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27. G.R. No.

L-59791 February 13, 1992

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE GREGORIO G. PINEDA, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, Metro Manila, TEOFILO ARAYON, SR.,
GIL DE GUZMAN, LUCITO SANTIAGO and TERESA BAUTISTA, respondents.

Quiason, Makalintal & Barot for petitioner.

Gil P. De Guzman Law Offices for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari on pure question of law seeking the
nullification of the orders issued by the respondent Judge Gregorio G. Pineda, in
his capacity as the presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch 21, Pasig, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 20269,
entitled "Manila Electric Company v. Teofilo Arayon, et al." The aforesaid orders
are as follows: (1) the order dated December 4, 1981 granting the motion for
payment of private respondents; (2) the order dated December 21, 1981 granting
the private respondents' omnibus motion; and (3) the order dated February 9,
1982 adjudging in favor of private respondents the fair market value of their
property at forty pesos (P40.00) per square meter for a total of P369,720.00 and
denying the motions for contempt for being moot and academic and the motion
for reconsideration of the orders dated December 4, 1981 and December 21,
1981 for lack of merit.

The antecedent facts giving rise to the controversy at bar are as follows:

Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of Philippines. Respondent Honorable
Judge Gregorio G. Pineda is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding
judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch
XXI, Pasig, Metro Manila. While private respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de
Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa Bautista are owners in fee simple of the
expropriated property situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal.

On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner
MERALCO against forty-two (42) defendants with the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila.

The complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV
Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner
needs portions of the land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate
area of 237,321 square meters. Despite petitioner's offers to pay compensation
and attempts to negotiate with the respondents', the parties failed to reach an
agreement.

Private respondents question in their motion to dismiss dated December 27,
1974 the petitioner's legal existence and the area sought to be expropriated as
too excessive.

On January 7, 1975, respondents Gil de Guzman and Teresa Bautista filed a
motion for contempt of court alleging, among other things that petitioner's
corporate existence had expired in 1969 and therefore it no longer exists under
Philippine Laws.

But despite the opposition of the private respondents, the court issued an Order
dated January 13, 1975 authorizing the petitioner to take or enter upon the
possession of the property sought to be expropriated.

On July 13, 1976, private respondents filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit
claiming that they are entitled to be paid at forty pesos (P40.00) per square meter
or an approximate sum of P272,000.00 and prayed that they be allowed to
withdraw the sum of P71,771.50 from petitioner's deposit-account with the
Philippine National Bank, Pasig Branch. However, respondents motion was
denied in an order dated September 3, 1976.

In the intervening period, Branch XXII became vacant when the presiding Judge
Nelly Valdellon-Solis retired, so respondent Judge Pineda acted on the motions
filed with Branch XXII.

Pursuant to a government policy, the petitioners on October 30, 1979 sold to the
National Power Corporation (Napocor) the power plants and transmission lines,
including the transmission lines traversing private respondents' property.

On February 11, 1980, respondent court issued an Order appointing the
members of the Board of Commissioners to make an appraisal of the properties.

On June 5, 1980, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that it has lost all its interests over the transmission lines and properties under
expropriation because of their sale to the Napocor. In view of this motion, the
work of the Commissioners was suspended.

On June 9, 1981, private respondents filed another motion for payment. But
despite the opposition of the petitioner, the respondent court issued the first of
the questioned Orders dated December 4, 1981 granting the motion for payment
of private respondents, to wit:

As prayed for by defendants Teofilo Arayon, Lucito Santiago, Teresa
Bautista and Gil de Guzman, thru counsel Gil de Guzman, in their
Motion for Payment, for reasons therein stated, this Court hereby
orders the plaintiff to pay the movants the amount of P20,400.00 for
the expropriated area of 6,800 square meters, at P3.00 per square
meter without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved
in the final adjudication of this case.

The aforesaid sum of P20,400.00 having been deposited by plaintiff
in the Philippine National Bank (Pasig Branch) under Savings
Account No. 9204, let the Deputy Sheriff of this Branch Mr. Sofronio
Villarin withdraw said amount in the names of Teofilo Arayon, Lucito
Santiago, Teresa Bautista and Gil de Guzman, the said amount to be
delivered to the defendant's counsel Atty. Gil de Guzman who shall
sign for the receipt thereof.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 108)

On December 15, 1981, private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying
that they be allowed to withdraw an additional sum of P90,125.50 from
petitioner's deposit-account with the Philippine National Bank.

By order dated December 21, 1981, the respondent court granted the Omnibus
Motion hereunder quoted as follows:

Acting on the Omnibus Motion dated December 15, 1981 filed by
Atty. Gil de Guzman, counsel for Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Lucito Santiago,
Teresita Bautista and for himself, and it appearing that there is
deposited in the bank in trust for them the amount of P90,125.50 to
guarantee just compensation of P272,000.00, thereby leaving a
balance of P161,475.00 still payable to them, the same is hereby
GRANTED.

Mr. Nazario Nuevo and Marianita Burog, respectively the Manager
and Cashier, Philippine National Bank, Pasig Branch, Pasig, Metro
Manila are hereby ordered to allow Sheriff Sofronio Villarin to
withdraw and collect from the bank the amount of P90,125.50 under
Savings Account No. 9204 and to deliver the same to Atty. Gil de
Guzman upon proper receipt, pending final determination of just
compensation.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 120)

Private respondents filed another motion dated January 8, 1982 praying that
petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of P169, 200.00.

On January 12, 1982 petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Orders
dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 and to declare private
respondents in contempt of court for forging or causing to be forged the receiving
stamp of petitioner's counsel and falsifying or causing to be falsified the signature
of its receiving clerk in their Omnibus Motion.

In response to private respondents' motion for payment dated January 8, 1982,
petitioner filed an opposition alleging that private respondents are not entitled to
payment of just compensation at this stage of the proceeding because there is
still no appraisal and valuation of the property.

On February 9, 1982 the respondent court denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and motion for contempt, the dispositive portion of which is
hereunder quoted as follows:

Viewed in the light of the foregoing, this Court hereby adjudges in
favor of defendants Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Lucito Santiago, Teresita
Bautista and Atty. Gil de Guzman the fair market value of their

for lack of merit. or the judge himself would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his own as to the value of the land in question. 1981 is also DENIED. A motion to lift the restraining order was filed by the respondents. computed at P200. the motion for reconsideration of the orders of December 4. Subsequently. 1975 until fully paid plus consequential damages in terms of attorney's fees in the sum of P10.55 per square meter and to render an accounting." (Rollo. minus the amount of P102. the Court starts to appoint commissioners to determine just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a credible real estate broker.000. 211-212) Furthermore. the respondent court stressed in said order that "at this stage. thus requiring petitioner to deposit P52.600. this amount to bear legal interest from February 24. 1982. he must base it upon competent evidence.720.00. . all these sums to be paid by MERALCO to said defendants with costs of suit. this petition. 1982 granting the private respondents' motion for execution pending appeal. 1981 and December 21. (Rollo.00 representing the consideration paid by Napocor for the property it bought from petitioner which includes the subject matter of this case. the respondent court issued an Order dated March 22. this Court reiterated its stand and noted that the restraining order is still effective. This Court issued a temporary restraining order addressed to respondent judge. For being moot and academic. Despite a series of oppositions and motions to lift the said order. Nevertheless. SO ORDERED.00 already withdrawn by defendants. p. if he formulates such an opinion. p. On March 26. 211) Hence.00 per square meter for a total of P369.00.800. petitioner filed a petition for preliminary injunction with this Court seeking to enjoin respondent judge and all persons acting under him from enforcing the Order dated March 22. the motions for contempt are DENIED. 1982. property taken by MERALCO at P40.

Furthermore. The applicable laws in the case at bar are Sections 5 and 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report is to be filed with the court. Upon the entry of the order of condemnation. xxx xxx xxx . the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. They agreed with respondent court's ruling dispensing the need for the appointment of a Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation. Respondent judge should have ordered that Napocor be impleaded in substitution of petitioner or could have at least impleaded both the Napocor and the petitioner as party plaintiffs. The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation. On the other hand. It stressed that respondent court ignored the procedure laid down by the law in determining just compensation because it formulated an opinion of its own as to the value of the land in question without allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold hearings for the reception of evidence. The said sections particularly deal with the ascertainment of compensation and the court's action upon commissioners' report. petitioner argues that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in granting the motion for execution pending appeal and consequently denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss. to wit: Sec.The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation to private respondents without formal presentation of evidence by the parties on the reasonable value of the property constitutes a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process. private respondents controvert the position of the petitioner and contend that the petitioner was not deprived of due process. thus concluding that the respondent court did not err in determining just compensation. 5.

and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation. to wit: There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation." The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. So. for cause shown. in the proceedings before the Trial Court. would an order of condemnation be a final one. An order of dismissal. and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken. Hon. accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith.R. after hearing. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section. since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. It ends with an order. for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. Sec. 8. or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners. 180 SCRA 576. Jose Mar Garcia (G. the court may. if this be ordained. 1989. December 22. upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint". The order . "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard. 583-584) the procedure for eminent domain. "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned. No. or. for thereafter. of course. or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part. 69260. as the Rules expressly state. We already emphasized in the case of Municipality of Biñan v. too. it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. if not of dismissal of the action. would be a final one. or even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith.

. The aforesaid joint venture agreement relied upon by the . Obviously. Thus. petitioner has not been given the opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have been presented by private respondents. in such instances. the latter may only do so for valid reasons. This agreement was merely attached to the motion to withdraw from petitioner's deposit. Obviously. too. and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all.e. 32 Phil. Moreover. without the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners. in the case at bar. where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded. Contrary to the submission of private respondents. Private respondents as landowners have not proved by competent evidence the value of their respective properties at a proper hearing. 1972.A Homes and private respondents on June 1. Respondent judge. Velasquez. i. and findings of. In an expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation. the commissioners would be final. one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise.50 per hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by A. a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation.00 per square meter on a property declared for real estate tax purposes at P2. 286). Likewise. fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before. the appointment of at least three (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive (Manila Railroad Company v. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit. too. arrived at the valuation of P40. Respondent judge arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own. such a dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom. the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence.B.

We find the contention of the petitioner tenable. is incompetent to determine just compensation. specifically Meralco's deed of sale dated October 30. Records. pp. 1982 issued by the respondent judge insofar as it finally determined the amount of just compensation is nullified. it committed no error. the property owners are subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of a larger sum. Thus. Meralco had already ceded and in fact lost all its rights and interests over the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of Napocor. 1979. in favor of Napocor show that the latter agreed to purchase the parcels of land already acquired by Meralco. the same contract reveals that the Napocor was previously advised and actually has knowledge of the pending litigation and proceedings against Meralco (see Rollo. 1981 the motions of private respondents for withdrawal of certain sums from the deposit of petitioner. interests and easements over those parcels of land which are the subject of the expropriation proceedings under Civil Case No. the rights. This case is hereby ordered remanded to the lower . as well as those parcels of land occupied by Meralco by virtue of grant of easements of right-of-way (see Rollo. 341-342). It is therefore proper for the lower court to either implead the Napocor in substitution of the petitioner or at the very least implead the former as party plaintiff. pp.respondent judge. (Court of First Instance of Rizal. 20269. this Court is convinced that the respondent judge's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court. they are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by the court. in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties. Prior to the determination of just compensation. when the respondent court granted in the Orders dated December 4. In addition. Thus. the petition is GRANTED and the order dated February 9. without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved in the final adjudication of the case. Hence. 342-343). Branch XXII). All premises considered. the property owners may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit made by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. 1981 and December 21. Upon an award of a smaller amount by the court. ACCORDINGLY.

