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JOINT TRAINING

FOR NIGHT AIR
WARFARE
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15. SUBJECT TERMS
Close air support - Study and teaching - United States; Night fighting (Military science) - Study and
teaching - United States
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unclassified unclassified unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Joint Training for Night Air Warfare

by

Brian W. McLean, Lt Col, USAF
Research Fellow
Airpower Research Institute

Winner of the Air Force Historical Foundation's
1991 ColonelJames Cannell Memorial Award

Air University Press
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5532

October 1992
Library
Library of
of Congress
Congress Cataloging-in-Publication
Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Data

McLean, Brian
McLean, Brian WW..
Joint
Joint training for night
training for night air
air warfare
warfare /by
/ by Brian
Brian W.
W. McLean.
McLean,
p.
p. cm.cm.
Includes
Includes bibliographical
bibliographical references.
references.
1I.. Close
Close air
air support-Study
support—Study and and teaching-United
teaching—^United States.
States.
22.. Night
Night fighting
fighting (Military
(Military science)--Study
science)—Study andand teaching-United
teaching—United States
States..
I.
I. Title.
Title.
UG703
UG703.M38 .M38 1992
1992
358.4' 142'07073-dc20
358.4'142'07073—dc20 92-27734
92-27734
CIP
CIP

DISCLAIIAER
DISCLAIMER

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This publication
publication was was produced
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interest of
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national
national defense-related
defense-related concepts.
concepts. The
The views
views expressed
expressed inin this
this publication
publication
are those
are those of
of the
the author
author and
and do
do not
not reflect
reflect the
the official
official policy
policy or
or position
position of
ofthe
the
Department
Department of of Defense
Defense or or the
the United
United States
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ii
Contents
Contents

Chapter
Chapter Page
Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DISCLAIMER iiii
FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FOREWORD vii
vii
ABOUT
ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
THE AUTHOR ix
ix
PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PREFACE xi
xi
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INTRODUCTION xv
xv
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Notes xvii
xvii

11 HISTORY
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AND BACKGROUND . . 11
Joint Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Joint Operations . . 11
Night Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Night Operations . . 55
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary . . 14
14
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Notes . . 15
15
22 DOING
DOING IT
IT IN
IN THE
THE DARKTHE
DARK—THE CHALLENGE . ..
CHALLENGE ..... 17
17
Operation Tae Kwon
Operation Tae Kwon Do Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
19
Mission Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mission Planning . . . . . . . . . . 22
22
Offensive Coimterair . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Offensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . 23
23
Defensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Defensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . 34
34
On-Call Close Air
On-CaU Close Air Support
Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
35
Mission Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mission Execution . . . . . . . . . . 37
37
Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Offensive Counterair
Offensive . . . . . . . . . . 38
38
Defensive Counterair
Defensive Coimterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
47
On-Call
On-Call Close
Close Air Support . . . . . . . . .
Air Support . . . . . . . . . . 48
48
Mission Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mission Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . 51
51
Summary
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
52
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Notes . . . . . . . . . . 53
53

iii
Chapter
Chapter Page
Page

PHOTO
PHOTO SECTION
SECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
55
33 CURRENT
CURRENT TRAINING
TEIAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
61
Requirements
Requirements for for Realistic
Realistic Training
Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
62
Red
Red Flag
Hag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
64
Naval Strike
Naval Strike Warfare
Warfare CenterCenter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
71
National
National Training
Training CenterCenter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
72
Twehtynine
Tweiitynine Palms
Palms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
74
Cope Thunder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cope Thunder . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
75
Team
Team Spirit
Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
77
Summary . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
79
Notes
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
79
44 CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS AND
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS .....
... 83
83
Expanding
Expanding Air Force Night
Air Force Night Capability
Capability . . . . . . . . . . . 85
85
Recommendation 1 : Implement Red
Recommendation 1: Implement Red Flag
Flag
2000 Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2000 Proposal 86
86
Recommendation
Recommendation 2: 2: Initiate
Initiate Annual
Annual NightNight
Cope Thunder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cope Thunder 88
88
Expanding
Expanding Joint
Joint Capability
Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
88
Recommendation
Recommendation 3: 3: Develop
Develop More More Extensive
Extensive
Joint Force Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Joint Force Tactics 89
89
Recommendation
Recommendation 4: 4: Expand
Expand Formal
Formal Joint Joint
Training Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Training Programs 89
89
Recommendation
Recommendation 5: 5: Begin
Begin Mission
Mission Commanders'
Commanders'
School
School at
at Red
Red Flag
Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
90
Recommendation 6:
Recommendation 6: Initiate
Initiate Annual
Annual Unified
Unified
Command
Command Red Red Flag
Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
92
Developing Joint Night Capability
Developing Joint Night Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
93
Recommendation
Recommendation 7: 7: Expand
Expand JointJoint Night
Night
Training
Training at
at Each
Each Center
Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
93
Recommendation 8: Increase
Recommendation 8: Increase Joint
Joint Night
Night
Operations
Operations atat Team
Team Spirit
Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
94
Recommendation 9: Develop an
Recommendation 9: Develop an Annual
Annual
Unified Command Exercise
Unified Command Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
94

iv
Chapter
Chapter Page
P"?'

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary 96
96
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. .• .•
Notes 97
97
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INDEX 99
99

Illustrations
Illustrations
Figure
Figure

11 The
The Korean
Korean Peninsula and Operation
Peninsula and Operation Tae
Tae Kwon
Kwon Do
Do .. .. .. 18
18
22 Aspect
Aspect Angle
Angle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
42

Table
Table

11 Available Assets for
Available Assets for Operation
Operation Tae
Tae Kwon
Kwon Do
Do . . . . . . . . 21
21
22 Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki OCA
OCA Mission
Mission Package
Package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
33
Foreword
Foreword

The
The reality of today's
reality of today's world
world is is that although the
that although the threat
threat ofWorld
of World WarWar
III
in may
may bebe greatly
greatly reduced,
reduced, the the possibility
possibility of of wars involving American
wars involving American
troops remains high. These wars probably will be conducted by
troops remains high. These wars probably will be conducted by large
large
and complex
and complex jointjoint staffs and likely
staffs and likely will
wUl be be characterized
characterized by by intense
intense
activity
activity carried out regardless
carried out regardless ofweather,
of weather, time time ofof day,
day, or or seasons
seasons of of the
the
year . Our most recent experiences in Panama, Grenada, Libya, and the
year. Our most recent experiences in Panama, Grenada, Libya, and the
Persian Gulf have
Persian Gulf have proven
proven thatthat modern
modem war war requires
requires joint
joint air,
air, land,
land, and
and
naval
naval forces fighting both
forces fighting both day
day and
and night.
night. Are
Are we we preparing
preparing to do this?
to do this?
Are we training for air operations
Are we training for air operations using
using all
all forces
forces at
at our
our disposal
disposal in
in aa
war
war that
that may begin in
may begin in the
the middle
middle of of the
the night?
night?
The author's contention is that training for
The author's contention is that training for night
night air air operations,
operations,
particularly
particularly with our sister
with our sister services,
services, is is in
in its infancy. Using
its infancy. Using hishis personal
personal
experience
experience he he sets
sets out
out to
to recommend
recommend better better uses
uses ofthe
of the training
training facilities
facilities
of all the services to improve the situation . After
of all the services to improve the situation. After examining
examining the
the history
history
of joint
of joint operations
operations and night air
and night air operations,
operations, presenting
presenting aa hypothetical
hypothetical
joint night scenario to show the tremendous challenges of
joint night scenario to show the tremendous challenges of such
such
operations, and
operations, describing the
and describing the current
current status
status of joint night
of joint night training
training
programs, the
programs, the author recommends aa phased
author recommends phased building-block
buHding-block approachapproach
that should increase the Air Force's capability to
that should increase the Air Force's capability to perform
perform both
both
single-service
single-service and and joint operations any
joint operations any time
time of of the
the dayday or night. This
or night. This
will ensure that we train as we plan to fight in future air operations.
will ensure that we train as we plan to fight in future air operations.

Vii
About
About the
the
Author
Author

Lt Col Brian W. McLean

Lt
Lt Col
Col Brian
Brian W.
W. ("Bingo") McLean prepared
("Bingo") McLean prepared this this book
book as as the
the Pacific
Pacific
Air Forces (PACAF) command-sponsored research fellow for 1990-91
Air Forces (PACAF) command-sponsored research fellow for 1990-91
at
at the
the Airpower
Airpower Research Institute (ARI)
Research Institute (ARI) forfor the
the Air
Air University
University Center
Center
for
for Aerospace
Aerospace Doctrine,
Doctrine, Research,
Research, and Education (AUCADRE),
and Education (AUCADRE),
Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama. A 1974 graduate of
Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama. A 1974 graduate of the
the US
US
Air
Air Force
Force Academy
Academy (USAFA),
(USAFA), ColonelColonel McLean McLean holds holds an an
undergraduate
undergraduate degree
degree in in International
International Relations
Relations (Far (Far Eastern
Eastern Studies)
Studies)
from the USAFA and a master's degree
from the USAFA and a master's degree in
in history
history from
from Old
Old Dominion
Dominion
University. Professional
University. Professional military
military education
education includes Squadron Officer
includes Squadron Officer
School (in residence), Air Command and Staff College (by
School (in residence). Air Command and Staff College (by
correspondence),
correspondence), and and Air
Air War
War College
College (in(in residence).
residence).
A
A master navigator. Colonel
master navigator, Colonel McLean
McLean has has accumulated
accumulated nearlynearly 3,000
3,000
flight hours since completing navigator
flight hours since completing navigator training
training as
as a
a distinguished
distinguished
graduate
graduate inin March 1975. From
March 1975. From 1975
1975 toto 1977
1977 hehe was
was aa C-141
C-141 navigator
navigator
at Travis AFB, California, when he was selected to cross train as
at Travis AFB, California, when he was selected to cross train as aa
weapons system officer
weapons system officer (WSO)
(WSO) in in F-4s Transition training
F-4s.. Transition training at at MacDill
MacDill
AFB,
AFB, Florida,
Florida, was
was followed
followed by by assignments
assignments as as aa WSO
WSO and and instructor
instructor
WSO to Royal Air Force (RAF) Bentwaters, United
WSO to Royal Air Force (RAF) Bentwaters, United Kingdom
Kingdom (UK);
(UK);
Osan
Osan AirAir Base
Base (AB),
(AB), Korea; and Moody
Korea; and Moody AFB, AFB, Georgia
Georgia.. InIn 1983,
1983, after
after
completing his assignment at Moody AFB, Colonel McLean
completing his assignment at Moody AFB, Colonel McLean
volunteered
volunteered for for Air
Air Force-Navy
Force-Navy officer
officer exchange
exchange duty duty asas anan F-14
F-14
instructor
instructor radar
radar intercept
intercept officer
officer (IRIO)
(IRIO) in in F-14s
F-14s atat Naval
Naval AirAir Station
Station
Miramar, San Diego, California. During his exchange tour
Miramar, San Diego, California. During his exchange tour with
with the
the
Navy,
Navy, Colonel
Colonel McLean
McLean earned
earned the
the somewhat
somewhat dubious
dubious distinction
distinction of
of
being the IRIO in the first all-Air Force crew to land an F-14 aboard an
being the IRIO in the first all-Air Force crew to land an F-14 aboard an
aircraft
aircraft carrier.
carrier. From
From 1986
1986 toto 1989,
1989, Colonel
Colonel McLean
McLean served
served onon the
the staff
staff
at
at Headquarters
Headquarters Tactical
Tactical Air
Air Command
Command (TAC) (TAC) under
under the
the Deputy
Deputy Chief
Chief
of Staff for
of Staff for Requirements
Requirements followed
followed by by aa tour
tour at
at Headquarters
Headquarters PACAF
PACAF
under
under the
the Deputy
Deputy Chief
Chief ofof Staff
Staff for
for Operations
Operations.. His
His assignment
assignment at at
Hickam AFB was curtailed when PACAF selected him as the PACAF
Hickam AFB was curtailed when PACAF selected him as the PACAF
command-sponsored
command-sponsored research research fellow
fellow and,
and, simultaneously,
simultaneously, to to be
be aa
member
member of of the
the Air
Air War
War College
College class
class of
of 1991
1991..
Colonel McLean, his wife Peg, and children Alexander
Colonel McLean, his wife Peg, and children Alexander andand Mary
Mary
Eileen
Eileen are
are currently
currently stationed
stationed atat Headquarters
Headquarters United
United States
States European
European
Command,
Command, Patch Patch Barracks,
Barracks, Stuttgart,
Stuttgart, Germany,
Germany, in in the
the Theater
Theater Plans
Plans
Division
Division of of J-5,
J-5, Plans
Plans and
and Programs
Programs..

x
Preface
Preface

The
The genesis
genesis of of this
this book
book cancan be be traced
traced to to two
two specific
specific assignments,
assignments,
my
my Air
Air Force-Navy
Force-Navy officerofficer exchange
exchange duty duty inin F- 14s and
F-14s and my my tour
tour onon the
the
staff in
staff in the
the Special
Special Management
Management Organization Organization for for low-altitude
low-altitude
navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) .
navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN).
From
From my my experiences
experiences withthe
with the Navy,
Navy, II gained
gained an an appreciation
appreciation for for how
how
well
well the
the services
services can
can work together if
work together we can
if we can overcome
overcome the the challenges
challenges
to joint operations. My experiences since then with Marine and
to joint operations. My experiences since then with Marine and Army
Army
personnel
personnel convinced
convinced me that the
me that the same
same discipline,
discipline, pride,
pride, and
and expertise
expertise
run through any warrior, regardless of what color uniform he or
run through any warrior, regardless of what color uniform he or she
she
wears
wears oror what
what service insignia is
service insignia is painted
painted on on the
the side
side ofthe
of the airplane.
airplane. ThisThis
ingrained
ingrained devotion
devotion to to duty,
duty, properly
properly directed toward mission
directed toward mission
accomplishment, can override any sense of interservice rivalry and
accomplishment, can override any sense of interservice rivalry and
greatly
greatly increase
increase the
the sum
sum total
total ofmilitary power throughjoint
of military powerthrough joint operations
operations..
This
This inherent
inherent capability
capability is is limited,
limited, though,
though, because
because of of aa lack
lack of of an
an
in-depth awareness of each other's capabilities and
in-depth awareness of each other's capabilities and limitations
limitations. .
Following this
Following this exposure
exposure to to the
the possibilities
possibilities of of joint
joint operations,
operations, my my
tour in the LANTIRN office at Headquarters TAC convinced me that
tour in the LANTIRN office at Headquarters TAG convinced me that
future air warfare
future air warfare mustmust include
include night night combat.
combat. The The tactical
tactical capability
capability
provided
provided by by the emerging night
the emerging technology was
night technology was too too great
great to to be
be
neglected. Each of the armed services had or was developing
neglected. Each of the armed services had or was developing the
the
technology
technology for night air
for night warfare, but
air warfare, but there
there waswas nono formal
formal program
program to to
develop or train forjoint night tactics or operations . When I was offered
develop or train for joint night tactics or operations. When I was offered
the opportunity in
the opportunity in February
February 1990 1990 to to compete
compete for for the
the PACAF
PACAF
command-sponsored
command-sponsored research research fellowship
fellowship at at AUCADRE,
AUCADRE, II saw saw this
this as
as
an opportunity to point out what I considered a significant oversight
an opportunity to point out what I considered a significant oversight and
and
propose
propose aa solution
solution to to the
the issue.
issue.
Although this book was started
Although this book was started wellwell before
before thethe events
events of of Operations
Operations
Desert
Desert Shield/Desert
Shield/Desert Storm,
Storm, II waswas personally
personally gratified
gratified to to see
see my my initial
initial
assumptions validated
assumptions validated.. JointJoint operations,
operations, including
including joint joint night
night
operations, are a critically important part of modern warfare . The
operations, are a critically important part of modem warfare. The
success
success ofof Operation
Operation Desert
Desert Storm
Storm was was thethe result
result ofof joint
joint development
development
and
and training
training efforts during the
efforts during the months
months of of Desert
Desert Shield.
Shield. We We mustmust
continue
continue those efforts now
those efforts now toto ensure
ensure aa future capability, particularly
future capability, particularly if if
we
we do do not have five
not have five months
months of preparation time
of preparation time inin theater
theater before
before thethe
initiation
initiation of combat. This
of combat. This report
report has proposed training
has aa proposed training method
method for for
ensuring that capability .
ensuring that capability.
II ask
ask the reader to
the reader to keep
keep twotwo key key factors
factors in mind regarding
in mind regarding the the
conclusions and recommendations in this book. First, there is nothing
conclusions and recommendations in this book. First, there is nothing
wrong with
wrong with the the way
way that that we
we have
have trained
trained for joint night
for joint night operations
operations in in
the
the past past oror in in the
the wayway we are training
we are training for for them
them today.
today. TheThe training
training
programs in place are the best that could be safely and
programs in place are the best that could be safely and prudently
prudently done,
done,
given
given the the technical capabilities in
technical capabilities in existence
existence.. This This book
book attempts
attempts to to
suggest a way that future training can be guided to incorporate new
suggest a way that future training can be guided to incorporate new
technology
technology for greater employment
for aa greater employment capabilitycapability.. Second,
Second, II am am notnot the
the
Air
Air Force Force expert
expert for for the
the definitive
defroitive jointjoint night
night training
training program.
program. DuringDuring
this last year I have been afforded the luxury of time to consider
this last year I have been afforded the luxury of time to consider
long-term possibilities ; II must
long-term possibUities; must leave
leave itit toto those
those responsible
responsible for for dealing
dealing
with short-term realities
with short-term realities to to determine
determine if if my
my suggestions
suggestions are are feasible.
feasible.
II would
would welcome
welcome the the opportunity
opportunity to to assist
assist them
them in in any
any way
way possible
possible to to
implement
implement this this plan.
plan.
II want
want to to express
express my my deepest personal gratitude
deepest personal gratitude to to LtLt ColCol JimJim
Brungess, my
Brungess, my former
former boss boss at Headquarters PACAF.
at Headquarters PACAF. Jim Jim mademade me me
aware
aware of of the
the research
research fellowfellow program
program at at AUCADRE
AUCADRE and kicked my
and kicked my
backside to get my application done in time.
backside to get my application done in time. You
You cannot
cannot ask
ask more
more from
from
aa leader
leader than than that
that he look after
he look after the
the needs
needs and and advancement
advancement of of his people..
his people
Jim personifies the very essence of an Air Force leader. I also want to
Jim personifies the very essence of an Air Force leader. I also want to
thank
thank my academic advisor,
my academic advisor, Dr Dr Lawrence
Lawrence Grinter,
Grinter, andand mymy editor,
editor, Hugh
Hugh
Richardson
Richardson.. They They took took my crude concepts
my crude concepts and and molded
molded them them intointo aa
coherent whole. I knew what I wanted to say; they
coherent whole. I knew what I wanted to say; they made
made sure
sure that
that II
really
really saidsaid it.it.
This has been
This has been aa veryvery rewarding
rewarding but but also very difficult
also aa very difficult year.
year. In In
addition
addition to to writing
writing this book, II attended
this book, attended Air War College. The
Air WarCollege. The combined
combined
study, research,
study, research, and and writing
writing work
work loadsloads of of the
the two
two programs
programs made made for for
aa typical
typical workday
workday of of about
about 1818 hours.
hours.
II cannot
cannot say say enough
enough good things about
good things about my my wife,
wife, Peg,
Peg, the
the one
one person
person
that made the whole year possible. She enabled me to keep my sanity
that made the whole year possible. She enabled me to keep my sanity
and perspective,
and perspective, picked picked up the family
up the family duties
duties when
when II had had to be off
to be off
somewhere studying
somewhere studying or or writing,
writing, and somehow understood
and somehow understood when when the the
planned trip to Disney World had to be delayed by three months.
planned trip to Disney World had to be delayed by three months. There
There

Xir
is an old
is an old saying
saying thatthat if
if the Air Force
the Air Force wanted
wanted you you toto have wife, they
have aa wife, they
would
would have have issued
issued you you one.
one. In
In Peg's
Peg's case,
case, II think they did
think they did.. Her
Her father
father
is aa retired
is retired B-52
B-52 pilot,
pilot, the sister who
the sister who introduced
introduced us us is
is married
married to an F-4
to an F-4
weapons system officer, and I first met Peg in the
weapons system officer, and I first met Peg in the Officers
Officers Club
Club at
at
Moody
Moody AFB, AFB, Georgia.
Georgia. Peg Peg might
might be be government
government spec, spec, butbut II guarantee
guarantee
she is one of a kind . Although during this past year I have forgotten to
she is one of a kind. Although during this past year I have forgotten to
thank
thank her her often
often enough
enough forfor all that she
all that she did,
did, II hope
hope sheshe knows
knows thatthat II love
love
her
her dearly and could
dearly and could not
not get
get by
by without
without herher..
As I seek to finish this, I am sitting in my
As I seek to finish this, I am sitting in my office
office at Maxwell, looking
at Maxwell, looking
out
out at the 13th
at the 13th fairway
fairway of of the
the golf
golf course, and trying
course, and trying toto convey
convey in in writing
writing
what
what thisthis last
last year
year hashas meant
meant to to meme.. The
The only
only way
way to to express
express that is to
that is to
ask myself three questions : Has the year been
ask myself three questions: Has the year been worth
worth the
the effort?
effort? Is
Is the
the
effort
effort something
something II can take pride
can take pride in in having
having done? Knowing what
done? Knowing what II know
know
now, would I do it again? The answer to all three is a resounding and
now, would I do it again? The answer to all three is a resounding and
unqualified
unqualified yes yes..

BRIAN
BRIAN W W.. McLEAN,
McLEAN, Lt Lt Col,
Col, USAF
USAF
Research
Research Fellow
Fellow
Airpower Research
Airpower Research Institute
Institute

xiii

i
Introduction
Introduction

As
As the
the United
United StatesStates enters
enters the
the decade
decade of of the
the 1990s,
1990s, we we areare faced
faced with
with
aa world
world substantially
substantially different
different fromfrom that
that which
which our our fathers faced in
fatliers faced in the
the
middle
middle decades
decades of the twentieth
of the twentieth century
century.. The The near
near paranoia
paranoia and and fear
fear ofof
aa global
global war
war between
between the the North
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (NATO)
and the Warsaw
and the Warsaw Pact Pact have been reduced
have been reduced to to the
the point
point ofof nonexistence
nonexistence..
The 40-year cold war has been "won."
The 40-year cold war has been "won."
Victory in
Victory in the cold war
the cold war has
has not,
not, however,
however, totally totally eliminated
eliminated the the need
need
for
for American
American military
military involvement
involvement outsideoutside the the NATO/Warsaw
NATO/Warsaw Pact Pact
area. The reality of conflict requiring the use of military forces has
area. The reality of conflict requiring the use of military forces has
changed
changed onlyonly in in scale
scale andand locale,
locale, not not in in kind.
kind. As As this book isis being
this book being
written
written (January
(January 1991), 1991), American
American and and allied
allied forces
forces are are deeply
deeply
committed in Operation Desert Storm, a
committed in Operation Desert Storm, a war
war to
to liberate
liberate Kuwait
Kuwait from
from
Iraq's
Iraq's unprovoked
unprovoked aggressionaggression and and toto bring
bring peace peace and and stability
stability to to the
the
region . Operation Desert Storm is the most obvious and visible conflict
region. Operation Desert Storm is the most obvious and visible conflict
involving
involving US US forces;
forces; by by no
no means
means is is itit the
the only
only partpart ofof the
the world
world in in
which
which armed
armed conflict
conflict may occur.. The
may occur The border
border between
between North North and and South
South
Korea is still some of the most heavily fortified terrain in history. Fidel
Korea is still some of the most heavily fortified terrain in history. Fidel
Castro's demonstrated
Castro's demonstrated predilection
predilection for for generating
generating tensiontension throughout
throughout
Latin America is still a reality, and the continuing war in Cambodia has
Latin America is still a reality, and the continuing war in Cambodia has
the potential of
the potential of overflowing
overflowing into into the
the territory
territory of of America's
America's ally, ally,
Thailand
ThaDand..
Although
Although the the possibility
possibility of of World
World War War lII HI has
has been
been greatly
greatly reduced,
reduced,
there
there is
is aa high
high probability
probability of of future
future wars
wars involving
involving American
American troops.troops.
The war today is in the Persian Gulf. Next week it could be in Korea or
The war today is in the Persian Gulf. Next week it could be in Korea or
Central
Central America
America.. Ifwar comes, what
If war comes, what form
form will will itit take?
take? Will
Will itit be
be aa series
series
of
of small,
small, isolated
isolated land,land, sea,sea, and
and air battles? Will
air battles? Will the the actual
actual battles
battles bebe
limited to only daytime and good weather, reserving the night and the
limited to only daytime and good weather, reserving the night and the
rainy
rainy season
season for for rest
rest and recovery while
and recovery whUe planning
planning for for the
the next
next day?
day? Both
Both
ofthese questions are
of these questions are obviously
obviously rhetorical.
rhetorical. As As Col
Col Dennis
Dennis M. M. Drew
Drew and and
Dr Donald M. Snow demonstrated in The
Dr Donald M. Snow demonstrated in The Eagle's
Eagle's Talons,
Talons, war
war in
in the
the
second half
second half ofof this
this century
century has has been
been conducted
conducted by by large
large andand complex
complex
joint staffs and characterized by a high tempo of activity carried out
joint staffs and characterized by a high tempo of activity carried out
regardless
regardless of of weather,
weather, time time of of day,
day, or or season
season of of the
the year.'
year.' TheThe mostmost
recent
recent USUS military
military experiences
experiences in in Grenada,
Grenada, Libya, Libya, andand Panama
Panama gave gave nono
indication
indication that that this
this will
will change
change.. Operation
Operation Desert Desert Storm,
Storm, begun begun with with
nearly continuous aerial bombardment by all US and allied aircraft,
nearly continuous aerial bombardment by all US and allied aircraft,
validates
validates with with emphasis
emphasis that that modern
modem war war isis joint
joint and
and around-the-clock
around-the-clock..
Our allies understand and accept this trend, particularly the
Our allies understand and accept this trend, particularly the tendency
tendency
for
for air
air warfare
warfare to to involve
involve night,
night, all-weather
all-weather operations
operations.. In In the
the Fall
Fall 1987
1987
issue
issue ofAirpower
of Airpower Journal,Journal, Air Air Vice-Marshal
Vice-Marshal R. R. A.
A. Mason
Mason of of the
the Royal
Royal
Air Force (RAF) predicted that the probable developments in air power
Air Force (RAF) predicted that the probable developments in airpower
in
in the 1990s would
the 1990s would include
include around-the-clock
around-the-clock air air operations
operations throughthrough the the
use
use of of night,
night, all-weather
all-weather weapon weapon systems.2
systems.^ As As is is being
being proven
proven in in
Operation
Operation Desert Desert Storm,
Storm, modern
modem war war requires
requires joint
joint air,
air, land,
land, andand naval
naval
forces
forces to to fight
fight both
both dayday and
and night.
night.
If we accept, therefore, that we
If we accept, therefore, that we must
must fight
fight both
both inin the
the day
day and
and at at night
night
and
and that
that we
we mustmust use use more
more than than just
just the
the forces
forces of of one
one service
service to to do
do so,
so,
the
the next
next logical
logical question
question becomes,
becomes. Are Are wewe prepared
prepared to to fight
fight this
this kind
kind
of war? Are we, the American military, trained and ready for effective
of war? Are we, the American military, trained and ready for effective
military
military air air operations
operations using using all all forces
forces at at our
our disposal
disposal in in aa war
war thatthat may
may
begin in the middle ofthe night? It is the purpose ofthis book to examine
begin in the middle of the night? It is the purpose of this book to examine
aa narrow
narrow portion
portion of of exactly
exactly that that question.
question.
This
This book
book addresses
addresses the the issue
issue of of joint
joint training
training for for night
night airair warfare
warfare..
Although intended primarily to apply to the Pacific Command
Although intended primarily to apply to the Pacific Command
(PACOM),
(PACOM), the the issues
issues andand questions
questions addressed
addressed throughout
throughout the the book
book areare
applicable to any area of potential conflict. This book is specifically
applicable to any area of potential conflict. This book is specifically
limited
limited to to joint
joint operations
operations with with American
American forces forces andand doesdoes notnot attempt
attempt
or
or intend
intend to to include
include combined
combined operations
operations with with international
international forces forces..
Further, the thrust of the book is limited to night operations . Some of
Further, the thrust of the book is limited to night operations. Some of
the
the ideas
ideas addressed
addressed are are applicable
applicable to to single-service
single-service operations
operations at at night
night
and
and joint
joint operations
operations during during the the day
day.. However,
However, day day air air warfare,
warfare, and and
specifically
specifically single-service
single-service combat,combat, are are subjects
subjects that that are
are already
already studied
studied
in
in depth
depth and and the the basis
basis of of most
most of of ourour training.
training. It It isis this
this author's
author's
contention that training for night air operations, particularly with our
contention that training for night air operations, particularly with our
sister
sister services,
services, is is at
at best
best inin its
its infancy.
infancy.
Each
Each of of the
the four
four armed
armed services
services has has spent
spent literally
literally billions
billions of of dollars
dollars
to acquire the technical means for night warfare . At the same time, the
to acquire the technical means for night warfare. At the same time, the
various
various services
services have have aa number
number of of high-technology
high-technology training training centers-
centers—
Red Flag, Cope Thunder, and the National Training Center, for
Red Flag, Cope Thunder, and the National Training Center, for

Xvi
example--capable of
example—capable of providing
providing training
training in in all aspects of
all aspects of air
air war,
war,
including regular joint-service participation . However, there is not yet
including regular joint-service participation. However, there is not yet
an existing
an existing program
program for joint training
for joint training in in night
night air
air warfare
warfare at at any
any ofof these
these
training areas.. That
training areas That which
which youyou dodo not train for
not train for in
in peacetime
peacetime you you cannot
cannot
reasonably expect to do in war . This book recommends some better uses
reasonably expect to do in war. This book recommends some better uses
of available training
of available training facilities
facilities to
to improve
improve that that situation
situation..
Chapter
Chapter 11 addresses
addresses the the history
history and and background
background of both joint
of both joint air
air
operations and night warfare to explain how we
operations and night warfare to explain how we reached
reached the
the point
point where
where
we
we areare today Chapter 22 addresses
today.. Chapter addresses the the current
current status
status of our night
of our night airair
warfare equipment and our system for planning and conducting joint
warfare equipment and our system for planning and conducting joint
warfare
warfare.. The The author uses aa hypothetical
author uses hypothetical air air operation against North
operation against North
Korean
Korean forcesforces to to illustrate
illustrate some
some of of this capability.. Chapter
this capability Chapter 33 examines
examines
the various large-scale training programs and exercises used to practice
the various large-scale training programs and exercises used to practice
for night warfare,
for night warfare, particularly
particularly to determine where
to determine where weaknesses
weaknesses or or
limitations
limitations might exist. Chapter
might exist. Chapter 44 discusses
discusses possible
possible ways
ways of of making
making
better use of available equipment and
better use of available equipment and resources
resources for
for more
more realistic
realistic
training
training in in joint night warfare
joint night warfare..
It is a recognized weakness
It is a recognized weakness of this book
of this book that
tliat the
the experiences
experiences of of
Operation
Operation Desert Storm are
Desert Storm are not
not adequately considered.. This
adequately considered This isis
unavoidable,
unavoidable, given given that
that Operation
Operation DesertDesert Storm
Storm has has just
just begun
begun and and
neither unclassified after-action reports nor lessons
neither unclassified after-action reports nor lessons learned
learned are
are yet
yet
available
available.. ItIt isis hoped
hoped that
that future authors may
future authors may be be able
able to
to build upon this
build upon this
book to add the lessons learned in the war against Iraq.
book to add the lessons learned in the war against Iraq.

