Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1991, Vol. 60, No.

3,439-455

Copyright 1991 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0022-3514/91/J3.00

Presidential Effectiveness and the Leadership Motive Profile
William D. Spangler
School of Management State University of New "York at Binghamton

Robert J. House
Wharton School of Management University of Pennsylvania

As much as 59% of the variance in measures of presidential performance may be explained by individual differences in power (positive), affiliation (negative), achievement (negative), and number of nots appearing in presidential speeches and letters (positive). Motives and the interactions of power and nots independently predicted presidential performance. An overall index of the leadership motive syndrome did not predict presidential performance independently of motives and the interaction of power and nots. Three supplementary analyses indicated that the nots index measured a style of using power, institutional versus personalistic, rather than activity inhibition, as had been proposed by McClelland, Davis, Kalin, and Wanner (1972).

Over several decades, McClelland, Atkinson, and their colleagues have studied the nature, sources, and effects of needs, such as the need for achievement, need for affiliation, and need for power (e.g., Atkinson, 1958; Atkinson & Birch, 1970; McClelland, 1961,1975,1985a, 1985b; McClelland & Winter, 1969; Winter, 1973). More recently, attention has also been given to activity inhibition, defined as the motive to use power for social rather than personal objectives (McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982; McClelland & Burnham, 1976; McClelland, Davis, Kalin & Wanner, 1972). One result of this continuing research has been the proposition that a certain personality profile, labeled the leadership motive profile, is related to effective leadership. Specifically, the effective leader is more likely to have a high need for power, high activity inhibition, and a lower need for affiliation than the ineffective leader (McClelland, 1975; McClelland & Burnham, 1976). Furthermore, a number of research studies have indicated that this relationship between the leadership motive profile and leader effectiveness is more likely to be found at higher levels of an organization and in general rather than technical jobs (Cornelius & Lane, 1984; McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982; Winter, 1978). Winter (1987) and Winter and Stewart (1977) applied the concepts and measurement techniques of McClelland and colleagues to the study of the American presidency. Winter and Stewart (1977) demonstrated that presidential motive scores for power, affiliation, and achievement may be derived from presidential inaugural speeches, and they showed that these scores were related to a number of important presidential outcomes. For example, need for achievement was significantly and positively related to number of changes in cabinet posts per year and was negatively related to the proportion of first-term cabinet appointees who had previous legislative experience. Affiliation correlated positively with scandals, forced resignations, or

This article was partially supported by Grant 410-85-0095-R2 from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to William D. Spangler, School of Management, State University of New York, Box 6000, Binghamton, New York 13901.

indictments of cabinet or staff members and with arms limitations agreements. Winter (1987) reported significant positive correlations between presidential need for power and war entry, war avoidance, consensus of greatness, and great decisions cited. However, Winter (1987) and Winter and Stewart (1977) did not specifically test the effects of the leadership motive profile on presidential performance. First, they did not have a measure of activity inhibition. Second, the leadership motive profile posits a stable positive relationship between the profile and overall leader performance. Winter (1987) and Winter and Stewart (1977) used a number of measures of presidential performance, some of which were very specific, with the results that a given motive had a positive association with one measure and a negative association with another. By analyzing the content of presidential inaugural speeches and correlating the resulting motive scores with measures of presidential performance, Winter (1987) and Winter and Stewart (1977) demonstrated that it is possible to study the effects of the leadership motive profile on presidential performance, but they did not in fact test the hypothesis that the leadership motive profile is positively related to effective performance. Therefore, the major purpose of this study was to extend the work of Winter (1987) and Winter and Stewart (1977) by testing the impact of the leadership motive profile on presidential performance. The second objective of this study was to test the form of the relationship between motives and presidential performance. According to one view (e^ Block & Ozer, 1982), specific levels of personality characteristics may form unique configurations or syndromes that predict behavior. That is, a syndrome of personality characteristics may predict behavior in a way that the variables used to define the syndrome cannot. A second view (e.g., Mendelsohn, Weiss, & Feimer, 1982) is that personality characteristics have effects on behavior that are not dependent on the presence of some syndrome. In the present instance, the leadership motive profile may predict leader effectiveness for one or both of two reasons. First, leader effectiveness may depend on the coexistence of a high need for power, lower need

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WILLIAM D. SPANGLER AND ROBERT J. HOUSE

for affiliation, and high activity inhibition. That is, the leadership motive profile is actually a syndrome. Alternatively, the leadership motive profile may be related to leader effectiveness, because power and activity inhibition are positively related to effectiveness and affiliation is negatively related to effectiveness. Previous research (e.g., Cummin, 1967; McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982; McClelland & Burnham, 1976; Varga, 1975; Winter, 1987) did not clearly distinguish and test these two interpretations of the leadership motive profile.

can presidential need for power and war entry, war avoidance, consensus of greatness, and great decisions cited.

Activity Inhibition
A second element of the leadership motive profile is activity inhibition. McClelland et al. (1972) found that stories written in response to TAT pictures could be distinguished by how characters in the stories used their power. Characters in some stories used their power on behalf of someone else. Characters in other stories showed no signs of inhibition or self-control. McClelland et al. (1972) found that individuals whose stories reflected low activity inhibition tended to exhibit specific behavior such as rudeness, excessive drinking, sexual exploitation, and a concern with symbols of personal success such as fancy cars and big offices (McClelland & Burnham, 1976; McClelland et al. 1972). One might expect that high activity inhibition would be more predictive of management or leader success than low activity inhibition because, by definition, individuals with a socialized orientation have a concern with the goals of the organization or group and not just personal goals. McClelland and Boyatzis (1982) also argued that high self-control is likely to be associated with leader success because "it [self-control] means the person is likely to be concerned with maintaining organizational systems and following orderly procedures" (p. 737). A number of studies have found a positive relationship between the leadership motive profile measured as a dichotomous variable (1 = moderately high power, power greater than affiliation, and activity inhibition equal to or greater than the sample median; 0 = absence of the profile) and leader effectiveness (McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982; McClelland & Burnham, 1976; Winter, 1978).

Previous Research Power
Individuals who are high in need for power, as measured by a content analysis of Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) stories or running text, exhibit a concern with strong vigorous action that affects others, action that has an emotional impact on others, and reputation and status (Winter, 1973). Management and political positions provide status and reputation to incumbents and offer numerous opportunities to influence others and have an emotional impact on them. Furthermore, an essential component of successful performance in a management or political position is the motivation, control, and coordination of others for some organizational or social objective. The acquisition and exercise of power reinforces the behavior of those who are high in the need for power, and therefore there should be positive associations between need for power and the pursuit of management/political positions, level attained in organizations and society, and success in such positions. A number of studies have found such associations. Cummin (1967) compared the motive scores of two groups of executives. He found that the need-for-power scores of the more successful executives were higher on average than the need-for-power scores of the less successful ones. Winter (1973, chap. 4) summarized several studies in which there was a positive relationship between need for power and leadership success. Varga (1975) studied 118 executives, scientists, and engineers working on 17 pharmaceutical and chemical industry research and development projects. He found that need for power was related to technical and economic success when found in conjunction with need for achievement. McClelland and Burnham (1976) reported that managers attending a series of management workshops were higher on need for power than people in general and that the more effective managers among the participants were higher on need for power than those who were less successful. In a study of high-level United States naval officers, Winter (1978) found that the leadership motive pattern was associated with superior in comparison with average performance ratings by supervisors. McClelland and Boyatzis (1982) studied the long-term success of American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) technical and nontechnical managers. Motive scores were available for 311 entry-level managers tested between 1956 and 1960. McClelland and Boyatzis found that managers characterized by the leadership motive profile had attained, on average, a higher level in the organization after 8 and 16 years than those who were not so characterized. Winter (1987) reported significant positive correlations between Ameri-

Affiliation
A third element of the leadership motive profile is need for affiliation. Individuals who are high on this need tend to be concerned with establishing, maintaining, and restoring close personal, emotional relationships with others (Heyns, Veroff, & Atkinson, 1958). McClelland and Boyatzis (1982) argued, in essence, that there should be a negative relationship between need for affiliation and leader performance. The manager who is low on need for affiliation can make decisions on the basis of organizational necessity. Subordinates may be hired, promoted, or fired on the basis of performance rather than the personal relations between them and the leader/manager, and the relationship between the manager and his or her superiors will be governed by business considerations rather than personal relationships. On the other hand, a leader or manager who is high on need for affiliation will be concerned about personal relationships with others to the detriment of organizational requirements. McClelland and Burnham (1976) made a related point. Managers of bureaucratic organizations must be universalistic in applying rules. If they make exceptions for the particular needs of individuals, which is what a high need-foraffiliation manager is likely to do, the whole system will break down. Studies using a dichotomous measure of the leadership motive profile (e.g., McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982; McClelland &

PRESIDENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS AND MOTIVE PROFILES Burnham, 1976; Winter, 1978) provide weak support for the proposition that affiliation and performance should be negatively associated. However, the interpretation of these studies is difficult because affiliation, power, and activity inhibition are combined in a single dichotomous measure. One might expect high political office to provide an opportunity to test this hypothesis because behavior in such positions may be less constrained than in bureaucratic positions. Indeed, Winter and Stewart (1977) found that presidential affiliation correlated .53 with a measure of presidential corruption. Other studies, however, have not supported this hypothesis consistently. Cummin (1967) found positive but nonsignificant correlations between affiliation and executive success. Cornelius and Lane (1984) found that in a subsample of first-line supervisors, need for affiliation was positively related to job performance and favorable subordinate attitudes and not to the need for power or the leadership motive profile, although the leadership motive profile, defined as standardized power minus standardized affiliation, was positively related to the size of the manager's unit for the overall sample studied by Cornelius and Lane.