In our times. the National Power Corporation is impleaded as party plaintiff therein. Tagbilaran City. in his capacity as Presiding Judge. 6085. he can be that violent to give up his life for it."1 The Facts This is an appeal via a petition2 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals dated July 29. justice is the supreme need of man. 63691 entitled "Land Bank of the Philippines v. 2002 in CA-G. yet they succumbed to downfall when their leaders had gone so immorally low that they could not anymore render justice to their people. Man can endure without food for days. Regional Trial Court. SPOUSES PLACIDO ORILLA and CLARA DY ORILLA.: "Without doubt. SP No. vs. Branch 3. . respondents. G. sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC) in Civil Case No.court for trial with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners. Tagbilaran City. but if he is deprived even with the least injustice. Amila. J. DECISION NACHURA. 28. 157206 June 27. Hon. petitioner. we are witnesses to radical changes in our society rooted on alleged injustice. The only hope is in the courts as the last bulwark of democracy being the administrator of justice and the legitimate recourse of their grievances. SO ORDERED. History will tell us that many great nations had emerged in the past. Spouses Placido Orilla and Clara Dy Orilla. 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Further." Said Decision affirmed the Order4 dated December 21. 2008 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES. No.R.R. Venancio J. Branch 3.

2000. et al. 18401. judgment is hereby rendered fixing the just compensation of the land of petitioner subject matter of the instant action at P7. the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (DAR-PARO) of Bohol sent respondents a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition dated November 15. the SAC rendered a Decision5 dated November 20. After trial on the merits. on December 15. the Provincial Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (Provincial DARAB) conducted a summary hearing on the amount of just compensation. 11-12706. Fajardo of which petitioner shall submit a bill of costs therefor for the approval of the Court. 1996 informing them of the compulsory acquisition of 21.00 per square meter. 6085 and was raffled to Branch 3. respondents are hereby ordered to jointly and solidarily indemnify the petitioners their expenses for attorney’s fee and contract fee in the conduct of the appraisal of the land by a duly licensed real estate appraiser Angelo G. the Provincial DARAB affirmed the valuation made by the petitioner.7 Subsequently. Thereafter. Court of Appeals. Respondents rejected the said valuation.6 On December 11. as only prayed for. respondents filed an action for the determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court (as a Special Agrarian Court [SAC]) of Tagbilaran City.1289 hectares of their landholdings pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act [RA] 6657) for P371. which shall earn legal interest from the filing of the complaint until the same shall have been fully paid. 2000. situated in Bohol. In the latter part of November 1996. 2000. The case was docketed as Civil Case No."9 .99 as compensation based on the valuation made by the Land Bank of the Philippines (petitioner).154. Furthermore. Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the consolidated cases of "Landbank of the Philippines v.3416 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. Unsatisfied. petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. the dispositive portion of which reads – WHEREFORE. Consequently. respondents filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal8 pursuant to Section 2.Spouses Placido and Clara Orilla (respondents) were the owners of Lot No. containing an area of 23. 1. SO ORDERED.

The DAR alleged in its Notice that it received a copy of the SAC Decision only on December 6. et al. 1995.R. 2000. pursuant to the Supreme Court decisions in "Landbank of the Philippines vs.. et al. which was likewise denied in an Order17 dated December 29. is therefore. on December 18. 2001. 118745. Court of Appeals. On March 13. 1995 and "Department of Agrarian Reform vs. in cash or in any governmental financial instrument the total amount due the petitioner- spouses as may be computed within the parameters of Sec. the herein motion is granted and the petitioners are hereby ordered to post bond equivalent to one-half of the amount due them by virtue of the decision in this case." G.00 (equivalent to P7.023. 2000. Respondents and the presiding judge of the SAC. 2000.and "Department of Agrarian Reform v. respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration14 of the amount of the bond to be posted. The respondent Land Bank of the Philippines. filed their respective comments19 on the petition. Court of Appeals. which was later denied in an Order15 dated January 11.1289 hectares).00 per square meter for 21. 2000. the petitioners may withdraw the same for their use and benefit consequent to their right of ownership thereof. ordered to immediately deposit with any accessible bank."10 Respondents claimed that the total amount of P1. promulgated on October 6. the DAR filed its own Notice of Appeal11 from the SAC Decision dated November 20. adjudged by the SAC as just compensation. 2000. On December 21. the SAC issued an Order12 granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. et al. petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action18 for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. promulgated on October 6. . Furthermore. 2001. No. It questioned the propriety of the SAC Order granting the execution pending appeal. 2000. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 on December 27. the decretal portion of which reads – WHEREFORE. No. as may be designated by respondent DAR. 118712.R. 2000.13 On December 25.479. as nominal party." G. 18(1) of RA 6657. Meanwhile. could then be withdrawn under the authority of the aforementioned case. Court of Appeals.

and equity. 2003." G. RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF THE COMPENSATION FIXED BY THE SAC BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF PROMPT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION. ET AL. the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that the assailed SAC Order dated December 21. this appeal. 1995 AND JULY 5. 1996. 118712. Hence. fairness. COURT OF APPEALS.. according to our ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. but the same was denied in a Resolution dated February 5. EVEN THOUGH THE PRINCIPLE OF PROMPT PAYMENT IS SATISFIED BY THE PAYMENT AND IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE PROVISIONAL COMPENSATION UNDER SECTION 16(E) OF RA 6657. 2002. PEDRO L. petitioner asserts that. Court of Appeals. For its first ground. NO.In its Decision dated July 29. AND NOT BY EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF THE COMPENSATION FIXED BY THE SAC. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF "LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V.R. Petitioner anchors its petition on the following grounds: I. as respondents had been deprived of the use and possession of their property pursuant to RA 6657 and are entitled to be immediately compensated with the amount as determined by the SAC under the principle of "prompt payment" of just compensation. 2000 granting execution pending appeal was consistent with justice. UPON SUBMISSION OF THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS. OCTOBER 6. YAP. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE SAC ORDER FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL WHICH WAS ISSUED WITHOUT ANY GOOD REASON RECOGNIZED UNDER EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND PROPER HEARING AND RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 2(A).20 the principle of "prompt payment" of just compensation is already satisfied by the concurrence of two (2) conditions: (a) .

Anent the second ground. fairness. (2) that suspending the payment of compensation will prolong the agony that respondents have been suffering by reason of the deprivation of their property. namely: "(1) that execution pending appeal would be in consonance with justice. at the time of the filing of such motion.On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal. Execution of a judgment pending appeal is governed by Section 2(a) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. As the issues raised are interrelated. in its discretion. as the case may be. – (a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. and (3) that it would be good and helpful to the economy" are not valid reasons to justify the execution pending appeal. as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.the deposits made by petitioner in any accessible bank. 2. This appeal should be denied. not merely earmarked or reserved in trust. they shall be discussed jointly. to wit: SEC. order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal. and (b) the deposits must be immediately released to the landowner upon compliance with the legal requirements under Section 1621 of RA 6657. -. especially because the execution was granted without a hearing. equivalent to the DAR/LBP valuation of the expropriated property as provisional compensation. petitioner argues that the good reasons cited by the SAC. must be in cash and bonds as expressly provided for by Section 16(e) of RA 6657. . and equity considering that the land had long been taken by the DAR. even pending the final judicial determination of just compensation. xxxx Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. Discretionary execution. said court may.

by rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR.00 . do good reasons exist to justify the grant by the SAC of the motion for execution pending appeal? The answer is a resounding YES. we have held that "good reasons" consist of compelling or superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages suffered should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment or final order.22 In this case.1289 hectares of their landholdings. envisioning freedom from the bondage to the land they actually till.As provided above. Unless they are divulged. As an exercise of police power. respondents brought the matter to the SAC for the determination of just compensation. execution pending appeal should not be granted routinely but only in extraordinary circumstances.99 for the compulsory acquisition of 21.154. Consequently. As expected. petitioner valued the property of respondents at P371. subject to the limitation that he can only be entitled to "just compensation. it must be strictly construed. As an exception to the rule that only a final judgment may be executed. it would be difficult to determine whether judicial discretion has been properly exercised. This amount respondents rejected. The Rules of Court does not enumerate the circumstances which would justify the execution of the judgment or decision pending appeal. The existence of good reasons is what confers discretionary power on a court to issue a writ of execution pending appeal. However. the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just compensation. After presentation of evidence from both parties. the SAC found the valuation of the LBP and the DAR too low and pegged the "just compensation" due the respondents at P7. not the government." Clearly therefore. the landowner will exercise this right to the hilt. Thus. in a situation where the odds are practically against him.23 being a means to obtain social justice by distributing land to the farmers. These reasons must be stated in the order granting the same. However.24 In this case. it puts the landowner. the same amount was affirmed by the DAR after the conduct of summary proceedings. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the property taken by the government. He cannot resist it. execution of the judgment or final order pending appeal is discretionary. The expropriation of private property under RA 6657 is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

the nearest point of the land is about 1. 6. 7. 11.00 for the 21. 9. . the SAC noted the following circumstances: 1. which portion is rain-fed and produces 60-80 cavans of rice per hectare with two (2) harvest seasons a year. 5. across the National Highway. or a total of P1. the area is traversed with electricity providing electric power to some occupants. five (5) hectares is cogonal but now most area is planted with cassava.3416 hectares. the total area of the land based on the sketch-map presented by the MARO is 23. fruit trees like mangoes and jackfruits were also planted on the property. the land is adjoining the National Highway of Ubay-Trinidad.per square meter.5 kilometers from Poblacion Ubay. 4. about a kilometer away. In determining such value. the Ubay Airport is about two (2) kilometers from the landholding. north of the landholding. sandy loam. 2. without stones. 11. about 200 meters away from the landholding. is an irrigation canal of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA).1289 hectares. rocks or [pebbles].4928 hectares of the land is devoted to planting rice. four (4) hectares is planted with 210 fruit-bearing coconut trees. which private respondents used to receive a share of P1. 8. 10. the land is generally plain.023. 3.479.500. Bohol.00 per harvest four (4) times a year. is the seashore. 12.

the Philippine Carabao Center at the Ubay Stock Farm. petitioner’s contention that the main basis for the valuation it made was the very low price that the petitioners had paid for the land when they acquired it along with other parcels from the Development Bank of the Philippines in a foreclosure sale. 13.000. The SAC. 14. 17. 16. the current value. and the assessment by the government functionary concerned. and 18. deemed it proper to grant their motion for .25 In light of these circumstances. the Ilaya Reservior Irrigation Project. the sworn valuation of the owner. and several other public and private business facilities. the SAC found that the valuation made by petitioner. testimony of the representative from petitioner that the factors considered in the appraisal of land are the cost of acquisition of the land.2416 hectares but representing only 48% of the actual value of the property.00 for the entire 23. its actual use and income. Fajardo appraised the land at P80.00 for all other portions thereof. the 250-hectare Central Visayas Coconut Seeds Production Center. 45-002-00084 is P621. the market value of the land per Tax Declaration No. 15. the Leyte-Bohol Interconnection Project Phase I.310. was unjustly way below the fair valuation of the landholding at the time of its taking by the DAR. the fact that Ubay town is a fast-growing municipality being a consistent recipient of government projects and facilities in view of its natural resources and favorable geographical location—Bohol Circumferential Road Improvement Project Phase I. the Metro San Pascual Rural and Waterworks System. that the real estate appraiser Angelo Z.000. and affirmed by the DAR. its nature.00 per hectare for the Riceland and P30. mindful also of the advanced age of respondents at the time of the presentation of evidence for the determination of just compensation. the testimony of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer for DAR that it was contemplated that the property be disposed to farmer-beneficiaries at a relatively higher price.