Notes
Notes

11.. Col M. Drew
Dennis M.
Col Dennis Drew and and Dr
Dr Donald
Donald M.M. Snow, The Eagle's
Snow, The Eagle's Talons:
Talons: The
The
American Experience at War (Maxwell AFB, Ala .: Air
American Experience at War (MaxweU AFB, Ala.: Air University
University Press,
Press, December
December
1988),
1988), 30.
30.
Vice-Marshal R
2. Air Vice-Marshal
2. Air R.. A.
A. Mason,
Mason, RAF,
RAF, "The
'The Decade
Decade ofof Opportunity
Opportunity:: Air
Air Power
Power
in the 1990s,"AirpowerJournal, Fall 1987, 6.
in the 1990s," Airpower Journal, Fall 1987, 6.

xvii
Chapter 11
Chapter

History and Background

We
We have stressed the
have stressed the need
need for
for joint
joint night
night air warfare training.
air warfare training. Let
Let us
us
now examine briefly
now examine briefly thehistory ofjoint
the history of joint operations
operations and
and night
night air
air warfare
warfare..

Joint
Joint Operations
Operations

The American
The American military's modem experience
military's modem experience with with joint
joint operations
operations
started
started during World War
during World War II.
11. The
The integration
integration of the naval,
of the naval, ground,
ground, andand
air forces in the Pack theater was a superb
air forces in the Pacific theater was a superb example
example ofjoint
of joint operations
operations
using
using all available resources
all available resources to to accomplish
accomplish aa commoncommon objective
objective.. AirAir
assets bombarded
assets bombarded Japanese positions in
Japanese positions in advance
advance of amphibious assault
of amphibious assault
by both Marine
by both Marine and
and Army
Army forces
forces. . Once
Once ashore,
ashore, the
the land
land forces
forces were
were
supplied by
supplied by naval
naval forces and protected
forces and protected from from counterattack
counterattack by both naval
by both naval
and air assets . With the land position secured,
and air assets. With the land position seciu-ed, forward
forward airfields
airfields were
were
prepared
prepared to to allow land-based heavy
allow land-based heavy bombers
bombers to reduce resistance
to reduce resistance on on the
the
next island in
next island in the
the chain,
chain, always
always moving closer to
moving closer to bring
bring the
the Japanese
Japanese
home islands within range
home islands within range of
of aerial
aerial bombardment.
bombardment. Simultaneously,
Simultaneously,
naval and air
naval and air forces
forces interdicted
interdicted all supply lines
all supply lines into
into Japan, softening the
Japan, softening the
home islands for the final land invasion ofJapan.
home islands for the final land invasion of Japan. Although
Although the
the atomic
atomic
bombs dropped
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
on Hiroshimaand Nagasaki eliminated
eliminated the the need for the
need for the
final invasion, itit would
final invasion, would have have been
been the the ultimate
ultimate example
example of of joint
joint
operations.
operations.
From this experience
From this experience in in World
World War War II came aa recognition
n came recognition that that any
any
future war would have to use joint operations if we were to
future war would have to use joint operations if we were to win.
win. Such
Such
disparate individuals
disparate individuals as as Gen Douglas MacArthur
Gen Douglas MacArthur and and Adm
Adm Chester
Chester
Nimitz,
Nimitz, rival commanders throughout
rival commanders throughout the Pacific campaign,
the Pacific campaign, found found
themselves in complete agreement that joint
themselves in complete agreement that joint action
action between
between all
all the
the

1
JOINT
JOINT "TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

services
services was
was responsible
responsible for for the
the victory
victory over over Japan.
Japan. Generals
Generals George George
Marshall
Marshall and and Omar
Omar Bradley
Bradley not not only
only agreed
agreed thatthat joint
joint action
action had had won
won
World
World WarWar 11 II but
but predicted
predicted that that aa joint
joint effort
effort would
would be be required
required for for
victory
victory inin any future war.'
any future war.' TheThe strongest
strongest support
support for for this
this concept
concept was was
advanced by Maj Gen Follet Bradley, writing to the editor ofthe New York
advanced by Maj Gen Follet Bradley, writing to the editor of the New York
Times
Times inin response
response to to aa question
question onthe
on the need
need fora
for a new
new andand separate
separate airpower
airpower
doctrine
doctrine:: "We
"We do do not
not need
need aa Mahan
Mahan of of air
air power
power so so much
much as as anan oracle
oracle of of
combined
combined operations--triphibious
operations—triphibious.. .. .. .. [With] [With] air air power
power in in combination
combination
with
with land
land andand sea
sea power
power on on aa battle,
batde, aa campaign
campaign and and aa war."
war." z^
Clearly,
Clearly, the the concept
concept and and need
need forjoint
for joint warfare
warfare was was well
weU established
established
by
by the
the end
end of of World
World War War II. n. However,
However, this this experience
experience was was apparently
apparently
forgotten
forgotten between
between the the end
end ofof World
World War War n II in
in August
August 19451945 andand thethe North
North
Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950. In his article in the
Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950. In his article in the
Spring
Spring 1990
1990 issueissue of of Air power Journal,
Airpower Journal, Maj Maj RogerRoger F. Kropf cites
F. Kropf cites
"inadequate
"inadequate joint joint training
training in in air-ground
air-ground coordination"
coordination" as as aa major
major
detriment
detriment to to the
the effectiveness
effectiveness of of the
the FarFar East
East AirAir Forces
Forces (FEAF)(FEAF) in in
supporting
supporting the the Eighth
Eighth ArmyArmy in in the
the initial
initial stages
stages of of the
the Korean
Korean War.3War.^
Before
Before the
the outbreak
outbreak of of the
the Korean
Korean War, War, FEAFFEAF and and the
the Eighth
Eighth ArmyArmy did did
not have any
not have any continuing
continuing doctrinedoctrine or or training
training program
program to to develop
develop aa
coordinated
coordinated air/ground
air/ground team team .'a* Their performance reflected
Their performance reflected thisthis lack
lack.. By
By
contrast,
contrast, thethe United
United States
States Navy
Navy (USN)(USN) and and the
the United
United States
States Marine
Marine
Corps
Corps (USMC)
(USMC) did have an
did have an ongoing
ongoing programprogram for for air
air assets
assets to to train
train with
with
the
the ground
ground unitsunits that
that they
they were
were supporting
supporting.^ .s The
The bestbest evidence
evidence of of the
the
success
success of of thethe USN/USMC
USN/USMC training training effectiveness
effectiveness was was provided
provided by by
enemy
enemy prisoners
prisoners of of war
war who who stated
stated thatthat the
the allied
allied weapon
weapon the the North
North
Koreans feared most was "the blue airplanes."6 (During the Korean War
Koreans feared most was "the blue airplanes. "^ (During the Korean War
period,
period, US
US Air Air Force
Force aircraft
aircraft were
were usually
usually silver
silver while
while USN
USN and and USMC
USMC
aircraft
aircraft were
were painted
painted aa dark dark blue
blue.) .) The
The Air Air Force/Army
Force/Army team team hadhad to to
relearn
releam at at thethe cost
cost of of American
American lives lives what
what the the USN/USMC
USNAJSMC team team
remembered
remembered about about joint
joint operations.
operations.
This cycle of learning/forgetting/relearning woiald
This cycle of leaming/forgetting/releaming would be be repeated
repeated in in the
the
time
time between
between the the Korean
Korean War War and and the
the Vietnam
Vietnam War. War. Between
Between the the wars
wars
we
we had
had once
once againagain forgotten
forgotten how how to to work
work together
together due due to to lack
lack of of
peacetime
peacetime practice
practice in in joint
joint operations.
operations. But But unlike
imlike our our joint
joint experiences
experiences

2
HISTORY
HISTORY AND
AND BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

in
in the Korean War,
the Korean War, air air operations
operations duringduring the the Vietnam
Vietnam War War revealed
revealed
more
more resistance
resistance to to cooperation.
cooperation.
At the operational level,
At the operational level, the the command
command and and control
control systemssystems
established
established for for the air war
the air war in in Vietnam
Vietnam discouraged
discouraged rather rather than than
encouraged
encouraged possiblepossible jointjoint operations
operations.. UnderUnder Air Air Force
Force doctrine,
doctrine, all all air
air
assets, regardless of
assets, regardless of service,
service, should
should come
come under
under aa single
single air
air component
component
commander.
commander. This This principle,
principle, called
called unity
unity of of command,
command, allows allows the the air
air
commander to mass air assets for a decisive and overwhelming attack
commander to mass air assets for a decisive and overwhelming attack
against
against an an enemy's
enemy's weak weak spots.
spots.
The mechanism for
The mechanism for achieving
achieving this this unity
unity ofcommand
of command is is the air tasking
the air tasking
order (ATO), a single (albeit massive)
order (ATO), a single (albeit massive) document
document listing
listing the
the total
total daily
daily
air
air effort
effort.. Information
Information in in the
the ATO
ATO includes
includes tasked
tasked unit, assigned target,
unit, assigned target,
and required time over target (TOT) for each sortie to be flown.
and required time over target (TOT) for each sortie to be flown.
To make the
To make the system
system workwork under
under Air Air Force
Force doctrine requires that
doctrine requires that all
all
air
air assets
assets comecome under under aa single
single air air commander
commander (not (not necessarily
necessarily Air Air
Force) . Since none of the services in the Vietnam War was
Force). Since none of the services in the Vietnam War was willing
willing to
to
relinquish
relinquish command
command and and control
control of of its
its air
air assets
assets to to the
the others,
others, therethere waswas
not
not aa single
single air component commander
air component commander for the entire
for the entire war
war effort
effort.. Instead,
Instead,
Vietnam was
Vietnam was divided
divided in
in route
route packages
packages with
with the
the Navy
Navy controlling
controlling some
some
segments
segments and and thethe Air
Air Force others.^.$ Air
Force others Air Force
Force aircraft
aircraft were
were not not tasked
tasked
against targets in Navy route packages, and Navy
against targets in Navy route packages, and Navy aircraft
aircraft stayed
stayed out
out of
of
Air
Air Force
Force areas Marine air,
areas.. Marine air, because
because of of the
the physical
physical location
location of of their
their
bases in
bases in one
one ofthe
of the AirAir Force
Force designated
designated route route package
package areas,
areas, came
came underunder
Air Force command
Air Force command and
and control
control but
but only
only for
for those
those sorties
sorties that
that were
were
excess
excess to to Marine
Marine ground-support
ground-support needs needs.. The The Marines
Marines retained
retained control
control
over those air sorties that the Marine Corps determined were
over those air sorties that the Marine Corps determined were required
required
to
to support
support the the Marine
Marine ground
ground troops
troops.^ .9 In
In effect,
effect, air air power
power in in Vietnam
Vietnam
was
was split into three
split into three separate
separate wars.wars.
This command structure
This command structure prevented
prevented or
or atat least
least complicated
complicated the proper
the proper
application
application of of mass
mass combat
combat power power in in joint
joint airair operations.
operations. Even Even the the
massive attacks against Hanoi and Haiphong in Linebacker were
massive attacks against Hanoi and Haiphong in Linebacker II
n were not
not
truly joint in
truly joint in that
that nono single
single airair component
component commander commander directed directed the the
whole
whole operation.
operation. As "the most
As "the most vital
vital area
area in in North Vietnam," Hanoi
North Vietnam," Hanoi was was
declared an "integrated strike zone"
declared an "integrated strike zone" for
for both
both Navy
Navy and
and Air
Air Force
Force
attacks.
attacks.'*^ Integrated did
I° Integrated did not,
not, however,
however, mean joint. Each
mean joint. Each service
service stillstill

3
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

controlled
controlled its its own
own assets
assets butbut now
now could
could attack
attack targets
targets in in other
other than than its
its
assigned
assigned areaarea of of responsibility."
responsibility." Although Although this was aa good
this was good attemptattempt to to
bring
bring sufficient
sufficient combatcombat power power to to bear
bear onon aa target,
target, suchsuch aa practice
practice
violated
violated thethe principle
principle of of economy
economy of of force.
force. Without
Without aa single
single commander
comm ander
for
for aa joint
joint effort, there was
effort, there was no no easy
easy method
method of of ensuring
ensuring that that the the Navy
Navy
or
or Air
Air Force
Force did did not
not attempt
attempt to to attack
attack aa target
target that
that the other had already
the other had already
destroyed
destroyed..
Difficulty in
Difficulty in joint
joint operations
operations was was also
also revealed
revealed at at the
the tactical
tactical levellevel in in
the Vietnam
the Vietnam War. War. LackLack of of common
common radios radios complicated
complicated the the ability
ability of of
Air
Air Force
Force aircraft
aircraft to to support
support the the Army
Army ground
ground troops.
troops. The The Army Army used used
very
very high
high frequency
frequency (VHF) (VHF) or or frequency
frequency modulation
modulation (FM) (FM) radios,
radios, whilewhile
Air
Air Force
Force aircraft
aircraft werewere equipped
equipped with with ultrahigh
ultrahigh frequency
frequency (UHF) (UHF)
radios
radios.. These
These systems
systems werewere not not and
and areare not
not compatible
compatible;; communication
communication
with
with each other was
each other was impossible.
impossible.'^ 12
As
As aa result,
result, the Air Force
the Air Force pUot pilot could
could
not
not talk
talk with
with thethe Army
Army ground
ground commander
commander he he was
was supporting
supporting without without
going
going through
through aa forward
forward air air controller
controller (FAQ (F^C) who who was was equipped
equipped with with
UHF,
UHF, VHF, VHF, and and FM FM radios
radios.. TheThe FAC FAC would
would then then relay
relay the the target
target
description,
description, location
location of of friendlies,
friendlies, and and enemy
enemy air air defenses
defenses.. If If there
there waswas
no
no FAC
FAC in in the
the area,
area, the
the fighters
fighters had had no no easy
easy way
way to to talk
talk with
with the the ground
ground
commander
commander and and positively
positively identify
identify the the target.
target.
Although the system worked, it added extra
Although the system worked, it added extra layers
layers of of control,
control, the the
possibility
possibility of of confusion
confusion in in the
the ground-to-FAC-to-fighter
ground-to-FAC-to-fighter link, link, and and time
time
delays
delays in in getting
getting bombsbombs on on target.
target. Suggestions
Suggestions that that thethe fighters
fighters be be
equipped
equipped with with radios
radios that that allowed
allowed direct direct ground-to-fighter
ground-to-fighter
communication
communication were were rejected,
rejected, in in part
part because
because the the fighter
fighter pilot
pUot mightmight be be
"distracted
"distracted by by irrelevant
irrelevant information"
information" from from thethe ground.
ground. Whether
Whether or or not
not
this was aa valid
this was valid criticism
criticism was was never operationally tested
never operationally tested.'^ . 13 Joint
Joint Air Air
Force-Army
Force-Army training training before
before the the war
war maymay have
have identified
identified aa need need forfor
direct
direct communication
communication between between ground ground and and air air and
and developed
developed
appropriate
appropriate procedures
procedures to to avoid
avoid the the worrisome
worrisome irrelevant
irrelevant information
information..
The
The AirAir Force
Force foundfound that that even
even withwith the the dedicated
dedicated FACs, FACs, the the
unfamiliar
unfamiliar terminology
terminology used used by by the
the ground
ground troops
troops hampered
hampered effective effective
air
air support
support operations
operations.''* As aa minor
. 14 As minor example,
example, even even today
today the the AirAir Force
Force
pilot normally judges distance in terms of nautical miles and feet.
pUot normally judges distance in terms of nautical mUes and feet .
Aircraft
Aircraft instruments,
instruments, flightflight maps,
maps, and and weapons
weapons ballistics
ballistics are are calibrated
calibrated

4
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

in
in this
this standard.
standard. InIn contrast,
contrast, the
the Army
Army ground
ground trooptroop uses
uses kilometers
kilometers and and
teeters with instruments and maps calibrated
meters with instruments and maps calibrated accordingly
accordingly. . The
The
difference between the
difference between the two
two systems
systems is is extreme
extreme;; one one nautical
nautical mile
mile is is
nearly
nearly twotwo kilometers
kilometers while
while one
one foot
foot is less than
is less than one-third
one-third ofof aa meter.
meter.
As
As the
the reader
reader can
can readily
readUy appreciate,
appreciate, shifting
shifting your
your bomb
bomb aimpoint
aimpoint 100
100
feet
feet farther
farther away
away from
from friendly troops is
friendly troops is not
not enough
enough when when the
the ground
ground
commander wanted you to move it 100 meters . It is possible to make aa
commander wanted you to move it 100 meters. It is possible to make
relatively
relatively simple
simple mental
mental translation
translation between
between the the two systems if
two systems if you
you areare
aware
aware ofof the
the differences
differences and
and are
are trained
trained toto do
do so
so.. The
The Air
Air Force
Force wartime
wartime
preparation of a pamphlet on how to speak
preparation of a pamphlet on how to speak Army
Army is
is something
something that
that
should
should have
have been
been identified
identified inin peacetime
peacetime training.
training.
In joint operations during World War II,
In joint operations during World War U, the
the Korean
Korean War,War, andand thethe
Vietnam
Vietnam War,War, what
what wewe failed
failed to
to train
train for
for inin peacetime
peacetime we we had
had to to learn
learn
how
how to do in
to do in wartime
wartime.. AsAs chapter
chapter 44 discusses
discusses in in more
more detail,
detail, we
we are are in
in
danger of making the same mistake again.
danger of making the same mistake again.

Night
Night Operations
Operations

If
If the
the history
history of of joint
joint operations
operations can can bebe fairly
fairly characterized
characterized as as
continually
continually relearning
releaming the the same
same lessons,
lessons, night
night operations
operations can can bebe
described
described as as lessons
lessons learned
learned but but not implemented due
not implemented due to lack of
to lack of
technology. From World War H until Operation El Dorado Canyon
technology. From World War n until Operation El Dorado Canyon
against
against Libya
Libya in in 1986,
1986, night tactical air
night tactical air warriors
warriors werewere frustrated
firustrated by
by
equipment
equipment limitations.
limitations. They
They knew
knew what what they
they wanted
wanted to to do
do but
but lacked
lacked
the technical capability to do it.
the technical capability to do it.
America's
America's firstfirst experiences
experiences with with night
night air
air warfare
warfare camecame during
during
World War II, but it came primarily in the form of negative lessons .
World War II, but it came primarily in the form of negative lessons.
In
In the
the early
early stages
stages of
of the
the war Nazi Germany,
against Nazi
war against Germany, RAF RAF Bomber
Bomber
Command was
Command was forced
forced into
into night
night areabombing
area bombing as as aa method
method of of surviving
surviving the
the
German air defenses while continuing to press
German air defenses while continuing to press the
the air
air war
war over
over Europe
Europe. .
However, night
However, bombing at
night bombing at that
that time
time lacked
lacked the the precision-targeting
precision-targeting
capability
capability of of the American-conducted daylight
the American-conducted daylight bombing
bombing campaign
campaign.
According to
According to postwar
postwar testimony
testimony by
by Albert
Albert Speer,
Speer, Adolf
Adolf Hitler's
Hitler's ministe
ministei
of
of production,
production, the daylight bombing
the daylight bombing was was aa far
far more
more effective
effective weapon.
weapon.

5
JOIh,,'I"TRAINING
JOINT TRAINING FORFOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARIi

The
The night
night area area bombing
bombing of of the the cities
cities diddid not not achieve
achieve sufficiently
sufficiently
accurate bombs on target to
accurate bombs on target to effectively
effectively destroy or disrupt
destroy or disrupt the
the German
German
strategic
strategic war-fighting
war-fighting capability.
capability.'^ 15

These early experiences
These early experiences could could have have mademade airmenairmen believe
believe that that night
night
air
air warfare
warfare was was too
too tough
tough to to do.
do. It It is
is fortunate
fortunate that that air
air power
power advocates
advocates
of World War
of World War II El recognized
recognized that that the the problem
problem lay lay in in the
the technology
technology
available, not in the basic concept. Even with the limited accuracy
available, not in the basic concept. Even with the limited accuracy
available
available at at that
that time,
time, thethe combination
combination ofUS of US Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces (USAAF)
(USAAF)
daylight
daylight bombing
bombing and and RAF RAF night
night bombingbombing did did have
have the the benefit
benefit of of not
not
giving
giving thethe German defenders
German defenders any
any rest and recovery
rest and recovery time
time in
in which
which they
they
could
could feel
feel completely
completely immune immune from from attack
attack.'*. 16 The
The nightnight attacks
attacks maymay
have been more harassing than they were militarily effective, but they
have been more harassing than they were militarily effective, but they
still
still provided
provided aa continuing
continuing threat threat whichwhich the the German
German defensesdefenses could could not
not
totally
totally ignore.
ignore.
While the
WhUe strategic air
the strategic air war
war gainedgained some benefit from
some benefit from around-the-
around-the-
clock
clock operations,
operations, itit was was at at the
the tactical
tactical level .that the
levelthat the real
real advantages
advantages to to
be realized from
be realized from aa nightnight air-war
air-war capability
capability were demonstrated.. For
were demonstrated For
instance,
instance, one one of of the
the keykey lessons
lessons learned learned during during the the interdiction
interdiction
campaign
campaign in in Europe
Europe was was thethe importance
importance of of continuous
continuous attack attack on on the
the
enemy's lines of communication (LOC).1' Our inability to find and hit
enemy's lines of communication (LOG).'^ Our inability to find and hit
interdiction
interdiction targets
targets in in the
the dark
dark in in effect
effect gave
gave thethe Nazis
Nazis aa night
night sanctuary
sanctuary
in
in which
which theythey could
could operate
operate almost almost at at will.
wUl. Although
Although some some limited
limited
success
success was was achieved
achieved by by B-25s
B-25s droppingdropping aerialaerial flares
flares to locate and
to locate and
illuminate targets for
illuminate targets for attack
attack by by RAF Mosquito bombers,
RAF Mosquito bombers, the the lack
lack ofof aa
night precision capability was a source of constant frustration to both
night precision capability was a source of constant frustration to both
air and ground
air and ground commanders
commanders.'* .' 8
Interdiction
Interdiction was was not not the
the only
only tactical
tactical air air mission
mission hurt hurt by by aa lack
lack of of
night
night capability
capability.. The The Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, taking taking aa lesson
lesson from from the the RAF's
RAF's nightnight
bombing campaign earlier
bombing campaign earlier in the war,
in the war, demonstrated
demonstrated the the importance
importance of of
having an effective night defensive counterair (DCA) capability during
having an effective night defensive counterair (DCA) capability during
the
the Battle
Battle of the Bulge
of the Bulge.. By By using
using teams teams of pathfinding flare
of pathfinding flare ships
ships and
and
attack
attack aircraft
aircraft at at night,
night, the the Germans
Germans were were able able to to maintain
maintain
around-the-clockpressure
around-the-clock pressure on
on the
the fixed
fixed American
American positions
positions in
in Bastogne
Bastogne. .
The
The Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's task task waswas considerably
considerably easier easier because
because of of the
the total
total lack
lack
of effective Allied resistance . 19 The presence of a properly equipped
of effective Allied resistance.'^ The presence of a properly equipped

6
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

and
and trained
trained nightnight fighter
fighter could could have have considerably
considerably reduced reduced the the
effectiveness of the German attack by destroying either
effectiveness of the German attack by destroying either the
the pathfinders
pathfinders
or
or the
the attack aircraft. In
attack aircraft. In anyany event,
event, aa night
night DCADCA capability
capability wouldwould havehave
made
made thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe planningplanning problem considerably greater.
problem considerably greater.
While we
While we forgot
forgot the
the lessons
lessons learned
learned in
in joint
joint air
air operations
operations between
between
World
World WarWar II n and
and Korea,
Korea, the same statement
the same statement cannot
cannot be be made
made about
about thethe
lessons of night air warfare. At the start of the Korean War, we
lessons of night air warfare. At the start of the Korean War, we
remembered
remembered and and applied
applied the the lessons
lessons we we hadhad learned
learned aboutabout nightnight
interdiction
interdiction andand night
night close
close air air support
support (CAS)(CAS) in in the
the skies
skies over
over Europe.
Europe.
The major interdiction operations were
The major interdiction operations were carried
carried out
out around-the-clock
around-the-clock to
to
deny the
deny the enemy
enemy aa periodperiod of of rest
rest andand repair.
repair. One particularly effective
One particularly effective
tactic was the practice of scheduling a late-night reattack against aa
tactic was the practice of scheduling a late-night reattack against
known
known LOC LOC that that had had already
already been been cut cut during
during the day. Since
the day. Since the the
Communist
Communist forces forces used used the the cover
cover of of night
night to to repair
repair andand reopen
reopen the the
damaged LOCs, this tactic had a dual benefit. First,
damaged LOCs, this tactic had a dual benefit. First, the
the reattack
reattack kept
kept
the
the LOC closed, preventing
LOC closed, preventing the the enemy
enemy from from using
using itit to
to move
move supplies
supplies..
Second,
Second, with
with proper timing, the
proper timing, the reattack
reattack couldcould occur
occur just
just asas the
the repair
repair
crew was
crew was completing
completing their
their work,
work, making
making a
a wasted
wasted effort
effort of
of their
their
supplies
supplies and
and manpower
manpower.^^ .
Unfortunately, although we
Unfortunately, although we had
had aa good
good idea
idea ofwhat
of what we we wanted
wanted to to dodo
with
with night
night airair war, technology had
war, technology had notnot substantially
substantially improved
improved our our
capability
capability to to dodo itit in
in the
the interval
interval between
between the wars.. The
the wars The FEAFFEAF B-29s,
B-29s,
operating
operating in
in a
a tactical
tactical support
support role,
role, achieved
achieved reasonable
reasonable accuracy
accuracy
against
against fixed
fixed targets
targets suchsuch as as bridges,
bridges, supply depots, and
supply depots, and large
large troop
troop
concentrations by the use of both onboard radar and ground-positioned
concentrations by the use of both onboard radar and ground-positioned
radar
radar beacons.
beacons. Although
Although this interdiction effort
this interdiction effort contributed
contributed greatly
greatly to to
the Allied
the Allied effort
effort by by preventing
preventing the the enemy
enemy from massing sufficient
from massing sufficient
supplies to support a
supplies to support a continued
continued assault,
assault, it
it could
could not
not completely
completely halt
halt the
the
very small
very small amount
amount of of supplies necessary for
supplies necessary the Chinese
for the Chinese and and North
North
Koreans to fight a defensive holding war during the prolonged peace
Koreans to fight a defensive holding war during the prolonged peace
negotiations
negotiations."^'.21 To
To achieve
achieve that that goal,
goal, thethe AirAir Force
Force would
would havehave needed
needed
the
the capability
capability to to locate
locate and and destroy
destroy supplies
supplies either
either at at the
the source
source or or inin
convoy. Because the source was the
convoy. Because the source was the politically
politically sacrosanct
sacrosanct Manchuria,
Manchuria,
the interdiction campaign
the interdiction campaign had had to to bebe directed
directed against
against LOCs LOCs and and thethe
convoys
convoys en en route.
route. Technical capability for
Technical capability for this
this mission
mission was was still
still limited
limited