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tween achievement and performance may be either nonsignificant or negative. McClelland and Burnham (1976) reported anecdotal data on the ineffectiveness of high-need-for-achievement managers. McClelland and Boyatzis (1982) reported a positive relationship between need for achievement and organizational success but only for low-level managers. Studies that have reported positive associations between need for achievement and performance seem to have relied on entrepreneurial or lower level managers. For example, Cummin (1967) reported that his successful executives on average scored higher on need for achievement than his less successful executives. However, his sample included "engineers and technical supervisors and represented the middle level of organizational hierarchy" (p. 79). Likewise, Wainer and Rubin (1969) found a positive association between need for achievement and company success, but their sample consisted of 51 technical entrepreneurs.

Interaction of Power and Activity Inhibition
A final component of the leadership motive profile is the interaction of power and activity inhibition. High-need-forpower managers characterized by high activity inhibition will be more effective than those high-need-for-power managers with low activity inhibition. The former will satisfy their need for power by working for organizational or institutional goals. The latter will use their position to aggrandize themselves at the expense of others and of the organization. The former group will be more effective not only because they are higher on activity inhibition than the latter but because activity inhibition affects the way high-power managers use their power. Likewise, high activity inhibition will be related to effectiveness only in the presence of high need for power (McClelland, 1975; McClelland & Burnham, 1976; McClelland et al., 1972). According to this argument, inhibition of power is immaterial if a manager does not express power in his or her position.

Achievement
There is the issue of how need for achievement is related to leader performance. Traditionally, need for achievement has not been included in the definition and measurement of the leadership motive profile, but there are substantial reasons for believing that there is a consistent negative relationship between achievement and leader performance for high-level leaders in nontechnical positions. Need for achievement may be defined as a concern for longterm involvement, competition against some standard of excellence, and unique accomplishment (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1958). Above all, need for achievement characterizes individuals who are motivated or driven by a need for personal accomplishment, that is, accomplishment through their own efforts. This motivation is fundamentally different from need for power. High need-for-power individuals are reinforced by their impact on others. Therefore, one might expect a positive relationship between need for achievement in technical or sales people or among small-scale entrepreneurs whose effectiveness depends on individual effort (McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982; McClelland & Burnham, 1976). However, in nontechnical management positions and at higher levels in organizations, and particularly in politics, in which technical requirements are few and impact on others is fundamental, effectiveness depends on the extent to which the leader or manager motivates and coordinates others. A manager or leader at a high level who attempts to do everything personally may be doomed to failure both because there is too much for a single person to do and because he or she is underutilizing the capacity of his or her subordinates and superiors. High need for achievement may lead a manager to attempt to assume personal control of all aspects of a position (McClelland & Burnham, 1976). A massive amount of research has confirmed the connection between need for achievement and personal effectiveness (e.g., McClelland, 1961; McClelland & Winter, 1969). However, in nontechnical and higher level positions, the relationship be-

Leadership Motive Profile and Leadership Motive Syndrome
Although the research summarized above suggests strongly that motives are related to leader performance, major methodological problems have not been resolved. Previous research has not clearly distinguished between a syndrome of personality dimensions associated with effective leadership and the independent effects of various motives and their interactions. As a result of this failure to distinguish a leadership motive syndrome from the independent effects of motives on performance, inappropriate or inadequate methods have been used to test the effects of motives on leader performance. One purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis that personality characteristics affect leader behavior as a unique syndrome. To test the leadership motive syndrome, it is appropriate to construct a dichotomous variable as follows: 1 = power of 45 or more, power greater than or equal to affiliation, and activity inhibition equal to or above the median of the sample; 0 = other leaders. A power score cutoff of 45, somewhat smaller than the standardized mean power score of 50, was used by McClelland and Boyatzis (1982) to increase the number of man-

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WILLIAM D. SPANGLER AND ROBERT J. HOUSE sons justify the use of multiple regression procedures in this case. 1. By aggregating a number of factors such as power, affiliation, and activity inhibition, it is impossible to determine which of the factors was responsible for the observed relationship between the profile and performance. 2. It is impossible to determine the relative impact of each factor on performance. 3. Creating an overall dichotomous index from a number of continuous, interval scales such as motive scores results in the loss of information (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). 4. In testing the hypothesis that power and activity inhibition interact, it is not enough to demonstrate that managers who are high on power and activity inhibition are more effective than those who are not. The observed superiority of these managers might be due to high power or high activity inhibition or both and not to the interaction of these two factors. That is, any test of the interaction hypothesis must control for the independent effects of power and activity inhibition, using methods that have been discussed in various places (Arnold, 1982; Cohen & Cohen, 1983; Lewis-Beck, 1980). Well-known tests relating power and activity inhibition to leader performance have used a dichotomous measure of the leadership motive profile (McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982; McClelland & Burnham, 1976; Winter, 1978). These tests could not separate the independent effects of power and activity inhibition from their presumed interactive effects. Cornelius and Lane (1984) used a continuous measure of the leadership motive profile, namely the difference between standardized power and standardized affiliation. They correlated this index with relevant outcomes. However, this procedure was not a test of the interactive hypothesis because their index did not include activity inhibition and did not separate proposed independent effects from the interactive effect of power and activity inhibition. 5. A test of the independent and interactive effects of motives on leader performance must include a measure of the leadership motive syndrome as a control variable. It is likely that measures of power, affiliation, and activity inhibition will be correlated with a measure of the leadership motive syndrome derived from these motive measures, so any observed relationships between motives and leader performance may be due to the causal effects of motives on performance or the causal effect of the syndrome on performance. Previous studies (Cummin, 1967; Varga, 1975; Wainer & Rubin, 1969; Winter, 1987; Winter & Stewart, 1977) regressed leader performance on motives but did not include a measure of the leadership motive syndrome as a control variable. In summary, previous research has demonstrated that motives and leader performance are strongly related, but two difficulties have characterized this research. First, a distinction has not always been made between the leadership motive profile defined by motives and their interactions independently affecting leader performance and the alternative hypothesis that a unique combination of motive levels, a syndrome, is related to leader performance. Second, previous research has not ade-

agers in their study classified as having the leadership motive profile. The performance of leaders with the syndrome and the performance of those without the syndrome may be compared by regressing leader performance on this dichotomous variable measuring the leadership motive syndrome. Merely regressing leader performance on motives and their interactions is not an appropriate test of the leadership motive syndrome because the hypothesis under consideration is that the syndrome contributes to behavior in some way different from the effects of motives and their interactions. A useful analogy would be an attempt to predict the ability of compounds to dissolve sugar by the amounts of hydrogen and oxygen in their composition.1 No relationship between levels of oxygen and hydrogen and dissolvability would be found. Only a certain configuration of oxygen and hydrogen constituting water would predict dissolving power, and this relationship could be discovered by regressing dissolvability on a dummy variable representing whether the dissolving compound were water or some other compound made of hydrogen and oxygen in proportions differing from water. However, to adequately test the leadership motive syndrome, it is necessary to eliminate the competing explanation that any observed significant relationship between the syndrome measure and leader performance is actually due to a spurious correlation between the syndrome and leader performance. There will probably be a positive correlation between the syndrome and leader power and activity inhibition, and a negative correlation between affiliation and the leadership motive syndrome measure. It may be that motives and their interactions actually cause leader performance, but the correlations between motives and the syndrome measure lead to the spurious relationship between the syndrome and leader performance. An appropriate test of the leadership motive syndrome hypothesis therefore is a regression of leader effectiveness on a dummy variable representing the leadership motive syndrome as well as motives and their interaction terms. In such a regression, the coefficient on the syndrome term estimates the direct effect of the syndrome on leader performance independent of any effects of motives on performance. Previous research has not taken this approach. Several studies (e.g, McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982; McClelland & Burnham, 1976; Winter, 1978) have calculated indices of the leadership motive syndrome and compared leader performance of those with and those without the syndrome. However, these studies have not controlled for the alternative hypothesis that the observed relationship between the syndrome and leader performance is actually due to the independent effects of motives and their interactions on leader performance. Furthermore, previous research did not adequately test the hypothesis that leader behavior is a function of motives and their interactions rather than of a syndrome. A test of the hypothesis that leader behavior is a function of motives and not of the leadership motive syndrome should rely on regressions of leader performance on motives, their interactions, and the leadership motive syndrome. A comparison of performance of leaders with the syndrome and those without the leadership motive syndrome is an inadequate test of the hypothesis that motives and their interactions affect leader behavior. Five rea-

We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this analogy.

