OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS ARTICLE 1161
dated 8 January 1987 on March 10, 1987.
G.R. No. 78911-25 December 11, 1987
CHARMINA B. BANAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC-Quezon City,
Branch 105 and Rosario Claudia respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review and set aside the orders of the
respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City dated (1) 8 January
1987 which rejected the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private
prosecutor in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-40909 to Q-40913 where respondent
Rosario Claudio is the accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; and
(2) 31 March 1987 which denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the order dated 8 January 1987; and for mandamus to allow Atty. Bustos to
enter his appearance as private prosecutor in the aforestated criminal cases.
It appears that fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 40909-40913, were filed against respondent Claudio before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City and originally assigned to Branch 84.
The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself when respondent Claudio,
through counsel, filed a petition for recuse dated May 19,1986.
The cases were re-raffled and consequently assigned on June 25, 1986 to
Branch 105 which was then presided over by Judge Johnico G. Serquina
During these proceedings, respondent Claudio was finally arraigned on
November 20, 1986 where she pleaded not guilty to the charges. Pre-trial was
then set on January 8, 1987.
In the meantime Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. replaced Judge Serquina as
presiding judge of Branch 105.
On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting the
appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground that
the charge is for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not
provide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against
property but public order."
The petitioner, through counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
Respondent Claudio filed her opposition to the motion for reconsideration on
March 25, 1987.
In an order dated 31 March 1987, the respondent court denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Court.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent Court acted with
grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in rejecting the
appearance of a private prosecutor.
The respondents make capital of the fact that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
punishes the act of knowingly issuing worthless checks as an offense against
public order. As such, it is argued that it is the State and the public that are the
principal complainants and, therefore, no civil indemnity is provided for by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which a private party or prosecutor may intervene.
On the other hand, the petitioner, relying on the legal axiom that "Every man
criminally liable is also civilly liable," contends that indemnity may be recovered
from the offender regardless of whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 so
provides.
A careful study of the concept of civil liability allows a solution to the issue in
the case at bar.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art.
100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional
theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (
1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose
law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose
person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission. However, this rather broad
and general provision is among the most complex and controversial topics in
criminal procedure. It can be misleading in its implications especially where
the same act or omission may be treated as a crime in one instance and as a
tort in another or where the law allows a separate civil action to proceed
independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it is
intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy
the generally accepted notion that, the civil liability actually arises from the
crime when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not. While an act or omission is
felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so
much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing
things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability
is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole
the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In
other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same
felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct
and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the
foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be
criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is
punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to
another. (See Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised
Edition, pp. 246-247).
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides,
indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage,
loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another.
The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the
penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of
Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692). Every
crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty
party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the
damage, and indemnification for the losses. (United States v. Bernardo, 19
Phil. 265).
Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered
the offenses committed against her. Not only the State but the petitioner too is
entitled to relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to protect. She
was assured that the checks were good when she parted with money, property
or services. She suffered with the State when the checks bounced.
In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, December 18, 1986) and the
cases consolidated therewith, we held that "The effects of a worthless check
transcend the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
and touch the interests of the community at large." Yet, we too recognized the
wrong done to the private party defrauded when we stated therein that "The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or the holder, but also an
injury to the public."
Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of
the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless
check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to
recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas
Pambansa Big. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-
handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the
remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a
separate civil suit. To do so, may leave the offended party unable to recover
even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant
drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to
provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to
40913 is justified not only for the protection of her interests but also in the
interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by
the Constitution (Section 16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987). A
separate civil action for the purpose would only prove to be costly,
burdensome, and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final
disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where
petitioner's rights may be fulIy adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial
court, resort t o a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.
WHEREFORE the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court is
ordered to permit the intervention of a private prosecutor in behalf of petitioner
Charmina B. Banal, in the prosecution of the civil aspect of Criminasl Cases
Nos. 40909 to 40913. The temporary restraining order issued by this court a
quo for further proceedings. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 82146 January 22, 1990
EULOGIO OCCENA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, Presiding Judge, Branch X of the Regional
Trial Court Sixth Judicial Region, San Jose, Antique; THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Honorable Provincial Fiscal of
Antique; and CRISTINA VEGAFRIA, respondents.
Comelec Legal Assistance Office for petitioner.
Comelec Legal Assistance Officer for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
On May 31, 1979, herein petitioner Eulogio Occena instituted before the
Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom, San Remigio Belison,
Province of Antique, Criminal Case No. 1717, a criminal complaint for Grave
Oral Defamation against herein private respondent Cristina Vegafria for
allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words
and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor,
malugus, Hudas," which, freely translated, mean: "You are a foolish Barangay
Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas" and other words and statements of
similar import which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his
person and honor.
Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. Trial
thereafter ensued, at which petitioner, without reserving his right to file a
separate civil action for damages actively intervened thru a private prosecutor.
After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral
Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No
damages were awarded to petitioner in view of the trial court's opinion that "the
facts and circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not
warrant the awarding of moral damages." 1
Disagreeing, petitioner sought relief from the Regional Trial Court, which in a
decision dated March 16, 1987 disposed of petitioner's appeal as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the civil aspect of the lower
court's decision of April 20, 1981 subject of this appeal, for lack of
merit, is hereby DENIED.
After the decision shall have become final, remand the records of this
case to the court of origin, Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Sibalom, San Remigio-Belison, Antique, for the execution of its
decision on the criminal aspect.
SO ORDERED. 2 from a judgment convicting the accused, two (2) appeals may, accordingly, be
Petitioner is now before us by way of a petition for review on certiorari seeking
to annul the RTC decision for being contrary to Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code providing that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable, and Article 2219 of the New Civil Code providing that moral
damages may be recovered in libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
He submits that public respondent RTC erred in relying on the cases ofRoa
vs. de la Cruz, 107 Phil. 10 and Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91
Phil. 672 cited therein. He differentiates said cases from the case at bar by
saying that in the case of Roa, the decision of the trial court had become final
before Maria C. Roa instituted a civil action for damages; whereas in the
instant case, the decision of the trial court has not yet become final by reason
of the timely appeal interposed by him and no civil action for damages has
been instituted by petitioner against private respondent for the same
cause. Tan, on the other hand, contemplates of two actions, one criminal and
one civil, and the prosecution of the criminal case had resulted in the acquittal
of the accused, which is not the situation here where the civil aspect was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action in accordance with Section 1, Rule
111, of the Rules of Court.
Private respondent for her part argues that the decision of the trial court carries
with it the final adjudication of her civil liability. Since petitioner chose to
actively intervene in the criminal action without reserving his right to file a
separate civil action for damages, he assumed the risk that in the event he
failed to recover damages he cannot appeal from the decision of the lower
court.
We find merit in the petition.
The issues confronting us in the instant petition is whether or not the decision
of the Second Municipal Trial Court of Sibalom, San-Remigio-Belison,
Province of Antique constitutes the final adjudication on the merits of private
respondent's civil liability; and whether or not petitioner is entitled to an award
of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found
by the trial court to be defamatory.
The decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court as affirmed by the Regional
Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 1709 cannot be considered as a final
adjudication on the civil liability of private respondent simply because said
decision has not yet become final due to the timely appeal filed by petitioner
with respect to the civil liability of the accused in said case. It was only the
unappealed criminal aspect of the case which has become final.
In the case of People vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287, we categorically stated that
taken. The accused may seek a review of said judgment, as regards both civil
and criminal actions; while the complainant may appeal with respect only to
the civil action, either because the lower court has refused to award damages
or because the award made is unsatisfactory to him. The right of either to
appeal or not to appeal in the event of conviction of the accused is not
dependent upon the other. Thus, private respondent's theory that in actively
intervening in the criminal action, petitioner waived his right to appeal from the
decision that may be rendered therein, is incorrect and inaccurate. Petitioner
may, as he did, appeal from the decision on the civil aspect which is deemed
instituted with the criminal action and such appeal, timely taken, prevents the
decision on the civil liability from attaining finality.
We tackle the second issue by determining the basis of civil liability arising
from crime. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses are governed by
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "(E)very person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable," in relation to Article 2177 of
the Civil Code on quasi-delict, the provisions for independent civil actions in
the Chapter on Human Relations and the provisions regulating damages, also
found in the Civil Code.
Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly
liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual
character: (1) as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of
the social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by
the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage,
contempt and others wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender
either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private
person injured by the crime. 3 In the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the
civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done
intentional or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. 4
In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight oral defamation
and sentenced to a fine of P50.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, but no civil liability arising from the felonious act of the accused
was adjudged. This is erroneous. As a general rule, a person who is found to
be criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he
lives and the individual member of the society or private person who was
injured or damaged by the punishable act or omission. The offense of which
private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil
liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was
caused to a private person. There is here an offended party, whose main
contention precisely is that he suffered damages in view of the defamatory
words and statements uttered by private respondent, in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages and the further sum of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as exemplary damages.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages
in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation This provision of law
establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to
recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation.
The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary
damages.
It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown. And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of
publication 5 subject to certain exceptions which are not present in the case at
bar.
Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and
Judas is clearly an imputation of defects in petitioner's character sufficient to
cause him embarrassment and social humiliation. Petitioner testified to the
feelings of shame and anguish he suffered as a result of the incident
complained of. 6 It is patently error for the trial court to overlook this vital piece
of evidence and to conclude that the "facts and circumstances of the case as
adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages."
Having misapprehended the facts, the trial court's findings with respect thereto
is not conclusive upon us.
From the evidence presented, we rule that for the injury to his feelings and
reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner is entitled to moral damages
in the sum of P5,000.00 and a further sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to pay
petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00
as exemplary damages. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Corts JJ., concur
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural
Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated
January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald
Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of
plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill,
with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of
the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally
prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1,
Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or
in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill,
because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration
of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the
following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on
January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments
therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-
founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby
reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21,
Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are
presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING
THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT:
I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A
VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE
111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS
NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194
OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT
CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS
RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT
THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case
No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent
to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored
Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do
not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And
so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his
father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed
the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues
presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and
further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or
negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the
nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mereculpa or
fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the
works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the
same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but
also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that
case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it
was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902
of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and
not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the
death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore
a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject
matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability
arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and
clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal
case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued
for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically
applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V.
House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because
of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages
in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902
of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should
ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are
announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it
might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the
Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little
scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and
damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even the
slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of
civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere
would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to
impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth
life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-
grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish
Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which
can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73
Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the
Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise
to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and
for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action
for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime,
forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed
by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked
to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et
seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the
stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural
 channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a
crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the
better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and
additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil
action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a
criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his
counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p.
621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the
foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal
Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal
that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact
it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made
therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919,
supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed,
Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions
in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the
subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And
it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice
Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of
the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the
ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana orquasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because
Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the
original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which
was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not
punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa
aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the
penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to
said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
"Obligations derived fromquasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of
Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More
precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177)
through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider
the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of
the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient
origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable
by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for
civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-
delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.",
(Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that
upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the
intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil
Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a
civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil
responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule
111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the
spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"-
to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it
refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but
also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here
