab Spring represents norm diffusion among Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) states. Specifically, we examine the cases of Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain and
consider how economic and demographic changes created space for human rights discourse in these
countries. We find that, in the case of MENA states, the Arab Spring represents significant pressure from below.
Access to new forms of social media allowed civil society to organize, publicize, and protest relatively efficiently.
Social media expanded the potential role of individuals and created newly empowered latent human rights
activists who emerged as leaders of the norm diffusion process. The resulting diffusion of human rights norms in
the Arab region represents one of the most significant expansions of the human rights regime since the regimes
inception.
Keywords Arab Spring . Norm diffusion . Human rights regime . Social media . Constructivism
J. Harrelson-Stephens (*)
Department of Political Science, Stephen F. Austin State University, Box 13045 SFA Station, LAN Room 108,
Nacogdoches, TX 75962, USAe-mail: harrelsoj@sfasu.edu
R. L. Callaway
Department of Political Science, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Sam Houston State University,
Box 2149, Huntsville, TX 77341, USAe-mail: rhonda.callaway@shsu.edu
You Say You Want a Revolution: the Arab Spring, Norm Diffusion, and the Human Rights Regime
414 J. Harrelson-Stephens, R.L. Callaway
Ash-sha b yurid isqat an-nizamThe people want to bring down the regime1
Introduction
The spark for the Arab Spring began on December 17, 2010 when Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself in
protest against the harsh treatment by local officials in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. At 26, Bouazizi became the symbol
of dissatisfaction with the government of Tunisia and, subsequently, the governments in the surrounding Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) states. A street vendor operating without official authorization, Bouazizis act
encapsulated the increasing sense of hopelessness and frustration. The actions of Bouazizi resonated
throughout the region as well as the world, since his gesture was intimately tied to a philosophy of life: that of
dignity, freedom, humanism, and human rights, aspirations that have fueled the Tunisian peoples hope and
moved them to produce a new moment of history (Jdey 2012,p. 71). That bold act of a single individual resisting
state corruption soon hit social media and the Arab Spring was born.
The events of the Arab Spring in 2011 seemed to portend a new era in the Arab world. A few years later, what
that era looks like remains unclear. The reaction of states within the region run the gamut, from what appears to
be the best hope for some lasting movement toward liberalization (in Tunisia), to countries that experienced a
complete breakdown (in Syria), and other countries which have still not emerged from winter (in Saudi Arabia).
This is not particularly different from the last region that attempted to transition to democracy and respect for
human rights. In Eastern Europe, responses ranged from a velvet divorce between Slovakia and the Czech
Republic, to complete breakdown in the former Yugoslavia, to peoples such as the Chechens who were entirely
left out of any movement toward democracy. As with Eastern Europe, the MENA states have already witnessed
reactionary forces attempting to turn back the revolutions, with backsliding occurring in a number of states.
While there is already a plethora of research focused on identifying the causes and likely consequences of the
Arab Spring2, we address both the literature on the overall efficacy of regimes and norm diffusion. We contend

that the Arab Spring represents a significant expansion of the human rights regime to a region of the world that
had, thus far, rejected Western notions of human rights. In order to accomplish this, we examine the extent to
which the Arab Spring represents norm diffusion among MENA states. Previous literature on human rights norm
diffusion has suggested that transnational advocacy networks pressure states from above and below to change
their behavior (Keck and Sikkink 1998). We find that, in the case of MENA states, the Arab Spring represents
significant pressure from below. The expansion of the regime was
1 Quote is from Egypt protests: An Arab Spring as Old Order Crumbles, BBC News, February 2, 2011 cited in
Salih (2013, p. 203).
2 For a complete discussion of the causes of the Arab Spring, see Abdelali (2013), Anderson (2011), Goldstone
(2011), and Salih (2013). For commentary and reflections on the Arab Spring, see Bishku (2013), Clark (2013),
Davenport and Moore (2012), Haseeb (2012), Klug (2012), Owen (2012), Sale (2012), and Sawani (2012).
The Arab Spring, Norm Diffusion, and the Human Rights Regime 415
accomplished within the societies themselves led by newly empowered latent human rights activists. Social
media helped facilitate the creation of this new type of activist that empowers individuals, at unprecedented
levels, in their challenge to the state. The resulting diffusion of human rights norms in the Arab region
represents one of the most significant expansions of the human rights regime since its inception.
Unlike a security regime based on power or a trade regime based on shared interests, the human rights regime
is an expression of values about how states should treat their citizens. The importance of the human rights
regime stems from an identity of liberal states (Risse and Sikkink 1999; Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway
2009) which is conferred international legitimacy. The emergence and resilience of the human rights regime is
better explained by the constructive paradigm as an ideational regime (Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway
2009). Thus, we utilize a constructivist lens in our examination of the relationship between the human rights
regime and the Arab Spring. There is an extensive body of literature, situated within the constructive paradigm,
that emphasizes norms, ideas, and identities that are viewed as legitimate by the international community. This
literature focuses on norms, norm development, and how norms make a difference in politics (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998, 888) or influences state behavior (Risse et al. 1999). More specifically, scholars examine the role
of transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Welch 2001; Price 2003; Piper and Uhlin 2009;
Carpenter 2007; Pieck 2013) and social movements (Tilly 1984; Brysk 1993; Stammers 1999, 2009; Khagram
et al. 2002; Tarrow 2005; Bob 2009), intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations
(Korey 1998; Lai 2011; Murdie and Davis 2012; Bassano 2014), and individuals, activists, and norm
entrepreneurs (Friedman 2012; Landy 2013; Press 2013; Song 2013) in developing and spreading the norms,
rules, and decision-making procedures associated with the human rights regime.
We begin by focusing on norm diffusion and how it occurs, paying particular attention to how social media has
expanded the potential role of individuals. Next, we examine the changes in MENA states that provide the
backdrop for widespread acceptance of new norms in the region. In this section, we utilize three cases, Tunisia,
Egypt, and Bahrain, to assess how changes in demographics and economics in each country facilitated
changing expectations about the role of the state. Moreover, access to new forms of social media allowed civil
society to organize, publicize, and protest relatively efficiently. We pay particular attention to how the use of
social media expands the way we conceptualize norm development. Finally, we explore the increased
acceptance of human rights norms among these states. Changes in the fundamental idea of the social contract
between MENA states and their citizens facilitated a rather rapid dissemination of the values of individual rights.
We conclude with reflections on the importance of the expansion of the human rights regime into MENA states
for the resiliency future of the regime itself.
The Process of Norm Diffusion
Regimes include sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around
which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations (Krasner 1982, p. 186). Our focus

is on the norms that are
derived from the regimes principles. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude (Krasner 1982, p.
186) or as Keohane (1984, p. 58) suggests the purposes that the members [of the regime] are expected to
pursue. According to Katzenstein (1996, p. 5), norms refer to collective expectations for the proper behavior of
actors with a given identity, whereas Krasner (1982, p. 186) defines norms as standards of behavior defined in
terms of rights and obligations. Thus, the human rights regime is based on shared values and expectations with
regard to how a state must treat its citizens. The principles of the human rights regime focus on individual rights
that are inalienable, or not granted or denied based on the whim of the state. The norms that encompass such
individual rights include governments that do not violate the integrity of the person, that represent the will of the
people, and that provide some level of basic human needs. In this way, the human rights regime is the language
of the dispossessed. Human rights, as the language of the dispossessed, builds on Donnellys (2003)
possession paradox or the idea of having and not having a right at the same time. The reality of having human
rights, based on ones humanity, and simultaneously having those rights denied by a state leads to the ability to
claim rights, if necessary (Donnelly 2003, p. 9). The human rights regime facilitates discourse within civil society
and assists the dispossessed in the claiming of rights. The power of the human rights regime is that it gives a
voice to the people to counter the power of the state. Human rights fundamentally mean that there are limits to
state power and individuals have some intrinsic value in the world. Thus, the ability of the human rights regime
to give a voice to dispossessed populations from the most powerful states to the most remote regions of the
world is one of its critical attributes.
Our focus is on the events of the Arab Spring, specifically the extent to which the norm of individual rights,
particularly the integrity of the person, has diffused in MENA states. By norm diffusion, we refer to a process
where prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining non-
adopters (Strang 1991, p. 325). It is important to note that diffusion is a process, not an event, and as such we
expect the acceptance of human rights norms to exhibit ebbs and flows. Therefore, initial norm diffusion would
not imply complete norm acceptance (as is still the case in the countries with the strongest acceptance of
international human rights norms). Rather, the process of norm diffusion is likely to be uneven and marked by
periods of backsliding, particularly due to conservative elements in society still holding on to traditional values.
The most prevalent explanations for diffusion of human rights norms utilize the spiral model (Risse et al. 1999).
The spiral model suggests norm diffusions occur through five stages: repression, denial, tactical concessions,
internalization, and finally, rule consistent behavior. For Risse and Sikkink (1999), the diffusion of human rights
norms depends, most crucially, on the development of transnational advocacy networks. These networks work
in two ways: mobilizing domestic groups from below and putting the norm-violating state on the international
agenda to create pressure from above. In the case of the human rights regime, non-state actors are often
critical players in both spotlighting cheaters via naming and shaming and norm development. These actors
include international NGOs, such as Amnesty International, along with numerous grassroots organizations that
emerge in response to state repression.
Norm diffusion, then, is the process by which a wide range of actors create pressure for norm adoption within
the country and generate global pressure for change. In terms
of human rights, the dual pressures are particularly important since states have little incentive to change their
behavior. As technology has empowered individuals, the role of civil society has become critical in articulating
values of the human rights regime. Today, individuals have an unprecedented ability to claim their rights,
spotlight repressive states, and organize society against human rights violations. Even in the most remote areas
of the globe, individuals carry cell phones with video cameras and access to the Internet, making it much more
difficult for states to sweep repression under the rug. In the last decade, the role of the individual has been

