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SECOND DIVISION and damages. The action, docketed as Civil Case No.

68896
and entitled Cesar Ochoa and Sylvia A. Ochoa, etc. v. Josefa
[G.R. No. 169292, April 13 : 2011] M. Guevarra, et al., was raffled to Branch 160, presided by
the respondent RTC Judge.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, JR. AND
AMPARO O. DE GUZMAN, PETITIONERS, VS. On May 22, 2002, the petitioners, as defendants in Civil
CESAR OCHOA AND SYLVIA A. OCHOA, Case No. 68896, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the sole
REPRESENTED BY ARACELI S. AZORES, AS THEIR ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action. The
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, RESPONDENTS. petitioners' motion to dismiss was formally opposed by the
private respondents.
DECISION
On December 16, 2002, the respondent RTC Judge denied
MENDOZA, J.: petitioners' motion to dismiss and at the same time set Civil
Case No. 68896 for pre-trial conference, directing the parties
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the to submit their respective pre-trial briefs.
August 11, 2005 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-GR. SP No. 89329, filed by petitioners, Spouses On March 31, 2003, the petitioners filed a second motion to
Francisco De Guzman, Jr. and Amparo O. De Guzman dismiss, alleging that the certification against forum
(petitioners). In the assailed decision, the CA found no shopping attached to the complaint was not executed by the
commission of grave abuse of discretion when the public principal parties (plaintiffs) in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7,
respondent therein, Judge Amelia A. Fabros (Judge Fabros), 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, rendering the complaint
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, fatally defective and thus dismissible.
Branch 160 (RTC), denied petitioners' second motion to
dismiss, in Civil Case No. 68896, an action for annulment of The private respondents opposed the second motion to
contract and damages. dismiss.

The facts of the case have been succinctly summarized by On February 12, 2004, the respondent RTC Judge issued her
the CA as follows: first assailed order, denying the second motion to dismiss,
disposing thus:
On March 25, 2002, respondent spouses Cesar Ochoa and
Sylvia Ochoa, through respondent Araceli Azores, ostensibly xxx
acting as attorney-in-fact, commenced in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Pasig City an action seeking the annulment Inasmuch as the records show that the pending incident is
of contract of mortgage, foreclosure sale, certificate of sale the second motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, the

same is hereby Denied for lack of merit. On August 11, 2005, the CA denied the petition for lack' of
merit. The CA, in its decision, agreed with the RTC that
SO ORDERED. following the omnibus motion rule, the defects of the
complaint pointed out by the petitioners were deemed
On May 25, 2004. the petitioners filed their motion for waived when they failed to raise it in their first motion to
reconsideration, but the respondent RTC Judge denied the dismiss.
motion through her second assailed order dated December
29, 2004, to wit: Not in conformity, the petitioners filed this petition for
review under Rule 45, anchored on this:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order
dated February 12, 2004, filed by the defendant Spouses GROUND
Francisco and Amparo De Guzman, through counsel, on
May 25, 2004, and after considering the grounds stated
therein in support of their motion, and finding no cogent THE COURT A QUO DECIDED A QUESTION OF
reason to warrant the reconsideration sought for, the motion SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH
is DENIED. LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT REFUSED
TO DISMISS, THE COMPLAINT DESPITE THE
SO ORDERED.[2] FACT THAT IT WAS INDUBITABLY SHOWN AND
ESTABLISHED THAT THE ESSENTIAL
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the order of denial to the CA REQUIREMENT OF CERTIFICATION OF NON-
via a petition for certiorari contending that the RTC should FORUM SHOPPING PURSUANT TO SECTION 5,
have dismissed the complaint motu proprio since it was RULE 7 OF THE RULES OF COURT WAS NOT
fatally defective. They pointed out that the Verification and OBSERVED AND COMPLIED WITH SINCE THE
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the SAME WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED PERSONALLY
complaint was not signed by Cesar Ochoa or Sylvia Ochoa BY THE PURPORTED PLAINTIFFS THEREIN.
but by Araceli S. Azores (Azores), who was acting as the
attorney-in-fact of Cesar Ochoa only. They invited the It is the position of the petitioners that the second motion to
attention of the RTC to the fact that the powers delegated to dismiss does not violate the Omnibus Motion Rule under
Azores did not include the authority to institute an action in Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court because the issue
court. Thus, according to the petitioners, the denial by the raised in the second motion was a question of jurisdiction.
RTC of their motion to dismiss was capricious, whimsical For said reason, the matter of the defective verification and
and arbitrary, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and certification cannot be considered to have been waived when
should be struck down as null and void. it was not interposed at the first instance. Considering that
the issue is jurisdictional, the RTC should have dismissed the

complaint motu proprio. Fabros. Absent such showing of arbitrariness,
capriciousness, or ill motive, the Court cannot but sustain the
The Court disagrees with the petitioners. ruling of the CA.

An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus
order which neither terminates the case nor finally disposes motion as a motion attacking a pleading, judgment or
of it, as it leaves something to be done by the court before proceeding. A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion
the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general because it attacks a pleading, that is, the complaint. For this
rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus motion,
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a must raise and include all objections available at the time of
remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not the filing of the motion because under Section 8, "all
errors of judgment.[3] objections not so included shall be deemed waived." As
inferred from the provision, only the following defenses
Therefore, an order denying a motion to dismiss may only be under Section 1, Rule 9, are excepted from its application:
reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the [a] lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; [b] there is
judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed another action pending between the same parties for the
in such cases is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the same cause (litis pendentia); [c] the action is barred by prior
decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the judgment (res judicata); and [d] the action is barred by the
final judgment.[4] statute of limitations or prescription.

Only in exceptional cases where the denial of the motion to In the case at bench, the petitioners raised the ground of
dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion that the defective verification and certification of forum shopping
Court allows the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. By only when they filed their second motion to dismiss, despite
"grave abuse of discretion," we mean such capricious and the fact that this ground was existent and available to them at
whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of the time of the filing of their first motion to dismiss. Absent
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where any justifiable reason to explain this fatal omission, the
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by ground of defective verification and certification of forum
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent shopping was deemed waived and could no longer be
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a questioned by the petitioners in their second motion to
virtual refusal-to perform the duty enjoined by or to .act all dismiss.
in contemplation of law.[5]
Moreover, contrary to petitioners' assertion, the requirement
In this case, the petitioners failed to convincingly regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not
substantiate its charge of arbitrariness on the part of Judge jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition

the rule requiring the submission of such certification of non-forum shopping.affecting the form of the pleading. if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. the Court rules in the negative." WHEREFORE. . the petition is DENIED. Rule 7 of the Rules of Court is clear that failure to comply with the requirements on the rule against forum shopping shall be cause for the dismissal of the case "upon motion and after hearing. although obligatory. the court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified. is not jurisdictional. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. [6] Similarly.[8] As to whether the trial court should have dismissed the complaint motu proprio. and that the pleading is filed in good faith. SO ORDERED. Section 5. In fact.[7] The certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora. and non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. as this Q practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.

Commission on Audit VELASCO. represented by Fr. Petitioner..versus . Sison. entitled Maximo Manila D.34 million went without proper bidding The Case procedures and documentations. . No. Noel Labendia for Himself and in Representation of Isog Han Samar Movement. J. Diocese of Calbayog. Catbalogan. 96611. Present: The Facts CORONA. and that purchases for rice. Noel Labendia of the Diocese NACHURA. Fr.. of highly anomalous transactions entered February 16. PERALTA. filed a letter-complaint MAXIMO D. JJ. Chairperson. that various purchases totaling PhP 29.R.R. and cement were substantially overpriced. among others. which found. of Calbayog. that calamity funds were expended without a State of Calamity having been declared by the President.: (COA). . accusing Governor Milagrosa T. was the Provincial Budget Officer. SP No. officials[3] of the Province of Samar. MENDOZA. Simeon Marcelo. 2008 Decision. the Isog Han Samar VELASCO. and addressed to then Ombudsman. Hon. -----------------x The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit DECISION investigation dated August 13. On October 11. Samar. 185954 OMBUDSMAN.. JR. JR. Sison x-----------------------------------------------------------------------. medicines. J. 2010 into by them amounting to several millions of pesos. Catbalogan. SISON. The CA Resolution denied THIRD DIVISION petitioner Office of the Ombudsmans Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs June 26. 2004 conducted by the Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO).[2] OFFICE OF THE G. Movement. Samar. Tan and other local public Respondent. 2004. including respondent Promulgated: Maximo D. Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing and seeking to set aside the Republic of the Philippines Resolution[1] dated December 18. electric fans. 2008 of the Court of SUPREME COURT Appeals (CA) in CA-G. Sison v.

the purchases were observations. Inconsistencies in the dates of observations: supporting documents relating to the purchases discussed in finding No. to wit: charged against the calamity fund. 324(d) of R. 2003. Rules and regulations pertaining to declaration from the President procurement of supplies and materials that Samar was under a state of were consciously and continually calamity. rules and regulations governing this mode 4. violated as disclosed in the verification 324(d) of R. were 3. in violation of Sec. as repeat orders were made by the required under Sec. medicines and assorted goods 1976. The use of the 5% budgetary reserves found highly irregular for lack for calamity as funding source of of proper bidding procedures emergency purchases was not legally and documentation. 76-41 dated July 30. Province without observing the 7160.A. pertinent law. Splitting of requisitions and purchase of procurement.67 million were found not complying with the 5. established. which was created under Management in Local LAO Office Order No. medicines. million and allegedly procured through public bidding. Governments (RRSPMLG). of selected purchases of the Province. There was overpricing in the purchase requirements set forth under the of rice. Supplies and Property The Special Audit Team.165 million from the Office of the President that worth of purchases through Samar was under a state of calamity. 1 a. Below were the findings and 2.34 on the validity of the transactions per se. At least PhP 28. and orders was resorted to in violation of c. Purchases of various items. totaling PhP 14. there being no declaration b.A. 2003-059 dated July 7. 7160. summarized the corresponding COA audit findings and Moreover. Emergency purchases of COA Circular No. electric fans and Rules and Regulations on cement in the amount of PhP . were so glaring that they raised doubts totaling at least PhP 29. despite absence of any 1.

and latter were then required to file their counter-affidavits and c.6 million. 2005. respectively. established due to rampant inconsistencies in dates. The necessity and veracity of the 341. the provisions of Section 4 of through Director Jose T. in violation of On January 24. At least 36 vouchers/claims were not supported with an official receipt.4 million in 2002 delivery date and the terms of and PhP 2. in violation of the were granted to various applicant- provisions of Section 74 and recipients without subjecting them to the other corollary provisions of guidelines set forth by the Department RRSPMLG. (DSWD). De Jesus. docketed as OMB-C-A-05-0051-B. An overpayment was also assorted goods and cement purchased by committed in the payments of cement in the Province of Samar could not be the amount of PhP 96. the totaling at least PhP 5. Purchase Orders were not duly accomplished to include a 8.00. and PhP 3. and that funds are available.364. in . The complete documentation. the Office of the Ombudsman. distribution of t-shirts/caps.09. Advanced deliveries of countervailing evidence against the complaint. Jr. Sison vehemently denied the even before the purchase orders accusations contained in the letter-complaint and claimed his were prepared and before the innocence on the charges. quantities.00. He did not. PhP 322. Some were even of Social Welfare and Development acknowledged by suppliers. and. Other observations gathered corollary well as the signatures of the alleged to the purchases made are the following: recipients in the Requisition and Issue Slip. PhP 7. He asserted that his function is public biddings were conducted.00.78 million as of April 2003 payment.000.[4] x x x b. a. found basis to proceed PD 1445 that all disbursements with the administrative case against the impleaded provincial must be supported with officials of Samar. medicines and assorted goods were made on some purchases In his counter-affidavit. limited to the issuance of a certification that an appropriation for the requisition exists. as 6.. medicines. 580.760. Financial Assistance (FA)/Assistance complete description of the to Individuals in Crisis Situation (AICS) items to be purchased.040. that the corresponding amount has been obligated.

MARIA LOURDES 1. Finance. . MAXIMO D. CORTEZ UY. ROMEO C. and are MANATAD-NUNEZ and ROSIE AMARO METED the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM VILLACORTE is DISMISSED. he alleged that not one of the documentary Accordingly. signature and that he was neither factually connected nor Montesa of the Bureau of Local Government directly implicated in the complaint. Respondents ROLANDO B. and shall carry with it the cancellation of by the requesting parties. 4. Governor Milagrosa T. AURELIO A. SISON. The CASTILLO III is DISMISSED in view of their re- dispositive portion of the Decision reads: election in May 2004. finding Sison and several other local SALURIO. III. In addition. VIEWED IN THE FOREGOING 3. vouch for the truthfulness of the certification issued SERVICE. RAMON P.. the Office of the Ombudsman TAN ARCALES. SUSANO DIMAKILING rendered a Decision. JIMMY R. JR. LEGASPI are FOUND GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT. The administrative complaint against respondents MILAGROSA T. and the never participated in the alleged irregularities as shown in perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the the minutes and attendance sheet of the bidding. and conduct prejudicial to the best ROSENAIDA A. misconduct. 2. interest of the service and dismissing him from service. Department of Finance. not participated in the alleged anomalous purchases and use of public funds by the Province of Samar. FELIX T.. Further. the DISHONESTY and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO administrative complaint against ANAMIE P. Sison submitted his Position Paper Order upon receipt hereof and to forthwith to the Office of the Ombudsman and reiterated that he had inform the Office of compliance herewith. evidences so far attached in the letter-complaint bore his Tan and Executive Director Presentacion R.any way. FIGUEROA. ROSALES and BARTOLOME R. who are no longer public REALES. For insufficiency of evidence. 2005. officials. dishonesty. MONTEJO. BIENVENIDA P. TAN. CONDE. officials of the Province of Samar guilty of grave ANTONIO DE LEON BOLASTIG. is DISMISSED.. JR. JR. JR. The administrative complaint against LIGHT. JUAN COLINARES LATORRE. are respectfully directed to implement this On May 6. BARDAJE and NUMERIANO C. REPOL and DAMIANO Z. DEAN. BARTOLOME P. DECISION is hereby rendered as ERNESTO CARCILLAR ARCALES.. follows: BABALCON. government service. THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE. FE ORTEGA On August 22. he averred that he eligibility. DY. 2006. forfeiture of retirement benefits.

On Bid Nos. Aggrieved. 082-2002: (a) to VERIFY whether actual 96611. the corresponding Complaint. 079-2002. The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Office is Complaint. the decision of the corresponding Complaint. 078-2002. 947-2002. 221-2002-12-083 and Finding and Intelligence Office for its 221-2002-11-065: (a) to DETERMINE the appropriate action. he is relative to the repeat orders made. Accordingly. 023-2003. herein petitioner MAXIMO D. 442-2002. 198-2002. SO ORDERED. SP No. 316-2002 administratively liable for grave misconduct. On DV Nos. if warranted. C-A-05-0051-B in so far as it finds the 931-2002. 944-2002. 861-2002. 1230-2001. 554-2002. public biddings took place relative to the transactions covered by these bids. the CA rendered a decision CHECK the veracity of the documents reversing and setting aside the decision of the Office of the relative to the repeat orders made. (b) to On June 26. SISON 1244-2002. docketed as CA-G. On Bid Nos. if warranted. let a copy of this Memorandum be furnished the Fact- a. 1411-2002. if SO ORDERED.) b. and (b) to FILE. and (d) to FILE the corresponding 5. 937-2002. Sison appealed to the CA via a Petition 2003. 1407-2001. 047-2003 and for Review under Rule 43. 014-2003. supplied.R. may be held administratively liable therefor. (b) to REVERSED and SET ASIDE for CHECK the veracity of the documents insufficiency of evidence. and (d) to FILE. 2008. 448-2002. 007. the WHEREFORE. (c) to Ombudsman against Sison. DIRECTED to conduct further fact-finding investigations on the following: Accordingly. and 431-2002: (a) to DETERMINE whether dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the actual public biddings were held relative to best interest of service is hereby the above-mentioned transactions. and Ombudsman dated 22 August 2006 in OMB- c.[6] . The fallo of the CA decision DETERMINE the other public officials who reads: may appear to be administratively liable therefor. 1375-2002. other public officials who may be held administratively liable.[5] (Emphasis necessary. 411-2002. (c) to absolved from administrative liability as ASCERTAIN the other public officials who charged. 1221-2002.

the Office of the Ombudsman to respondents petition for review when this filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit was prematurely filed as it disregarded the Attached Motion for Reconsideration. Our Ruling The Issues The appeal lacks merit. we have this petition. petitioner the administrative case against petitioner. convict Sison. he cannot be held administratively liable for simply attesting to the existence of appropriations for a certain III purpose. because (1) the Office of the and employees. I Intervention Is Discretionary upon the Court Whether the [CA] gravely erred in denying petitioners right to intervene in the proceedings. 2008. the CA held that the Office of the erroneous decision of the [CA] which has Ombudsman failed to adduce substantial evidence in order to not yet attained finality. it reasoned that Sisons responsibility as Provincial Budget Officer was to ensure II that appropriations exist in relation to the emergency Whether the [CA] erred in ruling that the purchase being made and that he had no hand or discretion in finding of the Office of the Ombudsman was characterizing a particular purchase as emergency in nature. not supported by substantial evidence. Whether the [CA] erred in giving due course On July 22. Moreover. (2) the Omnibus Office of the Ombudsman filed its Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed after the CA rendered its . which was well-entrenched jurisprudential doctrine of subsequently denied by the CA in its assailed resolution of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Motion to Intervene and to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration on a patently In ruling thus. 2008. and (b) contrary to the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal interest in appellate court a quos ruling. Hence. considering that (a) the Office The pivotal issue in this case is whether the Office of of the Ombudsman has sufficient legal the Ombudsman may be allowed to intervene and seek interest warranting its intervention in the reconsideration of the adverse decision rendered by the CA. save if such certification is proved to be false. the CA did not allow the Office of administrative authority over public officials the Ombudsman to intervene. Hence. proceedings before the [CA] since it rendered the subject decision pursuant to its In its Decision. December 18.

it contends that parties. with leave of court. A legal interest in the matter in litigation.[8] thus: To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. Who may intervene.Decision. Jr. nor should the claim of the intervenor parties. the decision of the CA had not yet attained finality. intervention is a procedure by which third persons. or in the success of either of the rights of the parties.[7] The permissive tenor of the rules shows the persons involved.) the Omnibus Motion to Intervene was timely filed. since it rendered pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the subject decision pursuant to its administrative authority the motion and served on the original over public officials and employees. at the time of its filing. however. which entitles one to intervene. Philippine National Bank (PNB) imposed upon its employee. The interest. the fully protected in a separate proceeding. and (3) the Office of the Ombudsman was the quasi-judicial body which rendered the impugned decision. or is so be capable of being properly decided in a separate situated as to be adversely affected by a proceeding. and (2) intervention person who has a legal interest in the matter must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the in litigation. since. or the whole controversy among.[11] intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention. not originally parties to the suit but claiming an We are not persuaded. and the Office of the Ombudsman cites Philippine National whether or not the intervenors rights may be Bank v. of the rights of the original parties. the of the court. . be allowed lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. distribution or other disposition of property must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and in the custody of the court or of an officer immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or thereof may. Simply. (Garcia). SECTION 2. [12] to intervene in the action. Time to intervene. Further. Garcia. [13] In the said case. A copy of the warrant its intervention in the proceedings. the Office of the filed at any time before rendition of Ombudsman asserts that it has sufficient legal interest to judgment by the trial court. two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a SECTION 1. or an interest against both. The motion to intervene may be In its Petition. come into the case in order to protect their right or interpose their claim. interest in the subject matter. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication In support of its argument that it has legal interest.[9] (Emphasis supplied. [10] Its main It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment all of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion conflicting claims of.