7
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

to
to the
the World
World WarII War n solution
solution of of using
using flare
flare ships
ships to to first
first acquirethe
acquire the target
target
and
and then
then illuminate
illuminate it it for
for the
the fighters
fighters or or light
light bombers
bombers that that followed
foUowed.^^ .
While
While thisthis tactic
tactic was
was somewhat
somewhat effectiveeffective in in the
the undefended
undefended or or lightly
lightly
defended
defended night night skies
skies over
over South
South Korea,
Korea, itit was
was completely
completely ineffective
ineffective
and
and too
too dangerous
dangerous in in the
the more
more heavily
heavily defended
defended areas areas over
over North
North Korea
Korea
near
near Pyongyang.
Pyongyang. Aerial Aerial flares,
flares, necessary
necessary for for the
the attacking
attacking aircraft
aircraft toto
see the target, also served to illuminate the attacker for the antiaircraft
see the target, also served to illuminate the attacker for the antiaircraft
artillery
artillery (AAA).
(AAA). In In addition
addition to to simple
simple illumination,
illumination, the the flares
flares helped
helped
the
the AAA
AAA gunnersguimers findfind thethe proper
proper elevation
elevation in in aiming
aiming their
their fire
fire at
at the
the
attackers.
attackers. SinceSince the
the attacking
attacking aircraft
aircraft hadhad toto remain
remain below
below the the flares
flares in
in
order
order toto seesee the
the target,
target, thethe height
height of of the
the flares
flares showed
showed the the maximum
maximum
23
height of the attackers.
height of the attackers P
Although
Although the the experiences
experiences in in night
night airair warfare
warfare with with the
the use
use ofof flare
flare
ships
ships andand fighter
fighter teams
teams were were only only moderately
moderately effective,
effective, they they diddid
provide
provide some some of of the
the earliest
earliest examples
examples of of true
true joint
joint night
night operations
operations..
Beginning
Begiiming in in March
March 1951, 1951, aa US US Marine
Marine night-fighter
night-fighter squadron,
squadron,
VMF(N)-513,
VMF(N)-513, equipped equipped with with F4U F4U Corsairs
Corsairs and and F7FF7F Tigercats,
Tigercats, beganbegan
conducting
conducting extensive extensive night night interdiction
interdiction missionsmissions out out of of Pusan
Pusan
Airfield
Airfield.. The The Marine
Marine night
night fighters
fighters worked
worked with with AirAir Force
Force C-47C-47 flare
flare
ships
ships as as hunter-killer
hunter-kUler teams teams.. TheThe flare
flare ships
ships would
would provide
provide illumination
illumination
to
to locate
locate convoys
convoys or or marshaling
marshaling areas areas along
along an assigned road.
an assigned road. Once
Once
these
these targets
targets were were located,
located, the the flare
flare ships
ships illuminated
illuminated them them for for the
the
attacking
attacking Marine Marine fighters
fighters.. Close
Close teamwork
teamwork was was required
required between
between the the
two
two services
services to to ensure
ensure that that the the target
target was was properly
properly illuminated
illuminated
throughout the attack . From 1 March through 31 May 1951,
throughout the attack. From 1 March through 31 May 1951, this
this
joint-team
joint-team missionmission claimed
claimed to to have
have attacked 11,980 enemy
attacked 11,980 enemy vehicles
vehicles andand
destroyed 1,420
destroyed 1,420.^ .
Night
Night jointjoint airair warfare
warfare was was not not limited
limited to to interdiction
interdiction missions,
missions,
however.
however. Early Early in in 1951,
1951, Communist
Communist air air defenses
defenses over over North
North Korea
Korea
forced the Air Force B-29s to operate almost exclusively at night. By
forced the Air Force B-29s to operate almost exclusively at night. By
July
July 1952
1952 NorthNorth Korean
Korean use use of of ground-controlled
ground-controlled radar radar waswas able
able toto
direct
direct enemy
enemy night night fighters
fighters to to within
within five
five miles
miles of of the
the attacking
attacking B-29sB-29s..
From
From thatthat distance,
distance, enemy
enemy groundground searchlights
searchlights could could then illuminate
then illuminate
the
the bomber
bomber for for the
the nonradar-equipped
nonradar-equipped MiG MiG to to complete
complete the the attack
attack
visually
visually.^^ . 25 To
To counter
counter this this threat,
threat, the the B-29s
B-29s required
required some some formform of of
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

night fighters for
night fighters for escort
escort or or for
for preattack
preattack sweeps
sweeps to to survive
survive in in the
the nownow
dangerous
dangerous nightnight skies
skies over
over North
North Korea. Although the
Korea. Although the Fifth
Fifth Air
Air Force
Force
had
had night-capable
night-capable F-94B
F-94B Starfires
Starfires at
at Suwon,
Suwon, the
the radar
radar in
in these
these aircraft
aircraft
was
was soso new
new andand soso valuable
valuable that the F-94s
that the F-94s were
were restricted
restricted to to only
only local
local
air defense operations . Once again, joint operations provided the
air defense operations. Once again, joint operations provided the
solution.
solution. VMF(N)-513
VMF(N)-513 provided provided night-fighter
night-fighter supportsupport for for the
the B-29s
B-29s
using first the
using first the older
older F7FF7F Tigercats,
Tigercats, then then reequipping
reequipping with with thethe newnew
F3D-2 Skynight jets in early November 1952
F3D-2 Skynight jets in early November 1952. . Following
Following the
the removal
removal
of operational restrictions
the operational
of the restrictions on on Air
Air Force
Force F-94s
F-94s in in November
November 1952, 1952,
Marine
Marine F3D-2s
F3D-2s continued flying joint
continued flying escort missions
joint escort missions for for the
the B-29s
B-29s
while
while the
the F-94s
F-94s tooktook over
over the
the barrier
barrier patrol
patrol and
and sweep
sweep operations
operations.'^* . 26
These
These joint
joint Air Air Force-Marine
Force-Marine Corps Corps night
night experiences
experiences shouldshould
demonstrate two points . First, joint operations can
demonstrate two points. First, joint operations can provide
provide increased
increased
capability
capability by by covering shortfalls in
covering shortfalls in single-service
single-service equipment.
equipment. For For
interdiction
interdiction missions,
missions, the the Air
Air Force
Force provided
provided the the flare
flare ship
ship capability
capability
that the Marines lacked,
that the Marines lacked, while
while the
the Marine
Mariije night
night fighters
fighters augmented
augmented
the
the limited
limited numbers
numbers of of Air
Air Force
Force night aircraft.. For
attack aircraft
night attack air escort,
For air escort,
the Marines initially covered a lack of available Air Force assets, then
the Marines initially covered a lack of available Air Force assets, then
provided
provided increased
increased numbers
nimibers of of night
night fighters
fighters to escort the
to escort the B-29s.
B-29s.
Second,
Second, but but moremore important,
important, even even when
when properly
properly planned
planned and and
coordinated, night air warfare is tough
coordinated, night air warfare is tough. . The
The joint
joint Air
Air Force-Marine
Force-Marine
Corps
Corps night
night interdiction
interdiction missions,
missions, even even with
with proper
proper missionmission planning,
planning,
was barely able to achieve a 12 percent kill ratio of trucks destroyed
was barely able to achieve a 12 percent kill ratio of trucks destroyed
versus
versus munitions
munitions expended
expended..
The
The North
North Koreans
Koreans and and Communist
Communist ChineseChinese were were well aware of
well aware of thethe
tactical benefits to be gained by taking advantage of the
tactical benefits to be gained by taking advantage of the FEAF's
FEAF's lack
lack
of night
of night capability
capability.. As As related
related byby Robert
Robert Futrell
Futrell in in The
The United
United States
States
Air
Air Force
Force in
in Korea
Korea 1950-1953,
1950-1953,
A Soviet-prepared manual
A Soviet-prepared manual published
published by by the
the ChineseRedsin
Chinese Reds in Manchuria
Manchuria inin 1947
1947
well illustrated the
well illustrated the importance
importance of
of night
night attack
attack as
as a
a Communist
Communist military
mihtary
technique.
technique. "Night
"Night combat," stated this
combat," stated this manual,
manual, "is
"is aa normal
normal occurrence
occurrence under
under
conditions of modem warfare.
conditions of modem warfare. Night
Night combat
combat can
can be
be conducted
conducted by
by a
a small
small unit,
unit,
large unit, orby a combined force ofthe
large unit, or by a combined force of the various
various arms.
amis . . . Despite
Despite the
the difficulty
difficulty
of control
of control during
during night
night attacks, offers many
attacks, itit offers many opportunities
opportunities for success in
for success in an
an
attack ."'
attack."

9
JOIN'r TRAINING FOR
JOINT TRAINING FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

The
The greatest
greatest example
example of of the
the enemy's
enemy's understanding
understanding of of the
the importance
importance
of
of night
night capability
capability was was demonstrated
demonstrated by by the
the Chinese
Chinese surprise
surprise attackattack
against
against the the United
United NationsNations (UN) (UN) ForcesForces near near thethe Yalu
Yalu River River in in
November
November 1950 1950.. By By moving
moving only only at at night
night andand remaining
remaining well well
camouflaged during the day, the Chinese were able to sneak 300,000
camouflaged during the day, the Chinese were able to sneak 300,000
combat
combat troops
troops across
across thethe Yalu
Yalu and into the
and into the UNUN rear
rear area
area in in October
October
1950.
1950. They
They remained
remained essentially
essentially undetected
undetected until until their
their opening
opening assaultassault
in
in November
November.'^^ . 28 Even
Even aa rudimentary
rudimentary night night reconnaissance
reconnaissance and and attack
attack
capability
capability could
could have
have substantially
substantially depleted
depleted this
this force or, at
force or, at aa minimum,
minimum,
provided tactical warning of Chinese presence before the attack began.
provided tactical warning of Chinese presence before the attack began.
If the
If the interval
interval between
between WorldWorld War War II II and
and the
the Korean
Korean War War brought
brought
only
only slight
slight improvement
improvement in in night
night air air warfare
warfare capability,
capability, the the period
period
between
between Korea
Korea and and Vietnam brought essentially
Vietnam brought essentially no improvement. The
no improvement. The
North Vietnamese
North Vietnamese recognized
recognized the the overwhelming
overwhelming equipment
equipment advantageadvantage
that the
that the USUS AirAir Force
Force possessed,
possessed, especially
especially in in our
our interdiction
interdiction and and
attack
attack capability
capability.. Taking
Taking aa lesson
lesson from from thethe experiences
experiences of of their
their fellow
fellow
Communists
Communists in in Korea,
Korea, the the North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese countered
countered American
American air air
interdiction by shifting their main resupply efforts to the sanctuary of
interdiction by shifting their main resupply efforts to the sanctuary of
night operations.
night operations. The The North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese Army Army (NVA)(NVA) and and Vietcong
Vietcong
went beyond
went beyond supply
supply at at night
night and
and tooktook advantage
advantage of the night
of the night sanctuary
sanctuary
to enhance
to enhance their their offensive
offensive capability
capability.. By staging major
By staging major ground ground
assaults
assaults at at night,
night, the the NVA
NVA was was able able toto largely
largely avoid
avoid the the American
American
CAS and battle area interdiction that they would have encountered
CAS and battle area interdiction that they would have encountered
in
in daylight operations.. 29
daylight operations
The
The initial
initial Air
Air Force
Force counter
counter to to enemy
enemy night
night operations
operations followed
followed the the
classic
classic patterns
patterns established
established in in World
World War War II n and
and Korea-flare
Korea—^flare ships ships
marking and
marking and illuminating
illuminating the the target
target forfor attack
attack aircraft
aircraft to bomb . In
to bomb. In
some cases, even the equipment was the same, with the use of
some cases, even the equipment was the same, with the use of
Korean War-vintage
Korean War-vintage A-26s A-26s in in thethe early
early days
days ofof the
the Vietnam
Vietnam War War..
Although the
Although the equipment
equipment used used would
would soon soon change
change to to more
more modern
modem F-4s F-4s
and B-57s,3° the technology required to change
and B-57s,^^ the technology required to change from
from the World War II
the World War II
tactic of
tactic of externally
externally illuminated
illuminated night night bombing
bombing had had not
not yet
yet arrived.
arrived. And,And,
just as was demonstrated in Korea, flare ship and bomber teams could
just as was demonstrated in Korea, flare ship and bomber teams could
not survive
not sirrvive inin thethe heavy
heavy AAAAAA environment
environment of of North Vietnam . 31
North Vietnam.

10
10
HISTORY
HISTORY AND
AND BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

Technology
Technology had, had, however,
however, brought
brought some increased night
some increased night capability
capability
in the form of more onboard sensor systems . Improvements in aircraft
in the form of more onboard sensor systems. Improvements in aircraft
ground-mapping radar
ground-mapping radar provided
provided somesome increased
increased nightnight accuracy
accuracy for F-4s
for F-4s
and
and F-105s
F-105s against
against large,
large, radar-significant targets, such
radar-significant targets, such as port facilities
as port facilities
or buildings, but
or buildings, but lacked
lacked sufficient
sufficient detail
detail to
to discriminate
discriminate truck
truck convoys
convoys
or
or infantry
infantry attacks
attacks.^^. Low-light-level
32
Low-light-level television
television and and infrared
infrared sensors
sensors
made the AC-130 an extremely effective night interdiction weapon, but,
made the AC-130 an extremely effective night interdiction weapon, but,
like
like the
the flare
flare ships,
ships, the the AC-130
AC-130 lacked lacked the the necessary
necessary speed speed and and
maneuverability
maneuverability to to survive
survive inin aa surface-to-air
surface-to-air missilemissile (SAM)
(SAM) or or AAA
AAA
environment
environment?^ .
The
The limitations
limitations imposedimposed on on air
air power
power by by aa lack
lack of night capability
of night capability
frustrated
frustrated thethe American commanders in
American commanders in Vietnam
Vietnam just just as
as much
much as as it did
it did
their
their predecessors
predecessors in in World
World War War Il. II. In
In April
April 19671967 AdmAdm U. U. SS.. Grant
Grant
Sharp,
Sharp, commander
commander in in chief of Pacific
chief of Command (PACOM),
Pacific Command (PACOM), formally
formally
identified the development of increased capability to accurately hit
identified the development of increased capability to accurately hit
targets
targets atat night
night and and in in bad
bad weather
weather as as aa high
high priority requirement for
priority requirement for
prosecution
prosecution of the Vietnam
of the Vietnam War. War.^'* ThisThis need
need waswas emphasized
emphasized by by Air
Air
Force Chief of Staff
Force Chief of Staff Gen
Gen John
John P.
P. McConnell
McConnell that
that same
same month.
month. In
In
testimony before Congress,
testimony before Congress, General
General McConnell
McConneU stated stated that
that theAir
the Air Force
Force
was deficient in tactical air power, particularly in its ability to
was deficient in tactical air power, particularly in its ability to hit
hit
pinpoint
pinpoint targets
targets at at night and in
night and in bad weather.^^ However,
bad weather. 35
However, identifying
identifying aa
need
need isis not
not sufficient
sufficient to to ensure
ensure aa capability
capability.. By By 1971,
1971, despite
despite thethe best
best
efforts ofAdmiral Sharp and
efforts of Admiral Sharp and General
General McConnell,
McConnell, the
the North
North Vietnamese
Vietnamese
continued to
continued to move
move 500 500 toto 1,000
1,000 trucks
trucks per night, down
per night, down the the HoHo Chi
Chi
Minh
Minh Trail with an
Trail with an average
average load
load of of 8,000
8,000 pounds
pounds of of cargo
cargo perper truck
truck.^^ 36

Little progress
Little progress was was made
rnade in
in the
the development
development of of night-capable
night-capable tactical
tactical
aviation during the
aviation during the three
three decades
decades between
between World World War War H 11 and
and the
the end
end of of
the Vietnam War. Nor would the
the Vietnam War. Nor would the remainder
remainder of the 1970s see
of the 1970s see a
a marked
marked
improvement
improvement.. InJune In June 1978 1978 Lt
Lt Gen
Gen Howard
Howard Fish,Fish, the
the Air
Air Force assistant
Force assistant
vice chief
vice chief of of staff, identified the
staff, identified the same
same deficiency
deficiency in in night
night attack
attack
capability
capability in in modem
modem NATO NATO that that Allied
Allied airmen
airmen had had seen
seen during
during thethe war
war
against
against Hitler
Hitler.^^ . TheThe real impact of
real impact of this
this deficiency
deficiency can be realized
can be realized when
when
you consider that the weather in northern Germany during January
you consider that the weather in northern Germany during January
averages
averages lessless than
than 8.58.5 hours
hours ofof daylight
daylight per per day.
day. Of Of this
this short
short period,
period,
only
only 6.3
6.3 hours
hours per per dayday have
have thethe mandatory 1,000-foot ceiling
mandatory 1,000-foot ceiling and and

11
11
JOINTTRAINING
JOINT TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

three-mile
three-mile horizontal visibility that
horizontal visibility that tactical
tactical aircraft
aircraft without
without specific
specific
.38
night
night capability
capability require
require.^* Tactical
Tactical air air power
power did did not
not have
have clear
clear weather
weather
for
for nearly
nearly 75 75 percent
percent of of the
the day
day..
Fortunately, technology finally caught
Fortunately, technology finally caught up up with
with required
required capability
capability
during
during the the mid-1980s
mid-1980s.. As As waswas amply
amply demonstrated
demonstrated by by the
the joint
joint AirAir
Force-Navy
Force-Navy actions actions against
against Libya
Libya during
during Operation
Operation El El Dorado
Dorado Canyon
Canyon
in
in 1986,
1986, airpower
air power has has achieved
achieved an an initial
initial capability
capability to to hit
hit isolated
isolated targets
targets
with
with pinpoint
pinpoint accuracy
accuracy at at night
night.. AnAn excellent
excellent demonstration
demonstration of of this
this
capability
capability was was shown
shown by by the
the crew
crew of of the
the F-111
F-111 that,
that, armed
armed with
with aa Pave
Pave
Tack
Tack infrared
infrared acquisition
acquisition and and targeting
targeting pod pod andand 500-pound
500-pound bombs,
bombs,
obliterated
obliterated an an Ilyushin
Ilyushin E-76
11-76 Candid
Candid jet jet transport
transport on on the
the ramp
ramp atat Tripoli
Tripoli
alrport.39
airport.
Nor is
Nor is the
the Air
Air Force
Force alone
alone in in new
new night
night tactical
tactical air
air warfare
warfare capability
capability..
While
While the the AirAir Force
Force F-1 11 s attacked
F-111s attacked the the airfield,
airfield, the Sidi Bilal
the Sidi Bilal naval
naval
training
training base, base, and and the
the Azziyah
Azziyah barracks
barracks in in Tripoli,
Tripoli, Navy
Navy A-6s A-6s
equipped
equipped with with both
both infrared
infrared and and low-light-level
low-light-level sensors sensors destroyed
destroyed
the Benina
the Benina military
military airfield
airfield and and thethe terrorist
terrorist training
training barracks
barracks at at
Benghazi .4° The
Benghazi.'*^ technical capability
The technical capability for for precision-night
precision-night operations
operations
that airmen
that airmen had had been
been seeking
seeking for for over
over 40 40 years
years hadhad finally
finally arrived.
arrived.
El Dorado
El Dorado CanyonCanyon can can be be considered
considered significant
significant for for more
more than
than just
just
the
the precision-night
precision-night capability
capability.. It It was
was anan excellent
excellent example
example of of theproper
the proper
integration of
integration of joint
joint assets
assets for for mission
mission accomplishment.
accomplishment. To To achieve
achieve
tactical
tactical surprise
surprise and and minimize
minimize US US losses,
losses, the the attack
attack waswas planned
planned to to hit
hit
all
all five
five selected targets during
selected targets during the the hours
hours of of darkness.
darkness. To To minimize
minimize
collateral damage, but ensure optimum target destruction, precision
collateral damage, but ensure optimum target destruction, precision
guided
guided bombs
bombs were were specified.
specified. The The only
only aircraft
aircraft that
that the
the Navy
Navy hadhad that
that
could
could do do this
this mission
mission was was the A-6E Grumman
the A-6E Grumman Intruder Intruder.. However,
However,
between
between the the two
two carriers
carriers inin the
the area,
area, the
the Coral
Coral SeaSea andand the
the America,
America, the the
Navy
Navy hadhad onlyonly aa total
total of
of 18
18 A-6s,
A-6s, notnot aa sufficient
sufficient number
number to to hit
hit all
all five
five
targets simultaneously .4r The choice was to either reduce the number
targets simultaneously.'*^ The choice was to either reduce the number
of
of targets
targets or or provide
provide extra extra aircraft
aircraft withwith precision-night-attack
precision-night-attack
capability
capability.. In In aa reverse
reverse of of the
the Korean
Korean experience
experience in in which Navy and
which Navy and
Marine
Marine aircraft
aircraft provided
provided extraextra aircraft
aircraft toto augment
augment Air Air Force
Force assets,
assets, in in
El
El Dorado
Dorado Canyon Canyon the the Air
Air Force
Force provided
provided F-111s F-1 Us fromftom bases
bases in in the
the
United
United Kingdom
Kingdom to to augment
augment the the Navy
Navy forcesforces already
already on on the
the scene.
scene.

12
12
HISTORY
HISTORY AND
AND BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, carrier-based
carrier-based F-14s, F-14s, F/A-18s,
F/A-18s, and and E-2Cs
E-2Cs provided
provided air air
superiority combat
superiority combat air air patrol
patrol (CAP),
(CAP), suppression
suppression of of enemy
enemy air air
defenses
defenses (SEAD),(SEAD), and and airborne
airborne commandcommand and and control
control support
support for for
both
both Air
Air Force
Force and
and Navy
Navy attacks
attacks/^ . The
The end
end result
result was
was the
the successful
successful
attack
attack of all five
of all five targets
targets with
with the the loss
loss of of only
only oneone F-111-a
F-111—a well-run,
well-run,
highly successful joint night operation by any measure.
highly successful joint night operation by any measure.
To
To judge
judge from from the unclassified information
the unclassified information that that is
is available
available through
through
the
the Cable
Cable News News Network
Network (CNN) (CNN) and and various
various newspaper
newspaper agencies,
agencies.
Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm appear to be an even greater
Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm appear to be an even greater
example
example of of aa successful
successful joint joint night
night air air war.
war. Joint
Joint operations
operations were were
established
established from from the the start
start of of Operation
Operation Desert Desert Shield
Shield.. AsAs GenGen Colin
Colin
Powell,
Powell, chairman
chairman of of the
the Joint
Joint Chiefs
Chiefs of,Staff,
of Staff, explained
explained in in his
his televised
televised
briefing
briefing on on 88 August
August 1990, 1990, US US Navy
Navy assets
assets provided
provided initial
initial air
air cover
cover
for Air Force and Army forces that were deploying into Saudi Arabia .
for Air Force and Army forces that were deploying into Saudi Arabia.
En
En route
route Air Air Force
Force F-15s
F-15s and and transport
transport aircraft
aircraft carrying
carrying the the 82d
82d
Airborne
Airborne Division
Division to to Saudi
Saudi Arabia
Arabia were-vulnerable
were.vulnerable to to Iraqi
Iraqi fighter
fighter
attack
attack in
in flight
flight. . Once on the ground, US forces would
Once on the ground, US forces would still
stUl be vulnerable
be vulnerable
to
to Iraqi
Iraqi attack
attack on on the
the airfield
airfield until
until thethe fighters
fighters could could bebe refueled
refueled andand
manned
manned by by fresh pilots . Navy
fresh pilots. Navy F-14sF-14s and and F-18s
F-18s operating
operating from from aircraft
aircraft
carriers
carriers in in the
the RedRed SeaSea provided
provided initial initial airair cover
cover until
until the
the Air
Air Force
Force
43
F-15s
F-15s were
were in in place
place andand combat
combat readyready.'*^.
This same principle of joint operations was
This same principle of joint operations was carried
carried toto an
an even
even greater
greater
degree
degree during
during Operation
Operation DesertDesert Storm.
Storm. Air Air Force F- 11 ls, F-1
Force F-llls, 17s, and
F-117s, and
F-15Es,
F-15Es, Navy Navy and and Marine
Marine A-6Es A-6Es and and F/A-18s,
F/A-18s, plus plus British,
British, French,
French,
and
and Italian
Italian Tornados
Tornados worked worked together
together in in an an integrated
integrated air air campaign
campaign
that devastated Iraq's
that devastated Iraq's offensive
offensive military
military capability
capability..
Substantive lessons learned are not yet available,
Substantive lessons learned are not yet available, but but some
some trends
trends
appear
appear to to be emerging. First,
be emerging. some of
First, some of the the coordination
coordination problems
problems
inherent
inherent in in joint
joint operations
operations have been resolved
have been resolved by by the
the designation
designation of of Lt
Lt
Gen
Gen Charles
Charles Homer Homer as as the
the joint
joint forces
forces air air component
component commander
commander
(JFACC)
(JFACC) for for allall air
air assets
assets.. As As General
General Homer Homer mentioned
mentioned in in his
his 17
17
January 1991 press briefing, all air missions were published and
January 1991 press briefing, aU air missions were published and
distributed
distributed in in aa single
single daily
daily ATO.44
ATO.''^ The The use use of joint ATO
of aa joint ATO is is an
an
important
important improvement
improvement over over ourour practices
practices during during thethe Vietnam
Vietnam War War in in
which each service had its
which each service had its own
own daily
daily air
air plan.
plan. By
By publishing
publishing aa single
single

13
13
JOINT
JOINT "TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

ATO
ATO under under the the command
command and and control
control of of aa single
single airair component
component
commander,
commander, Desert Desert StormStorm can can minimize
minimize the the problem
problem of of one
one aircraft
aircraft
bombing
bombing aa target target that
that aa previous
previous aircraft
aircraft hadhad already destroyed or,
already destroyed or, even
even
worse, no one hitting a target on the assumption that "the other guy will
worse, no one hitting a target on the assumption that "the other guy will
do
do itit."
."
A
A second
second trendtrend of of Desert
Desert Storm
Storm appears
appears to to be
be single
single aircraft
aircraft attacks
attacks
on
on aa target,
target, not not formation
formation attacks.
attacks. Apparently
Apparently each each individual target is
individual target is
being
being bombed
bombed by by aa single
single aircraft
aircraft atat aa time,
time, not
not by by simultaneous
simultaneous attacks
attacks
on the same aim point. For instance, the videotapes that General
on the same aim point. For instance, the videotapes that General
Homer
Homer showed showed of the F-111
of the F-111 laser
laser guided
guided bomb bomb attackattack against
against thethe
chemical
chemical weapons weapons storage storage bunker
bunker and and thethe F-117
F-117 bombing
bombing of of the
the
Iraqi
Iraqi airair force
force headquarters
headquarters building;building both both appear
appear to to be single aircraft
be single aircraft
missions
missions.'*^ . 45 Whether
Whether sequential
sequential attacks
attacks werewere mademade by by another
another aircraft
aircraft
separated
separated by by TOT
TOT or simultaneous attacks
or simultaneous attacks were
were made against physically
made against physically
separated
separated aim aim points
points on on the
the same
same general
general target
target has has not
not yet
yet been
been
revealed
revealed.. Nor Nor is is there
there anyany information
information as as to;whether
to whether Air Air Force
Force and Navy
and Navy
aircraft are attacking the same target at different times or attacking
aircraft are attacking the same target at different times or attacking
geographically
geographically separatedseparated targettarget areas,
areas, as as was
was done
done withwith the route pack
the route pack
system
system in Vietnam.. These
in Vietnam These are are important
important mission
mission areas areas that
that should
should bebe
investigated
investigated for for lessons
lessons learned
learned as as soon
soon as as itit is operationally feasible.
is operationally feasible.
There
There is is one important fact
one important that was
fact that was evident
evident in in Operation
Operation Desert
Desert
Storm. The night campaign was a total effort in all mission areas. Even
Storm. The night campaign was a total effort in all mission areas. Even
at night,
at night, the the attacking
attacking bombers
bombers were were protected
protected by by fighter
fighter CAP
CAP and and
SEAD
SEAD aircraft
aircraft.. Unlike
Unlike the the normal
normal practice
practice duringduring the the Vietnam
Vietnam War, War,
CAP
CAP and and SEAD
SEAD assets assets were
were tasked
tasked for for joint
joint missions,
missions, not not assigned
assigned toto
cover
cover onlyonly their
their particular
particular service
service.. The
The designation
designation of of General
General Homer
Homer
as the single JFACC made this the most efficient use of air power
as the single JFACC made this the most efficient use of air power
possible.
possible.