further buttressed by the rise of social media. With social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter,
individuals have additional tools to help them organize local protests and even generate global opposition to a
states treatment of its citizen. Social media facilitate expressions of solidarity, rapid dissemination of
information, and diffusion of norms across borders and even across oceans.
The availability and mobility of social media and the Internet have enabled the emergence of a new type of
actor, the latent human rights activist.3 Latent human rights activists are empowered by technology and
emboldened by social networks that help inform and inspire civil society. These individuals engage in what they
perceive to be relatively passive means of resistance, such as posting to social media outlets: resistance that
then takes on a life of its own. Latent human rights activists work alongside norm entrepreneurs, and the
prevalence of social media acts as a multiplier, empowering large segments of the population that had
previously been disengaged. Unlike activists of the past, latent activists do not see themselves as political
activists initially, but are galvanized by social media and political events and empowered to participate by
modern technology. As such, they not only eventually engage in human rights activism, but become part of the
enforcement mechanism, with the push of a button on their mobile phone. Mobile Internet access does not give
individuals an advantage over the state, per se, but instead acts as an equalizer in the struggle over both
organization and messaging.
Social media and latent human rights activists interact with civil society in unprecedented ways to frame public
opinion of new norms. Social media can help shape public opinion in critical ways, as opinions are first
transmitted by the media, and then they get echoed by friends, family members, and colleagues. It is in this
second, social step that political opinions are formed. This is the step in which the Internet in general, and social
media in particular, can make a difference (Shirky 2011, p. 5). Further, Halverson et al. (2013) suggests that
social media facilitates social bonds between individuals, ideas, and movements; bonds that are important to
the revolutions in question. Thus, social media can help inform and solidify public opinion and can aid in
expressions of solidarity across borders.
Existing theories, then, suggest that norm diffusion occurs when pressures from above and pressures from
below empower domestic groups and social acceptability
3 The latent human rights activist is not to be confused with the norm entrepreneur introduced by Finnemore
and Sikkink (1998). They discuss the role of a norm entrepreneur in the first stage of the life cycle of norm
influence. Specifically, norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to
embrace new norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 895). In the human rights case, norm entrepreneurs
would be those in society actively engaged in human rights activism in what the authors refer to as a two-level
norm game hoping to either use international norms to strengthen domestic norms or attempt to internationalize
domestic norms. The latent human rights activist is not the vanguard of human rights in their society, rather, a
by-stander who becomes an activist quite by accident.
shifts in favor of the norm. While Risse and Sikkinks (1999) model is useful in examining states that are
attempting to play within the rules of the game, dissatisfied states that eschew the current system likely operate
differently. In particular, constructivist theory suggests that human rights norm diffusion is aided by an identity of
liberal states. States, based on concerns of reputation and legitimacy, seek to be included as a liberal state.
However, Arab states have a competing identity that is based, in part, on a rejection of the West and its values.
Like other cultural values, Islamic identity is strongly held among Arab states, particularly as it is tied to deeply
held religious convictions. We hypothesize that this alternative identity significantly alters the way norm diffusion
will occur in Arab states. The Islamic identity, which rejects Western values, means that pressure from above is
likely to be ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. Moreover, social media creates a new source of
power from below that increases the potency of domestic actors. Therefore, we expect domestic factors to lead
the way in any expansion of the human rights regime into Arab states. Ultimately, norm diffusion can best be

described as a situation where
the burden of proof changes over time as a function of social acceptance. When considering a radical policy
innovation, the burden of proof rests on its advocates, but when it becomes widely acceptance, it is the
opponents of the policy who have to make their case compellingly in order to prevent its adoption (Gilardi 2014,
p. 2).
Thus, norm diffusion occurs when the burden of proof shifts from those advocating human rights to the state
attempting to defend repression. Next, we turn our attention to the Arab Spring as a case of norm diffusion.
The Arab Spring as a Catalyst for Norm Diffusion
The human rights regime emerged at the end of World War II and began to be accepted throughout much of the
world, most notably in Western states. The strongest norm of the regime remains the protection of security
rights, that is, the right not to be tortured, disappeared, or murdered by the state (Donnelly 2003; Harrelson-
Stephens and Callaway 2009). The MENA region has long been an exception, rejecting the security rights norm
as a Western value and one that Western countries frequently violate. A little more than a decade ago, Donnelly
concluded that among Arab states, there was no basis for even the weakest of regional regimes, which is not
surprising given the generally dismal state of national human rights practices in the region (Donnelly 2003,p.
145). Likewise, Forsythe argued that attention to human rights among Arab states was so negligible that it did
not warrant attention in his treatment of human rights norms (Forsythe 2000, p. 135). Islamic values are closely
intertwined with Islam. In theory, the Quran promotes a wide range of human rights; however, in practice, Islam
has embraced strong state sanctions against religious crimes and widespread discrimination against women.
Human rights activists in Arab countries often find themselves torn between supporting individual rights and
necessarily condemning the values of the West. The identity of liberal states, created by the West, is in direct
conflict with Islamic identity. While human rights values have spread in some regions of the world,
wholesale rejection of those values by many Arab and Asian states has meant that universality of the human
rights regime has proven elusive to date (Halliday 1995; Rishmawi 2005; Vitkauskaite-Meurice 2010).4 The
abysmal outlook for human rights norms in Arab states just a few years ago makes claims of human rights
among citizens in the Arab Spring all the more remarkable.
State Repression
Given the regions rejection of human rights, it is not surprising that MENA countries tended to be characterized
by a wide range of human rights violations ranging from a lack of political rights, violations of basic human
needs resulting from state neglect and mismanagement, to gross human rights violations involving torture,
disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. It was common for these authoritative regimes to effectively enervate
civil society by controlling nearly every aspect of political life from political parties to the election process,
including outlawing opposition parties. The abuse of personal integrity rights generally came at the hands of
either the military or state police. Strong militaries in many of these states were viewed as necessary; for
example, in times of trouble, the state would declare martial law and use the military to regain order. According
to Salih (2013, p. 187), MENA states were known to exploit declared states of emergency and laws which
purport to fight terrorism to justify their major crimes against their own citizens, including abduction, involuntary
disappearances, unwarranted arrest, torture, and unfair trials, and even unlawful killings.
In Tunisia, President Ben Alis regime had long kept tight restrictions on personal freedoms, particularly the
freedom of expression and the ability to form political parties (Anderson 2011; El-Khawas 2012). Prior to the
economic downturn, protests against the regime generally emanated from the interior region, in what is referred
to as the central-west, the southwest, the high steppes, or the central plateau (Jdey 2012,p. 71). The citizens of
this region regularly protested against centralization of power under colonial rule and then against the Tunisian
governments under Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Consequently, the government silenced protesters in this
region and across the state by arresting party opposition and human rights leaders (El-Khawas 2012; Black

2010; Amnesty International 2010) and by dominating political institutions within Tunisian society to the extent
that the profounder meaning of such concepts as human rights, freedom, and democracy was trampled (Jdey
2012,p. 75). For example, opposition leader Ali Ben Salem, founding member of the Association for the Fight
against Torture in Tunisia, suffered from poor health as a result of being tortured in policy custody; he also
endured continued surveillance by the states security agents (Amnesty International 2010).
4 Cultural relativism has long stood in the path of the realization of universal human rights across the globe. The
economic miracle associated with the Asian Tigers was the result of Asian Values, according to state leaders
such as Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, Jiang Zemin of China, and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore. These leaders
challenged the universality of human rights, specifically the emphasis on individual political rights over that of
the social and economic welfare of the state. Likewise, Islamic states contest that the universality of human
rights is a Western construct and argue that Islamic values take precedence. While the Arab Charter on Human
Rights went into force in 2008, the text of the document has raised repeated doubts on the commitment of the
Arab states to the universality of Human Rights (Vitkauskaite-Meurice 2010, p. 166).
The backlash against the states was further aggravated by the release of Wikileak documents. Tunisians
realized that corruption and nepotism in Tunisia ran deeper than any had imagined when those documents
revealed that more than half of Tunisias commercial elites were personally related to Ben Ali through his three
adult children, seven siblings, and second wifes ten brothers and sisters (Anderson 2011, pp. 27).5 This
combined with state repression, high unemployment, an educated youth, and a vibrant labor movement created
a perfect storm that was unleashed when Mohamed Bouazizis ultimate act of despair and defiance was
broadcast across the state. This time, the protests in the interior regions were accompanied by protesters,
primarily young, educated, and technologically savvy Tunisians, in the urban and coastal areas, all calling for
political and economic reforms.
Similarly, the Egyptians had their own martyr in Khalid Said, who became the face of state repression. Said was
arrested and died suspiciously in police custody in June 2010. His disfigured corpse was immortalized by social
media and his story became the focus of the We are all Khaled Said Facebook page. Thus, on the heels of the
protests in Tunisia, Egyptians began to take to the streets demanding a reassessment of their own social
contract. Like most MENA states, the Egyptian social contract meant that citizens exchanged political freedom
and an implicit acceptance of the military regime for the provision of social welfare goods such as petrol,
electricity, and groceries (Bishku 2013; Clark 2013; Goldstone 2011; Shehata 2011). The economic downturn of
the 1990s led to the Egyptian states inability to pay for the increasing costs of these social services. Only a few
segments of society were unaffected: the business aristocracy, Mubaraks family, and the Egyptian military. The
military played a significant and unique role in Mubaraks regime in that military elites were inextricably tied to
state governance as well as the states economy (Anderson 2011). 6 Those who were marginalized (factory
workers, peasants, government works, and increasingly young college graduates) were left with little recourse
as political parties had been banned since Nassar struck the welfare bargain in the 1950s and 1960s (Shehata
2011).
Fawzy (2012, p. 58) contends that the events that occurred on January 25th were a direct reaction towards the
lack of justice and human rights violations. The widespread abuse of ordinary citizens provided an environment
conducive to wider public participation in anti-regime demonstrations. Faced with increasing pressure from the
protest movements and the polices inability to effectively deal with the uprising, President Mubarak asked the
military, long an ally to the regime, to intervene. While troops were sent to the scene, their refusal to engage the
protestors on January 28th was the breaking point for the Mubarak regime. On February 11th, Mubarak
resigned his presidency as millions chanted isqat al-nizam, that is, the fall of the regime (Shehata 2011, p. 26).
In Bahrain, state repression often fell along ethnic fault lines. Thus, tension between the majority Shia and the
ruling Sunni minority underscored the revolution there. Sunnis comprise 30 % of the population in Bahrain

compared to the Shia population at 70 %. Similar to other dynastic regimes, the al-Kahlifa royal family and the
ruling class repress and discriminate against the Shia population in order to maintain power. Over the years, the
complaints by the Shia regarding discrimination in housing and
5 Also see El-Khawas (2012), Saideman (2012), and Border (2010) for a discussion on nepotism in Tunisia.
6 Harb (2003) notes that military officers held large agricultural interest and significant corporate holdings in
diverse economic sectors all in an exchange for the armys support of Mubaraks ruling party.
educational opportunities, higher levels of unemployment, and the lack of political representation led to protests
that were quickly and effectively repressed by the state (Bishku 2013; Nepstad 2013; DeVriese 2013). The
arrival of the Arab Spring renewed these traditional protests as well as inflamed new ones as citizens
demanded an end to torture, the release of political prisoners, genuinely free elections, and a representative
consultative council (Nepstad 2013, p. 343). Consequently, 30 people were killed and hundreds of other pro-
democracy protesters, including a human rights lawyer, have been detained. Members of the press were also
targeted; prominent blogger Zakariya Rashid Hassan al-Ashiri and publisher Karim Fakhrawiboth both died in
custody under mysterious circumstances (Global Voices Advocacy 2011).
Occupying the Pearl Roundabout, the Bahraini people initially called for political and judicial reform; however,
the brutal response by security forces soon changed the focus to human rights and impelled many among them
to shift to the more radical slogan of bringing down the regime used to great effect elsewhere during the Arab
Spring (Haseeb 2012, p. 189). The protests swelled to include over 100,000 people, constituting 10 % of the
total population, by far the largest percentage of participation in any of the revolutions. Ironically, the
government crackdown served to radicalize the movement and rather than calling for reforms, the protesters
sought an end to the Khalifa regime (Nepstad 2013; Gelvin 2012). Sensing that the domestic forces could not
contain the protest movement, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (hereafter GCC) intervened with
military force to protect the royal family. Martial law was declared on March 16, 2011 with Saudi and UAE troops
assigned to do the heavy lifting, while the Bahraini army tore down the Pearl Monument to erase the memory of
political dissent.7
Economic and Demographic Changes
While repression by MENA governments was nothing new, historically, the leaders were able to pacify the
citizenry through the use of the welfare state. Citizens have long engaged in tacit consent of a tradeoff: state
repression in exchange for social benefits from their governments. Thus, the acceptance of a human rights
norm was unlikely to occur absent the significant economic and demographic changes in the region. The oil-rich
MENA states ability to provide social goods became strained following years of fiscal mismanagement and
croynism. When combined with the global recession, this created a cadre of educated and unemployed citizens.
The economic recession was exacerbated by significant demographic changes across the MENA region. Youth
populations significantly increased, stretching the limited resources of the respective states. MENA youth were
also much more likely to be educated than previous generations. This youth bulge would be difficult to
accommodate in the best case, but providing social services to the growing number of younger citizens was
particularly problematic as economies in the region contracted.
The economic downturn hit the Tunisian population particularly hard, devastating the middle class, which
represents 50 % of the Tunisian population (Haseeb 2012). Bouazizis self-immolation suggests that it was
economic demands, not calls for freedom, that initially sparked the revolution in Tunisia (El-Khawas 2012, p. 8).
In
7 For a complete explication of the role of the GCC, Saudi Arabia, and the USA in responding to the revolution
in Bahrain, see Mitchell (2012) and Zunes (2013).
fact, Goldstone (2011, p. 3) argues that if the entire population grows rapidly while the lions share of economic

