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Case 5:16-cv-04183-DDC-KGG Document 23 Filed 04/10/17 Page 1 of 30

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF KANSAS

MELVIN HALE, PH.D.,

Plaintiff

v.

EMPORIA STATE UNIVERSITY (ESU),
JACKIE VIETTI, PH.D.,
DAVID CORDLE, PH.D.,
Case No. 16-4183-DDC-KGG
JUDY ANDERSON,
KEVIN JOHNSON,
RAY LAUBER,
MIRAH DOW, PH.D.,
GARY WYATT, PH.D.,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS

Defendants claim that this Court should dismiss Plaintiff‟s Complaint for the following

reasons:

1. Hale‟s Title VII claim fails as it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

2. Hale‟s Title VII claim fails because Hale did not engage in protected opposition to

discrimination. Because Hale cannot meet the element of a prima facie case, his Title VII

claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

3. Hale‟s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

because Hale‟s alleged speech was not on a matter of public concern.
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4. Defendants Vietti, Cordle, Anderson, Johnson, Lauber, Dow, and Wyatt are shielded

by qualified immunity on Hale‟s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

5. The Eleventh Amendment precludes Hale‟s official capacity claims against Defendants

Vietti, Cordle, Anderson, Johnson, Lauber, Dow, and Wyatt.

6. Hale‟s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim fails against Defendants Vietti, Cordle, Anderson,

Johnson, Lauber, Dow, and Wyatt to the extent they are sued in their official capacity

because they do not constitute persons under § 1983.

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 15, 2016, this Court adjudicated three Motions to Dismiss this action, and

permitted Plaintiff‟s Title VII Retaliation and First Amendment Retaliation claims to move

forward, 15-4947-SAC-KGS, Doc. 57, p. 30, inviting Plaintiff to illuminate specific actions of

the Defendants which they called “the cooling off period” for the purpose of determining if the

cooling off period would chill a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in protected speech.

In September 2016, Plaintiff faced severe medical and financial problems, and believed that he

should file for a voluntary dismissal according to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(2).

In its Order granting Plaintiff‟s Voluntary Motion to Dismiss filed on September 30,

2016, Judge Crow stated that “The court shall grant plaintiff‟s motion to dismiss this case

without prejudice upon the condition that all pleadings, discovery, testimony, orders or rulings,

or any other substantive matters from these proceedings, will be binding in any later filed action

of the same claims so as not to prejudice either party to this action, with costs to be borne by the

party incurring it.” (15-4947-SAC-KGS, Doc. 93, p. 6). Plaintiff re-filed this case on December

8, 2016 with the expectation that Defendants would be bound as stated in the Court‟s ruling.

They themselves state that “Defendants further admit that Plaintiff has previously filed an action

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with the same/similar claims in the District of Kansas in 15-4947-SAC-KGS, and Defendants

note that the court filings in that case speak for themselves.” Doc. 20, p. 1. Yet this motion

appears to be a violation of that order.

Defendants should be barred from bringing a Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings (the “Motion”) immediately upon the re-filing of this action. A minuscule amount of

discovery occurred since the case moved forward, so nothing has materially changed that would

warrant a motion for judgment on the pleadings upon re-filing of the case. A motion for

judgment on the pleadings is essentially adjudicated as a motion to dismiss. "The standard for

addressing a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d

518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006). “On a motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), a court

assesses whether the complaint "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) Intercept

Pharms., Inc. v. Howard, No. 14-2920-cv (2d Cir. Aug. 28, 2015). “The distinction between the

two motions is purely formal, because the court must review a Rule 12(c) motion under the same

standard that governs a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Resource Cen. for Ind. Living v. Ability

Resources, 534 F. Supp.2d 1204, 3 (D. Kan. 2008). Apparently the complaint contained

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief.

Perhaps Defendants are suggesting that they believe they can obtain a different ruling

from the newly assigned judge Daniel D. Crabtree, than that rendered by Judge Sam A. Crow,

who examined and pruned Plaintiff‟s claims in its Third Amended Complaint, and allowed Title

VII and First Amendment Retaliation claims to survive and move forward. Viewed in that light,

Defendant‟s motion can be viewed as an affront to the Court and the ends of justice.

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A Rule 12(c) motion is designed to provide a means of disposing of cases when the

material facts are not in dispute between the parties and a judgment on the merits can be

achieved by focusing on the content of the competing pleadings, exhibits thereto, matters

incorporated by reference in the pleadings, whatever is central or integral to the claim for relief

or defense, and any facts of which the district court will take judicial notice. The motion for a

judgment on the pleadings only has utility when all material allegations of fact are admitted or

not controverted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain to be decided by the district

court. In its answer Defendants assert disputes with the majority of the material facts. This case

should be moving forward with discovery where it left off when it was voluntarily dismissed

without prejudice. “Trial Rule 12(C) motions — like other motions which render adjudications

on the merits — convert into motions for summary judgment if the court accepts and uses

materials supplementary to the pleadings. Entry of judgment following such a motion, like

dismissal under T.R. 12(B)(6), constitutes an adjudication on the merits and bars its subsequent

assertion. Cf. Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Wm. F. Jungclaus Co. (1976), Ind. App., 352 N.E.2d 817

(dismissal on grounds of failure to state claim constitutes adjudication on merits). Foshee v.