hold, in reiteration of Garcia, thatculpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has
not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to
the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation
by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our
considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already
free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the
child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place
"by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant
to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall
terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor
to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow
money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father
or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a
situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the
joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article
2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in
order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other
hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated
by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of
the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter
into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See
Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else
invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not
relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does
not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married
child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity,
the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is
ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against
appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is
blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus
expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception of
liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in
Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See
article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil
action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an
adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil.
576, 579).
G.R. No. 80194 March 21, 1989
EDGAR JARANTILLA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING, respondents.
Corazon Miraflores and Vicente P. Billena for petitioner.
Manuel S. Gemarino for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-
swiped by a vehicle in the evening of July 7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo
City" 1 The respondent Court of Appeals concurred in the findings of the court a quo that the said
vehicle which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car, was then driven by petitioner Edgar
Jarantilla along said street toward the direction of the provincial capitol, and that private respondent
sustained physical injuries as a consequence. 2
Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence in Criminal Case No.
47207 thereof. 3 Private respondent, as the complaining witness therein, did not reserve his right
to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through a
private prosecutor. 4 Petitioner was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt".5
On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against the
petitioner in the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, 6 docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 9976, and which civil action involved the same subject matter and act
complained of in Criminal Case No. 47027. 7 In his answer filed therein, the petitioner alleged as special
and affirmative detenses that the private respondent had no cause of action and, additionally, that the
latter's cause of action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207 inasmuch as
when said criminal case was instituted the civil liability was also deemed instituted since therein plaintiff
failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively participated in the criminal case. 8
Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial
court issued on April 3, 1975 an order of denial, with the suggestion that
"(t)o enrich our jurisprudence, it is suggested that the defendant brings (sic)
this ruling to the Supreme Court by certiorari or other appropriate remedy,
to review the ruling of the court". 9
On June 17, 1975, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-
40992, 10 assailing the aforesaid order of the trial court. Said petition was dismissed for lack of merit
in the Court's resolution of July 23, 1975, and a motion for reconsideration thereof was denied for the
same reason in a resolution of October 28, 1975. 11
After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of
the herein private respondent and ordering herein petitioner to pay the
former the sum of P 6,920.00 for hospitalization, medicines and so forth,
P2,000.00 for other actual expenses, P25,000.00 for moral damages,
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and costs. 12
On July 29, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals 13 affirmed the decision of the
lower court except as to the award for moral damages which it reduced from P25,000.00 to P18,000.00.
A motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court on September 18, 1987. 14
The main issue for resolution by Us in the present recourse is whether the
private respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal action for
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and who participated in the
prosecution thereof without reserving the civil action arising from the act or
omission complained of, can file a separate action for civil liability arising
from the same act or omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted
in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was
adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal.
Prefatorily, We note that petitioner raises a collateral issue by faulting the
respondent court for refusing to resolve an assignment of error in his
appeal therein, said respondent court holding that the main issue had been
passed upon by this Court in G.R. No. L-40992 hereinbefore mentioned. It
is petitioner's position that the aforesaid two resolutions of the Court in said
case, the first dismissing the petition and the second denying the motion
for reconsideration, do not constitute the "law of the case' which would
control the subsequent proceed ings in this controversy.
1. We incline favorably to petitioner's submission on this score.
The "doctrine of the law of the case" has no application at the aforesaid
posture of the proceedings when the two resolutions were handed down.
While it may be true that G.R. No. L-40992 may have involved some of the
issues which were thereafter submitted for resolution on the merits by the
two lower courts, the proceedings involved there was one for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus assailing an interlocutory order of the court a
quo, specifically, its order denying therein defendants motion to dismiss.
This Court, without rendering a specific opinion or explanation as to the
legal and factual bases on which its two resolutions were predicated,
simply dismissed the special civil action on that incident for lack of merit. It
may very well be that such resolution was premised on the fact that the
Court, at that stage and on the basis of the facts then presented, did not
consider that the denial order of the court a quo was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. 15 To repeat, no rationale for such resolutions having been expounded on
the merits of that action, no law of the case may be said to have been laid down in G.R. No. L-40992 to
justify the respondent court's refusal to consider petitioner's claim that his former acquittal barred the
separate action.
'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on
a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once
irrevocably established, as the controlling legal rule of
decision between the same parties in the same case continues to
be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not,
so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court (21 C.J.S.
330). (Emphasis supplied). 16
It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter
of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case
constitutes the law of that particular case . . . (Emphasis supplied). 17
It is a rule of general application that the decision of an appellate
court in a case is the law of the case on the points presented
throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the case in both the
 trial and the appellate courts, and no question necessarily involved
and decided on that appeal will be considered on a second appeal
or writ of error in the same case, provided the facts and issues are
substantially the same as those on which the first question rested
and, according to some authorities, provided the decision is on the
merits . . . 18
2. With the foregoing ancillary issue out of the way, We now consider the
principal plaint of petitioner.
Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or omission
(in this case, the negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create
two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex
delictoand civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can
give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these
two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the
caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot
recover damages under both types of liability.19
We also note the reminder of petitioner that in Roa vs. De la Cruz, et al., 20 it
was held that where the offended party elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in
the criminal case through her intervention as a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein
constituted a bar to the subsequent civil action based upon the same cause. It is meet, however, not to
lose sight of the fact that the criminal action involved therein was for serious oral defamation which, while
within the contemplation of an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, constitutes only
a penal omen and cannot otherwise be considered as a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. And while petitioner draws attention to the supposed reiteration of the
Roa doctrine in the later case of Azucena vs. Potenciano, et al., 21 this time involving damage to property
through negligence as to make out a case of quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code,
such secondary reliance is misplaced since the therein plaintiff Azucena did not intervene in the criminal
action against defendant Potenciano. The citation of Roa in the later case ofAzucena was, therefore,
clearly obiter and affords no comfort to petitioner.
These are aside from the fact that there have been doctrinal, and even
statutory, 22 changes on the matter of civil actions arising from criminal offenses and quasi-delicts.
We will reserve our discussion on the statutory aspects for another case and time and, for the nonce,
We will consider the doctrinal developments on this issue.
In the case under consideration, private respondent participated and
intervened in the prosecution of the criminal suit against petitioner. Under
the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused
on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronounce ment on the civil
liability of the accused 23 and the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the
trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. 24
Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil aciton after
such acquittal. This is allowed under Article 29 of the Civil Code. We have
ruled in the relatively recent case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc.,
et al. 25 that:
In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was
acquitted on the ground that 'his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt' the plaintiff-appellant has the right to institute a
separate civil action to recover damages from the defendants-
appellants (See Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113). The well-
settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still
be civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil
liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist'. (Padilla
vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 cited in People vs. Rogelio
Ligon y Tria, et al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987; Filomeno
Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January
7, 1988). The ruling is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code which
provides:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same
act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence ...26
Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the
failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable,
as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right
to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The
rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it
becomes no longer enforceable. 27
Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered
through the application of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising
from the criminal offense. There is persuasive logic in the view that, under
such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil
liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which
presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction of
the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the
causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a
civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which
action can be proved by mere preponderance of evidence. 28 Complementary
to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages
is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission.
The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent supports
and is constitutive of a case for a quasi-delict committed by the petitioner,
thus:
3. That in the evening of July 7, 197l at about 7:00 o'clock, the
plaintiff crossed Iznart Street from his restaurant situated at 220
lznart St., Iloilo City, Philippines, on his way to a meeting of the
Cantonese Club at Aldeguer Street, Iloilo City and while he was
standing on the middle of the street as there were vehicles coming
from the Provincial Building towards Plazoleta Gay, Iloilo City, he
was bumped and sideswiped by Volkswagen car with plate No. B-
2508 W which was on its way from Plazoleta Gay towards the
Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City, which car was being driven by the
defendant in a reckless and negligent manner, at an excessive rate
of speed and in violation of the provisions of the Revised Motor
Vehicle (sic) as amended, in relation to the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code as well as in violation of existing city ordinances,
and by reason of his inexcusable lack of precaution and failure to
act with due negligence and by failing to take into consideration
(sic) his degree of intelligence, the atmospheric conditions of the
place as well as the width, traffic, visibility and other conditions of
lznart Street; 29
Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent
to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the
criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for
damages. 30The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill 31 that
... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
also actually charged criminally, to recover damages on both
scores; and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par.
(c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime
is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused . . .
The aforecited case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al.
involved virtually the same factual situation. The Court, in arriving at the
conclusion hereinbefore quoted, expressly declared that the failure of the
therein plaintiff to reserve his right to file a separate civil case is not fatal;
that his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing a
separate civil action for damages, especially considering that the accused
therein was acquitted because his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt; that the two cases were anchored on two different causes of action,
the criminal case being on a violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code while the subsequent complaint for damages was based on a quasi-
delict; and that in the judgment in the criminal case the aspect of civil
liability was not passed upon and resolved. Consequently, said civil case
may proceed as authorized by Article 29 of the Civil Code.
Our initial adverse observation on a portion of the decision of respondent
court aside, We hold that on the issues decisive of this case it did not err
in sustaining the decision a quo.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001]
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and
MARIA NICOLAS, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, modifying the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No.
066. Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide
through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal
from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate
court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify
private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00
representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral
damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son,
Ruben Nicolas.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information
charging petitioner Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of
Santiago, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge
of an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove
and operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar,
in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without
due regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the
necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property,
causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile
driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No.
918-7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile to
turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said
automobile.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecutions evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted
by the appellate court, showed that:
[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio decided to
catch shrimps at the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased who
told him that they (should) borrow the Ford Fiera of the accused George
Manantan who is also from Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the Ford
Fiera butsaid that the accused also wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal
Ambrocio and the deceased dropped by the accused at the Manantan
Technical School. They drank beer there before they proceeded to the farm
using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm they consumed one (more)
case of beer. At about 12:00 oclock noon they went home. Then at about 2:00
or 3:00 oclock that afternoon, (defense witness Miguel) Tabangin and (Ruben)
Nicolas and the accused returned to the house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a
duck. They cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case of
beer. They ate and drank until about 8:30 in the evening when the accused
invited them to go bowling. They went to Santiago, Isabela on board the Toyota
Starlet of the accused who drove the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling
Lanes at Mabini, Santiago, Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant
alley. While waiting for a vacant alley they drank one beer each. After waiting
for about 40 minutes and still no alley became vacant the accused invited his
companions to go to the LBC Night Club. They had drinks and took some lady
partners at the LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and proceeded to a
nearby store where they ate arroz caldoand then they decided to go
home. Again the accused drove the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused
in the front seat while the deceased and Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back seat
with the deceased immediately behind the accused. The accused was driving
at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour along the Maharlika Highway at
Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway (although
according to Charles Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80 to 90
kilometers per hours on [the] wrong lane of the highway because the car was
overtaking a tricycle) when they met a passenger jeepney with bright lights
on. The accused immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and move his
body away from the steering wheel but he was not able to avoid the oncoming
vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at the center of the road.
xxx
As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at
the side of the highway immediately at the approach of the street going to the
Flores Clinic while the jeep swerved across the road so that one half front
portion landed on the lane of the car while the back half portion was at its right
lane five meters away from the point of impact as shown by a sketch (Exhibit
A) prepared by Cudamon the following morning at the Police Headquarters at
the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost consciousness. When he
regained consciousness he was still inside the car (lying) on his belly with the
deceased on top of him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and then he
was pulled out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards, the deceased who was still
unconscious was pulled out from the car. Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the
deceased were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died that night
(Exhibit B) while Ambrocio suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs. [2]
The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially
the same as that of the prosecution, except that defense witness Miguel
Tabangin declared that Manantan did not drink beer that night. As to the
accident, the defense claimed that:
The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the
center of the road at about 30 kilometers per hour at the National Highway at
Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, when suddenly a passenger jeepney with bright
lights which was coming from the opposite direction and running very fast
suddenly swerve(d) to the cars lane and bumped the car which turned turtle
twice and rested on its top at the right edge of the road while the jeep stopped
across the center of the road as shown by a picture taken after the incident
(Exhibit 1) and a sketch (Exhibit 3) drawn by the accused during his rebuttal
testimony. The car was hit on the drivers side. As a result of the collision, the
accused and Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio were injured while Ruben
Nicolas died at the Flores Clinic where they were all brought for treatment.[3]
In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the
trial court decided Criminal Case No. 066 in petitioners favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the
accused NOT GUILTY of the crime charged and hereby acquits him.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the
civil aspect of the trial courts judgment. In their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 19240, the Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision appealed from
be modified and that appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages.
On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240
in favor of the Nicolas spouses, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-
appellee is hereby held civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving
his car which was the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, and
sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants in the amount of P174,400.00 for
the death of Ruben Nicolas,
SO ORDERED.[5]
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the
accident occurred, Manantan was in a state of intoxication, due to his having
consumed all in all, a total of at least twelve (12) bottles of beerbetween 9 a.m.
and 11 p.m.[6] It found that petitioners act of driving while intoxicated was a
clear violation of Section 53 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A.
No. 4136)[7] and pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code, [8] a statutory
presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioners act of violating the
Traffic Code is negligence in itself because the mishap, which occurred, was
the precise injury sought to be prevented by the regulation.[9]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its
resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the motion.
Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the
following issues for our consideration:
FIRST THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING
TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE
ACCUSEDS (PETITIONERS) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND
THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING UPON THE
SAME ISSUE AGAIN.
SECOND THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
AWARD DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