gains is hoarded by the elite, inequality and unemployment surges as well. As the costs of subsidies and other
programs the regime used to appease citizens rise, keeping the masses depoliticized places even more stress
on the regime. Rising prices and a stagnate economy alone are not the engines of the protests, rather
widespread poverty by the masses juxtaposed against extravagant lifestyles of a few, fueled the revolution
(Goldstone 2011). Bouazizis actions came to symbolize the injustice of the economic inequality in Tunisia.
Moreover, like other MENA states, Tunisias youth population had swollen in recent years. In Tunisia, 40 % of
the population is less than 25 years of age (CIA World Factbook) representing a 50 % increase in the youth
population since 1990. This cohort of young, educated, yet unemployed citizens became the vanguard of the
revolution.
Egypt also experienced significant growth in the youth population (50 %) since 1990, with over one third of its
total population between the ages of 15 and 29 (Shehata 2011); further, this group was increasingly both
educated and likely to be unemployed. The economic disparities produced by the recession resulted in young
Egyptians with college degrees that were ten times more likely to be unemployed than older Egyptians with only
a primary school education (Goldstone 2011). Egypt faced the same youth bulge as other MENA countries, but
the sheer size of the Egyptian population makes the problem comparatively more difficult to manage.8 The lack
of economic opportunities in Egypt was compounded by the inability to effectively participate in politics; thus,
Egypts youth had little recourse to alleviate their plight. Egypt also faced the emergence of more radical groups
that were able to provide social welfare in place of the state. Groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Kefaya movement provided economic and political support to disenfranchised Egyptians long before the crisis
that began in 2011 (Shehata 2011). Thus, Egyptians view of their government as the key provider of social
goods had gradually eroded. Similar to the events in Tunisia, the Egyptian regime fell victim to a public wary of
the economic stagnation plaguing the country, an alienated and growing youth population, continued demands
for womens rights, questions about an aging dynastic regime fraught with a bloated and ineffective bureaucracy,
and finally, concern about who might succeed Mubarak (Shehata 2011; Fawzy 2012).
Bahrain developed a more diversified economy resulting in a fairly robust middle class that is more urban and
less tribal than its MENA counterparts (Zunes 2013).9 The average annual income in Bahrain in 2013 was
$29,200 compared to $6,700 in Egypt and $9,900 in Tunisia. Further, compared to Tunisia and Egypt, Bahrains
youth bulge was relatively modest (28 % aged 1529). However, the economic advantage of Bahrain is belied by
its increasingly non-national demographic profile. Bahrains population is comprised of foreign manual labor, with
Bahrainis only making up 46% of the population. Like many of their MENA counterparts, the current Bahraini
population enjoys relatively high levels of education, yet is frustrated by high levels of unemployment (Mitchell
2012; Zunes 2013; CIA World Factbook). One critical
8 The July 2013 estimate of the total population in Egypt tops 85 million, compared to almost 11 million in
Tunisia and 1.2 million in Bahrain (CIA World Factbook).
9 The urban population in Bahrain constitutes over 88 % of the total population, compared to 66 % in Tunisia
and 43 % in Egypt.
difference between Bahrain and most other MENA states is the GCC and, more specifically, Saudi Arabias
willingness to send significant financial aid as well as security forces to reinforce the Bahraini government. To
the extent that Bahrains government faced the difficulties maintaining past levels of social services, Saudi
Arabia stepped in to fill the gap. This aid gave Bahrain a lifeline, enabling them to raise wages during the crisis,
for example (El-Tablawy 2011).
Although MENA states had long rejected the values of the human rights regime, economic and demographic
changes created the backdrop for changes in norm acceptance in these states. The basic social contract of the
region was rejected when governments had a difficult time maintaining previous levels of social provisions. With
fewer social goods, the increasingly educated populations changed what they expected from their respective

governments. It is in this context that we begin to see norm diffusion in the region and unlike previous
expansions of the human rights regime, in this revolution, social media would empower the masses.
The Role of Social Media
The upswing in social media largely occurred in the youth bulge since people under 30 years old made up 70 %
of Facebook users in the MENA region (Joseph 2012). According to Internet World Stats, there were over 72
million Internet users in the Middle East making up about 33.5 % of the population (DeVriese 2013). Like
previous instances of self-immolation, Bouaziziz self-immolation was largely ignored by mainstream media in
Tunisia. What was different this time was the ability to circumvent traditional media with one driven by civil
society, in a country that had the highest rate of Internet access in all of North Africa (Ghitis 2011). The
cyberspace medium of choice in Tunisia was Facebook with over two million users as the events of the Arab
Spring unfolded in December 2010. This was a significant increase compared to the 28,000 Facebook users in
2008 when a similar protest was crushed by the Tunisian government (Khondker 2011). As Clark (2013, p. 46)
noted
[I]n the past the self-immolation of a protestor in modern secular Tunisia of all places would not have
reverberated around the region the way it did. This time, however, the act was captured on film and transmitted
almost instantaneously via the electronic social media, giving rise to an irrepressible feeling of revulsion and
anger that seemed to empower the people, particularly the media-savvy but unemployed youth, to overcome
their fear of authority to the extent that they were prepared to die rather than to submit again.
In what would become a model for protests across the region, social media took center stage in coordinating
protests and exposing state repression. Although the government maintained its tight control on traditional
media, #bouazizi, #tunisia, and #sidibouzid proliferated across Twitter, while the Facebook group Mr President,
Tunisians are setting themselves on fire went viral (Joseph 2012). A tweet from an Egyptian activist sums up
the role of social media, we use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell
the world (Global Voices Advocacy 2011).
In spite of the explosion of attention on social media, mainstream media did not start paying attention to Tunisia
until after Ben Ali fled the country (Joseph 2012). In
Tunisia, latent human rights activists engaged in political debate in the public arena such that cafes, and public
squares have become decidedly scenes of debates, meetings, and expressions of difference and of will,
through clothing, speeches, gestures, music, songs, cartoons, all of which are grounded in hopes for a better
tomorrow (Jdey 2012, p. 84). Demonstrators utilized all forms of social media to keep the uprising in the public
eye and succeeded especially in exposing the repressive measures of the police, including the deliberate killing
of young demonstrators, mass arrests, and collective punishment (Aleya-Sghaier (2012, p. 24). The demands of
the people were becoming more crystallized as the regime struggled to remain in power. Thus, citizens were
participating in both human rights activism and reporting on human rights violations to the world at large at the
same time.10
As with other movements, the Egyptian Spring was aided by social media outlets that helped organize and
mobilize protests. Ironically, Internet filtering had been largely absent in Egypt prior to the uprisings
(Karagiannopoulos 2012). As a result, Egyptians were no strangers to blogging and other forms of social media.
Within days of Tunisias ouster of its president, #jan25 began trending on Twitter signifying a day of protests in
Egypt (Joseph 2012). One Egyptian-born Google executive used his Facebook page, We are all Khaled Said to
help rally protestors, a page that had 350,000 members by January 14, 2011 (Khondker 2011). A series of
protests ultimately culminated in a massive rally in Tahrir Square. Traditional media, however, remained heavily
restricted during these events. Eventually, the government shut down the Internet, though by then the citizens
were already taking to the streets (Karagiannopoulos 2012; Joseph 2012). The continuing violence highlights
the stake the military has in Egyptian politics and governance and calls into question the future of democratic

reform and respect for human rights in general.
Moreover, the movement in Egypt is particularly notable for the center stage women took in the revolution.
Womens organizations in Egypt focused on ending poverty, which was viewed as the core cause of inequality in
the country. Egypts Arab Spring saw women taking to the streets demanding economic and political rights and
calling for greater representation in society. Women in Egypt were active agents of social change as they
protested against the states inability to provide adequate social services and the repression meted out by the
authoritarian regime. Like their male counterparts, Egyptian women took to social media in order to name and
shame. Asmaa Mahfouzs YouTube video, Esraa Abdel Fattahs Facebook page, the April 6 Movement, and
Mona Eltahawys Twitter activity exemplify how women are participating in cyber-civil society11 as part of the
antigovernment protests in Egypt (Radsch 2012).
As one of the wealthier states in the region, Bahrainis enjoyed both Internet and mobile phone access. Access
to media, combined with a highly educated youth, created an active blogosphere and cyberspace in Bahrain
with approximately 53.5 % of the population active online. Facebook users in the Gulf Region doubled from 11.9
million to 21.3 million in 2010 alone. All of this activity enlarged the public sphere and provided an alternative
arena for public debate (DeVriese 2013, pp. 115, 121123). Similar to Egyptian bloggers, Bahrainis took the
blogosphere as early as 2004 and were key oppositional actors vis--vis the government. When the Arab Spring
arrived on the
10 See El-Khawas (2012) for additional discussion of Tunisians use of social media during the protests.
11 The term cyber-civil society is utilized by Khondker (2011) in describing the emergence of online protests in
Egypt.
peninsula, Bahrainis employed Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, particularly in response to the government
crackdown after the occupation of the Pearl Roundabout in February 2011.12 The Bahrain government was the
most active and perhaps creative in responding to cyber activism, utilizing Facebook and Twitter themselves to
post most-wanted lists. An undercover film crew produced a documentary, Bahrain: Shouting in the Dark, that
chronicles the brutality meted out by government forces as well as the use of the Internet by the government in
what amounted to virtual lynch mobs (Dewey et al. 2012, p. 22).13
The nature and likely success of these revolutions represent distinct realities in each of these countries. Egypts
strong military and the populations faith in that military stand in stark contrast to the outside intervention used to
repress the revolution in Bahrain. Likewise, the secular nature of the Tunisian government and the relative
degree of womens rights in that state set Tunisia apart from its MENA counterparts. Nonetheless, common
demographic and economic features set the stage for revolution across the region. More importantly for this
research, activists across the region moved beyond mere economic demands and utilized the language of
human rights in their calls for political reform. Thus, we turn our attention to the implications for the human rights
regime.
Expanding the Human Rights Regime
The Arab Spring can be viewed as evidence that the human rights regime continues to strengthen and gain
greater acceptance in the world. MENA states have long questioned the applicability of Western values to their
countries, often viewing international human rights as an imperialistic expression of US power, rather than a
universal individual endowment. Since the strength of the human rights regime stems from its values and ideas,
the acceptance of those ideas in a region of the world that had largely rejected the Western idea of human
rights is particularly noteworthy. Acceptance of human rights is not unanimous in these countries, but neither is
it unanimous in Western countries. Movements towards greater levels of human rights were met with
reactionary movements against any fundamental changes. Response to the pressure generated from societies
during the Arab Spring was varied, ranging from increased repression, to revolutionary overthrow of the existing
government, to complete breakdown of the state. In the three cases we examine, the Arab Spring and state