Shoney's, Inc, 637 N.E.2d 1277, 1280 (Ind. 1994). The inverse must also be true. The claims in

Plaintiff‟s current complaint moved forward on June 15, 2016 because of the merits, and

according to the ruling of the Court on September 30, 2016, “all pleadings, discovery, testimony,

orders or rulings, or any other substantive matters from these proceedings, will be binding in any

later filed action of the same claims.” (15-4947-SAC-KGS, Doc. 93, p. 6). Plaintiff has provided

copious supplemental material in previous pleadings to support the facts in this case; material

which proves that Defendant‟s representation of the facts is false and misleading. The narrative

they weave in their 12(c) motion is both a misrepresentation and an obfuscation of the facts.

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Hale has stated a prima facie case of malicious and intentional retaliation, and the

muzzling of Constitutionally-protected free speech by state actors who knew that Hale was

participating in protected activity on matters of public concern in direct violation of his

Constitutional rights, and they knew that what they were doing was illegal because it violated

their own policies, mentioned in Hale‟s Complaint in ¶¶ 161 and 238. Their Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings should be denied with prejudice. Considering that Defendants are

represented by the Office of Kansas Attorney General Derek Schmidt, perhaps the Court should

consider sanctions against the Attorney General of Kansas for bringing this motion. It is difficult

enough for a diligent pro se to contend with legal heavyweights in federal court. A pro se should

not have to contend with state-funded attorney misconduct. This matter should have settled by

now. It appears that Defendants are primarily engaged in a protracted legal battle to wear down

a pro se litigant who will not surrender. They have no concern about having to potentially pay

opposing attorney fees; are funded by tax dollars; and are willing to use disreputable legal tactics

to accomplish their goal, which is a manifest injustice.

II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

The court will dismiss a cause of action for judgment on the pleadings only when it

appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the theory of

recovery that would entitle him or her to relief, see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78

S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir.

1998), or when an issue of law is dispositive. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326, 109

S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). The court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual

allegations in the complaint, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, see Maher, 144 F.3d

at 1304, and all reasonable inferences from those facts are viewed in favor of the plaintiff, see

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Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir. 1998). The issue in resolving a motion

such as this is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he or she is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683,

40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (overruled on other grounds).

This case is not about a singular incident of racial discrimination, which Defendants

continue to harp upon as not rising to the level for a case of racial discrimination. This case is

about retaliation and the suppression of freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. It

is about the malevolent conduct of Interim President Jackie Vietti who led the effort to silence

Hale by encouraging students, faculty and staff to ignore Hale and his calls for an independent

investigation, not the internal “investigation” led by Ray Lauber, a longtime family friend of the

only suspect in the case. It is about a cover-up and a whitewash directed by Vietti, Johnson,

Cordle, Wyatt, Anderson, Lauber and Dow. Vietti repeatedly refused to have a dialog with Hale,

an Assistant Professor at ESU, in direct violation of ESU‟s policy prohibiting such conduct,

amidst her repeated statements to the press and the campus that ALL voices were heard. Hale

references this conduct in ¶ 130. By banishing and relegating him to the sidelines of the

university community, ESU et al. violated Hale‟s Constitutional right to freedom of speech on a

matter of public concern, ¶ 238. This conduct was hateful, detestable, and intentional.

This case is about Provost David Cordle and his refusal to do his job, and demand a

truthful investigation, and his role in conceiving and enacting the cooling off period, which

would arguably chill a person of ordinary firmness from speaking out about racism and the

corrupt behavior of a university determined to suppress freedom of speech, ¶ 237. Cordle was

joined and supported in this reprehensible conduct by Jackie Vietti, Kevin Johnson, Gary Wyatt,

Ray Lauber, Judy Anderson, and Mirah Dow.

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Provost Cordle defined Hale‟s extended cooling off period as follows: “The current

prohibition on your being present in any SLIM office or area will remain in effect through the

end of your 2015-16 academic year appointment. The current prohibition on communication

between you and anyone at SLIM beyond what is necessary for the instruction of your assigned

courses will remain in effect through the end of your 2015-16 academic year appointment; since

no instruction will be assigned for Spring Semester 2016, you are therefore prohibited from

contacting any SLIM faculty member, staff member, administrator, or student for any reason

after December 15, 2015.” Emphasis added. Such a prohibition amounted to an explicit

Constitutional violation because Hale was engaged in a public dispute over the manner in which

ESU handled the report of hate speech and racial discrimination.

This case is about Ray Lauber, who conveyed the message across campus to faculty and

staff to stop talking to Hale, ¶ 199. Lauber admitted having a long-term familial relationship

with Debra Rittgers, ¶¶ 70 to 73, the suspect in the writing of the racial slur according to a

nationally respected forensic document examiner, ¶ 69, but he architected the “investigation,”

which was nothing less than a full-scale ad hominem attack against Hale and his wife.

This case is about Kevin Johnson, ESU‟s General Counsel, who doubled down and even

referenced Hale and his wife Angelica as being banished from the campus to the FBI agent who

came to ESU, ¶¶ 222 to 230. Johnson claimed that hate crimes are a “misconception” and do not

actually exist, and pointed to a lack of a specific hate crime statute in Kansas, ¶¶ 107 to 111.

This case is about Mirah Dow, head of SLIM faculty, who assumed the role of Interim

SLIM Dean when Gwen Alexander was forced to step down. Dow prevented Hale from

returning to his office, and became an enforcer of the cooling off period in which he was

muzzled in his own department. Dow, whose conduct can best be described as duplicitous, said

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herself that she was surprised that Dean Alexander was remiss in her response to the hate speech

incident, ¶ 55, and that she believed a crime was committed, ¶ 104, and that Hale did nothing

wrong, ¶ 105, yet Dow still closed ranks with the administration in their efforts to silence Hale‟s

voice. She told Hale that the administration was looking for any excuse to terminate him, ¶ 192,

and that he shouldn‟t even sound tense “because they‟re looking for anything they can,” ¶ 195.