CONSIDERING THAT THE NON-DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR
AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA,
BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH THE PETITIONERS
ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE CIVIL ACTION WAS
IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS
NO EXPRESS WAIVER OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO
INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE
TRIAL COURT.
THIRD THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES
MARCELINO NICOLAS AND MARIA NICOLAS v. GEORGE
MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED
WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES NOT HAVING
BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.
In brief, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the
Court of Appeals as to his negligence or reckless imprudence?
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioners acquittal did not
extinguish his civil liability?
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply
the Manchester doctrine to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240?
On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not
have disturbed the findings of the trial court on the lack of negligence or
reckless imprudence under the guise of determining his civil liability. He argues
that the trial courts finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the
basis for his acquittal, and not reasonable doubt. He submits that in finding
him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only placed his
acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in double jeopardy.
Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that
petitioners guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state
in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or
negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted him on reasonable
doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings
of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and
damages.
Preliminarily, petitioners claim that the decision of the appellate court
awarding indemnity placed him in double jeopardy is misplaced. The
constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.[10] When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated
either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of
the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical
offense.[11]This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following
elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.[12] In the instant case,
petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No.
066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of
acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to
the Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal
Case No. 066.Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with
a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly
show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on
appeal. In modifying the lower courts judgment, the appellate court did not
modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal
case against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was
no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioners claim of having been placed in
double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil
liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is
not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the
door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator
of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission.[13] There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question,
and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds
other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule
111 of the Rules of Court.[14] The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of
the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. [15] This is the
situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,[16] where the civil action
for damages is for the same act or omission. Although the two actions have
different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those
discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal
proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact
there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or
omission.[17] The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and
secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding
herein petitioners acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article
29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioners
negligence or reckless imprudence.
On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding
that he was neither criminally negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as
his civil liability is predicated on the criminal offense, he argues that when the
latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded. He concludes that his
acquittal bars any civil action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial courts judgment
shows that the judgment of acquittal did not clearly and categorically declare
the non-existence of petitioners negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue
that his acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article
29 of the Civil Code to come into play.
Our scrutiny of the lower courts decision in Criminal Case No. 066
supports the conclusion of the appellate court that the acquittal was based on
reasonable doubt; hence, petitioners civil liability was not extinguished by his
discharge. We note the trial courts declaration that did not discount the
possibility that the accused was really negligent. However, it found that a
hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself
before the Court and since said hypothesis is consistent with the recordthe
Courts mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction.[18] The foregoing clearly
shows that petitioners acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt
had not been established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the
same act or omission lies.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in
awarding damages and indemnity, since private respondents did not pay the
corresponding filing fees for their claims for damages when the civil case was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Petitioner submits that the non-
payment of filing fees on the amount of the claim for damages violated the
doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149
SCRA 562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated March 24,
1988.[19] He avers that since Manchester held that The Court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees,
the appellate court was without jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R. CV No.
19240, much less award indemnity and damages.
Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to
the instant case. They ask us to note that the criminal case, with which the civil
case was impliedly instituted, was filed on July 1, 1983, while
the Manchester requirements as to docket and filing fees took effect only with
the promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on March 24,
1988. Moreover, the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela
did not allege the amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then
customarily or legally required that the civil damages sought be stated in the
information, the trial court had no basis in assessing the filing fees and
demanding payment thereof. Moreover, assuming that the Manchester ruling
is applied retroactively, under the Rules of Court, the filing fees for the
damages awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no violation
of the Manchester doctrine to speak of.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution
of civil actions with criminal actions was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of
the 1964 Rules of Court.[20] As correctly pointed out by private respondents,
under said rule, it was not required that the damages sought by the offended
party be stated in the complaint or information. With the adoption of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111, Section 1 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July
7, 1988, it is now required that:
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by
way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for
such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.
The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure at the time private respondents appealed the civil aspect of Criminal
Case No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature of a curative
statute, the amendment applies retroactively and affects pending actions as in
this case.
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the
criminal action, the actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this
case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to
be paid only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temperate, or
exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or information, or if they are
not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. [21] Recall that the
information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of
damages. Considering that the Rules of Criminal Procedure effectively
guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the
judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the
institution of the criminal action. The filing fees are deemed paid from the filing
of the criminal complaint or information. We therefore find no basis for
petitioners allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and
that the appellate court acquired no jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240
promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24,
1992, denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 48541 August 21, 1989
BERNABE CASTILLO (In his own behalf, and in behalf of SERAPION
CASTILLO, who has since then become deceased, and EULOGIO
CASTILLO, his minor child) and GENEROSA GALANG
CASTILLO,petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITO ROSARIO and
CRESENCIA ROSARIO, respondents-appellees.
Lino R. Eugenio for petitioners.
Eduardo G. Rosario for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the
February 13, 1978 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52567-R,
entitled "Bernabe Castillo, et al. v. Juanita Rosario, et al," affirming the
dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the complaint for damages
filed by petitioners against private respondents. Said dismissal was decreed
on the basis of the evidence before the trial court as well as the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR, entitled "People v. Juanito
Rosario."
Petitioners and private respondents figured in a vehicular accident on May 2,
1965 at Bagac, Villasis, Pangasinan, which caused injuries to their persons
and damage to their respective vehicles.
The parties have conflicting versions as to what actually transpired on that
fateful day; each party pointing to the negligence of the other as the proximate
cause of the accident. Thus, as expected in cases like this, the main issue is:
Who was at fault? According to the petitioners, the accident happened as
follows: 1
On May 2, 1985, at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner
Bernabe Castillo was driving his jeep with Plate No. J-4649 '64 Manila
on the right lane of the McArthur Highway with Generosa Castillo, his
wife, father Serapion Castillo, seated in front and Eulogio Castillo, then
a minor child, as passengers, bound and northward for Binmaley,
Pangasinan at the rate of 25 kilometers per hour. Just past San
Nicolas bridge, Villasis, he noticed, from a distance of 120 meters
more or less, a speeding oncoming car with Plate No. L-27045 '64
Cavite, along the same lane (facing north) he was driving, overtaking
a cargo truck ahead of it. He switched on his headlights to signal the
car to return to its own right lane as the way was not clear for it to
overtake the truck.
The car turned out to be driven by the private respondent, Juanito
Rosario, with his wife, Cresencia Rosario. The signal was
disregarded, as the car proceeded on its direction southward on the
right lane (facing north).lwph1.t In order to evade the impending
collision, petitioner Bernabe Castillo swerved his jeep to the right
towards the shoulder and applied on the brakes, and leaving his feet
on it, even, immediately after the impact. The car rested on the
shoulder of the right lane. The jeep's rear left wheel was on the road,
leaving short tiremarks behind it; while the car left long tire-marks,
specially its left rear wheel. The jeep suffered a shattered windshield,
pushed-in radiator. The left mid-portion of its bumper badly dented.
The car had a flat tire on its right front wheel; its right fender badly
dented as the headlamp on top of it. The bumber stooped downward,
because it went thru under the bumper of the jeep.
The driver of the jeep, including his passengers suffered physical
injuries. Bernabe Castillo, with the patella of his right knee, fractured,
suffered serious physical injuries, in other parts of his body. Serapion
Castillo whose head crushed through the windshield, was nearly
beheaded, while the other two passengers suffered multiple slight and
less serious injuries.
Private respondents, on the other hand, have their own version of the accident
and thus asseverate as follows: 2
Sometime in the early afternoon of May 2, 1965, the private
respondents, together with their small daughter, were on their way
from San Carlos City (Pangasinan) to Olongapo City where they
resided at the time and where Juanito Rosario, a member of the US
Navy, had been temporarily stationed. They rode in the family car.
(TSN, C. Rosario, p. 35; J. Rosario, pp. 2, 12 Annex "D", "Request for
Admission")
At or about 2:30 p.m. of the same date, as Juanito Rosario who was
driving the car, and his two passengers, were along MacArthur
Highway in Barrio Bacag, Villasis, Pangasinan, going towards the
south, they saw ahead of them a big heavily loaded cargo truck. (TSN,
B. Castillo, p. 532, Annex "B", "Request for Admission") The truck was
moving very slowly because of its heavy load so that Juanito Rosario
decided to overtake it. But before doing so, he first saw to it that the
road was clear and as additional precautionary measure, he blew his
horn several times at the time he was overtaking the truck. (TSN,
Juanito Rosario, pp. 4, 11; C. Rosario, pp. 31-41, Annex "B", "Request
for Admission")
Then as the car was about to overtake the slow moving cargo truck,
the car's front left tire suddenly burst due to pressure causing the car
to swerve to the left and naturally making steering and control difficult.
Because of the tendency of the car to veer towards the left due to the
blown out tire, the driver steered the car towards the direction where
he could find a safe place to park and fix the tire. He finally brought
the car to a halt at the left shoulder of the road (facing south). (TSN,
C. Rosario, p. 31; J. Rosario, pp. 4, 17, Annex "D", "Request for
Admission")
But barely had the said defendant parked his car on the left shoulder
of the road and just as he was about to get off to fix the flat tire, the
car was suddenly bumped by the jeep driven by Bernabe Castillo
which came from the opposite direction. (TSN, C. Rosario, p. 32; J.
Rosario, p. 6, "Request for Admission") Both vehicles were damaged,
the car suffering the heavier damage. (Please see Annex "C",
"Request for Admission") Passengers of the jeep sustained injuries
while those of the car were badly shaken.
On June 30, 1965, a civil case for the recovery of damages for the injuries
sustained by petitioners and for the damage to their vehicle as a result of the
collision, was instituted by the petitioners in the Court of First Instance of
Manila. While this case was pending, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed
an information dated September 29, 1965 against Juanito Rosario, private
respondent herein, for double physical injuries; double less serious physical
injuries; and damage to property thru reckless imprudence, in the Court of First
Instance of Urdaneta. Respondent Juanito Rosario was prosecuted and
convicted by the trial court in the criminal case. He appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which rendered a decision 3 acquitting him from the crime charged
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In the meantime, private respondents thru counsel, filed a "Request for
Admission" 4 on April 3, 1972 in the civil case, requesting petitioners to admit
the truthfulness of the facts set forth therein as well as the correctness and
genuineness of the documents attached thereto. On May 5,1972, petitioners
filled a "Manifestation", 5 admitting the allegations in the "Request for
Admission" with some qualifications. Later, both parties submitted their
respective memoranda.
On the basis of the testimonies and evidence submitted by the petitioners, as
well as the records of the criminal case attached in the "Request for
Admission" of the private respondents, the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered a decision 6 on December 28, 1972, dismissing the complaint of the
petitioners against private respondents as well as the counterclaim of private
respondents against the petitioners. On January 24, 1973, petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision 7 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. 8 The petitioners-appellants
raise in issue before Us the following questions, to wit:
1) Is the decision of the Court of Appeals, where its dispositive part,
or "fallo", states that the guilt of the (appellant) accused was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt final and conclusive, on an action for
damages based on quasi-delict?;
2) Are the testimonies given in a criminal case, without strict
compliance with Section 41 Rule 130 and without opportunity to cross
examine the witnesses who made these testimonies, admissible
evidence in a subsequent case and can be the basis of a valid
decision?;
3) Is an action for damages based on quasi-delict barred by a decision
of the appellate court acquitting the accused, the body of which lays
the blame on the plaintiff but in its dispositive part, declares the guilt
of the accused not proved beyond reasonable doubt ? 9
The main thrust of this petition for review which stems from a cause of action
based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana (being a recovery for damages arising
from the vehicular accident), is that petitioners were deprived of due process
because their civil action was decided on the basis of private respondent
Juanita Rosario's acquittal in the criminal case for reckless imprudence.
There is no dispute that the subject action for damages, being civil in nature,
is separate and distinct from the criminal aspect, necessitating only a
preponderance of evidence. According to a number of cases, 10 a quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a
substantively all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from a delict or crime. A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from
a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasidelictos
or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case. 11
In the case of Azucena v. Potenciano, L-14028, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 468,
470-471, this Court held:
... in the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries ..., the judgment of acquittal does not operate to
extinguish the civil liability of the defendant based on the same
incident. The civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case
according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no
logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action
contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal
prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
But this rule is not without exception. Thus, Section 2 (c) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration from a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not
exist.
In a previous case, CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR, People v. Rosario, the Court of
Appeals after a painstaking analysis of. (a) the testimonial evidence; (b) the
relative positions of the two vehicles as depicted in the sketches; (c) the
distance of each of the two vehicles from the cemented edge of the road; (d)
the point of impact; (e) the visible tire marks, and (f) the extent of the damage
caused upon each of the two vehicles, ruled that it was the driver of the jeep
and not the accused driver of the car who was negligent and accordingly
acquitted the latter. 12
Negligence, being the source and foundation of actions of quasi-delict, is the
basis for the recovery of damages. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals
found that no negligence was committed by Juanito Rosario to warrant an
award of damages to the petitioners.
Respondent Appellate Court states:
In acquitting defendant-appellee Juanito Rosario in CA-G.R. No.
07684-CR on October 28, 1968, this Court held that the collision was
not due to the negligence of Juanito Rosario but it was Castillo's own
act of driving the jeep to the shoulder [of the road] where the car was
that was actually the proximate cause of the collision.' (Ibid., p. 183)
With this finding, this Court actually exonerated appellee Juanito
Rosario from civil liability. Since plaintiffs-appellants' civil action is
predicated upon Juanito Rosario's alleged negligence which does not
exist, it follows that his acquittal in the criminal action, which is already
final, carried with it the extinction of civil responsibility arising
therefrom. (Corpus vs. Paje, 28 SCRA 1062, 1064, 1067; Faraon vs.
Priela, 24 SCRA 582, 583; De Soriano vs. Albornoz, 98 Phil. 785,
787788; Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672, 675). 13
It was the Court of Appeals findings that the collision was not due to the
negligence of Juanita Rosario but rather it was Castillo's own act of driving the
jeep to the shoulder of the road where the car was, which was actually the
proximate cause of the collision. With this findings, the Court of Appeals
exonerated Juanito Rosario from civil liability on the ground that the alleged
negligence did not exist.
As earlier stated, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals was an
affirmation of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the
trial of the case before the Court of First Instance, the private respondents
were not present, in view of the fact that they were out of the country at that
time. Their counsel introduced as part of their evidence, the records in the
criminal case, in accordance with Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. 14 These records were attached to their "Request for Admission" and
were substantially admitted by petitioners. The said records were mostly
composed of transcripts of the hearing in the criminal case. Petitioners raised,
as one of their objections, the propriety and correctness of admitting and
adopting these transcripts as part of the record in the civil case. According to
them, this is a violation of Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, on the
ground that petitioners were not given the opportunity to cross-examine. We
have to disagree. A careful reading of the transcripts would reveal that then
counsel for petitioners, Atty. Nicodemo Ferrer, actively participated during the
proceedings of the criminal case. He raised various objections, 15 in the course
of the trial. Petitioners, therefore, thru counsel had the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses.
Thus, the admission of the said testimonies cannot be set aside.
Finally, in a long line of decisions, this Court has held time and again that the
findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and not reviewable by
the Supreme Court. 16
In Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 and Tolentino v. De
Jesus, 56 SCRA 167, it was held that:
Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties
and on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its
findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee;
(6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the finding of facts
of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and
is contradicted by evidence on record.
Finding that the questioned decision does not fall under any of the exceptions
cited above, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions
of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby denied. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 141181 April 27, 2007
SAMSON CHING, Petitioner,
vs.
CLARITA NICDAO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Samson Ching of Complainant
the Decision1 dated November 22, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 23055. The assailed decision acquitted respondent Clarita The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9433 up to 9443 involving
Nicdao of eleven (11) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22, the following details:
otherwise known as "The Bouncing Checks Law." The instant petition pertains
and is limited to the civil aspect of the case as it submits that notwithstanding
respondent Nicdaos acquittal, she should be held liable to pay petitioner Check Private
Reason for
Ching the amounts of the dishonored checks in the aggregate sum Amount Date the
No. Complainant
of P20,950,000.00. Dishonor