PNB was the aggrieved party RA 6975 itself does not authorize a which complained of Garcias acts of dishonesty. and imposed the penalty of demotion or 0051-B. prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent.[16] in which this Court qualified and exonerated Garcia from the administrative charges against clarified the exercise of the right of a government agency to him. One party is the PNP member- employees. appeal in the instances that the law allows hampered its right to select honest and trustworthy appeal. the party aggrieved by the judgment on party appealing must be the one that is appeal. After all. becomes an active participant in prosecuting And third. an anomalous Second. Should private complainant to appeal a decision of Garcia be finally exonerated. In accordance with the ruling in Civil Service actively participate in the appeal of decisions in Commission v. the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Mamauag (Mamauag). Thus. instead of being impartial and detached. it might then be incumbent the disciplining authority. dismissal from the service. the Office of the is the government when the disciplining Ombudsman cannot use Garcia to support its intervention in authority imposes the penalty of demotion the appellate court for the following reasons: but the government believes that dismissal from the service is the proper penalty. it was Sison who appealed to the CA being. Otherwise. this Court ruled: of the PNB to appeal to the CA the CSC resolution exonerating Garcia. the issue here is the right of the Office of the situation will result where the disciplining Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal of its decision. and conduct can appeal is not the disciplining authority prejudicial to the best interest of the service by the Office of or tribunal which previously heard the case the Ombudsman in the administrative case. Dacoycoy. v. Garcia should be read along the respondent. Sections 43 and upon PNB to take him back into its fold. Sison was not exonerated from the administrative charges against him. in fact. be allowed to appeal a decision that. 45 of RA 6975 authorize either party to therefore. the penalty of forced resignation for gross neglect of Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v. imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. v. Court with Mathay. On appeal. so that it can protect and preserve its name as a respondent when the disciplining authority premier banking institution in the country. in its view. duty. However. OMB-C-A-05. not its authority or tribunal hearing the case. right to appeal. Jr. in Mathay.Garcia. In Mamauag. The other party Based on the facts above. First. The government unquestionably. and was. Thus. PNB should. Court of Appeals [15] and National .[14] this Court affirmed the standing administrative cases. Jr. dishonesty. the government party that dismissed for grave misconduct.

decided after Dacoycoy. More importantly. cease to be judicial body. The brought before it directly or on judge of a court or the officer of a quasi- appeal. regulations and/or jurisprudence. of Appeals. Ombudsman. the Civil Service Commission and have become adversarial instead. the It is an established doctrine that judges should Court declared: detach themselves from cases where their decisions are appealed to a higher court for review. in a way. the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed The court or the quasi-judicial from its role as adjudicator and agency must be detached and impartial. It must There must be no more need for him to remain partial and detached. No. Court applied this doctrine when it held that the CA erred in granting the Motion to Intervene filed by the Office of the In instituting G. Its mandated only when hearing and resolving the case function is to hear and decide before it. including contested judicial agency must keep in mind that he is appointments and to review an adjudicator who must settle the decisions and actions of its offices controversies between parties in accordance and agencies. it must be justify further his judgment when it is mindful of its role as an adjudicator. When the court judge or the quasi-judicial officer . The raison detre for To be sure when the such a doctrine is the fact that judges are not active resolutions of the Civil Service combatants in such proceeding and must leave the opposing Commission were brought to the parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate Court of Appeals. the Office of the Ombudsman is not an completely state his findings of fact and law. with the evidence and applicable laws. His judgment should already clearly and Clearly. appropriate party to intervene in the instant case. but even when its judgment is administrative cases instituted by or brought on appeal before a higher court. As a quasi-judicial appeal of their judgment.R. appealed before appellate courts. not became an advocate. not to litigate. Philippine National Police Criminal where his decision is appealed to a Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG). the Civil Service court to decide the issues without the judges active Commission was included only as a participation.[18] can be likened to a judge who should detach himself from cases In Pleyto v. not an advocate. to wit: 126354. they.[17] When judges actively participate in the nominal party.[19] the higher court for review.

case. The court or. the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed only on [20] Thus. As the CA held correctly: motion for intervention during the pendency of the proceedings before the CA. 1-95 dated May 16. defend forgotten. intervenes as a party in the appealed case. in this on June 26. what was brought on appeal his judgment. and his interest in the case administrative case against the petitioner becomes personal since his objective now is such that it would be directly affected by the no longer only to settle the controversy judgment that this Court had rendered. he The Office of the Ombudsman is not inevitably forsakes his detachment and a third party who has a legal interest in the impartiality. In support of its position. the facts reveal that this case was elevated stake in the outcome of this Rule 43 to the CA via a verified Petition for Review under Rule 43 of Petition. 1995. case. the Rules provides explicitly that a 95. is not Therefore.[22] That case. which govern appeals to the CA from judgments or final orders of quasi. as an adjudicator. is not a party in the said appeal. 2008. It between the original parties (which he had must be remembered that the legal interest already accomplished by rendering his required for an intervention must be direct judgment). Lest it be the appellants assignment of errors. In the instant court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents. the Office of the Ombudsman. 2008. 1. to refute and immediate in character. Rule 43. and not an advocate. Office of the Ombudsman. but more significantly. as well as Administrative Circular No. . Plainly. the Office of the Ombudsman does not applicable here.[21] the Rules of Court and Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. after the Decision of the CA was promulgated as petitioner and appellee as respondent. Samaniego. has no legal interest at Likewise. provides that the petition for review shall state the full motion to intervene may be filed at any time before names of the parties to the case without impleading the rendition of judgment by the trial court. Motion for Intervention Was Not Filed on Time judicial agencies. and prevent it from being before this Court is the very Decision by the overturned on appeal. however. Furthermore. the administrative agency that rendered the judgment appealed from. since the Office of the Ombudsman filed the have the legal interest to intervene. the only parties in such an appeal are the appellant July 22. petitioner cites Office of the Ombudsman v.

. the petition is DENIED. no intervention is permitted after a decision has already been rendered. . The Office of the Ombudsman is expected to be an activist watchman. 2008 in CA-G. the Office of the Ombudsman had sufficient time within which to file a motion to intervene. all other issues raised in the petition are rendered moot and academic and no further discussion is necessary. SO ORDERED.[24] In this case. Singzon. As such.[25] In light of the foregoing considerations. SP No. It should be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman was aware of the appeal filed by Sison.. The Rules of Court provides that the appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review with the CA. its failure to do so should not now be countenanced.R.[23] Clearly. The CA Resolution dated December 18. As we held in Rockland Construction Co. Inc. Jr. v. not merely a passive onlooker. 96611 is AFFIRMED. WHEREFORE. it cannot be denied that the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was belatedly filed. with proof of service of a copy on the court or agency a quo.

R. their agents and INTESTATE ESTATE OF anyone acting for and in their behalves.** Orders dated July 2. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 Respondent. Rodolfo G. No costs. JJ. In the said decision. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. 338 are hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. from RODOLFO G.*** and 2005. represented Promulgated: by BERNARDINO G. of the Regional Trial Court in Spec.: intestate court. and a permanent injunction is hereby issued enjoining respondents [petitioners]. Proc. 2010 Administrator. Bernardino G. CORONA.[5] The decretal portion of the DESANTIS NERI.[7] He died without issue.. No. J. -versus.R. C. 00576. the assailed PERALTA.[6] JALANDONI. decision of the appellate court reads: Petitioners. ABAD. on certiorari. the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation[11] before the intestate court.[8] x-----------------------------------------------------------------------. Jalandoni. Jalandoni ----------------------. the petition for CASTRO. LEONARDO-DE ACCORDINGLY. the MAY D. PEREZ. The antecedents are: JALANDONI as Special December 1. Branch 40.* certiorari is hereby GRANTED. December 1966. In . of Negros AONUEVO. the brother of Rodolfo. No. FIRST DIVISION On appeal[1] is the Decision[2] dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. No. G. the Court of Appeals nullified. to commence the judicial settlement of the latters estate. filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration [9] with the Court of First DECISION Instance of Negros Occidental. SP No.[10] On 17 January 2003.J. 178221 Orders[3] of the Regional Trial Court.ALEXANDER Occidental (intestate court) allowing herein petitioners and BLEE Present: their siblings[4] to intervene in the estate proceedings of the DESANTIS and JOHN late Rodolfo G.x (Bernardino). On 28 April 1967. Chairperson. enforcing the assailed Orders. 2004 and January 26. 338 and is currently pending before the PEREZ.

the following documents: According to the respondent. who Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel. [27] It ventured on . by that token. Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo. [23] To support their cause. the to Rodolfo.[24] b. [19] the respondent called attention to the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia. a. in turn. constitute prima facie proof of a prior marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.[12] evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings showed that Isabel had a previous and subsisting marriage The petitioners and their siblings contend that their with John Desantis at the time she was purportedly married grandmotherIsabelwas.) Their respective proof of births. both Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with respondent posits that the foregoing entries.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and Rodolfo.the Manifestation. [17] and On 2 July 2004. Isabel and John Desantis.[15] made in an official registry. having been the former predeceasing the latter.) The birth certificate of their mother.[20] As it turned out. In its Comment to the Manifestation. the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their siblings to take part in the settlement c. they introduced themselves as the however. It opposed the intervention on the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)who. now Sylvia was insufficient to prove that there was a previous represented by Bernardino as its Special Administrator. the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation. Jalandoni. marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. by the time the Manifestation was status of both Isabel and John Desantis as married. begged to differ.[18] proceedings.[14] As it was. The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. the petitioners was born on 14 February 1946. permitted the that the foregoing pieces of evidence sufficiently establish petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo. in the absence of any proof that it was dissolved. the record and their siblings pray that they be allowed to intervene on of birth of Sylvia states that she was a legitimate child of her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. at the time of Rodolfos death.[13] For which reason. was ground that the petitioners and their siblings have failed to revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one establish the status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo.[16] void ab initio. legal spouse of the latter.[22] The filed. Sylvia. and that they are her on her behalf. Isabels previous marriage.[21] The document also certifies the Jalandoni. The very John Desantis.[26] lawful representatives.[25] The intestate court was convinced that the evidence at hand adequately establish Isabels status as the It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings legal spouse of Rodolfo and.

the Court of Appeals granted the order. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of by the time she was married to Rodolfo. [38] Grave abuse of Desantis should have been taken as established. it would have facts therein statedwhich includes the civil status of her found that the intestate court did not act whimsically or parents. it chose to re-assess the evidence and touch upon In coming to its conclusion.the possibility that the entries in the birth record of Sylvia The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals regarding her legitimacy and the status of her parents.[35] In nullifying the intestate courts On 31 May 2007. They proffer the The respondent sought for reconsideration. [30] whether the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion. discretion on the part of the intestate court is belied by the fact that the said orders may be supported by the two (2) The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo. [36] Rather. [31] The appellate court. the Court of Appeals found that the issue pertaining to Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo. failed to show that Isabel has hand does not support the conclusion that Isabel had a any interest in the estate of Rodolfo.[34] To begin with. the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of petition and nullified the orders of the intestate court. the respondent hoisted a petition One. previous marriage with John Desantis. it nevertheless erred in finding that considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. but was following arguments: denied by the intestate court in its order dated 26 January 2006. [37] it was an error on the part of the intestate court to have disregarded the probative value of Sylvias birth certificate. the respondent was not able to produce any marriage certificate executed between Isabel . under a writ of certiorari. the previous marriage of Isabel with John capriciously in issuing its assailed orders. may erred when it nullified the orders of the intestate court have been made only in order to save Isabel and her family allowing the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the from the social condemnation of having a child out of settlement proceedings. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. held that Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of Sylvias birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the whether grave abuse of discretion exists. [39] their siblings failed to offer any other evidence proving that the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved Second.[33] From that premise.[32] Hence. siding with the respondent.[40] A proper evaluation of the evidence at and their siblings. wedlock.[28] The petitioners answer in the affirmative. Isabel cannot be inherit from Rodolfo.[29] Undeterred. The petitioners there was none. the instant appeal.[41] Hence. it then follows that Appeals was correct in addressing the issue of whether there the latter marriagethe Isabel-Rodolfo unionis a nullity for was sufficient evidence to prove that Isabel has a right to being bigamous. therefore.

That kind of error may Filipino couples who. the allowance is made in excess the probative value of such entries. Ultimately.[46] that no such marriage ever took place. the re- We are not impressed. the Court of Appeals was acting well within [44] the limits of review under a writ of certiorari. Verily. embarrass their families. to intervene therein. the Court of determines whether the petitioners and their siblings have Appeals clearly erred in finding that her marriage with successfully established Isabels interest in Rodolfos Rodolfo is bigamous. Consequently. The first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at best. In such event. as already mentioned. [43] In assessing jurisdiction. albeit Second Argument discretionary in nature. who has no interest in an action or certificate can. estatewhich. is an indispensable requisite to justify any intervention. whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. A courts power to allow or deny intervention. the Court of Appeals of the courts jurisdiction and can only be the product of an should have taken note of a typical practice among unwed exercise of discretion gravely abused. in turn. in order to save face and not to be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari. when a court commits a mistake and Moreover. is circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person The second argument of the petitioners is also without with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to merit. We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that intervene. but one of a marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. only lend credibility to the position proceeding. concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. The question of whether the intestate court gravely We now proceed to the second argument of the abused its discretion is intricately linked with the issue of petitioners.[45] Otherwise stated. the entries in the birth certificate of allows an uninterested person to intervene in a casethe Sylvia do not carry the necessary weight to be able to prove mistake is not simply an error of judgment.[42] The conspicuous absence of such allow a person. assessment of the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if the assailed orders of the intestate First Argument court were issued in excess of the latters jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.and John Desantis. a court has no authority to the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of . when it examined the evidence proving Isabels right to inherit from Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with Rodolfo. The sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence John Desantis was not satisfactorily proven.

and will. it is not regarded as the petitioners would like Us to do. As mentioned earlier. void ab initio. properly precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage appreciated. This Court cannot. as the primary evidence of a marital union. unless rebutted by clear and convincing in the estate of Rodolfo. Hence. they can. even would themselves argue that the document on which they a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent based their interest in intervention contains untruthful evidence of the marriage between his parents. That. in the contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and absence of any proof that such marriage had been dissolved John Desantis were married and (b) that Sylvia is by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo. the inescapable their legitimate child. between Isabel and John Desantis. The allegations of the petitioners. We affirm the Court of Appeals. This holds true the Court cannot countenance. it is the evidence presented by the In the present case. Desantis was adequately established. The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to Pursuant to existing laws.Consequently. They are presumed to be dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest true. [47] Jurisprudence a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant was in fact followed. stand as proof of the facts petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings attested.[53] They urge this Court to take note of a typical practice among unwed Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners. Clearly. statements made only in order to save face. supports the finding that Isabel was. the petitioners and their cannot be justified. [49] statements in its vital entries. the birth certificate of Sylvia petitioners and their siblings themselves which. The very evidence of the petitioners and their The petitioners did no better than to explain away siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in the entries in Sylvias birth certificate as untruthful Rodolfos estate. the Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. do not diminish the While a marriage certificate is considered the probative value of the entries. between Isabel and John Desantis. an intervention by the evidence. simply take judicial notice of sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record. Sylvias birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage therefore. siblings offered no such rebuttal. .[51] the foregoing entries are present evidence to prove that Isabels prior marriage was accorded prima facie weight. indeed.Rodolfo. by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence. Ironically. it previously married to John Desantis.[50] In clear and categorical language.[48] Hence. It certainly is odd that the petitioners evidence other than the marriage certificate. conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and.[52] In the case at bench.