Summary
Summary

This
This chapter
chapter has provided aa briefoverview
has provided of the
brief overview of the history
history ofbothjoint
of both joint
and night
and night tactical
tactical air
air operations
operations from
from World
World War
War II
11 through
through thepresent.
the present.
Limitations
Limitations onjoint
on joint operations have been
operations have been caused
caused by
by conflicts
conflicts in
in doctrine
doctrine

14
14
HISTORY
HISTORY AND
AND BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

or
or aa lack
lack of realistic training
of realistic training injoint
in joint operations.
operations. ByBy contrast,
contrast, limitations
limitations
and problems with night tactical air power have
and problems with night tactical air power have been
been the
the result
result of
of
technical limitations and
technical limitations and the nonavailability of
the nonavailability of the
the necessary
necessary
equipment.
equipment. Despite
Despite these
these problems, joint night
problems, joint night operations
operations inin time
time of
of
actual combat have
actual combat have proven
proven successful,
successful, as
as was
was demonstrated
demonstrated by
by the
the Air
Air
Force-Marine
Force-Marine Corps Corps teams
teams in
in Korea
Korea and the Air
and the Air Force-Navy
Force-Navy teamwork
teamwork
in Libya. The preliminary reports from Operation Desert Storm
in Libya. The preliminary reports from Operation Desert Storm
emphasized
emphasized that that given enough preparation
given enough preparation time,
time, wewe can
can operate
operate
successfully
successfully as as aa joint
joint team
team.. The
The next
next chapter
chapter discusses the current
discusses the current
challenges to continued joint success in
challenges to continued joint success in the
the night
night air
air war.
war.

Notes
Notes

1.
1. Robert
Robert F. F. Futrell,
Futrell, Ideas,
Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic
Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking
Thinking inin the
the United
United
States
States Air
Air Force,
Force, vol.vol. 1,
1, 1907-1960 (Maxwell AFB,
1907-1960 (Maxwell AFB, Ala Ala.:. : Air
Air University
University Press,Press,
December 1989), 169
December 1989), 169.. ,
2. Ibid., 2-3
2. Ibid., 2-3..
3. Maj
3. Maj RogerF.
Roger F. Kropf,
Kropf, "The
"The US US Air
Air Force
Force in
in Korea," Airpower Journal 4,
Korea," AirpowerJournal no. 11
4, no.
(Spring 1990)::44
(Spring 1990) 44..
4.
4. Ibid.,
Ibid., 36.
36.
5. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Russell F.
6. Russell F. Weigley,
Weigley, TheThe American
American WayWay of of War (Bloomington, Ind
War (Bloomington, Ind.:. : Indiana
Indiana
University
University Press,
Press, 1973),384-85 .
1973), 384-85.
7. Air
7. Force Manual
Air Force Manual (AFM)
(AFM) 1-1,1-1, Basic
Basic Aerospace
Aerospace Doctrine
Doctrine ofthe of the United
United States
States
Air Force, 16
Air Force, 16 March
March 1984, 2-11.
1984,2-11.
8. Gen William
8. Gen William W. W. Momyer,
Momyer, Airpower
Airpower in in Three
Three WarsWars (Washington,
(Washington, D.C.: D.C.:
Department ofthe
Department of the Air
Air Force,
Force, 1978),
1978), 91
91. .
9. FutreU, vol.
9. Futrell, vol. 2,1961-1984,
2,1961-1984,283. 283 .
10.
10. Momyer,
Momyer, 98. 98.
11 . Ibid., 99.
11. Ibid., 99.
12.
12. Donald
Donald J. Mrozek, Air
J. Mrozek, Air Power
Power andand the
the Ground
Ground War War in in Vietnam
Vietnam:: Ideas
Ideas and and
Actions (Maxwell AFB,
Actions (Maxwell AFB, Ala
Ala.:.: Air
Air University
University Press,
Press, January
January 1988),
1988), 43.
43.
13.
13. Ibid.
Ibid.
14.
14. Ibid.,
Ibid., 108
108..
15. Weigley, 358
15. Weigley, 358..
16. Col Dennis M.
16. Col Dennis M. Drew
Drew and and Dr Donald M.
Dr Donald M. Snow,
Snow, TheThe Eagle's
Eagle's Talons:
Talons: The The
American Experience at War (Maxwell AFB,
American Experience at War (Maxwell AFB, Ala
Ala.:.: Air
Air University
University Press,
Press, December
December
1988), 192
1988), 192..
17. Momyer,
17. Momyer, 167 167..

15
15
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIRWARFARE
AIR WARFARE

18.
18. Richard
Richard P. P. Hallion,
HaUion, "Strike
"Strike from
from the
the Sky,"
Sky," inin Strike
Strikefrom
from the Sky (Washington,
the Sky (Washington,
D.C.
D.C.:: Smithsonian
Smithsonian Institute, 1989), 149-227
Institute, 1989), 149-227..
19. Col
19. Col William
William R. R. Carter,
Carter, "Air
"Air Power
Power in the Battle
in the Battle ofof the
the Bulge
Bulge:: AA Theater
Theater
Campaign
Campaign Perspective,"AirpowerJournal
Perspective," Airpower Journal 3, no. 44 (Winter
3, no. (Winter 1989)
1989):: 21
21..
20.
20. Momyer,
Momyer, 178 178..
21
21.. Futrell,
Futrell, vol.
vol. 1, 303 .
1,303.
22.
22. Ibid
Ibid.,., 338.
338 .
23.. Momyer,
23 Momyer, 180 180..
24.
24. Robert
Robert F. F. Futrell,
Futrell, TheThe United
United States
States Air
Air Force
Force in in Korea
Korea 1950-1953,
1950-1953, rev.
lev. ed.
ed.
(Washington, D.C.: Office of
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air
Air Force History, 1983), 330.
Force History, 1983), 330.
25.
25. Ibid., 612-15 .
Ibid., 612-15.
26.
26. Ibid., 614-15 .
Ibid., 614-15.
27. Ibid.,
27. 355 .
Ibid., 355.
28.
28. Drew
Drew and and Snow,
Snow, 253253..
29. Momyer, 188, 280, 302 .
29. Momyer, 188,280,302.
30.
30. Ibid., 204..
Ibid., 204
31. Ibid., 180
31. Ibid., 180..
32. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33.
33. Ibid.,
Ibid., 214.
214.
34. Futrell, Ideas,
34. Futrell, Ideas, volvol.. 2, 479.
2,479. ' '.
35. Donald J. Mrozek, The US Air ForceAfter Vietnam : Postwar
35. Donald J. Mrozek, The US Air Force After Vietnam: Postwar Challenges
Challenges and
and
PotentialforResponses
Potentialfor Responses (Maxwell (Maxwell AFB,AFB, Ala.:
Ala.: Air
Air University Press, December
University Press, December 1988),
1988),
24.
24.
36.
36. Futrell,
Futrell, Ideas,
Wea5, vol vol.. 2, 309.
2,309.
37.
37. Ibid.,
Ibid., 509.
509.
38.
38. Ibid.,
Ibid., 558
558..
39.
39. Maj
Maj Gregory
Gregory L. L. Trebon,
Trebon, "Libyan
"Libyan State
State Sponsored
Sponsored Terrorism-What
Terrorism—^What Did Did
Operation
Operation El El Dorado
Dorado Canyon
Canyon Accomplish?"
Accomplish?" Reportno. 88-2600 (Maxwell
Report no. 88-2600 (MaxweU AFB,AFB, Ala
Ala.:.:
Air
Air Command
Command and and Staff
Staff College,
College, April
AprU 1988),
1988), 23-24.
23-24.
40.
40. Ibid.
Ibid.
41.
41. Ibid.,
Ibid., 24.
24.
42.
42. Ibid.,
Ibid., 26.
26.
43. Gen Colin
43. Gen Colin Powell,
Powell, Pentagon
Pentagon news
news conference,
conference, CNN,CNN, 88 August 1990.
August 1990.
44.
44. Lt
Lt Gen Charles Homer,
Gen Charles press briefing,
Homer, press briefing, CNN,
CNN, 17 17 January 1991..
January 1991
45.
45. Ibid.
Ibid.

16
16
Chapter
Chapter 22

Doing
Doing It
It in
in the
the Dark-The
Dark—The Challenge
Challenge

Chapter 11 examined
Chapter examined the the history
history of of both
both joint
joint operations
operations and and night
night
operations
operations.. This chapter discusses
This chapter discusses some some ofthe
of the challenges
challenges to to conducting
conducting
joint night air warfare with the equipment available today. To help
joint night air warfare with the equipment available today. To help the
the
reader
reader better
better understand
understand the the assets
assets and
and their
their possible
possible employment,
employment, this this
chapter presents a hypothetical joint night operation code-named
chapter presents a hypothetical joint night operation code-named
Operation
Operation TaeTae Kwon
Kwon Do. Do. The
The operation,
operation, to to be
be conducted
conducted on on the
the Korean
Korean
Peninsula, uses land-
Peninsula, uses land- andand carrier-based aircraft plus
carrier-based aircraft plus Army
Aimy helicopters
helicopters
to support a ground attack. The scenarios described in Operation Tae
to support a ground attack. The scenarios described in Operation Tae
Kwon
Kwon Do Do are
are by
by nono means
means meant
meant to to be
be exhaustive
exhaustive descriptions
descriptions ofjoint
of joint
operations
operations butbut merely
merely serve
serve as as examples
examples ofhowof how multiservice
multiservice assets
assets may
may
be
be employed
employed..
While reading
While reading thisthis chapter,
chapter, please note that
please note that this
this entire
entire operation
operation is is
strictly a figment of the author's imagination . Although physical
strictly a figment of the author's imagination. Although physical
descriptions of
descriptions of enemy
enemy and and friendly
friendly air air orders
orders of of battle
battle and and their
their
capabilities
capabilities areare realistic,
realistic, they
they areare based
based on unclassified information
on unclassified information
only.
only. Actual
Actual performance
performance or
or employment
employment tactics
tactics may
may be
be markedly
markedly
different
different.. The
The friendly
friendly assets
assets listed
listed areare based
based on on current
current USUS inventory
inventory
and may not actually be available for employment in Korea . The North
and may not actually be available for employment in Korea. The North
Korean
Korean airfield
airfield described
described and and the attack itself
the attack itself are
are purely
purely fictional
fictional andand
are
are not
not based
based on on any
any actual
actual plans
plans that
that the
the author
author has
has read
read or
or isis aware
aware of.
of.
All
All other place names
other place names are are selected
selected at at random
random from from anan atlas
atlas of
of the
the
Korean
Korean Peninsula
Peninsula (fig (fig.. 1).
1). Finally,
Finally, suchsuch anan operation
operation would
would probably
probably
include combined operations with US and allied nations' forces. For
include combined operations with US and allied nations' forces. For
ease
ease ofdiscussion,
of discussion. Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do will
wUl include
include US forces only
US forces only
and
and not
not the
the combined
combined forcesforces of of allied
allied nations
nations..

17
17
JOINT TRAINING FOR NIGHT AIR WARFARE

Figure 1. The Korean Peninsula and Operation Tae Kwon Do

18
THE
THE CI-IALLENGE
CHALLENGE

Operation
Operation Tae
Tae Kwon
Kwon Do
Do

For purposes of
For purposes of this
this discussion;
discussion, and and to make the
to make the example
example more more
realistic,
realistic, let
let us assume that
us assume that open
open conflict
conflict erupted
erupted between
between NorthNorth Korea Korea
and South Korea
and South Korea less less than
than 48 48 hours
hours ago ago.. The
The United
United States
States finds
finds itself itself
in a situation similar to
in a situation similar to that
that which
which we
we faced
faced in
in June
June 1950
1950. . North
North
Korean (NK)
Korean (NK) x forces
forces are attacking all
are attacking all along
along the the border
border withwith South South
Korea. So far, US and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces are holding
Korea. So far, US and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces are holding
their
their defensive
defensive positions
positions but but must
must taketake action
action soon
soon to to regain
regain the the
initiative
initiative and avoid being
and avoid being overrun.
overrun.
The commander in chief United
The commander in chief United Nations
Nations Command
Command (CINCUNC)
(CINCUNC)
plans
plans to regain the
to regain the initiative
initiative through
through Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do, Do, aa
counteroffensive
counteroffensive drive drive by elements of
by elements of thethe USUS Army
Army 2d 2d Infantry
Infantry
Division
Division north
north from
from Chorwon
Chorwon along
along the
the main
main road
road system
system to
to the
the port
port ofof
Wonsan.
Wonsan. The The ground
ground offensive
offensive is is to be supported
to be supported by by Air
Air Force,
Force, Navy, Navy,
and Marine air attacks, plus organic aviation assets of
and Marine air attacks, plus organic aviation assets of the
the 2d
2d Division
Division. .
Operations
Operations are are scheduled
scheduled to to commence
commence at at H-hour,
H-hour, 4:00
4:00 A.MA.M.. local
local time time
(0400L), tomorrow
(0400L), tomorrow (D (D day)
day)..
Unlike the situation in Operations
Unlike the situation in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm,
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the the
attack by
attack by North
North Korea
Korea has has caught
caught US forces by
US forces by surprise.
surprise. They
They have have not not
had five months to deploy forces into the theater.
had five months to deploy forces into the theater. Additional
Additional air
air and
and
ground
ground forces
forces are deploying from
are deploying from the the Continental
Continental UnitedUnited States States
(CONUS)
(CONUS) bases, bases, but but they
they willwUl notnot arrive
arrive in in time
time to support the
to support the initial
initial
attack ; only PACOM theater assets
attack; only PACOM theater assets are
are in
in place
place for
for the
the attack
attack. . These
These
include
include thethe Army
Army and and AirAir Force
Force units permanently stationed
units permanently stationed in in Korea,
Korea,
Air Force and Marine air units deployed in from Okinawa and Japan,
Air Force and Marine air units deployed in from Okinawa and Japan,
and US Navy
and US Navy Carrier
Carrier AirAir Wing 11 (CVW-11) aboard
Wing 11(CVW-11) aboard thethe USS
USS Abraham
Abraham
Lincoln, currently operating
Lincoln, currently operating in in the
the Sea
Sea of Japan. The
of Japan. The USSUSS Midway,
Midway,
normally based in Japan, is
normally based in Japan, is undergoing
undergoing refit
refit from
from its
its last
last deployment
deployment
and
and will
will not
not be under way
be under way for for at
at least
least 9696 hours
hours..
The
The ground
ground forcesforces are directly opposed
are directly opposed by by three North Korean
three North Korean
armored divisions at
armored divisions at Pyongyang.
Pyongyang. Enemy
Enemy air
air order
order of
of battle
battle includes
includes aa
wing
wing ofof ground
ground attack MiG-27 Flogger
attack MiG-27 Flogger Ds Ds atat Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki AB AB and and aa
wing of air-to-air MiG-23 Flogger Es at
wing of air-to-air MiG-23 Flogger Es at Yakimando
Yakimando AB,
AB, both
both in
in the
the
vicinity
vicinity of of Wonsan
Wonsan..

19
19
JOMT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

A
A major
major threat
threat to
to the
the success
success ofof this
this counteroffensive
counteroffensive is is the
the wing
wing of
of
NK
NK ground
ground attack
attack MiG-27 Flogger Ds
MiG-27 Flogger Ds at Bul-Go-Ki AB.
at Bul-Go-Ki AB . This
This isis on
on the
the
east
east coast
coast of
of North Korea, 30
North Korea, 30 miles
mUes north
north ofof the
the demilitarized
demilitarized zonezone
(DMZ)
(DMZ) andand 15
15 miles
miles inland
inland.. It
It is
is within
within range
range of
of USAF
USAF bases
bases in in South
South
Korea
Korea and
and US
US Navy
Navy carrier-based
carrier-based airair in
in the
the Sea
Sea of
of Japan,
Japan, but
but beyond
beyond
the range of friendly artillery or naval gunfire.
the range of friendly artillery or naval gunfire.
In
In support
support of of the
the ground
ground phase
phase of of Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do, Do,
CINCUNC
CINCUNC has has directed
directed the
the air
air component
component commander
commander to to accomplish
accomplish
the
the following
following missions,
missions, not
not necessarily
necessarily in in order
order of
of priority
priority::
11.. Conduct
Conduct offensive
offensive counterair
counterair (OCA)
(OCA) operations
operations toto neutralize
neutralize
Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki AB AB for
for at
at least
least 12
12 hours,
hours, from
from 0400L
0400L toto 1600L
1600L on on D
D day.
day.
2.
2. Provide
Provide DCA
DCA asas required
required against
against the
the MiG-23s
MiG-23s out
out of
of Yakimando
Yakimando
and
and whatever
whatever MiG-27s
MiG-27s maymay survive
survive the
the attack
attack on Bul-Go-Ki.
on Bul-Go-Ki.
33.. Provide
Provide CAS for the
CAS for the initial
initial ground
ground offensive
offensive as
as required
required..
Readers
Readers with
with aa knowledge
knowledge of of air
air power
power willwill recognize
recognize that that there
there are
are
some
some significant
significant omissions
omissions in in the
the total
total support
support that
that air
air power
power couldcould
provide
provide for
for Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do. Do. For
For instance,
instance, there
there is no mention
is no mention
of
of aa strategic
strategic bombing
bombing phase; phase; no no requirement
requirement to to destroy
destroy North North
Korea's
Korea's command,
command, control,
control, and and communications
communications nets nets;; andand no no
consideration
consideration of of air
air interdiction
interdiction to to prevent
prevent possible
possible reinforcement
reinforcement of of
the
the ground
ground divisions.
divisions. Similarly,
Similarly, the the reader
reader should
should note
note in in the
the ensuing
ensuing
discussion
discussion that not all
that not all available
available aircraft
aircraft will be tasked
will be tasked forfor the
the specific
specific
missions listed above . It is not the author's intent to imply that those
missions listed above. It is not the author's intent to imply that those
aircraft
aircraft not
not specifically
specifically selected
selected forfor the
the OCA,
OCA, DCA,DCA, or or CAS
CAS missions
missions
described
described would
would not
not be used at
be used at all
aU.. Rather, they would
Rather, they would be be available
available and and
would
would bebe tasked
tasked for
for other
other missions,
missions, suchsuch asas interdiction,
interdiction, that
that this
this section
section
does
does not
not discuss.
discuss. Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do isis not
not meant
meant to to bebe an
an
exhaustive discussion of the definitive joint night air campaign but
exhaustive discussion of the definitive joint night air campaign but
merely
merely anan illustration
illustration of
of some
some ofofthe
the challenges
challenges that
that can
can be
be encountered
encountered
in
in such
such operations.
operations. ToTo that
that endand
end and in in the
the interests
interests ofof brevity,
brevity, thisthis section
section
is
is deliberately
deliberately limited in scope to the OCA, DCA, and CAS missions .
limited in scope to the OCA, DCA, and CAS missions.
For
For purposes
purposes ofof internal
internal consistency,
consistency, the the missions
missions willwill bebe discussed
discussed
in
in the
the order
order presented
presented above.
above. TheThe reader
reader should
should bear
bear inin mind,
mind, however,
however,
that in
that in practice
practice the
the missions
missions would
would not not necessarily
necessarily be be executed
executed in in that
that

20
20
TUE
THE CZIALLENGE
CHALLENGE

order.
order. The OCA mission
The OCA mission against
against Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki is considered first
is considered first because
because
of
of the
the complexity
complexity of of the mission and
the mission and the
the size
size ofof the
the mission
mission package
package
required . Many of the mission elements and
required. Many of the mission elements and requirements
requirements of
of this
this OCA
OCA
mission
mission will
wUl bebe repeated
repeated to lesser degree
to aa lesser degree as as parts
parts of
of the
the DCA
DCA and and CAS
CAS
missions. To avoid
missions. To avoid repetition
repetition and
and for
for the
the sake
sake ofof brevity,
brevity, the
the discussion
discussion
ofthe DCA and the CAS
of the DCA and the CAS missions
missions will
will be
be brief
brief and
and will
wUl emphasize
emphasize only
only
those areas that
those areas that are different from
are different from the OCA mission.
the OCA mission. This
This abbreviated
abbreviated
treatment, however, is not meant to indicate that the DCA and
treatment, however, is not meant to indicate that the DCA and CAS
CAS
missions are
missions are any
any less
less important.
important.
The various air
The various air missions
missions of of Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do will
wiU bebe
considered in two parts, mission
considered in two parts, mission planning
planning and
and mission
mission execution.
execution.
Mission execution
Mission execution will will be
be further
further broken
broken down
down into
into three main phases
three main phases::
(1) ingress to the target area, (2) target acquisition and attack, and
(1) ingress to the target area, (2) target acquisition and attack, and (3)
(3)
egress from the
egress from the target
target area
area and
and return
return toto friendly
friendly territory.
territory.
Total air assets
Total air assets available
available to the air
to the air component
component commander
commander are are listed
listed
in table 1 . The bases listed are the normal bases, not the wartime
in table 1. The bases listed are the normal bases, not the wartime
locations
locations of
of the
the aircraft
aircraft..

Table
Table 11

Available Assets for
Available Assets for Operation
Operation Tae
Tae Kwon
Kwon Do
Do
Aircraft
Aircraft Base
Base Mission(s)
Mission(s)

USAF
USAF
F-15C/D
F-15C/D Kadena,
Kadena, Okinawa
Okinawa Air-to-Air
Air-to-Air
F-15C/D
F-15C/D Elmendorf, Alaska
Elmendorf, Alaska Air-to-Air
Air-to-Air
F-15E*
F-15E* Elmendorf, Alaska
Elmendorf, Alaska Multirole
Multirole
F-16C/D
F-16C/D Misawa, Japan
Misawa, Japan Multirole
Multirole
F-16C/D
F-16C/D Kunsan,
Kunsan, Korea
Korea Multirole
Multirole
F-16 (LANTIRN)*
F-16(LAN1'1RN)* Osan, Korea
Osan, Korea Multirole
Multirole
F-16 GANTIRN)*
F-16(LANTIRN)* Eielson, Alaska
Eielson, Alaska Multirole
Multirole
A-10
A-10 Eielson, Alaska
Kelson, Alaska CAS
CAS

♦Aircraft equipped
*Aircraft equipped and
and aircrew
aircrew trained
trained for normal employment
for normal employment in
in night
night missions.
missions.

2211
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

Tabled--Continued
Table 1—Continued

Aircraft
Aircraft Base
Base Mission(s)
Mission(s)

USN
USN
F-14
F-14 USS
USS Abraham
Abraham Lincoln
Lincoln Air-to-Air
Air-to-Air
A-6E*
A-6E* USS
USS Abraham
Abraham Lincoln
Lincoln Surface
Surface Attack
Attack
F/A-18*
F/A-18* `' USS
USS Abraham
Abraham Lincoln
Lincoln Multirole
Multirole
EA-6B*
EA-6B* USS
USS Abraham
Abraham Lincoln
Lincoln SEAD
SEAD
USMC
USMC
AV-8B*
AV-8B* Marine Corps Air
Marine Corps Air CAS
CAS
Station (MCAS),
Station (MCAS),
Iwakuni,
Iwakuni, Japan
Japan
F/A-18*
F/A-18* MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan
MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan Multirole
Multirole
USA
USA
AH-64
AH-64 Apache*
Apache* CAS/Battlefield
CAS/BatUefield
Air
Air Interdiction
Interdiction
OH-58D Kiowa*
OH-58DKiowa* FAC/ Observation
FAC/Observation

*Aircraft
*Aircraft equipped
equipped and
and aircrew
aircrew trained
trained for
for normal
normal employment
employment in
in night
night missions
missions..

Mission
Mission Planning
Planning

A
A major
major purpose
purpose ofof mission
mission planning
plaiming is is to
to select
select the
the appropriate
appropriate type
type
and
and numberofaircraft
number of aircraft forfor amission
a mission package
package.. The package must
The package must be
be sized
sized
and
and equipped
equipped to to deal
deal with
with all
all aspects
aspects ofof the
the mission,
mission, including
including ingress
ingress
to
to the
the target
target area
area through
through the
the enemy's
enemy's integrated
integrated airair defense
defense system
system
(LADS),
(IADS), target
target acquisition
acquisition andand attack,
attack, and
and safe
safe return
return to
to base.
base. Because
Because
of
of the
the diversity
diversity ofof missions
missions toto be
be accomplished
accomplished simultaneously
simultaneously and and the
the
scarcity
scarcity of
of air
air assets
assets available,
available, eacheach of
of the
the mission packages must
mission packages must bebe
chosen
chosen toto make
make both
both effective
effective andand efficient
efficient use
use of
of available
available resources
resources..
These
These considerations
considerations are are defined
defined in in the
the complementary
complementary principles
principles ofof
war
war known
known as as mass
mass and
and economy
economy of of force.
force. The
The package
package must
must have
have
sufficient
sufficient power
power to to accomplish
accomplish the the objective
objective (mass)
(mass) but
but must
must not
not be
be so
so
large
large as
as to
to waste
waste scarce
scarce air
air resources
resources on on secondary
secondary objectives
objectives oror
"overkill"
"overkill" (economy
(economy of of force)
force).'.'

22
22
'I'I
THE IE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

Offensive Counterair
Offensive Counterair
As described
As described in in AFM
AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace
1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine
Doctrine of of the
the United
United
States Air Force,
States Air Force, and and as as proven
proven by historical experience,
by historical experience, the the first
first
objective for air power is to control
objective for air power is to control the
the aerospace
aerospace environment.
environment. This
This
is described as
is described as counterair,
counterair, aa generalgeneral mission
mission thatthat isis divided
divided into into three
three
specific missions : defensive counterair, offensive counterair, and
specific missions: defensive counterair, offensive counterair, and
suppression
suppression of of enemy
enemy air air defenses
defenses (SEAD).3
(SEAD).
As
As the
the name
name implies,
implies, DCA DCA missions
missions are are designed
designed to to protect
protect friendly
friendly
assets-either ground, naval, or air-against enemy aerospace forces
assets—either ground, naval, or air—against enemy aerospace forces..
This
This can
can be accomplished with
be accomplished with interceptors,
interceptors, antiaircraft
antiaircraft artillery,
artillery,
surface-to-air missiles
surface-to-air missiles (SAM),
(SAM), or or some combination of
some combination of the
the three.
three. The The
classic example of a
classic example of a DCA
DCA operation
operation was
was the
the RAF's
RAF's defeat
defeat of
of the
the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe in in 1940
1940 during
during the the Battle
Battle ofof Britain.
Britain.
By contrast, an OCA mission seizes the initiative
By contrast, an OCA mission seizes the initiative from
from the the enemy
enemy to to
"seek out
"seek out and neutralize or
and neutralize destroy enemy
or destroy enemy aerospace
aerospace forces forces at at aa time
time
andplace
and place of of our
our choosing
choosing." ." 5^ This
This may
may involve
involve offensive
offensive fighter
fighter sweeps
sweeps
for air-to-air combat or air-to-surface
for air-to-air combat or air-to-surface bombing
bombing attacks
attacks against
against enemy
enemy
airfields and aircraft
airfields and aircraft on on the
the ground.
ground. The The classic
classic example
example of of anan OCAOCA
operation was the Israeli air force's destruction of the Egyptian air
operation was the Israeli air force's destruction of the Egyptian air
force on the
force on the ground
ground in in the
the opening
opening hours of the Six-Day
hours ofthe Six-Day War War in in 1967
1967..
The
The SEAD
SEAD mission "allows friendly
mission "allows friendly aerospace
aerospace forces
forces to to perform
perform their their
other missions effectively without
other missions effectively without interference
interference from
from enemy
enemy air
air
defenses."
defenses." 6* It requires successful
It requires successful negation
negation of of the
the enemy's
enemy's IADS, IADS, aa
combination
combination of of warning
warning radars,radars, enemy fighter aircraft,
enemy fighter aircraft, SAMs,SAMs, and and
AAA. This can be done
AAA. This can be done through
through either
either electronic
electronic disruption
disruption of
of theLADS
the IADS
radar
radar and
and communication
communication systems systems or or physical
physical destruction
destruction of of the
the
individual component parts. The opening phases of
individual component parts. The opening phases of Operation
Operation Desert
Desert
Storm,
Storm, including
including the electronic jamming
the electronic jamming of of the
the Iraqi
Iraqi radar
radar nets
nets and and the
the
F-4G destruction of
F-4G destruction of the
the SAMSAM radars,
radars, illustrated very well-planned
illustrated aa very weU-planned
SEAD operation.
SEAD operation.
Note
Note thatthat inin the above mission
the above mission descriptions
descriptions there there is is nono
differentiation as to either the type of aircraft to be used or the
differentiation as to either the type of aircraft to be used or the time
time
of day. A
of day. A daylight
daylight airfield
airfield attack using B-52s
attack using B-52s is is just
just as as much
much an an
OCA
OCA mission
mission as as is night attack
is aa night attack against
against the the same airfield using
same airfield using
F-111 s. The mission is defined by the
F-111 s. The mission is defined by the objectives
objectives to
to be
be accomplished,
accomplished.