Oct. 6, Samson T.Y.

Factual and Procedural Antecedents 0025242 P 20,000,000 DAIF*
1997 Ching

On October 21, 1997, petitioner Ching, a Chinese national, instituted criminal Oct. 6,
0088563 150,000 " "
complaints for eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22 against respondent 1997
Nicdao. Consequently, eleven (11) Informations were filed with the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Province of Oct. 6,
0121424 100,000 " "
Bataan, which, except as to the amounts and check numbers, uniformly read 1997
as follows:
Oct. 6,
0045315 50,000 " "
1997
The undersigned accuses Clarita S. Nicdao of a VIOLATION OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 22, committed as follows: Oct. 6,
0022546 100,000 " "
1997
That on or about October 06, 1997, at Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and Oct. 6,
0088757 100,000 " "
there willfully and unlawfully make or draw and issue Hermosa Savings & Loan 1997
Bank, Inc. Check No. [002524] dated October 06, 1997 in the amount of
Oct. 6,
[P20,000,000.00] in payment of her obligation with complainant Samson T.Y. 0089368 50,000 " "
1997
Ching, the said accused knowing fully well that at the time she issued the said
check she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for Oct. 6,
the payment in full of the said check upon presentment, which check when 0022739 50,000 " "
1997
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason that it was drawn against Oct. 6,
00894810 150,000 " "
insufficient funds and notwithstanding receipt of notice of such dishonor the 1997
said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to pay the value of
the said check in the amount of [P20,000,000.00] or to make arrangement with Oct. 6,
00893511 100,000 " "
the drawee bank for the payment in full of the same within five (5) banking 1997
days after receiving the said notice, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Samson T.Y. Ching in the aforementioned amount of [P20,000,000.00], Oct. 6,
01037712 100,000 " "
Philippine Currency. 1997