it does not end there. it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. while prompt payment of just compensation requires the immediate deposit and release to the landowner of the provisional compensation as determined by the DAR. "prompt payment" of just compensation is not satisfied by the mere deposit with any accessible bank of the provisional compensation determined by it or by the DAR. The word "just" is used to modify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real. and ample. compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.26 Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. While this decision does not finally resolve the propriety of the determination of just compensation by the SAC in view of the separate appeal on the matter.28 Put differently. broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition. Thus. it also encompasses the payment in full of the just compensation to the landholders as finally determined by the courts. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the true measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss.execution pending appeal with the objective of ensuring "prompt payment" of just compensation. "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property. full. we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the SAC judge in allowing . Contrary to the view of petitioner. substantial. Constitutionally. or the fair value of the property as between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell. as in this case. Verily. Without prompt payment. it cannot be said that there is already prompt payment of just compensation when there is only a partial payment thereof.27 The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land. and its subsequent release to the landowner after compliance with the legal requirements set by RA 6657. but also payment within a reasonable time from its taking.

but without imputing any dilatory tactics on the part of petitioner. through counsel Hilario C. fairness. even with the procedural flaw in the SAC’s grant of execution without a hearing. In the mind of the Court. it would not be long that death would overtake him. all along. thus. The good reasons cited by the SAC—that it would be in consonance with justice. in the amount of one-half of the just compensation determined by the said court or P739.execution pending appeal. aware of the protracted proceedings of the appeal of its November 20. despite pleas to reduce the same. good reasons for execution pending appeal consist of compelling or superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages suffered should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment or final order. to grant the execution pending appeal. What a misfortune to his long years of service to acquire that hard-earned savings only to be deprived therefrom at the time when he needed it most. the land has been under the enjoyment of farmer-beneficiaries without him yet being paid therefor. as nominal party. 2000 Decision. The appealed Decision will show that Orilla was already 71 years old at the time he testified in this case and the transcripts would further show that the money that he used in buying the DBP foreclosed property herein subject of compulsory acquisition by the DAR came from his retirement benefits evidently thinking that his investment would afford him security and contentment in his old age. thus deemed it proper. on the petition for certiorari and prohibition of petitioner before the Court of Appeals. To reiterate. Moreover. if payment for the land would be delayed further. and equity.50. the land was taken from him by the DAR at a price so low that he could not swallow. which the undersigned has just received a copy today. the execution of the judgment of the SAC was conditioned on the posting of a bond by the respondents. In the case at bar.29 The SAC. the injury that may be suffered by respondents if execution pending appeal is denied indeed outweighs the damage that may be . he brought the issue to court. viz. and that suspending payment will prolong the agony of respondents suffered due to the deprivation of their land —are eloquently elucidated in the Comment filed by SAC Judge Venancio J. But. in its sound discretion. Baril. luckily or unluckily. Amila.: In addition to the Comment of private respondents. Yet. it is well to state here that respondent Placido Orilla is already an old man just as his wife.511.

the assailed SAC Order of December 21. As correctly pointed out by respondents. for appellant. BAUTISTA ANGELO. said Act is unconstitutional because it has the effect of depriving plaintiff of the ownership. vs. L-12032 August 31. The posting of the required bond. along with the considerable bond posted by respondents. 1956. and that it is oppressive. the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 29. Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla. considering the constitutional mandate that just compensation be paid for expropriated property. 1383. J.: Plaintiff. given the particular circumstances of this case. adequately insulates the petitioner against any injury it may suffer if the SAC determination of just compensation is reduced. 2000 and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 29. filed on April 25. Jr. that assuming that it does. THE NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY. in the sense that petitioner will pay nothing at all to respondents. City Attorney Sixto A. First Assistant Government Corporate Counsel Simeon Gopengco and Solicitor Troadio T. 2002 are justified. control and operation of said waterworks system without compensation and without due process of law. to our mind. is an impossibility. . G. WHEREFORE. 29.R. Suffice it to say that. in the Court of First Instance of Baguio. Quinzon. 2000 SAC Decision. plaintiff-appelle. No.suffered by petitioner in the grant thereof. a public corporation created by Republic Act No. 2002 is AFFIRMED. contending that said Act does not include within its preview the Baguio Workshop System. 1959 CITY OF BAGUIO. the reversal of the November 20. a municipal corporation. Domondom for appellee. defendant- appellant. a complaint for declaratory relief against defendant.

municipalities and municipal districts similarly situated. there has already been a breach of said Act. rendered decision the dispositive part of which reads: "This Court. adding thereto that the action for the declaratory relief is improper for the reason that the Baguio waterworks System has already been transferred to defendant pursuant to Republic Act No. 1383 does not contemplates the exercise of the power of eliminate domain but the exertion of the police power of the State. if such has not been done.'" Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration. and upon its denial. 1383 is a proper exercise of the police power of the State. It took the present appeal. defendant filed its answer reiterating and amplifying the ground already advanced in this motion to dismiss. 1956. and (3) assuming arguendo that Republic Act No. 1956. On August 14. acting on the motion to dismiss as well as on the answer and rejoinder filed by both parties. And after allowing plaintiff to file a suplementary complaint. denied the motion and ordered defendant to file its answer to the complaint. . and that the provision of the said Act being clear and unambiguous. 1383 provides for the exchange of the NAWASA assets for the value of workshop system of Baguio is unconstitutional as this is not 'just compensation. . On July 6. 1956. holds that the workshop system of the City of Baguio falls filed within the category of 'private property'. it is still a constitutional exercise of the power of eliminate domain.unreasonable and unjust to plaintiff and other cities. the Court. . that at any rate the Baguio Waterworks System is not a private property but "public works of public service" over which the Legislature has control. 1383 (2) Republic Act No. as contemplated by our constitution and may not expropriated without just compensation — and that section 8 of republic act No. the parties submitted a written stipulation of the facts and filed written memoranda. that assuming that said Act contemplates an act of expropriation. The issues posed in this appeal are: (1) plaintiff's action for declatory relief is improper because there has already been a breach by plaintiff of Republic Act No. 1383 or. 1956. 1956. 1383 involves the exercise of the power of eminent domain the same does not violate our Constitution. defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Republic Act No. On My 22. . the Court on November 5. there is no necessity for construction. On June 21.

plaintiffs is maintaining the Baguio Waterworks System under a certificates of public convenience. The system supplies only the City of Baguio. it grants to the employees of the City one fifth (1/5) of cubic meter free from every one peso of their total salary per annum as part of their compensation. there is hereby created a public corporation to be known as the National workshop and Sewerage authority. Plaintiff is a municipal corporation organized under its Charter with principal place of business in the City of Baguio. its inhabitants. 1383. Zone and extends of the jurisdiction comprised by it. The employees of the national Government are not given this privilege but there is a provision plaintiff Charter which says: "in consideration of the exemption from the taxation to the extensive real state holdings of the national Government within the limit of the City. equal to fifty per centum of the expenses of the Government of the City exclusive of this accounts which appear as expenses by reason of inter-department charges and charges against the national Government for services and supplies. 1383 with provincial place of business in the City of manila. the Baguio general fund. while defendant is in the public corporation created by Republic Act No. there is created a permanent and continuing appropriation from the funds in the national Treasury not otherwise appropriated. The assets of said system as of December 31. — For purposes of consolidating and centralizing all waterworks. ." The purposes for which defendants was created is expressed in section 1 of republic Act No. 1955 were reported to be P1. domicile and place of business of the corporation.' its general purposes. there is need to state some facts necessarily for their determination since the proper application of the principles of law that may be pertinent would greatly depend upon them. and. and funds advanced by the national Government.98. direction and general supervision. sewerage and drainage systems in the Philippines under one control.795. and transient visitors. which shall be organized within one month after the approval of this Act. of the expenses of the improvements which the Government of the said City is required to make a reason for the location therein of the offenses of the national Government. and of free services in connection of the said offices. Under section 2553 of its Charter.408.Before we proceed with the discussion of this issues. as provided for in accordance. which we quote: Creation of the national Waterworks and Sewerage Authority. the same being financed by its own funds.

transfer to the Authority of its records. And to accomplish the above purpose. whether undertaken at the expense of the Authority or through subsidy of the national Government as provided in Section 10 of this act. operation and control of non- supporting and/or non-revenue producing water systems and sanitary works. All existing government owned waterworks and sewerage systems are transferred to the National waterworks and Sewerage Authority. and other government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems shall be received by the Authority in payment for an equal value of the assets of the National Waterworks and sewerage Authority. maintenance. The net book value of the properties and assets of the Metropolitan Water District and of government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in cities. supervision and control over all territory now embraced by the Metropolitan Water Districts as well as all areas now served by existing government-owned waterworks in the boundaries of cities. assets and liabilities. and in turn to pledge such assets as security for the payment of the waterworks and sewerage bonded debt. any from time to time extends its territory by the admission of or the inclusion of any municipal or municipal districts in the Philippines. The present Metropolitan Water District created Under Act Number Two Thousand eight hundred thirty-two. and its records. municipalities. The National Waterworks and Sewerage authority shall own and/or have jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the national waterworks and Sewerage Authority shall extend to the construction. or municipal districts. as amended. waterworks and sewerage systems in the cities. is hereby dissolved. municipalities. municipal district and other government waterworks and sewerage systems. assets and liabilities are transferred to the authority. municipalities and municipality districts in the Philippines including those served by the waterworks and wells and drills sections of the national Waterworks and Sewerage authority. . transfer to the Authority of entities. the following was provided in section 8 of the same act: Dissolution of the Metropolitan Water District.

7 providing. . among other things. District and City Engineers." And on March 15. in any Act or Executive Order or Proclamation of the President of the Philippines or in any city or municipal ordinance which is still in force. defendant. 151 to Provincial and City Auditors dated December 7. 1955. 1955. Likewise. 1956. as heretofore. the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. including the repair and improvement thereof and the construction of new waterworks projects in their respective districts in accordance with the Memorandum of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications dated October 25. shall continue to be in charge of the operation and maintenance of all existing waterworks systems. audit the accounts of the different waterworks systems in their respective jurisdictions in accordance with Provincial Auditor's Memorandum No. 1955. shall be deemed to be a reference to the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority created by this Act. which is "at the earliest time possible but not exceeding 90 days from the date of said order. (2) Pending the establishment of the Waterworks district offices of the Authority which shall ultimately include an auditing force. issued Office Memorandum No. 1955. 127 outlining the procedure for the transfer of government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the provinces. the following: (1) Pending the establishment of the Waterworks district offices of the Authority. cities and municipalities to defendant and provided for a time limit for such transfer. municipality or municipal district and other waterworks and sewerage system under the Bureau of Public Works. The references made to the Metropolitan Water District or to any existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage system in any city. On September 19. quoted in the Memorandum of the Director of Public Works dated October 27. implementing said Executive Order. they shall continue approving vouchers and payrolls for salaries and essential services chargeable against waterworks funds heretofore. provided that said expenses do not exceed the appropriations in the approved budget for the preceeding fiscal year. Provincial and City auditors shall.