23
23
JOINT'
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FORNIGHT
FOR NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

not
not by
by the
the capabilities
capabilities and and tactics
tactics ofthe
of the aircraft
aircraft to to be
be used.
used. TheThe decision
decision
for
for daylight
daylight or or night
night attack
attack is is driven
driven by by the
the threat
threat to be faced
to be faced and and the
the
aircraft
aircraft available,
available, not not byby the
the mission
mission to to be
be accomplished
accomplished..
An
An OCA OCA mission
mission against
against an an enemy
enemy airfield
airfield is is one
one of of thethe most
most
difficult
difficult types
types to to plan
plan because
because of of the
the diversity
diversity of of threats
threats thatthat will
will be
be
faced
faced and and the the tasks
tasks that
that must
must be be performed
performed to to accomplish
accomplish the the
mission.
mission. The The -mission
mission requires
requires that that anan aircraft
aircraft penetrate
penetrate behind behind
enemy
enemy lines,
lines, find
find and
and attack
attack aa target
target in in the
the face
face of of enemy
enemy defenses,
defenses,
and
and then
then return
return to to friendly
friendly lines
lines while
while avoiding
avoiding pursuit.
pursuit. Obviously,
Obviously,
some
some aircraft
aircraft must
must carry
carry bombs
bombs to to attack
attack thethe airfield
airfield and and the the aircraft
aircraft
on
on itit (OCA).
(OCA). The The package
package must must also also include
include protection
protection againstagainst
enemy
enemy defenses
defenses on on the
the ground
ground (SEAD) (SEAD) and and protection
protection from from enemy
enemy
fighters in the air (escort).
fighters in the air (escort).
Planning
Planning for for any
any tactical
tactical mission
mission starts
starts with
with the the mission
mission objective
objective
and
and target
target description.
description. The The objective
objective in in this
this case
case is is to
to neutralize
neutralize
Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki AB AB forfor the
the next
next 12 12 hours
hours.. Note
Note that
that this
this does
does notnot necessarily
necessarily
require
require complete
complete destruction
destruction of of the
the target,
target, just
just putting
putting itit out
out of of action
action
for a finite period of time . Bul-Go-Ki AB has a single runway with
for a finite period of time. Bul-Go-Ki AB has a single runway with
parallel
parallel taxiway
taxiway oriented
oriented west-to-east
west-to-east.. It It is
is bordered
bordered on on the
the south
south and
and
west
west byby mountains
mountains and and onon the
the north
north and and east
east byby lowlands
lowlands leading
leading to to the
the
Sea
Sea ofof Japan.
Japan. A A wing
wing of of MG-27
MiG-27 Flogger-D
Flogger-D aircraft aircraft is is dispersed
dispersed in in
hardened
hardened shelters
shelters throughout
throughout the the field.
field. The
The fieldfield is is defended
defended by by aa
mixture
mixture of of fixed
fixed and mobile AAA
and mobile AAA with with both
both radar
radar and and optical
optical aiming.
aiming.
Yakimando
Yakimando AB, AB, approximately
approximately 20 20 miles
miles north
north of of Bul-Go-Ki,
Bul-Go-Ki, has has aa
wing
wing of of MiG-23
MiG-23 FloggerFlogger Es Es on on airair defense
defense alert. alert. Intelligence
Intelligence
confirms four of the MiG-23 aircraft on five-minute alert and
confirms four of the MiG-23 aircraft on five-minute alert and anan
additional
additional 20 20 available
available within
within 30 30 minutes.
minutes.
Exact
Exact tactics
tactics andand weapons
weapons for for this
this type
type of of mission
mission are are varied
varied.. At
At
the
the low
low end end of of the
the spectrum,
spectrum, aa Special Special Forces
Forces team team is is inserted
inserted on on
base
base toto capture
capture or or kill
kill all the MiG
aU the MiG pilots
pilots in in their
their sleep
sleep.. The
The highhigh end
end
of the spectrum could be a Minuteman III nuclear missile launched
of the spectrum could be a Minuteman IE nuclear missile launched
from
from Montana.
Montana. It is not
It is not thethe purpose
purpose of of this
this section,
section, however,
however, to to
engage
engage in in aa prolonged
prolonged debate debate on on OCA
OCA tacticstactics.. Therefore,
Therefore, for for
purposes
purposes of of this
this example,
example, mission
mission planners
planners have have chosen
chosen to to crater
crater the
the
runway,
runway, taxiway,
taxiway, and and selected
selected choke
choke points
points on on the
the airfield
airfield to to prevent
prevent

24
24
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

the
the MiGs
MiGs from from taking
taking off.off. The
The aircraft
aircraft themselves
themselves are are too
too dispersed
dispersed
and
and too
too well
well protected
protected by by their
their shelters
shelters to to bebe feasible
feasible targets
targets.. ToTo ensure
ensure
sufficient
sufficient accuracy
accuracy and and bomb
bomb damage
damage to to close
close the field, the
the field, the attackers
attackers
will be loaded with precision guided munitions, specifically improved
will be loaded with precision guided munitions, specifically improved
2,000-pound
2,000-pound Mark-84s
Mark-84s with Paveway III
with Paveway III laser-guidance
laser-guidance packages.packages . This This
munition
munition is is commonly
commonly known known as either aa GBU-27
as either GBU-27 or or laser
laser guided
guided bombbomb
(LGB
(LOB).).
Working
Working backward
backward from from the
the target
target itself,
itself, thethe next
next step
step is
is to
to determine
determine
how
how toto defeat
defeat thethe enemy
enemy threat
threat that
that would prevent accomplishment
would prevent accomplishment of of
the
the mission.
mission. In In this
this case,
case, thethe threat
threat is is the
the MiG-23s
MiG-23s on on alert
alert at at
Yakimando,
Yakimando, plus plus the
the AAA
AAA and and the
the SAM
SAM sitessites atat Bul-Go-Ki.
Bul-Go-Ki. The The MiGs
MiGs
can be countered by escort fighters, self-protection with onboard
can be countered by escort fighters, self-protection with onboard
weapons,
weapons, or or preemptive
preemptive strikesstrikes against
against thethe airfield
airfield.. The
The SAM
SAM and and AAA
AAA
can
can be
be destroyed
destroyed by by dropping
dropping bombs bombs on on thethe sites
sites themselves
themselves or or byby
destroying
destroying their
their controlling
controlling radar
radar systems
systems with with high-speed
high-speed antiradiation
antiradiation
missiles
missiles (HARM)
(HARM).. The The defenses
defenses couldcould also
also be be avoided
avoided by by going
going below
below
their minimum altitude (for visual AAA, that is zero feet) or deceived
their minimum altitude (for visual AAA, that is zero feet) or deceived
through
through the the use
use ofof electronic
electronic warfare
warfare (EW) (EW) assets
assets.. For For purposes
purposes of of
this
this example,
example, the the air
air component
component commander
commander has has decided
decided to to follow
follow
General
General Homer's
Homer's example example in in Operation
Operation Desert Desert StormStorm and and provide
provide
escort
escort fighters
fighters and and SEAD
SEAD assets
assets forfor the
the attack
attack package
package..
Having
Having considered
considered the the target
target and
and the
the threat,
threat, thethe next
next point
point toto consider
consider
is
is the
the time
time forfor the
the attack.
attack. Lacking
Lacking any any other
other mission
mission considerations,
considerations,
planners
planners must
must select
select the
the TOT
TOT thatthat would
would provide
provide the the greatest
greatest possibility
possibility
of
of hitting
hitting the
the target with a minimal amount of risk to the aircrew . In
target with a minimal amount of risk to the aircrew. In this
this
case,
case, however,
however, mission
mission considerations
considerations dictatedictate thatthat thethe air
air attack
attack must
must
coincide
coincide withwith CINCUNC's counteroffensive at
CINCUNC's counteroffensive at 0400L,
0400L, D day. This
D day. This
requires
requires aa night
night attack
attack against
against Bul-Go-Ki.
Bul-Go-Ki.
Luckily,
Luckily, in in addition
addition to best meeting
to best meeting CINCUNC's
CINCUNC's objectives, objectives, aa nightnight
attack has certain tactical advantages . Target acquisition and attack is
attack has certain tactical advantages. Target acquisition and attack is
usually
usually better
better during
during daylight
daylight whenwhen the the target
target can can be be seen
seen withwith thethe
human
human eye.eye. Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, the the same
same daylight
daylight that that makes
makes the the target
target
visible
visible to
to the
the attacker
attacker makes
makes the the attacking
attacking aircraft
aircraft visible
visible toto the
the ground
ground
defenders.
defenders. In In daylight,
daylight, defenders
defenders are are not
not restricted
restricted to to radar-aimed
radar-aimed
weapons but can also use optically aimed AAA and SAMs. By
weapons but can also use optically aimed AAA and SAMs. By contrast,
contrast.

25
25
JOINT
JOINT "TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

force
force protection
protection is is usually
usually greater
greater at at night
night because
because the the enemy
enemy has has less
less
opportunity
opportunity to to see
see attacking
attacking aircraft
aircraft andand less
less available
available weapons
weapons to to shoot
shoot
at them.. Even
at them Even whenwhen thethe enemy
enemy detects
detects thethe attackers,
attackers, aa night
night attack
attack limits
limits
the enemy
the enemy defense
defense capability.
capability. One One choice
choice is is to
to expend
expend hugehuge quantities
quantities
of munitions
of munitions in in unaimed
unaimed barrage
barrage fire fire in
in the
the hopes
hopes of of hitting
hitting something
something..
This
This was
was graphically
graphically demonstrated
demonstrated in in the
the televised
televised videotapes
videotapes of of action
action
in the
in the night
night skysky over
over Baghdad
Baghdad on on 1717 January
January 1991 1991.. Alternatively,
Alternatively, the the
enemy
enemy cancan attempt
attempt to to improve
improve the the chances
chances of ofhitting
hitting anan attacker
attacker byby using
using
radar-aimed
radar-aimed and and guided
guided SAMs S AMs and and AAA.
AAA. RadarRadar guidance
guidance is is vulnerable
vulnerable
to
to either
either disruption
disruption by by EWEW assets,
assets or or destruction
destruction by by Wild
Wild Weasels.
Weasels. WhenWhen
properly
properly combined
combined with with aa low-altitude
low-altitude approach
approach to to delay
delay thethe possibility
possibility
of radar detection, a night, low-level attack has an excellent chance
of radar detection, a night, low-level attack has an excellent chance of of
achieving
achieving tactical
tactical surprise
surprise and and enhancing
enhancing force force survivability
survivability..
This
This possibility
possibility of of achieving tactical surprise
achieving tactical through aa night
surprise through night attack
attack
undoubtedly
undoubtedly contributed
contributed to to the
the timing
timing of of Desert
Desert StormStorm.. The
The political
political
deadline
deadline forfor the
the start
start ofof military
military operations
operations expired
expired at at 0800
0800 local
local Iraqi
Iraqi
time
time onon 1616 January
January 1991 1991.. HadHad Operation
Operation DesertDesert Storm
Storm commenced
commenced
then,
then, approximately
approximately the the first
first 10 10 hours
hours of of fighting
fighting would
would have been in
have been in
broad
broad daylight.
daylight. Instead,
Instead, the the airair attacks
attacks commenced
commenced at at 0130L
0130L on on 1717
January,
January, exploiting
exploiting the the tactical
tactical advantages
advantages of of darkness
darkness with with enough
enough
time
time toto accomplish
accomplish the the opening
opening phases phases of of thethe air
air campaign
campaign beforebefore
sunrise
sunrise.. This
This tactical
tactical advantage
advantage will will also
also be be exploited
exploited against
against
Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki..
Having
Having set set the
the mission
mission objectives,
objectives, threat,
threat, andand general
general plan
plan ofof attack,
attack,
the
the next
next appropriate
appropriate step step isis to
to determine
determine what what forces
forces areare available
available forfor
this
this mission
mission.. The The mission
mission packagepackage will will consist
consist of of four
four main
main
components
components:: (1) (1) low-altitude,
low-altitude, night-capable
night-capable attack attack aircraft
aircraft armed
armed with
with
LGBs;
LGBs; (2) (2) escort
escort fighters
fighters withwith air-to-air
air-to-air ordnance
ordnance;; (3) (3) SEAD
SEAD aircraft
aircraft
carrying
carrying HARMs
HARMs;; and and (4)(4) EWEW aircraft
aircraft forfor radar
radar jamming.
jamming. Necessary
Necessary
supporting aircraft will include tankers for poststrike refueling and
supporting aircraft will include tankers for poststrike refueling and
airborne
airborne warning
warning and and control
control system
system (AWACS)
(AWACS) aircraft aircraft..
With
With that
that mission
mission package
package in in mind,
mind, we we cancan look
look at at what
what tactical
tactical
aircraft
aircraft are
are available
available in in theater
theater to to support
support this this mission.
mission. Again,
Again, this
this
operation
operation is is deliberately
deliberately limited
limited to to those
those forces
forces thatthat are
are present
present in in
PACOM
PACOM on on DD dayday and
and does
does not
not include
include assets
assets that
that may
may be be en
en route
route from
fi-om

26
26
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

CONUS.
CONUS. For For that
that reason,
reason, aircraft such as
aircraft such as the
the F-117,
F-117, the the F-111,
F-111, the the A-7,
A-7,
and
and the
the B-52
B-52 are are not
not included.
included. In-theater
In-theater assets
assets are assumed to
are assumed to have
have
had
had time
time to to deploy
deploy to to the
the Korean
Korean Peninsula.
Peninsula.
From that list of available assets in
From that list of available assets in table
table l, 1, let
let usus try
try to
to put
put aa mission
mission
package
package together.
together. To To enhance
enhance tactical
tactical surprise
surprise and and force
force survivability,
survivability,
only
only aa single
single coordinated
coordinated missionmission package
package will will be be used
used instead
instead of of
successive attacks by several different mission packages over a period
successive attacks by several different mission packages over a period
of
of time
time.. If
If the
the CINCUNC
CINCUNC were were toto follow
follow the the route
route package
package example
example of of
the
the Vietnam
Vietnam War, War, he he would
would assign
assign thethe mission
mission to to either
either the
the Air
Air Force
Force
or
or the
the Navy
Navy based based on on area
area ofof responsibility.
responsibility. BecauseBecause of of the
the number
number of of
different
different tasks
tasks that
that must
must alsoalso be
be carried
carried out out in the total
in the total execution
execution of of
Operation Tae Kwon Do, the use of route packages could cause aa
Operation Tae Kwon Do, the use of route packages could cause
shortfall
shortfall in in one
one of the missions
of the missions andand aa surplus
surplus of of air
air in
in aa different sector..
different sector
A
A method
method that that may
may provide
provide moremore efficient
efficient use use of of available
available aircraft
aircraft
would
would be be to to consider
consider the the total
total amount
amount of of air
air power
power available
available and and assign
assign
targets
targets based
based on on mission
mission requirements,
requirements, not not geographical
geographical location.location.
Although not a common employment practice, there is historical
Although not a common employment practice, there is historical
precedent
precedent for for such
such aa package
package.. The The most
most recent
recent example
example for for which
which
unclassified
unclassified information
information is is available
available is is Operation
Operation El El Dorado
Dorado Canyon,
Canyon,
described in chapter 1 . This system of joint use of the totality of
described in chapter 1. This system of joint use of the totality of air
air
power
power is is the
the planning
plarming methodmethod we we will use in
will use in Operation
Operation Tae Kwon Do.
Tae Kwon Do.
The
The first
first aircraft
aircraft to to be chosen will
be chosen wiU bebe the
the actual
actual bomb carriers.. The
bomb carriers The
technical
technical capabilities
capabUities required
required for for aa night,
night, low-altitude,
low-altitude, LGB LGB attackattack
include
include either
either an an infrared
infrared or or low-light
low-light level
level sensor
sensor for for target
target acquisition
acquisition
and designation, a terrain-following radar system for ground avoidance,
and designation, a terrain-following radar system for ground avoidance,
and
and aa laser
laser target
target tracker
tracker and and designator
designator for for bomb
bomb guidance.
guidance. From From tabletable
1,
1, the
the available
available aircraft
aircraft with
with those
those capabilities
capabilities are are the
the F-16
F-16 andand F-15E
F-15E
with
with LANTIRN,
LANTERN, the the A-6E,
A- 6E, and
and the
the F/A-18.
F/A-18. ThereThere are are not
not enough
enough ofanyof any
one
one type
type of aircraft in
of aircraft the country
in the country to to perform
perform this this mission
mission with with aa single
single
type aircraft . Therefore, two different bombers are selected-the F-15E
type aircraft. Therefore, two different bombers are selected—^the F-15E
and the F/A-18.
andtheF/A-18.
The
The F-15E
F-15E is is chosen
chosen as as the
the lead
lead aircraft
aircraft because
because of of its
its unique
unique
capabilities
capabilities as as aa dual-role
dual-role aircraft
aircraft.. Because
Because of of its
its advanced
advanced radar radar andand
air-to-air
air-to-air weapons
weapons (AIM-7,(AIM-7, AIM-9,
AIM-9, and and gun),
gun), thethe F- 15E can
F-15E can perform
perform as as
aa self-escorting
self-escorting aircraft.
aircraft. ThisThis increases
increases the the total
total mission
mission package's
package's

27
27
JOINT
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NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

protection
protection capability
capability while while keeping
keeping the the package
package size size at
at aa minimal
minimal level.level.
The
The fewer
fewer thethe aircraft,
aircraft, the the less
less chance
chance of of them
them being
being detected
detected by by the
the
enemy.. As
enemy As aa bomb
bomb carrier,
carrier, the the F-15E
F-15E can can deliver
deliver andand guide
guide to'impact
to impact
its
its own LGBs . Using
own LGBs. Using aa tactic
tactic called
called "buddy-lasing,"
"buddy-lasing," the the F-15E
F-15E can can also
also
designate
designate aa target
target for
for an an aircraft
aircraft that
that can
can carry
carry LGBsLGBs but but does
does not not have
have
aa laser
laser designator
designator to to guide
guide thethe bomb
bomb intointo impact
impact.'. WhenWhen facedfaced withwith aa
limited
limited number,
number of of laser-equipped
laser-equipped aircraft,aircraft, buddy-lasing
buddy-lasing can increase the
can increase the
number
number of of LGBs
LGBs on on target
target by by using
using nonlaser-equipped
nonlaser-equipped aircraft aircraft such
such as as
the
the F/A-18
F/A-18 as as additional
additional bomb bomb carriers
carriers..
Both
Both self-designation
self-designation and and buddy-lasing
buddy-lasing tactics tactics are are inherent
inherent
capabilities
capabilities of of any
any laser-equipped
laser-equipped aircraft,aircraft, including
including the the F-16
F-16 withwith
LANTIRN
LANTIRN and and the
the A-6E.
A-6E. From From hishis own
own experience
experience in in local
local training
training and and
Red
Red FlagFlag exercises,
exercises, the the author
author recognizes
recognizes that that even
even in in the
the daytime;
daytime,
buddy-lasing
buddy-lasing in in aa high-threat
high-threat environment
environment is is aa highly
highly demanding
demanding task task
that
that is is better
better suited
suited to to aa two-man
two-man aircraft.
aircraft. ThisThis allows
allows the the pilot
pilot toto
concentrate
concentrate on on flying
flying the the aircraft
aircraft while
while the the weapons
weapons systemsystem officer
officer
(WSO),
(WSO), or or backseater,
backseater, concentrates
concentrates on on designating
designating the the targets.
targets. The The
single-seat
single-seat F-16, F-16, particularly
particularly in in the
the night
night environment
environment that that this
this
mission
mission callscalls for,
for, is
is less
less suited
suited toto be
be the
the designator
designator aircraft
aircraft thanthan is is the
the
F-1
F-15E.5E. Of
Of course, the A-6E is a two-seat aircraft that could perform the
course, the A-6E is a two-seat aircraft that could perform the
buddy-lasing
buddy-lasing tactic, tactic, butbut this
this aircraft
aircraft lacks
lacks the the previously
previously mentioned
mentioned
advanced
advanced air-to-air
air-to-air capability
capability of of the
the F-15E
F-15E and and would
would be be less
less capable
capable
of
of self-defense
self-defense on on this
this mission.
mission. Further,
Further, the the A-6E
A-6E lacks
lacks the the speed
speed
capability
capability of of the
the F-15E,
F-15E, increasing
increasing the the flight
flight time
time inin enemy territory.
enemy territory.
Therefore,
Therefore, the the tactically
tactically correct
correct choice
choice is is the
the F-15E.
F-15E.
The
The choice
choice of of the
the F/A-18
F/A-18 as as the
the second
second bomb bomb carrier
carrier is is driven
driven
primarily
primarily by by its
its self-defense
self-defense capabilities
capabilities.. Like
Like the the F-15E,
F-15E, itit can can carry
carry
and
and employ
employ both both the the close-range,
close-range, heat-seeking
heat-seeking AIM-9 AIM-9 and and thethe
longer-range,
longer-range, radar-guided
radar-guided AIM-7 AIM-7 whilewhile still
still loaded
loaded withwith LGBsLGBs and and
external
external fuelfuel tanks.
tanks. TheThe A-6EA-6E cannot
caimot carry
carry thethe AIM-7.
AIM-7. The The F-16
F-16 can can
carry
carry andand employ
employ the the AIM-7
AIM-7 but does not
but does not have
have enough
enough mounting
mounting points points
to
to carry
carry the AIM-7, LGBs,
the AIM-7, LGBs, and and the
the necessary
necessary external
external fuelfuel tanks
tanks at at the
the
same
same timetime.. As
As anan additional
additional LGB LGB platform,
platform, the the F/A-18
F/A-18 is is aa better
better choice
choice
for
for this
this mission.
mission.

28
28
THE
THE CI IALLENGE
CHALLENGE

Having
Having selected
selected the the bomb
bomb carriers,
carriers, mission
mission planners
planners must must next next
choose
choose the
the escort
escort aircraft
aircraft. . Any
Any of
of the
the air-to-air
air-to-air or
or multirole
multirole aircraft
aircraft
listed
listed inin table
table 11 would
would be be suitable
suitable for for this
this mission
mission during
during the the daytime,
daytime,
when escort aircraft can expect air-to-air combat to include aa
when escort aircraft can expect air-to-air combat to include
combination
combination ofbeyond
of beyond visualvisual range
range (BVR)
(BVR) intercept
intercept radar
radar missile
missile shotsshots
and close-in maneuvering
and close-in maneuvering for for IR IR and
and gun
gun shots.
shots. This
This isis not
not necessarily
necessarily
true at night : According to Lt Col John
true at night: According to Lt Col John ("Lucky")
("Lucky") Rivers, an
Rivers, an
experienced
experienced F-15 F-15 pilot
pUot andand Fighter
Fighter Weapons
Weapons Instructor
Instructor Course
Course (FWIC)(FWIC)
graduate,
graduate, night
night air-to-air combat will
air-to-air combat will probably
probably be be all
all BVR,
BVR, nontuming
nontuming
engagements.
engagements. Although
Although the the FWIC
FWIC syllabus
syllabus included
included somesome training
training in in
night
night air-to-air
air-to-air maneuvering,
maneuvering, they do not
they do not realistically
realistically expect
expect to to have
have to to
employ those skills since no other air force trains in that environment.$
employ those skills since no other air force trains in that environment.*
Colonel
Colonel Rivers's
Rivers's views
views agreeagree with
with those
those of of Lt
Lt Col
Col Mel
Mel Copeland,
Copeland,
another
another experienced
experienced F-15 F-15 pilot
pilot and
and former
former commander
commander of of thethe 54th
54th
Tactical
Tactical Fighter Squadron, an
Fighter Squadron, an F-15C
F-15C air air superiority
superiority squadron
squadron at at
Elmendorf
Elmendorf AFB, AFB, Alaska.
Alaska. Colonel
Colonel Copeland
Copeland also also expects
expects thatthat night
night airair
superiority will be primarily BVR and will require both launch-and-
superiority wiU be primarily BVR and wiU require both launch-and-
leave
leave missile
missile capability
capability and and "big-picture"
"big-picmre" (situational)
(situational) awareness
awareness..
Launch-and-leave
Launch-and-leave missiles, missiles, such such as as provided
provided by by thethe advanced
advanced
medium-range
medium-range air-to-air
air-to-air missile
missile (AMRAAM)
(AMRAAM) now now being fielded, are
being fielded, are
necessary
necessary so so that
that the escort fighters
the escort fighters are
are free
free to to maneuver
maneuver after after firing
firing
either to avoid being shot themselves or to attack following targets .
either to avoid being shot themselves or to attack following targets.
Postlaunch
Postlaunch radar
radar guidance
guidance requirements
requirements of of the
the current
current AIM-7
AIM-7 missiles
missiles
limit
limit the
the F-15's
F-15's freedom
freedom to to maneuver
maneuver..
The concept of situational awarenessrefers
The concept of situational awareness refers to the ability
to the ability ofthe
of the fighter
fighter
pilot
pilot to
to keep
keep track
track ofof the
the position
position of of his
his aircraft
aircraft in in space,
space, thethe position
position of of
both friendly
both friendly andand enemy
enemy aircraft
aircraft relative
relative to to his
his own
own aircraft,
aircraft, and and the
the
state
state ofthe
of the air
air battle
battle atat that
that moment,
moment, plus plus aa reasonable
reasonable prediction
prediction ofthe of the
next
next moment.
moment. Situational
Situational awareness
awareness requires
requires aa nearly nearly instinctive
instinctive
knowledge of which enemy aircraft can be attacked, which ones
knowledge of which enemy aircraft can be attacked, which ones maymay
be
be attacking,
attacking, andand the
the capability
capability of of dealing
dealing withwith thethe enemy
enemy attack.
attack. TheThe
pilot
pilot must
must make
make decisions
decisions and and take
take action
action quickly
quickly in in the
the faceface ofof aa
constantly
constantly changing
changing situation
situation whilewhile continuing
continuing to to fly
fly the
the aircraft,
aircraft, talktalk
on
on the
the radio,
radio, and
and (hopefully)
(hopefuUy) shoot shoot down
down MiGs
MiGs.. In In either
either day
day or or night,
night,
the pilotbuilds mental situational awareness through the use ofonboard
the pUot buUds mental situational awareness through the use of onboard

29
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TRAINING FOR NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

radar,
radar, radio
radio communication
communication with with other
other aircraft,
aircraft, andand external
external support
support
assets such as airborne or surface radar controllers. During the day, this
assets such as airborne or surface radar controllers. During the day, this
mental
mental picture
picture is is increased
increased and and confirmed
confirmed by by visual
visual references.
references. ThisThis can
can
be
be done
done by by either
either physically
physically seeing seeing the the other
other aircraft
aircraft or
or by
by reference
reference to to
visible
visible landmarks.
landmarks. At At night,
night, external
external visual
visual situational
situational awareness
awareness is is
extremely
extremely limited,
limited, forcing
forcing the the aircrew
aircrew to to rely
rely onon onboard
onboard displays
displays andand
mental images from radio calls .
mental images from radio calls.
Some
Some formform of of big-picture
big-picture display inside the
display inside the cockpit
cockpit is is necessary
necessary so so
that the escort
that the fighters can
escort fighters can quickly
quickly determine
determine where where the
the fight
fight is,
is, where
where
the
the friendlies
friendlies are are inin relation
relation to to the
the target,
target, andand which
which ofthe
of the radar
radar returns
returns
are
are the
the enemy.
enemy. At At present,
present, this this situational
situational awareness
awareness is is provided
provided in in the
the
F-15 and the F-16 by a combination of onboard radar and radio voice
F-15 and the F-16 by a combination of onboard radar and radio voice
communications
communications with with the the ground
ground or or airborne
airborne radarradar controller
controller..
Preferably,
Preferably, this this big
big picture
picture shouldshould be be aa real-time,
real-time, in-cockpit
in-cockpit visual
visual
display to cut down on the number of radio transmissions. In daytime,
display to cut down on the number of radio transmissions. In daytime,
some
some of of this
this situational
situational awareness
awareness can can bebe provided
provided by by visual
visual cues
cues
outside
outside thethe cockpit.
cockpit. There
There are are nono such
such visual
visual references
references at at night.
night. Colonel
Colonel
Copeland
Copeland considers
considers that that some
some formform of of internal
internal big-picture
big-picture display
display is is
absolutely essential for
absolutely essential for night
night air-to-air
air-to-air missions.9
missions.^
Although not all of the mission results from
Although not all of the mission results from Desert
Desert Storm
Storm havehave been
been
declassified
declassified yet, yet, at at least
least oneone unclassified
unclassified report report validates
validates Colonel
Colonel
Rivers's
Rivers's andColonel
and Colonel Copeland's
Copeland's viewpoints
viewpoints concerning
concerning BVR B VR ordnance
ordnance
and
and internal
internal situational
situational awareness.
awareness. During During aa televised
televised CNN interview,
CNN interview,
Capt
Capt Steve
Steve Tate,
Tate, an an F-15
F-15 pilot
pilot inin Operation
Operation Desert Desert Storm,
Storm, related
related his
his
experiences in the predawn hours of 17 January 1991 . While flying as
experiences in the predawn hours of 17 January 1991. WhUe flying as
air cover for
air cover for aa number
number of of allied
allied attackers, Captain Tate's
attackers, Captain Tate's radar
radar detected
detected
an
an unidentified
unidentified aircraftaircraft heading
heading toward toward his his formation.
formation. Following
Following
confirmation
confirmation by by the allied air
the allied air control
control system
system thatthat the
the radar
radar contact
contact waswas
aa hostile
hostile Iraqi
Iraqi fighter, Captain Tate
fighter. Captain Tate destroyed
destroyed it it with
with aa single
single
radar-guided
radar-guided AIM-7 AIM-7 missile.missile. His His first
first visual
visual contact
contact withwith the
the Iraqi
Iraqi
target
target was
was thethe resulting
resultiag fireball
fireball.'^.I0
Two
Two important
important points points should should be be noted
noted from from Captain
Captain Tate'sTate's
engagement. First, as Colonel Rivers predicted, the entire fight took
engagement. First, as Colonel Rivers predicted, the entire fight took
place
place without
without visualvisual contact
contact by by either
either aircraft
aircraft andand with
with little
little or
or no
no
maneuvering.
maneuvering. A A BVR
BVR missile
missile shot shot was was thethe key
key toto Captain
Captain Tate's
Tate's