1

PRESIDENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS AND MOTIVE PROFILES quately tested either version of the leadership motive profile. In this study, both versions of the leadership motive profile were tested by using multiple regressions that included a dummy variable for the leadership motive syndrome as well as measures of motives and the interaction of power and activity inhibition.

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Summary and Hypotheses
The theoretical and empirical results summarized above suggest that personality characteristics—such as power, affiliation, achievement, and activity inhibition—and particularly, the leadership motive profile as defined by McClelland et al. (McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982; McClelland & Burnham, 1976) may explain a significant part of the performance of leaders and managers in high-level, nontechnical, and political positions. Therefore, this profile may explain much of the effectiveness of American presidents. Winter (1987) and Winter and Stewart (1977) examined presidential behavior in terms of motives, but they did not examine the relationship between the leadership motive profile and presidential effectiveness. Furthermore, previous research has not adequately distinguished or tested the leadership motive syndrome and the alternative that leader motives independently predict leader effectiveness. Therefore, the primary objective of this research was to relate the leadership motive profile to presidential performance. The second objective of this research was to distinguish and appropriately test two versions of the leadership motive profile: first, that a specific configuration of motives, the leadership motive syndrome, would account for presidential effectiveness and second, that presidential motives would independently predict presidential effectiveness. From the empirical studies and theoretical discussion summarized above, two hypotheses were formulated and tested in this investigation: Hypothesis 1. The leadership motive syndrome will be positively related to presidential effectiveness independently of any relationship between effectiveness and presidential achievement, affiliation, power, and the interaction of power and activity inhibition. Hypothesis 2. Presidential effectiveness will be positively related to presidential power, activity inhibition, and the interaction of power and activity inhibition, and presidential effectiveness will be negatively related to presidential needs for achievement and affiliation. These relationships will be independent of any relationship between presidential effectiveness and the leadership motive syndrome. Method

Subjects
All 39 presidents from George Washington to Ronald Reagan who had been elected to office were included in the present study.

Data
Motive scores. Presidents' motive scores for the needs for achievement, affiliation, and power were taken from Winter (1987). These motive scores had been extracted from presidential first-term inau-

gural speeches by two coders working independently who had previously demonstrated reliability of .85 or better with expert-coded TAT materials. Five presidents, namely John Tyler, Millard Fillmore, Chester A. Arthur, Andrew Johnson, and Gerald R. Ford, were not elected to office and therefore were not included in the Winter (1987) study. There may be some question as to the extent inaugural speeches represent the sentiments and plans of presidents versus those of their speech writers. Winter (1987) has argued that inaugural speeches represent the personality and thoughts of presidents rather than their speech writers for several reasons: Speech writers know how to produce words and images that are appropriate to their clients, first inaugural speeches are important to presidents because they set the tone for the entire presidency, various preserved drafts of inaugural speeches show numerous corrections in the handwriting of presidents, and motive scores have predictive and construct validity because they successfully predict the actions and outcomes of presidents. Activity inhibition. To measure activity inhibition, McClelland and his colleagues (e.g., McClelland, 1975; McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982) merely counted the frequency of note in stories written by subjects in response to a set of TAT pictures and adjusted these frequencies for the length of the TAT stories (see McClelland, 1985b, for a review of research using this measure of activity inhibition). In the present instance, an initial attempt was made to derive a measure of presidential activity inhibition by counting the number of note appearing in presidential inaugural addresses. There was very little variation in this measure from one inaugural speech to another and indeed very few occurrences of the word not in these speeches. Therefore, a measure of activity inhibition was developed for our study that relied on other materials written by or about presidents. Seven coders collected data. Each coder was responsible for finding 15 items or passages, for a number of presidents, from among the following four sources: (a) letters and speeches in collections of letters and speeches; (b) letters and speeches in autobiographies, memoirs, and diaries; (c) autobiographies, memoirs, and diaries without letters; and (d) biographies by others. The coders were instructed to select all 15, or as many items from the first set as possible, and then to proceed to the next category, if necessary, and select as many as possible. The rationale for this approach was that the personal letters and speeches probably provided a better measure of power inhibition than other personal materials written by others. Two coders collected 15 items for each president, with the result that 30 items were available for each president. Coders also counted the total number of words in each passage and recorded for each item, rater, source (one of the four categories given above), and president. For each passage, the number ofnots was divided by the total number of words in the passage. These raw activity inhibition scores were regressed on dummy variables for president, source (as was done above), and rater. The final activity inhibition scores used in the present research were based on the regression weights on presidential dummy variables in a regression of the raw power inhibition scores regressed on president, source (as was done above), and rater. The regression weights represented activity inhibition scores independent of sources and rater effects. The regression weights were standardized to have a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10 to make them comparable with the Winter (1987) scores for achievement, affiliation, and power. Final activity inhibition scores were available for all presidents except Reagan. Activity inhibition was an index of 30 independently coded activity inhibition scores with a Cronbach's alpha of .71. It is possible that materials written about presidents produced less valid measures of activity inhibition than sources written by presidents. The basic analyses reported in this article were based on a sample of 33 presidents—the 34 presidents for whom motive scores were

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WILLIAM D. SPANGLER AND ROBERT J. HOUSE Winter's (1987) measure of consensus of greatness and the Murray and Blessing (1983) measure of mean greatness were standardized and averaged to form a two-item index labeled perceived greatness. These two items were combined in the present study because they were both subjective estimates of greatness by experts and because the two scales were correlated .96. This two-item index had an internal consistency reliability of .98. To supplement these previously published measures of presidential performance, we calculated three new measures of presidential performance. Three areas of presidential activity were identified: international relations, domestic and international economy, and domestic social issues. Within each area, seven types of activities were defined: military action, peace initiatives, other negotiations, appointments, legislation, mass appeals, and other actions. Each of these was defined twice, for example, military action taken and refused military action. Finally, each specific action was listed twice by outcome as successful and unsuccessful. So, for example, on the resulting coding form, one of the codeable options was "successful military action in the area of international relations." There were 84 codable options—3 Areas X 7 Types of Activities X 2 Options (action taken or action refused) X 2 Types of Outcomes (successful or unsuccessful). Using this coding form, seven coders were randomly assigned to code presidential actions for a number of terms of office using one of two sources. The coders were not aware of the motive scores that were used in the present study. The two sources were presidential biographies in Collier's Encyclopedia (1983) and Encyclopedia Britannica (1985). For each assigned term, each coder read the assigned text and coded as many of the 84 categories on the coding form as applied within each of the three areas of social, economic, and international relations performance. In cases in which the author of the biography described an action as successful or unsuccessful, the coder checked off the appropriate category. If the action was described but not evaluated by the author, the coder checked the successful category. Three performance indices were created by subtracting the total number of unsuccessful actions from the total number of successful actions for a given term. Final social, economic, and international relations performance measures were the average of four items (performance scores coded by two coders using two biographical sources for each president). Cronbach's alphas for these averaged performance measures were .65, .74, and .82, respectively. For the purposes of the present investigation, measures for presidents who served more than one term in office were averaged.

