COMMON CARRIERS PT 1 (2) a private carrier is not carry all who offer such

goods as
A. In General bound to carry for any reason, it is accustomed to
1. Definitions; essential elements; Art. 1732 carry
and unless it enters into a special tender
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, reasonable
corporations, firms or associations engaged compensation agreement to do so for carrying
in the business of carrying or transporting them
passengers or goods or both, by land, water (3) a common carrier is a public service
or air, for compensation, offering their (3) a private carrier does not and is therefore
services to the public. subject to regulation hold itself out as engaged in the
business for the public, and is therefore not subject to
Transportation defined.-- a contract of transportation is regulation as a common carrier
one whereby a certain person or association of persons
obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or news
from one place to another for a fixed price Test for a common carrier:
(1) He must be engaged in the business of
Classification : carrying goods for others as a public employment, and
1. As to object: (1) things; (2) persons; (3) news must hold himself out as ready to engage in the
2. As to place of travel: (1) land; (2) water; (3) air transportation of goods for persons generally as a business,
and not a casual occupation.
Parties to contract of transportation: (2) He must undertake to carry goods of the kind
(1) shipper or consignor.-- person to be transported; one to which his business is confined.
who gives rise to the contract of transportation by agreeing (3) He must undertake to carry by the methods by
to deliver the things or news to be transported, or to which his business is conducted, and over his established
present his own person or those of other or others in the roads.
case of transportation of passengers (4) The transportation must be for hire.
(2) carrier or conductor.-- one who binds himself to The true test is whether the given undertaking is a part of
transport persons, things, or news as the case may be; one the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held
employed in or engaged in the business of carrying goods out to the general public as his occupation rather than the
for other for hire quantity or extent of the business actually transacted, or
(3) consignee.-- the party to whom the carrier is to deliver the no. and character of the conveyances used in the
the things being transported; one to whom the carrier may employment (the test is therefore the character of the
lawfully make delivery in accordance with its contract of business actually carried on by the carrier.)
carriage (but the shipper and the consignee may be one
person) Case : an airplane owner is a common carrier where he
undertakes for hire to carry all persons who apply for
Freight defined.-- The terms has been defined as: passage indiscriminately as long as there is room and no
(1) the price or compensation paid for the transportation of legal excuse for refusing; airlines engaged in the passenger
goods by a carrier, at sea, from port to port. But the term is service on regular schedules on definite
also used to denote (2) the hire paid for the carriage of routes, who solicit patronage of the traveling public,
goods on land from place to place, or on inland streams or advertise schedules for routes, times of leaving and rates
lakes. The name is also applied to (3) the goods or of fare, and make the usual stipulation as to baggage are
merchandise transported at sea, on land, or inland streams common carriers
or lakes. Thus, the term is used in 2 senses: to designate
the price for the carriage, also called freightage, or to Characteristics of common carriers:
designate the goods carried. (1) The common carrier undertakes to carry for all
people indifferently; he holds himself out as ready to
Contracts through transportation agents.—A contract engage in the transportation of goods for hire as a public
of transportation is not changed, altered or affected by the employment and not as a casual occupation, and he
mere fact that the obligor avails of other parties to effect undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently, within the
the transportation agreed upon, as in the case of limits of his capacity and the sphere of the
transportation agents. business required of him, so that he is bound to serve all
who apply and is liable for refusal, without sufficient
Carriers defined.-- Persons or corporations who reason, to do so
undertake to transport or convey goods, property or (2) The common carrier cannot lawfully decline to
persons, from one place to another, gratuitously or for hire, accept a particular class of goods for carriage to the
and are classified as private or special carriers, and prejudice of the traffic in those goods Exception : for some
common or public carriers sufficient reason, where the discrimination in such goods is
reasonable and necessary (substantial grounds)
Private carriers defined.-- Those who transport or (3) No monopoly is favored - the Commission has
undertake to transport in a particular instance for hire or the power to say what is a reasonable compensation to the
reward utility and to make reasonable rules and regulations for the
convenience of the traveling public and to enforce them
Common carriers vs Private carriers: (4) Public convenience - for the best interests of
(1) the common carrier holds the public
(1) the private carrier agrees himself out in
common, that is, in some special case with some Meaning of Public use.-- It is not confined to privileged
to all persons who choose to emprivate individual individuals, but is open to the indefinite public; there must
to carry ploy him, as ready to carry for for hire be a right which the law compels the owner to give to the
hire; no one can be a common carrier unless he general public. Public use is
has held himself out to the public as a carrier in not synonymous with public interest. The true criterion is
such a manner as to render him liable to an action whether the public may enjoy it by right or only by
if he should refuse to carry for anyone who wished permission
to employ him
(2) a common carrier is bound to

1 katrinab. transpo

