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marasiganvs IAC GR L 69303, 152 scra 253

HEIRS OF MARIA MARASIGAN vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT et al.


G.R. No. L-69303 July 23, 1987

FACTS
In 1974, a deed of absolute sale was executed by Fe Bazar in favor of Maria
Marasigan. However, in 1975, Maria Marron was declared the owner of the subject
property in a land registration case. She filed a motion for execution which was
granted. The spouses, Bazar, refused to surrender their title and to execute the
deed of sale in Marronsfavor.

In 1978, when Marasigan had the title registered, the Register of Deeds of
Manila issued a TCT naming Maria Marasigan as the new owner, the notice of
lispendens caused to be annotated by Marron on the Bazars title was carried over
on the said new title.

ISSUE
Whether the party who bought the property with a notice of lispendens
annotated at the back of her title has a better right over the party in whose favor
the notice of lispendens was made.

RULING
No. The Court affirmed the ruling of the appellate court which ruled in favor of
the party how had the notice annotated and who won the litigation over the
property.
The Court reiterated the established rule that:

the filing of a notice of lispendens charges all strangers with a notice of the
particular litigation referred to therein and, therefore, any right they may thereafter
acquire on the property is subject to the eventuality of the suit. The doctrine of
lispendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity, the purpose of
which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the Court
until the judgment or decree shall have been entered; otherwise, by successive
alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive
and impossible of execution. (Laroza v. Guia, 134 SCRA 34 1)

4. ligon vs CA 244 scra 693

FACTS:
The Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP), by virtue of an absolute
deed, sold to IglesianiKristo (INK) 2 parcels of land in TandangSora, Barrio Culiat,
QC. It was stipulated therein that IDP shall undertake to evict all squatters in the
property within 45 days from the execution of the contract. IDP failed to do this,
hence, INK sued for specific performance with damages. IDP, on the other hand,
alleged that it was INK which violated the contract by delaying the payment of the
purchase price and sought to have the contract of sale rescinded. Thereafter, INK
filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that there was actually
no genuine issue as to any material fact; the TC granted. A year after, INK filed a
motion in the same case seeking to compel Leticia Ligon (petitioner), who was in
possession of the certificates of title over the properties as mortgagee of IDP, to
surrender said certificates to the RD of QC for the registration of the absolute deed
of sale in its name. Ligon allegedly refused and/or failed to deliver the certificates
despite repeated requests.To this, Ligon opposed saying that (a) IDP was not served
copy of the motion, (b) ownership of INK over the property was still in issue, (c) and
that the trial court had no jurisdiction as the motion involved the registrability of the
document of sale, and she was not made a party in the main case.

The TC granted INKs motion and ordered petitioner to surrender the


certificates of title in open court for the registration of the absolute deed of sale in
the latters name and the annotation of the mortgage executed in favor of petitioner
on the new certificates (to be issued to INK). Upon Ligons motion, the TC redirected
her to deliver the documents to the RD of QC.

ISSUE:
W/N INK has a superior right to the possession of the owners copies of the
certificated of title.

HELD:
YES. Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be
registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owners duplicate certificate is
presented together with such instrument, except in some cases or upon the order of
the court for cause shown. In case the person in possession refuses or fails to
surrender the same to the RD so that a voluntary document may be registered and
a new certificate issued, Sec. 107 of P.D. No. 1529 states:

Where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of the refusal


or failure of the holder to surrender the owners duplicate, the party in interest may
file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the RD. The court, after
hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate
certificate to surrender the same and direct the entry of a new certificate or
memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate
certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, of if for any reason the
outstanding owners duplicate cannot be delivered, the court may order the
annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu
thereof. Pursuant to Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, the distinction between the RTCs
general and the limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a cadastral court has
been eliminated. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified
registration proceedings by conferring upon the RTCs the authority to act not only
on applications for original registration but also over petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon
such applications or petitions. Even while Sec. 107 of PD 1529 speaks of a petition
which can be filed by one who wants to compel another to surrender the certificates
of title to the RD, this does not preclude a party to a pending case to include as
incident therein the relief stated under said section, especially if the subject
certificates of title to be surrendered are intimately connected with the subject
matter of the principal action. The principal action is based on expediency and in
accordance with the policy against multiplicity of suits. The order directing the
surrender of the certificates to the RD in order that the deed be registered in favor
of INK cannot in any way prejudice her rights and interests as mortagee, since any
lien annotated on the previous certificates which subsists shall be incorporated or
carried over to the new certificates of title.