CONTRARY TO LAW. At about the same time, fourteen (14) other criminal complaints, also for
violation of BP 22, were filed against respondent Nicdao by Emma Nuguid,
Dinalupihan, Bataan, October 21, 1997. said to be the common law spouse of petitioner Ching. Allegedly fourteen (14)
checks, amounting to P1,150,000.00, were issued by respondent Nicdao to
(Sgd.) SAMSON T.Y. CHING Nuguid but were dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. The Informations were
filed with the same MCTC and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9458 up to
9471.
At her arraignment, respondent Nicdao entered the plea of "not guilty" to all
the charges. A joint trial was then conducted for Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-
9443 and 9458-9471.
For the prosecution in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443, petitioner Ching and
Imelda Yandoc, an employee of the Hermosa Savings & Loan Bank, Inc., were
presented to prove the charges against respondent Nicdao. On direct-
examination,13 petitioner Ching preliminarily identified each of the eleven (11)
Hermosa Savings & Loan Bank (HSLB) checks that were allegedly issued to
him by respondent Nicdao amounting to P20,950,000.00. He identified the
signatures appearing on the checks as those of respondent Nicdao. He
recognized her signatures because respondent Nicdao allegedly signed the
checks in his presence. When petitioner Ching presented these checks for
payment, they were dishonored by the bank, HSLB, for being "DAIF" or "drawn
against insufficient funds."
Petitioner Ching averred that the checks were issued to him by respondent
Nicdao as security for the loans that she obtained from him. Their transaction
began sometime in October 1995 when respondent Nicdao,
proprietor/manager of Vignette Superstore, together with her husband,
approached him to borrow money in order for them to settle their financial
obligations. They agreed that respondent Nicdao would leave the checks
undated and that she would pay the loans within one year. However, when
petitioner Ching went to see her after the lapse of one year to ask for payment,
respondent Nicdao allegedly said that she had no cash.
Petitioner Ching claimed that he went back to respondent Nicdao several times
more but every time, she would tell him that she had no money. Then in
September 1997, respondent Nicdao allegedly got mad at him for being
insistent and challenged him about seeing each other in court. Because of
respondent Nicdao's alleged refusal to pay her obligations, on October 6,
1997, petitioner Ching deposited the checks that she issued to him. As he
earlier stated, the checks were dishonored by the bank for being "DAIF."
Shortly thereafter, petitioner Ching, together with Emma Nuguid, wrote a
demand letter to respondent Nicdao which, however, went unheeded.
Accordingly, they separately filed the criminal complaints against the latter.
On cross-examination,14 petitioner Ching claimed that he had been a
salesman of the La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing for almost ten
(10) years already. As such, he delivered the goods and had a warehouse. He
received salary and commissions. He could not, however, state his exact gross
income. According to him, it increased every year because of his business. He
asserted that aside from being a salesman, he was also in the business of
extending loans to other people at an interest, which varied depending on the
person he was dealing with.
Petitioner Ching confirmed the truthfulness of the allegations contained in the
eleven (11) Informations that he filed against respondent Nicdao. He reiterated
that, upon their agreement, the checks were all signed by respondent Nicdao
but she left them undated. Petitioner Ching admitted that he was the one who
wrote the date, October 6, 1997, on those checks when respondent Nicdao
refused to pay him.
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check (Check No. 002524), petitioner
Ching explained that he wrote the date and amount thereon when, upon his
estimation, the money that he regularly lent to respondent Nicdao beginning
October 1995 reached the said sum. He likewise intimated that prior to 1995,
they had another transaction amounting to P1,200,000.00 and, as security
therefor, respondent Nicdao similarly issued in his favor checks in varying
amounts of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00. When the said amount was fully
paid, petitioner Ching returned the checks to respondent Nicdao.
Petitioner Ching maintained that the eleven (11) checks subject of Criminal
Cases Nos. 9433-9443 pertained to respondent Nicdaos loan transactions
with him beginning October 1995. He also mentioned an instance when
respondent Nicdaos husband and daughter approached him at a casino to
borrow money from him. He lent themP300,000.00. According to petitioner
Ching, since this amount was also unpaid, he included it in the other amounts
that respondent Nicdao owed to him which totaled P20,000,000.00 and wrote
the said amount on one of respondent Nicdaos blank checks that she
delivered to him.
Petitioner Ching explained that from October 1995 up to 1997, he regularly
delivered money to respondent Nicdao, in the amount of P1,000,000.00 until
the total amount reached P20,000,000.00. He did not ask respondent Nicdao
to acknowledge receiving these amounts. Petitioner Ching claimed that he was
confident that he would be paid by respondent Nicdao because he had in his
possession her blank checks. On the other hand, the latter allegedly had no
cause to fear that he would fill up the checks with just any amount because
they had trust and confidence in each other. When asked to produce the piece
of paper on which he allegedly wrote the amounts that he lent to respondent
Nicdao, petitioner Ching could not present it; he reasoned that it was not with
him at that time.
It was also averred by petitioner Ching that respondent Nicdao confided to him
that she told her daughter Janette, who was married to a foreigner, that her
debt to him was only between P3,000,000.00 and P5,000,000.00. Petitioner
Ching claimed that he offered to accompany respondent Nicdao to her
daughter in order that they could apprise her of the amount that she owed him.
Respondent Nicdao refused for fear that it would cause disharmony in the
family. She assured petitioner Ching, however, that he would be paid by her
daughter.
Petitioner Ching reiterated that after the lapse of one (1) year from the time
respondent Nicdao issued the checks to him, he went to her several times to
collect payment. In all these instances, she said that she had no cash. Finally,
in September 1997, respondent Nicdao allegedly went to his house and told
him that Janette was only willing to pay him between P3,000,000.00
and P5,000,000.00 because, as far as her daughter was concerned, that was
the only amount borrowed from petitioner Ching. On hearing this, petitioner
Ching angrily told respondent Nicdao that she should not have allowed her
debt to reach P20,000,000.00 knowing that she would not be able to pay the
full amount.
Petitioner Ching identified the demand letter that he and Nuguid sent to
respondent Nicdao. He explained that he no longer informed her about
depositing her checks on his account because she already made that
statement about seeing him in court. Again, he admitted writing the date,
October 6, 1997, on all these checks.
Another witness presented by the prosecution was Imelda Yandoc, an
employee of HSLB. On direct-examination,15 she testified that she worked as
a checking account bookkeeper/teller of the bank. As such, she received the
checks that were drawn against the bank and verified if they were funded. On
October 6, 1997, she received several checks issued by respondent Nicdao.
She knew respondent Nicdao because the latter maintained a savings and
checking account with them. Yandoc identified the checks subject of Criminal
Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and affirmed that stamped at the back of each was the
annotation "DAIF". Further, per the banks records, as of October 8, 1997, only
a balance of P300.00 was left in respondent Nicdaos checking account
and P645.83 in her savings account. On even date, her account with the bank
was considered inactive.
On cross-examination,16 Yandoc stated anew that respondent Nicdaos
checks bounced on October 7, 1997 for being "DAIF" and her account was
closed the following day, on October 8, 1997. She informed the trial court that
there were actually twenty-five (25) checks of respondent Nicdao that were
dishonored at about the same time. The eleven (11) checks were purportedly
issued in favor of petitioner Ching while the other fourteen (14) were
purportedly issued in favor of Nuguid. Yandoc explained that respondent
Nicdao or her employee would usually call the bank to inquire if there was an
incoming check to be funded.
For its part, the defense proffered the testimonies of respondent Nicdao,
Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. On direct-examination,17 respondent
Nicdao stated that she only dealt with Nuguid. She vehemently denied the
allegation that she had borrowed money from both petitioner Ching and
Nuguid in the total amount ofP22,950,000.00. Respondent Nicdao admitted,
however, that she had obtained a loan from Nuguid but only forP2,100,000.00
and the same was already fully paid. As proof of such payment, she presented
a Planters Bank demand draft dated August 13, 1996 in the amount
of P1,200,000.00. The annotation at the back of the said demand draft showed
that it was endorsed and negotiated to the account of petitioner Ching.
In addition, respondent Nicdao also presented and identified several cigarette
wrappers18 at the back of which appeared computations. She explained that
Nuguid went to the grocery store everyday to collect interest payments. The
principal loan was P2,100,000.00 with 12% interest per day. Nuguid allegedly
wrote the payments for the daily interests at the back of the cigarette wrappers
that she gave to respondent Nicdao.
The principal loan amount of P2,100,000.00 was allegedly delivered by Nuguid
to respondent Nicdao in varying amounts of P100,000.00 and P150,000.00.
Respondent Nicdao refuted the averment of petitioner Ching that prior to 1995,
they had another transaction.
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, respondent Nicdao admitted that
the signature thereon was hers but denied that she issued the same to
petitioner Ching. Anent the other ten (10) checks, she likewise admitted that
the signatures thereon were hers while the amounts and payee thereon were
written by either Jocelyn Nicdao or Melanie Tolentino, who were employees of
Vignette Superstore and authorized by her to do so.
Respondent Nicdao clarified that, except for the P20,000,000.00 check, the
other ten (10) checks were handed to Nuguid on different occasions. Nuguid
came to the grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments.
Respondent Nicdao said that she purposely left the checks undated because
she would still have to notify Nuguid if she already had the money to fund the
checks.
Respondent Nicdao denied ever confiding to petitioner Ching that she was
afraid that her daughter would get mad if she found out about the amount that
she owed him. What allegedly transpired was that when she already had the
money to pay them (presumably referring to petitioner Ching and Nuguid), she
went to them to retrieve her checks. However, petitioner Ching and Nuguid
refused to return the checks claiming that she (respondent Nicdao) still owed
them money. She demanded that they show her the checks in order that she
would know the exact amount of her debt, but they refused. It was at this point
that she got angry and dared them to go to court.
After the said incident, respondent Nicdao was surprised to be notified by
HSLB that her check in the amount ofP20,000,000.00 was just presented to
the bank for payment. She claimed that it was only then that she remembered
that sometime in 1995, she was informed by her employee that one of her
checks was missing. At that time, she did not let it bother her thinking that it
would eventually surface when presented to the bank.
Respondent Nicdao could not explain how the said check came into petitioner
Chings possession. She explained that she kept her checks in an ordinary
cash box together with a stapler and the cigarette wrappers that contained
Nuguids computations. Her saleslady had access to this box. Respondent
Nicdao averred that it was Nuguid who offered to give her a loan as she would
allegedly need money to manage Vignette Superstore. Nuguid used to run the
said store before respondent Nicdaos daughter bought it from Nuguids family,
its previous owner. According to respondent Nicdao, it was Nuguid who
regularly delivered the cash to respondent Nicdao or, if she was not at the
grocery store, to her saleslady. Respondent Nicdao denied any knowledge
that the money loaned to her by Nuguid belonged to petitioner Ching.
At the continuation of her direct-examination,19 respondent Nicdao said that
she never dealt with petitioner Ching because it was Nuguid who went to the
grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments. When shown
theP20,000,000.00 check, respondent Nicdao admitted that the signature
thereon was hers but she denied issuing it as a blank check to petitioner Ching.
On the other hand, with respect to the other ten (10) checks, she also admitted
that the signatures thereon were hers and that the amounts thereon were
written by either Josie Nicdao or Melanie Tolentino, her employees whom she
authorized to do so. With respect to the payee, it was purposely left blank
allegedly upon instruction of Nuguid who said that she would use the checks
to pay someone else.
On cross-examination,20 respondent Nicdao explained that Josie Nicdao and
Melanie Tolentino were caretakers of the grocery store and that they manned
it when she was not there. She likewise confirmed that she authorized them to
write the amounts on the checks after she had affixed her signature thereon.
She stressed, however, that the P20,000,000.00 check was the one that was
reported to her as lost or missing by her saleslady sometime in 1995. She
never reported the matter to the bank because she was confident that it would
just surface when it would be presented for payment.
Again, respondent Nicdao identified the cigarette wrappers which indicated the
daily payments she had made to Nuguid. The latter allegedly went to the
grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments. Further, the figures at
the back of the cigarette wrappers were written by Nuguid. Respondent Nicdao
asserted that she recognized her handwriting because Nuguid sometimes
wrote them in her presence. Respondent Nicdao maintained that she had
already paid Nuguid the amount of P1,200,000.00 as evidenced by the
Planters Bank demand draft which she gave to the latter and which was
subsequently negotiated and deposited in petitioner Chings account. In
connection thereto, respondent Nicdao refuted the prosecutions allegation
that the demand draft was payment for a previous transaction that she had
with petitioner Ching. She clarified that the payments that Nuguid collected
from her everyday were only for the interests due. She did not ask Nuguid to
make written acknowledgements of her payments.
Melanie Tolentino was presented to corroborate the testimony of respondent
Nicdao. On direct-examination,21Tolentino stated that she worked at the
Vignette Superstore and she knew Nuguid because her employer, respondent
Nicdao, used to borrow money from her. She knew petitioner Ching only by
name and that he was the "husband" of Nuguid.
As an employee of the grocery store, Tolentino stated that she acted as its
caretaker and was entrusted with the custody of respondent Nicdaos personal
checks. Tolentino identified her own handwriting on some of the checks
especially with respect to the amounts and figures written thereon. She said
that Nuguid instructed her to leave the space for the payee blank as she would
use the checks to pay someone else. Tolentino added that she could not recall
respondent Nicdao issuing a check to petitioner Ching in the amount
of P20,000,000.00. She confirmed that they lost a check sometime in 1995.
When informed about it, respondent Nicdao told her that the check could have
been issued to someone else, and that it would just surface when presented
to the bank.
Tolentino recounted that Nuguid came to the grocery store everyday to collect
the interest payments of the loan. In some instances, upon respondent
Nicdaos instruction, Tolentino handed to Nuguid checks that were already
signed by respondent Nicdao. Sometimes, Tolentino would be the one to write
the amount on the checks. Nuguid, in turn, wrote the amounts on pieces of
paper which were kept by respondent Nicdao.
On cross-examination,22 Tolentino confirmed that she was authorized by
respondent Nicdao to fill up the checks and hand them to Nuguid. The latter
came to the grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments. Tolentino
claimed that in 1995, in the course of chronologically arranging respondent
Nicdaos check booklets, she noticed that a check was missing. Respondent
Nicdao told her that perhaps she issued it to someone and that it would just
turn up in the bank. Tolentino was certain that the missing check was the same
one that petitioner Ching presented to the bank for payment in the amount
of P20,000,000.00.
Tolentino stated that she left the employ of respondent Nicdao sometime in
1996. After the checks were dishonored in October 1997, Tolentino got a call
from respondent Nicdao. After she was shown a fax copy thereof, Tolentino
confirmed that the P20,000,000.00 check was the same one that she reported
as missing in 1995.
Jocelyn Nicdao also took the witness stand to corroborate the testimony of the
other defense witnesses. On direct-examination,23 she averred that she was a
saleslady at the Vignette Superstore from August 1994 up to April 1998. She
knew Nuguid as well as petitioner Ching.
Jocelyn Nicdao further testified that respondent Nicdao was indebted to
Nuguid. Jocelyn Nicdao used to fill up the checks of respondent Nicdao that
had already been signed by her and give them to Nuguid. The latter came to
the grocery store everyday to pick up the interest payments. Jocelyn Nicdao
identified the checks on which she wrote the amounts and, in some instances,
the name of Nuguid as payee. However, most of the time, Nuguid allegedly
instructed her to leave as blank the space for the payee.
Jocelyn Nicdao identified the cigarette wrappers as the documents on which
Nuguid acknowledged receipt of the interest payments. She explained that she
was the one who wrote the minus entries and they represented the daily
interest payments received by Nuguid.
On cross-examination,24 Jocelyn Nicdao stated that she was a distant cousin
of respondent Nicdao. She stopped working for her in 1998 because she
wanted to take a rest. Jocelyn Nicdao reiterated that she handed the checks
to Nuguid at the grocery store.
After due trial, on December 8, 1998, the MCTC rendered judgment in Criminal
Cases Nos. 9433-9443 convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) counts of
violation of BP 22. The MCTC gave credence to petitioner Chings testimony
that respondent Nicdao borrowed money from him in the total amount
of P20,950,000.00. Petitioner Ching delivered P1,000,000.00 every month to
respondent Nicdao from 1995 up to 1997 until the sum
reachedP20,000,000.00. The MCTC also found that subsequent thereto,
respondent Nicdao still borrowed money from petitioner Ching. As security for
these loans, respondent Nicdao issued checks to petitioner Ching. When the
latter deposited the checks (eleven in all) on October 6, 1997, they were
dishonored by the bank for being "DAIF."
The MCTC explained that the crime of violation of BP 22 has the following
elements: (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to
account or for value; (b) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at
the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (c)
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.25
According to the MCTC, all the foregoing elements are present in the case of
respondent Nicdaos issuance of the checks subject of Criminal Cases Nos.
9433-9443. On the first element, respondent Nicdao was found by the MCTC
to have made, drawn and issued the checks. The fact that she did not
personally write the payee and date on the checks was not material
considering that under Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "where
the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession
thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein.
And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature
in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates
as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount x x x." Respondent
Nicdao admitted that she authorized her employees to provide the details on
the checks after she had signed them.
The MCTC disbelieved respondent Nicdaos claim that the P20,000,000.00
check was the same one that she lost in 1995. It observed that ordinary
prudence would dictate that a lost check would at least be immediately
reported to the bank to prevent its unauthorized endorsement or negotiation.
Respondent Nicdao made no such report to the bank. Even if the said check
was indeed lost, the MCTC faulted respondent Nicdao for being negligent in
keeping the checks that she had already signed in an unsecured box.
The MCTC further ruled that there was no evidence to show that petitioner
Ching was not a holder in due course as to cause it (the MCTC) to believe that
the said check was not issued to him. Respondent Nicdaos admission of
indebtedness was sufficient to prove that there was consideration for the
issuance of the checks.
The second element was also found by the MCTC to be present as it held that
respondent Nicdao, as maker, drawer or issuer, had knowledge that at the time
of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment in full of the checks upon their presentment.
As to the third element, the MCTC established that the checks were
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for being "DAIF" or drawn
against insufficient funds. Stamped at the back of each check was the
annotation "DAIF." The bank representative likewise testified to the fact of
dishonor.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the MCTC declared that the conviction of
respondent Nicdao was warranted. It stressed that the mere act of issuing a
worthless check was malum prohibitum; hence, even if the checks were issued
in the form of deposit or guarantee, once dishonored, the same gave rise to