30
30
THE
THE CFIALLENGE
CHALLENGE

success. Second, Colonel
success. Second, Colonel Copeland's
Copeland's points stressing the
points stressing the need
need for for
launch-and-leave ordnance and
launch-and-leave ordnance and in-cockpit
in-cockpit big
big picture
picture are
are not
not
invalidated. The
invalidated. The fighter
fighter that
that Captain
Captain Tate Tate destroyed
destroyed was was thethe only
only enemy
enemy
aircraft in
aircraft in the
the area;
area; Captain
Captain Tate could afford
Tate could afford to to keep
keep illuminating
illuminating the the
target until the
target untU the AIM-7
AIM-7 hit.
hit. If
If there
there had
had been
been more
more enemy
enemy fighters
fighters
airborne, one
airborne, one could
could havehave fired
fired atat Captain
Captain Tate Tate while
while he he was
was illuminating
illuminating
the first Iraqi . Launch-and-leave ordnance reduces this danger .
the first Iraqi. Launch-and-leave ordnance reduces this danger.
As
As regards
regards the the need
need forfor aa big
big picture
picture in in the
the cockpit,
cockpit. Captain
Captain Tate Tate used
used
aa combination
combination of of onboard
onboard radar radar and
and external
external control
control systems
systems to to confirm
confirm
before firing that the radar contact
before firing that the radar contact was
was an
an enemy.
enemy. Only
Only one
one contact
contact on
on
internal radar
his internal
his radar and and clear
clear radio communications with
radio communications with the the external
external
control system made this a comparatively easy thing to do. Multiple
control system made this a comparatively easy thing to do. Multiple
engagements
engagements from from several
several different fighters might
different fighters might have have overloaded
overloaded
both
both the
the control system and
control system and Captain
Captain Tate's
Tate's situational
situational awareness
awareness to to the
the
point that the Iraqi was never confirmed hostile
point that the Iraqi was never confirmed hostile and
and escaped.
escaped.
The
The desirability
desirabUity of an internal,
of an internal, nonverbal
nonverbal big-picture capability can
big-picture capability can
perhaps
perhaps bestbest bebe explained
explained by by the
the concept
concept of"brain bytes." As
of "brain bytes." As explained
explained
by Capt Jane Patterson,
by Capt Jane Patterson, an
an instructor/senior
instructor/senior director
director in
in the
the E-3A
E-3A
AWACS,
AWACS, and and MajMaj DickDick Embry, former F-106
Embry, aa former F-106 and and F-16
F-16 interceptor
interceptor
pilot currently flying the E-3A, both a radar controller
pilot currently flying the E-3A, both a radar controller and
and a
a fighter
fighter pilot
pilot
only
only have
have so so many
many brain bytes available
brain bytes available to to receive,
receive, process,
process, and and act
act onon
information.
information. The The radarradar controller receives information
controller receives information from from the the
AWACS radar display and
AWACS radar display and mentally
mentally processes
processes it
it to
to determine
determine if
if the
the
radar contact is
radar contact is friend
friend or or foe.
foe. The controller then
The controller then transmits
transmits this this
information to the fighter pilot for action . It takes a certain amount of
information to the fighter pilot for action. It takes a certain amoimt of
brain
brain bytes
bytes for for the the controller
controller to to dodo thisthis verbally
verbally throughthrough radio radio
communication
communication and and aa corresponding
corresponding amount amount for for the fighter pilot to
the fighterpilot to hear
hear
the transmission and decide to act on
the transmission and decide to act on it.
it. The
The pilot
pilot must
must be
be listening
listening at
at
the
the same
same timetime the the controller
controller is talking or
is talking or must request aa retransmittal.
must request retransmittal.
In contrast, if using a nonverbal data link (DL), the controller uses
In contrast, if using a nonverbal data link (DL), the controller uses
fewer brain bytes
fewer brain bytes to to transmit information in
transmit information in symbology
symbology to to thethe
fighter's
fighter's internal displays.. The
internal displays The pilot does not
pilot does not have
have to to use
use brain
brain bytes
bytes
to form and say the necessary words, and the
to form and say the necessary words, and the information
information can
can be
be sent
sent
more
more quickly.
quickly. Since Since the the DL DL symbology
symbology remains remains on on thethe display,
display,
fighter pilots can
fighter pilots can receive
receive and and act
act upon
upon itit at their own
at their own pace.pace. Meanwhile,
Meanwhile,

31
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AIR WARFARE
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the radar
the radar controller
controller can can be
be transmitting
transmitting DL DL to
to other
other fighters
fighters against
against other
other
targets . From
targets. From theirtheir personal
personal experiences
experiences in in both
both types
types of of control
control
systems,
systems, Captain
Captain Patterson
Patterson and and Major
Major Embry
Embry state
state that
that the
the DL
DL system
system
is'faster
is faster and
and easier
easier to to use
use for
for both
both controllers
controllers and and the
the fighter
fighter pilots.'
pilots.''I
From
From the
the list
list of
of aircraft
aircraft inin table
table 1,1, only
only the
the F-14
F-14 possesses
possesses the the desired
desired
characteristics
characteristics of of launch-and-leave
launch-and-leave ordnance ordnance and and in-cockpit
in-cockpit big-picture
big-picture
(situational) awareness.
(situational) awareness. The The F-14's AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile
F-14's AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile
has
has the
the desired
desired long-range,
long-range, launch-and-leave
launch-and-leave capability
capability that that the
the AIM-7
AIM-7
does
does not
not.. Even with AMRAAM,
Even with AMRAAM, the the F-15s,
F-15s, -16s,
-16s, and
and -18s-18s dodo not
not have
have
the big picture
the big picture thatthat the
the F-14
F-14 has has.. The
The Tomcat's
Tomcat's tactical
tactical information
information
display,
display, continuously
continuously updatedupdated by by both
both onboard
onboard radar
radar andand either
either airborne
airborne
or
or ground
ground radar control DL, provides 360 degrees of real-time visual
radar control DL, provides 360 degrees of real-time visual
situational awareness to
simational awareness to the
the aircrew
aircrew.. Therefore,
Therefore, the the selected
selected escort
escort
aircraft
aircraft for
for this
this mission
mission is is the
the F-14 Tomcat.. The
F-14 Tomcat The number
number of of F-14s
F-14s
required
required for for this
this role
role can
can be be kept
kept to to aa minimum
minimum because because of of the
the
self-defense
self-defense capabilities
capabilities of of the
the bomb
bomb carriers
carriers.. This
This reduces
reduces the the overall
overall
size
size ofof the
the package
package whilewhile retaining
retaining sufficiency
sufficiency of of firepower.
firepower.
The
The next
next aircraft
aircraft to to be selected are
be selected are the
the SEAD
SEAD assets.
assets. The The EA-6B
EA-6B is is
the
the only
only available
available in-theater
in-theater aircraft
aircraft capable
capable of of independently
independently locating locating
and
and destroying
destroying enemy enemy threat
threat radars.
radars. It It also
also hashas the the ability
ability to to
electronically
electronically deceivedeceive and and disrupt
disrupt enemy
enemy radars
radars through
through electronic
electronic
jamming
jamming in in addition
addition to to destroying
destroying them them with
with HARMS.
HARMs. In In the
the Air
Air Force,
Force,
this
this electronic
electronic jamming
jamming mission
mission is is performed
performed by by the
the EF-111A
EF-111A Raven. Raven.
Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, they they have
have not
not yet
yet been
been deployed
deployed in in theater;
theater; the the EA-6B
EA-6B
is part of
is part of the
the standard
standard wing wing inventory
inventory on on an
an aircraft
aircraft carrier
carrier..
The
The EA-6B
EA-6B can can also serve as
also serve as the
the hunters
hunters inin aa hunter-killer
hunter-killer team team with
with
other
other aircraft
aircraft.. Since
Since therethere are are only
only aa limited
limited number number of of the
the
high-technology
high-technology hunters hunters in in theater,
theater, pairing
pairing them
them withwith aa suitable
suitable killer
killer
aircraft
aircraft capable
capable of of HARM
HARM employment
employment increases
increases the the overall
overall SEAD SEAD
protection for the whole package . The F-16, F/A-18, and A-6E are
protection for the whole package. The F-16, F/A-18, and A-6E are all
all
capable
capable of of performing
performing as as SEAD
SEAD killers.
killers. Since
Since the the EA-6B
EA-6B and and the
the
F/A-18
F/A-18 are are both
both Navy
Navy aircraft
aircraft andand operate
operate from
from thethe same
same aircraft
aircraft carrier,
carrier,
any
any difficulties
difficulties in in mission
mission planning
planning and and coordination
coordination are are minimized
minimized by by
pairing
pairing thethe EA-6B
EA-6B with with the
the F/A-18
F/A-18 as as aa SEAD
SEAD hunter-killer
hunter-killer team team..

32
32
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

As was
As was demonstrated
demonstrated in the opening
in the opening minutes
minutes of of Operation
Operation Desert
Desert
Storm, the presence of
Storm, the presence of the
the Army's
Army's night-capable
night-capable attack
attack helicopters
heUcopters can
can
bring
bring an
an interesting
interesting new
new SEAD
SEAD asset to the
asset to the theater.
theater. AsAs was
was revealed
revealed inin
the 25 February 1991 issue of the Air Force Times,
the 25 February 1991 issue of the Air Force Times, Army
Army AH-64
AH-64
Apache
Apache helicopters
helicopters armed
armed with laser guided
with laser guided Hellfire
Hellfire tactical
tactical air-to-
air-to-
surface missiles knocked
surface missiles knocked out out three
three Iraqi early-warning radars
Iraqi early-warning radars along
along the
the
Saudi Arabian border at approximately
Saudi Arabian border at approximately 0130L,
0130L, 17
17 January
January 1991,
1991, just
just as
as
the
the first
first wave
wave of of USAF
USAF aircraft
aircraft turned
turned north
north from their holding
from their holding points .12
points.'^
This
This opened
opened aa blind
blind spot
spot inin the Iraqi coverage,
the Iraqi coverage, allowing
allowing the the first
first waves
waves
of F-15Es to cross
of F-15Es to cross into
into Iraq
Iraq basically
basically undetected
undetected. . This
This was
was a
a superb
superb
example
example of of the
the proper
proper joint
joint use
use ofof night-capable
night-capable assetsassets for
for overall
overall
mission success. Again following the lesson
mission success. Again following the lesson from
from Desert
Desert Storm,
Storm,
planning
plaiming for Operation Tae
for Operation Tae Kwon
Kwon Do will include
Do will include joint SEAD
joint SEAD
employment with
employment with Army
Army Apaches
Apaches..
The proposed attack package
The proposed attack package against
against Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki AB AB is listed in
is listed in
table 2.
table 2. The
The author
author accepts
accepts that
that there
there are other possible
many other
are many possible mixtures
mixtures
that may be as effective, or even more effective. However, since the
that may be as effective, or even more effective. However, since the
purpose
purpose of of the
the example
example is to illustrate
is to potential challenges
illustrate potential challenges injoint
in joint night
night
employment,
employment, theform
the form of the example
of the example usedused isis more
more important
important thanthan the
the
substance.
substance.

Table
Table 22

Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki OCA Mission Package
OCA Mission Package
Aircraft
Aircraft Type
Type Armament
Armament

Attack
Attack F-15E
F-15E with
with LANTIRN
LANTIRN pods
pods (both aircraft):
(both aircraft): GBU-27s,
GBU-27s,
F/A-18
F/A-18 with
with FLIR
H.TR pod
pod AIM-7,
AIM-7, AIM-9,20-mm
AIM-9,20-mm gungun

Escort
Escort
Fighters
Hghters F-14
F-14 AIM-45
AIM-45 Phoenix,
Phoenix, AIM-7,
AIM-7,
AIM-9, 20-mm gun
AIM-9,20-inm gun

SEAD
SEAD EA-6B hunter-killer
EA-6B hunter-ldller HARM
HARM
killer
F/A-18 killer
F/A-18 HARM, AIM-9, AIM-7
HARM, AIM-9, AIM-7
AH-64
AH-64 Apache
Apache Hellfire, 30-mm gun
Hellfire, 30-mm gun

33
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING FOR NIGHT
TRAINING FOR NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

Table
Table 2--Continued
2—Continued

Aircraft
Aircraft Type
Type Armament
Armament

EW
EW
Support
Support EA-6B
EA-6B
Legend
Legend:: AIM-air
AIM—air intercept
intercept missile
missile
EW-electronic
EW—electronic warfare
warfare
FLIR-forward
FLIR—forward loolang
looking infrared
infrared radar
radar
HARM-high-speed
HARM—^high-speed antiradiation
antiradiation missile
missile
LANTIRN-low-altitude
LANTIRN—^low-altitude navigation
navigation and
and
targeting
targeting infrared
infrared at
at night
night
OCA-offensive
OCA—offensive counterair
counterair
SEAR-suppression
SEAD—suppression of of enemy
enemy air
air defense
defense

Defensive
Defensive Counterair
Counterair

Defensive
Defensive counterair
counterair missions
missions are are toto "detect,
"detect, identify,
identify, intercept;
intercept, and
and
destroy enemy aerospace forces that are attempting to attack friendly
destroy enemy aerospace forces that are attempting to attack friendly
13
forces
forces oror penetrate
penetrate friendly
friendly airspace ." DCA
airspace."'^ DCA over over the
the battlefield
battlefield
provides
provides thethe ground
ground troops
troops with
with the
the freedom
freedom to to carry
carry out
out the
the ground
ground
war
war without
without interference
interference from from enemy
enemy air air threats.
threats. DCADCA operations
operations
involve
involve many
many of of the
the same
same problems
problems as as faced
faced by by the
the escort
escort aircraft
aircraft for
for
the OCA mission. DCA aircraft at night should still expect to employ
the OCA mission. DCA aircraft at night should still expect to employ
BVR
BVR missile
missUe shots
shots with
with minimal
minimal maneuvering
maneuvering and and to to depend
depend on on
nonvisual
nonvisual methods
methods for for enemy
enemy detection
detection and and identification
identification..
In
In some
some respects,
respects, though,
though, the the DCA
DCA role role for
for this
this mission
mission should
should bebe
easier
easier.. The
The fighters
fighters escorting
escorting the the OCA
OCA package
package against
against Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki will will
expect
expect toto fight over enemy
fight over enemy airspace
airspace.. Under
Under such such conditions,
conditions, theythey must
must
be
be prepared
prepared to to deal
deal with
with aa threat
threat from
from anyany direction.
direction. In In contrast,
contrast, this
this
DCA
DCA mission
mission involves
involves airair operations
operations overover friendly
friendly lines,
lines, notpenetration
not penetration
into enemy territory . This provides two important advantages . First,
into enemy territory. This provides two important advantages. First, the
the
threat
threat of
of enemy
enemy SAMsSAMs and and AAA
AAA is is greatly
greatly reduced
reduced or or nonexistent.
nonexistent. By By
staying
staying over
over our own territory
our own territory andand beyond
beyond the the range
range ofthe enemy threat,
of the enemy threat,
we
we can
can eliminate
eliminate thethe need
need for
for SEAD
SEAD support,
support, freeing
freeing those
those assets
assets for
for
other
other missions.
missions. Second,
Second, thethe bandits
bandits will
will probably
probably be be coming
coming through
through
airspace friendly to us from a single predictable direction (i.e., north)
airspace friendly to us from a single predictable direction (i.e., north)..

34
34
TI
THEIE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

Even
Even though
though thisthis mission
mission still
still involves
involves night
night operations,
operations, thethe DCA
DCA forces
forces
do
do not
not need
need the
the same
same bigbig picture
picture that
that the
the escort
escort fighters
fighters required
required for
for the
the
OCA mission against Bul-Go-Ki.
OCA mission against Bul-Go-Ki.
Based
Based on on the
the above
above considerations,
considerations, any any ofof the
the air-to-air
air-to-air oror multirole
multirole
fighters
fighters listed
listed in table 11 could
in table could be appropriate for
be appropriate for this mission.. Although
this mission Although
the
the multirole
multirole F-16sF-16s or or F/A-18s
F/A-18s couldcould be be tasked
tasked forfor DCA
DCA overover the
the
battlefield,
battlefield, the
the relative
relative scarcity
scarcity of assets for
of assets for Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do
may make it necessary to save these multirole aircraft for either air
may make it necessary to save these multirole aircraft for either air
interdiction
interdiction (AI)
(AI) oror CAS
CAS.. InIn contrast,because
contrast, because ofaircraft
of aircraft design
design features,
features,
the
the air-to-air
air-to-air specialized
specialized F-15s
F-15s andand F-14s
F-14s cannot
cannot bebe as
as effectively
effectively used
used
for
for CAS
CAS or or AI AI missions
missions.. Further,
Further, thethe F-15s
F-15s andand F-14s
F-14s have
have the
the
advantages
advantages ofgreater
of greater loiter
loiter time
time and
and greater
greater missile
missile capacity
capacity compared
compared
to the multirole aircraft . Therefore, either of these two aircraft is
to the multirole aircraft. Therefore, either of these two aircraft is
preferable
preferable to to the
the multirole
multirole aircraft
aircraft for
for the
the DCA
DCA overover the
the battlefield.
battlefield.
Since
Since the
the F-14s
F-14s havehave already
already been
been tasked
tasked toto provide escort for
provide escort for the
the OCA
OCA
mission against Bul-Go-Ki, the F-15s will be used for the DCA over
mission against Bul-Go-Ki, the F-15s will be used for the DCA over
the
the battlefield.
battlefield.

On-Call Close Air
On-Call Close Air Support
Support
The
The final
final mission
mission areaarea toto consider
consider forfor Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do is is the
the
on-call
on-caU CASCAS for for thethe ground offensive. By
ground offensive. By definition,
definition, CASCAS supports
supports
"surface
"surface operations
operations by by attacking
attacking hostile
hostile targets
targets inin close
close proximity
proximity to to
friendly surface forces
Mendly surface forces."." Because
Because of of this
this "close
"close proximity,"
proximity," CAS CAS
missions "require detailed coordination and integration" with friendly
missions "require detailed coordination and integration" with fi:iendly
surface
surface forces . 14 As
forces.''* As was discussed in
was discussed in chapter
chapter 1,1, the
the traditional tactic for
traditional tactic for
night
night CAS
CAS intois to illuminate
illuminate the the target
target with
with aerial
aerial flares
flares for
for bombing
bombing from from
medium
medium altitude.
altitude. In In the
the face
face ofof today's high-threat air
today's high-threat air defenses,
defenses, this this
tactic is
tactic probably aa good
is probably good wayway toto ensure
ensure getting
getting killed!
killed! The
The flares
flares that
that
illuminate the enemy target also serve to highlight the attacking aircraft
illuminate the enemy target also serve to highlight the attacking aircraft
and
and the
the friendly
friendly ground
ground forces
forces.. Its
Its superior
superior capability
capability to to operate
operate in in the
the
dark
dark gives
gives thethe American
American Army Army aa tactical
tactical advantage
advantage for for our
our soldiers.
soldiers.'^ 15
Flares take away some ofthe
Flares take away some of the night-fighting
night-fighting advantages such as
advantages such as surprise
surprise
and
and concealment
concealment that that American
American technology
technology gives
gives ourground
our ground troops
troops.. To To
survive in the night CAS role, an aircraft must have the same high-speed,
survive in the night CAS role, an aircraft must have the same high-speed.

35
35
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

low-altitude
low-altitude capability
capability of of day
day CASCAS aircraft
aircraft.'*. 16 The
The night
night CAS
CAS pilot
pilot must
must
fly
fly at
at low
low level,
level, bebe able
able to to navigate
navigate to to the
the target
target area,
area, avoid
avoid thethe "rocks,
"rocks,
trees,
trees, and
and boulders"
boulders" along along the the way,
way, identify
identify the the target,
target, successfully
successfully
attack
attack it,
it, then
then egress
egress backback to to safety
safety..
At
At first
first glance,
glance, these
these appear
appear to to bebe the
the same
same challenges
challenges faced faced on on aa
night
night OCA
OCA mission,
mission, so so any
any ofthe
of the bombing
bombing aircraft
aircraft listed
listed inin table
table 11 could
could
be
be used
used inin the
the CAS
CAS role
role.. However,
However, there there areare some
some important
important differences
differences
that
that can
can make
make one one aircraft
aircraft better
better suited
suited thanthan another
another to to aa night
night CASCAS role.
role.
The
The OCAOCA mission
mission is is against
against aa largelarge target
target in in aa known
known position
position..
(Runways
(Runways do do not
not tend
tend to to move
move around.)
around.) Because
Because the the position
position is is known,
known,
attacks
attacks cancan be
be preplanned
preplanned from from an an optimum
optimum axis axis so so that
that the
the pilot
pilot can
can
ensure
ensure target
target identification.
identification.
On-call CAS
On-call CAS has has some
some different
different requirements,
requirements, however. however. Targets
Targets for for
on-call CAS
on-call CAS areare not
not identified
identified untiluntil after
after the
the battle
battle starts
starts and
and therefore
therefore
cannot be
cannot be preplanned
preplanned.. An An enemy
enemy tank platoon that
tank platoon that suddenly
suddenly comes comes out out
from
from under camouflage directly
under camouflage directly across
across the the line
line ofadvance
of advance could could require
require
on-call
on-call CAS CAS to to clear
clear the the way.
way. Typically,
Typically, aircraft
aircraft suitable
suitable forfor on-call
on-call
CAS
CAS mustmust be be capable
capable of of quick
quick response
response to to reach
reach the the target
target area,
area, have
have
some system
some system for for positive
positive targettarget identification
identification in in the
the middle
middle of of aa
battle-confused
battle-confused environment,
environment, and and bring
bring aa large
large variety
variety and and amount
amount of of
ordnance
ordnance.. TheyThey should
should also also have
have goodgood maneuverability
maneuverability to to stay
stay close
close toto
an
an active
active battle
battle areaarea whilewhile avoiding
avoiding enemy enemy defensesdefenses and and havehave
reasonable
reasonable loiter
loiter time
time to be able
to be able toto stay
stay andand get
get the
the job
job done
done.. TheThe AH-64
AH-64
Apache,
Apache, the the AV-8B
AV-8B Harrier
Harrier 11, II, and
and the
the A-10
A-10 Thunderbolt
Thunderbolt II 11 (Warthog)
(Warthog)
are all designed
are all designed for for exactly
exactly thesethese requirements
requirements.. The The Apache
Apache and and the
the
Harrier,
Harrier, withwith integral
integral FUR FLIR and and night
night vision
vision goggles
goggles (NVG),(NVG), are are
especially
especially well well equipped
equipped for for night
night CAS CAS missions
missions withoutwithout external
external
illumination
illumination.. The The A-10
A-10 has has neither
neither FUR FLIR nor nor NVGs
NVGs and and normally
normally
requires
requires external
external lighting
Ughting such such as as air-dropped
air-dropped flares flares or or artillery-fired
artiUery-fired
illumination
illumination rounds
rounds for for target
target identification
identification and and attack
attack.. However,
However, recent recent
experiences
experiences in in Operation
Operation Desert Desert StormStorm show show that that thethe Warthog
Warthog can can bebe
effectively
effectively employed
employed at at night
night without
without illumination
illumination of of the
the target
target by by using
using
the
the AGM-65D
AGM-65D with with imaging
imaging infrared
infrared (11R) (IIR) Maverick
Maverick for for both
both target
target
acquisition
acquisition and and attack
attack.. Burning
Burning enemy enemy vehicles
vehicles from from previous
previous attacks
attacks

36
36
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

have also proven
have also proven highly
highly effective
effective in
in illuminating
illuminating the
the remainder
remainder ofof the
the
convoy
convoy for
for subsequent
subsequent attack.
attack. 17
To follow
To follow the
the principle
principle of
of mass,
mass, all
all three
three aircraft-the
aircraft—^the Apache,
Apache, the
the
Harrier, and the Warthogwill be tasked to provide on-call CAS at
Harrier, and the Warthog—^wUl be tasked to provide on-call CAS at
night
night for
for Operation
Operation Tae
Tae Kwon
Kwon Do.Do. As
As will
will be
be discussed
discussed in
in the
the execution
execution
section,
section, the
the night
night CAS
CAS mission
mission hashas some
some interesting
interesting challenges
challenges in
in the
the
target
target acquisition and attack
acquisition and attack phase.
phase.

Mission
Mission Execution
Execution

With
With the
the packages
packages selected,
selected, letlet us
us walk
walk through
through the the missions
missions to to see
see
what
what challenges
challenges must
must bebe met
met during
during Operation
Operation TaeTae Kwon
Kwon Do.Do. As As stated
stated
in
in chapter
chapter 1, 1, this
this study
study focuses
focuses on on those
those areas
areas that
that are
are both
both joint
joint and
and
night
night operations.
operations. In In keeping
keeping withwith this
this focus,
focus, thethe mission
mission execution
execution
section of this chapter addresses only those areas that are peculiar to
section of this chapter addresses only those areas that are peculiar to
joint
joint night
night operations
operations..
There
There are
are aa number
number of of challenges
challenges in in joint
joint mission
mission accomplishment,
accomplishment,
whether
whether itit is
is aa day
day oror night
night mission.
mission. For For instance,
instance, how how well
well does
does the
the
Air
Air Force
Force ATO
ATO system
system pass
pass assigned
assigned targets
targets toto the
the Navy
Navy squadrons
squadrons
involved? What process can land-based Air Force aircrews use
involved? What process can land-based Air Force aircrews use for
for
premission
premission planning
planning with carrier-based Navy
with carrier-based Navy aircrews?
aircrews? What
What areare the
the
correct
correct start,
start, taxi,
taxi, and
and takeoff
takeoff times
times for
for all
all the
the squadrons
squadrons to to ensure
ensure aa
properly coordinated attack?
properly coordinated attack? Since
Since Navy
Navy aircraft can only
aircraft can only aerial
aerial refuel
refuel
off
off certain
certain Air
Air Force
Force tankers
tankers andand Air
Air Force
Force fighters
fighters cannot
cannot refuel
refuel off
off
any Navy
any Navy tankers,
tankers, what
what are are the
the required
required prestrike
prestiike andand poststrike
poststrike
refueling
refueling assets?
assets? AllAH ofof these
these are
are important
important joint
joint employment
employment issuesissues
that
that must
must be
be resolved
resolved before
before thethe mission,
mission, butbut they
they are not peculiar
are not peculiar toto
night
night operations
operations.. More important, they
More important, they are
are all
all issues that are
issues that are regularly
regularly
practiced
practiced inin local
local exercises,
exercises, joint
joint command
command post post exercises,
exercises, andand such
such
large-scale operations as
large-scale operations as Red
Red Flag
Flag and Cope Thunder.
and Cope Thunder.

37
37
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

Offensive
Offensive Counterair
Counterair
By
By its
its nature,
nature, the the OCAOCA mission
mission against
against Bul-Go-Ki
Bul-Go-Ki is is the
the largest
largest and
and
most
most complex
complex of of the
the three.
three. Accordingly,
Accordingly, itit will wUl encounter
encoimter the the largest
largest
number
number of of challenges
challenges to to joint
joint night-mission
night-mission accomplishment.
accomplishment. The The
challenges
challenges considered
considered are are not
not meant
meant toto be
be exhaustive,
exhaustive, nor nor isis the
the order
order
in
in which
which they they areare considered'
considered intendedintended to to reflect
reflect anyany particular
particular mission
mission
priority
priority.. TheyThey are are included
included simplysimply to to illustrate
illustrate somesome of of the
the areas
areas inin
which
which jointjoint night
night training
training can can improve
improve future
future operations.
operations.
Target
Target Ingress.
Ingress. The The first
first obstacle
obstacle encountered
encountered during during target
target ingress
ingress
is
is penetration
penetration ofthe of the enemy
enemy IADS,IADS, beginning
begiiming with with the
the early
early warning
warning and and
ground-controlled
ground-controlled intercept intercept radars
radars.. These
These areare the
the systems
systems that
that initially
initially
detect
detect incoming
incoming aircraft
aircraft and and control
control the
the overall
overall fighter,
fighter, SAM,
SAM, and and AAA
AAA
responses
responses.. EA-6BsEA-6Bs are are available
available for for passive
passive disruption
disruption and and deception
deception
of
of thethe IADS
IADS while while they,
they, in in conjunction
conjunction with with F/A-18s
F/A-18s and and Apache
Apache
helicopters,
helicopters, can can be be used
used forfor destruction.
destruction.
There
There are are two
two challenges
challenges to to effective
effective employment
employment ofthisjoint
of this joint SEAD
SEAD
package.
package. First, First, Army
Army helicopters
helicopters are are organic
organic to their assigned
to their assigned division
division..
They
They do do notnot normally
normally come come underunder the
the control
control of of the
the air
air component
component
commander
commander and, and, as as such,
such, areare not
not detailed
detailed in in the
the daily
daily ATO
ATO.. The The impact
impact
of
of this
this isis that
that helicopter
helicopter operations
operations are are usually
usually planned independently
planned independently
and
and are are not
not coordinated
coordinated through through the the ATO
ATO system
system.. In In effect,
effect, they
they can
can
become
become "wild "wild cards,"
cards," potentially
potentially operating
operating in in the
the same
same target
target area
area as
as
fixed-wing
fixed-wing aircraftaircraft but but neither
neither would
would have
have knowledge
knowledge of of the
the other's
other's
presence.
presence. And And at at night,
night, withwith external
external lights
lights off,
off, they
they cannot
cannot depend
depend on on
visual
visual lookout
lookout to to avoid
avoid each each other.
other.
The
The overall
overall mission
mission commander
commander must must have some way
have some way of of fmding
finding outout
which
which unitsunits areare supporting
supporting his his oror her
her package
package and and coordinate
coordinate with with the
the
aircrews
aircrews for for the
the exact
exact times
times andand location
location ofthe
of the SEAD
SEAD suppression.
suppression. This This
challenge
challenge is is relatively
relatively easy easy to to overcome
overcome:: include
include the the Apaches
Apaches in in the
the
ATO
ATO for for coordination
coordination purposespurposes.. ThisThis will
will not
not require
require aa change
change in in the
the
command
command and and control
control relationship
relationship of of the
the Army
Army aviation
aviation but but would
would
require
require aa firmfirm commitment
commitment on on aa mission-by-mission
mission-by-mission basis basis toto ensure
ensure that
that
the
the SEAD
SEAD support
support is is there
there when
when needed.
needed. TheThe challenge
challenge for the Air
for the Air Force
Force
to
to include
include the the Army
Army in in the
the ATO
ATO and and for
for the
the Army
Army to to decipher
decipher and and carry
carry
out
out thethe ATO
ATO are are suitable
suitable subjects
subjects of of training.
training.