5. dinglasan - moscosovs CA 128 scra 705


ANDREA M. MOSCOSO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMINA L. MORON,
respondents
G.R. No. L-46439
April 24, 1984

FACTS:
Petitioner applied for land registration of a parcel of residential land which
she alleged among others that the property is her share in the estate of her late
father in the partition she entered with her five other siblings. The application was
opposed by three alleged children of applicants father in a common law union prior
to his marriage with applicants mother. After the presentation of evidence, the trial
court rendered decision finding that applicant is not the exclusive owner of the
property and directing the registration of the land in co-ownership with applicant
and the three oppositors.

The land involved was acquired by IsidraVigeraVda. deMonge in 1907. She


died in 1915, survived by her child, PascualMonge, who married Guadalupe Oliver.
Guadalupe died in 1941 while Pascual died on June 9, 1950 or before the effectivity
of the Civil Code. He was survived by six children named Salvacion, Elpidio,
Remedios, Ruperta, Abelardo deceased) and Andrea, the petitioner herein.

Andrea MongeMoscoso claimed the land as her own because her brother and
sisters transferred their shares to her (Exh. K).

Before his marriage to Guadalupe, Pascual had sexual relations with


ZenonaLanuncia. He begot with her three children named Maximins, Concordia and
Apolonia (survived by Flaviano L. Marchadesch, Jr.).

Only MaximinaLanuncia Moron can be considered Pascual's acknowledged


natural child because of the power of attorney which he had executed in 1945 in her
favor. It is a "documentopublico" within the meaning of article 131 of the old Code.

Applicant filed motion for reconsideration. After hearing, the trial court
modified its decision finding that of the three oppositors, only one was able to prove
her being an acknowledged natural child of applicants father by competent proof,
hence, the applicants share would be 13/14. CA affirmed the decision. Applicant
contends that the trial court, acting as a land registration court, has no jurisdiction
to pass upon the issue whether oppositor is the acknowledged natural child of his
father.

ISSUE:
Does the court, acting in its limited jurisdiction as a land registration court,
competent to determine the right of the oppositor to inherit?

RULING:
Generally no. Exceptions: (1) Mutual consent of the parties to submit the
issues for the determination of the court; (2) Full opportunity was given to the
parties in the presentation of their respective sides of the issues and of the
evidence in support thereto; and (3) consideration by the court that the evidence
already of record is sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon the
issues. In the instant case, the exceptions exist. Besides, whether a particular
matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (Probate, Land
Registration, etc.) is, in reality, not a jurisdictional question. It is, in essence, a
procedural question.

The proceedings for the registration of title to land under the Torrens system
is an action in rem, not in personam, hence, personal notice to all claimants of the
res is not necessary to give the court jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the res,
and neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title
issued in a registration proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the land
situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or
in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which shall be binding upon all persons, known
or unknown.

6. mogello - zunigavs CA 95 scra

7. pasco - santosvsganayo 116 scra 431

8. riego - rudolflietz holdings vsreg of deeds of pque 344 scra 680


RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDING VS. RD

FACTS:
Petitioner corporation was formerly known as Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. On
July 15, 1996, it amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name to Rudolf
Lietz Holdings, Inc. The Amended Articles of Incorporation was approved by the
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 20, 1997.
As a consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the
transfer certificates of title over real properties owned by the said corporation, all of
which were under the old name, Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. For this purpose,
petitioner instituted, on November 20, 1997, a petition for amendment of titles with
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, docketed as LRC Case No. 97-0170.
The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City,
apparently because the titles sought to be amended, namely, Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 99446, 99447, 99448, 102486, 102487, 102488 and 102489, all state
that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise
inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that the lands covered by the
subject titles are located in Pasay City.

Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody of
the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City. Hence, on February 16, 1998, petitioner filed
an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition. In the attached Amended Petition,
petitioner impleaded instead as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City,
and alleged that its lands are located in Paraaque City.
For the meantime, the trial court dismissed the case motuproprio for improper
venue. Thus, this petition for review.