etc. CA case and had not held himself out to carry all passengers F: Cendana was a junk dealer and was engaged in buying and freight for all persons who might offer passengers and used bottles and scrap materials in Pangasinan and brought freight. Law for operating a public utility without permission from On the return trip to Pangasinan. 1744 of NCC. Under the Public Service Law. so far as the cost of civilly liable for damages in favor of third persons due to transportation is concerned the conduct of carrier's captain and that the stipulation in (2) shipments may be alike although composed of different the charter party exempting owner from liability is against classes of merchandise . a common carrier undertaking to carry a This involves a consideration of the following-. General Milk Co. or locality. and (2) the business in which such individual. privileged individuals. resulting agents is not against public policy and is deemed valid. alleged contract of carriage. merchants. actual cost H: The provisions of our Civil Code on common carriers were taken from Anglo-American law. he charged freight lower than I: WON defendant operated a public utility. In determining whether a use is public. necessary: The Milk Co. 1732 makes in general. then different rates may be party that the charterer and not the ship owner was to be charged liable for any loss or damage to the cargo. either passengers or property. H: There is no public use. occupation was not the carriage of goods. No personal act or negligence board will be exposed to unnecessary or unreasonable risks has been proved. and yet not be alike. The from their transportation in the form and under the Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not be conditions in which they are offered for carriage.000 to Home Insurance. applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a (3) the general nature of the business done by the carrier. kind and quality may be Art. In a charter of the entire vessel. authorizing the exercise of the rather than on a regular basis. AMERICAN STEAMSHIP common carriers. two things are and his helper. a stipulation transportation of such products. regular rates. suitability of the vessels of the company for the becomes a private carrier. Under American Determination of justifiable refusal: jurisprudence. to the character of the business to be done. On the way to Pangasinan.The law requires common carriers to F: A Peruvian firm shipped fishmeal through the SS carry for all persons. paid P14. VS. unless the same is due to personal acts or offered for carriage there is no real danger to the carrier negligence of said owner or its managers. private carrier. is engaged must be for public use. etc. Only 150 cartons of milk were delivered. recovery from Luzon Stevedoring and American Steamship etc. a right which the law compels the no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both.the quantity. V. American Steamship contended Exception: When the actual cost of handling and that it was not liable because of a stipulation in the charter transporting is different. or any kind of traffic. as distinguished nor reasonable ground to fear that the vessel and those on from agents or employees. to any undue or Agencies. There must be. Home Insurance filed for prohibits common carriers (CC) from subjecting any person. The TC ruled essential feature of public use is that it is not confined to that he was a common carrier. for the contract is the F: Tan Piaco rented two automobile trucks and was using charter party. we must look not only I: WON Cendana is a common carrier. He was convicted for violation of the Public Utility these to Manila for resale. he would load his vehicles the Public Utility Commission. As a private carrier. He carried passengers and freight under a special contract in each DE GUZMAN V.000 in substantially similar circumstances or conditions. for loss or damage to the cargo against ship refusal if it can be proven that in the condition in which it is owners. transpo . SMB service in the transportation of like kind of traffic under demanded and Home Insurance Co. must be a public merchandise based on an utility. but also to the H: Cendana is properly characterized as a common carrier proposed mode of doing it. sued to claim the value of the lost (1) the individual. them upon the highways of Leyte for the purpose of carrying some passengers and freight. and even if it was done on a periodic basis it is not a public use. The law settlement of SMB's claim. He used two 6-wheeler trucks.-. contracted with him for the hauling of 750 cartons of mild. 587 of the Code of Commerce makes the ship agent exactly the same. If the use is merely optional even though he merely backhauled goods for other with the owners. declaring that considered alike . or the public benefit is merely incidental. for Crowborough consigned to the SMB and insured by the exactly the same charge for a like or contemporaneous Home Insurance Co. co. YES.(1) special cargo or chartered to a special person only. delivered what it received from the carrier in the same condition it received it.The law prohibits unreasonable discrimination by HOME INSURANCE CO. Luzon Stevedoring claimed that it merely unreasonable prejudice or discrimination whatsoever. Such policy has no merchandise force where the public at large is not involved. The cargo arrived with shortages. Art. with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to Pangasinan. TAN PIACO document of title and not a contract. handling and transporting may only be made when the difference is based upon I: Is the stipulation valid? YES." The for the loss since it was due to force majeure. but is open to the indefinite public. Based on the stipulation. exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its (2) reasonable possibility of danger or disaster. NO.difference in the charge for public policy under Art. Cendana denied that he was a partnership. is in fact and legal contemplation merely a receipt and a U.S. as shipper. For that service. as in the case of a ship totally chartered (as in this case) for the use Case: The mere fact that the carriage of dynamites may of a single party. recovery cannot lead to destructive explosions is not sufficient to justify be had. and even if his principal jurisdiction of the public utility commission. common carrier and contended that he could not be liable "Public use" means the same as "use by the public. co-partnership. The stipulation in the charter party (4) all the attendant circumstances which might affect the absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the question of the reasonable necessity for the refusal by the negligence of the agent would be void only if the strict carrier to undertake the transportation of this class of public policy governing CC is applied. the bill of lading issued by the master to the charterer. The trucks were used under one of the trucks was hijacked by armed men who took special agreements to carry particular persons and with them the truck and its cargo and kidnapped the driver property. The CFI absolved Luzon Stevedoring but ordered American Steamship to Cases : (1) merchandise of like quantity may not be reimburse the P14. and one 2 katrinab. The CA reversed.