reaction also exhibited a good deal of variance. In Bahrain, domestic pressure was met with increased
repression supported by outside forces including Saudi Arabia. That state remains in what the spiral model
identifies as the first stage: repression. The Bahraini people took to the streets to mark the 2-year anniversary of
its Arab Spring, only to be met again with brutal repression from the state (Nyathi 2013). Egypts and Tunisias
Spring appear to be in the third phase of the spiral model: tactical concessions, which involves bargaining with
the opposition and talking the talk of human rights (Risse
12 Bahrain: Terror as Protesters Shot by The Guardian became a depository for Twitter and YouTube postings
regarding the events in Bahrain in general and the crackdown at the Pearl Roundabout more specifically.
13 One target of the Bahraini government was Ayat al-Qurmezi, a 20 year-old girl who had participated in
protests at Pearl Roundabout. The page garnered hundreds of defamatory posts calling for her arrest, torture,
and death. Ayat was later captured, and, after three months of torture, appeared on state TV to apologize for
her actions (Bahrain: Shouting in the Dark cited in Dewey et al. 2012).
and Sikkink 1999). In both Egypt and Tunisia, tactical concessions were offered, not to appease international
forces or gain international aid, but to try to forestall the revolution. We should note that state repression in
response to human rights demands does not undermine the important point here, which is that during the Arab
Spring, people across the region embraced widespread acceptance of the idea of human rights.
This acceptance is even more remarkable when we consider that the Western identity of liberal states conflicts
with the identity of Islam. Although the Quran creates a basis for universal human rights, human rights
advocates have a difficult time reconciling the repressive nature of many MENA states with the teachings of
Islam. Western conception of human rights faced serious hurdles in MENA states, as long held issues of identity
are contested. It is not surprising, from a constructivist point of view, that the human rights discourse that came
to define the Arab Spring was driven by forces within society rather than by international organization or NGOs.
However, with the Arab Spring, we see the first significant signs that the norms of the human rights regime have
been assimilated by significant parts of Arab society as citizens demanded their states respect individual human
rights. The widespread use of the language of human rights in the Arab Spring movement represents a
significant departure from the regions past identity with human rights.
Individuals across the Arab region who had been marginalized in their societies employed the language of
individual rights to demand change. For example, Ambassador Tacan Ildem (2012, p. 217), permanent
representative of Turkey to the OSCE, argued that the protests represented aspirations for the rule of law, good
governance, human rights, freedom, and democracy. Mohamed Bouazizis self-immolation represented a
desperate class of people long marginalized in Tunisia. In Egypt, women played a critical role, not only showing
up to demonstrate, but working at the forefront to organize the movement. Likewise, the Shia majority who
demanded equal rights alongside the ruling Sunni minority largely fueled the Bahrain movement. The demands
of those who took to the streets indicate that basic human rights and representative government are a near
universal claim and not merely a Western phenomenon as Inglehart and Norris (2003) found in the World
Values Surveys.14 Citizens across the Arab Spring demanded, not only improvements in the economic sphere,
but even more emphatically, recognition of their basic human rights. Thus, claims of human rights by citizens in
Egypt, Bahrain, and Tunisia, and across the region throughout the Arab Spring, represent an important step in
the acceptance of the human rights regime, regardless of ideology and religious differences. We contend that
the widespread protests across the MENA region after decades of relative silence represent a shift in the
burden of proof from the protestors to the state. Egypts military, refusing to respond to the protests with
increased repression, epitomized the iconic moment in that shift. The state military defied its orders indicating
that society held collective expectations that the state should not repress its citizens.
Domestic Sources of Norm Diffusion
What is notable about the Arab Spring is that pressures from above, which may be important in raising the

moral conscious and generating a human rights dialogue, were
14 Inglehart and Norris (2003) find that what does matter is culture and a wide gap still exists on several fronts:
divorce, abortion, gay rights, and gender equality.
largely unimportant as a precipitous factor during the Spring itself. Instead, economic and demographic changes
in the state created space for civil society to assert human rights values with domestic actors utilizing human
rights discourse to define the various revolutions in the region. The limited role for international actors in the
Arab Spring may point to a critical difference in how these countries identify themselves. This does not suggest
that international actors did not matter. Clearly, pressure from above helped inform Arab populations of the idea
of individual rights. Rather, we argue that in the immediate event, norm diffusion in the Arab world would have
to occur independent of international organizations for the substantive integration of human rights norms.
Moreover, shaming from above may have limited currency for the international human rights regime in such
states. Thus, in the Arab Spring, domestic actors led the way, promoting the norm of individual rights,
autonomous from Western NGOs and other international actors who cheered them on from the sidelines.
International actors that have long advocated human rights in the region may become important in the future,
but only to the extent that the identity of Arab states is no longer based on a rejection of the West. Nonetheless,
the Arab Spring represents a change in the collective expectations Arab citizens have about the appropriate
behavior of their states.
Norm diffusion in the MENA region was also facilitated by a third system of agents (Price 2003, p. 580), that is,
civil society. Citizens of Arab states met in coffee shops to exchange ideas and took to the streets to assert their
rights. Moreover, the Arab Spring witnessed the emergence of a new type of international actor, the latent
human rights activists, who benefitted from technological advances during the Arab Spring. Social media
represent a significant step forward in the ability of individuals to challenge state repression. The widespread
availability of social media provides instant information to a global audience, which not only mobilizes the
opposition, but also facilitates diffusion of a movement as we witnessed in the Arab Spring. Mohamed Bouazizi
was not the only Tunisian martyr. Among others, Abdesslem Trimech also set himself on fire in protest on
March 3, 2010 in Monastir, Tunisia. However, the world knows little about Trimech because the key difference
was the transmission of Bouazizis story throughout Tunisia and beyond via new mediaOn December 17, the
date of Bouazizis self-immolation, his cousins posted a video of a protest led by his mother. That video was
later aired on al-Jazeeras Mabasher channel, which had picked it up via Facebook (Halverson et al. 2013, p.
316). The ability to instantly record and transmit human rights claims across cyberspace facilitates more rapid
norm diffusion in every corner of the globe. Ghitis (2011, p. 1) suggests that modern media played a key role in
igniting the protests and keeping them alive until they reached a self-sustaining critical mass. The Internet made
history happen faster. Social media were employed in naming and shaming atrocities, appealing to the global
community, and mobilizing the opposition. The growing importance of social media and the resulting
empowerment of individuals are particularly important as MENA states have long resisted pressure from above,
dismissing claims of human rights as tools of Western states. Social media acts as a multiplier, empowering
domestic forces that were previously disengaged. In this way pressure from below is amplified.
The role of social media is even more important given the overall decline in the freedom of the press. Karlekar
et al. (2013) report that access to free media is at its lowest point in a decade. While about one third of the
countries in the world are rated Free, among MENA states, there is not a single country categorized as Free,
five that
are rated as Partly Free (26 %), and 14 are deemed Not Free (p. 74). Thus, not a single citizen in the region
enjoys a free press environment, only 8 % live in a partly free environment, and 92 % of MENA citizens live in
an environment where the media is not free. It is important to note that, in the past, the lack of free press could

be particularly stifling to nascent political movements. Todays access to cell phones and widespread use of
social media enlarges nascent movements. Where the state exerts considerable influence on traditional media
outlets, social media can form an effective counterbalance, both for citizens within the state and outside
observers. Individuals, engaging in their everyday activity of updating social media statuses, unwittingly become
the engine of the revolution. The widespread availability and ease of modern technology galvanized these latent
participants in ways unprecedented in social movements and created an important new lever in norm diffusion
and acceptance.
Conclusion
An examination of the Arab Spring as a reflection of the human rights regime yields several interesting results.
The movements themselves are evidence of the potency of the human rights regime, particularly in a region of
the world human rights scholars have long written off as unlikely to adopt Western norms of human rights.
Faced with worsening economies and increasing populations, citizens in MENA countries appear to be
renegotiating their respective social contracts. The traditional social contract entailed state provision of a wide
range of social services, including jobs and medical care, with relatively low levels of taxation. In turn, citizens
accept a powerful state, one that engages in repression to maintain the existing social order. In the past, MENA
states have been able to keep this social contract with the wealth earned from oil revenues. However, economic
contraction coupled with a youth bulge in many MENA states decreased the states ability to maintain the same
standard of living for its population. The broken social contract opened the space for citizens to engage in
human rights dialogue in a way that was previously inconceivable. Norm diffusion in MENA states was led by
domestic forces, including newly empowered latent human rights activists, against the backdrop of these
demographic and economic changes.
The challenge of reconciling Islamic identity with Western values of individual rights made the diffusion of
human rights values more difficult in this region. It also meant that pressure from above would take a back seat
to pressures from below. Thus, domestic economic and social changes, and newly empowered citizens, meant
that civil society was the engine of the revolution. The rise of social media and the empowerment of latent
human rights activists further strengthen the efficacy of civil society to diffuse norms, as both individuals and
groups within civil society have access to an international podium that states find almost impossible to control.
Todays latent human rights activists are initially unintentional, yet social media creates the potential for
otherwise alienated members of civil society to participate in palpable ways. The result is an unprecedented
ability to reach the entire world and mobilize both world public opinion and domestic actors. Adding a
constructivist lens adds significantly to our understanding of human rights norm diffusion among Arab states. In
much of the Arab world, the burden of proof has shifted; now, there is a collective expectation among Arab
populations that their states should refrain from repression.
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Subject: Revolutions; Constructivism; Human rights; Political science; Social networks;
Publication title: Human Rights Review
Volume: 15
Issue: 4
Pages: 413-431
Publication date: Dec 2014
Year: 2014
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Place of publication: Dordrecht
Country of publication: Netherlands
Publication subject: Political Science--Civil Rights
ISSN: 1524-8879
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12142-014-0315-5
Copyright: Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
_______________________________________________________________
Document 19 of 20
Palestine After the Arab Spring

Author: Finkelstein, Norman G; Rabbani, Mouin; Stern-Weiner, Jamie
Abstract (English): Many expected the Arab uprisings to strengthen official and popular Arab support for
Palestinian self-determination, and, for a time, they did. Since then, internal strife, the return in several Arab
states of the ancien regime, and an intensified regional Cold War have left the Palestinians isolated and
vulnerable. But historical precedent as well as existing tendencies counsel against despair.