ISSUE:
WON the dismissal of the case is proper.

HELD:
No, the dismissal of the case is NOT proper.
While the ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the petition below
was clearly that of improper venue, the Solicitor General confuses venue with
jurisdiction. A distinction between the two must be drawn. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law. It may not be
conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. On the other hand, the venue of an
action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties, and an
objection on improper venue may be waived by the failure of the defendant to raise
it at the proper time. In such an event, the court may still render a valid judgment.
Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties.
Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to
provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as
it relates to the place of trial.

Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that defenses
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived. The court may only dismiss an action motuproprio in case of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litispendentia, res judicata and prescription.
Therefore, the trial court in this case erred when it dismissed the petition
motuproprio.It should have waited for a motion to dismiss or a responsive pleading
from respondent, raising the objection or affirmative defense of improper venue,
before dismissing the petition. However, this was overtaken by petitioners motion
for leave to amend its petition.
Jurisdiction of RTC for Land Proceedings:

Petitioner correctly invoked the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in


seeking the amendment of its certificates of title. The jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court over matters involving the registration of lands and lands registered
under the Torrens system is conferred by Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
The Property Registration Decree. x xx More specifically, jurisdiction over petitions
for amendments of certificates of title, such as the one brought below, is provided
for by Section 108 of P.D. 1529.

CASE SYLLABUS:
Actions; Jurisdiction; Venue; Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an
action is conferred only by law and may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon
a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of an
action while venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent
of the parties, and an objection on improper venue may be waived by the failure of
the defendant to raise it at the proper time.While the ground invoked by the trial
court in dismissing the petition below was clearly that of improper venue, the
Solicitor General confuses venue with jurisdiction. A distinction between the two
must be drawn. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action is
conferred only by law. It may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court
which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. On
the other hand, the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the
consent of the parties, and an objection on improper venue may be waived by the
failure of the defendant to raise it at the proper time. In such an event, the court
may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the
consent or agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and
hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than
restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial.

Same; Same; Same; Courts; The court may only dismiss an action motuproprio in
case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litispendentia, res judicata and
prescription, but not for improper venue.Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. The court may only dismiss an action
motuproprio in case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litispendentia, res
judicata and prescription. Therefore, the trial court in this case erred when it
dismissed the petition motuproprio.It should have waited for a motion to dismiss or
a responsive pleading from respondent, raising the objection or affirmative defense
of improper venue, before dismissing the petition. However, this was overtaken by
petitioners motion for leave to amend its petition.

Same; Same; Land Titles; Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529); Jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts over matters involving the registration of lands and
lands registered under the Torrens System is conferred by Section 2 of P.D. No.
1529, while jurisdiction over petitions for amendments of certificates of title is
provided for by Section 108 of said Decree.Petitioner correctly invoked the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in seeking the amendment of its certificates
of title. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over matters involving the
registration of lands and lands registered under the Torrens system is conferred by
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, The Property Registration Decree. x xx
More specifically, jurisdiction over petitions for amendments of certificates of title,
such as the one brought below, is provided for by Section 108 of P.D. 1529.

Same; Same; Same; Venue; Actions affecting title to or possession of real property,
or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof is
situated.In the case at bar, the lands are located in Paraaque City, as stated on
the faces of the titles. Petitioner, thus, also correctly filed the petition in the place
where the lands are situated, pursuant to the following rule: Venue of real actions.
Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; Annexes form an integral part of the
pleading.Before the amended petition was filed, the trial court had already
dismissed the petition based on improper venue. It relied on the allegation in the
petition that the lands are located in Pasay City. However, the titles of the land,
copies of which were attached to the petition, plainly show that the lands involved
are situated in Paraaque City. The trial court should have considered these
annexes, as these form an integral part of the pleading.

Pleadings and Practice; Amendments of Pleadings; Amendments of pleadings are


liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every case may so far as
possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of cases or
prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expensecourts should be liberal in
allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the
real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and
the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay.Amendments to
pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every case
may so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial
of cases or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. The trial court,
therefore, should have allowed the amendment proposed by petitioner for in so
doing, it would have allowed the actual merits of the case to be speedily
determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner. The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to
pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies
between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the case decided on
the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages
of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment to the complaint was
made before the trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed by
law to answer and to prepare for trial.