Ultimately, Dow chose to keep her “power” over doing the right thing, ¶ 197. Dow was

complicit in the effort to silence Hale from making his voice heard about official corruption at

ESU, an affront to free speech on a matter of public concern.

This case is about Assistant Provost Gary Wyatt who was Interim SLIM Dean for a

period after the departure of Gwen Alexander. Wyatt prevented Hale from returning to his

office, and became an enforcer of the cooling off period in which he was muzzled in his own

department. Wyatt was a leader in the effort to suppress the facts and in promoting the cover-up

and whitewash, ¶¶ 103, 153, and 234. Wyatt was an integral player in official corruption that

stripped Hale of his Constitutional rights to confront official misconduct by government actors.

This case is about Judy Anderson, Director of Human Resources at ESU, and Lauber‟s

supervisor; the Title VII officer who supported the cooling off period which silenced Hale in

violation of explicit Title VII policies against repeated ignoring of a member of the university

community. Rather than go against the actions of Vietti and others, she acquiesced, and called a

law enforcement matter a personnel matter in a corrupt attempt to prevent transparent access to

information which should be made freely available to the public, ¶¶ 58 and 120.

"The First Amendment right of free speech includes not only the affirmative right to

speak, but also the right to be free from retaliation by a public official for the exercise of that

right." A plaintiff seeking to recover for First Amendment retaliation must allege that (1) she

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engaged in protected First Amendment activity, (2) the defendants took some action that

adversely affected her First Amendment rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between

her protected activity and the defendants' conduct. Id. at 686. Suarez Corp. Indus. v. Mc-Graw,

202 F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir. 2000).

This case is about racism being tolerated and defended by Emporia State University, and

the extent to which a corrupt and racist administration would go to deny racism using a sham

“investigation” as a cover-up foisted on the public to obscure the stark reality of both overt and

covert racism at ESU, which Dr. Hale, a black man, describes as palpable. Hale communicated

this foul truth to the public because the public has a right to know when a public institution is

violating Constitutional rights by suppressing someone who speaks out against official

corruption. This case should move forward so that the triers of fact can make a determination as

to liability and damages.

Individual Capacity 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment Retaliation claims against Vietti,

Cordle, Anderson, Johnson, Lauber, Dow and Wyatt are appropriate because they knowingly and

willfully violated Hale‟s Constitutional rights in retaliation for his reporting hate speech and for

reporting their corruption. It is indisputable that Hale engaged in protected First Amendment

activity. See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 404-05 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff

adequately alleged First Amendment retaliation based on government officials' response to his

publication of an article criticizing the FBI and other federal agencies). Hale criticized ESU‟s

improper handling of the reporting of the hate speech incident to The Associated Press, which

published its article in on July 29, 2015. The cooling off period was put into effect on or about

August 27, 2015. First Amendment retaliation is actionable because "retaliatory actions may

tend to chill individuals' exercise of constitutional rights." ACLU of Md., Inc. v. Wicomico

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County, Md., 999 F.2d 780, 785 (4th Cir. 1993). Not all retaliatory conduct tends to chill First

Amendment activity, however, DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995), and a

plaintiff seeking to recover for retaliation must show that the defendant's conduct resulted in

something more than a "de minimis inconvenience" to her exercise of First Amendment rights,

ACLU of Md., 999 F.2d at 786 n. 6. Both Hale and his wife‟s contracts were not renewed after

their complaints about corruption at ESU, in a public manner more akin to a lynching; certainly

something much more than a "de minimis inconvenience."

A retaliation claim challenging action taken because of EEO-related activity has three

elements:

 (1) protected activity: "participation" in an EEO process or "opposition" to

discrimination;

 (2) materially adverse action taken by the employer; and

(3) requisite level of causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse

action.

In the following sections Plaintiff will address (A) Protected activity, (B) Materially

adverse action, (C) Causal connection, (D) Defendants‟ retaliatory motive satisfies the "but for"

cause of the adverse employment action, (E) Plaintiff was in his right to complain to someone

other than his employer, (F) Retaliation is a separate claim from discrimination, (G) Plaintiff‟s

actions as a government employee amounted to engaging in free speech as a private person and

on a matter of public concern, (H) Defendants cannot proffer legitimate, non-retaliatory rationale

for taking adverse actions against Hale that are in fact not pretextual, (I) Defendants lacked

clearly articulated policies for the reporting of bias incidents, (J) Defendants sued in their

individual capacities do not automatically have Eleventh Amendment Immunity against 42

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U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment Retaliation claims, (K) Injunctive relief not barred by immunity,

(L) Qualified immunity, and (M) Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

A. Protected activity.

Although Hale was involved in more than one activity which could be characterized as

“protected,” the initial protected activity was reporting the writing of the racial slur found on a

graduate assistant‟s notepad to a school official, Dean Alexander, with the expectation that it

would be followed up with some affirmative actions to investigate the matter and take steps to

deter a repetition. When Alexander ignored Hale, Hale went to Defendant Dow to see if she

could get a different reaction from Alexander. Ultimately, Hale and his wife took the matter to

Defendant Cordle and Anderson, and to the ESU Police Department and local district attorney

Marc Goodman, ¶¶ 59 to 64.