SP No. the instant appeal is DENIED. . 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE. the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Accordingly. Costs against the petitioners.R.

in Land Registration (Reg. Purita Landicho (Landicho) filed SUPREME COURT before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal an Manila Application for Registration of a piece of land. predecessors in interest. 26 of San Mateo. testified that he and his co- rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of vendors have been in possession of the parcel of land since jurisdiction. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE that the parcel of land under consideration was formerly CHINESE CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION. 184589 June 13.R. 2013 Decision6 evaluating the evidence presented by the parties as follows: DEOGENES O. Case No. one Resolution2 dated September 17. 101789 for having been Geronimo. DECISION Gavino Espiritu and Asuncion Cruz. fifty-five years old. executed LEONARDO-DE CASTRO. 1965 all of This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of them executed jointly a final deed of absolute sale x x x Court assails the Decision1 dated May 26. Rizal. farmer. Respondents.. Montalban. Rizal FIRST DIVISION (subject property). N-5098 owner. J. within the Alienable or Disposable Block-I of I. vs. measuring 125 hectares. peaceful. and on July 20. 2008 of the Court of of the vendors. San Mateo.C. located in Barrio Patiis. the CFI rendered a G. It has been established by the evidence adduced by Landicho HON. Felix San Pascual and Juanita Vertudes. and Lucio Manuel and Justina Ramos. Said Decision and Resolution reversed and set 1930 and that the possession of Landicho. several smaller parcels owned and possessed by the spouses INC. No. Rizal. x x x. resident of Barrio Appeals in CA-G. 2008 and which superseded the conditional sale. continuous 200t of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). x x x. which was docketed as Land Reg. 1965. Gavino Espiritu. San and adverse against the whole world in the concept of an Mateo. Project No. .5 On November 16. 20073 and November 22. all of whom in January 1960. Petitioner. has been open. No. N-5098. together with her aside the Orders dated April 10.R. that the parcel of land is The Facts are as follows.) Case No. Rizal.: instruments of conditional sale of their respective parcels of land in favor of Landicho. Ignacio Santos and Socorro Santos. SP No. Republic of the Philippines On January 29. It has also been established that the parcel of land is (LRC Rec. 1965. Branch 75. N-27619). Caconto Cayetano and Verneta Bartolome. RODRIGUEZ.

1965 of the District Land Officer. in view of said report of investigation. x x x which stated Once this decision becomes final and executory. Notably. The oppositor did not present testimonial evidence but The opposition of the Director of Lands is hereby dismissed. No. issued Legal Division. married to subject property could be traced from Landicho to Blue . the opposition be withdrawn. Feliciano dated August 23. District No. let the order substantially that during the investigation and ocular for the issuance of the decree issue. on July 11. 141. and that the and orders the registration thereof in her name and personal same is not mortgaged or affected by any encumbrance. 8 inspection it has been ascertained that no public land application is involved and that no reservation is affected Upon finality of its Decision dated November 16. 167681 It is therefore clear from the evidence on record that the stated that it was issued pursuant to Decree No. No. In the end. Jose D. the CFI decreed: The subject property was thereafter sold several times. Bureau of Land. circumstances aforementioned. Eventually. ROD Santos issued to Landicho a TCT rather than an OCT for the subject property. recommending issuance of a decree and original certificate of title (OCT). of legal age. other detail regarding the decree and the original registration of C. plan Psu-201023 is not covered by Landicho’s name covering the subject property. 7081.A. x x x. and as the old TCTs of the vendors were cancelled. 2347"10 on the Bureau of Lands. addressed to the Chief. that. Quezon City. dated September 23.00 under Tax Dec. new TCTs WHEREFORE. and therefore. 1966. "to comply with Section 21 of Act No. Filipino. 1965. 16768111 in according to the records. Records Division. 1965 directing the already filed can be withdrawn.560. no applicant is entitled to the benefits provided by Section 48. Purita Landicho. and although TCT No. 1st Indorsement dated Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) August 24. 1480. he believed that the opposition CFI issued an Order9 on December 22. x x x.7 of the subject property was filled out. resident of 74-A South 19th of P12. to the effect that Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. x x x.classified as "montañoso" with an assessed value Teodorico Landicho. 1965. to the Director of Lands. Santos (Santos). The sale of the applicant. presented the report of investigation of Land Investigator Pedro R. the Court hereby confirms the title of the were accordingly issued to the buyers. taxes due to St. the thereby. as amended. any kind of public land application or patent. 7. office memorandum of the Chief.. to the parcel of land under consideration which for the current year had been paid. and x x x. 1965. Register of Deeds (ROD) for the Province of Rizal.

Branch 75. which Order dated December 22. in Land Reg. N-27619). pursuant to Landicho’ssuccessor-in-interest to the subject property. 12044. follows: . respectively. 1973. 1996. Two November 5.. issued on Rodriguez prayed that: November 22. which acquired TCT No. 1965 of the CFI in Land Reg. On November 14. entitled A. 42999. Nos. issued by the LRC Commissioner (now the Administrator of dated February 20. TCT No. Decree No. Rodriguez alleged (ADRDI)13 instituted Civil Case No. No. 425582. 344936 and 425582 of BCPI and WPFI. therein that the Decision dated November 16. 2005. based on the ruling Court of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City be of this Court in A.14 ADRDI was also able to have its notice of complete records and expediente of LRC No. 1998.. Case No. Philippine Chinese Charitable Association. under OCT No. N-5098 which confirmed Landicho’s title over the as of 2008. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). A. Inc. TCT No. Branch 167. As name of Meerkamp Co. 2429. of Pasig City Case No. of San Mateo. ADRDI subsequently transferred the subject property to b. (PCCAI). which was a portion of a bigger tract of land specifically stated that no decree of registration had been measuring around 513 hectares. on June 1.Chips Projects. v. Inc. ADRDI asserted ownership over the subject subject property has not been executed. Landicho executed a Deed of 344936 in its own name on November 10. 301. v.12 Seven years hence. Subsequently. 1975. Court of commanded to transmit to the Honorable Court the Appeals. 1965 and Doronila Resources Dev. (WPFI). Inc. and finally. Rodriguez property. 1480. Meanwhile. then to Absolute Sales (sic) over the subject property in favor of Winmar Poultry Farm. Doronila Resources Dev. in the name of said corporation. to herein respondent years later. (BCPI). Rizal. Inc. Rodriguez filed an Omnibus Motion before the RTC. or on May 18. the Clerk of TCT No. N-5098. Court of Appeals. covered by TCT No. Upon the filing of the instant motion. x x x adverse claim over the subject property annotated on TCT N-5098 (LRC Rec. was still pending before the RTC. Inc. Doronila Resources Dev.. GLRO Record No. 1983. 1971. Inc. the Honorable Court give due Amado Araneta (Araneta) to whom TCT No. herein petitioner Deogenes O. Landicho died. ADRDI caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens (as regards Civil Case No. 1906. July 15. 482970. 70589 was course to the instant motions and issue an Order as issued on March 25. 1956. the Land Registration Authority [LRA]) and that no OCT This bigger tract of land was originally registered in the had been ever issued by the ROD in Landicho’s name. 12044) on a. After hearing. 344936 of BCPI.

over the subject property. 2006 at 9:00 a. to of more than forty (40) years after the finality of the bring its TCT No. 15 The RTC favorably acted on Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion In the course of the proceedings concerning the in an Order dated April 10. Consequently. there being no direct action or final court decree having direct supervisory authority there. 482970 of PCCAI Initially. upon the Omnibus Motion of [Rodriguez] despite the lapse Case No. Thereafter. PCCAI filed before the RTC a Registration [Authority] to issue the Decree Verified Motion for Leave to Intervene in Land Reg. subsequently. through the Administrator his Omnibus Motion that TCT No. ordering the Register of Deeds PCCAI averred that Rodriguez maliciously failed to allege in for Marikina City. 2006 a subpoena previously assigned to the CFI Pasig and. the issue of jurisdiction arose particularly as to but alleged that said certificate of title was fictitious. PCCAI Original Certificate of Title containing the Technical asked the RTC to allow its intervention in Land Reg. 482970 remains valid and of the Land Registration Administration as subsisting. 2006. whether this Court may take cognizance of the instant case the RTC issued on November 3. having substantial x x and the Order dated December 22.. 2007.m. Rodriguez himself submitted as his Exhibit "GG" TCT No. reasoning as follows: aforementioned Omnibus Motion. 1965 x it was an indispensable party in the case. as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises. 482970 and Tax Declaration No. for its cancellation. Case of Registration. Directing the Administrator of the Land On November 17. Case Description as duly confirmed in the said Decision and No. Thus. i. in accordance with the tenor No. N-5098. PCCAI justified its intervention by arguing that of the Decision dated November 16. PCCAI likewise pointed [Rodriguez]. N-5098 so it could protect its vested rights and interests Order x x x in the name of the herein petitioner [Rodriguez]. only alleging that said certificate was fictitious. to note and admit its Answer-in- Intervention. and to testify in connection therewith. Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion constituted over. 482970. 1965 legal interest therein as the registered owner of the subject x x x. N-5098 set on November 8. ii. 1965. Decision of November 16. 482970. to issue the a collateral attack on the title of PCCAI. in the name of the petitioner property under TCT No. which is not sanctioned by law and jurisprudence. . out that Rodriguez himself submitted a copy of TCT No. 0229. SM-02. and to deny Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion for PETITIONER further prays for such other measures of relief utter lack of merit. rule commanding PCCAI to appear at the hearing of Land Reg.

this Court was involving properties within its territorial jurisdiction. married to Teodorico Landicho. A final and executory judgment in a land registration case. is hereby REITERATED. Menla. a writ of execution directing the proceedings in this Court is merely a continuation of the the issuance of a decree of registration and an original land registration proceedings commenced in the CFI Pasig. made aware of the existence of claimants to the subject specifically in San Mateo. a more important issue was put to fore—whether property. 1 SCRA 1294. The RTC resolved both the CFI Pasig proceedings. premises considered. PCCAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Consistency dictates and being a mere continuation of the aforequoted Order of the RTC. 269 SCRA 159) the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is likewise directed to issue an original certificate of title of the subject Secondly. at this time and in this Court (Sec. Cacho v. 157 Authority is directed to issue a decree of registration while SCRA 131. More importantly. this Court can only reiterate the Motion for Leave to Intervene with the attached Answer-in- directives in the Order dated December 22. de Branch 6. Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of Filipino and a resident of 74-A South 19th St. vda. however. 25 SCRA 316. certificate of title in the name of [Rodriguez]. Intervention and Motion for Reconsideration of PCCAI in . were transferred to this property. 1966 of the Court of First Instance of Pasig. of legal age. 1965 and the purpose.) Order dated December 22. 129). does not prescribe. 196[5]. However. Court of Appeals. Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. Albano. this Court cannot. with the creation of this Court under the provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Law. Ana vs. (Sta. The Land Registration Banuvar. issue.. both in favor and in the name of applicant Purita this Court may issue a writ of execution directing the Land Landicho.16 (Underscoring deleted.Clearly.17 of title in the name of [Rodriguez]. as earlier stated. 44. De Barroga vs. as prayed for. Quezon City. being merely WHEREFORE. registration over the subject property and the Register of after compliance with issuance requirements and Deeds of the Province of Rizal to issue an original certificate procedures. Rizal. there is no legal impediment for this Court to appropriate proceedings specifically sought to for this reiterate the Decision dated November 16. 1966 because the Rules on execution of Judgment pertaining to civil cases are not The RTC decreed thus: applicable to this kind of proceedings. rule on the legality or illegality of these claims of ownership. this Court has jurisdiction because. It cannot. all cases Finally. during the proceedings in this case. December 22. Batas Pambansa Blg. the Order dated declaratory in nature. proceedings. It is best that these claims be ventilated in Consequently.

2008 docketed as CA-G. N-1. Noblejas This Court after receiving evidence that a Decision was (Noblejas).R. PCCAI acknowledged that it is the 482970 of PCCAI (traced back to Landicho’s TCT No. 1480 under GLRO Record No. 2007 and November 22. become final and executory even after an Order to that effect 2429 issued in 1906. 301 in the name of Meerkamp no title was issued pursuant to the said Decision which has Co.18 At around the same time. TCT No. 2007. The new transfer certificate of title to be issued by virtue Intervention would not be allowed after the Decision has hereof is deemed to have been derived from Transfer become final and executory.) and TCT No. The LRA also explained that the ROD . 101789. signed by the Hon. 1906) which should be deemed cancelled with being tried. filed a Manifestation dated February 4. assailing the Orders informing the trial court that it cannot comply with said dated April 10.another Order dated November 22. 70589 of Araneta (traced and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or back to OCT No. respect to the said property and that the issuance of the same has been effected without the presentation of the owners WHEREFORE. to Landicho for the held: subject property in 1966. upon receipt of a copy of the RTC Order dated Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals. PCCAI argued Landicho’s name would only further aggravate the problem that when subsequent facts and circumstances transpired of double titling. however. premises considered.. The trial court issued a TCT. SP No. who took cognizance of the fact that the subject rendered in favor of the applicants spouses Landicho as property. as part of a bigger parcel of land. PCCAI filed a Petition for The LRA. LRC Commissioner Noblejas was issued. pursuant to Decree No. excess of jurisdiction. (Under Decree No. 2007. 1966 of then LRC Commissioner Antonio H.. In other words. 2007 of the RTC for Order since there were already two existing titles covering having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction the subject property. following the Order dated July 7. rather than an OCT. was already owner in fee simple of the subject parcels of land. and to issue a decree of registration and OCT in final and executory decision/order. 1480 dated is the issuance of a decree of registration and nothing more is November 22. and that registered under OCT No. The issue in the instant Petition Certificate of Title No. ministerial duty of the RTC to issue a writ of execution for a 167681). Andres Reyes as Judge. i. 19 (Emphasis To Intervene and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the deleted. the Motion For Leave duplicate of subsisting certificate of title. merely reiterated the said Order for the additionally stated in his Order that: implementation of the Decision dated November 16. 301 of Meerkamp Co. April 10.) PCCAI are both DENIED.e. 1966.

in a Decision dated May 26. then the trial court intervention of PCCAI in Land Reg. 159139." with the necessary expertise concerning land registration matters. this Court has allowed gave great weight and credence to the Manifestation dated exceptions to this rule. 2008 of the LRA reporting the double titling and the matter in litigation. conflicting claims on the ownership of the property which However. or in the success of either of the conflicting claims over the subject property. as a land registration court. 2008. August 22.which renders the execution of the final and executory The Court of Appeals additionally opined that the decision/order unjust or inequitable. to Case No. or an interest against both. it cannot be denied that there are executory and during the execution stage of the case. G. being the repository of may. In the found merit in the Petition of PCCAI. The Court of parties. Moreover. maintained that it was an indispensable party in Land Reg. 2006. . A person who has a legal interest in February 8. The Land Registration Authority. decision render its execution unjust and inequitable.R. 1965 and Order dated December 22. We cannot but agree with the above-quoted We are not unmindful that [PCCAI] filed its Intervention Manifestation. except only to correct clerical errors or the CFI. 1966 when the LRC issued TCT No. with leave of court. in the case of Information ownership over the subject property. from the above facts admitted by when the decision of the case was already final and the parties and the LRA. did not have the jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of Anent the issue of intervention. the supervening event which is the issuance of a cannot be passed upon by the lower court as a land decree of registration which was already implemented and registration court for lack of jurisdiction. be allowed to intervene in the land registration documents and the administrative agency action. or if supervening events or circumstances that transpire after the finality of the The Court of Appeals. N-5098 was should refrain from issuing a writ of execution. mistakes. Comelec. PCCAI lastly Technology of the Philippines vs. 1965 of longer be modified. PCCAI proper given the circumstances: likewise asserted that the RTC. N-5098 and that it should have been allowed by wit: the RTC to intervene during the hearing of Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion for the execution of the Decision dated "The basic doctrinal rule is that final judgments may no November 16. or when the judgment is void. or is so situated as to be Appeals held that: adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. The appellate court interest of substantial justice. the following doctrine was enunciated. 20 enforced upon the order of the Administrator of the LRC way back in July 11. Case No.

arguing that: From the foregoing. RTC Presiding Judge AN ISSUE WHICH WAS IRRELEVANT AND Josephine ZarateFernandez. [Rodriguez. the assailed orders are REVERSED AND THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAS RESOLVED SET ASIDE. Rodriguez sought recourse from this Court makes the said intervention proper and well-taken. the LRA Administrator.21 ITS JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE DISPUTES ON THE MERE MANIFESTATION OF THE LRA Based on the foregoing.167861 in the name of Purita Landicho instead of an OCT Aggrieved. B WHEREFORE. the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. implementing the said orders pending the outcome of a proper case before an appropriate court where the issue of II ownership of the subject land can be put to rest. and IMMATERIAL OR HAD OTHERWISE BEEN Marikina City ROD] are enjoined to cease and desist from RESOLVED. it appears absurd and senseless that an I OCT be issued in favor of Mr. through the present Petition. non-execution of the said orders will prevent further disarray. Accordingly. confusion and complexity on the issue of who is or A who should be the real owner of the subject land which is a matter that can be threshed out in a proper case for quieting THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD ABDICATED of title between adverse claimants. The ENDED JUDGMENT. the appellate court adjudged: THAT THERE WERE ISSUES OF OWNERSHIP WHICH HAVE FIRST TO BE RESOLVED. Rodriguez. [PCCAI] being an indispensable party in JURISDICTION WHEN IT RENDERED AN OPEN- the execution and/or implementation of the said orders. 22 THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD COMMITTED GRAVE Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the foregoing ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF Decision but was denied by the Court of Appeals in a JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THE [PCCAI] HAD Resolution dated September 17. Furthermore. it is in the paramount interest of justice that the assailed orders be THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD ACTED WITHOUT not implemented. LEGAL STANDING TO PREVENT OR SUSPEND THE . All told. 2008.

there is nothing more to implement. Case THE LAND REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR TO No.25 Corollary to this. Orders which were reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals could later on be revived or reinstated. by reversing and setting aside the foregoing Orders. 1965 Decision in [RODRIGUEZ] IS ENTITLED TO THE CORRECTIVE Land Reg. rather it B. the Court of Appeals clearly and categorically . In view of these conflicting claims. Case No. Rodriguez now avers that because ROD Santos issued TCT The instant Petition has no merit. In the dispositive portion of its Decision dated not a buyer in good faith of the subject property and that the May 26. both of whom trace back PROPERLY AND FULLY IMPLEMENTED. N-5098 At the outset. GOOD FAITH STATUS AS ITS TITLE WAS DEFECTIVE ON ITS FACE.OPERATION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION LAWS BY "REVERSED AND SET ASIDE" the Orders dated April 10. The cease and desist order of the appellate court COMPLY WITH THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER 16. 167681 for the subject property in Landicho’s name. Obviously. the Court finds unmeritorious Rodriguez’s was not validly implemented since no OCT was claim that the Court of Appeals rendered an open-ended issued. N-5098. it must be stressed that the issue brought before the Court of Appeals did not involve the question of III the ownership. a superfluity. The A phrase "pending the outcome of a proper case before an appropriate court where the issue of ownership of the subject THE [PCCAI] HAD NO RIGHT TO INTERVENE land can be put to rest. in the second line of the same dispositive portion is therefore 1965. means that the remedies sought by Rodriguez can be litigated and granted in an appropriate proceeding by a court THE [PCCAI] CANNOT CLAIM BUYER IN with proper jurisdiction. was compelled to take notice of the controversy INSURE THAT THE LAND REGISTRATION LAWS ARE between Rodriguez and PCCAI. The appellate court only concerned itself with the proper execution of the November 16. WAY OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER DIRECTING 2007 and November 22. 2007 of the RTC in Land Reg. To clarify matters. 1965 Decision in Land Reg. N-5098 but. N-5098. No.23 their titles to Landicho. Rodriguez posits that PCCAI is judgment."24 does not mean that the very same IN LRC NO. the November 16. Case No. due to the intricacy of the AND PREROGATIVE WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO matter. 2008.