38
38
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

The
The second
second challenge
challenge to to the
the joint
joint SEAD SEAD packagepackage is even more
is even more
appropriate to
appropriate to training
training.. This This is the problem
is the problem of of communications,
communications,
specifically the syndrome known as "what the captain
specifically the syndrome known as "what the captain means." means."
Terminology
Terminology that that is is familiar
familiar to to one one service
service may may be be totally
totally without
without
meaning
meaning to another service.
to another service. For For instance,
instance, the EA-6B is
the EA-6B is anan extremely
extremely
scarce and high-value air asset with a very
scarce and high-value air asset with a very limited
limited capability
capability to
to defend
defend
against enemy
itself against
itself qnemy fighters
fighters.. If If MiGs
MiGs are approaching missile
axe approaching missile firing
firing
range, AWACS
range, AWACS will will normally
normally warn warn such such aircraft
aircraft to to depart
depart the the threat
threat
area rather than
area rather than risk
risk being
being shot
shot down.
down. In
In Air
Air Force
Force terminology,
terminology, the
the
radio call
radio call for
for that
that action
action is "retrograde." However,
is "retrograde." However, in in Navy
Navy parlance,
parlance,
retrograde has no meaning. The Navy terms are fade
retrograde has no meaning. The Navy terms are fade or
or scram,
scram,
s
depending
depending on on the
the range
range of of the
the threat
threat.'^ . 1 The
The wrong
wrong radio
radio call call at at the
the wrong
wrong
time
time isis at best confusing
at best confusing and and at at worst
worst lethallethal.. Again,
Again, the the challenge
challenge can can
be met with relative ease through
be met with relative ease through joint
joint training.
training. But
But without
without such
such
training,
training, we we maymay not not even
even be be aware
aware of of the language differences.
the language differences.
The next obstacle in target ingress is the enemy air-to-air threat
The next obstacle in target ingress is the enemy air-to-air threat.. TheThe
mission elements
mission elements in in tables
tables 11 andand 22 were selected fortheirself-protection
were selected for their self-protection
air-to-air
air-to-air capability Proper use
capability.. Proper use of of this
this capability
capability requires
requires the the maximum
maximum
possible situational awareness for
possible situational awareness for all
aU aircraft
aircraft to
to increase
increase force
force survival
survival
and
and toto avoid fratricide.. For
avoid fratricide For instance,
instance, if if the
the bombers
bombers know know that that thethe radar
radar
contact
contact heading
heading towardtoward them them is is aa MiG-23
MiG-23 that that slipped
slipped past past the the escorting
escorting
F-14s, they can
F-14s, they can eliminate
eliminate the
the threat
threat with
with an
an AIM-7
AIM-7 in
in the
the face
face of
of the
the
NEG.
MiG. However,
However, if if the bombers are
the bombers are confused
confused as as toto whether
whether the the radar
radar
contact is a hostile MiG or an egressing
contact is a hostile MiG or an egressing SEAD
SEAD aircraft,
aircraft, they
they will
wiU be
be
forced
forced to to hold
hold their fire, allowing
their fire, allowing the the possible
possible threat
threat too too close
close to to firing
firing
parameters
parameters.. The The key key to to this
this challenge
challenge is is having
having the the most most accurate
accurate
situational awareness
situational awareness possible
possible. .
The
The escorting
escorting Tomcats can maximize their
Tomcats canmaximize their situational
situational awarenesswith
awareness with
onboard radar and external DL signals from either
onboard radar and external DL signals fi-om either surface
surface or
or airborne
airborne
radar
radar control
control systems
systems.. The The Air Force bombers
Air Force bombers and and SEAD
SEAD aircraft aircraft cannot
cannot
receive
receive this same DL;
this same DL; they
they are are dependent
dependent upon upon onboard
onboard radar radar and and voice
voice
radio communications to build
radio communications to build their
their situational
situational awareness
awareness. . The
The
equipment limitations
equipment limitations that that prevent
prevent joint joint use use ofof the
the DLDL displaydisplay cannot
cannot
be solved by joint training. However, building situational
be solved by joint training. However, building situational awareness
awareness

39
39
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

through
through voice radio communications,
voice radio communications, particularly
panicularly in in joint
joint operations,
operations,
can
can be
be improved
improved by by joint
joint training
training..
Achieving
Achieving aa big big picture
picture is is an
an additive
additive process
process in in which
which thethe total
total
situational
situational awareness
awareness of of thethe mission
mission package
package and and of of each
each package
package
member
member can can bebe increased
increased by by all
all elements
elements monitoring
monitoring the the same
same radio
radio
channels.
channels. By By listening
listening to the radio calls between the escort fighters, the
to the radio calls between the escort fighters, the
bombers
bombers and and SEAD
SEAD aircraft
aircraft can can form
form aa mental
mental image
image of of where
where the the
bandits
bandits are
are and
and what
what areas
areas to to avoid.
avoid. "Bandits
"Bandits over
over Herman's
Herman's manor"
manor" is is
aa very
very common
common call call at
at Cope
Cope Thunder
Thunder thatthat alerts
alerts everybody
everybody wherewhere to to
head
head for
for apiece
apiece of of the
the action
action.. Alternatively,
Alternatively, fromfrom thethe calls
calls ofthe
of the SEAD
SEAD
and
and bomber
bomber aircraft,
aircraft, the
the escorts
escorts can can build
build their
their own
own situational
situational
awareness
awareness as as to
to where
where somesome bandits
bandits got got through,
through, whichwhich formation
formation
needs
needs help,
help, and
and when
when thethe escorts
escorts cancan gogo home
home because
because thethe friendlies
friendlies
have
have all
all safely
safely egressed
egressed.. "Last
"Last friendly
friendly off off target"
target" opens
opens upup the
the target
target
area
area as
as aa free-fire
free-fire zone
zone since
since any any radar
radar contact
contact in in that
that area
area must
must now
now be be
aa bandit
bandit.. Each
Each individual
individual piece
piece of of information
information can can be
be processed
processed intointo aa
clearer
clearer big
big picture.
picture.
This will
This will only
only work,
work, though,
though, if if all
all elements
elements on on the
the net
net are
are using
using the
the
same
same terminology
terminology.. Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, just just asas was
was thethe case
case with
with the
the terms
terms
retrograde
retrograde and and fade/scram,
fadelscram, there there is is no
no strict
strict commonality
commonality of of terms
terms
between
between the the services,
services, nor
nor is is there
there universal
universal recognition
recognition of of where
where thethe
terminology may
terminology may be be different.
different. Two Two shortshort examples
examples will will serve
serve to to
illustrate
illustrate this
this point.
point.
Example
Example OneAir
One—Air Force
Force Fighter,
Fighter, Navy
Navy AWACS.
AWACS. The The first
first
example involves
example involves an
an Air Force F-15E
Air Force F-15E (Eagle
(Eagle 1)
1) receiving
receiving voice
voice threat
threat
warnings
warnings from
from aa Navy
Navy E-2C
E-2C AWACS
AWACS (Hawkeye)
(Hawkeye).. Voice
Voice calls
calls are
are
necessary
necessary because
because the
the Air
Air Force
Force aircraft
aircraft cannot
caimot receive
receive the
the E-2C's
E-2C's DL:
DL:
Hawkeye
Hawkeye to
to Eagle:
Eagle: "Multiple
"Multiple bandits,
bandits, 25
25 miles
miles and
and closing."
closing."
Hawkeye
Hawkeye hashas just
just warned
warned Eagle
Eagle 11 of
of enemy fighters coming
enemy fighters toward
coming toward
the
the latter.
latter. Eagle
Eagle then
then looks
looks into
into his
his or
or her
her own
own radar
radar scope,
scope, detects
detects two
two
separate
separate contacts
contacts coming
coming toward
toward his
his or
or her
her aircraft,
aircraft, and transmits to
and transmits to
Hawkeye:
Hawkeye: "Reno
"Reno two,
two, judy
judy angle."
angle."
In Air Force terminology, this
In Air Force terminology, this means
means that Eagle 11 can
that Eagle can distinguish
distinguish two
two
separate
separate contacts
contacts ("Reno
("Reno two")
two") and
and is
is turning
turning toto counter
counter the
the threat
threat

40
40
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

("judy angle")
("judy angle").. AsAs such,
such, Hawkeye
Hawkeye is is relieved
relieved from
from any
any more
more calls
calls asas to
to
the direction of the
the direction of the MiGs,
MiGs, but
but should
should keep
keep Eagle
Eagle 1
1 advised
advised as
as to
to their
their
range. This
range. This serves
serves as mental prompt
as aa mental prompt to to Eagle
Eagle 11 asas to
to how close they
how close they
are getting to shooting at each other. Simple, right?
are getting to shooting at each other. Simple, right? Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, not
not
in this case.
in this case. InIn Navy terminology, Reno
Navy terminology, Reno has
has nono meaning.
meaning. It It is
is anan
unfamiliar
unfamiliar term that adds
term that adds to to confusion.
confusion. Worse, judy angle
Worse, judy angle can can have
have the the
wrong meaning. Judy by itself,
wrong meaning. Judy by itself, is
is a
a common
common term
term to
to both
both Air
Air Force
Force
and
and Navy
Navy that means the
that means the fighter
fighter is is taking
taking control
control of of the
the intercept
intercept and and
the AWACS should cease all transmissions. Judy angle is
the AW ACS should cease all transmissions. Judy angle is only
only an
an
Air
Air Force term;; itit is
Force term is not
not used
used in in Navy parlance, and
Navy parlance, and itit is
is possible
possible that that
the
the Hawkeye
Hawkeye controller
controller has has never
never heard
heard itit before
before.. If Hawkeye gets
If Hawkeye gets
confused by Eagle's call, it is conceivable
confused by Eagle's call, it is conceivable that
that Hawkeye
Hawkeye will
will think
think
judy
judy angle
angle means
means the same thing
the same thing as as judy
judy and stop all
and stop all radio
radio calls
calls..
This would
This would leave
leave Eagle without aa vital
Eagle without vital piece
piece of of information-the
information—^the
range to the target .
range to the target.
Example
Example Two Air Force
Two—Air Force Fighter, Navy Fighter.
Fighter, Navy Fighter. The
The second
second
example involves Eagle
example involves Eagle 1,
1, an
an F-15E
F-15E on
on the OCA mission,
the OCA mission, and
and Hornet
Hornet
an F/A-18
1, an
1, F/A-18 flying
flying as
as his
his or her wingman:
or her wingman:
Eagle to Hornet
Eagle to Hornet:: "Contact
"Contact on
on the nose, high
the nose, high aspect ."
aspect."
Aspect
Aspect is is verbal shorthand for
verbal shorthand for aspect
aspect angle,
angle, aa termterm expressing
expressing the the
angular relationship between a target
angular relationship between a target aircraft
aircraft and
and your
your fighter.
fighter. In
In Air
Air
Force
Force terminology,
terminology, aspectaspect angle
angle isis defined
defined as as where
where youyou are
are in
in relation
relation
to
to the target's tail,
the target's tail, taking
taking into account the
into account the target's heading. It
target's heading. It is
is
expressed in increasing
expressed in increasing angles
angles from
from 0
0 to
to 180
180 degrees
degrees beginning
begirmuig at
at the
the
tail
taU of the enemy
of the enemy aircraft to the
aircraft to position of
the position of your aircraft (fig
your aircraft (fig.. 2).
2). Thus,
Thus,
in Air Force terminology, high aspect means
in Air Force terminology, high aspect means the
the radarcontact
radar contact is
is coming
coming
toward you
toward you and
and could
could be threat.. The
be aa threat The Navy, however, defines
Navy, however, defines aspect
aspect
angle
angle as as where
where youyou are
are in
in relation
relation toto the nose, not
the nose, not the
the tail
tail of
of the target.
the target.
To the Navy, high aspect
To the Navy, high aspect means
means the
the target
target is
is going
going away
away from
from you,
you, not
not
coming toward
coming toward you you.. You
You can derive exactly
can derive exactly the opposite meaning
the opposite meaning of of
the information provided because of an
the information provided because of an unknown
unknown difference
difference in
in
19
terminology.
terminology.'^
Could
Could these same problems
these same problems occur during joint
occur during joint day
day operations?
operations? Of Of
course . The radio terminology
course. The radio terminology would
would still
still cause
cause confusion.
confusion. However,
However,

41
41
JOINT TRAINING FOR NIGHT AIR WARFARE

Air Force Standard
170-

90-L k- 90"R 90'L — H90-R

Figure 2. Aspect Angle

the
the confusion
confusion would
would be be magnified
magnified by by the
the other
other problems
problems of of flying
flying
at night
at night.. Without
Without daylight
daylight visual
visual references,
references, moremore of of your
your attention
attention
must
must bebe devoted
devoted to to flying
flying the
the jet,
jet, leaving
leaving lessless time
time to to study
study other
other
sensors
sensors such
such as
as air-to-air
air-to-air radar.
radar. Since
Since the
the F-15E
F-15E is is aa two-seat
two-seat aircraft,
aircraft,
the backseater may not need range calls from Hawkeye . The F/A-18
the backseater may not need range calls from Hawkeye. The F/A-18
pilot,
pUot, even at night,
even at night, may
may have
have the
the time
time to to study
study hishis oror her
her radar
radar in
in
more
more detail
detail and
and come
come to to the
the right
right conclusion
conclusion.. But But itit will
will take
take more
more
time
time and
and concentration
concentration to to sort
sort through
through thethe confusion
confusion than than during
during the
the
day.
day. Although
Although joint
joint daylight
daylight training
training maymay point
point outout some
some of of these
these
confusion factors, the full impact of these factors on night operations
confusion factors, the fuU impact of these factors on night operations
may
may not
not be
be recognized
recognized because
because of of this
this natural
natural tendency
tendency to to adapt
adapt and
and
work
work through
through the
the confusion
confusion.. These
These examples
examples pose pose real
real challenges
challenges toto
operations in
joint operations a dynamic combat environment . They are simple,
joint in a dynamic combat enviroimient. They are simple,
but
but by
by no
no means
means minor
minor problems
problems.. Such
Such problems
problems can can and
and should
should be
be
identified
identified and and solved
solved through
through common
common experience
experience and and joint
joint
peacetime
peacetime training
training before
before they
they cancan become
become big big (albeit
(albeit simple)
simple)

42
42
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

problems
problems in in wartime operations. The
wartime operations. The next
next warwar might
might not not havehave fivefive
months
months of of preparation
preparation time time before
before the
the shooting
shooting beginsbegins..
The next challenge to be considered
The next challenge to be considered forthis
for this mission
mission is what formation
is what formation
should
should be flown? During
be flown? During daylight operations, the
daylight operations, the most
most common common
formation is a widespread, line-abreast fonnation for mutual
formation is a widespread, line-abreast formation for mutual protection.
protection.
This
This formation requires the
formation requires the wingman
wingman to to maintain
maintain visualvisual contact
contact with with
the leader either
the leader either directly
directly to to the
the right or directly
right or directly to to the
the left.
left. In this manner,
In this manner,
each pilot can detect a threat to the other aircraft
each pilot can detect a threat to the other aircraft and
and turn
turn to
to help
help defeat
defeat
it. In daylight,
it. In daylight, thethe wingman
wingman can can easily
easily seesee the lead aircraft,
the lead aircraft, but but this
this
visual
visual contact
contact is is quickly
quickly lost lost atat night.
night. In peacetime, at
In peacetime, at night,
night, the the lead's
lead's
external position lights would
external position lights would be
be on,
on, giving
giving the
the wingman
wingman a
a point
point of
of
reference.
reference. In In wartime,
wartime, to to maximize surprise, the
maximize surprise, the night
night fighters
fighters would would
not turn on their lights .20 The wingman, not having these
not turn on their lights.^^ The wingman, not having these external
external cues
cues
to keep sight
to keep sight of of the
the lead,
lead, would
would havehave to to depend
depend upon upon some some internal
internal
sensor
sensor to maintain formation.
to maintain formation. This This is capability that
is aa capability that the the fixed
fixed
forward-looking sensors of Air Force
forward-looking sensors of Air Force night
night fighters
fighters in
in use
use today
today cannot
cannot
provide. Therefore, Air
provide. Therefore, Air Force
Force units
units frequently
frequently traintrain forfor trail
trail formations
formations
in which the
in which the wingman
wingman can maintain sensor
can maintain sensor contact
contact with with the the lead
lead aircraft
aircraft
with forward-looking
with forward-looking radar
radar (FLR)
(FLR) and
and FLIR?'
FLIR.
There
There are are at
at least three drawbacks
least three drawbacks to to such
such trail formations.. First,
trail formations First, itit
tends to lengthen the attack package into
tends to lengthen the attack package into a
a "bomber
"bomber stream,"
stream," with
with aa
specked
specified minimum
minimum spacing spacing between
between aircraft
aircraft to ensure that
to ensure that thethe trailing
trailing
aircraft do
aircraft do not
not flyfly through
through the the fragmentation
fragmentation pattern pattern of of the the bombs
bombs
dropped by the previous
dropped by the previous aircraft.
aircraft. This
This minimum
minimum interval
interval between
between
aircraft
aircraft increases
increases total mission package
total mission package exposure
exposure time time behind
behind enemy enemy
lines. Since the escort fighters must provide cover
lines. Since the escort fighters must provide cover from
from the
the time
time the
the first
first
bomber
bomber crosses
crosses into into enemy territory until
enemy territory until the
the lastlast one leaves, this
one leaves, this
"vulnerability window"
"vulnerability window" can can be critical factor
be aa critical factor.. IfIf the
the window
window exceeds exceeds
the fuel supply of the escorts,
the fuel supply of the escorts, either
either sequential
sequential escorts
escorts must
must be
be provided
provided
or some bombers
or some bombers must must be be left
left exposed.
exposed.
The second drawback to a bomber
The second drawback to a bomber stream
stream is the element
is the element of of attack
attack
predictability. The
predictability. The firstfirst man through highlights
man through highlights the the remainder
remainder of of the
the
package
package for the defenders.
for the defenders. The The third drawback is
third drawback is that
that in in order
order to to
maintain formation, the entire package
maintain formation, the entire package must
must limit
limit its
its maximum
maximum speed
speed
to
to the maximum speed
the maximum speed of of the
the slowest member in
slowest member in the
the formation.
formation. This This

43
43
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

may
may be considerably less
be considerably less than
than the the desired
desired employment
employment speed speed of of the
the
other aircraft,
other aircraft, resulting
resulting in in aa mission
mission compromise
compromise that that does
does notnot really
really
meet
meet anybody's
anybody's desires.desires .
Unlike
Unlike current
current Air Air Force
Force aircraft,
aircraft. NavyNavy night night fighters
fighters are are equipped
equipped
with helmet-mounted night vision goggles. Since NVGs move with
with helmet-mounted night vision goggles. Since NVGs move the
with the
pilot's
pilot's head,
head, theythey areare not
not fixed
fixed to to forward
forward view view onlyonly.. This
This may
may provide
provide
some
some capability
capabUity for for maintaining
maintaining line-abreast
line-abreast formation
formation at at night,
night, even
even
without external lights on the leader's aircraft . This could cut the
without external lights on the leader's aircraft. This could cut the
vulnerability
vulnerability windowwindow at at least
least inin half.
half. ItIt may
may even even be be possible
possible to to use
use the
the
NVGs
NVGs for for ingress
ingress otherother than
than aa single
single route
route bomber
bomber stream stream.. Because
Because
NVGs
NVGs are are not
not limited
limited to to strictly
strictly straight
straight ahead,
ahead, the the mission
mission package
package
might
might bebe able
able to to use
use multiple
multiple parallel
parallel or or intersecting
intersecting ingress ingress routes
routes with
with
lateral separation instead of depending solely on nose-to-tail separation.
lateral separation instead of depending solely on nose-to-tail separation.
Planners
Planners must decide if
must decide if aa night line-abreast formation
night line-abreast formation is is tactically
tactically
preferable
preferable to to aa trail
trail formation,
formation, what what special
special techniques
techniques need need to to be
be used
used
for either type of
for either type of formation,
formation, or
or if
if neither
neither formation
formation is
is tactically
tactically feasible .
feasible.
These
These areare all
all examples
examples ofthe of the types
types of of decisions
decisions that that should
should be be made
made in in
peacetime training and not postponed for wartime employment .
peacetime training and not postponed for wartime employment.
Target
Target Acquisition
Acquisition and and Attack.
Attack. Assuming
Assuming the the joint
joint package
package doesdoes
not
not become
become lost, lost, separated,
separated, or or destroyed
destroyed somewhere
somewhere en en route,
route, target
target area
area
tactics are the next significant challenge. To a certain extent, ingress
tactics are the next significant challenge. To a certain extent, ingress
and egress
and egress routes
routes can can bebe deconflicted
deconflicted by by choosing
choosing different
different flight
flight paths.
paths.
However, all paths ultimately converge at Bul-Go-Ki, where mutual
However, aU paths ultimately converge at Bul-Go-Ki, where mutual
deconfliction
deconfliction becomesbecomes aa big big problem,
problem, assumingassuming aa near-simultaneous
near-simultaneous
time over target
time over target.. If If the
the SEAD
SEAD aircraft
aircraft go go in in first
first to
to suppress
suppress the the SAMs
SAMs
and AAA and then depart the target area, how do they avoid running
and AAA and then depart the target area, how do they avoid running
into the
into the bombers
bombers that that areare coming
coming into into the the target
target area?area? How
How do do the
the
bombers
bombers and and escorts
escorts keepkeep track
track of of which
which radar radar contacts coming toward
contacts coming toward
them
them are
are the
the egressing
egressing SEAD
SEAD aircraft
aircraft and
and which
which are
are attacking
attacking MiGs?
MiGs?
If
If the
the SEAD aircraft remain
SEAD aircraft remain in the target
in the target areaarea toto continue
continue to to keep
keep the
the
threat down, where do they fly to avoid running into the bombers or
threat down, where do they fly to avoid running into the bombers or
through the
flying through
flying the frag pattern from
frag pattern from thethe exploding
exploding LGBs? LGBs? What target
What target
attack route
attack route doesdoes thethe third
third element
element fly fly toto avoid
avoid running
rurming into into the
the first
first
element? If target area
element? If target area deconfliction
deconfliction is
is based
based on
on timing
timing and
and one
one of
of the
the

44
44
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

attackers
attackers is is late,
late, can
can hehe still
still drop
drop his
his bombs
bombs on on target
target or
or must
must hehe abort
abort
the
the attack?
attack?
The
The above
above questions
questions are are not
not peculiar
peculiar to
to night
night operations
operations but
but are
are made
made
significantly
significantly moremore difficult
difficult byby darkness
darkness.. In In daytime,
daytime, most
most ofof these
these
questions
questions can can be
be handled
handled by by the
the principles
principles of of "big
"big sky,
sky, small
small airplane"
airplane"
and "see and avoid." If the egressing SEAD aircraft and ingressing
and "see and avoid." If the egressing SEAD aircraft and ingressing
bombers
bombers can can visually
visually acquire
acquire eacheach other,
other, they
they can
can quickly
quickly solve
solve the
the
identification
identification and and avoidance
avoidance problems.
problems. Attack
Attack routes
routes and
and timing
timing must
must
still
stUl bebe deconflicted
deconflicted to to avoid
avoid fratricide,
fratricide, but
but they
they can
can be
be more
more flexible
flexible
during
during thethe day.
day. The
The latelate element
element can can see
see if
if the
the other
other elements
elements areare in
in the
the
way and
way and possibly
possibly attack
attack anyway.
anyway.
Night,
Night, however,
however, complicates
complicates things
things.. As
As wewe learned
learned inin Operation
Operation El El
Dorado
Dorado Canyon,
Canyon, strictstrict dependence
dependence on on timing
timing deconfliction
deconfliction cancan cause
cause
aborted attacks if the timing is off. Adm William Crowe explained in
aborted attacks if the timing is off. Adm William Crowe explained in
testimony
testimony to to the
the Senate
Senate concerning
concerning the pUot of
the pilot of anan otherwise
otherwise
mission-capable
mission-capable F-111 F-111 who aborted his
who aborted his mission
mission without
without ever
ever reaching
reaching
the
the target
target area:
area:
Since
Since he
he was
was late
late he
he just
just aborted.
aborted The
The problem
problem [with]
[with] coordination
coordination atat night
night is
is
you can't depend
you can't depend upon
upon the
the eyeball
eyebaU at
at all.
all. The
The coordination
coordination is
is all
all timing
timing andand
22
routes
routes.. Once
Once he
he got
got out
out of
of sequence,
sequence, he
he didn't
didn't believe
believe he
he should
should go
go in .
in.^^

One
One possible
possible solution
solution toto handling
handling thisthis deconfliction
deconfliction problem
problem is is aa
large TOT window at night instead of a fixed TOT. This allows
large TOT window at night instead of a fixed TOT. This allows
increased flexibility
increased flexibility forfor unplanned
unplarmed mission
mission delays,
delays, such
such as as the
the
avoidance of
avoidance of aa MiG
MiG oror SAM.
SAM.^^ SuchSuch TOTTOT windows,
windows, however,
however, willwill
increase
increase the
the required
required coverage
coverage time
time for both the
for both the DCA
DCA and the SEAD
and the SEAD
aircraft and
aircraft and may
may exceed
exceed thethe possible
possible time
time onon station
station for
for the
the number
number
of available aircraft . In such circumstances, spatial deconfliction
of available aircraft. In such circumstances, spatial deconfliction
(one aircraft
(one aircraft hits
hits the
the east
east end
end and
and another
another hitshits the
the west
west end
end of
of the
the
runway)
runway) is is better
better than
than time
time deconfliction.24
deconfliction.^ Using Using spatial
spatial separation
separation
gets back to
gets back to the
the problem of
problem of being
being able to see and avoid all the
able to see and avoid all the other
other
players,
players, oror at
at least
least the
the ones
ones inin your
your area.
area. Again,
Again, night
night makes
makes itit
tougher .
tougher.
Egress
Egress from
from thethe Target
Target Area
Area andand Return
Return to to Friendly
Friendly Territory.
Territory.
Once
Once the
the attackers
attackers have dropped their
have dropped bombs, the
their bombs, the next
next challenge
challenge isis how
how
to get home. Unless the bombers are flying in close formation during
to get home. Unless the bombers are flying in close formation during

45
45
JOINT
JOINT "TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

the
the bombing
bombing run ran (a (a viable
viable tactic
tactic but
but not
not without
without training
training challenges
challenges of of
its
its own),
own), they
they havehave probably
probably becomebecome physically
physically separated
separated during during thethe
attack
attack.. DoDo you you egress
egress alone,
alone, or or do
do you
you attempt
attempt to to find
find aa wmgman?
wingman? At At
night,
night, without
without lightslights on,on, howhow do do you
you find
find aa wingman?
wingman? Even Even if if you
you see
see
another
another airplane,
airplane, how how can can you
you tell
tell at
at aa safe
safe distance
distance if if itit is
is friend
friend or or foe?
foe?
If
If you
you plan
plan to to egress
egress single
single ship, what route
ship, what route do do you
you follow
follow to to avoid
avoid
hitting
hitting other
other aircraft
aircraft in in the
the target
target area
area oror to
to deconflict
deconflict from from follow-on
follow-on
attackers?
attackers? How How will will thethe escort
escort fighters
fighters and and thethe BEAD
SEAD aircraft aircraft know
know
that
that they
they areare clear
clear to depart the
to depart the target area?
target area?
Visual
Visual reference
reference at at night
night cannot
cannot be be depended
depended on on to to provide
provide thesethese
answers.
answers. Extensive
Extensive premission
premission planning
planning can can analyze
analyze and and answer
answer these
these
questions if the aircrews have the opportunity to do so . But with the
questions if the aircrews have the opportunity to do so. But with the
operating
operating basesbases of of the
the different
different mission
mission elements
elements physically
physically separated,
separated,
such
such opportunities
opportunities will will be be limited
limited at at best
best.. If If each
each membermember of of the
the
package is
package is familiar
familiar with the others' capabilities, tactics, and limitations,
with the others' capabilities, tactics, and Limitations,
the
the amount
amount ofpremission
of premission coordination
coordination that that is
is required
required may may be be reduced
reduced
to
to what
what cancan be handled with
be handled with aa simple
simple secure
secure voice
voice radio
radio transmission
transmission..
This
This could
could eveneven be be enhanced
enhanced by by aa baseline
baseline set set ofof agreed-upon
agreed-upon standard standard
employment
employment techniquestechniques that, that, with
with minimal
minimal time, time, cancan bebe modified
modified to to fit
fit
the exact tactical situation. Thekey to making such a system work would
the exact tactical situation. The key to making such a system work would
be
be thorough
thorough familiarity
familiarity through
through jointjoint practice
practice and and training.
training.
There
There is is atat least
least one other important
one other important aspect of joint night
aspect ofjoint night operations
operations
that
that the
the OCA
OCA portionportion of of Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do must
must plan plan for:
for: How
How
do you return
do you return through
through friendly
friendly defenses without getting
defenses without getting shot down by
shot down by
your own side? Over land, the returning aircraft must penetrate the
your own side? Over land, the returning aircraft must penetrate the
friendly
friendly fighters,
fighters, missile
missile zone, zone, andand even
even small
small armsarms firefire fromfrom ground
ground
troops
troops.. Confusion
Confusion between between ingressing
ingressing MiGs MiGs and and egressing
egressing friendly friendly
aircraft
aircraft can
can be be sorted
sorted out out with
with preplanned
preplanned radar radar identification
identification signals, signals,
established
established air routes through
air routes through the the defenses,
defenses, or or assigned
assigned altitudesaltitudes forfor
crossing friendly airspace . These last two techniques are commonly
crossing friendly airspace. These last two techniques are commonly
known
known as as "safe passage procedures"
"safe passage procedures" and and are
are frequently
frequently practicedpracticed in in
peacetime
peacetime training
training programs
programs at at wing
wing level
level and
and higher
higher..
The presence ofa naval
The presence of a naval force
force adds
adds another
another dimension
dimension to
to the
the problem
problem
of
of avoiding
avoiding being being hit hit byby friendly
friendly fire
fire.. For
For those
those portions
portions of of the
the ingress
ingress
and egress routes that are over water, the friendlies must follow
and egress routes that are over water, the friendlies must follow

46
46
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

specific "delousing"
specific "delousing" procedures
procedures and and avoid
avoid overflying
overflying any any US
US Navy
Navy
ships or
ships or risk
risk being
being fired upon.. As
fired upon As waswas demonstrated
demonstrated in in Operation
Operation ElEl
Dorado Canyon, there are at least two problems with this . First, the old
Dorado Canyon, there are at least two problems with this. First, the old
problem
problem of of unfamiliar
unfamiliar terminology
terminology.. Delousing
Delousing is is aa Navy
Navy term
term andand
procedure,
procedure, totally
totally without
without meaning
meaning to to Air
Air Force
Force aircrews
aircrews.. Second,
Second,
you cannot avoid
you cannot avoid overflying
overflying Navy
Navy ships
ships in
in the
the dark
dark when
when the
the Navy
Navy
refuses
refuses to
to tell
tell you
you where
where they
they are. 25 Although
are.^^ Although the the delousing
delousing andand ship
ship
deconfliction problems would still exist in the day, they are made
deconfliction problems would still exist in the day, they are made
greater at
greater at night
night because
because of of the
the reduced
reduced capability
capability to to see
see and
and avoid.
avoid.
This
This is
is not
not an equipment problem,
an equipment problem, but but aa prime
prime example
example of of an
an
operational challenge that can be overcome by familiarity with each
operational challenge that can be overcome by familiarity with each
other's
other's procedures
procedures through
through joint
joint training.
training.