Hale was thereafter contacted by the Associated Press, and he reported racially

discriminatory conduct and official corruption to the media, ¶ 100. Hale also participated in

protest marches demanding an end to racism, retaliation, falsified investigations and cover-ups,

and was shut down for this, ¶¶ 206 to 210. The Supreme Court has rejected a definition of

"oppose" that would require an employee to "actively" and "consistently" oppose an employer's

practice or to "instigate" or "initiate" the opposition. In Crawford v. Metro Gov't of Nashville &

Davidson County, the Court held that an employee has an actionable claim of retaliation where

she "speaks out about discrimination not on her own initiative, but in answering questions during

an employer's internal investigation.” 555 U.S. 271, 129 S. Ct. 846, 849 (2009).

Additionally, Plaintiff‟s filing of a police report is considered protected activity which

provided him with qualified immunity in most jurisdictions, and absolute immunity in others. In

Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1992) (“The primary question we must answer in

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this case is whether defamatory statements made to the authorities prior to the initiation of

criminal proceedings are absolutely privileged as within the course of judicial proceedings. ”) . . .

“Thus, although there are no recent Supreme Court decisions on this issue, it appears from these

cases that the district courts are dissatisfied with the results of the absolute privilege as set forth

in Ange and Robertson. Turning to other jurisdictions, it appears that a majority of states that

have addressed this issue have embraced a qualified privilege, see Kahermanes v. Marchese, 361

F. Supp. 168, 172 (E.D.Pa. 1973); Marsh v. Commercial Sav. Bank, 265 F. Supp. 614, 621

(W.D.Va. 1967); Miller v. Nuckolls, 77 Ark. 64, 91 S.W. 759, 761-62 (1905); Flanagan v.

McLane, 87 Conn. 220, 87 A. 727, 728 (1913).”

B. Materially adverse action.

How "adverse" must an employer's actions be to constitute retaliation? The Supreme

Court addressed this question in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, creating

an "objective standard" under which an action challenged as retaliatory must be "materially

adverse" to a reasonable employee. 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). The Court in Burlington resolved a

circuit split on the definition of "adverse employment action." Until 2006, the federal courts of

appeals were divided over how severe an employer's adverse action must be to fan within the

statute. Most broad: "Any activity reasonably likely to deter" an employee from vindicating

protected rights. (Ninth Circuit) Middle ground: An employment action that a reasonable

employee would find "materially adverse," i.e. resulting in tangible injury or harm. (Seventh

Circuit, D.C. Circuit) Most narrow: The employer has taken an "ultimate employment action"

(i.e. firing, demotion) against the employee. (Fifth Circuit, Eighth Circuit). The Supreme Court

ultimately resolved the "Circuit Split" in favor of a middle-of-the-road "materially adverse"

standard, but defined "materiality" objectively from the perspective of a "reasonable employee."

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Hale believes that his claims survive under the narrowest reading, but that the middle reading is

more appropriate: “An employment action that a reasonable employee would find "materially

adverse," i.e. resulting in tangible injury or harm.” By banishing Hale from his co-workers and

terminating his contract, when he had a reasonable expectation of becoming a tenured professor,

Defendant‟s actions satisfy the second element of a Title VII retaliation claim, adverse action.

For the purposes of a First Amendment Retaliation claim under § 1983, a plaintiff suffers

adverse action if the defendant's allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter "a person of

ordinary firmness" from the exercise of First Amendment rights. Washington v. County of

Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 320 (2d Cir. 2004); Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir.

2002); Carroll v. Pfeffer, 262 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1176

(10th Cir. 2001); Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000); Bloch v. Ribar, 156

F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998); Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982); cf. Suarez

Corp., 202 F.3d at 688 (noting that retaliatory disclosure of information may constitute adverse

action if it is "sufficiently embarrassing, humiliating, or emotionally distressful" and citing

Bloch's "ordinary firmness" standard). Hale was humiliated by being banished from his office

and colleagues. Whether the cooling off period would chill a person of ordinary firmness from

reporting hate speech, or official misconduct that violated free speech, is a matter best reserved

for the triers of fact, but it is highly probable on the face of it.

C. Causal connection between Plaintiff’s protected activity and the materially adverse

action.

An employee must ultimately demonstrate a causal nexus between his or her protected

conduct and the employer's retaliatory response. The courts of appeals recognize three methods

of proving causation: (1) temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse

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action; (2) proof that other similarly situated employees were treated more favorably; and (3)

direct proof of the employer's retaliatory intent. Jimenez, supra (citing Sumner). The evidence

presented in this case demonstrates that the temporal proximity between the protected activity

and the adverse action are intertwined. On July 7, 2015, less than a week after Plaintiff took his

concerns about the incident of hate speech to the campus police, and asked them to do something

about it, Dean Alexander stated in a legally recorded conversation in her office that “What I

don’t appreciate is that you went over, you know, to the Police.” Within two weeks Alexander

terminated Angelica Hale‟s contract and began removing duties from Hale, ¶¶ 204 to 206. There

are virtually no degrees of separation between the report to the campus police, and obvious

dissatisfaction from the administration, which ultimately was manifest in the cooling off period

and the termination of his contract. Both animus and loathing are palpable in Alexander‟s tone

on the recording. Immediately after Hale‟s July 7th conversation with Alexander, Angelica Hale

observed Alexander engaged in a long conversation with Vietti in the ESU parking lot. The

actions Defendants took to shut Hale down and silence him were brazen and shameless.