available minus Reagan—for whom no activity inhibition scores were available. Of these 33 presidents, activity inhibition scores for only 2 (William Henry Harrison and Warren G. Harding) were based exclusively on materials written about the presidents. Activity inhibition scores for another 7 presidents were based in part on materials written by presidents and in part on materials written about presidents. For each of the 33 presidents in the basic analysis, 30 passages were coded for nots, giving a total of 990 passages. Of these 990 passages, 186 (19%) were taken from materials written about presidents rather than by presidents. It appears, therefore, that any bias introduced into the measure of activity inhibition by the use of materials written about rather than by presidents was modest. Furthermore, it appears that if a bias were introduced by the use of materials written about rather than by presidents, such a bias would be a conservative bias that would act to weaken the observed relationship between activity inhibition and performance. Power X Activity Inhibition interaction term. To test Hypothesis 2, that power interacting with activity inhibition would positively affect presidential performance, we calculated a product term. Power and activity inhibition deviation scores were calculated by subtracting from each variable the mean score for that variable. The two resulting deviation scores were multiplied to produce the product term. Presidential performance. The focus of the current research was presidential performance. Two sets of data were used. The first set of data consisted of five measures of presidential performance that had been used previously by Winter (1987)2 and Murray and Blessing (1983). Three additional measures of presidential performance were created for the present study. Winter (1987) used five measures of presidential performance. These included war entry, defined in terms of a list developed by Richardson (1960), and war avoidance, crises that could have developed into wars but were settled peacefully. Maranell (1970) had surveyed 571 historians of the United States to rate presidents on several dimensions including general prestige, strength of action, presidential activeness, and accomplishments of the administration. From these four scales, Winter (1987) constructed a measure of perceived performance that he called consensus of greatness. Furthermore, Winter calculated a measure of performance based on "decisions that have historic impact on the country and world." This measure was based on a compilation made by Morris (1967) and included such decisions as the Louisiana Purchase by Jefferson and the abolition of central banking by Jackson. Winter (1987) referred to this last measure as great decisions cited. A fifth measure of performance used by Winter, arms limitations, was not used in the present study because of its small sample size (14 presidents). One additional previously published measure of presidential performance was used in the present study. Murray and Blessing (1983) surveyed 846 historians who rated all American presidents excluding W H. Harrison, James Garfield, and Ronald Reagan. Murray and Blessing calculated from these ratings mean greatness scores. For the purposes of the present investigation, war entry, war avoidance, and great decisions cited were standardized and averaged to form an index of presidential performance. These three measures were combined because they were significantly intercorrelated, were quantitative or objective as opposed to perceived measures of performance, and were measures of similar forceful types of actions. War entry and war avoidance both were measures related to war, and of 38 great decisions cited by Morris (1967), 20 concerned declarations of war or decisions to use military force (Washington suppressed the Whiskey Rebellion; James K. Polk declared war on Mexico), war avoidance (John Adams decided to avoid war with France), or threats of use offeree (Harry S Truman decided to contain Soviet expansionism). The resulting threeitem measure was labeled direct presidential action and had an internal consistency reliability of .73.

Measuring the Leadership Motive Syndrome
Achievement, affiliation, and power scores were expressed in terms of T scores (for each, M = 50, SD = 10). To measure the leadership motive syndrome in the present study, we created a dichotomous variable (1 = presidents with power T score of 45 or more, power T score greater than or equal the affiliation Tscore, and activity inhibition at or above the median; 0 = other presidents). This definition of the leadership motive syndrome was used by McClelland and Boyatzis (1982) in their analysis of AT&T managers.

Analysis
The two hypotheses developed in this article were tested with standard regression techniques. Each of the five measures of performance defined above was regressed on the dummy variable measuring the leadership motive syndrome and on achievement, affiliation, power,

2

These data were kindly provided to us by D. G. Winter.

PRESIDENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS AND MOTIVE PROFILES activity inhibition, and the Power X Activity Inhibition interaction term. Hypothesis 1 stated that the leadership motive syndrome would be positively related to presidential performance. Therefore, one-tailed t tests of regression coefficients for the leadership motive syndrome measure were tests of Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 stated that achievement and affiliation would be negatively related to performance and that power, activity inhibition, and the interaction of Power X Activity Inhibition would be positively related to presidential performance. These predictions were tested with one-tailed t tests of the coefficients of the respective independent variables. If achievement, affiliation, power and activity inhibition, and the interaction of power and activity inhibition affect presidential performance independently of any effect by way of the leadership motive syndrome (Hypothesis 2), then it is of interest to determine the relative contribution of each of these motives to explaining presidential performance. To determine the relative importance of each independent variable, we calculated standardized regression coefficients for each independent variable in each regression. The magnitude of these coefficients, sign ignored, indicates the relative direct effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable (Snedecor & Cochran, 1967).

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Results
Table 1 shows means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables used in the present study. Table 2 summarizes the basic statistical tests of the two hypotheses developed in this article. Hypothesis 1 stated that the leadership motive syndrome would be positively related to presidential performance independently of any relationship between the syndrome and presidential performance mediated by motives and their interactions. In Table 2 it is evident that this hypothesis was not confirmed for any of the five measures of presidential performance used in the present investigation. Hypothesis 2 stated that power and activity inhibition would be positively related to performance and that affiliation and achievement would be negatively related to performance. As predicted, power was positively and significantly related to presidential performance in four of five regressions, and in the remaining regression (economic performance) the coefficient was positive. Activity inhibition was positively and significantly related to all five measures of presidential performance. Achievement was negatively and significantly related to three measures of performance (direct presidential action, perceived greatness, and social performance) and was negatively but not significantly related to international relations performance. Affiliation was negatively and significantly related to perceived greatness and social performance, and it was negatively but not significantly related to the remaining three measures of presidential performance. Contrary to expectations, the interaction of power and activity inhibition was not significantly related to any measure of presidential performance. With the exception of the unexpected results for the interaction of power and activity inhibition, results from this study provided support for Hypothesis 2. Significant standardized regression coefficients found in Table 2 provide an indication of the relative impact of each motive on presidential performance. Larger standardized regression coefficients indicate a greater direct effect of a variable on per-

formance. In four of five of the regressions summarized in Table 2, the standardized regression for power was larger in absolute size than was any other standardized coefficient. In four regressions, the standardized coefficients on activity inhibition were the next largest coefficients. In the case of economic performance, this activity inhibition coefficient was the largest coefficient. Affiliation had the third largest direct effect in two regressions (perceived greatness and social performance). Achievement had the third largest effect in one regression (direct presidential action) and the fourth largest effect in two regressions (perceived greatness and social performance). In general then, power was the most important predictor of presidential performance, followed in order by activity inhibition, affiliation, and achievement. In previous research, the leadership motive profile had been defined in terms of power, affiliation, and activity inhibition. In the present study, a suggestion was made to include achievement as a component of the leadership motive profile. An argument was made that achievement would be negatively related to performance of high-level nontechnical leaders. This hypothesis was confirmed for three of five measures of presidential performance in this study. Furthermore, adding achievement to regressions—including affiliation, power, activity inhibition, the syndrome dummy variable, and the Power X Activity Inhibition interaction term—increased the regression R2 from .42 to .51 (direct presidential action), from .32 to .38 (perceived greatness), and from .24 to .30 (social performance). Previous research (e.g., Cornelius & Lane, 1984; Groesbeck, 1958; Wainer&Rubin,1969;Winter,1973)found low and generally insignificant correlations among achievement, affiliation, and power scores. In contrast, motive score correlations in the present study were positive and significant. Achievement and affiliation correlated .31 (p= .07, two-tailed), achievement and power correlated .30 (p = .08, two-tailed), and affiliation and power correlated .48 (p = .004, two-tailed). Differences in the lengths of presidential inaugural speeches cannot account for these intercorrelations because the Winter (1987) motive scores, which were used in the present research, had been adjusted for length of inaugural speeches. A major difference between previous research and the present study is that previous studies relied on samples of managers or students who were approximately the same age. In the present case, presidents were separated from each other by as much as two centuries. The possibility therefore arises that motive pairs were correlated because each motive was significantly correlated with time. To test this proposition that motives were spuriously correlated because of their association with time, we plotted each motive against time defined to be the number of years from 1788 (the year before Washington's first year in office) and the midpoint of each president's first term of office. These plots showed that achievement and power were strongly and linearly related to time and that affiliation and time were strongly related in a U-shaped relationship or quadratic relationship. Time explained 27% of the variance in achievement and 26% of the variance in power, and time and time squared together explained 46% of the variance in affiliation scores. In these re-

446

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Table 2 Tests of Hypotheses
Dependent variable Direct presidential action* n 31 .R2 .51 Independent variables Syndrome" Achievement Affiliation Power Activity inhibition Interaction l c Syndrome" Achievement Affiliation Power Activity inhibition Interaction l c Syndrome" Achievement Affiliation Power Activity inhibition Interaction l c Syndrome" Achievement Affiliation Power Activity inhibition Interaction l c Syndrome" Achievement Affiliation Power Activity inhibition Interaction l c Standardized coefficient -.027 -.319 -.256 .749 .478 .038 -.045 -.251 -.510 .678 .475 -.062 -.096 -.284 -.500 .597 .423 -.095 -.362 .114 -.300 .225 .379 .247 -.228 -.223 -.325 .662 .336 -.061 Hypothesis Predicted sign t