Full text: _TVM:UNDEFINED_
Subject: Palestinians; Cold War; Self Determination;
Publication title: Insight Turkey
Volume: 17
Issue: 3
Pages: 23-32
Year: 2015
Section: COMMENTARY
Publisher: SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
Place of publication: Ankara
ISSN: 1302-177X
Document feature: Photographs References
_______________________________________________________________
Document 20 of 20
THE IMPACT OF THE ARAB SPRING ON THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD IN THE MIDDLE EAST: JORDAN AS A CASE STUDY
Author: Alsoudi, Abdelmahdi
Abstract:
The events of the Arab Spring have led to new political realities in the Arab world and paved the way for the
Muslim Brotherhood to form short-lived governments in Tunisia and Egypt. Encouraged by these developments,
the Brotherhood in Jordan played a leading role in the uprising there, adopted extreme positions, and boycotted
the 2010 and 2013 parliamentary elections. The movement today is in open confrontation with the Jordanian
regime and suffers from internal division and conflict. The disastrous outcome of the Arab Spring for Syria,

Libya, and Yemen, as well as the banning of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE has
weakened the movement's political influence in the region, especially in Jordan. Its political future in Jordan now
depends on government policy and the unfolding of internal crisis within the movement. This article argues that
the Arab Spring has had a serious negative impact on the Brotherhood both in Jordan and in the region and that
serious efforts would be required to restore its previous political role and influence.
Full text:
Headnote
The events of the Arab Spring have led to new political realities in the Arab world and paved the way for the
Muslim Brotherhood to form short-lived governments in Tunisia and Egypt. Encouraged by these developments,
the Brotherhood in Jordan played a leading role in the uprising there, adopted extreme positions, and boycotted
the 2010 and 2013 parliamentary elections. The movement today is in open confrontation with the Jordanian
regime and suffers from internal division and conflict. The disastrous outcome of the Arab Spring for Syria,
Libya, and Yemen, as well as the banning of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE has
weakened the movement's political influence in the region, especially in Jordan. Its political future in Jordan now
depends on government policy and the unfolding of internal crisis within the movement. This article argues that
the Arab Spring has had a serious negative impact on the Brotherhood both in Jordan and in the region and that
serious efforts would be required to restore its previous political role and influence.
INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 2011, the Arab world faced a wave of uprisings leading to the overthrow of four Arab regimes, in
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen; and creating conflict and civil wars in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iraq-with less
impact on Jordan, Morocco, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and other Arab countries. The Arab
Spring has paved the way for some more moderate Islamists to establish political parties, run in and win
parliamentary elections, and even form governments in Tunisia and Egypt. It has also led to the appearance of
new radical Islamist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State (IS, formerly called ISIS) in Syria,
Iraq, and Libya, and Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in Yemen.
In Jordan, however, the impact of the Arab Spring was less dramatic, as the Jordanian leadership took several
political steps to meet the people's demands and used soft power to manage and control the uprising. Yet the
Islamist movement in Jordan-inspired by the empowerment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia and Egypt-
rejected all of the government's efforts, including its proposal to participate in the political process. Instead, it
chose to boycott the 2010 and 2013 parliamentary elections. In mid-2014, the fortunes of the Muslim
Brotherhood in both Egypt and Tunisia were reversed, with both movements losing political power. The
Brotherhood was banned in Egypt and declared a terrorist organization in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
The chaos and civil wars in Syria, Yemen, and Libya; the appearance of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq; and
the burning of the Jordanian pilot by IS in February 2015 has changed Jordanians' attitudes toward the Muslim
Brotherhood and other Islamist groups. The Muslim Brothers' uncompromising position toward political
participation, insisting on their extreme demands of fixing the political system and boycotting the parliamentary
elections, has created serious internal conflict among its leadership and damaged its relationship with the
regime. The Brotherhood first witnessed the appearance of the Zamzam Initiative and later the establishment of
the Society of Muslim Brothers in Jordan, which was immediately licensed by the government in April 2015. This
was in addition to rivalries from other Islamic political parties and groups such as al-Wasat Party and other
Salafi and jihadi groups. These internal and external factors raised serious questions about the political future of
the Muslim Brotherhood. This article's focus is the impact of the Arab Spring on the political future of the
Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (JMB). It also analyzes the extent to which the JMB's position and actions have
weakened its support among the Jordanian people and how this has affected their relationship with the regime.
The impact of Arab Spring on Islamists in Jordan provides an excellent case study to explore the future role of
Islamist politics in Jordan and beyond.

IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY AND OBJECTIVES
The Muslim Brotherhood's radical stance during the Arab Spring, especially its refusal to all of the Jordanian
government's proposals to participate in the political process, has damaged its traditionally good relationship
with the regime in Jordan and created internal conflict among the Brotherhood leadership, which resulted in the
movement's split into two rival groups-the old Muslim Brotherhood and the Society of Muslim Brothers in
Jordan. The government's proposal was interpreted by the old Muslim Brotherhood as an attempt to weaken the
Brotherhood's political and societal role. Today, it faces serious challenges not only to its legal existence but
also to its political future. This article thus deals with the very important issue of Arab Spring's impact on the
political future of the Muslim Brothers, which has far-reaching consequences not only for the security and
stability of Jordan but also for the entire region. The article addresses the dynamics of the Arab Spring and its
impact on the Middle East, the Jordanian regime's responses to the Arab Spring; how the Arab Spring has
affected the Muslim Brotherhood; the relationship between the regime and Muslim Brotherhood; and the impact
of the Arab Spring on the Muslim Brotherhood's political future in Jordan.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
This article aims to analyze the impact of Arab spring on the political future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan
and the region. It does so through a combination of comparative and qualitative research methods, with Jordan
as a case study. It draws on a range of primary and secondary sources, including declarations, interviews,
documents, reports, books, and articles about the impact of Arab Spring on the Muslim Brothers from 2011 to
2015. Numerous documents, decisions, laws, and statements issued by the governments of the region and the
Muslim Brotherhood were analyzed. In order to understand the different outcomes and impact of the Arab
Spring on the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and the region, the article compared the experiences of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Jordan and other Arab countries. It used eight variables to examine their effects on the success
or failure of the uprisings in both Jordan and Egypt. These are: 1. Elite unity; 2. Scale of protest; 3. Use of force;
4. Occupation of public places; 5. Responses to uprising demands; 6. Army intervention; 7. Population unity; 8.
Uprising unity. This article assumes that the presence of these variables indicates success while their absence
indicates the regime's failure in handling the uprising. With regards to the first variable, elite unity, if the elite
broke away from the regime this was measured as negative while the elite's unity and support for the regime
was measured as positive. The scale of protest, the second variable, was measured by considering massive
protests as positive and smaller-scale protests as negative. With the third variable, use of force, if force was
used this was regarded negative and no force was considered positive. Occupation of public places, the fourth
variable, was positive if occupation of a public place occurred and negative if this did not happen. The fifth
variable, regime responses to the uprising demands, was viewed as positive if the regime met some of the
protesters' demands and negative if it did not. Army intervention, the sixth variable, was considered positive if
the army refused to intervene and negative if it did intervene. The seventh variable, population unity, was
positive if the people fully supported the uprising whereas division among the people or their lack of support was
considered negative. The eighth and final variable, uprising unity, was positive if unity existed and negative if
there was division.
Review of Literature
There have been many social movements throughout history that have dramatically changed societies, such as
the revolutions in Russia, France, the United States, China, Europe, South America, and the Middle East. They
varied widely in their impact and ideologies, with some bringing changes to the socioeconomic and political
structures and others working to reform the existing sociopolitical system. Despite the many differences among
social movements, sociologists have identified many important similarities with regard to their causes and
outcomes.1
Sociologists and experts on social movements' have introduced several theories to explain the causes and
dynamics of social movements, among them the Resource Mobilization Theory, which seeks to explain the

emergence of social movements through the availability of resources, such as knowledge, money, media,
solidarity, and internal and external support. The theory argues that social movements develop when individuals
with grievances are able to mobilize sufficient resources to take action. It assumes a link between the
availability of resources and the success or failure of a social movement.2
However, the resource theory was later replaced by the Political Process Theory, which emphasizes the role of
political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes, along with protest cycles. Charles Tilly
asserts that the interaction between interests, organization, and opportunity, explains the level of mobilization
and collective action. He argues that social movements are rational attempts by disadvantaged people to
mobilize collective political power to achieve their common goal or interest. 3 Doug McAdam argues that in
order for individuals to participate in a movement, they must feel the current political system lacks legitimacy
and that their participation could bring about meaningful change in the society.4 This is very useful in analyzing
the Arab Spring, as the success of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt encouraged the formation of similar
movements throughout the Arab World. The contentious politics theory-which was developed during the 1990s
and the beginning of the twenty-first century by Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, and Doug McAdam-deals with the
use of revolt, demonstrations, and even revolution to express grievances or to change government policy. 5
However, Fawaz Gerges used the contentious politics theory to analyze the complexities of the Arab uprisings
without neglecting the connections between the people and other structural factors. 6 The four-stage social
movement theory argues that social movements go through four stages of development: emergence,
coalescence, bureaucratization, and decline. 7 This theory does not, however, apply to the Arab uprisings, as
they have erupted and declined in a very short period of time.
The other relevant theory is the Marxist theory of class relations, which argues that social movements grow out
of basic social and economic relations, people's participation in social movements is a rational activity, and
"revolutions are connected to the larger society."8However, because of its main focus on class conflict, it offers
limited explanatory power in traditional and classless societies like Arab societies, where other political and
religious factors play a significant role.
The Social Movement Theory was used recently by Sean Lynch to compare successful and unsuccessful Arab
uprisings by using seven variables.9 He examined and compared two successful uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia
and three unsuccessful uprisings in Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain, where success was defined as the
overthrow of the previous regime. He concluded that the three important variables to the success or failure of
these uprisings were elite unity, organizational diffusion, and the level of democratization achieved in the
country prior to the uprising. He concluded that the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt were successful as they
received six and seven variables out of seven while the uprisings in Jordan, Morocco and Bahrain were
unsuccessful because they received less than four variables.10
This study, however, is framed on both the theory of social movement and the theory of political Islam, as the
latter is more applicable to the Arab uprising, especially its political and religious dimensions. The role of
political Islam was and still is a central concern for many Arab as well as foreign academics and politicians. One
of the main questions that have occupied political sociologists, politicians, and political scientists is whether
Islam is a peaceful or evil religion and more importantly whether Islam is compatible with democracy or not.
Indeed, this subject has become increasingly significant in the political, social, and security realms among many
Arab and Western scholars and influenced the agenda of Islamic movement even before the Arab Spring. 11
Analyses of this issue are sometimes marked by prejudice and misunderstanding, as for many Western
analysts political Islam is not combatable with democracy. They argue that political Islam is not only against
democracy but also prevents many Muslim countries from moving toward modernization and democracy.12
Huntington claimed that the traditional conflict between the old ideologies was replaced by conflict between
civilizations. He especially singled out Islam to be the major source of future conflict with Western civilization. 13
The second view argues that political Islam is not against democratic principles; rather the ideologies of