Vietti sought to extinguish Hale‟s professional credibility by demanding that he retract

his belief that Debra Rittgers was a bona fide suspect in the writing of the slur, ¶¶ 132, 133. She

too labeled his complaint a personnel matter, which he refused to do. In response to a letter from

a student questioning the actions of the university, Vietti wrote a response on August 11, 2015

that implies misconduct on the part of Hale, and suggests Hale should have made a personnel

complaint instead of a police report. Plaintiff steadfastly refused to file a personnel complaint

about the hate speech incident, because in his view it is not a personnel matter; it is a law

enforcement matter. ESU has a long history of treating police matters as personnel matters so

that they can refuse to comment on the subject and avoid freedom of information act requests

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from the press and the public, while retaliating against employees with grievances. Defendants

doubled down on the “it‟s a personnel matter” defense, and used this weapon to squelch all

discussion about the hate speech incident on the entire ESU campus, ¶¶ 134 to 138, and 179 to

181. The chilling effect was universally felt. Virtually everyone quit speaking to the Hales and

avoided and ignored them.

In a press conference, held on September 9, 2015, Defendants Vietti and Johnson

concocted a raft of falsehoods about Plaintiff, his wife, and the hate speech incident, going so far

as to state that if the Dean had been present on April 8, 2015, when Plaintiff learned of the hate

speech incident in a text from his wife, and then reported it, in person, to the Dean, that he and

his wife would not have even known about the incident, and that they came to know about it only

as a “fluke,” ¶¶ 213 to 217. Their entire press conference was filed with lies and disturbing

innuendoes about the character of the Hales. A recording of the press conference is available on

KVOE‟s website at the following URL: http://kvoe.com/newsedit/10322-esu-no-racial-

discrimination-or-hate-crime-in-slim-department. It is located at the bottom of the page, entitled:

Full ESU News Conference: Sep. 9, 2015.

Vietti and Johnson stated that their internal investigation had the strongest possible

factual, fair, and logical foundation, but their story of what happened was nothing less than pre-

packaged lies prepared for a “friendly” media audience who would uncritically consume them

without daring to challenge or embarrass them. ESU is the bedrock institution and biggest

employer in Emporia. Without it Emporia would quickly become just another ghost town in the

Midwest. Hale and his wife were portrayed as opportunists who had “a different perception than

others” by Vietti and Johnson, and who were activated by “a fluke.” He and his wife were

skewered by trolls on the Internet, and their names were added to an Internet site for hate hoax

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perpetrators, ¶ 137. All of this was orchestrated by the Defendants and their supporters. Despite

this, Hale and his wife were courageous enough to step outside the limits of free speech at

Emporia State University to tell the truth, and they both have paid a heavy price. This should not

be allowed at an institution supported by federal, state, and local tax dollars.

D. Defendants’ retaliatory motive satisfies the "but for" cause of the adverse employment

action.

Plaintiff asserts that but for his reporting of a hate speech incident to law enforcement,

and to senior members of the Emporia State administration, he would not have been subject to

adverse employment action of any kind. Hale was highly regarded and respected for his work as

an Assistant Professor. The Supreme Court expressly rejected the EEOC's view that a Title VII

retaliation plaintiff need demonstrate only that retaliation was one of several motivating factors

in the employer's decision, instead deciding that such a plaintiff must prove that the employer's

retaliatory motive was the "but for" cause of the adverse employment action. Univ. of Tex.

Southern Med. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 570 U.S., 186 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2013).

Hale contends that the evidence will show that until he complained of a matter of public

concern, the universities refusal to conduct a fair and transparent investigation into a repugnant

incident of hate speech, that his status in SLIM was not in question. The faculty members in

SLIM held Hale in high regard, and his student reviews before the cooling off period were

exemplary for a new professor, ¶ 80.

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E. Plaintiff was in his right to complain to someone other than his employer, such as the

ESU Police Department and the local district attorney.

"Courts have not limited the scope of the opposition clause to complaints made to the

employer; complaints about the employer to others that the employer learns about can be

protected opposition." Employment Discrimination Law 15-20 (5th ed. 2012). Although

opposition typically involves complaints to managers, it may be a reasonable manner of

opposition to inform others of alleged discrimination, including union officials, coworkers, an

attorney, or others outside the company, Cf. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276 (endorsing the EEOC's

position that communicating to one's employer a belief that the employer has engaged in

employment discrimination "virtually always" constitutes "opposition" to the activity, and stating

that any exceptions would be "eccentric cases"); see, e.g., Minor v. Bostwick Labs., Inc., 669

F.3d 428, 438 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that plaintiff's meeting with a corporate executive to

protest a supervisor's direction to falsify time records to avoid overtime was FLSA protected

activity). See Pearson v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 723 F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 2013) (observing

that "there is no dispute that writing one's legislator is protected conduct"); Conetta v. Nat'l Hair

Care Ctrs., Inc., 236 F.3d 67, 76 (1st Cir. 2001) (ruling that employee's complaints of sexual

harassment to coworker who was a son of general manager was protected opposition); Johnson

v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 580 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that "there is no qualification

on . . . the party to whom the complaint is made known," and it may include management,

unions, other employees, newspaper reporters, or "anyone else"). Scarbrough v. Bd. of Trs. Fla.

A&M Univ., 504 F.3d 1220, 1222 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding a reasonable jury could find that

university employee engaged in protected activity by involving the campus police after he was

threatened and physically accosted as a result of rejecting his supervisor's sexual advances).

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F. Retaliation is a separate claim from discrimination.

Retaliation is a separate claim from discrimination, and does not require racial

discrimination even though Hale contends that “repeated ignoring” meets the threshold for

proving a hostile work environment. “Even if the employee cannot prevail on the underlying

claim of discrimination (for example, where the employee does not satisfy the „severe or

pervasive‟ threshold for proving a hostile work environment claim), s/he can prevail on a

retaliation claim if s/he in good faith, reasonably believed the employer was engaging in

discriminatory conduct. See La Grande v. DeCresente Distrib. Co., 370 Fed. App'x 206, 212 (2d

Cir. 2010); Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 08-5367-cv, 2010, U.S. App. Lexis

12640, *8 n,4 (2d Cir. June 21,2010) (finding that the plaintiff "need not be disabled within the

meaning of the ADA to pursue her retaliation claim, providing she can demonstrate 'a good faith,

reasonable belief that the underlying challenged actions of the employer violated the law'"

(quoting Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives. Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 1999)

(citation omitted)).