Landicho’s TCT No. without the traced back.’s OCT No. in another preservation. A collateral attack is made when. was a valid execution of the said CFI decision. rely on its TCT No. Branch 167. PCCAI. A strong Landicho because the subject property. 1965 provides that "a certificate of title shall not be subject to Decision and December 22. on the other The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to hand. 2008 filed land. Such act would validity can be raised only in an action expressly instituted only cause more confusion and complication. 1480 and that they are valid. PCCAI can subject property. otherwise only is PCCAI questioning the right of Rodriguez to the known as the Property Registration Decree. . 1965 Order of the CFI in Land collateral attack. rather than the for that purpose. is a derivative of Decree No. modified. 16781 issued to Landicho. Pasig City. Once Landicho. 482970 is spurious. which Meerkamp Co." to avoid the possibility of losing his The LRA. It cannot be altered. In Decaleng v. it is also defending the validity of except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. 1529. 482970 until the same has been annulled and/or cancelled. explicitly issuance of an OCT pursuant to the November 16. 1480 and OCT No. the former is better Meerkamp Co. 167681 could be traced back to TCT No. explained that a TCT was issued to ownership of the land referred to therein.27 the Court declared that a Torrens subject property to Rodriguez would give rise to a third title cannot be attacked collaterally. or sitting on the "mirador su casa. 301 dated November 22. and the issue on its certificate of title over the same property." TCT No. Case No.26 In this case. Bishop of the Missionary District of the 70589 (which is a derivative of Meerkamp Co. issuing an OCT covering the United States of America. 1906 in the name of owner of the subject property under TCT No. Complicating the matter further is the pendency of Civil Case No. 167681 issued to Landicho) against Araneta who holds TCT No. which were cancelled to the extent of the entitled to the protection of the Torrens system. 301 of As between PCCAI and Rodriguez. insists that the issuance of TCT No. PCCAI is the registered OCT No. 482970. from which its own TCT No. In view of the foregoing. In other words. Not Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. the owner may rest secure. Philippine Islands of Protestant Episcopal Church in the 301). A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the before the RTC. necessity of waiting in the portals of the court. or cancelled Reg. of the Torrens system of registration.latter’s TCT No. 482970 may be a title is registered. as part of a bigger presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and parcel of land. was already covered by Decree No. 167681 to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. 482970 (which is a derivative of TCT No. N-5098. 12044 in the RTC. in its Manifestation dated February 4.

1965. which is proscribed under Section functions: 48 of the Property Registration Decree. The resolution of these Motion before the RTC in Land Reg. it is tasked with the following attack on said certificate.action to obtain a different relief. registration of the subject property instituted by Landicho 482970 of PCCAI. he should have directly challenged the validity of of Land Titles and Deeds of the corresponding the extant TCT No. 482970 2008 of the LRA. Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. N-5098 was an application for 167681 and/or its derivative TCTs. which was granted by the CFI in its Decision subject property to BCPI (the predecessor-in-interest of dated November 16. be declared void and/or cancelled. spurious. the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for according brushed aside said certificate of title for allegedly being weight and credence to the Manifestation dated February 4. 482970 of PCCAI for the very same certificates of title. Case No. but he simply Clearly. Still. asserting that he was PCCAI) in 1971 and also to Rodriguez in 1996. N-5098. protecting the Torrens system of land titling and Case No. and the good Landicho’s lawful successor-in-interest. in purchasing the subject property. (1) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final If Rodriguez wants to have a decree of registration and OCT judgments of the courts in land registration issued in his (or even in Landicho’s name) for the subject proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registrars property. Land Reg. the legal effects of Landicho’s sale of the before the CFI. judgment. the RTC had no jurisdiction to grant such relief in a land The LRA exists for the sole purpose of implementing and registration case. the certificate of title is title be annulled or canceled. (2) Be the central repository of records relative to petition for quieting of title) and pray the said certificate of original registration of lands titled under the Torrens . The proper court in an assailed as an incident in said action. Rodriguez did not pray that TCT No.. property in an action specifically instituted for such purpose (i. as well as Rodriguez. Rodriguez.e. petition for annulment and/or cancellation of title. Rodriguez acknowledged the existence of TCT No. including TCT No. and even if he did. Case No. filed an Omnibus faith or bad faith of PCCAI. N-5098 issues will ultimately be determinative of who between seeking the issuance of a decree of registration and an OCT Rodriguez and PCCAI is the rightful owner of the subject in his name for the subject property pursuant to the said CFI property. under the circumstances. 482970 of PCCAI for the same property.28 In particular. appropriate action can try the factual and legal issues involving the alleged fatal defects in Landicho’s TCT No. is a collateral registration.

of the Torrens system of to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration registration. Rather than a sign of negligence or upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of nonfeasance in the performance of its duty.29 compelling the LRA to issue a decree of registration as ordered by a land registration court. directing the issuance registration for the same. They have That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is no discretion in the matter. Spouses Laburada v. including subdivision and consolidation not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing itself plans of titled lands. On Manifestation. filed the Manifestation dated 31 In Ramos v. However. even imperative. According to the LRA. there was of a decree of registration and an OCT for the same property already an existing certificate of title for the property. if they are in doubt understandable. as it would "further aggravate the land registration court granted the motion for reconsideration already existing problem of double titling.]" and for this reason. the LRA’s the decree. both "uncancelled and registration court respectively granting registration of a extant[. which was then acting as an agent of the court. the LRA cannot comply with parcel of land and directing the issuance of a decree of the RTC Order dated April 10. Considering the court. the LRA filed a motion for February 4. (3) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings and to the In another case. system. Land Registration other agencies of the government in the Authority. the LRA was only faithfully pursuing its appeal. in this respect. not as administrative officials. as officials of the court and probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land. in this case."30 The LRA. Rodriguez. The in Landicho’s name." In filing said of the LRA and set aside its earlier decision and order. The Court took into The duty of LRA officials to issue decrees of registration is account the LRA report that the parcels of land were already ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the registered and held: court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record. and because it was merely following the recommendation of the LRA.32 the Court refused to issue a writ of mandamus implementation of the land reform program. They act. these officials ought to seek clarification from the reaction is reasonable. the Court declared that the land registration court did mandate to protect the Torrens system and performing its .33 proceedings. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance and thereby destroy the integrity. court. and their act is the act of the such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose. 2008 to inform the RTC that the subject property reconsideration of the decision and order of the land is already covered by two TCTs. 2007.

viz: Finally. is not inflexible. Rodriguez will adversely affect PCCAI. the allowance or disallowance of a motion for may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after trial court. the Court allowed exceptions in several cases. or is so have not been impleaded. 482970. and whether filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once separate proceeding. The issuance of another certificate of title to Reg. be allowed to submitted for decision before the Supreme Court. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene In fine. again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court The subject property is presently covered by TCT No. Interventions legal interest in the matter in litigation. with leave of court. Case No. fully and completely available for justice.34 (Citations omitted. pertinent provisions of which read: This rule. In Lim v. who either of the parties. Its purpose is not 482970 in the name of PCCAI.1âwphi1 As the registered to hinder or delay. N-5098. We stress attached to the motion and served on the original parties. SECTION 2. constituting a cloud the Court of Appeals did not abdicate its jurisdiction when it on its TCT No. granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition of PCCAI largely based on the Manifestation of the LRA. however. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be consideration of the appropriate circumstances. when SECTION 1. intervention is governed by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. the right to be heard even after a situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other decision has been rendered by the trial court. or an interest against both. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule. intervene may be filed. and even intervene in the action. or in the success of have also been granted to afford indispensable parties. PCCAI clearly has a legal interest in the subject administration of justice. Contrary to Rodriguez’s assertion. Pacquing. and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties. the motion for intervention adjudication of the rights of the original parties.function of extending assistance to the RTC as regards Land property.) . but to facilitate and promote the owner. The court shall consider whether or where the assailed order has already become final and not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the executory. since the Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to LRA filed such a Manifestation as an officer of the court. – A person who has a demanded by the higher interest of justice. when the disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an petition for review of the judgment has already been officer thereof may. Who may intervene.

Case No. The relaxation of the rules of procedure on intervention. Rodriguez trace their titles back to Landicho. 101789. the intervention of PCCAI could not unduly delay or prejudice SO ORDERED. the instant Petition is DISMISSED. 1996. 482970 for MODIFICATION deleting the second sentence of the the same on July 15. PCCAI bought the subject property from WPFI Reg. Branch 75 of San Mateo. 2007 of the 16. after learning of Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. the adjudication of the rights of Landicho.R. 167681. filed before the RTC on May 18. Case No. as previously discussed herein. 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA- interests of both PCCAI and Rodriguez in the subject G. SP No. Hence. subject property from Landicho on November 14. Such action was the most opportune and expedient remedy available to PCCAI to prevent the RTC from ordering the issuance of a decree of registration and OCT in Rodriguez’s name. Case No. 2006 subpoena issued by the RTC. is AFFIRMED with the on November 13. . And fourth. 2007 and November 22. N-5098. N-5098 involved Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion. N-5098 via the November 3. PCCAI was reasonably expected to oppose the same. in which he prayed for the execution of the November 16. 1965 Decision of the CFI. 1973 and was issued TCT No. First. reversing and setting aside the Orders property arose only after the CFI Decision dated November dated April 10. the Decision dated May 26. Second. Rizal in Land executory. the latest proceedings in Land Reg. PCCAI moved to intervene in the case only to oppose Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion on the ground that the subject property is already registered in its name under TCT No. Third. Case No. For this reason. the RTC should have allowed the intervention of PCCAI. 1965 in Land Reg. 2005. 482970. the original party in Land Reg. N-5098 became final and Regional Trial Court. 1975. while Rodriguez bought the dispositive portion for being a superfluity. which originated from Landicho’s TCT No. N-5098. both PCCAI and Costs against petitioner.The particular circumstances of this case similarly justify the ACCORDINGLY.

J. and MONSERRAT VILLABA. LETICIA FERNANDEZ-TORREA. JOEL LLERA. No. October 16. 115813. COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER dated May 30. AS HEIRS OF pendens. prohibition and mandamus with application SECOND DIVISION for preliminary injunction filed by petitioners in CA-G. Branch 47. VICENTE URBANOZO. (2) the re-annotation of said notice of lis FERNANDEZ-LEGASPI. 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. LEVITA LLERA (ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND ANTONIO BERLIZO). respondent Jesus Ciocons Motion for Execution Pending . and (3) the annulment of the decision of said RTC PRUDENCIO FERNANDEZ. Civil Case Nos. FEBE LLERA (ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND LUCIANO LIM). This petition FERNANDEZ-HUGONIN.R. 1988 of the RTC in the aforecited civil cases. for the cancellation of Entry No. DE LLERA. 2000] July 23. JESUS CIOCON. which was the notice of lis pendens pertaining to CAVA. [1] respondents DECISION QUISUMBING. RUFO CALVEZ. [2] and the order dated October 31. and ESMERNA cancellation. ZENAIDA now asks for (1) the annulment of the said order of FERNANDEZ-ILEDAN. petitioners. The decision effectively affirmed the Order dated [G. T- ADOLFO FERNANDEZ. ALFONSO JARDENIL and ANUNCIACION JOVER. 7687 and 7723 annotated in TCT No.: For review is the Decision dated February 17. SALVACION N. 1991 granting private CIRILO CIOCON. TERESITA FERNANDEZ- 178073. 1991 that set aside the original decision vs. 1994. EDUARDO FERNANDEZ. dated October 15. 30086. HOSPICIO PEDRINA. GLORIA 165298 of the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod. SP No. of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the special civil action for certiorari.R. VDA. ELEVENTH DIVISION).

7723 were eventually consolidated. reply after fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.[6] Private respondents Levita Llera. [7] . He was substituted in the civil suit by his transmitted to the Court of Appeals with incomplete heirs namely: Dominadora. Civil Case No. Fernandez died on days whether or not they agree to have the records January 23. Fernandez refused. presiding Prudencio Fernandez. Zenaida and Esmerna. Ciocon.[3] and all proceedings conducted pursuant to said 435 from Ciocon. Judge Enrique Jocson. Leticia. Judge Jocson issued an Order litem denied receiving any money from Ciocon and averred requiring the parties to state in writing within fifteen (15) that Ciocons receipt was a forgery. Allegedly. Anunciacion Jover. he tried to eject private respondent Jesus Ciocon indifferent about submitting to a decision based on extant but and some other occupants off the property. On May 30. Rufo Calves. 7687 before Branch 47 of the RTC of Negros Occidental for reconveyance of the land or what Private respondents and intervenors timely filed their remains of it after deducting portions already sold to notices of appeal which were given due course on July 29. After Fernandez acquired ownership judge of RTC Branch 47. 1985. Ciocon instituted against 435 to the heirs of Fernandez. 7687 and Civil Case No. Civil Case 7723 was filed by Alfonso decision and order. September 21. Adolfo.Appeal. and Vicente Urbanozo who also Appeals resolution dated May 30. 1988. transcripts of stenographic notes.[4] and their children Eduardo. Fernandez through his guardian ad On March 12. price to Fernandez on February 7. and Monserrat Villalba were intervenors in said On July 29. noting that the parties were of the lot. on the intervenors to deliver immediate possession of Lot No. others. Ciocon claimed he had paid for the full reconveyance 1988. 1994 denying petitioners claimed to have bought portions of the lot from motion for reconsideration. It also seeks the review of the Court of Jardenil. 1990. This petition involves Lot 435 of the Bacolod cadastre originally titled to petitioners predecessor-in-interest. 1958 for which Fernandez signed a receipt. order the transmittal of the extant records to the Court of Appeals. After this rejection.[5] Fernandez Civil Case No. Hospicio Pedrina. 1966. the court would consider the parties silence as conformity and Gloria. incomplete records proceeded to render judgment dismissing Ciocon asked Fernandez that he be given a last chance to both complaints and ordering private respondent Ciocon and repurchase the lot. 1988 an order was issued ordering suit who claimed that they had purchased portions of Lot transmittal of the records to the appellate court. . and if they should fail to Teresita.

1991. 178073 was one of the entries carried over in TCT No. 178073. It also ordered the cancellation of the new title 177656. 5381 and 13188 upon the plaintiffs filing of additional bond of P300. all unlisted in the issued to Fernandez and the issuance of a new title in the March 17. litigated. Above-Entitled Cases Decided Anew. 7723. On December 2.M. 1063. T-164785.[11] Gargars name. 178526. Judge Jocson reasoned that denied.[8] which Judge Jocson petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order was granted on October 3. T-165298 in appealed the second decision. motion was in the best interest of justice. Meanwhile the Court of Appeals noted the On October 29.[13] The TCT in the name of Fernandez was cancelled and a new TCT was issued On September 30. on October 25. 1988. Ciocon filed a motion asking that Roberto Tolentino. 1992.[17] name of Jesus Ciocon and intervenors.00. 1991.[10] Ciocon then sold the subject property to one Eduardo Not surprisingly. 1991. 1992. Ciocon filed a Motion to have in the name of respondent Ciocon. In the second decision.. T-165298.[16] re-taking of the testimonies of witnesses Ciocon and Tolentino. was not among the entries listed in the motion. 1992. Entry No. Judge Jocson ordered the cancellation the first decision and directed the return of the disputed lot to of the entries of the notices of lis pendens listed in the Ciocon and intervenors except the portions still being aforementioned motion. 178527. the judge explained that the Court of Appeals. resulting in the issuance of TCT No. 1992 motion. 1991. remanded the case and ordered the No. including Entry Nos. The second decision was a complete reversal of On July 23. after receiving the notices of appeal and It was only on April 20. at 3:45 P. Judge Jocson rendered a second notice of lis pendens involved in Civil Case No. and 178073. Ciocon moved for execution incompleteness of the records and ordered the re-taking and pending appeal. the handwriting expert who testified on the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City be directed to cancel the alleged forgery of Fernandez signature. the On October 15. 1991.[15] Entry No. granting the entries in TCT No. 1991. 7687 and decision setting aside the judgment rendered on May 30. trial court granted the motion ex parte. 1991. petitioners Gargar. and without the testimony of On March 17.[12] Six days after.[14] since the cases were decided on the basis of the records taken by his predecessor. 5121. that Entry the incomplete records.[9] 44213. 178073 was annotated on TCT T-164785.[18] Gargar immediately .000. particularly Entries Nos. on November 4. the completion of missing testimonies.