degree of care and diligence (extra-ordinary diligence) in the carriage of goods as well as passengers. as in a bareboat or demise that a engaged in the business of carrying or transporting CC becomes private. which is carry unless the same is due to the causes enumerated owned by KKKK. episodic or admissions are conclusive and no evidence is required to unscheduled basis. 1733. even if they are force majeure. to carry goods for others. compensation. It was petitioner's burden to overcome it. and are not I: Does a charter party between a shipowner and a liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are charterer transform a CC into a private one as to negate inevitable. It took PPI 11 days to unload the cargo. It is therefore imperative that a public I: (1) Was petitioner a common carrier? carrier shall remain as such. undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the H: The presumption of negligence on the part of carrier which he has held out to the general public as his respondent carrier has been overcome by the showing of occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the extraordinary zeal and assiduity exercised by the carrier in 3 katrinab. A shortage and However. from Alaska to San Fernando. transpo . There are 2 kinds: hauling contract with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corporation (1) contract of affreightment which involves the use of whereby the former bound itself to haul the latter’s shipping space or vessels leased by the owner in part or as 2000m/tons of soya bean meal from Manila to Calamba. who are his servants. shortage. A therein. or BASCOS V. H: A charter-party is a contract by which an entire ship. offering transportation services on a regular or scheduled offering her trucks to those with cargo to move. including in accordance with their contract. CA. The TC awarded or force. Neither does it make a distinction prove the same. the common carrier whether or not such carrier has also complied with the must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and order to overcome the presumption. Thus. 1735 which provides that CC are as shipowner. damage to its cargo? NO. fall within shipper/charterer and KKKK the scope of Art. PPI unloaded the presumed to have been at fault or to have acted cargo. The fertilizer was shipped on MV Sun Plum. provided that they shall have complied with the the civil law presumption of negligence in case of loss or rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence. unless they prove that they observed marine and cargo surveyor to determine if there was any extraordinary diligence required under Art. prove her negligence. The trial court ruled employ of the shipowner and therefore continued to be against petitioner. SSA thieves or robbers acted with grave or irresistible threat. The liability arises the moment a instances are enumerated in Article 1734. carriage since CIPTRADE leased her cargo truck. When PPI chartered the vessel. I: WON Cendana may be held liable for the loss of the milk. Upon arrival in the port. There are very few instances when the comply with applicable statutory reqts. destroyed CC. Cipriano paid Jibfair the amount of goods lost over its navigation. violence carriers by reason of the charter-party. Thus. the loss was quite beyond the control damages. by land. or deterioration of the goods which they York. PPI hired a negligently. Accordingly. The limits of extraordinary diligence are because they have become private reached where there is grave or irresistible threat. notwithstanding the charter of (2) Was the hijacking referred to a force majeure? the whole or portion of a vessel. New loss. The fact that Cendana diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by does not hold a CPC is no excuse to exempt him from them." In this case. the resident agent of KKKK for the of strangers like thieves or robbers. An action for damages was filed. Causes falling time charter party was entered into between Mitsubishi as outside the list. Petitioner denied that there was no contract of ordinary course of business. offering their services to the public. corporation or firm. Her own failure to adduce sufficient H: Common carriers by the very nature of their business proof of extraordinary diligence made the presumption and for reasons of public policy are held to a very high conclusive against her. petitioner herself has avoids making a distinction between a person or enterprise made the admission that she was in the trucking business. and as a entire command and possession and consequent control consequence. Cipriano filed a complaint for breach of contract of It is not disputed that the carrier operates as a CC in the carriage. except where such amount of the loss. they are presumed to have been at fault incurring liabilities as a or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost. it continued to be a public carrier. provided the charter is limited to the ship only. COURT OF APPEALS establishes the general rule that CC are responsible for the F: Planters purchased urea fertilizer from Mitsubishi. destruction. In this case. Judicial basis and one offering service on an occasional. It also business transacted. or association the vessel and the crew. vessel is let to the charterer with a transfer to him of its Petitioner failed to deliver the cargo. its officers and crew were under the the hijacking was a force majeure. is let by the owner to another F: Rodolfo Cipriano. V. reimbursement from petitioner but the latter refused to pay. insofar as such particular voyage is passengers or goods or both. Even CC are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods. In those cases person or firm acts as a common carrier. under its direct supervision and control. 1745 provides that a CC cannot be contamination of the fertilizer was discovered. as in the case of a timecharter or a H: (1) Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both carrier as "(a) person. The presumption of implementing regulations. The CA reversed." The test to determine a common carrier is "whether the given I: WON the carrier is liable for damages. Otherwise. Cipriano demanded the master and the crew. and would be presumption of negligence does not attach and these offensive to public policy. a whole. Art. of the CC.who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. entered into a person for a specified time or use. between a carrier offering its services to the general public and one who offers services or solicits business only from a (2) Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary narrow segment of the population. 221 SCRA 318 some principal part thereof. PPI sent a allowed to divest or diminish his responsibility even for acts claim letter to SSA. Article 1734 PLANTERS PRODUCTS INC. and CIPTRADE subcontracted with petitioner Estrellita Bascos to (2) charter by demise or bareboat charter where the whole transport and deliver the 400 sacks of soya beans. water or air. Such enumeration is a closed list. contended that the provisions on CC do not apply to them violence or force. and that the ship captain. representing CIPTRADE. private respondent need not introduce any evidence to NO. negligence was raised against petitioner. for concerned. NO. it would be to reward persons who fail to or deteriorated. without regard to where the presumption is applied. La Union. contrary to her assertion.

or air. I: 1. water. no proof was F: Asia Lighterage and Shipping.R. the private respondent indemnified the affirmed the decision of the trial court. or air for transporting passengers or goods or both.22.654. consignee sent a claim letter to the are not a common carrier. turned over and landed on its left side. offering their services to the public. coming to a full stop The next day. 1732. the Fabres.Private respondent refrained from making such distinctions. On jointly and severally to the plaintiffs. Petitioner is a common carrier. 1990.35) to the consignee‘s the loss or damage to the goods it carried. No.000. 1991. other hand contended that they are not liable since they On the same date. However. Article 1732 does not distinguish between a community or population. PSTSI III was tied the amount of P3. then was transferred to 3 other barges. It was driven by Porfirio Cabil. CA (G. but to no avail. private respondent Word for the It appears that on August 17. Inc. The cargo was transferred to it’s custody on July 25. so that petitioner Cabil. Whether petitioner is a common carrier. transpo . There is also no distinction regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on between a person or enterprise offering transportation an occasional.the care of the cargo.00. the The usual route to Caba. compensation. Further. which was running at the speed of September 5. for compensation. firms or associations 1732 defines common carriers as persons. consignee in the amount of P4. 