" This contention is untenable. (4) Provincial Waterworks Boards. invoking section 2 of rule 66 which provides. 1383. there has been no breach of said law because no actual physical turn-over of the Baguio Waterworks System has so far been made. the omission is significant and this Court takes that in any objection to the declaratory relief . 1383 took effect upon its approval on June 18. Let us now discussed the issues raised. the NAWASA has failed to argue this point. (3) Pending the establishment of the waterworks district offices of the Authority. appellant contends that appellee's action for declaratory relief is improper because there has already been a breach of the Republic Act No. As regards the first issue. provincial. All budgets and plantillas of personnel of said waterworks personnel. 127 of the President. including collectors who were formerly directly under the Provincial. or City councils of cities and municipal councils of Municipalities and municipal districts ipso facto ceased to have control and supervision over waterworks systems within their respective territorial jurisdictions upon the formal organization of the National Waterworks and sewerage Authority in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No." Because of such admission. for which reason the trial court made in its decision the following comment: In its memorandum. city and municipal treasurers shall continue to perform the work of handling the collections and disbursements of funds of the waterworks systems and artesian wells projects in their respective jurisdictions in accordance with provincial circular of the Secretary of Finance to all provincial and City Treasurers dated November 23. Municipal Boards. it has always been assumed in the trial court that the present action is proper because there has not been such breach so much so that appellant desisted from raising the point in the rest of the proceedings in the trial court and in the long memorandum it has submitted.. shall be effective only after their approval by the Board of directors of the Authority. To begin with. City or Municipal Treasurers. provincial Boards. whether permanent. 1955. and notwithstanding Executive Order No. 1955. however. the answer filed by defendant through its counsel the Solicitor General contains a express admission of the avernment in appellee's complaint that "although Republic Act No. "A contract or statue may be construed before there has been a breach thereof. temporary or emergency. 1383.

nor destroy. but in so doing it does not confiscate them because it directs that they be paid with an equal value of the assets of the NAWASA. 1383 could at least be considered as a legitimate exercise of police power such that Congress may in the exercise of such power enact a law transferring Government property from one agency to another. 1383 provides that government-owned waterworks system should be transferred to appellant at the earliest time possible. The most that appellant did to carry out such provision is to issue its Office memorandum No.proceedings are waived. The act does not confiscate. . Republic Act No. It merely directs that all waterworks belonging to cities." That appellant would now take an inconsistent stand is strange in any event. 7 which prescribes the preparatory steps for such transfer pending the establishment of the branch office of the NAWASA that would take over the waterworks concerned. and unless by administrative action this provision is actually carried out. Act No. We agree with the trial court that so far there has not been a breach of the law and that the other requisites necessary for an action for declaratory relief are present. In other words. This is far from the intent and purpose of the law. it cannot be said that the transfer has been effected. 1383 constitutes a valid exercise of police power rather than a directive to expropriate the waterworks of the appellee by the exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot also be entertained. municipalities. appellant invokes the principle that the transfer of property and authority by an act of Congress from one class of public officer to another where the property continues devoted to its original purpose does not impair any vested right of the city owning the property. but before any definite step could be taken to comply with said directive the present action was instituted. But appellant invites our attention to some authorities purporting to show the Republic Act No. and laying stress one said authorities it contends that although Congress cannot deprive the citizens of a municipal corporation of the use of property held in trust for their benefit it may however change the trustee with or without its consent or compensation provided the citizens are not deprived of its enjoyment. The contention that the Republic Act No. we find that such is the situation obtaining here. 1383). nor appropriate property belonging to the appellee. This is clearly inferred from the context of the law (section 8. and municipal districts in the Philippines be transferred to the NAWASA for the purpose of placing them under the control and supervision of one agency with a view to promoting their efficient management. Rep.

At any rate. Shrik vs. park. waterworks cannot be taken away without observing the safeguards set by our Constitution for the protection of private property. its purpose is to effect a real transfer of the ownership of the waterworks to the new agency and does not merely encompass a transfer of administration. this court has already expressed the view that the waterworks system is patrimonial property of the city that has established it. the authorities cited do not bear out the proposition of appellant as clearly pointed out by counsel for appellee in his brief. 33 Phil.(Mendoza vs. And being owned by the municipal corporation in a proprietary character. The Baguio Waterworks System is not like any public road. Here. I. Revised. 557). or private corporations. if any. of the property of municipal corporation from one agency to another is merely done for purposes of administration. And in this jurisdiction. the weight of authority as far as the legislature is concerned classes them as private affairs. Accordingly the right of state as to the private property of municipal corporation is a right of regulation to be exercised in harmony with the general policy of the state. perhaps it is correct to affirm that a majority of decision recognize the private rights of the municipal corporation. 509). While the judicial opinions on this subject are more or less uncertain in expression. is not a right of appropriation. Vol. But it is insisted that the waterworks system of Baguio City does not have the character of patrimonial property but comes under the phrase "public works for public service" mentioned in Article 424 of the New Civil Code and as such is subjected to the control of Congress. 313 Pa. as we have already shown. and hence support the view that all its property of a distinctly private character is fully protected by the constitutional provisions protecting private property of the individual or the private corporation. McQuillin Municipal Corporation. They in substance point out that the transfer. its ownership and benefits being retained by the corporation. 1383. (sec. 239. 239. and though broader than exists in the case of individuals. While the cases may differ as to the public or private character of waterworks. street or any other public property held in trust by a municipal corporation held for the benefit of the public but it is rather a property owned by appellee in its proprietary character.But the authorities cited are not in point. p. De Leon. . 158. City of Lancaster. Such is not the clear intent of Republic Act No. and court judgment apparently conflicting. 169 Atl. This contention is also untenable.

xxx xxx xxx

The decision maintain that the property held by a municipal corporation
units private capacity is not subject to the unrestricted control of the
legislature, and the municipality cannot be deprived of such property
against its will, except by the exercise of eminent domain with payment of
full compensation. (McQuillin Municipal Corporation, 2nd Ed., Vol. I, pp.
670-681).

In its private capacity a municipal corporation is wholly different. The
people of a compact community usually require certain conveniences
which cannot be furnished without a franchise from the State and which
are either unnecessary in the rural districts, such as a system of sewers, or
parks and open spaces, or which on account of the expenses it would be
financially impossible to supply except where the population is reasonably
dense, such as water or gas. But in so far as the municipality is thus
authorized to exercise the functions of a private corporation, it is clothed
with the capacities of a private corporation and may claim its rights and
immunities, even as against the sovereign, and is subject to the liabilities
of such a corporation, even as against third parties. (19 R.C. L. p. 698)

The attempt of appellant in having waterworks considered as public property
subject to the control of Congress or one which can be regulated by the exercise
of police power having failed, that question that now arises is: Does Republic Act
No. 1383 provide for the automatic expropriation of the waterworks in question in
the light of our Constitution? In other words, does said law comply with the
requirements of section 6, Article XIII, in relation to section 1(2), Article III, of our
Constitution?

Section 6, Article XIII of our Constitution provides:

SEC. 6. The State may, in the interest of National Welfare and defense,
establish and operate industries and means of transportation and
communication, and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to
public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by
the Government.

Section 1 (2), Article III, of our Constitution provides:

(2) Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.

It is clear that the State may, in the interest of National welfare, transfer to public
ownership any private enterprise upon payment of just compensation. At the
same time, one has to bear in mind that no person can be deprived of his
property except for public use and upon payment of just compensation. There is
an attempt to observe this requirement in Republic Act No. 1383 when in
providing for the transfer of appellee's waterworks system to a national agency it
was directed that the transfer be made upon payment of an equivalent value of
the property. Has this been implemented? Has appellant actually transferred to
appellee any asset of the NAWASA that may be considered just compensation
for the property expropriated? There is nothing in the record to show that such
was done. Neither is there anything to this effect in Office Memorandum No. 7
issued by the NAWASA in implementation of the provision of the Republic Act
No. 1383. The law speaks of assets of the NAWASA by they are not specified.
While the Act empowers the NAWASA to contract indebtedness and issue bonds
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Finance when necessary for the
transaction of its business (sec. 2, par. (L), sec. 5, Act No. 1383), no such action
has been taken to comply with appellant's commitment in so far as payment of
compensation of appellee is concerned. As to when such action should be taken
no one knows. And unless this aspect of the law is clarified and appellee is given
its due compensation, appellee cannot be deprived of its property even if
appellant desires to take over its administration in line with the spirit of the law.
We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the law, insofar as it expropriates
the waterworks in question without providing for an effective payment of just
compensation, violates our Constitution. In this respect, the decision of the trial
court is correct.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

30. G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila,
HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of

Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON. ERNESTO
A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON.
ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON. HONORIO U.
LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON. ROMUALDO S.
MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO,
HON. FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON.
MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C.
ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO,
HON. VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON. ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON.
ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON. DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A.
TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON.
FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q. BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P.
DELA PAZ, HON. BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON R.
CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON, HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR.,
HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON.
ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON. LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B.
DAWIS, in their capacity as councilors of the City of Manila, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and
MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is
immoral is what you feel bad after.

Ernest Hermingway
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1

It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed by
oneself, is less immoral than if performed by someone else, who would be
well-intentioned in his dishonesty.

J. Christopher Gerald
Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I

The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to
the fundamental law of the land. It is foremost a guardian of the Constitution but
not the conscience of individuals. And if it need be, the Court will not hesitate to
"make the hammer fall, and heavily" in the words of Justice Laurel, and uphold
the constitutional guarantees when faced with laws that, though not lacking in
zeal to promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitutionality.

The pivotal issue in this Petition1 under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Decision2 in Civil Case No.
93-66511 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower court),3 is
the validity of Ordinance No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.4

The antecedents are as follows:

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and
lodging houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed
as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.6
On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 (RTC
Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of
the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance,
insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.8

Enacted by the City Council9 on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City
Mayor on 30 March 1993, the said Ordinance is entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION
OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.10

The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary
notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in

499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in. any business providing certain forms of amusement.D. Beerhouses 5. or from granting licenses and accepting payments for the operation of business enumerated in the preceding section. SEC. Night Clubs 6. annoy the inhabitants. the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are prohibited from issuing permits. Kalaw Sr. services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community. Motels 12. such as but not limited to: 1. and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. the businesses enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby . Discotheques 9. or devoted to. pursuant to P. 2 The City Mayor. Massage Parlors 3. Street in the North. Day Clubs 7. temporary or otherwise. Karaoke Bars 4. Cabarets 10. Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West. entertainment. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in. Taft Avenue in the East. Sauna Parlors 2. Dance Halls 11.the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. 3. Super Clubs 8. Inns SEC.

the . Records and music shops 6. at the discretion of the Court. the President.000. 11. with well-defined activities for wholesome family entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele. gasoline service station. PROVIDED. SEC. Handicrafts display centers 4. Curio or antique shop 2. or both. be punished by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5. dock or yard. Art galleries 5. art exhibitions. stage and theatrical plays. Theaters engaged in the exhibition.00) PESOS. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila. such as but not limited to: 1. 10.given three (3) months from the date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area. Flower shops 9. Coffee shops 8. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants. shall upon conviction. motor repair shop. Souvenir Shops 3. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance. or funeral establishments. except new warehouse or open-storage depot. Restaurants 7. light industry with any machinery. not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows. that in case of juridical person. concerts and the like. 4.