Hence. 7687 and No. . he is hereby directed to various proceedings taken in the court below. for certiorari. petitioners filed a petition solution to the case. dated February 17.mortgaged the property to the Rizal Commercial and The observation is partly based on the single fact agreed on Banking Corporation to secure a loan for P2. [20] circumstances. for having been issued without jurisdiction. this Courts order is consideration on appeal. elevate the record thereof to this Court for consideration on appeal. 1992. the Court of Evidence has been submitted. there can be no satisfactory On February 2. 7687 and we believe. the case was submitted for decision. of the Regional Trial civil action of certiorari presupposes that there is no appeal Court cancelling the lis pendens notations in the TCT. 7723 to the Court of Appeals.000. would be more speedy and adequate. served if we allow the regular appeal. and this can only be achieved in a final Appeals. to proceed in due course instead of annulling the proceeding with said cases. that the appeal be allowed to push through. that a judge has been designate to desist from further proceeding with Civil Cases designated to substitute for the respondent Judge who had No. It must also be noted that until and unless there is a directing the transmittal of the records to the Court of definitive ruling. decision dated May 30. 1993. 7723. the judge-designate in Civil Cases Nos. 1994. by both parties. After hearing demonstrably congruent with law and justice under the on March 17. In its Decision. and to elevate the records for been separated from the service.000. 1988. Petitioners prayed that the trial court be In the case at bar.00. It is our considered opinion that justice would be better WHEREFORE. the trial court issued another Order. On May 28. and Civil Case No. 1992. application for preliminary injunction. Instead.[19] judgment. Said the appellate court: directed to said judge-designate. and its nor any plain. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary Decision dated October 15. compelled to elevate the records of Civil Case No. 1991 setting aside its original course of law. the remedy of appeal is available which. 1993. prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary injunction under Rule 65 to annul and set Section 1 of Rule 65 (Rules of Court) governing the special aside the Order dated July 23. which had been timely 7687 and 7723 is hereby ordered to desist from further filed. after the hearing of the Appeals dismissed the petition and ordered the judge. on the issue of rightful possession and ownership of the property in question.

178073. SO ORDERED. a patent nullity because no motion for the cancellation of the notice (Entry No. the Appeals refused to recognize that.Petition DISMISSED.[21] (4) The execution pending appeal in 1991 was The motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the itself invalid. On the contrary. Petitioners stress that respondent Ciocon (3) Even assuming that the motion had been filed prayed for cancellation only of certain entries appearing on and the RTC still had jurisdiction. petitioners contend that in was filed. 178073. particularly Entry No. This entry was made . there was no the TCT but not Entry No. by then. and in violation of due process and pass on (1) the impropriety and invalidity of the trial courts fundamental rules of procedure. at the very least. the RTC had already lost jurisdiction to grant the cancellation by the RTC of the notice of lis same since the appeal by petitioners from the pendens. insofar as it are best left for determination by the Court of Appeals. the Court of (2) Assuming that a motion was filed. promulgating its assailed decision. upon a mere ex first and even the second decision had been parte motion is already grave abuse of discretion. there were reasons for maintaining said notice of lis pendens. 1992 (Annex C). said notice of lis pendens. which was the basis of the (1) The cancellation of said notice of lis pendens is cancellation of the cited notice of lis pendens. there was no Entry No. petition was denied. and even perfected. graver abuse since Entry No. pending appeal. 178073 was not even subject of the motion at all.[22] cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and (2) the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court when the latter granted the In its support petitioners argue that: motion for execution of its second decision dated October 15. 178073 yet. Petitioners point out that showing of the necessity for the cancellation of at the time Ciocon asked for cancellation of the other entries. is null and void because it was issued dismissing the petition for certiorari insofar as it refused to without jurisdiction. 1991. asserting that: Considering that the issues of ownership and possession The order of July 23. 178073) On the first point. Hence. this petition. and denying the corrective writ of certiorari against the RTC. cancelled the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated petitioners in essence aver that the appellate court erred in by the petitioners.

But they resolutely ask Civil Procedure. The peculiar and was no abuse of discretion on its part because the RTC could exceptional circumstances of the case. Such 435. We have scrutinized the records but found no respondents claim. of the property as collateral for a P2. This is already bound by such determination by the RTC. no bone of contention in the present appeal. [23] Petitioners contend that of the basis for cancellation of said notice is precisely the without a motion for cancellation of Entry No. indubitably molesting the adverse party or was not necessary to protect manifest that the annotation was not merely to molest the the rights of the party who caused its annotation. Rule 14 of the Rules of rightful possession and ownership be resolved in the of Court. making cancellation of the notice is factual. [24] process. the Supreme Court is recovery of the property extremely complicated. manifestly prejudicing petitioners. 24. This infirmity in the ex parte cancellation resulted A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole in the hasty use by Gargar. They other party but was needed to protect petitioners interest contend that since the determination of the basis for from any hasty transfer of the property to another. they conceded that the issues subsequent alienation. at the outset. . as in the rendering of determine on its own if a notice was for the purpose of two conflicting decisions by the same judge.000. announcement is founded upon public policy and necessity. the new registered owner of Lot world that a particular real property is in litigation. with respect to the cited notice of lis showing that the annotation was caused by petitioners pendens. or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be In their opposition and comment to the petition. 178073. exactly what happened in this case when the notice of lis pendens was cancelled. is for molesting the adverse party. Without notice and court has inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens. nor that it was not notice was within the discretion of the RTC and that there needed to protect petitioners rights. the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated Petitioners assert that in their motion for and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by reconsideration of the petition. While the trial hearing on it could be conducted. that the trial courts determination cancellation of certain entries.000. 14 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of appeal rather than risk more delay. hearing.[25] Under Sec.[26] now Sec.more than a month after Ciocon filed his motion for We note. there was manifest denial of petitioners right to due such power is exercised under express provisions of law. private annotated. a notice of lis pendens may be canceled for the nullification of the order cancelling the cited notice only after proper showing that the purpose of its annotation of lis pendens and pray for re-annotation thereof. that the order cancelling the annotation of the merely to molest private respondents.00 loan.

the decisions having respondents stand. which the trial court erroneously took as respondents are allowed to file a bond. was dismissed for non-prosequitur on the part of the and it certainly could not have been included since the entry plaintiff. 178073. The cancellation of encumbered the property as security for a loan. Further. a notice of lis pendens cannot be injudicious and erroneous. regardless of the a remand of the case. Further. There should be notice to the party who . Judge Jocsons order of deemed ipso facto cancelled. much less without any motion at all. where the not merely to molest the other party. or where judgment was rendered against the party was annotated in the TCT only a month after the filing of the who caused such a notation. private respondent Ciocons motion dated March party because of several continuances procured by petitioner. Petitioners had in fact been adjudged owners of upon the mere filing of a bond by the party on whose title the the lot in the first decision and it was private respondents notice is annotated.[27] These exceptional cancellation included Entry No. However. in substitution of said notice. contrary to private there had been no final judgment yet. of the court and to prevent the defeat of the judgment by it was the Court of Appeals which ordered the re-taking of subsequent alienation will be rendered meaningless if private the lost testimonies. Ciocon sold the property to Gargar who order to remand by the Court of Appeals. 178073 in particular. 17.[29] circumstances are not present in this case. Furthermore. the lis pendensnotations should not have been ordered since therefore. In such instances. the trial courts inherent power to cancel a caused the annotation so that he may be heard to object to notice of lis pendens is exercised only under exceptional the cancellation of his notice and show to the court that the circumstances. 1992. It will be noted that although the case took long to resolve. to cancel certain notices of lis pendens did not where the case which is the basis for the lis pendens notation include a request to cancel Entry No. courts determination of the bases of the cancellation of the cited notice. said notice is motion. [30] As it happened in was also timely appealed. we find the trial courts order More significantly. the Court could not be bound by the trial been timely appealed. The ultimate purpose of the annotation who filed a motion that the case be decided anew. resulting in a second decision which amount. such as: where such circumstances are notice of lis pendens is necessary to protect his rights and is imputable to the party who caused the annotation.[28] As the records of this litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice of the other case reflect. We are. 1992. constrained to conclude that. ordered cancelled on an ex parte motion. it was not due to Neither can a notice of lis pendens be ordered cancelled petitioners. The records mentioned no such this case. on April 20. despite a which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power timely notice of appeal from the first decision.

No amount of rationalization therefore. We now resolve the question of jurisdiction. is that after perfection of an appeal. court may issue orders only if in the exercise of its residual functions. The divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over a case to resolve records show that the notices of appeal from the first pending incidents. nor that it was not omission of the parties.The perfection of an appeal jurisdiction upon the perfection of the appeal from its first divests the trial court of jurisdiction over a case and the trial decision as early as 1988.[32] annotation. First. the trial court no longer had jurisdiction. the assailed decision of the Court of The Court is not unaware of Asmala vs. there jurisdiction it had lost. although reluctantly. was no showing that the annotation of the notice was for the waived. at the time of the order of cancellation of the notice. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired. The operative phrase. can confer on the trial court the deprived of their right to be heard on notice. WHEREFORE. it was granted ex parte. And third. we need not delve on the appellate courts parte approval of the motion for execution pending appeal of dismissal of the petition for certiorari. Such is not the case here for the RTC already lost its for execution pending appeal.[31] At such time the appeals may be ordered at any given time by the court having were perfected. It is mooted by the trial courts second decision. petitioners acceptance. 178073.[34] that the cancellation decision of the trial court were filed within the reglementary of a notice of lis pendens. Neither is it conferred by necessary to protect the rights of those who sought the acquiescence of the court. diminished or extended by any act or purpose of molesting the adverse party. even a this case. There is abundant jurisprudence stating that jurisdiction over it. Fundamental is the doctrine that jurisdiction is The cancellation order of the notice of lis pendens in fixed by law. Dy. enlarged. being a mere incident to an action. however.Second. It must also be borne in mind that the order of cancellation of notation of lis pendens was based on the ex Lastly. should be set aside for three declaration that a new decision is being made in the best reasons. of the appellate for being the result of a hearing ex parte. process. Entry No. Petitioners were interest of justice. Comelec. hence without courts judgment that the issues of rightful possession and notice to the adverse party and thereby violative of due ownership of the property be resolved in the appeal. period and were duly approved. Appeals is hereby MODIFIED as follows: [33] holding that the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not . This order is fatally flawed. and also to issue orders over it. and Roxas vs. the trial court loses jurisdiction the cancellation be ordered by a court having jurisdiction to amend a decision appealed from.

located in Kinayao. pendens. 165298. MORALES. Tajala. by Decision[2] of June 19. Sultan Kudarat. No. JR.: (4) The Court of Appeals upon receipt of the The Department of Environment and Natural complete records is directed to immediately Resources (DENR) Regional Executive Director Jim O. Present: directed the cancellation of the notice of lis CARPIO pendens.. 2007. proceed with the appeal for the determination of Sampulna (RD Sampulna). Entry No. Bagumbayan.[4] . 7687 and No. T. T. the rightful ownership and possession of the lot (1) denied for lack merit the application[3] of Julieta Panolino in dispute. JOSEPHINE L. which was opposed by herein respondent Josephine L. 7723 is ordered to elevate the records of said cases to the Court of Appeals for consideration on appeal.. J. (2) directed petitioner to vacate the contested property and SO ORDERED. Civil Cases No. remove at her expense whatever improvements she may have introduced thereon. 1992 of the Regional JULIETA G. (2) The Register of Deeds of the City of Bacolod is ABAD.R. JJ. Promulgated: Respondent.[1] June 29. 7723 insofar as it Petitioner. (petitioner). for a free patent over a parcel of land Costs against private respondents. in PANOLINO. 7687 ---------x and No. versus BRION. BERSAMIN. TAJALA. Entry No. and (3) advised respondent to file THIRD DIVISION her free patent application over the contested property within sixty days. 183616 Trial Court of Negros Occidental. Branch 47. 178073 on TCT No. is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. 2010 x----------------------------------------- (3) The judge-designate in Civil Cases No. DECISION CARPIO MORALES.* and directed to RE-ANNOTATE the notice of lis VILLARAMA. 165298. J.Chairperson. 178073 on TCT No.(1) The Order dated July 23.

r DENR Secretary. The RD explained that is reversed on reconsideration. perfection of the appeal. If the decision filed beyond the reglementary period. (emphasis and party and the Office of the underscoring supplied) Secretary. transmit the records of the case to the Office of (a) Unless otherwise provided by law or the Secretary with each page executive order. the petitioner should have filed her appeal on September 13. 2007. Petitioner received a copy of the decision on June 27. 2007. stating that she to perfect his appeal during the re was appealing the decision and order to the Office of the mainder ofthe period for appeal. of which she filed a motion for reconsideration (b) If a motion for on July 11. holding that it was tion of denial. pursuant to DENR Administrative resolution of reversal within which Order No. Applicability of the Regional Office which adjudicated Rules of Court. and paying the required fees. The Rules of Court shall the case a notice of appeal. 87. decision/order of the Regional 2007. 2007. Office is filed and such motion for reconsideration is denied. 2007. appeals from the numbered consecutively and decisions/orders of the DENR initialed by the custodian of the Regional Offices shall be perfected records. within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a copy of the decision/order xxxx complained of by the party adversely affected. Her motion was denied by reconsideration of the [5] Order of September 6. the On September 19. RD eckoned from receipt of the resolu Sampulna denied the notice of appeal. aggrieved party shall have fifteen 2007as she had only one day left of the 15-day reglementary (15) days from receipt of the period for the purpose. serving apply when not inconsistent with the copies thereof upon the prevailing provisions hereof. Series of 1990. upon SECTION 1. Perfection of Appeals. copy of which shereceived on September 12. which provide: (c) The Regional office shall. by filing with the SECTION 6. . petitioner filed a Notice of movant shall have the right Appeal[6] before the Office of RD Sampulna. 2007. By Order[7]of October 16.[8] the pertinent portions of to perfect his appeal.

Hence. 2007.[12] denied new rule aims to regiment or make the petitioners motion. 2007.[13] counted from receipt of the order the RD or until September 27. 2007 Order that she still had a fresh Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of fifteen days from her receipt on September 12. Her motion was denied dismissing a motion for a new trial or by Order[10] of November 28. v. 2007 of inconsistent with Rule 41. i. receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial. et al. et al. by Resolution[11] of January 25. 2007 denying her motion for Section 3 of the Rules which states that reconsideration of the decision. motion for reconsideration The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether (whether full or partial) or any final order or the fresh period rule laid down in Neypes applies to resolution. Petitioner elevated the matter via certiorari before Henceforth. This pronouncement is not Secretary. counted from her notice on September 12. petitioners case. motion for reconsideration. provided in the Rules and to afford litigants [9] petitioner argued in her motion for reconsideration of RD fair opportunity to appeal their cases. Rule 42 on Office of the DENR Secretary and the Office of the petitions for review from the Regional President before resorting to judicial action. Invoking the rule enunciated by this Court in the To standardize the appeal periods 2005 case of Neypes. she having bypassed the to the Regional Trial Courts. Court of Appeals. to be counted from certiorari. [14] the RDs Order of September 6. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and . the present petition for review on appeal period uniform. the appellate court. 2007 Order to the DENR x x x. rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing 2008.. arguing that judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals. By and Rule 45 governing appeals Resolution of June 25. Rule 43 on appeals from quasi- Petitioner moved for reconsideration. period of 15 days within which to file the 2007 of copy of the September 6.e. 2007 Order denying her notice of appeal in the Regional Trial motion for reconsideration of the June 19. her petition for certiorari raised a purely legal issue. 2007 Decision of Court. this fresh period the Court of Appeals which. dismissed it on the ground that petitioner failed to appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts exhaust administrative remedies. the Sampulnas October 16. The the issue raised is clearly a question of fact. that he had a fresh period of 15 days to appeal RD Sampulnas October 16. holding that by certiorari to the Supreme Court. the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order The fresh period rule in Neypes declares: appealed from. Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals.. 2008.

Court of Appeals for it to resolve the legal issue of whether the fresh period rule in Neypes is applicable to petitioners In this case. the decision of Section 39 of BP 129[15] which becomes final and executory after the lapse shortened the appeal period from 30 days of the original appeal period provided to 15 days to hasten the disposition of in Rule 41. however. the new 15- Neither does this new rule run day period may be availed of only if either counter to the spirit motion is filed. of remanding this case to the justice fairly. we likewise aspire to deliver Instead. Obviously. It receipt of notice of judgment x x x or from should. minimize and/or rectify question of fact which entails an examination of the any error of judgment. [17] given another opportunity to review the case The appellate courts ruling that such issue raises a and. denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. The original period of appeal x x x underscoring supplied. otherwise.[16] (emphasis and cases. days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be countedfrom . be construed in the sense receipt of notice of final order appealed in which it ordinarily implies. a party litigant may 15 days from notice of judgment or within either file his notice of appeal within 15 15 days from notice of the final order. Hence. as a rule. in the process. use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within To recapitulate. the new period of 15 case. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for The issue raised by petitioner before the appellate reconsideration.independence of one thing from another. italics in the original) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. judgments of courts become final at some definite time. While we aim to probative value of the evidence presented by the parties [18] is resolve cases with dispatch and to have thus erroneous. Section 3. the Court opts to resolve it to obviate further delay. the from x x x. which days from receipt of the Regional Trial we already determined to refer to the x x x Courts decision or file it within 15 days order denying the motion for a new trial or from receipt of the order (the final order) reconsideration. In this manner. the trial court is one of law because it can be resolved by merely court which rendered the assailed decision is determining what the law is under the undisputed facts.

reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. Obviously. Petitioners present case is administrative in nature involving an appeal from the decision or order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. No costs. and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court). the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to perfect his appeal. . Rule 41. the assailed issuances of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. it may not apply to the case of petitioner whose motion for reconsideration was denied. 87. WHEREFORE. the fresh period rule shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts). Series of 1990. Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals). not on the ground advanced therein but on the ground reflected in the foregoing discussion. Section 1 clearly provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied. Series of 1990. As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision in Neypes. Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals). As earlier quoted. these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. whereas if the decision is reversed. as clarified in Neypes. Such appeal is indeed governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order No. the movant shall perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period of appeal. Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court). 87. being inconsistent with Section 1 of Administrative Order No. Section 3 of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED.

the "two- dismissal rule" under Rule 17. 02-103319 without prejudice.6 Manila The issues before this court are procedural. Both Republic of the Philippines orders were issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila. the SECOND DIVISION factual antecedents in this case. MERCEDES IGNE1 AND LUCINA SANTOS. and (2) the omnibus order5 dated July 30. SP.R. which stemmed from a .. SUPREME COURT Branch 6. J. No. 2002 dismissing Civil Case No. Respondents. 86818. 2014 RAMON CHING AND POWING PROPERTIES. 2004.R. which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. JAIME CHENG. Petitioners. which upheld the (1) order4 dated November 22. G. Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure will not apply if the prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant. DECISION LEONEN. vs. No. JOSEPH CHENG. INC. However.: Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals of actions at the instance of the plaintiff. Hence. 175507 October 8.