moderate political Islamists are compatible with the main principles of Western democracy, and Islam calls for
Shura-justice and respect for other religions.14 Some have argued that it is too simplistic to say that Islam is
against democracy or intolerant towards others and have considered such views as far from the truth. 15 Others
argue that Islamists' calls for democracy are not genuine, but they do so because they have learned that
political participation is the easiest way to gain political power.16
As for the relationship between political Islam and democracy, Islamic rule was not among protesters' main
demands. Indeed, the uprisings began with no political leadership, religious motivation, or left-right ideology;
and for the first time, the protests and rallies were directed against the undemocratic governments and their
failed socioeconomic and political policies. The majority of protesters were not Islamists; rather they were from
all walks of life-youth, adults, men, women, Muslims, Christians, secular, and religious-and demanded freedom,
dignity, and improved living conditions, later calling for political reform and the overthrow of the autocratic rulers.
As for the causes of the Arab Spring, many factors played a significant role in the uprising and its spread to
other countries, including inequality, poverty, unemployment, unjust distribution of wealth, corruption, and
repression.17
Democracy and political reform were among protester demands, but were not major factors behind the uprising;
Arab societies remain traditional and adhere to Islamic values, whereas democratization requires modernization
and major shifts in peoples' social values. 18Accordingly, if such theories were used to explain the Arab Spring,
one would expect the participants in the uprising to be the youth and the educated-who are the strongest
supporters of democracy and are less religious, in contrast to the illiterate and elderly. 19 Indeed, UNDP reports
(2012) confirmed such views, revealing that the majority of participants in the uprising were mostly young and
educated. 20 Literature on social movements has also asserted the importance of the role of NGOs, political
parties, and other organized groups in providing coordination and organizational capabilities for large-scale
uprisings and revolts.21
Prior to the 2011 Arab Spring, the Middle East was often seen from the Western perspective as a uniquely
undemocratic region with few organized groups or civil society activities. However, the Arab Spring has
challenged social movement theory's classical concepts of political opportunity, collective action, and
mobilization structures. Evidence on the Arab uprisings show that NGOs, professional associations, civil society
organizations, political parties, and mosques in the Arab World played a significant role in the uprisings.22
THE DYNAMICS OF THE ARAB SPRING AND THE IMPACT ON THE MIDDLE EAST
The Arab Spring started in Tunisia on December 17, 2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in an act
of protest due to humiliation and injustice at the hands of a local municipality official. The incident sparked a
wave of protest across Tunisia and led to the overthrow of President Zayn alAbidin bin Ali. Similar
unprecedented demonstrations, rallies, and massive protests-in terms of their massive numbers, demands, and
social composition-erupted in many other Arab countries, including Bahrain, Yemen, Jordan, and Syria.23 The
Arab Spring was in fact a spontaneous movement that came about as a result of the accumulation of numerous
socioeconomic and political problems since the early 1990s.24 Initially, protesters came out in small numbers,
calling upon their governments to improve socioeconomic conditions, freedom, and employment; to respect
citizen rights; and to provide dignity, equality, human rights, and democracy.25
Initially they were without political leadership, religious motivation, or left/right ideology. In addition, for the first
time, the protests and rallies were directed against their own governments and not against external enemies
such as the United States or Israel.26 Within a few months, the Arab social uprisings had attracted huge
numbers of protesters, and two presidents were overthrown-President bin Ali of Tunisia on January 14, 2011,
and Egyptian President Husni Mubarak on February 11, 2011. These dramatic developments were not
expected or even thinkable in the Arab world, which had been ruled by autocratic regimes for decades. Many
observers expected other Arab regimes to fall one after the other, but such this did not materialize, and only 4 of
22 have fallen as of the writing of this article.

The success or failure of social movements can be explained by several different factors, such as the support of
new political actors, elite unity, scale shift (a movement's geographic expansion or contraction), external
support, organizational diffusion, and the level of democratization. 27 Many Arab regimes have adopted new
measures to manage and control the uprisings, including partially meeting demonstrators' demands, replacing
unpopular governments, issuing new laws, and conducting or promising political and economic reform.28 The
response of both the Jordanian and GCC regimes was a combination of security and economic measures to
calm the protesters.29
The Islamic groups that initially benefited from the Arab Spring were the moderate Islamists, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco. 30 The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, however, refused all of the
government's efforts and proposals to participate in the political process and instead boycotted the two
parliamentary elections that took place in 2010 and 2013. This radical position put them on a collision course
with the regime and sparked internal conflict among its leadership.
In the final analysis, the Arab Spring was not about Islam, Islamic or democratic rule; rather, it was about
improving socioeconomic conditions, bringing about political reform, dignity, freedom, and fighting corruption. In
the two cases in which the Muslim Brotherhood gained power and formed governments in Egypt and Tunisia,
none of them advocated Islamic rule. Instead, they followed the old system of government, which was yet again
rejected by the people in both countries. The other important feature of the Arab uprisings was the broad
solidarity among the different societal components, the massive scale of protesters, and more importantly that
the protesters had become unintimidated by the regime's oppression.31
However, by mid-2013, the initial success of the uprisings and the Muslim Brotherhood's rise to power came to
an end. New radical Islamist groups emerged to dominate the political and military scene in the Middle East.
The Brothers' rule was replaced by military or old elites in Egypt and Tunisia. The other important impact the
Arab Spring has had is the emergence of many radical Islamist groups, such as the Islamic State, Jabhat
alNusra, Ahrar al-Sham in Syria and Iraq; the Houthis in Yemen; and numerous other groups in Egypt, Libya,
and the GCC countries. Moreover, many Arab countries are in a state of chaos and civil war, which has required
the intervention of the international community and their regional allies in order to fight these radical groups in
Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. The violence and terrorism committed by some members of the Brotherhood and
other radical Islamist groups in Egypt since the 2013 military coup supports the notion that exclusion may lead
to radicalization, while the behavior of the Islamists in Tunisia supports the notion that inclusion may lead to
moderation. The appearance of these radical groups has affected the image of all Islamist groups, with people
fearing Islamist rule-especially in light of the beheadings, torture, and other atrocities committed by the Islamic
State and other radical Islamist groups.
The Effects of the Arab Spring on Islamists in the Middle East
The Arab Spring has affected the Islamists in each Arab country differently. Initially, the Muslim Brotherhood in
Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco benefited from the events, as the movements succeeded to win a majority of seats
in the parliamentary elections and formed governments in each of the three countries. The outcome, however,
has been less positive for the Islamists in Jordan, the GCC, and other Arab countries. The other significant
result of the Arab Spring was the emergence of several radical Islamist groups, including the Islamic State and
Jabhat alNusra in Syria and Iraq, the Islamic Movement in Libya, the Shi'i movement in Bahrain, and the
Houthis and al-Qa'ida in Yemen.
The declaration of the Islamic Caliphate in large parts of Syria and Iraq as well as the chaos and civil wars in
Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen have opened the door to the emergence of additional radical Islamist groups
throughout the Middle East. Indeed, many Arab countries today face serious challenges to their security and
stability (both direct and indirect) by some of these radical Islamist groups, which continue to shift alliances and
to change names and ideologies. The Arab Spring has thus had a disastrous impact on the so-called
"moderate" Islamists, while boosting the power and influence of the radical Islamists in the region. Today, many

Arab countries face internal conflict, civil wars, and terrorism, which are expected to continue for years.
ARAB SPRING INSPIRATION TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN JORDAN
With the start of the Arab Spring in Jordan, several Muslim Brotherhood leaders made no secret their view that
the uprising had shifted the internal balance of political power in their favor. Indeed, the empowerment of
Muslim Brotherhood parties in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco as well as the sight of successive Arab regimes
falling one after the other due to the pressure from the uprisings raised the morale of the Brotherhood in Jordan,
which hoped to gain political power like their sister movements in Egypt and Tunisia. Ghaith alQudah, head of
the Islamic Action Front (IAF, the political wing of the Brotherhood in Jordan) Youth Sector, declared, "What's
happening now in the Arab world is giving us a clear message that we can make changes and that all Arab
regimes should understand this reality."32
Another Brotherhood member asserted, "We use the parliamentary election results in other Arab countries to
say to our government look, when the elections are fair, the Islamists will win."33 Dima Tahboub of the IAF
Shura Council noted, "The Arab people are religious by nature, and regardless of Westernization and
Globalization, when they are given a free choice they choose Islamists to rule.34 Another member of the Shura
Council and Head of the Women's Sector Eyda Mutlaq stated, "The Arab Spring today uncovered the real
power of the people; look at al-Nahda in Tunis, after years of exile, they came back and the people elected
them." 35 Shura Council member and Head of the IAF Political Office Ruhayil Gharaibeh, despite his
knowledge that the Arab Spring was originally initiated by nonIslamist youth, claimed, "The Arab Spring is one
of the fruits of Islamic movement's activities and work. This is precisely what the Muslim Brotherhood has been
working to achieve during the last eighty years."36
As for the Brotherhood in Jordan, it called for similar demands introduced by other Islamic movements but
stopped short of calling for regime change. It organized regular demonstrations, rallies, and public meetings in
major cities, and at the end of each event repeated its demands to amend major constitution articles-especially
those related to the king's power to dissolve the parliament (Article 34), appoint the prime minister (Article 35),
and to appoint members of the Upper House (Article 36). Muslim Brotherhood leaders argued that the
constitution should empower the people to be the source of authority (Articles 1, 24), that the political party that
wins the majority should be entitled to appoint the prime minister, the Upper House should either be abolished
or elected by the people, and there should be safeguards against arbitrary dissolution of the parliament by the
king. They repeated these demands in all of the media outlets and published them on their official web pages.
37 These demands represented a bold departure from their traditional demands of modern election laws, and
indeed were inspired by the empowerment of the Brotherhood in Tunisia and Egypt. Questioning king's power
had been unthinkable before the Arab Spring, even in moments of political crisis.38
In addition, many Brotherhood leaders referred to the Moroccan experience as an example the Jordanian
regime should follow, especially appointing the leader of the majority party as prime minister. 39 Some
considered the Moroccan model the "least costly solution for solving the current crisis in Jordan and to reach a
compromise between the desires of regime and the people." 40 Others even went as far as suggesting a
ceremonial role for the king. Gharaibeh noted, "As we can't continue living under a form of rule that goes back
to the Middle Ages, whereby one person exercises all the power without accountability."41 He continued, "I
believe all Arab regimes will change and the only difference between countries will be the time and scale of
change; that all corrupt oppressive regimes will be removed; that there will be a democratic system based on
freedom and political participation and that Jordan will definitely be part of this process."42 Similarly, IAF Deputy
Secretary General Nimr al-Assaf stated, "We are in the 21st century, and nobody accepts absolute power to be
in the hands of one single person; no way."43
However, the JMB leadership understood the consequences of crossing the red lines regarding the king's status
and power, and therefore stopped short of calling for regime change as was the case in other countries. Indeed,
no senior leader of the IAF or the JMB has called for changing the Hashemite rule. On the contrary, most of