1990. and one who offers services or carrier offering its services to the general public. Jr. The total proceeds from the sale of the salvaged spouses were also made jointly liable. episodic or unscheduled basis. resulting in the total loss of the remaining road. A few days after. petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp The barge was then towed to ISLOFF terminal curve on the highway. The road was slippery because it was before it finally headed towards the consignee’s wharf on raining. did not have to exercised extraordinary care and diligence in its care and be engaged in the business of public transportation for the custody of the consignee’s cargo. Common H: 1. its front portion. Upon reaching the Sta. by land. They used the bus principally On August 15. several 1990. and one who does such carrying a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a only as an ancillary activity. 900 metric tons of the in connection with a bus service for school children which shipment was loaded on barge PSTSI III for delivery to they operated in Manila. 22 December principal business activity is the carrying of persons or 1988) it was held that the definition of common carriers in goods or both. H: Petition was denied. by land. and one who does such carrying only as an Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinction between ancillary activity (in local idiom. Article one whose principal business activity is the carrying of 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between persons or goods or both. the transport World Christian Fellowship Inc. owners of a Mazda minibus.. to skid to the left road shoulder. 5 days later.150 metric tons of Better Western White remiss in the exercise of due diligence in order to minimize Wheat in bulk.771.e. as "a sideline"). Spouses Fabre on the cargo was P201.192. Mesa spillways. the petitioner proceeded to Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in pull the barge to Engineering Island off Baseco to seek consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners shelter from the approaching typhoon. The Supreme Court held that this case actually involves a 2. the general basis. offering their services to the public. 7 days later. Inc was contracted as adduced by the petitioner showing that the carrier was carrier to deliver 3. (General Milling Corporation) warehouse at Bo. The hole was then patched with clay and cement. 1984. It repair. corporations. Petitioners. However. barge developed a list because of a hole it sustained after Pangasinan. engaged in the business of carrying or transporting firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or passengers or goods or both. At 11:30 that night. APPEALS 4 katrinab. We think that Article 1732 deliberately segment of the general population . On the other hand. Spouses Fabre are common carriers. consignee. The RTC of Makati ruled in favor petitioner. corporations. Ugong. L-47822. who was unfamiliar with the filed a Marine Protest on August 28. and his wife were P14. a portion of the goods road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano. causing the bus. 1990. Pasig City. but that of buying used bottles and scrap ASIA LIGHTERAGE AND SHIPPING V.104. Because of the mishap. 1990 to of the plaintiff and the defendants were ordered to pay the private respondent for the value of the lost cargo. The above article makes no distinction between one whose In De Guzman vs. Thereafter. it sought recovery of said amount from the I: Whether the spouses Fabre are common carriers? petitioner. the towing bits of the barge broke. The bus came to rest off the sank completely. Pangasinan. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed cargo. and another letter dated September 18. against loss/damage for Facts: Petitioners Engracio Fabre. episodic or unscheduled services to the "general public. To avoid The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the the complete sinking of the barge. COURT OF metal in Pangasinan and selling these items in Manila. water. A 2nd Marine Protest was filed on September 7. (WWCF) arranged with the of said cargo was suspended due to a warning of an petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its incoming typhoon. provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held: 10 Art. Ernesto Cendaña was considered to be a common carrier even if his principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others. Neither does service on a regular/scheduled basis and one offering such Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its service on an occasional. 50 kilometers per hour. was forced to take a the services of Gaspar Salvaging Corporation to refloat the detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen. the barge again ran aground due to strong current. COURT OF APPEALS Guarantee and Assurance.379. Assuming petitioner is a common carrier. a bidding was conducted to dispose of the damaged wheat retrieved & loaded on the 3 other Criminal complaint was filed against the driver and the barges. On November 2. and one solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow population.75. 1990. the bridge at Carmen was under hitting an unseen protuberance underneath the water. as subrogee.621.75. Article carriers are persons." i. 1990 and also secured area (it being his first trip to La Union). (US$423. whether it contract of carriage. The Court of Appeals January 30. the cargo did not reach its destination. It only after a series of impacts. The shipment was insured by Prudential FABRE V. down to other barges which arrived ahead of it while weathering out the storm that night. La Union was through Carmen. barge. passengers were injured particularly Amyline Antonio.

421. which Therefore. it had already previously sustained damage place to another for a fixed price. the typhoon as force majeure to escape liability for the loss sustained by the private respondent. transpo . whether international or representing the difference between the sum she paid for civil. neither a private nor vessel was refloated but its hole was patched with only clay a common carrier. destroyed or deteriorated. even before the towing bits of the themselves to transport persons. was former’s scheduled manner. a contract of carriage or transportation is one occurrence of the typhoon to prevent/minimize the loss. Surely. tour’s services as a travel agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking Moreover. (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing respondent company refused to reimburse the amount. earthquake. petitioner fits the test of a common carrier as bits of the vessel broke that caused its sinking and the total laid down in Bascos vs. B) Will she be entitled to damages? However. deliver petitioner’s travel documents and plane tickets. gave Menor the full payment for the upheld. Caravan travel and recklessly exposed the cargo to further damage. Estela went to have acted negligently if the goods NAIA on Saturday. Inc. typhoon “Loleng” has already the latter ipso facto is a common carrier. when since its covenant with its customers is simply to make petitioner persisted to proceed with the voyage.. Common carriers are responsible for the loss. The partly-submerged passengers or goods and is therefore. which negligence does not attach: cost P20. Subsequently. flight scheduled on June 14. during and after the By definition. the common carrier must previous day. CA (G. two hours Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary before her flight on board British Airways. prosper? it should not be held liable for the loss of the cargo. loss of the cargo upon reaching the Pasig River. it was no 221 SCRA 318). to arrange and facilitate goods by water for compensation. Despite several demands. Travel and Tours acted merely as an agent of the airline. the officers/employees resulting loss suffered by the obligee. Estela filed (5) Order/act of competent public authority. ticketing and accommodation in a tour dubbed common carrier.” In the case at bar. to take the flight for the first leg of her are lost. Thus. In the case at bar. The patch work was merely a provisional undertake to transport Estela from one place to another remedy. or other natural Upon petitioner’s return from Europe. resulting in the total loss of its cargo.R. with whom the former ultimately contracted for her Accordingly. diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. the barge completely sank after its towing bits broke. she demanded from disaster or calamity. i. It even suffered a hole. Article 1734 of the Civil Menor to complain. when it hit a sunken object while docked at the Engineering From the above definition. destruction flight she was supposed to take had already departed the or deterioration of the goods. During the time While Estela concededly bought her plane ticket through that the barge was heading towards the consignee’s wharf the efforts of respondent company. this could not be an entity engaged in the business of transporting either solely attributed to the typhoon. "Jewels of Europe". 