9. tito - juniovsdelossantos 128 scra 705

10. anarna - escondevsbarlongay GR 67583, july 31, 1987


G.R. No. L-67583 July 31, 1987
BASILISA S. ESCONDE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SAMILO N. BARLONGAY and RAMON V. DELFIN, respondents.

Facts:
Private respondent Ramon V. Delfin is the applicant for Registration of Title in
Bulacan. The application was granted. Judge Crispin V. Bautista issued an Order
denying for lack of merit the opposition filed by the Esconde spouses to the petition
for Writ of Possession. Private respondent, moved for the dismissal of the case
among others the complaint fails to state sufficient cause or causes of action for
reconveyance. Judge Constantino denied Petition to Quash Writ of Possession. The
Sheriff then delivered possession to the private respondent, but then petitioner re-
entered the premises and took possession thereof, hence private respondent filed a
Motion for an Alias Writ of Possession

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ADMIT AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND FOR ISSUANCE OF RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS
PROPER.

Ruling:
The petition is devoid of merit. "A land registration proceedings which is in
rem, is valid and conclusive against the whole world. The failure of the plaintiff and
her husband, despite the notice of the publication and posting by the sheriff of the
notice of hearing, to oppose the defendant's application for registration will bar her
from filing this action.

However, an action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted


to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey
the land to him (Bilog, "Remedies Available to Aggrieved Parties As a Consequence
of Registration

Under the Torrens System"; Property Registration 1979; pp. 122-123). The
prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose property was
wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens System from bringing an
action, after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the
property in question.Such an action does not aim or purport to re-open the
registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show
that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the
real owner thereof (Rodriguez v. Toreno, 79 SCRA 357 [1977]). An ordinary civil
action for reconveyance does not seek to set aside the decree but respecting the
decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or
reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner (Director of
Lands, et al. v. Register of Deeds, et al., 92 Phil. 827 [1953]).

11. belen - moscosovs CA 128 scra 719

12. delosreyes - talusanvstayag 356 scra 263


TALUSAN VS. TAYAG

FACTS:
On June 28, 1988, [herein petitioners] filed a complaint wherein they alleged,
inter alia, that:
--They bought the subject property covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
651, from its former owner, Elias Imperial, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale:
--On October 15, 1985, [herein Respondent] Juan D. Hernandez, x xx sued x xx in
his capacity as City Treasurer of Baguio City, wrote a letter to the former owner Elias
Imperial informing him that the above described property would be sold at public
auction on December 9, 1985, x xx to satisfy the delinquent real estate taxes,
penalties and cost of sale, and demanded payment of the sum of P4,039.80,
representing total taxes due and penalties thereon;
--Elias Imperial and his entire family emigrated to Australia in 1974. Elias Imperial
never authorized a certain Dante Origan x xx to receive any letter or mail matter for
and on his behalf;
--[Respondent] Hernandez sold the above-described property to [Respondent] Tayag
for P4,400.00 without any notice to the former owner thereof, [or] to [petitioners],
and without compliance with the provisions of PD No. 464, as evidenced by the
Certificate of Sale.
--[Petitioners] have been in actual possession of the Unit in question, since they
bought the same from its former owners, and their possession is open, public,
continuous, adverse and in the concept of owners, while [Respondent]
HermegildoTayag has never been in possession of the said property;
--[Petitioners] through intermediaries offered to pay to the [respondents] the sum of
P4,400 plus all interests and expenses which [they] might have incurred x xx but
said offer was rejected without any just [or] lawful cause.
On July 14, 1988, [Respondent] HermenegildoTayag filed his [A]nswer with
[C]ounterclaim (pages 28-32 of the Record), wherein he substantially denied the
allegations in the complaint and, at the same time, raised the following affirmative
defenses, among others:
--(T)he ownership of the Condominium unit registered under Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 651, Baguio City, has been consolidated in his name by virtue
of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16,
1987 x xx . The said decision has [become] final and executory as evidenced by the
Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;
--The public auction sale complied with the requirements of Presidential Decree No.
464 hence, the same is lawful and valid:
[Respondent] Hernandez likewise filed an [A]nswer on July 18. 1988, wherein he
denied the material averments in the complaint and stated that no irregularity or
illegality was committed in the conduct of the proceedings with respect to the
delinquent real property of Elias Imperial and the actuations of the defendant herein
were all within the limits of his authority and in accordance with the provisions of
the law pertaining to delinquent real property, particularly, P.D. 464 otherwise
known as the Real Property Tax Code and therefore, no damages may be imputed
against him.
Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of the auction sale. They
cited irregularities in the proceedings and noncompliance with statutory
requirements.