G. Plaintiff’s actions as a government employee amounted to engaging in free speech as a

private person and on a matter of public concern, and defendants took an adverse action

against him which was motivated by his free speech.

The Supreme Court noted that for many years "the unchallenged dogma was that a public

employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment — including

those which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights." Connick, 461 U. S., at 143. That

dogma has been qualified in important respects. See id., at 144-145. The Court has made clear

that public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their

employment. Rather, the First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain

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circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern. See, e. g., Pickering v.

Board of Ed. of Township High School Diet. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 568 (1968); Rankin v.

McPherson, 483 U. S. 378, 384 (1987); United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U. S. 454, 466

(1995). Using the first step of the Pickering analysis, if the free speech is made pursuant to the

employee‟s ordinary job duties, then the employee is not speaking as a citizen for First

Amendment purposes, and the inquiry ends. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).

But if the “employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the inquiry turns to

whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee

differently from any other member of the general public.” “However, to be protected, speech

must do more than just generally relate to a matter of public interest; it must also be sufficiently

informative to be useful to the public in evaluating government conduct.” Brin v. Kansas, 101 F.

Supp. 2d 1343, 1351 (D. Kan. 2000). These conditions are met in Hale‟s complaint.

“Matters of public concern are those of interest to the community, whether for social,

political or other reasons.” Lytle, 138 F.3d at 863. Matters solely of personal interest to

government employees, however, are not protected by the First Amendment. Connick, 461 U.S.

at 147. Although speech related to internal personnel disputes ordinarily do not involve public

concern, "speech which discloses any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance

on the part of city officials . . . clearly concerns matters of public import." Conaway v. Smith,

853 F.2d 789, 796 (10th Cir. 1988). In assessing whether speech is protected, we must consider

the "content, form and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Connick,

461 U.S. at 147. Defendants refusal to acknowledge that an incident of hate speech occurred,

and their resultant disavowal of what Hale and his wife reported, is an outrage, and the manner in

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which Hale and his wife were treated for the legitimate reporting of the hate speech incident

reveals corruption at the highest levels of the university that is simply breathtaking.

Plaintiff's speech constituted something other than a mere personnel matter. Furthermore,

Plaintiff's motive was not to air personal grievances or disputes with no relevance to the public.

Plaintiff was informed of an incident that he reasonably believed was not socially benign or

acceptable in a university setting involving the word “NIGGAZ.” Hale‟s report of what he

considered a hate crime, although technically it is hate speech, was not part of his regular duties.

Had it been objective and impartial, the investigation envisioned by Hale would have relieved

him of any further involvement in the matter except as requested or directed by his employer.

Hale was being repeatedly ignored on the directions of each and every Defendant, so Hale

believed that the public, including the students on campus, had a right to know what had

happened, and more importantly, to know about the abject failure of university public policy on

the reporting of discrimination and harassment. The fact that Hale‟s story of corruption at ESU

was carried by the Associated Press and numerous news and media outlets nationwide, and has

subsequently been followed by hundreds of supporters online, should solidify the matter as one

of public interest.

In November 2016 Hale published a book entitled Django Unchained and the March on

Emporia State: Institutional Racism as Practiced on an Academic Plantation in Kansas. It

appears both callous and contemptuous for the Attorney General‟s office to misrepresent Hale‟s

stance as anything other than a principled stand against racism and discrimination, no different

than Rosa Park‟s stand in Montgomery, Alabama. Instead of standing with Hale, the Attorney

General‟s office would rather throw Hale under the bus, and drive him into poverty. The actions

of the Attorney General‟s office appear to be in defense and promotion of official misconduct.

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Hale viewed his actions as necessary protected activity not bound in any manner to his

work as an Assistant Professor. In Garcetti, the Supreme Court ruled that “Giving employees an

internal forum for their speech will discourage them from concluding that the safest avenue of

expression is to state their views in public. Garcetti at 424. Defendants did exactly the opposite,

unlawfully refusing to have any real meaningful dialog with Hale, thereby forcing him to state

his views in public. ESU forced Hale to go public because the matter was one of public concern.

H. Defendants cannot proffer legitimate, non-retaliatory rationale for taking adverse

actions against Hale that are in fact not pretextual.

“[A]t the pretext stage the plaintiff must produce evidence beyond the mere assertion that

the alleged justification is implausible and show that discriminatory animus actually motivated

the employer's decision (citing pre-Reeves decisions)); Hamilton v. Boise Cascade Exp., 280 F.

App'x. 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2008)(“Although we do not require „pretext plus,‟ specifically that a

plaintiff demonstrate that the reason was false and a motive for discrimination, the falsity

combined with other circumstances in the case must permit the inference that unlawful

discrimination was a motivating factor in the decision”); Thoman v. Philips Med. Sys., 2007 WL

203943 (D.N.J. 2007).” Hale‟s work performance was satisfactory before the cooling off period,

thus defendants cannot possibly proffer legitimate, non-retaliatory rationale for taking adverse

actions against Hale that are in fact not pretextual. Defendants have never offered to Hale, or

anyone, a specific legitimate, non-retaliatory rationale for taking adverse actions against Hale.