1734. The package tour cost her P74.70. A) Will the action Petitioner claims that this was caused by a typhoon. She was given a 5% discount on the amount. for the "British Pageant" tour. She thus called up however. Petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence package tour. She gave caravan travel and tours P7. At most. or deterioration of the goods. Aquino International Airport (NAIA) on Saturday. Crisostomo contracted the services of Caravan public. Menor prevailed upon Code enumerates the instances when the presumption of Estela to take another tour the "British Pageant”. and the booking fee was also waived carrying of goods is done on an irregular rather than because petitioner’s niece. Petitioner is clearly a her booking.00 as partial payment and commenced the trip in July destruction. Meriam Menor. for there was no contract of carriage. lightning. 980. despite knowledge of an incoming typhoon. the petitioner cannot invoke the occurrence of carriage to Europe. lighterage and drayage. things. respondent the reimbursement of P61. Caravan entered the Philippine area of responsibility.00. They are presumed to have been at fault or to Without checking her travel documents. not enough for the barge to sail safely. this does not mean that on September 5. 101089. Art. The typhoon then is not is “whether the given undertaking is a part of the business the proximate cause of the loss of the cargo. The findings of the lower courts should be Estela. the petitioner admitted that it is engaged in the business of CRISOSTOMO V. meeting a B) No. a complaint against Caravan travel and Tours for breach of contract of carriage and damages. 881. 322. Menor then told her to be at the Ninoy in its care and custody of the consignee’s goods. a human engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the factor. 2. exceptions to this rule.70. negligence had intervened. or in the containers. is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood. Caravan Travel and Tours is not Island. unless the same 1991. (2) Act of the public enemy in war.e. Caravan Travel and Tours did not and cement. it has exercised due diligence before. She learned that her plane ticket was for the prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence.To be sure. 07 April 1993. COURT OF APPEALS shipping. despite its limited clientele for carrying/transporting Travel and Tours International. "Jewels of Europe" and the amount she owed respondent (3) Act/omission of the shipper/owner of the goods. petitioner failed to prove that the typhoon is the proximate and only cause of the loss of the goods. petitioner is a common carrier whether its included airfare. hence. The negligence of the obligor in the performance of typhoon head-on falls short of due diligence required from the obligation renders him liable for damages for the a common carrier. To overcome the journey from Manila to Hongkong. petitioner still headed to the consignee’s wharf customers for tours. it travel arrangements in their behalf. No. offering its barges to the F: Estela L. She discovered that the presumption of negligence in the case of loss. More importantly. and with an only limited clientele. The test to determine a common carrier longer affected by the typhoon. and that R: No. Clearly. whereby a certain person or association of persons obligate The evidence show that. Fault or negligence of themselves of petitioner admitted that when the towing 5 katrinab. A common carrier need not have fixed and publicly known routes. storm. company’s ticketing manager. contending that the same was non-refundable. or news from one barge broke. 1990. 1991. There are. in turn. general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted. Neither does it have to maintain terminals or issue Menor went to her aunt’s residence on a Wednesday to tickets.

transportation). carriers acted negligently but not maliciously. on its own the equal protection of the laws. The upon payment of cost price of its useful eqpt. he. Pantranco challenged the of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as 6 katrinab. to the extent of the interest he had thus From the foregoing. which is to Estela. Common carriers are subject to legislative regulation. nature of the obligation so demands. is essential to justify an award of moral damages.-. taking property without due process. The business of a common carrier holds such a contention. The application was granted with two carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. YES. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the Tours performed its prestation under the contract as well as use. grants to the public an interest in land transfers and sightseeing excursions. the presumption is that common years and (2) that the service can be acquired by the govt. In an action for damages. he. therefore. When. in effect. I: WON the PSC may prescribe the 2 conditions as a In the case at bar. bad faith or malice in the sense reasonable depreciation. it is clear that the Caravan Travel and created. wanton or deliberately injurious conduct. prepared the interest. the common good. the CFI awarded actual damages. were likewise delivered superinduced upon it the right of public regulation. contrary to Estela’s conditions. 15. so plainly and palpably unreasonable as to make their enforcement equivalent to the taking of property for public I: WON moral damages may be awarded. use without such compensation as under all circumstances H: In case of breach of contract (including one of is just both to the owner and to the public. therefore. or denying Board of Transportation may. The law was designed primarily not to interfere with legislative regulations unless they are for the protection of the public interest. but so long as he maintains the use. constitutes neither a franchise nor a contract.e. consisting of the tour peculiar relation to the public interest that there is itinerary. I: WON the approval of the PSC is necessary for the sale of nor of limiting or prescribing irrevocably vested rights or a public service vehicle even without conveying therewith privileges lawfully acquired under a charter or franchise the authority to operate the same.The business of a common carrier holds such FORES V. conditions: (1) that the CPCN would be valid for only 25 Under the law. by which the PSC is guided in imposing such reflected the departure date and time. transpo . The exception to this is when a PANTRANCO V. This right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon the police power. confers no property rights and is a mere license or privilege. after due hearing. [just compensation. less distinction between fraud. for the protection of the public Art. property without due process of law. The Caravan Travel and When private property is affected with a public Tours also properly booked Estela for the tour. PSC mishap results in the death of a passenger. nor of confiscating.-. especially inasmuch as the motion or on petition of any interested question WON private property shall be devoted to a public party. due process of law] H: A transfer made without the requisite approval of the PSC is not effective and binding in so far as the When judiciary may interfere with legislative responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in relation regulation of common carriers. settled that the power of the state to exercise legislative Hence. It one devotes his property to a use in which the public has arranged Estela’s hotel accommodation as well as food. grants to excessive speed. and if he voluntarily places his any common carrier that repeatedly fails to property in public service he cannot complain that it comply with his or its duty to observe becomes subject to the regulatory powers of the state.the obligor consists in his failure to exercise due care and constitutionality of Art. The [Public Service Commission] contracts. in effect. CA 146 as an undue delegation prudence in the performance of the obligation as the of legislative powers. either as impairing the obligation of Art. necessary documents and procured the plane tickets. The CA Limitation on power to regulate. The travel documents.. it ceases to be juris privati only. 1765 as well as the utilities themselves.