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6.7 Exercises

6.2.3 but assume that the tick size is strictly positive, such that

A1 = + < + < + 2.

a. Explain why the LOB will feature at least qL shares oered at price A2 .

b. Let Y1 be the number of shares oered at price A1 . Define r = /. Observe

that r 2 [1,2]. Using the assumptions regarding the order flow at time 1, show that:

(r1)

1. Y1 = 0 i 1

1.

(r1)

2. Y1 = qS i 1

2 [1 , 1).

(r1)

3. Y1 = qL i 1

2 [0, 1 ).

(r1)

d. Now assume that 1

2 [1 , 1) and suppose that time priority is not

enforced any more. Instead, if two traders post a limit order at price A1 , then the

oer that is executed first is determined randomly. Specifically, the limit order posted

by trader j 2 {1, 2} is executed first with probability 0.5. Let Y1j be the number of

shares oered by trader j 2 {1, 2} at price A1 . Explain why, in equilibrium, Y11 and

Y12 must satisfy the following conditions for j = 1 andj = 2:

(A1 E(v | q Y1j )) Pr(q Y1j ) + (A1 E(v | q Y11 + Y12 )) Pr(q (Y11 + Y12 )) 0

2

e. Suppose that qL = 2qS . Deduce that Y1I = Y12 = qS form an equilibrium if:

! "

(r 1) 1 + (1 )

2 (1 ), ,

1 2

f. Why is cumulative depth greater when the random tie-breaking rule is used

h i

for (r1)

1

2 1 , 1+(1)

2

?

6.3.3 and assume that two specialists can stop out a market order. When a market

order arrives, they post a stop-out price at which they are ready to fill. The specialist

with the more competitive price executes. If there is a tie, the order is split equally

between the two specialists.

a. Show that if

qL

>1+ ,

qS (1 )(1 )

then, in equilibrium, the oers in the LOB are as described by equations (6.25) and

(6.26), and the specialists stop out the small orders at a price (bid or ask) equal to

.

b. In this case, do the specialists improve liquidity?

6.8 Solutions

Exercise 2:

a. Consider an informed trader arriving at date 1 and assume that the payo

of the security is vH = + . As A1 < v0 + < A2 , the informed investor should

3

send a buy market order for a quantity just equal to that oered at price A1 but no

more (otherwise part of her order will execute at a price larger than her valuation

for the security). Hence, only sell limit orders at price A1 are exposed to the risk of

being hit by informed orders and sell limit orders at price A2 will only execute (if

that happens) against market orders submitted by uninformed orders. Hence, limit

order traders should fill the book so that at least qL shares (the maximal liquidity

demand) are oered at this price.

b. Let q be the size of the market order submitted at date 1. The expected profit

on the marginal sell limit order oered at price A1 is given by

8

>

> + for Y1 qS

>

<

E(ev | q Y1 ) =

+ +(1)(1) for qS < Y1 qL

>

>

>

: + for Y1 > qL

Remember that A1 = + . We deduce that E(V | q qL ) A1 i

(r 1)

(1 ) (6.45)

1

Under this condition, the number of shares oered at price A1 should be qL . Oering

less would attract competition while oering more would be suboptimal as additional

shares would execute only if the trader arriving at date 2 is informed (since the

maximal order size for a liquidity trader is qL ).

When Condition (6.45) is not satisfied then Y1 = qS if E(V | q qS ) < A1 and

Y1 = 0 otherwise. We have E(V | q qS ) < A1 i:

< ,

4

which rewrites:

(r 1)

< 1.