I. Defendants lacked clearly articulated policies for the reporting of bias incidents.

“It generally is necessary for employers to establish, publicize, and enforce anti-

harassment policies and complaint procedures. As the Supreme Court stated, „Title VII is

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designed to encourage the creation of anti-harassment policies and effective grievance

mechanisms.‟” Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. Dean Alexander stated that ESU did not have a

policy for reporting the racial incident that occurred, ¶ 50.

“An anti-harassment policy and complaint procedure should contain, at a minimum, the

following elements:

 A clear explanation of prohibited conduct;

 Assurance that employees who make complaints of harassment or provide information

related to such complaints will be protected against retaliation;

 A clearly described complaint process that provides accessible avenues of complaint;

 Assurance that the employer will protect the confidentiality of harassment complaints to

the extent possible;

 A complaint process that provides a prompt, thorough, and impartial investigation; and

 Assurance that the employer will take immediate and appropriate corrective action when

it determines that harassment has occurred.”1 Emphasis added.

J. Defendants are sued in their individual capacities, and do not automatically have

Eleventh Amendment Immunity against 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment Retaliation

claims.

Defendants attempt to have Plaintiff's claims brought against Vietti, Cordle, Anderson,

Johnson, Lauber, Dow, and Wyatt in their individual capacities dismissed. They argue that

Vietti, Cordle, Anderson, Johnson, Lauber, Dow, and Wyatt are qualified immune from suit. The

1
EEOC, “Enforcement Guidance.”

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doctrine of qualified immunity holds that "government officials performing discretionary

functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

It is well-settled that "[w]hen a defendant pleads qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the heavy

burden of establishing: (1) that the defendant's actions violated a federal constitutional or

statutory right; and (2) that the right violated was clearly established at the time of the

defendant's actions." Greene v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir. 1999). Moreover,

"[w]here a qualified immunity defense is asserted in a 12(b)(6) motion . . . we apply a heightened

pleading standard, requiring the complaint to contain specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact

sufficient to allow the district court to determine that those facts, if proved, demonstrate that the

actions taken were not objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law." Dill v. City of

Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The legal standards set forth above govern the court's decision as to qualified immunity,

and the two prongs, 1) violation of federal constitutional and statutory rights, and 2) that the

rights violated were clearly established, have been adequately met in Plaintiff‟s complaint.

In the event the court does not agree that Plaintiff has established facts necessary to

determine that Defendants both violated and knew they were in violation of federal statutes,

Plaintiff‟s asks for leave to amend its complaint. A plaintiff may amend his complaint after the

qualified immunity defense is raised. See id. at 1204 ("After the defense is raised, Plaintiff may

amend his complaint to include additional specific, nonconclusory allegations of fact sufficient

to allow the district court to determine whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.")

(internal quotations omitted); Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d

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642, 646 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[O]nce the defense has been raised, the court must allow the plaintiff

the limited opportunity . . . to come forward with facts or allegations sufficient to show both that

the defendant's alleged conduct violated the law and that law was clearly established when the

alleged violation occurred.").

K. Injunctive relief not barred by immunity

Under ex parte Young, private parties can sue state officials in their official capacity to

enforce federal laws and regulations, but only for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief,

209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state

actors for injunctive relief because preventing a state official from performing allegedly illegal

acts does not infringe upon a state‟s sovereignty. The Supreme Court held in Ex parte Young,

209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar

a suit against a State official for prospective injunctive relief. In order to determine whether this

doctrine applies, we "need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint

alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as

prospective." Verizon Md., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152

L.Ed.2d 871 (2002) (internal quotations omitted). We do not consider the merits of the plaintiff's

claims; it is enough that the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law. Id. at 646, 122

S.Ct. 1753. State officials can be sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief, and in their

individual capacities for money damages. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58.

This is because injunctions are not barred by the 11th Amendment, and because injunctions look

forward, not back. Such a suit does not represent a suit against the government entity for which

he is associated, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).

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Plaintiff believes that the specific mode of any injunctive relief should be deferred until

after discovery, but offers the following as preliminary proposals:

A. That the Court find that Defendants engages in conduct subject to penalty under 42

U.S.C. §1983 and Title VII, and that injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent them from

engaging in further such conduct.

B. That the Court find that Defendants engaged in a sham investigation and a cover-up

involving allegations of a bias incident at ESU, and that injunctive relief is appropriate to

demand that Defendants publicly retract their claim that a fair, logical and thorough investigation

was done.

C. That the Court order Debra Rittgers to submit to a forensic handwriting examination

and a polygraph test to determine whether or not she wrote the offensive racial epithet.

D. That the ESU Bulletin retracts false comments attributed to Hale, and admit to

publishing false narratives and allegations against Hale.

E. That Defendants be required to contact all media entities previously contacted by

them to inform them that their “investigation” into the allegations made by Hale was biased and

falsified to make it appear that ESU was discrimination and hate crime-free.

F. Granting of a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant ESU, its officers, agents,

servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or participation with it, from maintaining a

racially hostile work environment and from any other employment practice that discriminates on

the basis of race, and from retaliating against employees who oppose unlawful discrimination,

make a charge of unlawful discrimination, or participate in an investigation of unlawful

discrimination.

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G. That Plaintiff Hale is permitted to engage in post-judgment discovery to ensure

compliance with the injunctive relief granted.

L. Qualified immunity

In the case of Saucier v. Katz, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

considered an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity, 194 F.3d 962 (1999).