(b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it. SEC. (Emphasis supplied) In the RTC Petition. Approved by His Honor. lodging houses and other similar establishments." nor did they use women as "tools for entertainment." and neither did they "disturb the community. (4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment. operation and maintenance of hotels. the Mayor on March 30."11 MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment. 1993. MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments. (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected. PROVIDED FURTHER." "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. inns. motels. or person-in-charge of operation shall be liable thereof. General Manager. March 9. (5) The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights. pension houses. Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today. (2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P. the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently. 49913 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone with certain restrictions.D. that in case of subsequent violation and conviction. 5. and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal . motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.) No. 1993.

public dance halls.. and other places for entertainment or amusement.. circuses. public dancing schools. petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code. and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita- Malate area but not outside of this area. operation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod. (4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land. (vii) Regulate the establishment. and shall: . massage parlors. and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities. approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code.16 which reads. hotels.. thus: Section 458. . shall enact ordinances. as the legislative body of the city.. but not pension houses.14 In their Answer15 dated 23 July 1993. Powers. billiard pools. prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community. regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment.. sauna baths. Duties. Functions and Compensation. or.protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns. buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall: . lodging houses or other similar establishments.. including theatrical performances. or require the suspension or suppression of the same. particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants.

Further. or both such fine and imprisonment. the Ordinance had the presumption of validity. . (kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety. private respondent had the burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial zone. thus: ARTICLE III THE MUNICIPAL BOARD . for a single offense. the petitioners likewise claimed. and the promotion of the morality.Citing Kwong Sing v. and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter. convenience. the petitioners noted. hence. Legislative powers. – The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers: . good order.21 Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P. 409.23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal . to govern and to restrain places of exhibition and amusement. . the furtherance of the prosperity. . City of Manila.19 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila)20 which reads.22 The Ordinance. comfort. Section 18. peace. and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months' imprisonment. Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No.D.17 petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in the above-quoted provision included the power to control. cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in operation. . and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.18 Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III.

30 On 11 January 1995. judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3]. SO ORDERED. Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:27 WHEREFORE. petitioners filed the present Petition. Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision. and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional. of the City of Manila null and void.28 Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal29 on 12 December 1994. unfair. (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P. Jr. respondent Judge Perfecto A.34 They allege that the . Laguio.24 On 28 June 1993.25 And on 16 July 1993. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government units provided for in Art. Sec. again in an intrepid gesture.S.D. except those specified therein. 3. No costs. on 25 November 1994.26 After trial. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively. 49931 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments.protection clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila. Series of 1993. and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that had been issued by this Court against the defendant. he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC.33 petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the lower court. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance. unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power. manifesting that they are elevating the case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law. enjoining the petitioners from implementing the Ordinance. alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires.32 In the Petition and in its Memorandum. or otherwise.

35 In its Memorandum36 dated 27 May 1996. (2) must not be unfair or oppressive. (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade. It reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power.38 The Ordinance must satisfy two . The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts at rendering them worthless. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid. it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. A long-time resident. confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful business. Much as the Court harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila and yearns to restore its lost grandeur. ultra vires and therefore null and void. that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance. ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws. that it is violative of due process. as it did. 499.D. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the Constitution. the Court witnessed the area's many turn of events. (3) must not be partial or discriminatory. This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-Malate area being its home for several decades. and that it enjoys the presumption of validity. that it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates a constitutional provision. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. it believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end. The Court is of the opinion. and so holds. It relished its glory days and endured its days of infamy.37 Anent the first criterion. and (6) must not be unreasonable. it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. it does not contravene P. (5) must be general and consistent with public policy. and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated discretion in the execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

or incidental for its efficient and effective governance. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted. among other things. the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. enhance economic prosperity and social justice. known as the general welfare clause.40 The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power. as well as powers necessary. appropriate. improve public morals. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. approve resolutions and . The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. in this case. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units. local government units shall ensure and support.39 This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. the preservation and enrichment of culture. General Welfare. those necessarily implied therefrom. maintain peace and order. are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. promote health and safety. encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities.requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature.41 This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code. which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions. viz: SECTION 16. The national legislature is still the principal of the local government units. as agencies of the State. promote full employment among their residents. and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact ordinances.

liberty or property without due process of law."48 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. however broad and far-reaching. liberty.46 Sec. The maintenance of peace and order. . and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation . The Ordinance infringes the Due Process Clause The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of life. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building. and property. 1. and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. liberty or property without due process of law. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution The police power of the City Council. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The relevant constitutional provisions are the following: SEC.47 A. and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. . 14. 5. . the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. 9. the protection of life.45 SEC.appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code.44 SEC. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.42 The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.43 In the case at bar. No person shall be deprived of life.

as the phrase implies. substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the government's action. liberty. or property.50 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life. be valid. in each appropriate case. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action. liberty. forfeiture. obedience to the dictates of justice. and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure. asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person's life. liberty or property. from seizure. or property.49 and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power. In other words. such as for protecting fundamental rights.56 . to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government. as that phrase connotes.S. if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.53 Substantive due process.of life.51 The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation.54 Case law in the United States (U. refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life. to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments. and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. and private corporations and partnerships are "persons" within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. usually called "procedural due process" and "substantive due process. unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason.55 For example.52 This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government. liberty and property of individuals. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used." Procedural due process.

60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. adultery and . hotels and motels. bars. Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association. particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights.58 Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life. karaoke bars. City Mayor of Manila63 had already taken judicial notice of the "alarming increase in the rate of prostitution. for even under the guise of protecting the public interest.61 Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites. girlie houses. licensed and tax-paying nightclubs. arbitrarily or despotically57 as its exercise is subject to a qualification. as distinguished from those of a particular class. liberty and property. Individual rights. it bears emphasis. Inc. and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity. require an interference with private rights. The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate. cocktail lounges. limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law. the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights62  a violation of the due process clause. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment.The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally. may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. v. but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically.59 Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance.

"64 The object of the Ordinance was. the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive. Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill- repute and establishments of the like which the City Council may lawfully prohibit. day clubs. it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution. which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry. it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers. It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable regulations looking to the promotion of the moral and social values of the community.fornication in Manila traceable in great part to existence of motels. karaoke bars. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. super clubs. motels and inns. the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights. dance halls. adultery. in the remote instance that an immoral sexual act . We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality.65 it is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors. may take place in the most innocent of places that it may even take place in the substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance. However. the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community. night clubs. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police powers. This is not warranted under the accepted definitions of these terms. accordingly. If the flawed logic of the Ordinance were to be followed. fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila. That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal prostitution is of no moment. massage parlors. discotheques. being a human frailty. the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. Otherwise stated. cabarets.

it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits. it would be extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity. curb. . which by its nature cannot be said to be injurious to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral. building.66 The problem. we would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila ordering the closure of the church or court concerned. While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable. it needs to be pointed out. street or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption. Indeed. Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are impure men. If that were so and if that were allowed. there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.transpires in a church cloister or a court chamber. a building or establishment. they unwittingly punish even the proprietors and operators of "wholesome. premiums and blessings of democracy." "innocent" establishments. but the deplorable human activity that may occur within its premises. fornication and other social ills. but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants. is not the establishment. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity. there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights. reprehensible or not. it is in the hearts of men. The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. In other words.67 and it may even impose increased license fees. personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning. in its every nook and cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities. then the Ermita-Malate area would not only be purged of its supposed social ills. park. operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing. Every house. it cannot for that reason alone be punished. Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments. even the Scripture and the Tradition of Christians churches continually recall the presence and universality of sin in man's history. it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations. In the instant case.

the governmental interference itself. super clubs. but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator. In Section 3 thereof. to marry. . the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways. to live and work where he will. and . dance halls. the "premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently."68 In accordance with this case. and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. cabarets. it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance.70 sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen." It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes." It said: While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty.Means employed are constitutionally infirm The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors. night clubs. beerhouses. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments]." Further. subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. to acquire useful knowledge. to engage in any of the common occupations of life. the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract. establish a home and bring up children. discotheques. to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling. karaoke bars. motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which "to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area. Board of Regents. . to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience.69 The U. massage parlors. day clubs. infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to liberty and property.

Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint. if it is to be a repository of freedom.73 Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. In a Constitution for a free people. it must include privacy as well. and of the mystery of human life. Supreme Court explained: These matters. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence. In another case. child rearing. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood where they formed under compulsion of the State. In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these choices.74 . as long as they do not run afoul of the law. of meaning. family relationships. there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed. it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes personal decisions relating to marriage. generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized…as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. choices central to personal dignity and autonomy.72 Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of the Ordinance may seek autonomy for these purposes. involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime. and education. the U. Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premises be it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedom it is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.S. of universe.71 Persons desirous to own. contraception. procreation. are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

so very aptly stated: Man is one among many.76 There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the Court chooses to exercise restraint and restrict itself to the issues presented when it should. broadly speaking. they should suffer the consequences of the choice they have made. which are. Modality employed is unlawful taking In addition. As the case of Morfe v. obstinately refusing reduction to unity. Indeed. the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation. they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. That. ultimately.The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. Mutuc. that his experience is private.75 borrowing the words of Laski. indeed. His separateness. and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If his will is set by the will of others. are indefeasible. The Court only reaffirms and guarantees their right to make this choice. If he surrenders his will to others. the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.77 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses . the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not diminished. he surrenders himself. he ceases to be a master of himself. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty. his isolation. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The previous pronouncements of the Court are not to be interpreted as a license for adults to engage in criminal conduct. is their choice. Should they be prosecuted for their illegal conduct.

If the government takes away a person's property to benefit society. then society should pay." On many other occasions as well. In part too.into allowed businesses. if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. should be borne by the public as a whole. it is about loss spreading. Mahon. the U.79 There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property. in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support the act. The principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. A "possessory" taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. Section 9. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. or whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the public action. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions. While property may be regulated to a certain extent. In Mahon. that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.S. in all fairness and justice. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require that the economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the government and thus borne by the public as a whole.83 .81 it was held that a taking also could be found if government regulation of the use of property went "too far." The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution." When regulation reaches a certain magnitude. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each case. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. The Constitution expressly provides in Article III.80 In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v.82 No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking.

It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no . depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner.86 A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require compensation under the takings clause. the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of government action. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use.85 When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good. to leave his property economically idle. a permanent deprivation of property.88 The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the "prohibited" establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to "wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." The directive to "wind up business operations" amounts to a closure of the establishment. a taking nonetheless may have occurred. that is. should be borne by the public as a whole. Consideration must be given to the substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices which the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a period of time. and is practically confiscatory. from the owner's point of view. he has suffered a taking. Suppose he transfers it to another area. in all fairness and justice. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an "allowed" business. equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make the use prohibitable.What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.87 A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed expectations of the owner. he will likewise leave the entire establishment idle. the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust.84 A regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent the government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. otherwise it will be closed permanently after a subsequent violation should be borne by the public as this end benefits them as a whole. it is unreasonable. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a "taking" of private property. A zoning ordinance.reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. How may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop. The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita- Malate area or to convert into allowed businesses are confiscatory as well. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not. The proffered solution does not put an end to the "problem. The burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business. by zoning. even without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional burden imposed on the owner to build another establishment solely from his coffers. The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the government. The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the Ermita-Malate area. It needs restating that the property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose while the property taken under the power of eminent domain is intended for a public use or . nay. which limits a "wholesome" property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. art gallery or music lounge without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private property without due process of law. In every sense. The police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking." it merely relocates it. Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain. onerous and oppressive. although a valid exercise of police power. Not only is this impractical. be destroyed without compensation. The conversion into allowed enterprises is just as ridiculous.