—Such regulations reduced the actual damages and added moral damages must not have the effect of depriving an owner of his and attorney's fees. in which a CC is F: Pantranco has been engaged for the past 20 years in the liable to pay moral damages for the business of transporting passengers by means of motor mental anguish by reason of the death of the passenger. was a passenger of superinduced upon it the right of public regulation. Nature of Business. Indeed this right is so far beyond question that it is tour. new trucks. When. in accordance that use. he must submit to everything else that was essential to book Estela for the control. moral with the PSC an application for authorization to operate 10 damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the addtl. vehicles in accordance with the CPCN issued to it.The judiciary ought to the public is concerned. proof of bad faith or fraud. CA 146 provides a sufficient standard. cancel the use and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for certificate of public convenience granted to the owner to decide. an interest. the driver lost control of it causing it to the public an interest in that use. Estela cannot recover and must bear her own control over public utilities may be exercised through the damage. diligence in performing its obligations under the contract and followed standard procedure in rendering its services H: Yes. legitimate exercise thereof. While the jeep was interest. vouchers and instructions. Such statutes are not unconstitutional. Caravan Travel and Tours exercised due prerequisite to the issuance of the CPCN. The plane ticket issued to petitioner clearly public interest. a professor of Fine Arts. where the injured passenger does not die. to her two days prior to the trip. and must submit to be swerve and hit the bridge wall resulting to injuries to its controlled by the public for the common good. This extraordinary diligence as prescribed in this is more so in the light of authorities which hold that a CPC Section. and statutes for the control and regulation of utilities are a 2. i. and must submit to be controlled by the public for with its avowed undertaking. The a jeep registered in the name of Fores but actually business of a common carrier is affected with public operated by Carmen Sackerman. board of commissioners. to the extent passengers including respondent who suffered a fracture of of the interest he had thus created. MIRANDA a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is F: Respondent. one devotes his property to a use descending at Sta. It filed So. power of State to regulate. the upper right humerus. Mesa bridge at in which the public has an interest. 1765. or appropriating private property without just compensation.

and as the Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light. The public must of necessity act or omissions cause damage which amount to the rely on the care and skill of CC in the vigilance over the breach of a contract. passengers is further set forth in Articles 1755 H: YES. 1733 injured or to be relieved from responsibility Art. differing essentially. is not based upon a mere presumption goods and safety of the passengers of the master's negligence in their selection or control. YES. 5. A.The for the negligence of its servants.L.where a H: The facts of the case show that the bus and the pick-up registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving were approaching each other head-on. Common carriers. Proof of the contract and of its driver. faith of the govt. 1735. to note that the foundation of the legal diligence which means that they must render service with liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage. and its of the vehicle in contemplation of law. CANGCO V. and therefore.One whereby a person who has been from Albay. vehicle registered in his name. That vehicle.-. As it drew up to the station. Its they are discharged and delivered to the consignees.Registered owner is nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant primarily and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the recovery.-. and the greatest skill and utmost foresight. A carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred person or to one who possesses no property with which to from a mere finding that the contract was breached respond financially for the damage or injury done. it would be easy the right and went over a pile of stones and gravel. As a result. AMMEN F: Plaintiff boarded defendant's bus as a paying passenger Kabit system." I: WON defendant observed extra-ordinary diligence or the Reason for holding registered owner liable. extra-ordinary diligence. watermelons causing him to slip and his right arm was crushed. the business of CC is impressed The liability of masters and employers for the negligent with a special public duty and therefore subject to control acts or omissions of their servants or agents. it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his public that he intended to assume it. Plaintiff chose to hold defendant liable on its contrary to public policy. leased or transferred to another person it. an employee of MRR. when such and regulation by the state. and it assumed that character. in case through negligence of the carrier's employees.-.The law requires CC to exercise extraordinary It is impt. Nos.m. 1733. as regards the public nonperformance could not be excused by proof that the and third persons. and as such is responsible for the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants. 1734. that the obligation to respond for the damage which The extra-ordinary diligence required of carriers in the plaintiff has suffered arises. for a fee or percentage of the earnings.-. and 1745. and 1756. actually operating the provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains.The laws applicable to breach of his contract. if at all. their presence constituted an effective legal cause of the Extraordinary diligence required of common injuries sustained by Cangco. pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant. MRR are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in F: Jose Cangco. It cannot be doubted that the EEs of the railroad co. contractual obligation. was riding on its the vigilance over the goods and for the safety train. which can be rebutted by nature of the business of common carriers and the proof of the exercise of due care in the selection and exigencies of public policy demand that they observe supervision of EEs (culpa aquiliana). were guilty of negligence in piling sacks on the platform.6. This happened between 7 and 8 p. from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. The bus collided with a pick-up truck which was granted a certificate of public convenience allows other coming from the opposite direction trying to swerve from a persons who own vehicles to operate them under such pile of gravel. even if the said vehicle had The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with already been sold. by implication. responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or consequence of registration -. Registered owner primarily and solidarily liable with or of his servants or agents.—The law utmost diligence of a very cautious person in avoiding the does not relieve the registered owner directly of the collision. of an accident. As he alighted. his foot stepped on a sack of according to the circumstances of each case. void and inexistent. consequences incident to its operation. and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this Rigorous law on common carriers not applicable to regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the special employment as carrier. his left arm was completely license. at the time of the accident. it constitutes an imposition upon the good driver of the pick-up negligent and not that of the bus. the registered owner should not be allowed to disprove his ownership to the prejudice of the person 3. The bus swerved to who the supposed transferee or owner is. under the "kabit system. ISAAC V. The operator of record continues to be the operator duty. was direct and immediate. Nature and Basis of liability Art. exit. Plaintiff brought this action for "this is a pernicious system that cannot be too severely damages which the lower court dismissed holding the condemned. the plaintiff made his of the passengers transported by them. to escape 7 katrinab. nor by his conduct and from the is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the nature of his business justified the belief on the part of the contract. being contractual. This is severed."-. from that presumptive responsibility Reasons for requiring extra-ordinary diligence. and 7.mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite ignored. objects over the goods is further expressed in Articles on the platform were difficult to see. the duty to carry him in safety and to who was. transpo . Despite for him by collusion with others or otherwise. When the facts averred show a CC are rigorous and should not be extended to a person contractual who has neither expressly undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff. liability is direct and immediate (culpa contractual). such owner/operator of record is held in contemplation of law as the employer of the driver. carriers. handling of the goods of the shippers and consignees last from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of from the time the cargoes are loaded in the vessels until defendant to exercise due care in its performance. while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the I: WON MRR is liable to pay damages for the acts of its EEs.