98-91046 (the first case). Ching allegedly induced Mercedes Igne and her children.15 Fortunately.26 .20 naming himself as the sole heir and adjudicating two women. This case was docketed as Civil Case the titles to the properties and business documents. Antonio Ching was murdered.11 agreement and waiver in consideration of 22. must be stated to give context to its On July 18.13 both Mercedes and Lucina have not. among which was Po Wing Properties. headed by however. and a warrant sometime in 1996. the Ching family association.9 upon himself the entirety of Antonio Ching’s estate. 1996. Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng. to sign an agreement and It is alleged that Antonio Ching owned several businesses waiver18 to Antonio Ching’s estate in consideration of P22. 1998.5 million was made. unduly influenced him to give Mercedes Ching’s birth certificate indicates that he was Antonio Igne and her children financial aid considering that they Ching’s illegitimate child. Mercedes Igne’s children alleged that Ramon Ching Incorporated (Po Wing Properties). she and Antonio Ching merely served Antonio Ching for years. claim to association to execute an affidavit of settlement of estate be Antonio Ching’s illegitimate children with his housemaid. declaring him to be Antonio Ching’s sole heir. on the other hand. he had children from estate. disputed this. his estate to his heirs if something were to happen to him.5 and properties. Antonio Ching died.12 While Ramon Ching disputed this.23Information24 was filed against him. the police found Ramon Ching to be its primary Lucina Santos alleged that when Antonio Ching fell ill suspect. She maintains that even ifRamon Vicente Cheng. he entrusted her with the distribution of of arrest25 was issued.14 After a year of investigating Antonio Ching’s death. It was for this reason that an adopted him and treated him like their own.19 On October 29. Antonio Ching recovered from of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before the Regional illness and allegedly demanded that Ramon Ching return all Trial Court of Manila.21 Ramon Ching alleged that he was the only child of Antonio Ramon Ching denied these allegationsand insisted that when Ching with his common-law wife. 16 No. million. 1996. She alleged that she handed all the property titles and On October 7.complicated family feud.8 It is also allegedly executed an affidavit of settlement of alleged that whilehe was unmarried. Ramon Ching alleged to have been worth more than 380 million.10 She. and business documents to Ramon Ching for Mercedes Igne (the Chengs) filed a complaint for declaration safekeeping. Jaime Cheng. Joseph Cheng.17 Ramon procedural development.22 Mercedes Igne. He also alleged that hewas summoned by the family Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng. Lucina Santos.7 His total assets are never paid them.

Ramon Ching and Po Wing Branch 6. Waiver. the complaint was amended.33 When Branch 20 was made of court.31 Procedure. the Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for "Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Waiver.The amended complaint was for "Annulment of substantially the same parties and causes of action. the Chengs and Lucina should have been with prejudice under the "two dismissal Santos were given fifteen (15) days to file the appropriate rule" of Rule 17. in view of the previous dismissal of the first case.37 On April 19. 34 Agreement. Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents On November 11. to implead additional defendants. 2002.29 dismissal of the second case was made without prejudice. 35 filed a motion for intervention and was allowed to intervene. Branch 6 issued an order granting the motion to dismiss on the basis that the summons had not After the responsive pleadings had been filed. however. During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. They argue that the dismissal the Chengs’ counsel. Deed of Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Absolute Sale. 2002. it issued an order transferring the case Wing Properties.32This case was docketed as Civil Case No. the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for "Annulment of Agreement. with leave Regional Trial Court of Manila. the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of a motion to dismiss their complaint in the second case. and Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer Properties."27 Sometime after. Po Wing yet been served on Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties. 1999.30 Upon motion of dated November 22. Properties filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of and they had not yet filed any responsive pleading. On December 9. for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon 103319 (the second case) and raffled to Branch 20 of the Ching and Po Wing Properties. 02. Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil pleading. the Regional Trial Court of Manila. of which Ramon Ching was a primary to Branch 6. Waiver. Preliminary Injunction. 2002. including Po aware of the first case. Affidavit of Extra judicial Agreement. 2001.On March 22. 2002. granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of Properties filed a motion for reconsideration of the order lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. This case was docketed as . Lucina Santos praying that it be dismissed without prejudice. 2002. They did not do so. considering that the case before it involved stockholder. Extra. The jurisdiction of the subject matter.28 On November 22. 36 On November 13.

dismissal of the second case was with prejudice since the Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a petition for non-filing of an amended complaint in the first case operated certiorari (the first certiorari case) with the Court of Appeals. and cause of action.49 On December 28.45 order40 resolving both the motion for reconsideration in the second case and the motion to dismiss in the third case. In this case. hence. 2002. the trial court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration in the third case.51 The Chengs. as a dismissal on the merits.38 the Court of Appeals.42 case involving the same parties. 02-105251(the third case) and was eventually temporary restraining order (the second certiorari case) with raffled to Branch 6. 2004. 46 Ramon trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and the Ching and Po Wing Properties filed this present petition for motion to dismiss.48 They also argue that the assailing the order dated November 22.2002 and the portion second case should be dismissed on the ground of res of the omnibus order dated July 30.43 On December 10. did not file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application comply. it found that the filed by both parties. while the dismissal of the second case was at the On July 30. 2007. for temporary restraining order in the third case.41 On October 8. forum-shopping. subject matter. the Court of Appeals rendered the Properties filed their comment/opposition to the application decision44 in the first certiorari case dismissing the petition. 2004. The Lucina Santos was able to file a comment50 on the petition denial prompted Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties to within the period required. 2004. while their Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties argue that the motion for reconsideration in the third case was pending.53 they eventually filed a .Civil Case No. Ramon Ching and Po Wing On March 23. litis Properties’ reliance on the "two-dismissal rule" was pendencia. The Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration. and failure of the complaint to misplaced since the rule involves two motions for dismissals state a cause of action. Branch 6 issued an omnibus instance of the plaintiffs. holding that the dismissal of the second review47 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. would not bar the filing of the third case.39 dismissal of the first case was upon the motion of the defendants.52 Upon the issuance by this court of a show cause for a writ of preliminary injunction or the issuance of a order on September 24. however. case was without prejudice and. A series of responsive pleadings were filed by the plaintiff only. 2006. which upheldthe judicata since there was a previous final judgment of the first dismissal of the second case. They also The appellate court ruled that Ramon Ching and Po Wing filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. 2004.

54 I. The pertinent provisions state: only moved for dismissal once in the second case. Respondents argue that the petition for review should be The petition is denied. the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. 57 RULE 17 58 In their reply. court granted the motion to dismiss. Whether the trial court’s dismissal of the second In their comment.60 filed. — A complaint in the trial courts. and (2) they Rules of Civil Procedure. Whether respondents committed forum shopping and executory whenhe failed to file his motion for when they filed the third case while the motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period. 1. Upon such notice being third cases.59 They reiterate that their petition for may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of review is only about the second case. They argue that the trial court’s order became final II. which involved the same omnibus the Rules of Civil Procedure order by the trial court.62 adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who . Unless otherwise stated in the notice. the dismissal is Upon the filing of the parties’ respective memoranda.56 They also argue that the "two- dismissal rule" and res judicata did not apply since (1) the Dismissals of actions are governed by Rule 17 of the 1997 failure to amend a complaint is not a dismissal.comment with substantially the same allegations and For this court’s resolution are the following issues: arguments as that of Lucina Santos’. 55 reconsideration of the second case was still pending. except that a notice operates as an case was submitted for decision. dismissed on the ground of forum shopping and litis pendencia since Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties are The "two-dismissal rule" vis-à-vis seeking relief simultaneously in two forums by filing the two petitions for certiorari. respondents allege that when the trial case operated as a bar to the filing of a third case. petitioners argue that they did not commit DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS forum shopping since the actions they commenced against respondents stemmed from the complaints filed against them SEC. Ramon Ching’s counsel asper the "two-dismissal rule". 61 the without prejudice. it just so happened that dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a the assailed omnibus order resolved both the second and motion for summary judgment. and was notified in open court that the dismissal was without prejudice. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff.

2. for no dismissed either upon motion of the defendant or by the justifiable cause. A court. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant court. This dismissal shall have the effect of an In Insular Veneer. — If. not of the defendant. the dismissal is with prejudice the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint. Unless otherwise specified in the order. The third section contemplates dismissals due to the fault of the plaintiff such as the failure to prosecute. of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or which covers motions to dismiss. class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court.63 in a separate action. Generally. the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of court motu propio. Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or the plaintiff. the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. — Except as The first section of the rule contemplates a situation where a provided in the preceding section. 3. without prejudice to the right instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16. Inc. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. Dismissals upon the upon the court's own motion.has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on adjudication upon the merits. to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time. and the dismissal is the same action. v. dismissal. a complaint shall not be plaintiff requests the dismissal of the case beforeany dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the responsive pleadings have been filed by the defendant.64 Consolidated Logging and Lumber Mills filed a complaint against Insular Veneer to . or unless otherwise declared by the court. the court. It is court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems donethrough notice by the plaintiff and confirmation by the proper. (Emphasis supplied) SEC. Plan. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. The dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion for declared by the court. unless otherwise declared by or including the same claim. The case is SEC. Hon. It requires leave of court. a generally without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. the In all instances. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the The second section of the rule contemplates a situation defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action where a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he before the service on him or her of the plaintiff’s motion to manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in dismiss. or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court.

69 action pending between the same parties for the same cause" . presided over by Judge Plan. It did not prosecute its amended complaint in the Isabela court as if mention any previous action pending in the Isabela court. Consolidated Logging’ [sic] filed a new case in Manila at its The Isabela court apparently treated the filing of the own risk.70 dismissal. Its lawyer at his peril failed toappear at the pre- amended complaint as a withdrawal of its notice of trial. this time in a trial court in Manila. arguing that the dismissal by the Manila court Manila court. While the action on its notice for dismissal was pending.68 This court ruled that the filing of the amended complaint in Insular Veneer also filed in the Isabela court a motion to the Isabela court was barred by the prior dismissal of the dismiss. stating that: constituted res judicataover the case. Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Civil Isabela court and revived its old action by means of an Procedure.65 unarguable fact that Consolidated Logging on its volition dismissed its action for damages and injunction in the The trial court granted the motion and treated the restraining Isabela court and refiled substantially the same action in the order as a writ of preliminary injunction. Rule 16 of the Rules of Court The dismissal was the subject of the petition for certiorari that an action may be dismissed because "there is another and mandamus with this court. When Consolidated Manila court. denied the motion to dismiss. The Isabela court. during pre-trial. Consolidated Logging subsequently returned to the Isabela court to revive the same complaint. it filed a notice of dismissal action for failure to prosecute. Consolidated Logging filed the same complaint against consign it to oblivion as if it were a bad dream. 67 nothing had transpired in the Manila court. when the Manila court dismissed its Logging recovered the logs.66 amended complaint. The complaint and motion were filed in a trial court in In resolving that issue. it went hack [sic] to the under Rule 17. The provision in section 1(e). It This court stated that: also filed ex partea motion for issuance of a restraining order. Then.recover some logs the former had delivered to the latter. and Insular Veneer. We hold that it cannot elude the effects of its conduct in junking the Isabela The Manila court eventually dismissed the complaint due to case and in giving that case a reincarnation in the Manila the nonappearance of Consolidated Logging’s counsel court. Consolidated Logging would liketo forget the Manila case. we are confronted with the Isabela.

1999. A motion to dismiss was inevitably filed plaintiff caused its dismissal. and certificate of titles with damages. Lis was consented to by the defendant on the ground pendensas a ground for a motion to dismiss has the same that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the requisites as the plea of res judicata. 1970 in the Manila case could he [sic] view of the "two-dismissal rule" interposed in the Isabela court to support the defense of res judicata. the prior dismissal The dismissal of the second case was without prejudice in order dated January 5. which should be threshed out in a special proceedings case. claim. subject matters. i.e. when on the same claim. The original ceases to vexatious litigation.71 Here. the following The trial court granted that motion to dismiss. dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are new causes of action that should have been adjudicated in a without prejudice except when it is the second time that the special proceeding."73 When a complaint is dismissed a perform any further function as a pleading. the original The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid pleading is deemed abandoned.e. when a pleading is amended. This is a clear departure from the main cause of action in the (3) Both notices for dismissal werefiled by the original complaint which is for declaration of nullity of plaintiff. former. the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. So. 2158. Consolidated Logging filed its amended complaint dated March 16. It was later amended to include not only new defendants but As a general rule. The case stands second time. filed by Plaintiff Joseph a competent court. And the rules of procedure .72 On the other hand. with prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim. 1970 in Civil Case No. operate as an adjudication upon the merits. Cheng. for a dismissal to by the defendants onthe ground of lack of jurisdiction. extra-judicial settlement of the intestate (2) Both cases were based on or include the same estate of Antonio Ching and receivership. show that additional causes of action were incorporated i. the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief for trial on the amended pleading only. Accordingly. stating that: requisites must be present: A careful perusal of the allegations of the Amended (1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by Complaint dated February 10.presupposes that two similar actions are simultaneously (4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff pending in two different Courts of First Instance.

of the claim. Section 3. for the plaintiffs.e. the trial court does not dismiss . the dismissal should have been with . it does not contemplate a However. within which to file an appropriate pleading. Section 1(b) of the Rules of Civil Petitioners are of the view that when Atty. they SECTION 1.. default. prejudice according to Rule 17. the court finds the Motion to request made bythe plaintiff’s counsel that had no bearing on Dismiss filed by Atty. he is given a period of fifteen (15) days Since there was already a dismissal prior to plaintiff’s from today. Mirardo Arroyo Obias.. . Casals to be the dismissal of the case.. two dismissals caused by the plaintiff on the same claim.which govern special proceedings case are different and The trial court dismissed the first case by granting the distinct from the rules of procedure applicable in an ordinary motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. pleading will not reverse the dismissal. he violated the order of the court. the trial court’s instruction to file the appropriate copy furnished to all the parties concerned... a claim. the case anew. meritorious and the Court is left with no alternative but to dismiss as it hereby dismisses the Amended Complaint.. Mirardo Arroyo Procedure. on motion of Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias a period of fifteen (15) days tofile an appropriate pleading. it was merely acquiescing to a In view of the afore-going. Maria Lina Nieva S. made the original dismissal an adjudication upon the filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a merits. SO ORDERED. Under Rule 17. This. Section 3. a defendant may move to dismiss the case if the plaintiff defaults. i.. When it allowed civil action. (b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter Unfortunately. Atty. a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the dismissal through the default of the plaintiff. i. Section 1. If the plaintiff fails to file the appropriate pleading.74 The dismissal of the first case was done at the instance of the defendant under Rule 16. in accordance with Rule 17. petitioners’ theory is erroneous. which states: Obias failed to file the appropriate pleading within fifteen (15) days. the order dismissing the case still stands. Grounds. counsel situation where the dismissal was due to lack of jurisdiction.— Within the time for but before argue.. Hence.e. they following grounds: argue that when respondents filed the second case and then caused its dismissal.

[T]he trial court has no discretion or option to deny the SO ORDERED. Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs. In O. this case is hereby Development Corporation:76 ordered DISMISSED without prejudice. court’s discretion. there was already one prior dismissal at the the trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the dismissed.. since dismissal by the plaintiff under Section 1. Similarly. as shown by their signatures over their respective names Thus. . the trial court issued its order dated by Rule 17. all the plaintiffs namely.. When they manifested that they have not yet filed their Answer as there moved to dismiss the second case. The November 22. Ramon Chang [sic]. since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a instance of the defendants. who dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. Macamir Realty and prejudice. the motion to dismiss can was a defect in the address of Ramon Cheng [sic] and the be considered as the first dismissal at the plaintiff’s instance.75 a party may re-file the Lucina Santos appeared without their counsels. they were reflected thereat. Thereby. it does not necessarily follow that the re-filing of the claim was barred For this reason. Mercedes Igne and Under Section 5 of the same rule. verbally affirmed the execution of the Motion to Dismiss. 2002 dismissing the case. without prejudice. and further considering that the requested by respondents before the service of any defendants herein have not yet filed their Answers nor any responsive pleadings. Jovenir Construction and Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure without Development Corporation v. While it is true that there were matter of right. circumstances surrounding each dismissal must first be The order states: .B. Petitioners do not deny that the second dismissal was Under the circumstances. Jaime Cheng. when respondents filed the second case. latter has not yet been served with summons. Even if When respondents filed the third case on substantially the the motion cites the most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal.77 (Emphasis supplied) two previous dismissals on the same claim. Accordingly. That they same action or claim subject to certain exceptions. regardless of ground. Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. and as prayed for. merely refiling the same claim that had been previously except the counsel for defendant. the plaintiffs has [sic] the right to out rightly [sic] instance is a matter of right that is not subject to the trial cause the dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Section 2. same claim. When this Motion was called for hearing.78 (Emphasis supplied) motion. the dismissal at this pleading. Joseph Cheng.. none of the defendants appeared.