these leaders have affirmed the importance of the monarchy to Jordan's stability and national unity.
However, there was not agreement among all members of the Muslim brotherhood leaders about these radical
demands and statements nor, and more importantly, regarding the decision to boycotting the 2010 and 2013
parliamentary elections. Indeed some among the JMB leadership publically announced their disagreement.
They feared major constitutional changes would give the Jordanians of Palestinian origin a greater role in
country's political future at the expense of the Jordanian people. This internal discord led to the creation of the
unlicensed Zamzam Movement and later to the establishment of the licensed Muslim Brotherhood Society in
Jordan, which was immediately recognized by the Jordanian government.
The Muslim Brotherhood's Role in the Uprising in Jordan
The uprising in Jordan was initiated in 2010 by group of youth in Dhiban, a small village near Amman and
spread to other parts of the country. On November 7, 2011, the IAF and the JMB promptly joined the uprising
(Herrak) along with other groups and political parties in the opposition.44 The JMB did not participate in the
initial phase of the uprising in Jordan, which was dominated largely by several groups of youth protesters.
However, after seeing the success of the uprisings in neighboring Arab countries, the Brotherhood not only
began to participate but also took over the leadership of the uprising movement, which became known locally as
"the mobilization" or (al-Herrak).
The IAF and JMB began to organize and mobilize regular demonstrations and rallies in Amman and other major
cities on a larger scale than ever before. As the Arab uprisings expanded across the region, the JMB increased
its mobilization activities and conducted substantial popular demonstrations in Amman, Irbed, and Zarqa,
demanding from the regime major sociopolitical reforms, including fixing the whole political system.45
There is no dispute that the JMB is the main opposition group in Jordan with political experience, organizational
skills, financial resources, and popular support. It is true that there are the so-called the national movement,
leftists, and other Islamic political parties, but none are able to compete with the Islamic movement. The JMB
has vast numbers of members and supporters in addition to a long history of providing social, educational, and
medical services and organizing public events that have enabled them to control the street.46 One IAF member
claimed that 90 percent of demonstrators were from the Islamic movement and without them there would be few
demonstrators.47 However, in a move to show its leadership of the national uprising, the JMB coordinated and
cooperated with other established political opposition parties and newly fragmented regional Herrak
committees. Thus, the main logic behind the JMB strategy in cooperating with other political parties and groups
was to not only to increase overall pressure on the regime but also to show the regime and the public that the
JMB constituted the main political opposition in the country.
The JMB organized meetings in the mosques, knowing that the government would not dare to prevent people
from going to pray. It thus took advantage of Friday prayers to organize regular rallies and demonstrations. At
the end of each rally, Brotherhood and other prominent opposition leaders gave speeches-broadcast live on
television, social, and other media outlets-outlining their demands. The main weekly event was a regular rally
led by JMB leaders marching arm-in-arm with other opposition leaders from al-Husayni Mosque to al-Nakheel
Square in downtown Amman. Their demands were usually a reflection of the IAF and JMB written statement,
which included real political reform; changing the election law; amending the constitution; empowering the
people to be the real source of power; limiting the king's authority to dissolve the parliament; and rejecting
government's superficial, illusory, and cosmetic reforms.48
While most demonstrations concluded peacefully, on March 24, 2011, a youth activist group seized the Jamal
Abd al-Nasir roundabout in Amman and declared an open sit-in. Although this move was not officially led by the
JMB leaders, the majority of protesters were Muslim Brotherhood and IAF members.49 Some IAF leaders
alleged that the intelligence department was in fact behind them, as quoted in an interview with Jacob Amis;
"We have two governments-one formed by the king and the other is formed by the intelligence department. The
regime wants to control the Muslim Brotherhood, but that is not going to happen."50 Another JMB member

expressed the movement's resolve to continue its political activities and demands. 51 The Brotherhood
leadership rejected all government efforts and proposals for political reform and continued its weekly rallies in
hopes of getting a better deal.52 As quoted in another interview by Jacob Amis, "Now our movement is
irreversible, and I pray to God to help our king make the right and brave decision to prevent Jordan from having
the same fate as Syria and Yemen.'' 53 By adopting such a radical position, the group placed itself on a collision
course with the regime.
Regime Response to the Arab Spring in Jordan
In January 2011, Jordan, like other countries in the Arab world, was hit by a continuous wave of protests, rallies,
and demonstrations calling for socioeconomic and political reform. The demands included dismissing the
government, dissolving the parliament, amending the electoral law, and conducting fair and free elections.54
The king responded positively to some of the protesters' demands by dismissing five governments in two years
and taking several other steps, including the establishment of an independent commission to oversee elections,
a constitutional court to monitor legislation, and other independent bodies to oversee the elections and to fight
corruption; he amended the election law to include 27 seats for the nationalist list and continued its top-down
political and economic reform policies. The king, however, stopped short of limiting any of his executive
powers.55
Despite positive responses from the general public and the national media for these steps, Brotherhood General
Supervisor Hamam Sa'id declared that these measures and proposals "did not make the people the source of
political power." 56 The JMB and the Islamic Action Front issued a joint statement rejecting these proposals,
asserting, "The government wasted an opportunity to make substantial amendments to the structure of the
political system, to render to the people their right as the source of power, to respond to the peoples' demands
for real reform, and to meet the challenges that the country faces."57
The Jordanian regime's response to the Arab Spring was different from that of most other Arab countries,
particularly Egypt, especially in dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood. Unlike Egypt, the Jordanian government
has not, as of the writing of this article, banned the movement but has encouraged internal conflict. At the same
time, it has permitted the establishment of other Islamist political parties, such as al-Wasat, and granted a
license to the new Society of Muslim Brothers. It has dealt with the JMB as a non-licensed organization with the
possibility of allowing the Society of Muslim Brothers to take over all of the JMB's assets, without officially
banning the old movement.
The Failure of the Uprising in Jordan
Many scholars have attempted to understand why the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia were successful but not so
in Jordan other Arab countries. They have used different approaches to answer this question, including Marxist
theory, social movement, and political Islam theories. Sean Lynch has used social movement theory to compare
the outcomes of the Arab Spring in five Arab countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Bahrain.
According to Lynch, a successful uprising is defined as one that overthrows the existing regime. The study
concluded that elite unity with the regime in power, the existence of mobilizing organizations in the country, and
the level of democratization in each country before the uprising were the most important factors in the success
or failure of the uprising. 58 However, this study sought to determine the difference between the outcome of
uprisings in Jordan and Egypt by using both social movement and political Islam theories to test the effects of
eight variables (Table 1). These are: elite unity and support for the regime; size and scale of protest; use of
force; uprising occupation of public places; regime responses to protesters' demands; army intervention;
population unity and support for the uprising; and, finally, the unity of the uprising. It examines the impact of
eight variables on the different outcomes of the uprisings in Jordan and Egypt (Table 1).
Regarding the third variable, the use of force against protesters, the regime in Jordan used soft power to deal
with protesters and there were no deaths or serious causalities among protesters. While the Jordanian
government gave some space to demonstrators to express their views and demands, at the same time, it

established certain red lines-specifically against direct criticism of the king and demonstrations inside the
Palestinian refugee camps and tribal areas, as such activities could endanger stability and national unity. 59
The regime in Egypt, on the other hand, used excessive force to disperse protesters, which led to thousands of
deaths and casualties among demonstrators and the police. In the case of Egypt, this use of force in fact
provoked the protesters and drove more people to join the uprising.
The main factors appearing to determine the success or failure of the Arab uprisings in Jordan and Egypt
included elite unity and support for the regime, army intervention, unity of the people behind the uprising, the
size and scale of the uprising, and the ability of those involved in the uprising to occupy public squares and
places. Egypt scored five out of eight variables while Jordan scored only two out of eight. Thus, the uprising in
Egypt was successful in overthrowing the regime because it enjoyed the support of the people; the elite broke
its unity with the regime; it was a massive movement; it succeeded in occupying public places; the army refused
to support the regime; the regime did not respond positively to the protesters' demands; and the regime used
excessive force against protesters, leading to many deaths and casualties among the population. The uprising
in Jordan, on the other hand, was not successful because the elite maintained unity with the regime, protests
were small scale, the regime used soft power instead of force, the regime did not allow protesters to occupy
public places, the regime responded positively to protesters' demands, there was no public unity behind the
uprising, and the uprising was not united but fragmented.60
The Arab Spring and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood's Political Future
By November 2011, the uprising in Jordan which was started by small youth groups across the countryside,
developed into a popular movement that spread to the major cities. Friday protests soon became regular event
in Jordan. The protesters were divided into three groups: the Islamists, which consisted mainly of the Muslim
Brotherhood and the IAF; al-Herrak, which was made up of independent youth; and the nationalist and leftist
groups and political parties. Initially, the Muslim Brotherhood was hesitant and reluctant to join the uprising, but
since late 2011, it has dominated the uprising and helped it spread to the major urban centers. The Brotherhood
has also coordinated some of its activities with the nationalist and leftist groups especially after Friday's prayers.
The Brotherhood and the nationalist groups wanted political change. They therefore called for fixing the political
system and limiting the king's powers. Al-Herrak, on the other hand, worked in smaller numbers and isolated
groups in smaller towns and villages and was more interested in improving socioeconomic conditions, solving
poverty and unemployment, and fighting corruption. The JMB leaders, inspired by the success of other
Islamists, felt they were in a strong position and therefore refused to participate in the political process unless
the regime met all their demands. They thus rejected all of the government's proposals for political and
economic reforms and boycotted the 2010 and 2013 general elections.
During 2014 and 2015, however, the situation changed dramatically: The Muslim Brotherhood both in Egypt and
Tunisia lost political power and the Brotherhood in Egypt was banned and labeled a terrorist organization in
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Moreover, several new extreme Islamists groups have
emerged, including the Islamic State (IS), Jabhat alNusra, and the Houthis. These groups have caused chaos
and civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya and other Arab countries. IS rule in Syria and Iraq, Muslim
Brotherhood rule in Egypt and Tunisia, and Houthi rule in Yemen have changed the attitudes of the people
toward Islamists in the Arab world.
The appearance of numerous radical Islamists groups and the civil wars in the region as well as the JMB's
refusal to participate in the Jordanian parliamentary elections has weakened its position in the public eye and
created serious internal conflict among the JMB leadership. In Jordan, the first sign of this internal conflict was
the establishment of the Zamzam Movement, which was followed by the establishment of the Society of Muslim
Brothers in Jordan. This government move has practically split the Muslim Brotherhood into two rival groups-
one dominated by Palestinian extreme leadership and the second led by moderate Jordanian leadership. This is