RTC had consolidated ownership of the condominium unit in favor of


Respondent Tayag.

CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the auction sale should be nullified due to non-compliance
with the mandatory requirement of Section 46 of P.D. 464 that such notice of
delinquency of the payment of the property tax should be published.

HELD:
Petitioners contend that the auction sale was invalid, because several
requisites regarding notice and publication were not satisfied. We are not convinced.

In the case at bench, it cannot be denied that the requirements of notice,


publication and posting have been complied with by the public defendant prior to
the auction sale wherein the subject condominium unit was sold. x xx Ergo, there
was nothing irregular in the questioned public auction -- thus, the validity of the
same must be upheld in accordance with the aforementioned cases.[19]
The CA ruling notwithstanding, we shall proceed to discuss these factual issues in
order to assure petitioners of a complete adjudication of their case, and not a mere
disposition of procedural technicalities.
The Non-Publication of Notice of Real Property Tax Delinquency

Petitioners assert that the tax sale should be annulled because of


noncompliance with the requirement of publication prescribed in Section 65 of PD
464.

In this regard, we note that unlike land registration proceedings which are in
rem, cases involving an auction sale of land for the collection of delinquent taxes
are in personam. Thus, notice by publication, though sufficient in proceedings in
rem, does not as a rule satisfy the requirement of proceedings in personam.[20] As
such, mere publication of the notice of delinquency would not suffice, considering
that the procedure in tax sales is in personam. It was, therefore, still incumbent
upon the city treasurer to send the notice of tax delinquency directly to the
taxpayer in order to protect the interests of the latter.

In the present case, the notice of delinquency was sent by registered mail to
the permanent address of the registered owner in Manila. In that notice, the city
treasurer of Baguio City directed him to settle the charges immediately and to
protect his interest in the property. Under the circumstances, we hold that the
notice sent by registeredadequately protected the rights of the taxpayer, who was
the registered owner of the condominium unit.

For purposes of the real property tax, the registered owner of the property is
deemed the taxpayer. Hence, only the registered owner is entitled to a notice of tax
delinquency and other proceedings relative to the tax sale. Not being registered
owners of the property, petitioners cannot claim to have been deprived of such
notice. In fact, they were not entitled to it.

13. dinglasan - director of forestry vsmunoz 23 scra 1183


Director of Forestry vs Munoz
FACTS:
Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco) is a
company engaged in logging. It was given a Certificate of Private Woodland
Registration so that it can operate in a 72,000 hectare land. It also has a Titulo de
Propriedad which it acquired in 1894 under the Spanish regime.

In 1964, the NAWASA (National Water and Sewerage Authority) director


ordered the cancellation of Piadecos certificate because it encroached beyond what
was allowed in the certificate. It actually cut trees in the Angat and Marikina
watershed area which was prohibited. The lower court ruled in favor of Piadeco.
Piadeco also had a settlement with Nawasa. Piadeco sought to renew its certificate
but it was denied by the Asst. Director of Forestry. The latter ruled that the Spanish
title is no longer recognized and should have never been used to apply for a
Certificate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Piadeco can claim ownership over the property.

HELD:
No. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for another
Certificate. There should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-
2 has the force and effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817,
Revised Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of
the department head, to issue regulations deemed expedient or necessary to
secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in such manner as to
insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the
future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to
the same end. Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the
Director of Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the
objects and purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when
Congress authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation, [a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.

14. mogello - intestate estate of don mariano san pedrovs CA 265 scra
733
15. pasco - paraguyavsescurel-crucillo 711 scra 275