It is different courts to rule on the same or related causes and only when the trial court’s order either is silent on the matter. prejudice. Mirardo Arroyo Obias to file the appropriate pleading in the first case came under the purview of Rule 17. degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Atty. Chua:81 The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or of adjudication on the merits. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case. Forum shopping trifles with the courts. as in this However. respondents’ act of filing the third case while petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was still pending Even assuming for the sake of argument that the failure of constituted forum shopping. other than by appeal or a special civil expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is action for certiorari. grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the or states otherwise. the dismissal in the second rule" case is still considered as one without prejudice. the trial court brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks specifically orders the dismissal to be without prejudice. the general rule is that dismissal of a case for favorable disposition. .80 (Emphasis supplied) abuses their processes. Section The rule against forum shopping and the "twin-dismissal 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. while the dismissal of the second case was without case. In Gomez v.examined to determine before the rule may apply. unless action. either simultaneously or successively. been issued in one forum. Forum shopping may be resorted to by failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action. What iscritical is the vexation In granting the dismissal of the second case. without prejudice. Alcantara:79 In Yap v. renderedby the different fora upon the same issues. on the otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. Stated supposition that one or the other court would make a differently. and is necessarily understood proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of to be with prejudice to the filing of another action. that the dismissal will be considered an process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being adjudication on the merits. in an attempt to seek a favorable and the only exception is when the order of dismissal opinion in another. it may also constitute direct contempt.

the most important factor toask is whether the wait until the final disposition of the second case before elements of litis pendentiaare present. and reliefs transgressed certain procedural safeguards. the relief being founded on the same facts."84 The second case. they unfortunately of parties. among which are sought. the test for determining forum shopping is in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. As it stands. When respondents filed the third case. and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one. Moreover. This theory is founded on the public policy that the the motion to dismiss since "[n]o rule prohibits the filing of same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy such a motion for reconsideration. incourts more than once. however. or whether a final filing the third case. such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. Clearly.To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum The prudent thing that respondents could have done was to shopping. case was without prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim. judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons. petitioners’ motion In Yap: for reconsideration of the dismissal of the second case was still pending. rights or causes of action. or refers to that situation wherein another action is pending even on appeal to a higher court. the order of dismissal was not yet final Litis pendentiaas a ground for the dismissal of a civil action since it could still be overturned upon reconsideration. was still pending when the third case was filed.82 (Emphasis supplied) the rules on litis pendentiaand res judicata. Garcia83 that a defendant has the right to file a regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of motion for reconsideration of a trial court’s order denying action. between the same parties for the same cause of action. or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions. . petitioners were not prohibited from filing the The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that motion for reconsideration. in order that possible conflicting therefore. the dismissal of the second judgment in one case will amount to res judicatain another. The requisites of litis pendentiaare: (a) the identity of parties. In their whether in the two (or more) cases pending. (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for. This court has already stated in a party is not allowed to vex another more than once Narciso v. otherwise stated. there is identity haste to file the third case.

and reliefs in the second and third cases. In Dy v. measure to those who trifle with the orderly administration of justice. That the Court en banchad occasion to condemn and penalize the . This multiplicity of suits is the veryevil sought to be avoided rights. Inc. this court while another petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction was pending before the Regional Trial This. . and not on the judicatain the other. motion for reconsideration in the third case. Any judgment by this court on the The rule originated from the 1986 case of Buan v. petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with affect the disposition of the third case. however. There is no question that there was an identity of parties. omnibus order dated July 30. they engaged in forum shopping. the petitioners in both actions .regardless ofwhich party is successful. This court. would amount to res petition would be based now on the third case.. 2004 denied two pending stated: motions by petitioners: (1) the motion for reconsideration in the second case and (2) the motion to dismiss in the third Indeed. remains pending. The same set of facts. in fact. Mandy be true that the trial court already dismissed the second case Commodities Co. upon substantially identical factual premises. Lopez. the first in accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. the penalty is and. thus. While it may by the rule on forum shopping. to this day. Considering that the dismissal summary dismissal not only of the petition pending before of the second case was the subject of the first certiorari case this Court.86 the rule is that: when the third case was filed. when respondents filed the third case. .85 (Emphasis supplied) second case. it failed to take into account that a motion for reconsideration was filed in the second case Once there is a finding of forum shopping. Since petitioners are barred from filing a second only the sanction of dismissal oftheir case before this Court motion for reconsideration of the second case.88 In Buan. have incurred not case. The denial of petitioners’ in this Court and that in the Regional Trial Court as well. could Quite recently. in dismissing both actions. it can be reasonably lower court. This is so because twin dismissal is a punitive concluded that the second case. was still pending. but also of the other case that is pending in a and this present petition for review. is the reason why there were two different Court of Manila involving the same parties and based on the petitions for certiorari before the appellate court..87 (Emphasis supplied) Hence. still be the subject of a separate petition for certiorari. that now the subject of this review. but also certiorari case was filed before the appellate court and is the punitive measure of dismissal of both their actions. propriety of the dismissal of the second case will inevitably Jr.

"91 The filing of the third case. was upon request of the plaintiff for valid procedural reasons. which originates from the third case merits. substantial justice for the fresh new· case to proceed. They filed the correct every action and proceeding. It appears that the resolution on the merits of the original aptly described as "forum shopping[. in an attempt to protect their (3) there are valid procedural reasons that serve the goal of rights.92 (Emphasis supplied) pleading the second time around but eventually sought its dismissal as they"[suspected] that their counsel is not amply The rule on forum shopping will not strictly apply when it protecting their interests as the case is not moving for almost can be shown that (1) the original case has been dismissed three (3) years. courts as it "trifle[s] with the orderly administration of resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than justice.act of litigants of filing the same suit in different courts. . however. It is prohibited by the pending in court. rather than on technicalities or procedural examination must first be made on the purpose of the imperfections.]"89 controversy between the parties has long beenmired in numerous procedural entanglements.1âwphi1 Parties resort to forum shopping when they file served better. Accordingly. Courts of inevitably result in the summary dismissal of the third case. the grant of this petition would would not serve the ends of substantial justice. In that way. must be avoided. the ends of justice would be rule. and butonly to get the case moving. after all parties have been given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and Because of the severity of the penalty of the rule.In fact. speedy and inexpensive disposition of to file the appropriate pleading. A strict and rigid application of rules. justice must always endeavor to resolve cases on their Any action. it court. the dismissal of the first case became liberally construed in order to promote their objective of final and executory upon the failure of respondents’counsel ensuring the just. While it might be more The rule essentially penalizes the forum shopper by judicially expedient to apply the "twin-dismissal rule" and dismissing all pending actions on the same claim filed in any disallow the proceedings in the third case to continue. an defenses. Section 6 of Rule 1 states that the Rules [on Civil Procedure] shall be In this case. therefore. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to several actions of the same claim in different forums in the expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters hope of obtaining a favorable result. therefore. (2) not precisely for the purpose of obtaining a favorable result the only pending matter is a motion for reconsideration."90 promote substantial justice. [C]ases should be determined on the merits. rather than summarily dismiss these on technicalities: pending with any court would be barred by res judicata.

R. 2003] . THIRD DIVISION [G. WHEREFORE. The third case filed apparently contains the better cause of action for the plaintiffs and is now being prosecuted by a counsel they are more comfortable with. No. Branch 6 is ordered to proceed with Civil Case No. It is for this reason that we deny the petition. SO ORDERED. 153828. 02- 105251 with due and deliberate dispatch. October 24. Substantial justice will be better served if respondents do not fall victim to the labyrinth in the procedures that their travails led them. the petition is DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila.The motion for reconsideration filed in the second case has since been dismissed and is now the subject of a petition for certiorari.

2002. private respondents husband. PR Builders.: On March 19. and ordering PR Builders to refund The case was eventually raffled to RTC. the HLURB issued a writ of execution NORMA C. petitioner. Bagabaldo Paraaque City. Inc. after which public respondent judge issued the .31.[1]which respectively granted from proceeding with the public auction. 2002 and for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary Order dated May 10. The property was scheduled for public auction on March 20. conducted. parcel of land in Canlubang. Branch 276. RTC of Paraaque City. 2002. public respondent Judge Norma C. execution sale. a petition for prohibition with prayer Yao. of the Regional Trial Court of injunction. decision rescinding the contract to sell between petitioner and PR Builders. Perrello issued a 72-hour temporary restraining order and set On September 17. YAO. as well as to pay presided by public respondent judge. DECISION Bernadine Villarin. registered in the names of spouses Pablito Villarin and private respondent. J. Private respondent private respondent Bernadine D. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. 2002. Laguna. Pursuant to the writ. the subject property could not be levied on to answer Regulatory Board (HLURB) against a certain corporation.000. seeking to enjoin Sheriff Melvin T. in her capacity as against PR Builders and its managers. the HLURB rendered a the case for raffle and conference on March 22. 2002. Muntinlupa City. Villarins petition for alleged that she co-owned the property subject of the prohibition and denied petitioners motion for intervention. A conference was then damages in the amount of P250. THE EX-OFICIO enforcement. On even date. Enrico Baluyot and Pablito Villarin.103.116. Calamba. that the property regime between private respondent and her husband was complete separation of The present controversy stemmed from a complaint property. and that she was not a party in the HLURB case. filed by petitioner before the Housing and Land Use hence. PERELLO. for the separate liability of her husband. the deputy sheriff levied on a VILLARIN. 1999. private respondent filed before the Before us is a petition for certiorari filed by Lincoln L. petitioner the amount of P2. CORONA. to the office of the Clerk of Court of Muntinlupa for Branch 276. SHERIFF. respondents. assailing the resolution dated March 22. and its managers. Branch 274. MUNTINLUPA CITY and BERNADINE D. vs. and referred the writ Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court. HONORABLE Thereafter.LINCOLN L.

However. To each spouse shall belong Aggrieved. . dispose of. (214a) exempt from execution and therefore could not be sold to satisfy the obligation of private respondents husband. default thereof. May 10. 2002 granting private It is a basic precept that the power of the court in the respondents petition for prohibition and declaring execution of judgments extends only to properties the subject property exempt from execution. Branch 27. indeed. The levy scheduled auction sale did not materialize. 146. SO ORDERED in open Court. For respondent judge issued the resolution of March 22. There is no case for them to intervene. possess. 145. to the current market value of their separate properties. by the sheriff on property by virtue of a writ of attachment may be considered as made under the authority of the court On April 25. one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's petitioner filed a motion for intervention.[3]In the case at bar. Art. industrial or civil. Hence. 1998 of the Regional Trial Court. 2002: It was co-owned by herein private respondent who was a stranger in the HLURB case. Articles 145 and 146 of the Family Code governing the regime of complete separation of property provide: Let the decision be executed to satisfy the judgment debt. in case of insufficiency or that the same was filed late. hence the intervention is too late. The property relation of ORDER spouses Villarin was governed by the regime of complete separation of property as decreed in the order [4] dated The MOTION FOR INTERVENTION is denied.[2] administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate. November 10. petitioner filed the instant petition all earnings from his or her profession.assailed resolution of March 22. public debts. due or received respondent judge in: (a) declaring the subject property during his marriage from his or her separate property. Paraaque City. 2002. considering that this case has long been decided. or. the unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in denying petitioners motion for intervention on the ground proportion to their income. 2002. without need of the consent of the other. and (b) Art. the property levied on by the respondent judge denied the motion in her assailed order of sheriff was clearly not exclusively owned by Pablito Villarin. or more than a month after public only vis-a-vis property belonging to the defendant. business or industry for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to public and all fruits. Each spouse shall own. natural.

Nothing in the said provision HLURB case. it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal do so. quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. pertinent thereto. copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and reserved by Section 17. and (b) consideration must be given as to whether the Section 2. This right is specifically thereof. officer or person. whether requirements must concur as the first is not more important exercising judicial. petitioners claim that he had the right to private respondent. and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of Section 3. or with . speedy. or whether the intervenors rights may SEC. corporation. On the other hand. however. private respondent acted well within her rights in filing a petition for prohibition against the deputy The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified sheriff because the latter went beyond his authority in true copy of the judgment.When the proceedings of be protected in a separate proceeding or not. it is 46. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced. or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (2a) essential that the party who is interested in sustaining the act or acts sought to be prohibited or enjoined be impleaded as Consequently. interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise qualified. board. Thus. be solidary. and there is no appeal or any other plain. petitioner claims that he was an indispensable requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in party in the petition for prohibition and should have been petitions for prohibition. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. than the second. a It is clear from the foregoing that the only time the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the separate properties of the spouses can be made to answer for proper court. This has not been shown in the case at desist from further proceedings in the action or matter bar. He was not allowed to intervention.The liability of the spouses to creditors for family expenses grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of shall. Both any tribunal. specified therein. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Rule Petitioner insists that. order or resolution subject attaching the subject property. alleging the facts with certainty and praying liabilities to creditors is when those liabilities are incurred that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to for family expenses.[5] are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction. 2 Petition for prohibition. as the judgment creditor in the intervene is without basis. in a petition for prohibition. . Accordingly. (215a) jurisdiction. to allow allowed to intervene in the said case.

SO ORDERED. the said resolution had already become final and executory.[6] Petitioner filed his motion only on April 25. Records reveal that reason of passion or personal hostility. he must exercise WHEREFORE. Moreover. the mere fact that petitioner failed to move for the reconsideration of the trial courts resolution is sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the instant petition. prescribed therefor. after the lapse of 15 days. the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. The court resolution granting private respondents petition for prohibition and lifting the levy on the subject property was issued on March 22. . the petition is hereby dismissed for said right in accordance with the rules and within the period lack of merit. In the case at bar. 2002. way beyond the period set forth in the rules. 2002. Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct its errors. 2002. even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed had the right to intervene. respondent judge in rendering the assailed resolution and order. if any. The Court fails to there are other pieces of property exclusively owned by the find grave abuse of discretion committed by public defendants in the HLURB case that can be levied upon. grave abuse of discretion is committed when as a judgment creditor was adversely affected by the lifting the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by of the levy on the subject real property. By April 6. it cannot be said that petitioners right Finally. As provided in the Rules of Court. Besides.

GEORGE G. FELIPE . OCRAVIO F. GUERRERO.. HERMINIO ELEVADO. BEATRIZ TANTOCO. ATTY. LAWRENCE CHUA. ALFREDO ITALIA. SONIA SY CHUA. ERIBERTO H. JESUS YUJUICO. TERESITA ALBERTO G. ATTY. MIGUEL DELA PAZ. MODESTA FABRIG and MAXIMINO SALCEDA. MERRERA.. CAROLINA C. JUANITO METILLA. MARTINA S. NONA. 2003] Marquez. OVIDEO MEJICA. ARCH. ANA MARIA JARAMILLO. FRED CHUA. PINLAC. represented by Atty. CORAZON A. represented by Tessie Sebastian. FEDERICO GARCIA. DOMINADOR RIVERA. Consolacion Sales-Demontano. JEAN MAKASIAR-PUNO. RICARDO YAP. vs. MELIA LATOMBO. SERGIO ACABAN. September 10. ATTY. Ramon Gerona. REYES. represented by Jeremias SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION Panlilio. No. RODOLFO F. DECENA.R. MARCELA CELESTINO-GARCIA. SATURNINA SALES. RUBEN GUILLERMO. FELIPE A. FAUSTO YADAO. JOSE ESTEVA. represented by Atty. represented by Filomena Cervantes. MARIANO GUEVARRA. represented by Emmanuel [G. BRIONES. PANGILINAN-RIVERO. JR. JR. NARCISO S. ROGELIO VELASCO. ATTY. ATTY. LEONCIA VELASCO. LINA. FLORES. DANILO C. CIRILO GONZALES. SIMEROS. ESTRELLA BASA. COURT OF APPEALS. RUBIO. ROSAURO/PATRICK MARQUEZ. 91486. petitioners. ILDEFONSO MORALES. VILLY TOBIAS.

SEBASTIAN LOPEZ. YAPCHULAY. DISCORA YATCO. NICOLAS. WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF SANTIAGO. OFELIA B. ANG. FRANCISCA YAPCHULAY. MARQUITA/ REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. YAPCHULAY. LOURDES BLANCO. QUIRINA O. NICOMEDES PENARANDA. intervenor. represented by VICTORINA Y. DELIA DORION. SOLEDAD BAUTISTA DE COLUMNA. represented by Manuel dela Roca. LEDESMA. BEATRIZ SALANDANAN and BONILLA. FELIX B. FE B. GENEROSA MEDINA VDA. PEDRO by Catalina Blanco. JAIME P. ROSENDO registered OWNERS OF VILAR-MALOLES ABUBO. WILMA B. VIRGINIA GOMEZ. represented by Enrico YAPCHULAY. REMEDIOS C. DOVAS. RESOLUTION represented by Josefa Capistrano. TUVERA. YAPCHULAY. BASILISA B. ROSARIO DE MATA. RAYMUNDO M. GERARDO L. JOSE S. represented by Zenaida Valle. respondents. YAPCHULAY. DE NOGUERA. GREGORIO AVENTINO. represented by the Land MANABAT. This resolves the Petition-In-Intervention[1] filed by the RUFINA CRUZ. FIDEL PANGANIBAN. THE PHILIPPINES. MATEO and OFELIA INOVEJAS. RUTH C. NOGUERA. represented by Emmanuel Marquez. Registration Authority and the Motion for [2] CAPAGCUAN and MAYNARD CAPAGCUAN. YAPCHULAY. VEICENTE P. and CONSUELO YATCO. represented by JOSEFA Republic of the Philippines. J. PRECIOSISIMA V. OFELIA IGNACIO. SPOUSES ANITA SALONGA. MAURO U. YAPCHULAY. represented by Wilfredo Orejuros. represented by Heidi ZARATE. intervenor. The facts may be briefly restated as follows: The controversy stemmed from a Petition for Quieting of Title . (VILMA) SUBDIVISION. ALFREDO LIM. FELISA B. represented by ATTY.: ALTAMIRANO and MINERVA FETALVERO. SHIRLEY BUCAG. GIL S. DOMINGO ALTAMIRANO and SPOUSES ROLANDO YNARES-SANTIAGO. Clarification filed by respondents. Aventino. and other MEDRANO.DE CASTRO. BEATRIZ RINGPIS. FIRME. GABRIEL. GEN. represented by Santos Chavez. ANG. ATTY. represented LOURDES ALONTE-VASQUEZ. MARIANO B. JOSEFA SANCHEZ and COSIO and VICTORINA CARINO. Bobis. ROSALINA VILLEGAS. LEONARDO L.