the prosecution for and conviction of BP 22.26 The decretal portion of the
MCTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused is found guilty of violating
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in 11 counts, and is hereby ordered to pay the private
complainant the amount of P20,950,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from
date of filing of the complaint until the total amount had been paid. The prayer
for moral damages is denied for lack of evidence to prove the same. She is
likewise ordered to suffer imprisonment equivalent to 1 year for every check
issued and which penalty shall be served successively.
SO ORDERED.27
Incidentally, on January 11, 1999, the MCTC likewise rendered its judgment in
Criminal Cases Nos. 9458-9471 and convicted respondent Nicdao of the
fourteen (14) counts of violation of BP 22 filed against her by Nuguid.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5,
in separate Decisions both dated May 10, 1999, affirmed in toto the decisions
of the MCTC convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) and fourteen (14)
counts of violation of BP 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and 9458-9471,
respectively.
Respondent Nicdao forthwith filed with the CA separate petitions for review of
the two decisions of the RTC. The petition involving the eleven (11) checks
purportedly issued to petitioner Ching was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23055
(assigned to the 13th Division). On the other hand, the petition involving the
fourteen (14) checks purportedly issued to Nuguid was docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 23054 (originally assigned to the 7th Division but transferred to the 6th
Division). The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its respective
comments on the said petitions. Subsequently, the OSG filed in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23055 a motion for its consolidation with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054. The OSG
prayed that CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 pending before the 13th Division be
transferred and consolidated with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 in accordance with
the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).
Acting on the motion for consolidation, the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055
issued a Resolution dated October 19, 1999 advising the OSG to file the
motion in CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 as it bore the lowest number. Respondent
Nicdao opposed the consolidation of the two cases. She likewise filed her reply
to the comment of the OSG in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055.
On November 22, 1999, the CA (13th Division) rendered the assailed Decision
in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 acquitting respondent Nicdao of the eleven (11)
counts of violation of BP 22 filed against her by petitioner Ching. The decretal
portion of the assailed CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, being meritorious, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the decision dated May 10, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, 3rd
Judicial Region, Branch 5, Bataan, affirming the decision dated December 8,
1998, of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa,
Bataan, convicting petitioner Clarita S. Nicdao in Criminal Cases No. 9433 to
9443 of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another
judgment rendered ACQUITTING her in all these cases, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.28
On even date, the CA issued an Entry of Judgment declaring that the above
decision has become final and executory and is recorded in the Book of
Judgments.
In acquitting respondent Nicdao in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055, the CA made the
following factual findings:
Petitioner [respondent herein] Clarita S. Nicdao, a middle-aged mother and
housekeeper who only finished high school, has a daughter, Janette Boyd,
who is married to a wealthy expatriate.
Complainant [petitioner herein] Samson Ching is a Chinese national, who
claimed he is a salesman of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory.
Emma Nuguid, complainants live-in partner, is a CPA and formerly connected
with Sycip, Gorres and Velayo. Nuguid used to own a grocery store now known
as the Vignette Superstore. She sold this grocery store, which was about to be
foreclosed, to petitioners daughter, Janette Boyd. Since then, petitioner began
managing said store. However, since petitioner could not always be at the
Vignette Superstore to keep shop, she entrusted to her salesladies, Melanie
Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao, pre-signed checks, which were left blank as to
amount and the payee, to cover for any delivery of merchandise sold at the
store. The blank and personal checks were placed in a cash box at Vignette
Superstore and were filled up by said salesladies upon instruction of petitioner
as to amount, payee and date.
Soon thereafter, Emma Nuguid befriended petitioner and offered to lend
money to the latter which could be used in running her newly acquired store.
Nuguid represented to petitioner that as former manager of the Vignette
Superstore, she knew that petitioner would be in need of credit to meet the
daily expenses of running the business, particularly in the daily purchases of
merchandise to be sold at the store. After Emma Nuguid succeeded in
befriending petitioner, Nuguid was able to gain access to the Vignette
Superstore where petitioners blank and pre-signed checks were kept.29
In addition, the CA also made the finding that respondent Nicdao borrowed
money from Nuguid in the total amount of P2,100,000.00 secured by twenty-
four (24) checks drawn against respondent Nicdaos account with HSLB. Upon
Nuguids instruction, the checks given by respondent Nicdao as security for
the loans were left blank as to the payee and the date. The loans consisted of
(a) P950,000.00 covered by ten (10) checks subject of the criminal complaints
filed by petitioner Ching (CA-G.R. CR No. 23055); and (b) P1,150,000.00
covered by fourteen (14) checks subject of the criminal complaints filed by
Nuguid (CA-G.R. CR No. 23054). The loans totaledP2,100,000.00 and they
were transacted between respondent Nicdao and Nuguid only. Respondent
Nicdao never dealt with petitioner Ching.
Against the foregoing factual findings, the CA declared that, based on the
evidence, respondent Nicdao had already fully paid the loans. In particular, the
CA referred to the Planters Bank demand draft in the amount ofP1,200,000.00
which, by his own admission, petitioner Ching had received. The appellate
court debunked petitioner Chings allegation that the said demand draft was
payment for a previous transaction. According to the CA, petitioner Ching
failed to adduce evidence to prove the existence of a previous transaction
between him and respondent Nicdao.
Apart from the demand draft, the CA also stated that respondent Nicdao made
interest payments on a daily basis to Nuguid as evidenced by the computations
written at the back of the cigarette wrappers. Based on these computations,
as of July 21, 1997, respondent Nicdao had made a total of P5,780,000.00
payments to Nuguid for the interests alone. Adding up this amount and that of
the Planters Bank demand draft, the CA placed the payments made by
respondent Nicdao to Nuguid as already amounting to P6,980,000.00 for the
principal loan amount of only P2,100,000.00.
The CA negated petitioner Chings contention that the payments as reflected
at the back of the cigarette wrappers could be applied only to the interests due.
Since the transactions were not evidenced by any document or writing, the CA
ratiocinated that no interests could be collected because, under Article 1956
of the Civil Code, "no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly
stipulated in writing."
The CA gave credence to the testimony of respondent Nicdao that when she
had fully paid her loans to Nuguid, she tried to retrieve her checks. Nuguid,
however, refused to return the checks to respondent Nicdao. Instead, Nuguid
and petitioner Ching filled up the said checks to make it appear that: (a)
petitioner Ching was the payee in five checks; (b) the six checks were payable
to cash; (c) Nuguid was the payee in fourteen (14) checks. Petitioner Ching
and Nuguid then put the date October 6, 1997 on all these checks and
deposited them the following day. On October 8, 1997, through a joint demand
letter, they informed respondent Nicdao that her checks were dishonored by
HSLB and gave her three days to settle her indebtedness or else face
prosecution for violation of BP 22.
With the finding that respondent Nicdao had fully paid her loan obligations to
Nuguid, the CA declared that she could no longer be held liable for violation of
BP 22. It was explained that to be held liable under BP 22, it must be
established, inter alia, that the check was made or drawn and issued to apply
on account or for value. According to the CA, the word "account" refers to a
pre-existing obligation, while "for value" means an obligation incurred
simultaneously with the issuance of the check. In the case of respondent
Nicdaos checks, the pre-existing obligations secured by them were already
extinguished after full payment had been made by respondent Nicdao to
Nuguid. Obligations are extinguished by, among others, payment. 30 The CA
believed that when petitioner Ching and Nuguid refused to return respondent
Nicdaos checks despite her total payment of P6,980,000.00 for the loans
secured by the checks, petitioner Ching and Nuguid were using BP 22 to
coerce respondent Nicdao to pay a debt which she no longer owed them.
With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, the CA was not convinced by
petitioner Chings claim that he deliveredP1,000,000.00 every month to
respondent Nicdao until the amount reached P20,000,000.00 and, when she
refused to pay the same, he filled up the check, which she earlier delivered to
him as security for the loans, by writing thereon the said amount. In
disbelieving petitioner Ching, the CA pointed out that, contrary to his assertion,
he was never employed by the La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing
per the letter of Susan Resurreccion, Vice-President and Legal Counsel of the
said company. Moreover, as admitted by petitioner Ching, he did not own the
house where he and Nuguid lived.
Moreover, the CA characterized as incredible and contrary to human
experience that petitioner Ching would, as he claimed, deliver a total sum
of P20,000,000.00 to respondent Nicdao without any documentary proof
thereof, e.g., written acknowledgment that she received the same. On the
other hand, it found plausible respondent Nicdaos version of the story that
the P20,000,000.00 check was the same one that was missing way back in
1995. The CA opined that this missing check surfaced in the hands of
petitioner Ching who, in cahoots with Nuguid, wrote the
amount P20,000,000.00 thereon and deposited it in his account. To the mind
of the CA, the inference that the check was stolen was anchored on competent
circumstantial evidence. Specifically, Nuguid, as previous manager/owner of
the grocery store, had access thereto. Likewise applicable, according to the
CA, was the presumption that the person in possession of the stolen article
was presumed to be guilty of taking the stolen article.31
The CA emphasized that the P20,000,000.00 check was never delivered by
respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As such, the said check without the
details as to the date, amount and payee, was an incomplete and undelivered
instrument when it was stolen and ended up in petitioner Chings hands. On
this point, the CA applied Sections 15 and 16 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law:
SEC. 15. Incomplete instrument not delivered. Where an incomplete
instrument has not been delivered, it will not, if completed and negotiated
without authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as against any
person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery.
SEC. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. Every contract on a
negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the
instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate
parties and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the
delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority
of the party making, drawing, accepting or indorsing, as the case may be; and,
in such case, the delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a
special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property. But
where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery
thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is
conclusively presumed. And where the instrument is no longer in the
possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional
delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved.
The CA held that the P20,000,000.00 check was filled up by petitioner Ching
without respondent Nicdaos authority. Further, it was incomplete and
undelivered. Hence, petitioner Ching did not acquire any right or interest
therein and could not assert any cause of action founded on the
stolen checks.32 Under these circumstances, the CA concluded that
respondent could not be held liable for violation of BP 22.
The Petitioners Case
As mentioned earlier, the instant petition pertains and is limited solely to the
civil aspect of the case as petitioner Ching argues that notwithstanding
respondent Nicdaos acquittal of the eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22,
she should be held liable to pay petitioner Ching the amounts of the dishonored
checks in the aggregate sum ofP20,950,000.00.
He urges the Court to review the findings of facts made by the CA as they are
allegedly based on a misapprehension of facts and manifestly erroneous and
contradicted by the evidence. Further, the CAs factual findings are in conflict
with those of the RTC and MCTC.
Petitioner Ching vigorously argues that notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos
acquittal by the CA, the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and authority to
resolve and rule on her civil liability. He invokes Section 1, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court which, prior to its amendment, provided, in part:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. x x x
Supreme Court Circular No. 57-9733 dated September 16, 1997 is also cited
as it provides in part:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed
to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. x x x
Petitioner Ching theorizes that, under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules
of Court, the civil action for the recovery of damages under Articles 32, 33, 34,
and 2176 arising from the same act or omission of the accused is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. Moreover, under the above-quoted Circular,
the criminal action for violation of BP 22 necessarily includes the
corresponding civil action, which is the recovery of the amount of the
dishonored check representing the civil obligation of the drawer to the payee.
In seeking to enforce the alleged civil liability of respondent Nicdao, petitioner
Ching maintains that she had loan obligations to him totaling P20,950,000.00.
The existence of the same is allegedly established by his testimony before the
MCTC. Also, he asks the Court to take judicial notice that for a monetary loan
secured by a check, the check itself is the evidence of indebtedness.
He insists that, contrary to her protestation, respondent Nicdao also transacted
with him, not only with Nuguid. Petitioner Ching pointed out that during
respondent Nicdaos testimony, she referred to her creditors in plural form, e.g.
"[I] told them, most checks that I issued I will inform them if I have money."
Even respondent Nicdaos employees allegedly knew him; they testified that
Nuguid instructed them at times to leave as blank the payee on the checks as
they would be paid to someone else, who turned out to be petitioner Ching.
It was allegedly erroneous for the CA to hold that he had no capacity to
lend P20,950,000.00 to respondent Nicdao. Petitioner Ching clarified that what
he meant when he testified before the MCTC was that he was engaged in
dealership with La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing, and not merely
its sales agent. He stresses that he owns a warehouse and is also in the
business of lending money. Further, the CAs reasoning that he could not
possibly have lent P20,950,000.00 to respondent Nicdao since petitioner
Ching and Nuguid did not own the house where they live, is allegedly non
sequitur.
Petitioner Ching maintains that, contrary to the CAs finding, the Planters Bank
demand draft for P1,200,000.00 was in payment for respondent Nicdaos
previous loan transaction with him. Apart from the P20,000,000.00 check, the
other ten (10) checks (totaling P950,000.00) were allegedly issued by
respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching as security for the loans that she
obtained from him from 1995 to 1997. The existence of another loan obligation
prior to the said period was allegedly established by the testimony of
respondent Nicdaos own witness, Jocelyn Nicdao, who testified that when she
started working in Vignette Superstore in 1994, she noticed that respondent
Nicdao was already indebted to Nuguid.
Petitioner Ching also takes exception to the CAs ruling that the payments
made by respondent Nicdao as reflected on the computations at the back of
the cigarette wrappers were for both the principal loan and interests. He insists
that they were for the interests alone. Even respondent Nicdaos testimony
allegedly showed that they were daily interest payments. Petitioner Ching
further avers that the interest payments totaling P5,780,000.00 can only mean
that, contrary to respondent Nicdaos claim, her loan obligations amounted to
much more thanP2,100,000.00. Further, she is allegedly estopped from
questioning the interests because she willingly paid the same.
Petitioner Ching also harps on respondent Nicdaos silence when she received
his and Nuguids demand letter to her. Through the said letter, they notified
her that the twenty-five (25) checks valued at P22,100,000.00 were
dishonored by the HSLB, and that she had three days to settle her
ndebtedness with them, otherwise, face prosecution. Respondent Nicdaos
silence, i.e., her failure to deny or protest the same by way of reply, vis--vis
the demand letter, allegedly constitutes an admission of the statements
contained therein.
On the other hand, the MCTCs decision, as affirmed by the RTC, is allegedly
based on the evidence on record; it has been established that the checks were
respondent Nicdaos personal checks, that the signatures thereon were hers
and that she had issued them to petitioner Ching. With respect to
the P20,000,000.00 check, petitioner Ching assails the CAs ruling that it was
stolen and was never delivered or issued by respondent Nicdao to him. The
issue of the said check being stolen was allegedly not raised during trial.
Further, her failure to report the alleged theft to the bank to stop payment of
the said lost or missing check is allegedly contrary to human experience.
Petitioner Ching describes respondent Nicdaos defense of stolen or lost check
as incredible and, therefore, false.
Aside from the foregoing substantive issues that he raised, petitioner Ching
also faults the CA for not acting and ordering the consolidation of CA-G.R. CR
No. 23055 with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054. He informs the Court that latter case
is still pending with the CA.
In fine, it is petitioner Chings view that the CA gravely erred in disregarding
the findings of the MCTC, as affirmed by the RTC, and submits that there is
more than sufficient preponderant evidence to hold respondent Nicdao civilly
liable to him in the amount of P20,950,000.00. He thus prays that the Court
direct respondent Nicdao to pay him the said amount plus 12% interest per
annum computed from the date of written demand until the total amount is fully
paid.
The Respondents Counter-Arguments
Respondent Nicdao urges the Court to deny the petition. She posits
preliminarily that it is barred under Section 2(b), Rule 111 of the Revised Rules
of Court which states:
SEC. 2. Institution of separate of civil action. - Except in the cases provided for
in Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil
action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment in the
criminal action.
xxxx
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
According to respondent Nicdao, the assailed CA decision has already made
a finding to the effect that the fact upon which her civil liability might arise did
not exist. She refers to the ruling of the CA that the P20,000,000.00 check was
stolen; hence, petitioner Ching did not acquire any right or interest over the
said check and could not assert any cause of action founded on the said check.
Consequently, the CA held that respondent Nicdao had no obligation to make
good the stolen check and cannot be held liable for violation of BP 22. She
also refers to the CAs pronouncement relative to the ten (10) other checks
that they were not issued to apply on account or for value, considering that the
loan obligations secured by these checks had already been extinguished by
her full payment thereof.
To respondent Nicdaos mind, these pronouncements are equivalent to a
finding that the facts upon which her civil liability may arise do not exist. The
instant petition, which seeks to enforce her civil liability based on the eleven
(11) checks, is thus allegedly already barred by the final and executory
decision acquitting her.
In any case, respondent Nicdao contends that the CA did not commit serious
misapprehension of facts when it found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a
stolen check and that she never made any transaction with petitioner Ching.
Moreover, the other ten (10) checks were not issued to apply on account or for
value. These findings are allegedly supported by the evidence on record which
consisted of the respective testimonies of the defense witnesses to the effect
that: respondent Nicdao had the practice of leaving pre-signed checks placed
inside an unsecured cash box in the Vignette Superstore; the salesladies were
given the authority to fill up the said checks as to the amount, payee and date;
Nuguid beguiled respondent Nicdao to obtain loans from her; as security for