Perceived greatness*1

32

.38

Social performance

33

.30

Economic performance

33

.14

International relations performance

33

.23

1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2

+
+ + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + +

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.56
-1.09 .85 1.61f 1.13 -1.00 -1.15 -1.24 2.63** l.SOf -.29

+ + +

"Direct presidential action = the mean of standardized war entry, war avoidance, and great decisions cited (Winter, 1987). "Syndrome = leadership motive syndrome measured with a dummy variable (1 = presidents with power score of 45 or greater, power score greater than or equal to affiliation score, activity inhibition at or above the median; 0 = other presidents). c Interaction 1 = interaction of power and activity inhibition measured by multiplying power deviation scores by activity inhibition deviation scores. d Perceived greatness = the mean of standardized consensus of greatness (Maranell, 1970; Winter, 1987) and Murray and Blessing mean greatness (Murray & Blessing, 1983). t/><.!, one tailed. * p < .05, one-tailed. **p< .01, one-tailed. ***p< .001, one-tailed.

gressions, time and time squared were significant (p < .01, two-tailed). Partial correlations among the motives, controlling for time, were calculated. Residuals from the regressions of achievement and power on time and from the regression of affiliation on time and time squared were calculated and correlated to produce partial correlations. These partial correlations were . 15 (achievement and affiliation), .06 (achievement and power), and .23 (affiliation and power). All partial correlations were less than the corresponding zero-order correlations, and not one was significant (p = .05, two-tailed). Therefore, we conclude that the observed significant correlations found in Table 1 among achievement, power, and affiliation were due to their correlations with time. We may speculate as to why presidential motive scores have changed over time. A number of scholars (e.g., Bailey, 1966; Corwin, 1940; Loos, 1986; Simonton, 1987) have pointed out that the power of the presidency has grown over time. Corwin, for example, argued that the power of the presidency expanded as the United States became a world power and as the laissez-

faire theory of government was replaced by the idea that government should be active and reforming. We suggest that the increasing power of the presidency has made the office more attractive over time to potential candidates who have been high in need for power. Likewise, the increasing power of the presidency perhaps has appealed to those high in need for achievement in that the expanded powers of the office have given highneed-for-achievement presidents increased opportunities to pursue personal achievement. The very strong U-shaped relationship between need for affiliation and time is intriguing. The earliest presidents from Washington to Martin Van Buren had an average affiliation score of 50, and presidents since William H. Taft have had an average affiliation score of 58, whereas presidents from W H. Harrison through Taft had an average affiliation score of 44. We speculate that this relationship between affiliation scores and time might be the result of two independent effects. Simonton (1987) pointed out that nomination and selection of a president in the early days of the republic was an elitist and relatively simple affair. A small group of top party members or state legis-

448

WILLIAM D. SPANGLER AND ROBERT J. HOUSE

lators might nominate candidates, and the electoral college was given the actual task of appointing the president. Under these circumstances, personal relationships between candidates and a small number of important politicians, in part due to the candidates' need for affiliation, might be an important factor in securing a nomination and election to the presidency. Over time, these elitist practices declined in importance, and hence the role of affiliation in maintaining advantageous political relationships with a small number of power brokers became less significant. In recent decades, however, the popular vote has decided who becomes president, primaries have become increasingly important, the electoral college has become an insignificant factor in deciding elections, and success with the media has affected the popular vote, both in the primaries and in the presidential election itself. Possibly, the ability of a candidate to project a friendly and caring personal image, based in part on a high need for affiliation, has given some candidates an increased probability of winning elections at the expense of candidates who have had a lower need for affiliation. Discussion The results of this investigation confirm those of previous studies. A sizable part of the variance in leader performance may be explained in terms of motives such as power, achievement, affiliation, and activity inhibition. Furthermore, there is evidence that power and activity inhibition are positively related to leader performance, whereas affiliation and achievement are negatively related to leader performance. Given the number of organizational and environmental constraints operating on American presidents (such as checks and balances operating within the structure of government, party realities, public opinion and the power of the media, and tradition), it is remarkable that as much as 51 % of the variance in a measure of direct presidential action (Table 2) may be explained by a simple set of motive scores taken from inaugural speeches and presidential letters and other speeches. Four issues deserve further discussion. These are (a) threats to the validity of the conclusion that presidential motives may cause presidential performance, (b) variations in the predictive power of motives according to the type of performance measured, (c) proper and improper methods of testing the leadership motive profile, and (d) the construct validity of measures of activity inhibition that rely on the relative frequency ofnots in writings of leaders. Validity Threats The results summarized in Table 2 support the conclusion that motive characteristics may cause, in part, presidential performance. However, at least six alternative explanations of the findings in Table 2 need to be examined. 1. Presidential performance produces motive scores. Klinger (1971) observed that subjects who engage in much achievement fantasy begin to do so after they have already begun to achieve in actuality. One explanation of this observation is that behavior and stimuli in the environment activate coher-

ent individual "subselves," which include fantasy such as is recorded in TAT stories, related affects, goals, and self-perceptions (Klinger, 1971, pp. 363-364). Another explanation of the proposal that performance is responsible for motives is Bern's (1967) self-perception model. Individuals behave for reasons that are not clear to them and then try to make sense of their behavior by attributing to themselves motives capable of explaining the behavior. In the present instance, this explanation of the observed relationships between presidential motives and performance is impossible because presidential motives were coded from presidential first-term inaugural speeches that were delivered before instances of presidential behavior occurred. The span of time between the inaugural speech and the recorded performance behavior was as long as 8 years (12 years in the case of Franklin D. Roosevelt's three complete terms of office). 2. The observed relationships between motives and performance is a spurious correlation. Klinger (1971) argued that "social status is probably the underlying social factor which is responsible for much of the relationship between TAT achievement fantasy and performance" (p. 320). That is, in a sample of subjects with differing social statuses, need for achievement is positively related to social status and so is achievement behavior, and therefore there is a spurious correlation between motive scores and performance scores. In the present study, the social status variable was effectively controlled because our sample consisted exclusively of individuals with the same status, namely, presidents of the United States. 3. Single-source response bias accounts for the observed findings. A number of authors (e.g., Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986; Roberts & Click, 1981; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977) have argued that causal analyses that depend on independent and dependent variables measured at a single point in time with a single instrument such as an opinion questionnaire are suspect. Any observed relationship between measures of two constructs may have been induced by the method or instrument used rather than by the phenomena under investigation. For example, in responding to a questionnaire, a subject may attempt to make two sets of responses consistent with each other or may use his or her responses to one set of items as a basis for inferring responses to other items that appear to be linked to the first set. In large part, the single-source responsebias problem arises because the subject remembers answers to one question or set in responding to other items. In the present research, we have taken some pains to avoid this very serious validity threat. Motive scores, activity inhibition measures, and performance measures came from different sources, were coded by different scorers, and were based on events that occurred at distinct points of time. Motive scores were taken from presidential first-term inaugural speeches. Performance measures were counts of behavior from distinct sources such as presidential biographies coded by scorers different from those who coded motive scores, or performance measures were based on expert opinion. Furthermore, many of the data were objective (e.g, war entry and great decisions cited) and hence were less susceptible to single-source response bias than were subjective data. 4. Raters inferred motive scores from their knowledge of

PRESIDENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS AND MOTIVE PROFILES

