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Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on
the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was
reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority
and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.


Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.


The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the
Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any
other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the
legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he

betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry
into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied
for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that
he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of
his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Valles v. COMELEC
Australian citizenship; governor of Davao Oriental - Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the
place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on
the basis of the place of birth; The signing into law of the 1935 Constitution has established the principle of
jus sanguinis as basis for acquisition of Philippine citizenship; The mere fact of a person is a holder of an
Australian passport and has an ACR are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and
dont militate against her claim of Philippine citizenship; For candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough
that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship; A declaration to support and defend the Constitution is effective
renunciation of foreign citizenship.

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004


Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared
petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated
his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all
the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national
campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to
wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of


Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?


No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,
and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like
the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the
provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves
much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely
open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are
susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the
intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid

limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the
burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate
of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the
burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the
State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona
fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or
capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the
candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be
bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of
the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further
evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine
the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The national territory of the Philippines comprises:

1) the Philippine archipelago;

2) all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction

PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO that body of water studded with islands which is delineated in the Treaty of
Paris (1898), as amended by the Treaty of Washington (1900) and the Treaty with Great Britain (1930).

consists of its
a) Terrestrial
b) Fluvial
c) Aerial domains

including its
a) Territorial sea
b) The seabed
c) The subsoil
d) The insular shelves; and
e) The other submarine areas

INTERNAL WATERS the waters Around, Between and Connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions

includes any territory that presently belongs or might in the future belong to the Philippines through any of
the accepted international modes of acquiring territory.


Two elements:
1. The definition of internal waters (supra);
2. The straight baseline method of delineating the territorial sea consists of drawing straight lines
connecting the outermost points on the coast without departing to any appreciable extent from the
general direction of the coast.
Important distances with respect to the waters around the Philippines
-Territorial Sea 12 nautical miles (n.m.)
-Contiguous Zone 12 n.m. from the edge of the territorial sea
-Exclusive Economic Zone 200 n.m. from the baseline

[includes T.S. and C.Z.]
NOTE: There can be a Continental Shelf without an EEZ, but not an EEZ without a Continental Shelf.


The belt of the sea located between the coast and internal waters of the coastal state on the one hand,
and the high seas on the other, extending up to 12 nautical miles from the low water mark.


Extends up to 12 nautical miles from the territorial sea. Although not part of the territory, the coastal State
may exercise jurisdiction to prevent infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws.


Body of water extending up to 200 nautical miles, within which the state may exercise sovereign rights to
explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources

The state in the EEZ exercises jurisdiction with regard to:

1. the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations, and structures;
2. marine scientific research;
3. the protection and preservation of marine environment;

Case Digest: UP vs. Dizon

G.R. No. 171182 : August 23, 2012


LICUANAN, Petitioners,


HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 80, STERN BUILDERS, INC., and SERVILLANO DELA CRUZ, Respondents.


University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern
Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and renovation of the buildings in the campus of
the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing. However, the third billing worth
P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders
sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance.

On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on January
16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said
motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002.
Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City.

Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the
notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the
RTC issued the writ of execution.

On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final and executory.
Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their previous motion having already
been granted and despite the writ of execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted
another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ of
execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs
depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of the funds.

Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.


I. Whether or not the UPs funds can be validly garnished?

II. Whether or not the UPs appeal dated June 3, 2002 has been filed out of time?

HELD: The petition for review is meritorious.

FIRST ISSUE: UPs funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment.

POLITICAL LAW: garnishment of public funds; suability vs. liability of the State

Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a
legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the
States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a government
instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under Act
No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the
purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going
into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any
banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned
with the UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the
UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of
real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.

A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated
in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should first be made between suability and
liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the
other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by
the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law." The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the
primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated
the claim against the UP.

SECOND ISSUE: Period of appeal did not start without effective service of decision upon counsel of record.

REMEDIAL LAW: doctrine of immutability of a final judgment; service of judgments; fresh-period rule;
computation of time

At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the amount of P16,370,191.74 illegally garnished from
its trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the finality of the judgment based on the supposed tardiness of UPs
appeal, which the RTC declared on September 26, 2002. It is true that a decision that has attained finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether the modification is made by the court
that rendered it or by this Court as the highest court of the land. But the doctrine of immutability of a final
judgment has not been absolute, and has admitted several exceptions, among them: (a) the correction of
clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void
judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that render its
execution unjust and inequitable. We rule that the UPs plea for equity warrants the Courts exercise of the
exceptional power to disregard the declaration of finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in clear
violation of the UPs right to due process.

Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal
Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. Verily, the
service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be validly made upon the OLS in Diliman,
and no other. It is settled that where a party has appeared by counsel, service must be made upon such
counsel. This is clear enough from Section 2, second paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly
states that: "If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or
one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for
several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side."

Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such that the
remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be correct
to find that the judgment of the RTC became final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal
being filed too late on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the UP, the CA
and the RTC applied the rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
to the effect that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing
the appeal; and that the period resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. For
that reason, the CA and the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing.

However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the fresh-period rule that the Court
first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, viz: "to
standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration." The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law that aims

"to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution," is
impervious to any serious challenge. This is because there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the denial,
the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within the context of the fresh-period
rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from service of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next
working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal, conformably with Section 1 of Rule 22,
Rules of Court, which holds that: "If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working
Petition for review is GRANTED. The CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

City of Manila vs. Teotico

City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CA
G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA
Concepcion, J.:

Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila,
within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board
the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or
manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla
complaint against the City which dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay

Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the
damages suffered by Teotico.

Ruling: Decision affirmed.

In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been
constantly kept in good conditionand manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers
concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said
article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said
street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not
necessarily detract from the City's "control or supervision."

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004]

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]

Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon
ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X.
Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if
no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On
23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004,
Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC
en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution
that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later
consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only
the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of
the Philippines.

Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939
during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus
sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs.
Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal
of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become
the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity
of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The
parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe
was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents
have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to
present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but
also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.


Posted by kaye lee on 11:13 PM
156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974 December 17 1987 [Appointing Power]

Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the
Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed
the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

Whether or not the appointment is valid.

Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison,
without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full
authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the
consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in
constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not

enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group
require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of
those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association Inc. v City of Davao (Environmental Law)
Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association Inc. v City of Davao

January 9, 2009

CA Mindanao Station, Lantion

NOTE: still pending in the SC


Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07, Series of 2007: An Ordinance
Banning Aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all agricultural entities in
Davao City

RTC: rendered ordinance valid and unconstitutional


WON the ordinance banning aerial spraying is unconstitutional Constitutional right to health and to a
healthful and balanced ecology.


(Still pending SC decision)


It is within the mandate and authority of the City of Davao to enact Ordinance since it is a measure that
has an ostensible LAWFUL SUBJECT: protection of public health and the environment against the alleged
harmful effects of aerial spraying of pesticides or fungicides.

However, UNLAWFUL MEANS since unduly oppressive to individuals and the three months period shift from
aerial spraying to ground spraying unreasonable, oppressive and impossible to comply with.

City of Davao lacked:

- Technical understanding on the intricacies of the engineering works required for the efficient operation of
banana plantations, indifference to corporeal rights of banana planters to protect and enhance their

- To abandon aerial spraying without affording them enough time to convert and adopt other spraying
practices would preclude the banana planters from being able to fertilize their plantations Such an
apparent eventuality would prejudice the operation of the plantations and the economic repercussions
thereof would just be akin to shutting down the venture.

Also, since SEPARABILITY CLAUSE IS NON-EXISTING, the whole ordinance is unconstitutional.

No scientific basis for banning aerial spraying. Testimonies in favor of City of Davao did not prove that
the aerial spraying of substances is the proximate cause of the various ailments the victims allegedly

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE it does NOT classify which substances are prohibited from being applied
aerially even as reasonable distinctions should be made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects
of liquid substances to the public health, livelihood and the environment

Ordinance is confiscation of property without due process of law, it deprives plantation owners of the
lawful and beneficial use of such areas to be ceded, without just compensation (with regards to buffer
zones required by the ordinance)

10 SCRA 1 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government Invalid Delegation

Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.

The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority Development Assistance
Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations
Act (GAA).

Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard projects
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship
grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);

b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft

c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for
soft projects.

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may
request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is
approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential
pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has
been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR
this has been around since about 1983.

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle
blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system
had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork
barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An
audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes
of Luy et al.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.


I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.


I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the
following principles:

a. Separation of Powers

As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The
executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of.
Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats happening was that,
after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF
funds should be allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the
principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork
barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).

This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned).
That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which
was delegated to it by the Constitution.

Exceptions to the rule are:

(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;

(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF
money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged
in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate
the power to the individual member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact
that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his
PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives,
whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied
in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system
but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related
ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance
energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated
to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund Realignment Constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program

Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio
Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of
then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was
disbursed upon the request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the
CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M
for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP.
Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).


I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).

II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.

III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.


I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending.
As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In
DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would
have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned
via the DAP.

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents
power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at
bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even
the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment
of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within their respective offices.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated
because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and
other non-Executive agencies.

Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects
are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they
were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal

On the issue of what are savings

These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in
the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA
does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers.
Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are
already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under
the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect
that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was
secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate
the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries
of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the
DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and
proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that
they have not acted in good faith.