the loans, respondent Nicdao issued checks to Nuguid; when the salesladies
gave the checks to Nuguid, she instructed them to leave blank the payee and
date; Nuguid had access to the grocery store; in 1995, one of the salesladies
reported that a check was missing; in 1997, when she had fully paid her loans
to Nuguid, respondent Nicdao tried to retrieve her checks but Nuguid and
petitioner Ching falsely told her that she still owed them money; they then
maliciously filled up the checks making it appear that petitioner Ching was the
payee in the five checks and the six others were payable to "cash"; and
knowing fully well that these checks were not funded because respondent
Nicdao already fully paid her loans, petitioner Ching and Nuguid deposited the
checks and caused them to be dishonored by HSLB.
It is pointed out by respondent Nicdao that her testimony (that
the P20,000,000.00 check was the same one that she lost sometime in 1995)
was corroborated by the respective testimonies of her employees. Another
indication that it was stolen was the fact that among all the checks which ended
up in the hands of petitioner Ching and Nuguid, only the P20,000,000.00 check
was fully typewritten; the rest were invariably handwritten as to the amounts,
payee and date.
Respondent Nicdao defends the CAs conclusion that the P20,000,000.00
check was stolen on the ground that an appeal in a criminal case throws open
the whole case to the appellate courts scrutiny. In any event, she maintains
that she had been consistent in her theory of defense and merely relied on the
disputable presumption that the person in possession of a stolen article is
presumed to be the author of the theft.
Considering that it was stolen, respondent Nicdao argues, the P20,000,000.00
check was an incomplete and undelivered instrument in the hands of petitioner
Ching and he did not acquire any right or interest therein. Further, he cannot
assert any cause of action founded on the said stolen check. Accordingly,
petitioner Chings attempt to collect payment on the said check through the
instant petition must fail.
Respondent Nicdao describes as downright incredible petitioner Chings
testimony that she owed him a total sum of P20,950,000.00 without any
documentary proof of the loan transactions. She submits that it is contrary to
human experience for loan transactions involving such huge amounts of
money to be devoid of any documentary proof. In relation thereto, respondent
Nicdao underscores that petitioner Ching lied about being employed as a
salesman of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing. It is underscored
that he has not adequately shown that he possessed the financial capacity to
lend such a huge amount to respondent Nicdao as he so claimed.
Neither could she be held liable for the ten (10) other checks (in the total
amount of P950,000,000.00) because as respondent Nicdao asseverates, she
merely issued them to Nuguid as security for her loans obtained from the latter
beginning October 1995 up to 1997. As evidenced by the Planters Bank
demand draft in the amount ofP1,200,000.00, she already made payment in
1996. The said demand draft was negotiated to petitioner Chings account and
he admitted receipt thereof. Respondent Nicdao belies his claim that the
demand draft was payment for a prior existing obligation. She asserts that
petitioner Ching was unable to present evidence of such a previous
transaction.
In addition to the Planters Bank demand draft, respondent Nicdao insists that
petitioner Ching received, through Nuguid, cash payments as evidenced by
the computations written at the back of the cigarette wrappers. Nuguid went to
the Vignette Superstore everyday to collect these payments. The other
defense witnesses corroborated this fact. Petitioner Ching allegedly never
disputed the accuracy of the accounts appearing on these cigarette wrappers;
nor did he dispute their authenticity and accuracy.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the CA allegedly correctly held that,
computing the amount of the Planters Bank demand draft (P1,200,000.00) and
those reflected at the back of the cigarette wrappers (P5,780,000.00),
respondent Nicdao had already paid petitioner Ching and Nuguid a total sum
of P6,980,000.00 for her loan obligations totaling only P950,000.00, as
secured by the ten (10) HSLB checks excluding the stolenP20,000,000.00
check.
Respondent Nicdao rebuts petitioner Chings argument (that the daily
payments were applied to the interests), and claims that this is illegal.
Petitioner Ching cannot insist that the daily payments she made applied only
to the interests on the loan obligations, considering that there is admittedly no
document evidencing these loans, hence, no written stipulation for the
payment of interests thereon. On this point, she invokes Article 1956 of the
Civil Code, which proscribes the collection of interest payments unless
expressly stipulated in writing.
Respondent Nicdao emphasizes that the ten (10) other checks that she issued
to Nuguid as security for her loans had already been discharged upon her full
payment thereof. It is her belief that these checks can no longer be used to
coerce her to pay a debt that she does not owe.
On the CAs failure to consolidate CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 and CA-G.R. CR
No. 23054, respondent Nicdao proffers the explanation that under the RIRCA,
consolidation of the cases is not mandatory. In fine, respondent Nicdao urges
the Court to deny the petition as it failed to discharge the burden of proving her
civil liability with the required preponderance of evidence. Moreover, the CAs
acquittal of respondent Nicdao is premised on the finding that, apart from the
stolen check, the ten (10) other checks were not made to apply to a valid, due
and demandable obligation. This, in effect, is a categorical ruling that the fact
from which the civil liability of respondent Nicdao may arise does not exist.
The Courts Rulings
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Notwithstanding respondent Nicdaos acquittal, petitioner Ching is entitled to
appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period
It is axiomatic that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable."34 Under the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil
action is generally impliedly instituted with the criminal action. At the time of
petitioner Chings filing of the Informations against respondent Nicdao, Section
1,35 Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, quoted earlier, provided in part:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
xxxx
As a corollary to the above rule, an acquittal does not necessarily carry with it
the extinguishment of the civil liability of the accused. Section 2(b) 36 of the
same Rule, also quoted earlier, provided in part:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
It is also relevant to mention that judgments of acquittal are required to state
"whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of
the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist."37
In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court enunciated that the civil liability is
not extinguished by acquittal: (a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused
is not criminal but only civil in nature; and (c) where the civil liability is not
derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.
Thus, under Article 29 of the Civil Code
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt,
the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it
may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due
to that ground.
The Court likewise expounded in Salazar v. People39 the consequences of an
acquittal on the civil aspect in this wise:
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the
civil aspect of the criminal case where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declared
that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there
is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did
not commit the act or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment
on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the
judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may
appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period
therefor.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended
party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent
Nicdaos acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the
criminal action since he did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor
did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Following the long recognized rule that "the appeal period accorded to the
accused should also be available to the offended party who seeks redress of
the civil aspect of the decision," the period to appeal granted to petitioner Ching
is the same as that granted to the accused.40 With petitioner Chings timely
filing of the instant petition for review of the civil aspect of the CAs decision,
the Court thus has the jurisdiction and authority to determine the civil liability
of respondent Nicdao notwithstanding her acquittal.
In order for the petition to prosper, however, it must establish that the judgment
of the CA acquitting respondent Nicdao falls under any of the three categories
enumerated in Salazar and Sapiera, to wit:
(a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only
civil; and
(c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
Salazar also enunciated that the civil action based on the delict is extinguished
if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the
accused did not commit the act or omission imputed to him.
For reasons that will be discussed shortly, the Court holds that respondent
Nicdao cannot be held civilly liable to petitioner Ching.
The acquittal of respondent Nicdao likewise effectively extinguished her civil
liability
A painstaking review of the case leads to the conclusion that respondent
Nicdaos acquittal likewise carried with it the extinction of the action to enforce
her civil liability. There is simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao civilly
liable to petitioner Ching.
First, the CAs acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on
reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on the finding that she did not commit
the act penalized under BP 22. In particular, the CA found that
the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check which was never issued nor
delivered by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As such, according to the
CA, petitioner Ching "did not acquire any right or interest over Check No.
002524 and cannot assert any cause of action founded on said check," 41 and
that respondent Nicdao "has no obligation to make good the stolen check and
cannot, therefore, be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22."42
With respect to the ten (10) other checks, the CA established that the loans
secured by these checks had already been extinguished after full payment had
been made by respondent Nicdao. In this connection, the second element for
the crime under BP 22, i.e., "that the check is made or drawn and issued to
apply on account or for value," is not present.
Second, in acquitting respondent Nicdao, the CA did not adjudge her to be
civilly liable to petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly stated that she had
already fully paid her obligations. The CA computed the payments made by
respondent Nicdao vis--vis her loan obligations in this manner:
Clearly, adding the payments recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by
Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting totaling P5,780,000.00 and
the P1,200,000.00 demand draft received by Emma Nuguid, it would appear
that petitioner [respondent herein] had already made payments in the total
amount of P6,980,000.00 for her loan obligation of only P2,100,000.00
(P950,000.00 in the case at bar and P1,150,000.00 in CA-G.R. CR No.
23054).43
On the other hand, its finding relative to the P20,000,000.00 check that it was
a stolen check necessarily absolved respondent Nicdao of any civil liability
thereon as well.
Third, while petitioner Ching attempts to show that respondent Nicdaos liability
did not arise from or was not based upon the criminal act of which she was
acquitted (ex delicto) but from her loan obligations to him (ex contractu),
however, petitioner Ching miserably failed to prove by preponderant evidence
the existence of these unpaid loan obligations. Significantly, it can be inferred
from the following findings of the CA in its decision acquitting respondent
Nicdao that the act or omission from which her civil liability may arise did not
exist. On theP20,000,000.00 check, the CA found as follows:
True, indeed, the missing pre-signed and undated check no. 002524 surfaced
in the possession of complainant Ching who, in cahoots with his paramour
Emma Nuguid, filled up the blank check with his name as payee and in the
fantastic amount of P20,000,000.00, dated it October 6, 1997, and presented
it to the bank on October 7, 1997, along with the other checks, for payment.
Therefore, the inference that the check was stolen is anchored on competent
circumstantial evidence. The fact already established is that Emma Nuguid ,
previous owner of the store, had access to said store. Moreover, the
possession of a thing that was stolen , absent a credible reason, as in this
case, gives rise to the presumption that the person in possession of the stolen
article is presumed to be guilty of taking the stolen article (People v. Zafra, 237
SCRA 664).
As previously shown, at the time check no. 002524 was stolen, the said check
was blank in its material aspect (as to the name of payee, the amount of the
check, and the date of the check), but was already pre-signed by petitioner. In
fact, complainant Ching himself admitted that check no. 002524 in his
possession was a blank check (TSN, Jan. 7, 1998, pp. 24-27, Annex J,
Petition).
Moreover, since it has been established that check no. 002524 had been
missing since 1995 (TSN, Sept. 9, 1998, pp. 14-15, Annex DD, Petition; TSN,
Sept. 10, 1998, pp. 43-46, Annex EE, Petition), it is abundantly clear that said
check was never delivered to complainant Ching. Check no. 002524 was an
incomplete and undelivered instrument when it was stolen and ended up in the
hands of complainant Ching. Sections 15 and 16 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law provide:
xxxx
In the case of check no. 002524, it is admitted by complainant Ching that said
check in his possession was a blank check and was subsequently completed
by him alone without authority from petitioner. Inasmuch as check no. 002524
was incomplete and undelivered in the hands of complainant Ching, he did not
acquire any right or interest therein and cannot, therefore, assert any cause of
action founded on said stolen check (Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Sima We, 219 SCRA 736, 740).
It goes without saying that since complainant Ching did not acquire any right
or interest over check no. 002524 and cannot assert any cause of action
founded on said check, petitioner has no obligation to make good the stolen
check and cannot, therefore, be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 44
Anent the other ten (10) checks, the CA made the following findings:
Evidence sufficiently shows that the loans secured by the ten (10) checks
involved in the cases subject of this petition had already been paid. It is not
controverted that petitioner gave Emma Nuguid a demand draft valued
atP1,200,000 to pay for the loans guaranteed by said checks and other checks
issued to her. Samson Ching admitted having received the demand draft which
he deposited in his bank account. However, complainant Samson Ching
claimed that the said demand draft represents payment for a previous
obligation incurred by petitioner. However, complainant Ching failed to adduce
any evidence to prove the existence of the alleged obligation of the petitioner
prior to those secured by the subject checks.
Apart from the payment to Emma Nuguid through said demand draft, it is also
not disputed that petitioner made cash payments to Emma Nuguid who
collected the payments almost daily at the Vignette Superstore. As of July 21,
1997, Emma Nuguid collected cash payments amounting to
approximately P5,780,000.00. All of these cash payments were recorded at
the back of cigarette cartons by Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting, the
authenticity and accuracy of which were never denied by either complainant
Ching or Emma Nuguid.
Clearly, adding the payments recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by
Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting totaling P5,780,000.00 and
the P1,200,000.00 demand draft received by Emma Nuguid, it would appear
that petitioner had already made payments in the total amount
of P6,980,000.00 for her loan in the total amount of P6,980,000.00 for her loan
obligation of only P2,100,000.00 (P950,000.00 in the case at bar and
P1,150,000.00 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23054).45
Generally checks may constitute evidence of indebtedness. 46 However, in
view of the CAs findings relating to the eleven (11) checks. That
the P20,000,00 0.00 was a stolen check and the obligations secured by the
other ten (10) checks had already been fully paid by respondent Nicdao they
can no longer be given credence to establish respondent Nicdaos civil liability
to petitioner Ching. Such civil liability, therefore, must be established by
preponderant evidence other than the discredited checks.
After a careful examination of the records of the case,47 the Court holds that
the existence of respondent Nicdaos civil liability to petitioner Ching in the
amount of P20,950,000.00 representing her unpaid obligations to the latter has
not been sufficiently established by preponderant evidence. Petitioner Ching
mainly relies on his testimony before the MCTC to establish the existence of
these unpaid obligations. In gist, he testified that from October 1995 up to
1997, respondent Nicdao obtained loans from him in the total amount
of P20,950,000.00. As security for her obligations, she issued eleven (11)
checks which were invariably blank as to the date, amounts and payee. When
respondent Nicdao allegedly refused to pay her obligations despite his due
demand, petitioner filled up the checks in his possession with the
corresponding amounts and date and deposited them in his account. They
were subsequently dishonored by the HSLB for being "DAIF" and petitioner
Ching accordingly filed the criminal complaints against respondent Nicdao for
violation of BP 22.
It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who
makes the allegations Et incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; cum per
rerum naturam factum negantis probatio nulla sit (The proof lies upon him who
affirms, not upon him who denies; since, by the nature of things, he who denies
a fact cannot produce any proof).48 In civil cases, the party having the burden
of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.49 Section 1,
Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court offers the guidelines in determining
preponderance of evidence:
SEC. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial.
The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
Unfortunately, petitioner Chings testimony alone does not constitute
preponderant evidence to establish respondent Nicdaos civil liability to him
amounting to P20,950,000.00. Apart from the discredited checks, he failed to
adduce any other documentary evidence to prove that respondent Nicdao still
has unpaid obligations to him in the said amount. Bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules. 50
In contrast, respondent Nicdaos defense consisted in, among others, her
allegation that she had already paid her obligations to petitioner Ching through
Nuguid. In support thereof, she presented the Planters Bank demand draft
for P1,200,000.00. The said demand draft was negotiated to petitioner Chings
account and he admitted receipt of the value thereof. Petitioner Ching tried to
controvert this by claiming that it was payment for a previous transaction
between him and respondent Nicdao. However, other than his self-serving
claim, petitioner Ching did not proffer any documentary evidence to prove the
existence of the said previous transaction. Considering that the Planters Bank
demand draft was dated August 13, 1996, it is logical to conclude that, absent
any evidence to the contrary, it formed part of respondent Nicdaos payment
to petitioner Ching on account of the loan obligations that she obtained from
him since October 1995.
Additionally, respondent Nicdao submitted as evidence the cigarette wrappers
at the back of which were written the computations of the daily payments that
she had made to Nuguid. The fact of the daily payments was corroborated by
the other witnesses for the defense, namely, Jocelyn Nicdao and Tolentino.
As found by the CA, based on these computations, respondent Nicdao had
made a total payment of P5,780,000.00 to Nuguid as of July 21, 1997.51 Again,
the payments made, as reflected at the back of these cigarette wrappers, were
not disputed by petitioner Ching. Hence, these payments as well as the
amount of the Planters Bank demand draft establish that respondent Nicdao
already paid the total amount of P6,980,000.00 to Nuguid and petitioner Ching.
The Court agrees with the CA that the daily payments made by respondent
Nicdao amounting to P5,780,000.00 cannot be considered as interest
payments only. Even respondent Nicdao testified that the daily payments that
she made to Nuguid were for the interests due. However, as correctly ruled by
the CA, no interests could be properly collected in the loan transactions
between petitioner Ching and respondent Nicdao because there was no
stipulation therefor in writing. To reiterate, under Article 1956 of the Civil Code,
"no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing."
Neither could respondent Nicdao be considered to be estopped from denying ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
the validity of these interests. Estoppel cannot give validity to an act that is Associate Justice
prohibited by law or one that is against public policy. 52 Clearly, the collection
of interests without any stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law. WE CONCUR:
Consequently, the daily payments made by respondent Nicdao amounting
to P5,780,000.00 were properly considered by the CA as applying to the CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
principal amount of her loan obligations.
Associate Justice