" "annoy the inhabitants.purpose and is therefore "wholesome.' " Similarly. the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions. in order to be valid and constitutional. which make possible abuses in its execution."89 If it be of public benefit that a "wholesome" property remain unused or relegated to a particular purpose. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of prohibition." The ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others. Nazario. The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.93 as cited in People v. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by. It in no way controls or guides the discretion vested in them.90 Further. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments." and "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. These lawful establishments may be . and must not admit of the exercise. or of an opportunity for the exercise. Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause. of unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions. in Coates v.92 Thus. Ordinances such as this. specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid.S.94 the U.91 Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must. depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested. City of Cincinnati. are unreasonable and invalid. the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments "tend to disturb the community." The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions. then certainly the public should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private property for public use.

In this regard. The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association. and theaters as well as escort agencies. the U. In FW/PBS. Anent the first contention. is also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure which regulated the mode in which motels may conduct business in order to put an end to practices which could . Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a study which the city considered. of a reasonable regulation which is a far cry from the ill-considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council. the Court held that limiting motel room rentals to ten (10) hours will have no discernible effect on personal bonds as those bonds that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than ten (10) hours are not those that have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs. As regards the second point. Dallas. nude model studio and sexual encounter centers. video stores.regulated. v. the ordinance required that such businesses be licensed. The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. but not prevented from carrying on their business.S. hence. They likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour limitation on the rental of motel rooms placed an unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of association. It imposed reasonable restrictions.S. A group of motel owners were among the three groups of businesses that filed separate suits challenging the ordinance. INC.96 it needs pointing out. City Mayor of Manila." which are defined to include adult arcades. cabarets. The motel owners asserted that the city violated the due process clause by failing to produce adequate support for its supposition that renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours resulted in increased crime and other secondary effects. was adequate to support the city's determination that motels permitting room rentals for fewer than ten (10 ) hours should be included within the licensing scheme. bookstores. motels. Worthy of note is an example derived from the U. Inc. Among other things.95 the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating "sexually oriented businesses. its validity was upheld. we take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property. v. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance.

be upheld as valid. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade. in the opinion that what in fact exists "cannot approximate the ideal. B. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity.98 The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.97 The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and personal rights of citizens. in other words. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. what does in fact exist. To assure that the general welfare be promoted. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show .101 The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise: … What does it signify? To quote from J. both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. it cannot." There is recognition."100 It limits governmental discrimination.encourage vice and immorality. should not be treated differently.99 The "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned. Necessarily. Similar subjects. however.M. there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels. which is of the very essence of the idea of law. that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. even under the guise of exercising police power. Land Tenure Administration: "The ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike. Tuason & Co. which is the end of law. v.

there are no substantial distinctions between motels. lodging houses or other similar establishments. If the classification is reasonable. inns. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated." Classification is thus not ruled out. hotels. or at the very least. discrimination that finds no support in reason. pension houses. . To be valid. the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses. 2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law. as an indispensable requisite. 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only. hotels. both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. lodging houses or other similar establishments. not be arbitrary. if not identical.102 Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. 4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. the conditions not being different. it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner. far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility. all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance. that the governmental act assailed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed.104 In the Court's view. both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. By definition. it must conform to the following requirements: 1) It must be based on substantial distinctions. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges. are analogous. those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion.103 The classification must.

as the legislative body of the city. and not prohibit. it is ultra vires The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate. And why would the assumption that there is an ongoing immoral activity apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when men are in harness? This discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to important government objectives. Powers. and maintenance of motels. and shall: .105 Thus. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area. hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv). . . (a) The sangguniang panlungsod. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. shall enact ordinances. Failing the test of constitutionality. the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with prevailing laws.The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. Functions and Compensation. operation. C. Duties. It is not any less grave a sin when men engage in it. the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof. The standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is also discriminatory as prostitution one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish is not a profession exclusive to women. the discrimination is invalid. . The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws. which provides that: Section 458. The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment. approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code.

billiard pools. and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities. particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants. as the legislative body of the city. and other places for entertainment or amusement. public dance halls. (iv) Regulate the establishment. . While its power to regulate the establishment. operation. hotels. and other similar establishments. Duties. buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall: . Functions and Compensation. . . inns. and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. . (4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land. regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment. . (vii) Regulate the establishment. public dancing schools. pension houses. shall enact ordinances. massage parlors. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod. including tourist guides and transports . beerhouses. approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code. prohibit certain forms of . . (4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land. or. circuses. Powers. sauna baths. operation and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities. lodging houses. or require the suspension or suppression of the same. . buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall: . which reads as follows: Section 458. motels. operation and maintenance of cafes. restaurants. . . and shall: . including theatrical performances.

power to prohibit is impliedly withheld. Clearly. Esguerra.109 These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion110 that they were modified by the Code vesting upon City Councils prohibitory powers. The several powers of the City Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4 .107 And in People v. operation and maintenance of such establishments. lodging houses.108 wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of the Municipality of Tacloban which prohibited the selling. and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate. amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community. the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. restaurants. sauna baths. to govern. motels. The Court therein declared that: (A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to regulate or to license and regulate the liquor traffic." as used in subsection (l). particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" are stated in the second and third clauses. public dance halls. and other similar establishments. but "regulate" should not be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit. section 2444 of the Administrative Code. It is well to recall the rulings of the Court in Kwong Sing v. Similarly. under the power to regulate laundries. massage parlors. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment. suppress and suspend "such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment. the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools. with respect to cafes. the municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the employment or business shall be exercised. pension houses. and to restrain." Consequently. beerhouses. City of Manila106 that: The word "regulate. hotels. means and includes the power to control. respectively of the same Section. inns. giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the municipality is empowered only to regulate the same and not prohibit.

18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without merit. the ruling of the Court in People v. By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies. hotels. public dancing schools. suppress or prohibit. It held that: The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause. it is pertinent to emphasize.(vii) of the Code. are separated by semi-colons (.113 Moreover.115 is instructive. said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. motels. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City Council may suspend. sauna baths. massage parlors. 3. thing. pension houses. This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among "other events or activities for amusement or entertainment.114 The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause of the Code and of Art. The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof.111 These powers. and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)). On the first point. inns.). lodging houses. or otherwise come under the rule of strict construction. should not be confused. suppression and prohibition.112 The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses. it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person. or section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code. refers to . impose penalties or punishments. public dance halls. therefore. the use of which indicates that the clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to justify being put together in a single enumeration or paragraph. commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified power of regulation. Esguerra. Sec. and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)).

which cannot be removed by any fair and reasonable method of interpretation. that which is passed later prevails. since it is the latest expression of legislative will. both relating to the same subject matter. a municipal council may enact the ordinance in question. Such repeals have been divided into two general classes: those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of the two can remain in force and those which occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a substitute therefor. submitting to petitioners' interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit motels. As between two laws on the same subject matter. decrees. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. matters not covered by the other provisions of the same Code. it is the latest expression of the legislative will which must prevail and override the earlier. acts. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest expression of the legislative will should prevail. which are irreconcilably inconsistent. for the power to regulate the selling. giving away and dispensing of intoxicating liquors. the selling." Thus. would be to make the latter superfluous and nugatory. giving away and dispensing thereof is granted specifically by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will must necessarily prevail and override the earlier law. or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. . city charters. the Revised Charter of Manila. executive orders. because the power to prohibit.117 Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions contrary to those of an existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. proclamations and administrative regulations. or later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto. Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and special laws. includes the power to regulate. To hold that. notwithstanding the provision of section 2242 (g). and therefore it can not be applied to intoxicating liquors.118 In addition. under the general power granted by section 2238. that portion of the Charter stating such must be considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latter's provisions granting the City Council mere regulatory powers. On the second point.116 If there is an inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes.

fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property. and in this connection. shall: . If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications. as the legislative body of the city. mendicancy. Powers. approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code. the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and establishments in another section of the Code which is reproduced as follows: Section 458. (v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent. and shall: (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government.119 Notably. health or comfort of the community. prostitution. juvenile delinquency. or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city. . maintenance of drug dens. . gambling and other prohibited games of chance. the printing. drug pushing. . It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property. It is a legitimate business. Duties. . . establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod. suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places. Functions and Compensation. drug addiction.It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. . That tenet applies to a nuisance per se. shall enact ordinances. vagrancy.

499. circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances. operation and maintenance. Likewise.120 Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code. even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. rendering none of them useless or superfluous.If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance. it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these establishments with houses of ill-repute and expand the City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. and. dump or yard. Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of massage clinics." Thus. concert halls. It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection. its proper force and effect. That these establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the Code. motels and lodging houses as among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof. As correctly argued by MTDC. if possible. the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. it can be inferred that the Code considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. cinemas. pastime or fun. The same Section also defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and entertainment. sauna. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot. It is evident that these establishments may only be regulated in their establishment. light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. hotels. it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same .D. avocation. it would have so declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect. where words under consideration appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies. Turkish and Swedish baths. motor repair shop." "synonymous to relaxation." and "amusement places" to include "theaters. gasoline service station. giving to each in its place.