in addition to the existence of other Islamist Salafi, jihadi groups, and other political parties, such as the Wasat
Party (which has participated in the political process since 1993 and won 15 seats in 2013 elections). Indeed,
the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan today is far weaker than before. The government has succeeded
in weakening the uprising by playing the protesters- the Islamists, political parties, and al-Herrak-against so that
the uprising no longer poses any real danger to the regime and the country.
CONCLUSION
The Arab Spring has brought about new realities, which could be explained using a variety of sociological
theories. This article employs both social movement and political Islam theories to explain the dynamics of the
Arab Spring and its impact on the political future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and the Middle East. The
Arab Spring was a spontaneous social movement that started in Tunisia and spread throughout the Arab world.
The majority of protesters were young, came from all walks of life, and had no specific religious or political
ideologies. They did not call for Arab unity, Arab nationalism, or Islamic rule.
They were later joined by Islamists and members of other leftist and opposition political parties and groups.
Their main demands were improving socioeconomic conditions, employment opportunities, fighting corruption,
freedom, and respect of dignity and human rights. The uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia began peacefully but
faced brutal responses from both regimes. The death and injuries of thousands of protesters in both countries
has changed the dynamics of the uprisings and attracted millions of protesters.
The rise of Muslim Brotherhood to political power in Egypt inspired many MB and other Islamist groups and
parties in Jordan and other Arab countries, motivating them to join the uprisings in their own countries.
However, in 2013 and 2014, the Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia not only lost political power but Brotherhood
in Egypt was also declared a terrorist organization and banned in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
The main conclusion of this article, therefore, is that the Arab Spring has had a disastrous impact on the political
future of the so-called moderate Islamists, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, in the Arab world in general, and
especially in Egypt and Jordan. The second important result of the Arab Spring is that it opened the door for the
appearance of many new radical Islamist groups in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sinai in Egypt, and Yemen. These
groups, including the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, the Houthis, and others have spread radicalism and terror
throughout the region. The United States and many other European countries intervened in Libya, Syria, and
Iraq, while Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries intervened in Bahrain and Yemen. This intervention, however,
and the support for the uprisings resulted in continuous chaos and civil wars in these countries.
The Arab Spring has thus deeply changed the sociopolitical landscape and created internal conflict in several
Arab countries-including Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen-with a lesser effect on Jordan, Morocco, and
the GCC countries. The appearance of the Islamic State and other radical groups and their brutal crimes
against civilians have contributed to the negative image of Islamists in general and frightened people from any
form of Islamic rule. The Brotherhood in Jordan was inspired by the success of its sister movements in Egypt
and Tunisia and in a miscalculated move, it rejected all the government's efforts and proposals to participate in
the political process, boycotting the 2010 and 2013 parliamentary elections. The group continued its protest
activities and cosponsored thousands of demonstrations and rallies across the country, particularly in Amman
and other major cities after Friday prayers.
The uprising in Jordan, however, failed due to the government's strategy: partially giving in to protester
demands, dividing the uprising by playing the participating groups against each other; preventing sit-ins in public
places, and using soft power to control and manage the protest. The regime followed the old "divide and rule"
policy as it encouraged internal conflict and practically split the movement into two rival groups. It succeeded in
dividing the uprising into several groups such Jordanians against Palestinians, Islamists versus non-Islamists,
and different Herrak, for example, north Herrak against south or cities versus countryside. This practically
brought the uprising to a complete halt.
Moreover, the July 2013 military coup in Egypt, the spread of chaos and civil wars in neighboring Arab

countries, the arrival of more than 600,000 Syrian refugees to Jordan, the appearance of many radical Islamists
groups, and the civil wars in neighboring countries has weakened the JMB position in the eyes of the public and
created serious internal conflict among its leadership. Today, the JMB is split into two rival groups-one
dominated by Palestinian extreme leadership and the second led by moderate Jordanian leadership. However,
it is too early to determine the impact of this split on the JMB's political future. This divide is only one problem
facing the JMB. In addition, there are other rival political Islamist groups, including Salafi, jihadi, and other
political parties like the Wasat Party (which has participated in the political process since 1993 and won 15
seats in 2013 elections).
Regarding the political future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, the regime's position and policy toward its
political future and legal existence remain vague. In September 2015, the government introduced a new
parliamentary election law, abrogating the one-man, one-vote system and adopting a multi-vote system in its
place. The new law was received positively among many political circles and the press, though the old JMB's
position is on the upcoming parliamentary elections is not clear. It is unlikely, however, that the government will
ban the JMB before the elections.
Footnote
NOTES
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27 Lynch, "The Arab Spring."
28 Paul Silverstein, "Weighing Morocco's New Constitution," Middle East Research and Information Project.
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29 Danya Greenfield, "Jordan King Launches 'White Revolution,'" al-Monitor, February 14, 2013,
http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/02/jordanking-abdullah-ii-white-revolution.html; Habib Toumi,
"Qatar to Hold Parliamentary Elections in 2013," Gulf News, November 1, 2011,
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/qatar-tohold-parliamentary-elections-in-20131.921954; Peter Salisbury,
"Insulting the Sultan," Foreign Policy, October 19, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/19/insultingthe-sultan-
in-oman/; Ahmed Al Omran, "Saudi Activists Silenced and the U.S. Is Silent," Foreign Policy, March 11, 2013,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/11/saudiactivists-silenced-and-the-u-s-is-silent/; Lori Plotkin Boghardt, "The
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30 Rosiny, "The Arab Spring."
31 Ibid.
32 Ghaith al-Qudah, Head of IAF Youth Sector, Interview by Jacob Amis, August 25, 2011, Amman, Jordan.
33 Hayat al-Missaymi, IAF Shura Council, Quoted by Jacob Amis, December 18, 2011, Amman, Jordan.
34 Dima Tahboub, IAF Shura Council, Interview by Jacob Amis, December 11, 2011, Amman, Jordan.
35 Eyda Mutlaq, IAF Shura Council and Head of Women's Sector, Quoted by Jacob Amis, December 15, 2011,
Amman, Jordan.
36 Ruhayil Gharaibeh, Muslim Brotherhood Shura Council and Head of IAF Political Office, Interview by Lynch,
October 3, 2011, Amman, Jordan.
37 Islamic Action Front Website, 2011, http://www.jabha.net/.
38 Shadi Hamid, "Jordan: The Myth of the Democratizing Monarchy," in Nathan Brown and Emad El-Din Shahin
(eds.), The Struggle over Democracy in the Middle East (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 128.
39 Marina Ottoway and Marwan Muasher, "Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet," Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, December 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/arab_mona
rchies1.pdf.
40 Zaki Bani Irsheid, Muslim Brotherhood Deputy General Supervisor, Interview by Jacob Amis, December 20,
2011, Amman, Jordan.
41 Gharaibeh, Interview by Lynch, 2011.
42 Ibid.
43 Nimr al-Assaf, IAF Deputy Secretary General, Interview by Jacob Amis, December 12, 2011, Amman,
Jordan.
44 Jacob Amis, "The Jordanian Brotherhood in the Arab Spring," Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 14
(2013), http://www.hudson.org/research/9876-thejordanian-brotherhood-in-the-arab-spring, pp. 38-57.
45 Islamic Action Front Website, http://www.jabha.net/.

46 Muhammad Abu Rumman, "The Muslim Brotherhood After the Boycott of Parliamentary Elections of 2010"
[in Arabic], Center for Strategic Studies Papers.
47 Hayat al-Missaymi, IAF Shura Council, Quoted by Jacob Amis, December 18, 2011, Amman, Jordan.
48 Hamam Sa'id, Jordan Muslim Brotherhood Website, August 21, 2011, http://www.ikhwan-jor.com/.
49 Ghaith al-Qudah, Interview by Jacob Amis, 2011; Taylor Luck, "Mafraq Clashes Place Islamists, Gov't at
Crossroads," Jordan Times, December 27, 2011.
50 Ghaith al-Qudah, Interview by Jacob Amis, 2011.
51 Gharaibeh, Interview by Lynch, 2011.
52 Cory Eldridge and Nicholas Seely, ''Taher Masri: The Struggle for Reform,'' Jo Magazine, April 17, 2011.
53 Ghaith al-Qudah, Interview by Jacob Amis, 2011.
54 Roxana Apalaghie, "Plausible and Implausible Aspects of Jordan's Protests," Middle East Political and
Economic Institute, September 30, 2011, http://mepei.com/infocus/5397-plausible-and-implausible-aspectsof-
jordans-protests.
55 Marwan Muasher, "Jordan's Proposed Constitutional Amendments-A First Step in the Right Direction,"
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 17, 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/08/17/jord
an-s-proposed-constitutional-amendmentsfirst-step-in-right-direction.
56 Al-Jazeera News, August 20, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.net/home/print/f6451603 -4dff-4ca1-9c10-
122741d17432/e887a1df75cd-465a-9a25-96efdd7d7662.
57 Ibid.
58 Lynch,"The Arab Spring."
59Samuel Helfont and Tally Helfont, "Jordan: Between the Arab Spring and the Gulf Cooperation Council,"
Orbis, Vol. 56, (Winter 2012), pp. 82-95.
60 Ibid; Shadi Hamid and Courtney Freer, "How Stable Is Jordan? King Abdullah's Half-Hearted Reforms and
the Challenge of the Arab Spring," Brookings Doha Center Publications, No. 8 of 47, November 2011,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/11/jordan-hamid-freer; Taylor Dewey, Juliane Kaden, Miriam
Marks, Shun Matsushima, and Beijing Zhu, "The Impact of Social Media on Social Unrest in the Arab Spring,"
Defense Intelligence Agency Final Report, March 20, 2012,
https://publicpolicy.stanford.edu/publications/impact-social-media-social-unrest-arab-spring.
AuthorAffiliation
By Abdelmahdi Alsoudi*
*This research was conducted during the author's sabbatical leave from the University of Jordan during the
2014-2015 academic year at the Religious Department, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, USA.
*Prof. Abdelmahdi Alsoudi (Ph.D. 1986, Keele University (U.K. ) is currently a professor of political sociology
and Middle East studies at the Department of Sociology at Jordan University. He joined the Center for Strategic
Studies at Jordan University as a senior researcher in 1986 and has been a lecturer and conducted research in
many Arab and Western universities, including the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS), Denver
University 2007-2008; United Arab Emirates University (2000-2002); Princess Rahmeh University College,
20022003; Visiting Scholar (DAAD grant) at Bonn University, 2004; Visiting Professor (International Policy
Fellowship), Georgetown University, 2005; and Visiting Scholar at the Department of Religious Studies at North
Carolina University at Charlotte (2014-2015). He has participated in numerous regional and international
conferences and has published several articles on socio-political issues, such as Islam and democracy, anti-
Americanism in the Arab World, and democracy and political reform in the Arab World.
Publication title: Middle East Review of International Affairs (Online)
Volume: 19

Issue: 3
Pages: 41-57
Number of pages: 17
Publication date: Fall 2015
Year: 2015
Publisher: Global Research in International Affairs Center (GLORIA)
Place of publication: Herzliya
Country of publication: Israel
Publication subject: Asian Studies, Political Science--International Relations
Document feature: Tables References
Copyright: Copyright Global Research in International Affairs Center (GLORIA) Fall 2015

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2. The Arab "Feminist" Spring?........................................................................................................................ 2

3. United States Security Interests, the Arab Spring, and Iran......................................................................... 5

4. Is the Arab Spring Israel's Winter?............................................................................................................... 6

5. The Arab Spring............................................................................................................................................ 12

6. Paradox of Neoliberalism: Arab Spring's Implications on North Korea........................................................ 23

7. Arab Fall or Arab Winter?............................................................................................................................. 34

8. Turkey and the Arab Spring.......................................................................................................................... 35

10. The Arab Spring Is No Facebook Revolution............................................................................................. 44

11. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS MAKING SHARIA "A" OR "THE" CHIEF SOURCE OF

13. Review Essay: After the Arab Spring......................................................................................................... 83

14. Arap Bahari (The Arab Spring)................................................................................................................... 93

15. THE ARAB SPRING: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS................................................................................. 96

19. Palestine After the Arab Spring.................................................................................................................. 147

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Subject: Nonfiction; Women; Arabs; Arab Americans; Immigration;

Location: United States US

Publication title: Journal of Third World Studies

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The Arab "Feminist" Spring?

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United States Security Interests, the Arab Spring, and Iran

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