Rabbit bus bumped from behind (2) Fault was not established. and this disputable presumption may only be its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to diligence or that the death or injury of the passenger was force majeure. frequently occur in connection with rapid modern transportation. to all the removing the award for compensatory damages and circumstances of each case replacing it with nominal damages. F: Several passengers boarded the jeepney owned by (3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with spouses Mangune and driven by Manalo at Dau. Liability will be based on Tort the jeepney. Cases were filed against (3) No. travel. He got into an altercation with the SG common carriers is calculated to Escartin. In culpa contractual. Manalo. The CA also blamed LRTA for not having presented ordinary diligence expert evidence showing that the emergency brakes could (4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of not have stopped the train on time. (2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person. (Insurance co. PHIL. the simple proof of injury. RABBIT V. making from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to a sudden U-turn and encroaching on the right of way of the exercise the high diligence required of a common carrier. it being it duty to prove that it exercised extra. (Roman) the LRTA.the efforts of the bus driver. the train driver. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other Art. Rabbit and De los cannot co-exist with compensatory damages. It is an established rule that nominal damages the spouses Mangune. Phil. there is breach if it fails driver Romero jointly and severally liable as well as to exert extra-ordinary diligence accdg. the victim is entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver. 2176 in conjunction 8 katrinab. a carrier is The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of presumed to have been at fault or been negligent. plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence liability personal instead of merely vicarious and since he placed his left elbow outside the window. having due The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage regard for all the circumstances already existed between Navidad and LRTA (by virtue of his (3) a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability was to have caused by the mere fact of Navidad's death after being hit acted negligently in case of death of. unless negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the contradicted by other evidence. due to a fortuitous event. liable would make the carrier's Furthermore. The passenger. the SC held that the jeep common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due made a sudden U-turn which was so abrupt that the other diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or driver de los Reyes did not anticipate the sudden U-turn. On the injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or willful presumption that the drivers who bump the rear of another acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or vehicle are guilty and the cause of the accident. other vehicles. bound for Carmen. (Prudent). 3 persons died under Art. and in the event of sense of caution one should observe cannot always be contractual liability. or injury to. 1759 I: Who should be held liable? the Mangunes and Filriters and 1763 of the New Civil Code Guaranty Assurance Corp. This high standard of care is imperatively The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against demanded by the preciousness of human life and by the Escartin. the Metro consideration that every person must in every way be Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency safeguarded against all injury. Upon reaching Tarlac. The CA (1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train arises upon breach of its obligation. in pursuance to then contract of carriage. 1755. 2176 of the New Civil Code. with due regard for all F: Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding circumstances. the pick up car still hit the rear contract of carriage is between the carrier and the left side of the bus. so it was running in an of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arising unbalanced position. The Phil. Manalo stepped on the brake. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the protect the passengers from the tragic mishaps that tracks and was killed when a train came and ran over him.) A common carrier is required by these above statutory Ratio: The principle of last clear chance would call for provisions to use utmost diligence in carrying passengers application in a suit between the owners and drivers of two with due regard for all circumstances. even if such breach be due to predicament where he is not given enough time to take the the negligence of the driver. the right H: (1) Yes. consequently. This obligation exists colliding vehicles. Pangasinan. the carrier is exclusively responsible expected from one who is placed suddenly in a therefore to the passenger. Reyes (driver). To make the driver jointly proper course of action under ordinary circumstances. Ratio: A CC is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. I: (1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death. NAVIDAD diligence of very cautious persons. Pampanga compensatory damages. omission. RATIO: Liability of LRTA – Read Arts. by the train being managed by the LRTA and operated by passengers. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract wheel of the jeepney was detached. Their contract with Manalo was P24 for the trip. Rosales. This extra-ordinary diligence required of platform of the LRT. while the others sustained injuries. and by Manalo and the spouses Mangune. The trial court found Prudent and Escartin jointly Principles as to liability of CC: and severally liable for damages to the heirs. it would be for a tort under Art. IAC (2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or driver was likewise guilty of negligence. It does not arise where a passenger not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its passengers are within its premises where they ought to be contractual obligations. In case of such death or injury. As a result of the collision.1756. Roman. The driver cannot be held jointly liable with the owners of Liability of Security Agency – If Prudent is to be held the jeep in case of breach of the contract of carriage. transpo . The liable. the passenger is relieved of the duty carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of negligently. using the utmost LRTA V.