449

presidential performance. A major problem with leadership research is that leader characteristics are often rated by experts or by individuals who know the leader. Measures of leader performance, which might be made by the same raters, are then regressed on these leader characteristics in an attempt to demonstrate that individual leader characteristics produced variations in leader performance. A difficulty with this approach is that the raters may have some knowledge of the leaders' performance and may use this knowledge to infer leader characteristics. For example, Lord, Binning, Rush, and Thomas (1978) demonstrated experimentally that manipulated performance information can affect how observers rate leaders on leadership characteristics. One explanation for this finding is that observers have an implicit leadership theory (Rush, Thomas, & Lord, 1977) that relates leadership characteristics to leader performance. If the observers have some information about performance, they use their implicit theory to infer the leader characteristics that likely produced the performance. In the present research, this phenomenon may have contributed to the observed relationships between motive scores and performance. One may assume that the trained scorers used by Winter (1987) to code first-term inaugural speeches would have some perceptions of the relative performance of at least some of the presidents whose speeches they coded. One may further assume that these perceptions would correlate to some degree with the five measures of performance used in the present study. Furthermore, these coders perhaps were familiar with the work of McClelland and Atkinson and their colleagues and believed that motives and performance might be related in systematic ways. It appears that this validity threat, though possible, was of minor significance in Winter's (1987) coding of motives from presidential inaugural speeches. In coding these presidential inaugural speeches, the identities of presidents were disguised. Winter (1987) used copies of speeches from a single-volume compilation with identical format and type face, each president's name was replaced with a code number, and the speeches were mixed together randomly. Furthermore, although the scorers were aware of the work of McClelland and colleagues because they had been thoroughly trained in scoring motives from running text, they were not aware of any specific hypotheses regarding motives and presidential performance.3 5. Raters inferred presidential performance from their knowledge of presidential personality. This hypothesis is the reverse of the hypothesis given above. If a rater knew that a given president was forceful and powerful, that is, high on power and lower on affiliation, and if the rater had an implicit leadership theory that power and affiliation are related to performance, the rater might infer presidential performance from a knowledge of presidential motives. Such a process could explain the results found in Table 2. This explanation is not likely in the present case. Four of the five measures of performance used in the present study (direct presidential action and social, economic, and international relations performance) were based on counting instances of objective behavior. Only one performance measure—perceived greatness—was based on expert opinion. In general, the results summarized in Table 2 were consistent across type of perfor-

mance measure, objective versus subjective. If raters had inferred presidential performance from their knowledge of motive scores, then Hypothesis 2 would have been confirmed for perceived greatness but not for the other four measures of presidential performance. 6. Significant relationships reported in Table 2 are due to spurious correlations with time. There are significant correlations between time and achievement, affiliation, and power. It is possible that time is also correlated with the measures of presidential performance used in the present study. Time may be correlated with presidential performance for two reasons. First, the presidency has grown in power over time, and incumbents therefore have been in a more favorable position to perform successfully. Second, there is more data for more recent presidents, and therefore there may be a positive correlation between performance measures and time. Correlations between time and the five measures of presidential performance used in this study were all nonsignificant. The five basic regressions of presidential performance on achievement, affiliation, power, and activity inhibition were rerun with the addition of time. The only effect of including time as an independent variable in these regressions was to increase the number of regression coefficients that were significant in the predicted direction from 12 to 14. Therefore, there is no evidence that the results summarized in Table 2 are due to correlations between time, independent variables, and dependent variables. In summary, it appears that six alternative explanations of the findings summarized in Table 2 and discussed above are relatively implausible.

Predictive Power of Motives
One unexpected finding of this investigation was the wide variation in the predictability of different measures of presidential performance. Motives jointly predicted 51% of direct presidential action, 38% of perceived greatness, 30% of social performance, 14% of economic performance, and 23% of international relations performance (Table 2). It may be that these differences in predictability reflect differences in the degree of control presidents have had over each of the five types of performance measured in this study. That is, motives and other individual determinants of behavior have a greater impact on performance in those cases in which the environmental impact on performance is relatively weak. There are reasons for believing that presidents have had the most control over performance represented by direct presidential action, some control over social performance, and the least control over economic and international relations performance. Direct presidential action was composed of measures of specific presidential behavior (war entry, war avoidance, and great decisions cited). In the area of domestic social issues, the president has been able to take direct military action as commander in chief, propose legislation to Congress, and make appointments to positions in the executive branch and even to

3 These details on the coding of presidential inaugural speeches were provided by D. G. Winter.

450

WILLIAM D. SPANGLER AND ROBERT J. HOUSE syndrome hypothesis is a regression of leader effectiveness on a dummy variable representing the leadership motive syndrome as well as motives and their interaction terms. In such a regression, the coefficient on the syndrome represents the direct effect of the syndrome on leader performance independent of any effects of motives on performance. In the present case, the dichotomous syndrome measure was significantly related to war entry, Murray and Blessing (1983) mean greatness, and direct presidential action, as well as to power and the interaction of power and activity inhibition (Table 1). In the regressions reported in Table 2, it was apparent that the observed relationship between the syndrome and presidential performance was due to the relationships between the syndrome and the motives on the one hand and between the motives and performance on the other. To test for the independent effects of various motives and their interactions, we found standard multiple regressions of performance measures on motives and their interactions to be suitable. However, any test of the hypothesis that leader behavior is a function of motives and not of the leadership motive syndrome must control for the effects of the syndrome, because it is likely that motive scores will be correlated with syndrome scores. In the present instance, it was seen (Table 2) that motives predicted presidential performance after the effects of the leader motive syndrome had been controlled in the regressions. In summary, future research into the relationship of motives to leader performance should clearly distinguish the syndrome effects of motives from the independent effects of motives and should test simultaneously the effects of the leadership motive syndrome and motives and their interactions.

the Supreme Court that might perpetuate the president's social views long after he has left office. Perhaps the major source of the president's domestic influence has been the prestige of the office, the trust Americans have placed in the president, and the power of the president over public opinion (Corwin, 1940; DiClerico, 1983). Presidents may have more power over the American economy than any other group of individuals, but they preside over a pluralistic economy in which private enterprise makes the key decisions about production, pricing, and investment (Koenig, 1981). Presidential influence over foreign economies is even more limited. Corwin (1940) pointed out that authority in the area of foreign affairs has been divided between the president and Congress and that foreign relations may be determined by foreign individuals and states rather than by either Congress or the president. To test the possibility that R2 depended on the type of performance measured, we converted the five R2s displayed in Table 2 into multiple correlation coefficients and transformed using Fisher's z transformation, and we calculated 95% confidence intervals for each transformed multiple correlation coefficient. All confidence intervals overlapped, indicating that the observed jR2s were not significantly different from each other. Nonetheless, future research into the relationship between leader motives and leader performance might do well to include multiple measures of leader performance as well as an environmental moderator variable, namely, the degree of control leaders have over measured outcomes.

Testing the Leadership Motive Profile
In testing the effects of motives on leader performance, it is necessary to clearly define the purposes of the investigation. If the focus of interest is the effects of the leadership motive syndrome on behavior, then regressions of performance measures on motives will not be appropriate because the very hypothesis under investigation is that the leadership motive syndrome predicts behavior that cannot be predicted by examining the relations of motives to performance one variable at a time. If the focus of the study is the independent effects of motives on behavior, then using a single dichotomous variable to represent the motives is inappropriate. Dichotomizing continuous intervalscale variables loses information (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Combining several variables into a single index makes it impossible to disentangle the independent effects of affiliation, achievement power, and activity inhibition. Such a collapsing also makes it impossible to legitimately test the hypothesis that power and activity inhibition interactively affect performance. To test the leadership motive syndrome, it is appropriate to construct a dichotomous variable (1 = power of 45 or more, power greater than or equal to affiliation, and activity inhibition at or above the median of the sample) and to compare performance levels of leaders with the syndrome with those of leaders without the syndrome. However, to test the leadership motive syndrome, it is necessary to eliminate the competing explanation that any observed significant relationship between the syndrome measure and performance is actually due to correlations between the syndrome and motives as well as between motives and performance. An appropriate test of the

Using Nots to Measure Activity Inhibition
Two expectations of this study were not confirmed. There was no evidence that activity inhibition combined with power and affiliation to form a configuration of motives unique to specific presidents, and there was no evidence that activity inhibition interacted with power to affect presidential performance. Three reasons may account for this failure to demonstrate the interactive role of activity inhibition. First, it is possible that activity inhibition does not in fact interact with motives to affect leader performance. Second, activity inhibition and power may interact in a form not tested in the present research. Third, it is possible that the measure of activity inhibition used in this study, adjusted number of nots from presidential materials, is not in fact a measure of activity inhibition as defined by McClelland et al. (1972). To test these three interpretations of the unexpected findings, we undertook three additional analyses. First, the five measures of presidential performance used in this study were regressed on motives and two additional measures of the interaction of power and activity inhibition. These regressions were calculated in order to test the possibility that power and activity inhibition do indeed interactively affect presidential performance but in a form not tested in the basic study. Second, the measure of activity inhibition based on adjusted number of nots was correlated with Simonton's (1986) 14 measures of presidential personality. Third, biographies of 33 presidents were coded

PRESIDENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS AND MOTIVE PROFILES for forceful presidential action, and these action scores were regressed on power, activity inhibition, and the interaction of power and activity inhibition. The first additional analysis explored two alternative forms of the interaction of power and activity inhibition. The basic test of the interaction hypothesis relied on an interaction term formed by multiplying power deviation scores times activity inhibition deviation scores. No interaction effect was found with any of the five measures of presidential performance (Table 2). However, this form of the interaction effect assumed a linear interactive relationship between power and activity inhibition. That is, the relationship between power and performance was expected to increase at a constant rate as activity inhibition scores increased, and the relationship between activity inhibition and performance was expected to increase at a constant rate as power scores increased. However, it is possible that the relationship between power and performance increases or is positive only for high levels of activity inhibition. Similarly, it is possible that the relationship between activity inhibition and performance increases or is positive only for high levels of power. To test these possibilities, we calculated two measures of the interaction of power and activity inhibition and used them to predict presidential performance in addition to the deviation scores measure of the interactive effect (Interaction 1) used in the basic hypotheses tests (Table 2). A second interaction term (Interaction 2) was calculated by multiplying power by an activity inhibition category variable (activity inhibition greater than or equal to the median = 1; activity inhibition less than the median = 0). A third interaction measure (Interaction 3) was calculated by multiplying activity inhibition by a power category variable (power greater than or equal to the median = 1; power less than the median = 0). A fourth interaction term was also calculated by multiplying the activity inhibition category variable by the power category variable, but it was not used in the present analysis because of its high correlations with the second interaction term (r = .80) and the third interaction term (r = .74). However, the second and the third interaction terms were correlated .42 and could therefore be used together in regressions without fear of multicollinearity (Lewis-Beck, 1980). Each of the five measures of presidential performance defined and used in this study was regressed on achievement, affiliation, power, activity inhibition, and the two new interaction terms. Results of these regressions are presented in Table 3. The interaction term calculated from power and the activity inhibition category variable (Interaction 2) was significantly and negatively related to social performance (p = .07, twotailed) and economic performance (p = .01, two-tailed). The interaction term calculated from activity inhibition and the power category variable (Interaction 3) was significantly and positively related to direct presidential action (p = .05, twotailed). The standard definition of indices based on nots, that such scales measure social versus personal use of power, cannot explain this pattern of results. The positive relationship between the Power X Activity Inhibition interaction and direct presidential action is understandable. Leaders who use their power for social as opposed to personal goals are more effective than

451

those who use their power for personal goals. But this standard interpretation of nots measures can explain neither the two negative interactions found in Table 3 nor the fact that no interaction terms predicted perceived greatness and international relations performance. To further explore the meaning of the nots index used in this study, we correlated the nots measures used here with 14 presidential personality variables developed by Simonton (1986). Simonton used a modified version of the Gough Adjective Check List to measure presidential personality. Raters rated presidents on adjectives using a variety of historical materials. A factor analysis of the resulting ratings produced 14 personality dimensions, which were given labels such as moderation, friendliness, and intellectual brilliance on the basis of the adjectives that loaded on the factors and on the basis of correlations between these factors and measures of presidential personality previously published. Activity inhibition, as measured in the present investigation by the adjusted number of nots appearing in presidential letters and speeches, was correlated with each of these 14 personality measures. Activity inhibition was negatively correlated with moderation (r = —.26, p =. 11, two-tailed), positively correlated with forcefulness (r - .37, p = .02, twotailed), and negatively correlated with conservatism (r = -.42, p = .008, two-tailed). These correlations were based on a sample of 38 presidents. These results provide an initial definition of the personality correlates of presidents who were high versus low on the adjusted nots measure. In Simonton's (1986) study, forcefulness was positively related to terms such as determined, active, demanding, and restless. Moderation was negatively related to these same terms and negatively related also to such characteristics as temperamental, hasty, excitable, impatient, and outspoken. Finally, conservative and conventional defined Simonton's conservative factor. Therefore, it appears that presidents who scored high on activity inhibition tended to be more impatient, forceful, radical, demanding, and active than presidents who scored low on activity inhibition. This reinterpretation of activity inhibition as measured by nots provides an explanation of the main effects found in Table 2 and the interaction effects found in Table 3. Direct presidential action in the present study was an index composed of war entry, war avoidance, and great decisions (Morris, 1967). Great decisions included presidential declarations of war, war avoidance actions, threats of use of war, and other actions taken by the president acting on his own. Therefore, a president who was simultaneously active, forceful, radical, and high on need for power would be expected to take more actions of the type measured by the direct presidential action index than presidents who were not simultaneously high on both measures. Furthermore, such direct presidential action should be positively related to both power and activity inhibition acting independently. On the other hand, social and economic presidential performance included negotiations, appointments, legislation, and mass appeals, that is, activities that require working with others and using established procedures and precedents. Presidents who had a high need for power would be expected to be more effective than presidents who had a low need for power. Presidents who were somewhat radical, impatient, forceful, and

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WILLIAM D. SPANGLER AND ROBERT J. HOUSE

Table 3 Tests of Power X Activity Inhibition Interaction Effects
Dependent variable Direct presidential action* n 31 R2 .59 Independent variables Achievement Affiliation Power Activity inhibition Interaction 2b Interaction 3° Achievement Affiliation Power Activity inhibition Interaction 2b Interaction 3C Achievement Affiliation Power Activity inhibition Interaction 2b Interaction 3C Achievement Affiliation Power Activity inhibition Interaction 2b Interaction 3C Achievement Affiliation Power Activity inhibition Interaction 2b Interaction 3C Standardized coefficient
-.364 -.209 .496 .454 -.116 .414 -.261 -.508 .578 .495 -.110 .155 -.335 -.438 .470 .628 -.495 .379 .012 .009 .521 .781 -.832 -.129 -.226 -.247 .703 .426 -.259 -.107

t

Perceived greatness"1

32

.39

Social performance

33

.45

Economic performance

33

.27

International relations performance

33

.22

-2.58* -1.28 1.98f 2.09* -.51 2.05t -1.50 -2.56* 1.92f 1.88t -.40 .63 -2.06* -2.35* 1.68 2.54* -1.91t 1.69 .07 .04 1.61 2.73* -2.79** -.50 -1.17 -1.11 2.10* 1.44 -.84 -.40

* Direct presidential action = the mean of standardized war entry, war avoidance, and great decisions cited (Winter, 1987). b Interaction 2 = interaction of power and activity inhibition measured by multiplying power times a dummy variable (0 = activity inhibition less than the sample median; 1 = activity inhibition greater than or equal to the sample median). c Interaction 3 = interaction of power and activity inhibition measured by multiplying activity inhibition times a dummy variable (0 = power less than the sample median; 1 = power greater than or equal to the sample median). d Perceived greatness = the mean of standardized consensus of greatness (Winter, 1987) and Murray and Blessing mean greatness (Murray & Blessing, 1983). t p <. 1, two-tailed. * p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed.

active would be more effective than presidents who were more conservative, passive, and moderate. However, a president who was simultaneously radical, impetuous, and determined and high on need for power possibly engaged in behavior that made him or her less effective than other presidents. Such a president would tend to bypass Congress and individuals and groups with traditional authority such as the president's cabinet, would tend to take impetuous military action, would take illegal and secretive action to achieve his or her goals, and might even circumvent the Constitution to achieve his or her objectives. The nots index appears to be a measure of how leaders, including presidents, use power. The president who is low on the nots index favors exercising power through others and through established institutions such as Congress and appointed officials such as ambassadors. The president who is high on nots tends to bypass established institutions and appointed officials to take personal action. Furthermore, this tendency moderates the use of power. A leader who is high on power and low on the

nots measure might exert strong, forceful action through traditional means and other people and institutions. A leader with a high need for power who is also impetuous, radical, and forceful, exercises power in an impetuous, personal, and radical manner. To further study the nature of the nots measure and how the personality characteristics underlying this measure interact with need for power, we undertook a third analysis. Biographies of 33 presidents were coded for evidence of strong, impetuous, and personal action. These presidential behavior scores from the 33 biographies were then correlated with activity inhibition as measured in this study by the adjusted number of nots appearing in presidential letters and speeches. If there is a personality characteristic measured by nots that is related to personal and impetuous versus conservative and institutional action, then there should be a positive and significant correlation between this nots measure and the index of impetuous, personalistic presidential action from the 33 biographies.

PRESIDENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS AND MOTIVE PROFILES To test this hypothesis, we developed a coding form on which presidents were rated. A president was scored — 1 for forceful presidential action that was customary, moderate, or institutional. For such presidents, congress passed many of the president's bills, cabinet members were instrumental in carrying out the president's program, the president's ambassadors were prominent and successful, and the president undertook war with congressional approval. Presidential biographies were coded 1 if there was evidence of strong, forceful action of a personal, radical, and immoderate nature: If, for example, the president relied on executive orders and proclamations, many of his bills were defeated in Congress, he used the veto more frequently than other presidents, he undertook wars without congressional approval, and he engaged in personal diplomacy rather than diplomacy through established channels. Finally, weak, indecisive, or passive presidents were coded 0. Using this coding form, two undergraduate and one graduate research assistant coded 33 presidents for personal and impetuous action using a summary of presidential action found in Loos (1986). This summary was supplemented with full-length presidential biographies in Magill (1986). Of a total of 39 presidents from Washington to Reagan, 33 were included in the present analysis. Five (Tyler, Fillmore, A. Johnson, Arthur, and Ford) were not elected to office, so power scores were not available from Winter's (1987) coding of inaugural speeches. Reagan was excluded from the present analysis because no activity inhibition scores were available. The three coders had no knowledge of the hypothesis under investigation. The three sets of codes were combined into a three-item index of personal and impetuous presidential action with an alpha of .55. The correlation of this index with the nots measure used in the present study Was .51 (p = .0015, one-tailed). It is possible that the actual correlation between nots and impetuous presidential action from coding the 33 biographies was actually substantially higher than .51 because of unreliability in both measures used in the correlation. If the observed correlation is corrected for attenuation (Nunnally, 1978) using reliabilities of. 5 5 for the three-item measure of impetuous presidential action and .71 for the nots measure, the resultant estimated correlation between nots and impetuous presidential action is .80. Therefore, the hypothesis that nots measures a disposition toward impetuous and personalistic action as opposed to conservative and institutional action was supported by this third analysis. From these three additional analyses of the construct validity of the nots measure used in the present investigation as well as the basic results summarized in Table 2, three conclusions may be drawn. First, the index of nots strongly predicted presidential performance. Indeed, adding the nots measure as well as two interaction measures (power times the nots category variable, and the nots continuous measure times a power category variable) to equations using achievement, power, and affiliation significantly increased the percentage of variance explained in direct presidential action (R2 increased from .33 to .59), F(3, 24) = 5.07, p < .01; social performance (R2 increased from .16 to .45), F(3,26) = 4.57, p < .05; and economic performance (R2 increased from .01 to .27), F(3,26) = 3.09, p < .05. Adding the nots measure alone to a regression including achievement,

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power, and affiliation increased the percentage of variance explained in perceived greatness from .21 to .37, F(l, 27) = 6.86, p < .05. Thus, it may be concluded that nots predicts presidential performance in these four domains. Second, in the present study, nots evidently did not measure activity inhibition as defined by McClelland et al. (1972). McClelland et al. defined activity inhibition as the tendency to use power for social (e.g., organizational or social) purposes rather than personal purposes. The present analyses suggest that nots measure a tendency to be forceful, immoderate, and unconventional. The distinction between this interpretation of the nots measure and activity inhibition as defined by McClelland et al. (1972) is this: The nots measure refers to the means by which power is exercised (conventional/institutional versus personal and radical), whereas activity inhibition refers to the goal of power use (personal versus social). This measure, based on the adjusted number of nots in TAT stories or running text, predicts how leaders use their power. It does not predict whether they will use their power for social or personal objectives. A leader who is immoderate, radical, and forceful may use his or her power either for social or personal purposes, and a leader who uses power for social objectives may make use of either institutional or radical methods of reaching his or her objectives. This distinction may be made clear by citing the case of Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln had the third highest nots score in the present study (T= 65.46), and his administration was characterized by bold, personal presidential action such as the use of vetoes, proclamations, and executive orders; the conduct of the Civil War without congressional involvement; and the suspension of constitutional guarantees (Magill, 1986). However, according to Magill, Lincoln used his enormous power to save the nation rather than for his own personal advantage. Therefore, we suggest that measures based on the number of nots in TAT stories or running text and valid measures of activity inhibition or social responsibility may provide a better understanding of leader behavior than either measure used alone. Fortunately, Winter and Barenbaum (1985) have developed a measure of social responsibility that relies on directly coding imagery in TAT stories and running text. This new interpretation of the meaning of activity inhibition as measured by number of nots does not conflict with previous research using nots measures (e.g., McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982; McClelland & Burnham, 1976; Winter, 1978). These previous studies found that number of nots, together with high power and low affiliation treated as a syndrome, predicted leader performance, which is consistent with the finding reported in this investigation that activity inhibition and need for power were positively related to presidential performance. However, these studies did not test for the possible interaction of power and activity inhibition, and they did not examine personality correlates of activity inhibition. The third conclusion derived from the three additional analyses described above is that the present research did not in fact test the leadership motive syndrome. The leadership motive syndrome predicts that activity inhibition and power together with lower affiliation will constitute a unique configuration or syndrome that will predict presidential performance. Further-

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WILLIAM D. SPANGLER AND ROBERT J. HOUSE Corwin, E. S. (1940). The president: Office and powers. New York: New \brk University Press. Cummin, P. C. (1967). TAT correlates of executive performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 51, 78-81. DiClerico, R. E. (1983). The American president. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Encyclopedia Britannica. (1985). Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica. Groesbeck, B. L. (1958). Toward description of personality in terms of configuration of motives. In J. W Atkinson (Ed.), Motives in fantasy, action, and society (pp. 383-395). Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand. Heyns, R. W, Veroff, J., & Atkinson, J. W (1958). A scoring manual for the affiliation motive. In J. W Atkinson (Ed.), Motives in fantasy, action, and society (pp. 205-218). Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand. K linger, E. (1971). Structure and functions of fantasy. New\brk: Wiley. Koenig, L. W (1981). The chief executive. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1980). Applied regression: An introduction. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Loos, J. L. (1986). Introduction. In F. N. Magill (Ed.), The American presidents: The office and the men (pp. xi-xx). Pasadena, CA: Salem Press. Lord, R. G., Binning, J. F, Rush, M. C, & Thomas, J. C. (1978). The effect of performance cues and leader behavior on questionnaire ratings of leader behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 21, 27-39. Magill, F. N. (Ed.). (1986). The American presidents: The office and the men. Pasadena, CA: Salem Press. Maranell, G. (1970). The evaluation of presidents: An extension of the Schlesinger poll. Journal of American History, 57,104-113. McClelland, D. C. (1961). The achieving society. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand. McClelland, D. C. (1975). Power: The inner experience. New York: Irvington. McClelland, D. C. (1985a). How motives, skills, and values determine what people do. American Psychologist, 40, 812-825. McClelland, D. C. (1985b). Human motivation. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman. McClelland, D. C, Atkinson, J. W, Clark, R. A., & Lowell, E. L. (1958). A scoring manual for the achievement motive. In J. W Atkinson (Ed.), Motives in fantasy, action, and society (pp. 179-204). Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand. McClelland, D. C., & Boyatzis, R. E. (1982). Leadership motive pattern and long-term success in management. Journal of Applied Psychology, 67, 737-743. McClelland, D. C, & Burnham, D. (1976, March-April). Power is the great motivator. Harvard Business Review, pp. 100-110,159-166. McClelland, D. C, Davis, W N., Kalin, R, & Wanner, E. (1972). The drinking man. New York: Free Press. McClelland, D. C, & Winter, D. G. (1969). Motivating economic achievement. New York: Free Press. Mendelsohn, G. A, Weiss, D. S., & Feimer, N. R. (1982). Conceptual and empirical analysis of the typological implications of patterns of socialization and femininity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42,1157-1170. Morris, R. B. (1967). Great presidential decisions: State papers that changed the course of history (rev. ed.). Philadelphia: Lippincott. Murray, R. K., & Blessing, T. H. (1983). The presidential performance study: A progress report. Journal of American History, 70, 535-555. Nunnally, J. C. (1978). Psychometric theory. New York: McGraw-Hill. Podsakoff, P. M., & Organ, S. W (1986). Self-reports in organizational research: Problems and prospects. Journal of Management, 12, 531544.

more, the present study did not test the hypothesis that activity inhibition interacts with power to positively affect presidential performance. These hypotheses were not tested in this study because the note measure was not actually a measure of activity inhibition.

Conclusion
This study has confirmed previous research that demonstrated that motives predict leader effectiveness. In particular, this study has shown that power and an index based on nots were positively related to presidential performance and that achievement and affiliation were negatively related to presidential performance. Our study also provides an agenda for future research into motives and leader performance. First, personality measures based on nots should not be abandoned. Rather, studies should further explore the construct validity of this measure. Second, future research should include not measures as well as directly measured indices of social responsibility (Winter & Barenbaum, 1985). Third, future research should competitively test the leadership motive syndrome hypothesis against the alternative hypothesis that leader performance is a function of distinct personality characteristics and their interactions. This study has provided a method of conducting such tests by constructing a dummy variable measure of the leadership motive syndrome to be included in regressions that also include main effects and interactions of motives such as achievement, affiliation, power, and activity inhibition. Furthermore, our results strongly suggest that any test of the leadership motive syndrome or of the interactive effects of activity inhibition should be based on direct measures (e.g., Winter & Barenbaum, 1985) of activity inhibition together with nots indices. Finally, future research should further test the hypothesis that need for achievement is negatively related to the performance of highlevel nontechnical leaders.

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