1

c. Observe that the number of shares oered in equilibrium at price A1 is weakly

decreasing in . Intuitively, as increases, the risk of being hit by an informed order

for limit orders at price A1 gets larger and accordingly the number of shares oered

at this price is reduced.

d. Consider trader j = 1. With probability 12 , trader 1s limit order at price A1

executes first. In this case, the trader obtains an expected profit on the marginal

share of his limit order equal to:

With probability 12 , trader js limit order at price A1 executes second. In this case,

the trader obtains an expected profit on the marginal share of his limit order equal

to:

Hence, the expected profit on the marginal share oered by trader j = 1 is:

0.5(A1 E(v | q Y1j ))Pr(q Y11 ) + 0.5(A1 E(v | q Y1j ))Pr(q Y11 + Y12 )

The reasoning is similar for trader j = 2. In equilibrium, either this expected profit

is less than zero for Y11 = Y12 = 0 or not. If the former case is realized then no

investor finds optimal to submit a limit order at price A1 as he would make a loss.

If not then in equilibrium Y11 and Y12 must be such that the expected profit on the

marginal share oered by trader j is just equal to zero as otherwise one trader would

find it profitable to supply more shares.

5

e. If Y1j = qS then Y11 +Y12 = qL . Thus, using 2.2 and the fact that Pr(q qS ) = 1

and Pr(q qL ) = ( + (1 )(1 )), we obtain:

We deduce that :

i

(r 1)

(1 ) 0.5 + 0.5(1 ).

1

It is also easily checked that a trader oering more shares than qS shares at price

A1 expects a negative expected profit on the marginal share if he expects the other

trader to oer qS shares at price A1 .

f. The previous finding implies that there exists a range of parameters for which

the cumulative depth at price A1 is equal to qS when time priority is used but

qL = 2qS when the random tie-breaking rule is used.To understand why, suppose

first that time priority is enforced. If trader j = 1 is first to oer qS shares at price

A1 then trader j = 2 cannot post a limit order without making loss (see question 2.2).

Yet, trader j = 2 would like to bypass trader 1s time priority since shares oered at

the top of the book yields a strictly positive expected profit. This is exactly what he

can do when time priority is replaced by the random tie-breaking rule. In this case

the first mover advantage of trader j = 1 does not exist any more. Even if trader

j = 2 moves second, he can be selected as the trader who will be first executed and

enjoys the expected profit that trader j = 1 was expecting with time priority. Thus,

the random tie breaking rule intensifies competition among liquidity providers and

results in a greater depth at price A1 , at least for some parameter values.

6

Exercise 4:

a. Suppose first that the two specialists stop out small buy market orders at price

. If the informed investor behaves as when there is a single specialist (i.e., always

submit a large buy market order when she observes that the value of the security is

vH ) then the oers in the limit order book must be as described in equations (6.25),

and (6.26). Thus, we just need to check whether the informed investor is better

submitting a large buy market order rather than a small buy market order when the

value of the security is vH . The expected profit of the informed investor with a large

buy market order when the value of the security is vH is:

Indeed the order walks up the book and executes partially at Ah (qS ) and then at

Ah (qL ). In contrast he expected profit of the informed investor with a small buy

market order when the value of the security is vH is:

qS (vH ),

since the order will be stopped by the specialists (who cannot tell whether the order

comes from an informed or an uninformed investor). Thus, the informed investor is

better submitting a large buy market order rather than a small buy market order i

That is,

7

that this condition is equivalent to:

qL

>1+ . (6.46)

qS (1 )(1 )

Now suppose that the informed investor submits only large buy market order when

the value of the security is vH . Then when a small order arrives, the specialists know

that the order comes from an uninformed investor. Thus, stopping out the order by

oering to execute it at a price below Ah (qS ) but greater than is profitable. Price

competition among specialists drives their oers to the lowest possible price, i.e., .

b. We observed in Section 6.3.3 that both large and small investors are worse

o when a single specialist can stop out market orders. With two specialists the

answer is not so clear cut. Indeed, when a small order arrives and Condition (6.46)

is satisfied, the order will execute at . Hence, there is no bid-ask spread for small

orders. For these orders the possibility of multiple specialists stopping out incoming

market orders is a good thing. In contrast investors submitting large orders are still

worse o in the hybrid market structure relative to the pure limit order market.

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