It is constitutionally infirm. the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional . Concededly. such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. In the case before us. While this may be the rule. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation.124 Conclusion All considered. the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires. And not to be forgotten.must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law. the local government units cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. Metropolitan Manila Authority:122 The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. which has the force and effect of a statute. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land. the enactment in question. or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable. discriminating or in derogation of a common right. or an act of the legislature. As delegates of the Congress. it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation. But inspite of its virtuous aims. the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary  we reiterate our support for it. null and void. it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance. The Ordinance contravenes statutes. partial. which are merely local in origin cannot prevail against the decree. oppressive. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions.123 Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity.121 As succinctly illustrated in Solicitor General v.

petitioner. 1980 CRISTINA DE KNECHT. and the Republic of the Philippines pines seeking the following relief: WHEREFORE. WHEREFORE. with costs. BAUTISTA. respondents.: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Cristina de Knecht against the Honorable Pedro JL. SO ORDERED. G.authority to stand on. PEDRO JL. as Judge presiding over Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay City). . J. the City Council. FERNANDEZ. L-51078 October 30. cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws  not even under the guise of police power. HON.R. petitioner respectfully prays that judgment be rendered annulling the order for immediate possession issued by respondent court in the expropriation proceedings and commanding respondents to desist from further proceedings in the expropriation action or the order for immediate possession issued in said action. vs. Bautista. No. Local legislative bodies. in this case. 31. as Judge presiding over Branch III of the Court of First Instance (Pasay City) and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

the original plan of making the extension of EDSA through Araneta Avenue instead of the new plan going through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. that President Marcos directed then Minister Baltazar Aquino to explain within twenty-four (24) hours why the proposed project should not be suspended. the herein petitioner being one of them. that after formal hearings to . 1977 a formal petition to President Ferdinand E. their representative representative and agents from enforcing the here questioned order for mediate posession petitioner offering to post a bond executed to the parties enjoined in an amount to be fixed by the Court to the effect that she will pay to such parties all damages which they may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide she is not entitled there She prays for such other remedy as the Court may deem just and equitable in the premises. an adjunct of building program. would pass through Cuneta Avenue up to Roxas Boulevard that this route would be a straight one taking into account the direction of EDSA. that on April 21. or on December 13. that preparation to the implementation of the aforesaid plan. the Manila — Cavite Coastal Read Project. 1974. filed on April 15. 1977 then Minister Aquino submitted his explanation defending the new proposed route. Petitioner prays that a restraint order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex-parte enjoining respondents. 1 The petitioner alleges that than ten (10) years ago. the government through the Department of Public Workmen's and Communication (now MPH) prepared a to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to Roxas Boulevard. that the proposed extension. Marcos asking him to order the Ministry of Public Highways to adoption. that the President then referred the matter to the Human Settlements Commission for investigation and recommendation. then Secretary Baltazar Aquino of the Department of Public Highways directed the City Engineer of Pasay City not to issue temporary or permanent permits for the construction and/or improvement of buildings and other structures located within the proposed extension through Cuneta Avenue that shortly thereafter the Department of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets which are lined with old substantial houses. that upon learning of the changed the owners of the residential houses that would be affected. Quezon City for July 1979.

1979 for preliminary junction was also filed. . The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. An urgent motion dated March 28. 2 In February 1979. (b) The choice of properties to be expropriated made by the Ministry of Public Highways was arbitrary and erroneous. (c) The complaint was premature as the plaintiff never really had gone through serious negotiations with the defendant for the purchase of her property. 1979 on the following grounds: (a) court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action because the complaint failed to allege that the instant project for expropriation bore the approval of the Ministry of Human Settlements and the Metro Manila Government nor pursuant to Presidential Decrees Nos. Pascual City presided by the respondent Judge. In June 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property sought to be expropriated on the ground that said Republic had made the required deposit with the Philippine National Bank. 7001-P and entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. among them the herein petitioner. the Settlements Commission submitted a report recommending the reversion of the extension of EDSA to the original plan passing through Cuneta Avenue. 1396 and 1517." The herein petitioner filed a motion to dismiss dated March 19.which all the parties proponents and oppositors were given full opportunity to ventilate their views and to present their evidence. the government filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 824. and (d) The complaint relied on an arbitrary and erroneous valuation of properties and disregarded consequential damages. and that notwithstanding the said report and recommendation. Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. Branch III. a complaint for expropriation against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. de Santos. the Ministry of Public Highways insisted on implementing the plan to make the extension of EDSA go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. etc.

Also. Where the legislature has delegated a power of eminent do-main." 4 The petitioner assails the choice of the Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets route on the following grounds: The choice of property to be expropriated cannot be without rhyme or reason. arbitrariness or capriciousness and due process determination as to whether or not the proposed location was proper in terms of the public interests. 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take and enter upon the possession of the properties sought be condemned. the equal protection of the law must be accorded. Logically then.The respondent judge issued a writ of possession dated June 14. The choice of property must be examined for bad faith. but also to the owners of solid and substantial homes and quality residential lands occupied for generations. The condemnor may not choose any property it wants. Even the claim of respondent's Secretary Baltazar Aquino that there would be a saving of P2 million under his new plan must be reviewed for it bears no relation to the site of the proposed EDSA extension As envisioned by the government. bad faith or gross abuse of discretion. the proposed extension must point to the south and not detour to the north. the EDSA extension would be linked to the Cavite Expressway. 5 The respondents maintain that the respondent court did not act without jurisdiction or exceed its jurisdiction or gravel abuse its discretion in issuing the . the question of the necessity for taking a particular fine for the intended improvement rests in the discretion of the grantee power subject however to review by the courts in case of fraud. 3 The petitioner contends that "Respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order to take over and enter upon the possession of the properties sought to be expropriated-petitioner having raised a constitutional question which respondent court must resolve before it can issue an order to take or enter upon the possession of properties sought to be expropriated. not on to the motel owners along Cuneta (Fisher) Avenue.

Article IV of the Constitution of the Philippines provides: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 433.order dated June 14. Section 2. when the Ministry of Public Highways decided to change the site of EDSA Ex- tension to Roxas Boulevard from Cuneta Avenue to the Del Pan — Fernando Item Streets the residents of Del Pan and Fernando Rein Streets who were to be adversely affected by the construction of ED — SA Extension to Roxas Boulevard along Del Pan . Inc. In selecting the Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets line the Government did not do so because it wanted to save the motel located along Cuneta Avenue but because it wanted to minimize the social impact factor or problem involved. Cuneta Avenue and Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets lines.. 413. was. Tuazon & Co. vs. the Supreme Court said: For the purpose of obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity. meet satisfactorily planning and design criteria and therefore are both acceptable. that the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily' choose what private property should be taken.Fernando Rein Streets were duly notified of such proposed project. the respondents aver: 'There was no sudden change of plan in the selection of the site of the EDSA Extension to Roxas Blvd. It must be stated that both lines. In J. 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take over and enter the possession of the properties sought to be appropriated because the Republic has complied with all the statutory requirements which entitled it to have immediate possession of the properties involved. Land Tenure administration 31 SCRA. As a matter of fact. it is enough if the respondents or defendants named be the government . M. 7 There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take private property for public use upon the payment of just compensation. Petitioner herein was one of those notified Annex 1). 6 Defending the change of the EDSA extension to pass through Fernando Rein — Del Pan Streets." It is recognized. It be conceded that the Cuneta Avenue line goes southward and outward (from the city center while the Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets line follows northward and inward direction.

. It is a mandate of reason. It is obvious then that a landowner is covered by the mantle of protection due process affords. . can deny due process only under pain of nullity. 436) In the instant case. it is the antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. the two officials may be made respondents in the action without need of including the Executive Secretary as a party in the action The failure to meet tile exacting standard of due process would likewise constitute a valid objection to the exercise of this congressional power. It frowns on arbitrariness. It negates state power to act in an impressive manner. As was so emphatically stressed by the present Chief Justice. it stands as a guaranty of justice. Thus. the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play. 'Acts of Congress. It is to be presumed that . the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. In the same case the Supreme Court concluded: With due recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken and how much thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation. it is a fact that the Department of Public Highways originally establish the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue. while the Philippines was still an unincorporated territory of the United States. it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence. as well as those of the Executive. It is. (p. That the equal protection clause will not allow. where the statute assailed was sought to be enforced by the Land Tenure Administrative and the Solicitor General. That was so intimated in the above leading Guido Case. In that sense. officials who would give operation and effect to official action allegedly tainted with unconstitutionality. That is the standard that must be met by any government talk agency in the exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it. There was an earlier pronouncement to that effect in a decision rendered long before the adoption of the Constitution under the previous organic law then in force.. as had been stressed so often.

the Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets line follows northward and inward direction. alignment 1 is straighter than alignment 2. ." 8 It is doubtful whether the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue can be objected to on the ground of social impact. the Solicitor General justifies the change to Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets on the ground that the government "wanted to the social impact factor or problem involved. Cuneta Avenue and Del Pan — Fernando Rein Streets lines. Functionality This issue has to do with the physical design of a highway. In fact.the Department of Public Highways made studies before deciding on Cuneta Avenue.. 9 The Human Settlements Commission considered conditionality social impact and cost. social impact and cost A. Director Antonio Goco of the Department of Public Highways admitted that alignment 2 is three (3) meters longer than alignment 1.cedes ". It is indeed odd why suddenly the proposed extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard was changed to go through Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets which the Solicitor General con... it is incontestable that the straighter and shorter alignment is preferable to one which is not. Furthermore. Even granting. The improvements and buildings along Cuneta Avenue to be affected by the extension are mostly motels. alignment 1 is definitely the contour conforming alignment to EDSA whereas alignment 2 affords a greater radius of unnatural curvature as it hooks slightly northward before finally joining with Roxas Boulevard. that more people be affected. inclusive of engineering factors and management consideration From both engineering and traffic management viewpoints. Systematically and diagramatically. arguendo. While admit "that both lines. The pertinent portion of its report reads: Comparison of Alignment 1 (Cuneta Fisher) and Alignment 2 (Del Pan — Fernando Rein) based on the criteria of functionality. the Human Setlements Commission has suggested coordinative efforts of said Commission with the National Housing Authority and other government agencies in the relocation and resettlement of those adversely affected. meet satisfactorily planning and design criteria and therefore are both acceptable ..

considering that. Consequently. B. the choice of alignment 2 which is longer by three (3) meters than alignment 1 could have serious repercussions on our energy conservation drive and from the larger perspective of the national economy.000) vehicles a day will have to traverse an extra three (3) meters. Social Impact The following factual data which have a direct bearing on the issue of social impact were culled from the records of the case and the evidence presented during the public hearings: (1) Number of property owners: Alignment 1 73 Alignment 2 49 (2) Incidence of non-resident owner: Alignment 1 25 (34. no less than fifty thousand (50. by ad. there will be a need for a grade separator or interchange at the Roxas Boulevard junction.statistical data. Finally.Roxas Boulevard Interchange. whichever alignment is adopted. a necessary corollary to the extension project. it is imperative to have interchanges as far apart as possible to avoid traffic from slow down in negotiating the slope on the interchanges.3%) Alignment 2 31 (63.3%) (3) Number of actually affected . Up north would be the future Buendia Avenue. Besides. alignment 1 which is farther away from Buendia Avenue than alignment 2 is the better alignment from the viewpoint of the construction of the grade separator or interchange. From the of highway design.

It is evident from the foregoing figures that social impact is greater on the residents of alignment 1. C.residents: Alignment 1 547 Alignment 2 290 (estimated) (4) Average income of residents: Alignment 2: Below P350 P350 – P500 P 500 – P 800 P800 – Pl000 Over P1000 16 (28%) 24 (42%) 0 (14%) 5 (9%) 4 (7%) Alignment 2: Figures not available. Cost The resolution of the issue of right-of-way acquisition cost depends to a large extend on the nature of the properties to be affected and the relative value thereof. A comparison of alignment 1 and alignment 2 on these two points has produced the following results: (1) Nature and number of properties involved: Line I Line 2 Lo ts Lot I Lot Im s m s pr pr ov ov em e ent m s e .

nt R 41 4 38 34 e 6 si d e n ti al C 25 2 11 13 o 4 m m e r ci al I 5 3 1 1 n d u st ri al C 1 1 1 1 h u r c h .

E _ _ _ _ d u c a ti o n al T 72 7 51 49 O 5 T A L (2) Relative value of properties affected: L o Im T t pr o s ov t e a m l en ts A P P P l 9. 5 g 0. 8 n 6 . t 8 8 1 . 9 . 5 1 i 30 . n 13 2 2 m 6 8 2 e .