1988. 333 in hereof. covering the area in excess of said actual area. exception of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted respondents. Atty. with and OCT No. WHEREFORE. SO ORDERED. On March 21. TCT No. Felipe Briones and Juanito S. 614 the subsequent TCTs issued and emanating therefrom. 3548 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon herein petitioners the corresponding individual transfer City. 5690. 1 is covered by TCT No. as null and void ab initio. with the certificate of titles upon proper application made thereof. with the Rodolfo T.574 Sq. 614. OCTs and TCTs hereof are concerned. to wit: Alberto G. Lot No. . in so far as those areas covered by the cancelled respondents. Metilla as exception of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted absolute owners in fee simple title of the aforesaid Lots 1. & 3 hereof by virtue of extra-ordinary prescription. 3548 as well as Lot Nos. respondents: 5) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel 1) Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners all TCTs subsequently issued based on OCT No. including respondent owners of Vilmar-Maloles (Vilma) 4) Declaring the area of TCT No. as null and void ab initio. 2 and 3 were originally covered by OCT No. 1985. The and actual area of 4. as well as the dispositive portion of which reads: TCTs subsequently issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. 333. TCT No. 2. 614. with the exception of the lands covered by the respective transfer 6) Declaring the writ of preliminary injunction dated August certificate of title belonging to the non-defaulted 7. 2) Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 1. respectively. Eriberto H. Decena. excess of the actual area of 4. from its record. judgment is hereby with the exception of those belonging to non-defaulted rendered in favor of petitioners and against the defaulted respondents. while OCT No. premises considered. Meters.filed by petitioners over 3 vast parcels of land known as Lot 3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel Nos. against the defendants who were declared in default. 2 respondents. 5690 and TCT No. 2 & 3. the trial the exception of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted court rendered a Partial Decision [3] in favor of petitioners and respondents. 333 in excess of its true Subdivision whose properties were within Lot No. Pinlac. Meters. as permanent. and the subsequent TCTs issued therefrom. 7) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to issue 5690 and TCT No. Reyes.574 Sq.

3. 2002. the petition and affirming the Judgment of the Court of and Appeals. The dispositive portion thereof reads: (2) affirming the Decision of the Court of WHEREFORE. should not have judgment be rendered declaring: been annulled by the Court of Appeals because the petition for annulment of judgment filed by the respondents 1) That OCT No. they January 19. SP No. The appellate court trial courts Partial Decision pertaining to Lot No. inter alia. the Court of Appeals be reconsidered insofar as Lot No. Petitioners motion for PARTIALLY GRANTED and our Decision promulgated on reconsideration of the said decision was denied. represented by the Land Registration Authority (LRA). . 1989. They prayed that the January 19. 333 is a valid and existing title in concerned only Lot No. 1989. SO ORDERED. the decision of Appeals in CA-G. which was granted in a reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dipositive portion of the decision[4] dated November 15. (1) reinstating paragraph (4) and (5) of the On January 19. thus ruled that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondents because of defective service of WHEREFORE. thru Petitioners filed a Motion for the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). hence. the defaulted title owners of Vilma On November 20. 17596 in the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 3. the Republic of the Philippines. 2001. the Motion for Reconsideration is summons by publication. 17596 is all other respects. 2001. that the disposition intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention praying that of the trial court with respect to Lot No. we rendered a Decision denying Partial Decision of the court a quo. in view of all the foregoing. 3 is concerned.R.R. 2. On May 17. 2001 is MODIFIED as follows: filed this petition for certiorari. the Court issued a Resolution filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul the Partial partially granting petitioners motion for reconsideration by Decision of the trial court. No. filed a motion for Reconsideration[6] contending. line with the decisions this Honorable Court 2001 decision of the Court which affirmed the decision of had already rendered.[7] SO ORDERED.[5] On July 22. AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

[11] intervention was original area of 52. [9] Indeed. granted even after the decision became final and executory.737 square meters. the Court has allowed intervention the point that petitioners are indeed indispensable parties notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial with such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that court. But needless to say. 333 same. 5) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. when and completely available for justice. 2) That OCT No. 333 was never expanded from its In Mago v. The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full 4) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the No. this discretion should be exercised are null and void. submitted for decision in the Supreme Court. in total disregard of their right to be heard. 333. It is aimed to facilitate a on the face of the resolution of the Community Relations and comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding Information Office (CRIO) sought to be enjoined. like all other rules of prohibition with injunction without petitioners being procedure is intended to make the powers of the Court fully impleaded. Q-35672 is null and void. for relief from judgment.[10] . thus 3) That the land occupied by petitioners is not forest land and is covered by OCT No. [8] subject property cannot be disputed. Court of Appeals. intervention was allowed even when the a final adjudication cannot be made in their absence without petition for review of the assailed judgment was already affecting. Q-35673 with respect to OCT No. such interest. We need not belabor in exceptional cases. nay injuring.949. The denial of their motion to intervene arising from the strict application of the rule was The Republic likewise prays for such other relief as may be an injustice to petitioners whose substantial interest in the just and equitable under the circumstances. In one case. petitioners technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof. and judiciously and only after consideration of all the circumstances obtaining in the case. no notice of But it is apparent that the courts a quo only considered the the hearings/proceedings having been sent to technicalities of the rules on intervention and of the petition the Republic and other interested parties. were the ones directly to be affected. It must be stressed that the trial court granted private respondent's petition for The rule on intervention.

In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals where the motions much less hesitation or circumvention, on the part of
for intervention were filed when the case had already subordinate and inferior courts to abide and conform to the
reached this Court, it was declared: rule enunciated by the Supreme Court.[12]

It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention The Solicitor General summarized the interest of the
filed by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where Republic in Lot No. 3 (originally covered by OCT No. 333),
trial had already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x as follows:
the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is On March 5, 1979, then President Marcos issued
already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are Proclamation No. 1826 reserving for national government
obviously and manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed center site a parcel of land situated in the Constitution Hill,
under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court [now Quezon City, Metro Manila, containing an area of four
Rule 19, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure]. million for hundred forty thousand FOUR HUNDRED
SIXTY-SIX SQUARE METERS. In a certification [Annex
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules F, Rollo, p. 1415] issued by the Land Registration Authority,
therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole it attested to the fact that the National Government Center
purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the described in Proclamation No. 1826 is within the area
Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose covered by GLRO Record No. 1037 (OCT-333) and GLRO
of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to Record No. 5975 as plotted in our Municipal Index Sheet
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of (MIS) Nos. 2574-C, 5707-B, 5708-A, 5708-B and 3339-D.
contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but
to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does In a letter [Annex B-2, Rollo, p. 1330], the Housing and
not constitute the thing itself which courts are always Urban Development Coordinating Council certified that
striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best within the Project site/jurisdiction of the National
adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to Government Center Housing Project (NGCHP) and the
an end. NGC-EASTSIDE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, the
following government buildings, offices and complexes are
In Tahanan Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, this situated:
Court allowed intervention almost at the end of the
proceedings. Accordingly, there should be no quibbling, 1) House of Representatives;

2) Civil Service Commission (CSC); Clearly, the intervention of the Republic is necessary to
protect public interest as well as government properties
3) Department of Social Works and Development located and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The
(DSWD); Constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law can
4) Sandiganbayan; certainly be invoked by the Republic which is an
indispensable party to the case at bar. As correctly pointed
5) Commission on Audit (COA); out by the Solicitor General, while the provision is intended
as a protection of individuals against arbitrary action of the
6) Department of Public Works and Highways State, it may also be invoked by the Republic to protect its
(DPWH) Depot; properties.[14]

7) Polytechnic University of the Philippines After a thorough re-examination of the case, we find
(PUP) Commonwealth Campus; that our November 20, 2001 Resolution reinstating
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the trial courts Partial Decision
8) TESDA Skills Training Center; pertaining to Lot No. 3, overlooked certain aspects which, if
not corrected, will cause extreme and irreparable confusion
9) Several Public Elementary and High Schools, and prejudice. The reinstated portions of the decision states:
Health Centers and Barangay Halls.
4) Declaring the area of [OCT] No. 333 in excess of its true
It also certified that the NGCHP under its Peoples Housing and actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, as well as the TCTs
Alternative for Social Empowerment land Acquisition subsequently issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon
Development Program (PHASE-LADP), has already City, covering the area in excess of said actual area, with the
awarded 3,975 TCTs to its beneficiaries. This program exception of those belonging to non-defaulted respondents,
comprises the biggest chunk of the NGCHP with about 117 as null and void ab initio;
hectares intended for disposition to qualified
beneficiaries. Further, in line with the National Governments 5) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
thrust of fast-tracking the implementation of the NGCHP, the all TCTs subsequently issued based on OCT No. 333 in
remaining 20,696 TCTs are about to be awarded to qualified excess of the actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, with the
beneficiaries.[13]

exception of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted Regarding the issue of nullity of OCT No. 333,
respondents;[15]
We find that the then Land Registration Court had the power,
We note that paragraph 4 does not at all specify which authority and jurisdiction to issue it. It was issued after trial,
portions are in excess of the 4,574 square meter area of OCT or presumptively in a fair and square trial with all the
No. 333 and which areas belong to the defaulted and non- requisites of the law (The Phil. British Co., Inc. vs. de los
defaulted respondents. Neither did the body of the trial Angeles, 63 SCRA 52).
courts decision state the metes and bounds that would serve
as basis in implementing the dispositive portion The Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known in local history
thereof. Verily, this flaw goes into the very identity of the as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in its sections 13 to 18,
disputed land. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are therefore null and void mentions three (3) classes of land, to wit, public land or
for having been rendered in violation of the constitutional public domain, mineral lands, and timber land. (Ramos vs.
mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175). Early decisions as regards
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts classification of public lands, such as Mapa vs. Insular
and the law on which it is based. [16] Hence, the November 20, Government, 10 Phil 175, Ramos vs. Director of
2001 Resolution reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the trial Lands, supra, and Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine
courts Partial Decision should be modified. Islands, 40 Phil. 10, which were decided under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926
The OSGs prayer that OCT No. 333 be held as a valid enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926,
and existing title is likewise meritorious. In Republic v. or prior to the passage of Act No. 2874, had impliedly ruled
Tofemi Realty Corporation (Tofemi),[17] an action for that there was no legal provision vesting in the chief
Cancellation of Titles & Reversion of TCT No. 55747 and Executive or President of the Philippines the power to
TCT No. 55748, the validity of OCT No. 333 from which classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and
said transfer certificates of title originated, has already been agricultural; so that the courts then were free to make
settled. In dismissing the petition of the Republic, it was held corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
therein that OCT No. 333 is a valid title duly issued by the invested with implicit power in so doing, depending upon
Land Registration Court. The Republic did not appeal the preponderance of the evidence. In Mapa vs. Insular
therefrom and the decision became final and Government, supra, Feb. 10, 1908, the Court of Land
executory. Pertinent portion of which states Registration granted the application for registration after

R. however. The Supreme Court affirmed the on October 21. To declare the land now as forest land and must no longer be relitigated in the present case. to the area covered by OCT No. No. the presumption should be. Ankron vs. therefore. 333. principle of law applicable to a certain state of facts. Stand by the a title was decreed in favor of the applicant because the Land decisions and disturb not what is settled. in held therein that the area of OCT No. which the facts sued upon are substantially the same. supra). We cannot adopt the Philippine Islands to have a large public domain come under findings as to the area of OCT No.Such is the natural attitude of the deprivation of property of adjacent land owners without due sagacious citizen. covering Lots Nos. OCT No. [19] It is the record does not reveal that the Government has always beyond cavil. 65. 1924. While it was x x x Upon the other hand. The Psu-32606 approved by the Court of First Instance of Rizal Attorney General appealed. Decision of the court a quo.O. 1037. Government of the adhere to such principle and apply it to all future cases in Philippine Islands.949. 333 is 52. the principle of stare decisis is not applicable because Ramos vs. It is a salutary and Registration Court found that the land applied for is necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a agricultural susceptible of private appropriation (Ramos vs. would deprive defendants of their registered With respect. TCTs Nos. said issue must be laid to rest issuance of OCT 333. the application for registration was granted and consequently the issuance of Stare decisis et non quieta movere. In G. supra. process of law. We repeat by way of emphasis. supra: the decision of the Court of Appeals did not indicate the boundaries of the lot covered by OCT No. 333 was not specified. One very good reason is that it is good for the OCT No. 1937 only. 333 being legal and valid.L. also. These TCTs were in turn derived properties are located in Lot No.finding that it was neither timber nor mineral and came 76 and 81 which originally formed parts of Parcel C of Plan within the definition of Agricultural land under Act 926. that land is agricultural in square meters. 1 did not question the from TCTs Nos. Director of lands. The defaulted defendants whose are also legal and valid. It was pronounced in 333. 45832 and 45833. that since the court had already ruled considered the lot in question as forest reserve prior to the on the validity OCT No. on the authority of LC Map 639 of Rizal approved on March 11.735 lieu of contrary evidence. So. property without due process of law. the metes and bounds of the land covered by nature. ergo. 333 for it might cause private ownership. 333. (Emphasis supplied)[18] appealed judgment. it must Director of Lands. decision of the trial court. Neither was it shown in the . the Court cannot nullify the entire Partial 55747 and 55748. being derived from the said mother title.

the decision in CA-G. 2 was affirmed by this Court in G. Under the 1997 Rules on Civil case. In their Motion for Clarification and Manifestation. 1989 decision of the same court 1) Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners in CA-G. who void.Petition-In-Intervention that the OSG is an indispensable null and void. 1. 90245 on April 8. SP No. 1. Felipe Briones and Juanito S. re-filed in the proper court. 2 and 3. it did not contradict the Court of Appeals Procedure. 2 originally covered by declared petitioners. 3. who are individual members of the WW OCT No. also void. 2 where respondents properties are decision dated November 15.R. the declaration of nullity of paragraphs 4 and were declared the owners of Lot Nos. 2. Lot No. 614.R. which merely amended the first hereof. Atty. located.R.R. a decision of November 15. 2 and 3 in the 5 of the dispositive portion of the decision a quo concerning Partial Decision. SP No. judgment or final order or resolution and render the same . Metilla as Case No. 17596 judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned which set aside the Partial Decision of the trial court. 17221. to wit: Alberto G. SP No. specifically Rule 47. Decena. [20] We find no conflict between the two decisions of the Court of Appeals. No. including that in paragraph 1 declaring petitioners as decision in CA-G. the World War II Veterans Legionaries respondents seek the clarification of paragraph 1 of the trial of the Philippines (WW II) filed a Petition-in-Intervention courts Partial Decision declaring petitioners as owners of. The latter decision of the appellate court absolute owners in fee simple title of the aforesaid Lots 1. However. as absolute owners of Lot Nos. Reyes. 3. SP No. 17221 had nothing to do with the merits of the affects Lot No. It alleges that the Court of Appeals among others. without prejudice to the original action being party to Lot No. Aside from this. Eriberto H. the No.R. is declared prayer that it be substituted for its individual members. provides: 17596. renders the disposition in paragraph 1 insofar as it SP No. As such. It is true that both decisions affected the In view of the annulment of the trial courts Partial portion of the Partial Decision of the trial court which Decision with respect to Lot No. 1989 in CA-G. Pinlac. 1. In the meantime. with prior leave of court. with the 1990. 2. all portions of the decision pertaining to Lot II. Q-35672. ran counter to the June 22. Section 7 thereof. exception of the lands covered by the respective transfer certificate of title belonging to non-defaulted respondents. Lot No. which is the subject of the instant petition for review. 17221 merely granted WW IIs absolute owners in fee simple of Lot No. 1989 in CA-G. Likewise. Paragraph 1.R. paragraph of the Partial Decision of the trial court in Civil Rodolfo F. & 3 hereof by virtue of extraordinary prescription.

Branch 83. 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. is annulled The Petition-in-Intervention filed by the World War insofar as it concerns Lot No. dated March 21. 2. originally covered by OCT Veterans Legionaries of the Philippines is DENIED for lack No. 17596 is affirmed in all other SO ORDERED. of merit. WHEREFORE. . No.R. 1988 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. 614 and Lot No. in view of all the foregoing. 2 and 3. 3 originally covered by OCT No. Q-35762. 2001 is MODIFIED as follows: The Decision Nos. The Resolution promulgated on declares petitioners as absolute owners in fee simple of Lot November 20. The November 15. in Civil Case No. the As clarified above. respects. 333. paragraph 1 of the dispositive Petition-In-Intervention of the Republic of the Philippines is portion of the decision of the court a quo is void insofar as it PARTIALLY GRANTED.