With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, the defense of respondent Nicdao

that it was stolen and that she never issued or delivered the same to petitioner MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Ching was corroborated by the other defense witnesses, namely, Tolentino MARTINEZ
Asscociate Justice
and Jocelyn Nicdao. Associate Justice

All told, as between petitioner Ching and respondent Nicdao, the requisite ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
quantum of evidence - preponderance of evidence - indubitably lies with Associate Justice
respondent Nicdao. As earlier intimated, she cannot be held civilly liable to
petitioner Ching for her acquittal; under the circumstances which have just ATTESTATION
been discussed lengthily, such acquittal carried with it the extinction of her civil
liability as well. I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
The CA committed no reversible error in not consolidating CA-G.R. CR No. Courts Division.
23055 and CA-G.R. CR No. 23054
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
During the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 and CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 Associate Justice
in the CA, the pertinent provision of the RIRCA on consolidation of cases Chairperson
provided:
CERTIFICATION
SEC. 7. Consolidation of Cases. Whenever two or more allied cases are
assigned to different Justices, they may be consolidated for study and report Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
to a single Justice. Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
(a) At the instance of any party or Justice to whom the case is assigned for to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
study and report, and with the conformity of all the Justices concerned, the
consolidation may be allowed when the cases to be consolidated involve the REYNATO S. PUNO
same parties and/or related questions of fact and/or law.53 Chief Justice

The use of the word "may" denotes the permissive, not mandatory, nature of G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983
the above provision, Thus, no grave error could be imputed to the CA when it
proceeded to render its decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055, without
CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner,
consolidating it with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054.
vs.
HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Ernesto P. Miel for petitioner.
SO ORDERED. Gorgonio T. Alvarez for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS,
In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern
Samar, DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The
complaining witness is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The
information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her
right to file a separate civil action for damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)
The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for
damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the same court. She alleged that her
husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent
judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section
3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads:t.hqw
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. (Civil Code,)
There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth
noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This
is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and
"criminal prosecution." This conclusion is supported by the comment of the
Code Commission, thus:t.hqw

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not
included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment
has been rendered in the criminal action. ...
According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111,
New Rules of Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only after final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." (Rollo, p. 33.)
The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow
the citizen to enforce his rights in a private action brought by him,
regardless of the action of the State attorney. It is not conducive to
civic spirit and to individual self-reliance and initiative to habituate the
citizens to depend upon the government for the vindication of their
own private rights. It is true that in many of the cases referred to in the
provision cited, a criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be
remembered that while the State is the complainant in the criminal
case, the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he
who has suffered directly. He should be permitted to demand
reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. (Report, p. 46.)

And Tolentino says:t.hqw

The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge
granting the defendant's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 141 is highly
impressed with merit.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil
Code is the applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted
hereinbelow:t.hqw
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for
in Articles 31,32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the
right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.)
The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal action
has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense
can be prosecuted. The present articles creates an exception to this
rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In
these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal
action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured
party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the
claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action
should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been
terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the
result of the civil action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974.])
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of Separate Opinions
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only
physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted AQUINO, J., concurring:
homicide.t.hqw
I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may
The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and create a civil action based on article 100 of the Penal Code or an action based
'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary on culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are
sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal assumed in article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice
Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that for the same act or omission of the defendant" (Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil.
these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See Formento vs. CA,
impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, L-26442, August 29,1969,29 SCRA 437).
but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it
is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and
in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for may give rise to an independent civil action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used
terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its
technical sense. In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that
understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, reckless imprudence is not included in article 33 of the Civil Code, is not
bacause the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four
the Code Commission recommended that the civil action for physical Justices concurred in the result.
injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American
Law, and this recommendation must hove been accepted by the
Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the
intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received
by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as
the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the
offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide,
or attempted homicide, or even death," (Carandang vs. Santiago, 97
Phil. 94, 96-97 [1955].)

Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that
reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the
Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the
decision and four of them merely concurred in the result.

In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr.
Japzon may proceed independently of the criminal action against her.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case
No. 141 is hereby set aside; no special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.1wph1.t

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin, JJ.,

concur.