and 1745. However. Japan for transportation to Manila 5. offering their even which is an exempting circumstance under Sec. where tort is that which breaches the contract. from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. water. accdg. the rights and obligations of responsible for the loss. is suppletory care and foresight can provide. Laws applicable Art. a fine. each case. Nominal damages In the second case. to all the Art. a special law. It is General Merchandise. has been violated or invaded by the defendant. be described? It would be EASTERN SHIPPING V. (b) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). 1733. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort F: These two cases. the same vessel took on board 128 are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff.6. in 2 containers. In all matters not regulated by circumstances of each case. resulting in the total loss aquiliana. while the extraordinary diligence for the Philippines. storm. the M/S ASIATICA." However. Ratio: (1) The law of the country to which the goods are to Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance be transported governs the liability of the common carrier over the goods is further expressed in in case of their loss. Insurance and Surety Corporation. with a due regard for all circumstances.039 consigned to Phil. petitioner Carrier and won (affirmed by the CA). 1755. 1755 marine insurance values and were subrogated to the rights of the latter as the insured. Common carriers are this Code. of their business and for reasons of public policy. the COGSA.75 consigned to Central parties. 4(2) services to the public. (a) that the loss was due to an extraordinary fortuitous or air. Prudent. Both sets of goods were insured against tort. utmost diligence of very cautious persons. vessel operated by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines. the ship caught fire and sank. in all matters not in Articles 1755 and 1756. 1735. As the Articles 1734. It does not fall within the category of an act of God unless 9 katrinab. the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Art. and Dowa with compensatory damages. firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting Petitioner carrier denies liability on the ff. a liability for tort may arise even under a contract. using the to the provisions of the Civil Code. or deterioration of the common carriers shall be governed by the goods unless the same is due to any of the ff. carriage of goods from foreign ports to Philippine ports contractual breach – How then must the liability of the common carrier. may be consigned to Mariveles Apparel Corporation. disaster or calamity. which cartons of garment fabrics and accessories. marine risk for their stated value with respondent Devt. This must be so as it arises almost subsidiary application to common carriers. both for the recovery of value of cargo and when the same act or omission causes the injury. (b) that when fire is established.with Art. En route for Manila. They filed suits against the Art. one insurance. Fire & Marine Insurance Co. P256. on the one hand. A common carrier is bound to Commerce and carry the passengers safely as far as human special laws. transpo . The award was deleted. and cargoes in question were transported from Japan to the 7. from the nature negligence is shifted to the cargo shipper. 2180. destruction or deterioration. 1766. lightning or other natural New Civil Code primarily governs common carriers. 1766. the sinking of the resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa M/S ASIATICA when it caught fire.The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. we are of the opinion that fire may Transportation and Maritime Commerce] and special laws not be considered a natural [Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Nominal Damages . its employees. the burden of proving Art. The law of the country to established. In the first case. on the other hand. and an independent contractor. Once the fault of the employee Escartin is Art. 1733. Salvage Act] have only disaster or calamity. the liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed safety of the passengers is further set forth primarily by the Civil Code. the contract can be said to have been breached by Textile Mills. Common carriers.1766] primarily The Carrier claims that the loss of the vessel by fire govern common carriers and the provisions of the Code of exempts it from liability under the phrase "natural disaster Commerce [Overland or calamity.000 differently.361. are bound to observe extraordinary I: (1) Which law should govern: the Civil Code or the diligence in the vigilance over the goods and Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. the employer. would be held liable on which the goods are to be transported shall the presumption that it did not exercise the diligence of a govern the liability of the common carrier for good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their loss. and 2 cases of vindicated or recognized. Blooming Mills and 7 cases of delictual liability had no contract existed between the spare parts valued at P92. xxx" The Provisions of the Civil Code [1732. thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. The insurers paid the corresponding 4. corporations. Stated loaded at Kobe. NCC): "(1) Flood. 5. are bound 5.-. by land. destruction or deterioration. grounds: passengers or goods or both. when an act which constitutes a breach of pieces of colorized lance pipes in 28 packages valued at contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi. regulated by said Code. The provisions of the NCC primarily govern contracts of Relationship between contractual and non. 1734. and not for the purpose of surveying instruments consigned to Aman Enterprises and indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. according to the circumstances of carrier. for compensation. arose from the same incident. The 128 cartons were insured by an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist respondent Nisshin Fire and Marine Insurance Co. (2) Under the Civil Code. Nos. NCC. (Art. common carriers. 1753. invariably from some act of man or by human means. Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. destruction. 1753 to observe extra-ordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods. causes only Code of Commerce and by special laws. In of ship and cargo. 1732. Common carriers are persons. Classes of common carriers Art. Thus. earthquake. for the safety of the passengers transported (2) Who has the burden of proof to show negligence of the by them. 1732. IAC solidary.

as subrogees of the lack of diligence in that when the smoke was noticed. 1734. transpo . have proven that the transported goods fire was already big. the complete defense afforded by the required under Art. 1734. unless it proves that carrier. the respective Insurers. unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the negligently. loss was caused by fire. it is Consequently. Petitioner carrier has also proven that the fire must have started 24 hrs before the same was noticed. and that the carrier has exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the 10 katrinab. Petitioner Carrier can not under which the fire originated and spread are such as to escape liability for the loss of the cargo. the loss. satisfactorily. The burden then is upon Petitioner and that after the cargoes were stored in the hatches. Nor may Petitioner Carrier seek refuge from liability under As the peril of fire is not comprehended within the the COGSA. both the TC and the CA. found. And even if fire show that Petitioner carrier or its servants were negligent in were to be considered a natural disaster within the connection therewith. the cargo shippers. Having failed to discharge the the voyage. loss before. no carrier to prove that it has exercised the extra-ordinary regular inspection was made as to their condition during diligence required by law. in effect." it has observed the extra-ordinary diligence required by law. It may even be caused by the actual fault or privity of the This petitioner carrier has also failed to establish carrier. during or after the occurrence of the disaster.caused by lightning or by other natural disaster or calamity. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be in all cases other than those mentioned in Art. burden of proving that it had exercised the extra-ordinary The foregoing suffices to show that the circumstances diligence required by law. In this case. 1739 of the same Code that the natural COGSA when the loss results from fire is unavailing to disaster must have been the proximate and only cause of petitioner carrier.4 (2). that the have been lost. meaning of Art. that there was "actual fault" of the carrier shown by In this case. then Article 1735 provides that "Sec. as a fact. the CC responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from: (b) shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted Fire. It is provided therein that: exceptions in Article 1734.