9 e 1 .2M as claimed by the oppositors. Consequently. g 89 4 9 n 0 4 5 m . 1 0 6 A 8. 10 After considering all the issues and factors. r 7 e 9 n 6 c e It is obvious from the immediately table that the right. 6 1 l 31 .of-way acquisition cost difference factor of the two alignment is only P269. 6 . n 3 0 t 0 2 0 2 D P i 2 f 6 f 9 e . 4 i 4.196 and not P2M as alleged by the Department of Public Highways and P1. the cost difference factor between the two alignments is so minimal as to be practically nil in the consideration of the issues involved in this case. the Human Setlements Commission made the following recommendations: .

a self . 4. impact. The negotiated sale approach to compensation as proposed should apply to a whichever alignment is selected. through its implementing agencies. and ignore importantly. 3. 2. The course of the decision in this case consequently boils down to the soul-searching and heart-rending choice between people on one hand and progress and development on the other. In deciding in favor of the latter. the Hearing Board takes cognizance of the following points: 1. the National Housing Authority and other such governmental agencies. The EDSA extension to Roxas Boulevard is necessary and desirable from the strictly technical viewpoint and the overall perspective of the Metro Manila transport system. before the Government. the execution of a comprehensive and detailed plan for the relocation and resettlement of the adversely and genuinely affected residents of alignment I which will necessitate the coordinative efforts of such agencies as the Human Settlements Commission. functionality. undertakes the actual step of appropriating properties on alignment I to pave the way for the extension the hearing Board recommends the following as absolute. The factor of functionality states strongly against the selection of alignment 2 while the factor of great social and economic impact bears grieviously on the residents of alignment 1. cost and property valuation as basis for scheme of compensation to be adopted in the instant case. particularly the Department of Public Highways. However. binding and imperative preconditions: 1. The preparation.Weighing in the balance the issues and factors of necessity. recommends the reverend of the extension project to alignment 1. To be concrete. The right-of-way acquisition cost difference factor is so minimal as to influence in any way the choice of either alignment as the extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard. the Hearing Board is not unmindful that progress and development are carried out by the State precisely and ultimately for the benefit of its people and therefore.

The prompt payment of fair and just compensation through the negotiated sale approach. The respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the Republic of the Philippines to take immediate possession of the properties sought to be expropriated. July 4.R. Finally. Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take or enter upon the possession of the properties sought to be condemned is set aside and the respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 7001-P. The order of June 14. it is clear that the choice of Fernando Rein — Del Pan Streets as the line through which the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. de Santos. school. 87335 February 12. G. final disposition and endorsement thereof to His Excellency.. From all the foregoing. Makati. SO ORDERED. 1990 .. WHEREFORE. Respectfully submitted to the Human Settlements Commission Commissioners for consideration. 11 ." except to dismiss said case. the President of the Philippines. entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. etc. 2. their present social and economic standing. the Hearing Board recommends that the Department of Public Highways conduct public hearings before undertaking on future expropriations of private properties for public use. the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. Metro Manila. No. 1977. church and industries for employment should be set up to enable the affected residents of alignment 1 to maintain. the facts of record and recommendations of the Human Settlements Commission. 32. sufficient community or human settlement complete with infrastructure capture market.

CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS.: The issue posed in this case is whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of this Court may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation. vs. No. docketed as Civil Case No. In an order dated June 14. GANCAYCO. 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Pasay City an expropriation proceedings against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets among them Cristina De Knecht (de Knecht for short) together with Concepcion Cabarrus. petitioner. pendency of appeal with the President of the Philippines. In June. Nieva. 1979 de Knecht filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G. and some fifteen other defendants. 7001- P.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1979 the Republic filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property to be expropriated on the ground that it had made the required deposit with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of 10% of the amount of compensation stated in the complaint. Villanueva. On March 29. and created a Committee of three to determine the just compensation for the lands involved in the proceedings. and Ante Law Offices for respondent Cristina de Knecht. 1979 de Knecht filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction. respondents. J. On July 16. prematureness of complaint and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the properties. On March 19. 1979 de Knecht filed an ex parte urgent motion for the issuance by the trial court of a restraining order to restrain the Republic from proceeding with the taking of immediate possession and control of the property sought to be condemned. 1979 the lower court issued a writ of possession authorizing the Republic to enter into and take possession of the properties sought to be condemned.R. On February 20. Talamayan. Elegado. L-51078 and directed against the order of the .

de Santos. that it had no objection to the said motion to dismiss as it was in accordance with the aforestated decision. The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in the order of the lower court dated December 18. 340 expropriating the same properties and for the same purpose.lower court dated June 14. The Republic filed a manifestation on September 7.' except to dismiss said case. de Elizalde. Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. Francisco Elizalde and Antonio Roxas moved to dismiss the expropriation action in compliance with the dispositive portion of the aforesaid decision of this Court which had become final and in order to avoid further damage to same defendants who were denied possession of their properties. 1981 stating. 51078) before the lower court on the ground that the choice of Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets as the line through which the . De Knecht appealed from said order to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered on December 28. 1981 defendants Maria Del Carmen Roxas Vda. 1983 dismissed the case by reason of the enactment of the said law. among others. the order appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE. entitled 'Republic of the Philippines vs. 1983. the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. On September 2. 1986. On October 30. 1979 praying that the respondent be commanded to desist from further proceeding in the expropriation action and from implementing said order. 1980 this Court rendered a decision. the dispositive part of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE. 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take c enter upon the possession of the properties sought to be condemned is set aside and the respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 2 the dispositive part of which reads as follows: PREMISES CONSIDERED. The order of June 14. 7001-P. The lower court in an order of September 2. the Republic filed a motion to dismiss said case due to the enactment of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 1 On August 8. 1988. et al. As prayed for in the appellant's brief another Order is hereby issued dismissing the expropriation proceedings (Civil Case No.

and (3) thus completing the Manila Flood and Control and Drainage Project. 4 The petition is impressed with merit. (2) controlling flood by the construction of the outlet for the Estero Tripa de Gallina (which drains the area of Marikina. the national government. through the Department of Public Works and Highways began work on what was to be the westward extension of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) outfall (or outlet) of the Manila and suburbs flood control and drainage project and the Estero Tripa de Gallina. III WHETHER OR NOT THE LAW OF THE CASE THEORY SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE CASE AT BAR. Manila and Paranaque). No pronouncement as to Costs. SAID "CHOICE" HAVING BEEN SUPPLANTED BY THE LEGISLATURE'S CHOICE. There is no question that as early as 1977.P. 340). These projects were aimed at: (1) easing traffic congestion in the Baclaran and outlying areas. (PROPERLY PUT. . Pasay. 340 IS THE PROPER GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE EXPROPRIATION CASE. 7001-P UPON JUDICIAL NOTICE OF B. BLG. 3 Hence the Republic filed that herein petition for review of the A aforestated decision whereby the following issues were raised: I WHETHER OR NOT THE ENACTMENT OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code. Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be extended is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. II WHETHER OR NOT THE DPWH'S "CHOICE" OF LAND TO BE EXPROPRIATED IS STILL AN ISSUE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DIS CRETION IN DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO.

6 In view of the said finding. No. 340 was enacted by the Batasang Pambansa on February 17. Blg.P." 5 It is based on the recommendation of the Human Settlements Commission that the choice of Cuneta street as the line of the extension will minimize the social impact factor as the buildings and improvement therein are mostly motels. this Court held that the "choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets as the line through which the EDSA should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. L-51078. Bautista. the petitioner's right as determined therein should no longer be disturbed and that the same has become the law of the case between the parties involved. 1980 in De Knecht vs. including de Knecht whose holding is hardly 5% of the whole route area. 1979 the petitioner filed the expropriation proceedings in the Court of First Instance. as above related on February 20. It is only with respect to the remaining 10 to 15 percent along the route that the petitioner cannot negotiate through a sales agreement with a few land owners.So the petitioner acquired the needed properties through negotiated purchase starting with the lands from Taft Avenue up to Roxas Boulevard including the lands in Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets. It acquired through negotiated purchases about 80 to 85 percent of the lands involved in the project whose owners did not raise any objection as to arbitrariness on the choice of the project and of the route. Thus. 1983. Subsequently B.R. the appellate court set aside the questioned order of the trial court and issued another order dismissing the expropriation proceedings before the lower court pursuant to the ruling in De Knecht case. On the basis of said law petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case before the trial court and this was granted. G. 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take possession of the properties sought to be condemned and enjoined the respondent judge from taking any further action in the case except to dismiss the same. Said decision having become final no action was taken by the lower court on the said directive of this Court to dismiss the case. There is no question that in the decision of this Court dated October 30. . On appeal by de Knecht to the Court of Appeals the appellate court held that the decision of the Supreme Court having become final. Thus. this Court set aside the order of the trial court dated June 14.

and for the same purpose. 8 When on February 17.P. Blg. 340.P. 340 expropriating the very properties subject of the present proceedings. all part of 'The Project'. 1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed B. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. Only private respondent remains as the solitary obstacle to this project that will solve not only the drainage and flood control problem but also minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area. guarded and surrounded as the lot is perennially by De Knecht's . 7 Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation. Eighty percent of the EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension had been completed. Blg. solely because the single piece of property I occupied' by De Knecht. it appears that it was based on supervening events that occurred after the decision of this Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the expropriation through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets. 340 was enacted to hasten 'The Project' and thus solve these problems. and its implementation has resulted so far in an 80% completion of the EDSA outfall and a 30% completion of the EDSA extension.While it is true that said final judgment of this Court on the subject becomes the law of the case between the parties. although already expropriated under B. Batas Pambansa Blg. All residents in the area have been relocated and duly compensated. is the only parcel of land where Government engineers could not enter due to the 'armed' resistance offered by De Knecht. Judicial notice may be taken that these problems bedevil life and property not only in the areas directly affected but also in areas much beyond. The Solicitor General summarizing the situation said — The construction and completion of the Metro Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and the EDSA extension are essential to alleviate the worsening traffic problem in the Baclaran and Pasay City areas and the perennial flood problems. This instant case stands in the way of the final solution of the above- mentioned problems. it is equally true that the right of the petitioner to take private properties for public use upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws.

The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting B. fierce private security guards. WHEREFORE. Blg. And the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case pending before it on the ground of the enactment of B. In sum. B. 9 The Court finds justification in proceeding with the said expropriation proceedings through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets from ESDA to Roxas Boulevard due to the aforestated supervening events after the rendition of the decision of this Court in De Knecht. 340 therefore effectively superseded the aforesaid final and executory decision of this Court. 1988 and its resolution dated March 9. Moreover. even in the face of BP340. Blg. the petition is hereby GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 28. Without said property. single-handedly stands in the way of the completion of 'The Project' essential to the progress of Metro Manila and surrounding areas. Thus the anterior decision of this Court must yield to this subsequent legislative flat.P. 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order of Branch III of the . the said decision. already 30% completed. Parañaque and Marikina — which flow through the Estero Tripa de Gallina will continue to have no way or outlet that could drain into Manila Bay. without any more legal interest in the land. the EDSA extension. De Knecht holds the Legislative sovereign will and choice inutile. and the flood waters of Pasay. Blg.P.P. 340. can in no way be finished. the EDSA outfall construction on both sides of the said property cannot be joined together. and traffic will continue to clog and jam the intersections of EDSA and Taft Avenue in Baclaran and pile up along the airport roads. is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter (over two years later in this case) making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. It may thus be said that De Knecht. 340. Without the property she persists in occupying and without any bloodletting.

1983 is hereby reinstated without pronouncement as to costs.then Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasay City in Civil Case No. . 7001-P dated September 2. SO ORDERED.