The Court of Appeals affirmed, noting at the outset its two-part analysis for qualified immunity

questions. First, the Court of Appeals considers "whether the law governing the official's

conduct was clearly established." Id., at 967. If it was not, that ends the matter, and the official is

entitled to immunity. If, however, the law was clearly established when the conduct occurred, the

Court of Appeals' second step is to determine if a reasonable officer could have believed, in light

of the clearly established law, that his conduct was lawful. Ibid.

The university context in which this suit arises is constantly addressing issues involving

freedom of speech and academic freedom, so it is reasonable to conclude that the Defendants

were aware of the First Amendment. It is reasonable to conclude that they knew without a doubt

that their muzzling of Hale was unlawful. Hale himself raised this issue explicitly with Vietti,

Johnson, Cordle, Dow, Lauber and SLIM Dean Gwen Alexander, as well as with the ESU Police

Department. Each Defendant, Vietti, Cordle, Anderson, Johnson, Lauber, Dow, and Wyatt, in

their individual capacities, did take actions that placed unlawful limits on Hale‟s First

Amendment activities. On information and belief, Hale contends that Defendant‟s actions were

undertaken because they believed that he was unable to afford legal representation to confront

them in court, and that he lacked the legal knowledge and stamina to do so himself, so they

casually and flagrantly violated his Constitutional rights. Hale also believes that Defendants

Vietti, Johnson and Cordle exhibited explicit and unconcealed animus towards him. He believes

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that they showed him no professional respect whatsoever, and in his presence looked at him with

eyes full of disdain and contempt. In the meeting with Cordle and Johnson referenced in ¶ 218

Hale asked Cordle if he would like to hear his side of the matter, to which Cordle responded that

“If I were interested in that we would have done that by now.” Cordle and Johnson looked at

Hale in stony silence when Hale stated that he felt that their conduct was racist.

"Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, `government officials performing

discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known." Ramirez v. Oklahoma Dep't of Mental Health, 41 F.3d

584, 592 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); cf. Harris v.

Board of Educ. of the City of Atlanta, 105 F.3d 591, 595 (11th Cir. 1997) ("In all but the most

exceptional cases, qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary

functions from the burdens of civil trials and from liability for damages."). The key to the

qualified immunity inquiry is the "objective reasonableness of the official's conduct in light of

the legal rules that were clearly established at the time the action was taken." Melton v. City of

Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 727 (10th Cir. 1989) (quotations omitted), modified on other

grounds, 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1991). The Defendants conduct in this case is not objectively

reasonable, borne out by the fact that they flagrantly lied on Hale and misrepresented the facts of

the hate speech incident to the public and the press in order to cover-up racism, whitewash the

connotations, and make an example of Hale for confronting racism and corruption, ¶¶ 213 to

222. Lies are intentional and indicative of malice and animosity aforethought.

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M. Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations

As to whether or not the Court is permitted to consider equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations for Plaintiff‟s Title VII claim, Plaintiff believes that equitable tolling is warranted.

“Federal precedent equitably tolls the limitations period in three circumstances: (1) where the

plaintiff has actively pursued his or her judicial remedies by filing a timely but defective

pleading; (2) where extraordinary circumstances outside the plaintiff's control make it impossible

for the plaintiff to timely assert his or her claim; or (3) where the plaintiff, by exercising

reasonable diligence, could not have discovered essential information bearing on his or her

claim.” Abbott v. State, 979 P.2d 994, 998 (Alaska 1999). “We have allowed equitable tolling

in situations where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective

pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his

adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass. We have generally been much

less forgiving in receiving late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in

preserving his legal rights.” Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151

(1984), Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (U.S. 1990).

In this litigation, it has been noted by the Court that “Plaintiff has been diligent in

litigating this case,” 15-4947-SAC-KGS, Doc. 93, p. 4. Plaintiff asks this Court to consider at

least two extraordinary circumstances outside of its control that made it impossible to continue

litigating at the point where the Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(2) was filed. Defendant‟s actions against

Plaintiff caused his loss of income, as well as that of his spouse. The physical stress of such

events was a contributing factor to serious physiological ailments that resulted in Plaintiff having

to seek emergency room treatment on five occasions within three weeks, not including numerous

follow-up doctor visits. Claimant has done his best to exercise due diligence in preserving his

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legal rights. Equitable tolling, unlike estoppel, does not require active deception or employer

misconduct, but focuses rather on the employee with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.

Machules v. Dep't of Admin., 523 So.2d 1132, 1133-1134 (Fla. 1988). Plaintiff does not know if

it would have been more appropriate to have filed for a continuance instead of a voluntary

motion to dismiss because he was too ill to even figure this out due to his pain and suffering.

Defendants do not deserve to benefit from a miscarriage of justice based on a defective pleading

by a pro se litigant who was otherwise diligent and is now in forma pauperis due to their illegal

actions.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, and the undisputed evidence that conclusively shows that

Defendants knowingly violated Plaintiff‟s Constitutional rights, Hale‟s Complaint is entitled to

move forward as previously ordered by this Court.

WHEREFORE, Hale respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendants‟ Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings, and grant such further relief as may be necessary to promote the ends

of justice.

Dated: April 10, 2017 Respectively submitted,

______________________________
/s/ Melvin Hale, Defendant Pro Se
P.O. Box 6176
Goodyear, AZ 85338
reefresh@yahoo.com
916-690-7927

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case No. 16-4183-DDC-KGG
I hereby certify that on this 10th day of April, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing

with the Court by email at: ksd_clerks_topeka@ksd.uscourts.gov, and a notice of electronic

filing was sent via the CM/ECF system to all counsel of record.

/s/ Melvin Hale
P.O. Box 6176
Goodyear, AZ 85338
916-690-7927

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