Defensive
Defensive Counterair
Counterair
The
The execution requirements for
execution requirements for the
the defensive
defensive counterair
counterair mission
mission of of
Operation
Operation Tae Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do are
are considerably
considerably lessless complex
complex than than were
were the
the
requirements
requirements for
for the OCA
the OCA mission.
mission. Since
Since DCA
DCA is
is conducted
conducted over
over
friendly
friendly territory,
territory, targettarget ingress
ingress andand egress
egress challenges
challenges are are greatly
greatly
simplified: get to the right piece of sky and stay there until you have to
simplified: get to the right piece of sky and stay there until you have to
go
go homehome.. There There are, are, of
of course,
course, challenges
challenges of of nonstandard
nonstandard radio radio
terminology
terminology if if we
we areare working
working withwith aa joint
joint control
control system
system to to reach
reach the
the
assigned area, but these
assigned area, but these have
have already
already been
been addressed.
addressed. Joint
Joint night
night DCA
DCA
does,
does, however,
however, involveinvolve some
some challenges
challenges in in the
the target
target acquisition
acquisition and and
attack
attack phase.
phase.
The
The major
major challenge
challenge to to the
the night
night DCA
DCA mission
mission is is similar
similar to to the
the one
one
faced
faced by by the
the OCAOCA mission
mission during
during egress.
egress. How
How do do you
you sort
sort out
out the
the good
good
guys from the bad guys and avoid shooting the
guys from the bad guys and avoid shooting the wrong
wrong ones?
ones? Changing
Changing
classified
classified identification
identification friend
friend or or foe
foe (IFF)
(IFF) radio
radio signals
signals thatthat only
only
friendly aircraft have the necessary equipment to transmit can help sort
friendly aircraft have the necessary equipment to transmit can help sort
out, but
itit out, but itit will
will only
only show
show that
that aradar
a radar contact
contact isis afriendly.
a friendly. The The presence
presence
of
of aa correct
correct IFF IFF cancan demonstrate
demonstrate that that the unknown is
the unknown is aa friendly,
friendly, butbut
the absence of the correct signal does not automatically mean it is aa
the absence of the correct signal does not automatically mean it is
hostile
hostile.. Battle
Battle damagedamage may may prevent
prevent the the friendly
friendly equipment
equipment from from
working
working correctly
correctly.. Compliance
Compliance with with classified
classified safe passage procedures,
safe passage procedures.

47
47
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

sanctuary
sanctuary altitudes,
altitudes, andand controlled
controlled crossing points all
crossing points all help
help toto identify
identify
friend
friend from
from foe. foe. This
This greatly
greatly simplifies
simplifies the the DCADCA problem
problem since since
high-speed
high-speed radarradar contacts
contacts heading toward friendly
heading toward friendly airspace
airspace and and not
not in in
compliance
compliance with with safe
safe passage
passage procedures
procedures can can be be assumed
assumed to to be
be hostile.
hostile.
Joint
Joint DCA
DCA missions
missions for Operation Tae
for Operation Tae Kwon
Kwon Do Do involve
involve additional
additional
challenge for target acquisition and attack--the presence of Army
challenge for target acquisition and attack-—the presence of Army air air
defense
defense artillery
artillery (ADA)
(ADA) for self-protection of
for self-protection the ground
of the ground forces
forces.. There
There
must
must bebe aa positive
positive command
command and and control
control system
system to to determine
determine whichwhich
enemy aircraft are engaged by
enemy aircraft are engaged by friendly
friendly DCA
DCA aircraft
aircraft and
and which
which are
are
fired on by
fired on by friendly
friendly SAMsSAMs or or AAA.
AAA. Firing
Firing on on aa single
single target
target by
by allall
three
three systems
systems is an inefficient
is an inefficient use use of
of scarce
scarce weapons
weapons whilewhile notnot firing
firing
on the
on the target
target by by any
any weapon
weapon is is noneffective
noneffective.. In In the
the same
same vein,
vein, there
there
must
must be be aa common
common joint joint identification
identification system system for for Army
Army ADA ADA to to
avoid fratricide ofrecovering friendlies . In the day, this last problem
avoid fratricide of recovering friendlies. In the day, this last problem
can partially
can partially be be alleviated
alleviated by by visual
visual identification
identification before
before firing
firing.. The
The
ADA
ADA willwill not
not have
have this
this luxury
luxury at at night.
night.
All
All of these challenges
of these challenges can can be be overcome,
overcome, but but they
they will
wiU probably
probably
require frequent
require frequent realistic
realistic training
training by all participants
by all participants to avoid mistakes
to avoid mistakes..
Just as Air Force crews must be familiar with Navy delousing
Just as Air Force crews must be familiar with Navy delousing
procedures
procedures if if operating
operating near ships, Navy
near ships, Navy crews
crews mustmust follow
foUow Air Air Force
Force
safe
safe passage
passage procedures
procedures if if operating
operating in in anan Air
Air Force
Force areaarea of of
responsibility.
responsibihty. And
And the
the DCA
DCA pilot
pilot must
must be
be trained
trained in
in and
and be
be familiar
familiar
with
with whichever
whichever systemsystem is is in
in effect
effect atat that
that time
time andand place
place.. Both
Both AirAir Force
Force
and Navy crews operating near ground forces must be thoroughly
and Navy crews operating near ground forces must be thoroughly
familiar
familiar with
with thethe ADA
ADA procedures,
procedures, just just as
as the
the missile
missUe operator must be
operator must be
trained in
trained in the
the appropriate
appropriate IFF IFF procedures
procedures.. As As was
was true
true before,
before, thethe
natural confusion that occurs at
natural confusion that occurs at night
night magnifies
magnifies the
the confusion
confusion that
that
can
can be
be caused
caused by by joint
joint operations
operations.. These
These are are not equipment problems
not equipment problems
but
but training
training challenges
challenges..

On-Call
On-Cali Close
Close Air
Air Support
Support

Like
Like the
the DCA missions, on-call
DCA missions, on-call CAS
CAS missions
missions have
have less
less complex
complex
target ingress
target ingress and
and egress
egress challenges
challenges since
since they
they are conducted primarily
are conducted primarily

48
48
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

over friendly lines.
over friendly lines. However,
However, the the target acquisition and
target acquisition and attack
attack phase
phase is is
considerably
considerably more more challenging,
challenging, given given the
the nature
nature of of the
the targets.
targets.
On-call CAS missions involve targets
On-call CAS missions involve targets that
that are
are not
not identified
identified until
until after
after
the
the battle
battle starts and, therefore,
starts and, therefore, cannot
cannot be be as
as well preplanned.. An
well preplanned An enemy
enemy
tank platoon that suddenly comes out from under camouflage directly
tank platoon that suddenly comes out from under camouflage directly
across
across thethe line
line ofof advance
advance could
could require
require on-call
on-call CAS CAS to clear the
to clear the way.
way.
On-call
On-call CAS CAS brings
brings the added challenge
the added challenge offinding
of finding time-critical
time-critical mobile mobile
targets, such as moving tanks, whose exact position is not always known
targets, such as moving tanks, whose exact position is not always known
to the
to the pilot
pUot before
before takeoff.
takeoff. The attackiag aircraft
The attacking aircraft must
must thenthen be be directed
directed
to
to the
the target
target by FAC, located
by aa FAC, located either
either on on the
the ground
ground with with thethe Army
Army troops
troops
or in an airplane near the battle area.
or in an airplane near the battle area. During
During the
the day,
day, highly
highly prominent
prominent
terrain features
terrain features (rivers,
(rivers, solitary
solitary hills,
hills, etc.), easily recognizable
etc.), easily recognizable structures
structures
(towers), flashing mirrors, or colored smoke markers are all used
(towers), flashing mirrors, or colored smoke markers are all used as as
reference
reference points
points fromfrom which
which the the CAS pilot can
CAS pilot can be be directed
directed to to the
the target
target..
At
At night,
night, such
such cuescues maymay notnot bebe visible
visible ifif they
they are are outside
outside the the field
field ofof
view of the night-fighter's sensor equipment.
view of the night-fighter's sensor equipment. This
This is
is particularly
particularly aa
problem
problem for for the
the F-15E
F-15E and and F-16
F-16 LANTIRN
LANTIRN aircraft,aircraft, which
which are are equipped
equipped
with aa comparatively
with comparatively narrow narrow field-of-view
field-of-view sensor sensor thatthat is is optimized
optimized for for
use straight ahead
use straight ahead but,
but, unfortunately,
unfortunately, not
not for
for the
the CAS
CAS mission.
mission. In
In the
the
dynamic
dynamic CAS CAS environment,
environment, the the pilot
pUot must
must be be able
able to
to acquire
acquire and and attack
attack
targets that may not be directly ahead of the aircraft .
targets that may not be directly ahead of the aircraft. Since
Since exact
exact target
target
location
location will
will probably
probably not be known
not be known before
before reaching
reaching the the target
target area,
area, itit
may not be
may not be possible
possible to to preplan
preplan an an attack
attack axis that ensures
axis that ensures the the target
target is is
26
within a narrow forward-fixed
within a narrow forward-fixed field
field of
of view
view.^^.
Aircrews equipped
Aircrews equipped with with NVGs
NVGs such such as the Navy
as the Navy F/A-18F/A-18 and and the
the
Marine F/A-18D and AV-8B have considerably less restricted
Marine F/A-18D and AV-8B have considerably less restricted fields
fields of
of
view.. Since
view Since the the NVGs
NVGs look where the
look where the pilot's
pilot's headhead looks,
looks, suitably
suitably
equipped aircraft can
equipped aircraft can acquire
acquire targets
targets andand reference
reference pointspoints in in positions
positions
other than straight ahead of
other than straight ahead of the
the aircraft.
aircraft. The
The ability
ability of
of the
the Air
Air Force
Force
airborne
airborne FAC FAC to to recognize
recognize what what the Marine AV-8B
the Marine AV-8B pilot pilot can can seesee oror
for the Army ground FAC to understand what things an Air Force
for the Army ground FAC to understand what things an Air Force
F-16 pilot with
F-16 pilot with LANTIRN
LANTIRN can can identify
identify is is aa skill
skill that
that can can onlyonly be be
acquired
acquired through frequent realistic
through frequent realistic training
training..
A second critical skill in any CAS mission
A second critical skill in any CAS mission is is how
how to to sort
sort outout the
the
friendlies
friendlies fromfrom the enemy. Even
the enemy. Even in in the
the daytime,
daytime, this this is is not
not an an easily
easily

49
49
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FORNIGHT
FOR NIGHT AIRWARFARE
AIR WARFARE

acquired
acquired skill,
skill, especially
especially when when using
using joint
joint forces
forces that
that may
may notnot have
have
had
had the
the opportunity
opportunity to to practice
practice together
together.. During
During the the 2929 January
January 1991 1991
night
night battle
battle toto retake
retake the the Saudi
Saudi town town of of Khafji
Khafji from from an an Iraqi
Iraqi armored
armored
force,
force, an an Air
Air Force
Force A-10
A-10 mistook
mistook aa US US Marine
Marine Corps Corps lightlight armored
armored
vehicle
vehicle (LAV)(LAV) for for an an Iraqi
Iraqi armored
armored vehicle vehicle.. The The subsequent
subsequent
Maverick
Maverick attackattack destroyed
destroyed the the LAV
LAV and and resulted
resulted in seven Marines
in seven Marines
being
being killed
killed by 27
by friendly fire. Slightly more than two weeks later,
friendly fire.^' Slightly more than two weeks later,
aa US
US ArmyArmy Apache
Apache helicopter
helicopter mistakenly
mistakenly destroyed destroyed one one USUS ArmyArmy
Bradley
Bradley infantry
infantry fighting
fighting vehiclevehicle and and one one US US Army Army armored
armored
personnel
personnel carrier
carrier usingusing Hellfire
Hellfire missiles
missiles during
during aa nightnight skirmish
skirmish with with
Iraqi
Iraqi troops
troops nearnear the the Saudi
Saudi border
border.^* .28 Positive
Positive targettarget identification
identification in in
close
close air air support,
support, particularly
particularly at at night,
night, is is aa difficult
difficult problem
problem.. Some Some
method
method of of positively
positively identifying
identifying targetstargets fromfrom friendlies
friendlies is is aa critical
critical
skill
skill when
when aa CAS CAS mission
mission is is supporting
supporting ground ground troopstroops in in close
close
proximity
proximity to to thethe enemy.
enemy.
Colored
Colored smoke,
smoke, large large fabric
fabric panels,
panels, even even visual
visual recognition
recognition of of aa
particular
particular tank silhouette are
tank silhouette are all
all daytime
daytime targettarget identification
identification techniques
techniques
that
that are
are not
not suitable
suitable at night. But
at night. But an an enemy
enemy tank tank looks
looks pretty
pretty much
much like like
aa friendly
friendly tanktank when when you you can can only
only see see itit as
as aa monochromatic
monochromatic FLIR FLIR
display.
display. Infrared
Infrared strobestrobe lights
lights to to mark
mark friendly
friendly positions
positions or or friendly
friendly
equipment
equipment and and troops
troops marked
marked with with special
special low low florescent
florescent camouflage
camouflage
that
that isis visible
visible in in the
the NVGs
NVGs but but not
not to
to the
the naked
naked eye eye are some suggestions
are some suggestions
of
of what
what might
might be be feasible
feasible at at night
night..
If
If the
the CAS
CAS aircraft
aircraft is is equipped
equipped with with aa laser-sensing
laser-sensing display, display, suchsuch asas
the
the Pave
Pave Penny
Penny pods pods on on some
some A-10 A-10 attack aircraft, then positive target
attack aircraft, then positive target
identification
identification can can bebe made
made by by an
an airborne
airborne or or ground
ground FAC FAC usingusing aa laser
laser
to
to illuminate
illuminate the the target
target.. Using
Using thisthis technique,
technique, either either an an airborne
airborne FAC FAC in in
an
an Apache
Apache helicopter
helicopter or or aa ground
ground FAC FAC with with aaman-portable
man-portable ground ground laser
laser
locator
locator designator
designator (GLLD) (GLLD) illuminates
illuminates the the target
target with
with aa specific
specific laser
laser
code
code and and frequency.
frequency. (The (The latter
latter option
option may may be be particularly
particularly desirable
desirable
since
since the the person
person on on the
the ground
ground has has aa better
better understanding
understanding of of exactly
exactly
where
where he he or
or she
she needs
needs the the bombs
bombs to to support
support the the ground
ground war.) war.) When
When the the
Pave
Pave Penny
Penny system
system detects
detects the the reflectedlaser
reflected laser energy, energy, itit provides
provides aa target
target
cue
cue inin the pilot's heads
the pilot's heads up up display
display (HUD)(HUD) to to show
show target
target location
location.. With
With
this
this cue,
cue, the
the pilot
pilot can can then
then point
point thethe airplane
airplane at at the
the target
target andand useuse the
the

50
50
THE
THE CHALLENGE
CHALLENGE

1IR Maverick's
nR Maverick's sensor
sensor for
for final
final target
target acquisition
acquisition and attack.. If
and attack the HUD
If the HUD
also can provide a FLIR display with the Pave Penny cue overlaid on
also can provide a FLIR display with the Pave Penny cue overlaid on
it,
it, the
the pilot
pilot could
could also
also attack
attack with
with guns
guns oror nonprecision bombs."^ Like
nonprecision bombs .29
Like
any other skill,
any other skUl, though,
though, these
these target-identification
target-identification (ID)
(ID) techniques
techniques must must
be trained for by the forces that expect to
be trained for by the forces that expect to employ
employ them
them. .

Mission
Mission Feasibility
Feasibility

At this
At this point,
point, itit is
is appropriate
appropriate to to ask
ask whether
whether or or not
not such
such aa joint
joint
mission
mission with
with both
both Air
Air Force
Force and
and Navy
Navy aircraft
aircraft on
on a
a single
single target
target is
is
realistic
realistic.. It
It is
is the
the author's
author's contention
contention that that not
not only
only isis itit realistic
realistic but
but isis
tactically and doctrinally sound and has historic precedent. First, as was
tactically and doctrinally sound and has historic precedent. First, as was
mentioned
mentioned above,above, one one of of the fundamental principles
the fundamental principles of of war
war isis the
the
principle of mass.
principleof mass. AFM
AFM 1-1 1-1 states,
states, "Aerospace
"Aerospace forces forces possess
possess the the ability
ability
to concentrate enormous decisive
to concentrate enormous decisive striking
striking power
power upon selected
upon selected targets
targets
when
when andand where
where it it is
is needed
needed most
most." ." 3°
^ This
This applies
applies toto all
aU airair forces,
forces, notnot
just
just the
the Air
Air Force
Force.. AA well-known
well-known large large force
force mission-packaging
mission-packaging concept concept
in
in the
the tactical
tactical air
air force
force is is what
what isis commonly
commonly called called the
the "gorilla
"gorilla." .,3^'1 This
This
involves aa large
involves large number
number of of various
various types
types of of aircraft
aircraft attacking
attacking aa single
single
target. Each type of aircraft is selected for its particular
target. Each type of aircraft is selected for its particular capability,
capability, such
such
as F-16s
as F-16s for bomb deliveries,
for bomb deliveries, F-15s
F-15s for for air
air superiority,
superiority, and and F-4Gs
F-4Gs for for
SEAD.
SEAD. With With the the proper
proper combination
combination of of the
the strengths
strengths of of various
various
components,
components, we we can form aa much
can form much stronger
stronger and and more
more effective
effective whole
whole..
A
A joint
joint force
force gorilla
gorilla such
such as as is
is proposed
proposed here here is
is merely
merely the the logical
logical
extension of a proven concept.
extension of a proven concept.
Aside
Aside from
from being
being tactically sound, the
tactically sound, the concept
concept of of ajoint
a joint force
force gorilla
gorUla
has
has historical
historical precedent.
precedent. As As was
was discussed
discussed in chapter 1,
in chapter 1, USAF
USAF bombers
bombers
were protectedby
were protected by Marinenight
Marine night fighters
fighters to
to make
make up
up for
for a
a lackofrequired
lack of required
capability,
capability, whilewhile AirAir Force
Force CASCAS and interdiction missions
and interdiction missions were were
augmentedby Marine and Navy assets toprovide the necessary numbers
augmented by Marine and Navy assets to provide the necessary numbers
of
of aircraft
aircraft (or
(or mass)
mass) forfor mission
mission effectiveness
effectiveness..
More recently,
More recently, USAFUSAF F-11 F-lllsIs were
were usedused in in Operation
Operation El El Dorado
Dorado
Canyon because the Navy did not have enough
Canyon because the Navy did not have enough A-6Es
A-6Es in
in place
place to
to
accomplish
accomplish the the mission
mission objectives
objectives independently
independently.. Navy Navy aircraft
aircraft

51
51
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE,
WARFARE

provided
provided the the necessary
necessary air-to-air
air-to-air protection
protection (F-14s)
(F-14s) andand SEAD
SEAD assets
assets
(F/A-18s,
(F/A-18s, A-7s)
A-7s) for
for both
both the
the Air
Air Force
Force andand Navy
Navy attacks.
attacks. Joint
Joint force
force
employment was a required and logical decision
employment was a required and logical decision. . The
The inclusion
inclusion of Air
of Air
Force
Force aircraft
aircraft as
as aa joint
joint package
package had had the
the added
added benefit
benefit of of enhancing
enhancing
tactical surprise. While Libyan defenses concentrated mainly on
tactical surprise. WhUe Libyan defenses concentrated mainly on the
the
known,
known, in-place
in-place carriers
carriers toto the
the east,
east, the
the unexpected
unexpected F-1 F-lllsl is out
out of
of the
the
northwest provided
northwest provided aa second
second andand totally
totally unexpected
unexpected axis axis ofof attack
attack for
for
the overall mission.
the overall mission.
Finally,
Finally, the
the idea
idea of
of aa joint
joint force
force package
package is is doctrinally
doctrinally sound.
sound. Again,
Again,
AFM
AFM 1-1 1-1 says,
says, "Unity
"Unity of of Command
Command is is imperative
imperative to employing all
to employing all
aerospace
aerospace forces
forces effectively.
effectively. .. .. .. Aerospace
Aerospace forces
forces are
are employed
employed as as an
an
entity
entity through
through thethe leadership
leadership of of an an air
air commander
commander." ." 32 Since all
^^ Since all air
air
assets, regardless of service, should be under a single commander, force
assets, regardless of service, should be under a single commander, force
packaging
packaging should
should be based mainly
be based mainly on on required
required capability
capability for for mission
mission
accomplishment,
accomplishment, not not on
on whether
whether the the airplane
airplane has has "USN"
"USN" or or "USAF"
"US AF" on on
the side .
the side.

Summary
Summary

By
By no
no means
means is is this
this example
example meant to illustrate
meant to illustrate all of the
all of the problems
problems
and solutions
and solutions of of joint
joint Air
Air Force-Navy
Force-Navy night night operations.
operations. Neither
Neither isis itit
meant to conclusively
meant to conclusively prove
prove to
to the
the reader
reader that
that joint
joint night
night operations
operations are
are
tactically
tactically desirable
desirable in all cases.
in all cases. There
There will
wUl bebe times
times when
when the the challenges
challenges
outweigh the benefits and joint night operations should not
outweigh the benefits and joint night operations should not bebe
attempted.
attempted. However,
However, as as this
this example
example hopefully
hopefully demonstrated
demonstrated to to the
the
reader,
reader, there
there isis at
at least
least aa possibility
possibility ofof increased
increased tactical
tactical capability
capability
operations if
through joint operations the challenges can
through joint if the challenges can be
be met.
met. How
How to
to meet
meet and
and
overcome these
overcome these challenges,
challenges, and and even
even what some of
what some of the
the challenges
challenges are, are,
should be identified in peacetime training . Writing off joint night
should be identified in peacetime training. Writing off joint night
operations
operations as as too
too hard
hard toto do
do without
without first
first trying
trying isis just
just asas bad
bad asas hoping
hoping
wartime experiences
that wartime
that experiences will wUl provide
provide solutions
solutions to to wartime
wartime problems
problems
that were not identified in peacetime training . Accordingly, chapter
that were not identified in peacetime training. Accordingly, chapter 33
addresses the
addresses the current
current status
status ofof joint
joint night
night training.
training.

52
52
THE CHALLENGE
THE CHALLENGE

Notes
Notes

11.. AFM
AFM 1-1,l-l, BasicAerospace
Basic Aerospace Doctrine
Doctrine of of the
the UnitedStatesAir
United States Air Force,
Force, 16
16 March
March
1984,2-7.
1984,2-7.
2. Ibid., 2-11.
2. Ibid., 2-11.
3. Ibid., 3-3
3. Ibid., 3-3..
4. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5.
5. Ibid.
Ibid.
6.
6. Ibid.
Ibid.
7.
7. Multicommand
Multicommand Manual Manual (MCM)(MCM) 3-1, 3-1, Tactical Employment, vol.
Tactical Employment, 6, F-111
vol. 6, F-Ill
Tactics,
Tactics, 14 14 October
October 1988, 2-3 .
1988,2-3.
8.
8. Lt
Lt Col
Col John
John Rivers,
Rivers, Air
Air War
War College, Maxwell AFB,
College, Maxwell AFB, Ala
Ala., interview with
., interview with
author,
author, September
September 1990. 1990.
9.
9. Lt
Lt Col
Col MelMel Copeland,
Copeland, Air Air War College, Maxwell
War College, Maxwell AFB,AFB, Ala.,
Ala., interview
interview with
with
author,
author, September
September 1990. 1990.
10.
10. Capt
Capt Steve
Steve Tate,
Tate, F-15
F-15 pilot,
pilot, lst
1st Tactical
Tactical Fighter
Fighter Wing,
Wing, television
television interview
interview
from
from Saudi Arabia, CNN,
Saudi Arabia, CNN, 17 17 January
January 1991.
1991.
11.
11. Capt
Capt Jane Patterson, instructor/senior
Jane Patterson, instructor/senior director,
director, and
and Maj
Maj Dick
Dick Embry,
Embry, pilot,
pilot,
964th
964th AWACS,
AWACS, Red Red Flag
Hag 91-2,
91-2, Nellis
Nellis AFB,
AFB, Nev
Nev.,., interview
interview with
with author,
author, 13
13 February
February
1991..
1991
12.
12. Edith
Edith M.
M. Lederer
Lederer and
and David
David Evans,
Evans, "The
"The Air
Air Campaign:
Campaign: A A Look
Look atat How
How ItIt All
All
Began,"
Began," Air AJ> Force
Force Times
Times 51,
51, no.
no. 29
29 (25
(25 February
February 1991)
1991):: 18.
18.
13.. AFM
13 AFM 1-1,1-1, 3-3
3-3..
14.. Ibid.,
14 3-4..
Ibid., 3-4
15
15.. Col
Col Paul
Paul J.J. Kern,
Kern, commander,
commander, 2d 2d Brigade,
Brigade, XVIII
XVIII Airborne
Airborne Corps,
Corps, "Soldiers
"Soldiers
`Oriented
'Oriented on on the
the enemy',"
enemy'," AirA/r Force
Force Times,
Times, 1717 September
September 1990, 68.
1990,68.
16.
16. "U.S.
"U.S. Tactical
Tactical Forces
Forces Close
Close toto Adding
Adding Three
Three New
New Night-Fighting
Night-Fighting Aircraft,"
Aircraft,"
Aviation
Aviation WeekWeek & & Space
Space Technology,
Technology, 12 12 November
November 1990, 63 .
1990,63.
17.
17. Julie
Julie Bird,
Bird, "`Warthogs'
"'Warthogs' Do Do Their
Their Hunting
Hunting after
after Sunset,"
Sunset," Air
Air Force
Force Times
Times 51,
51,
no.
no. 28
28 (18
(18 February
February 1991):
1991): 8.8.
18.
18. Patterson
Patterson interview
interview..
19.
19. Both
Both of these examples
of these examples are drawn from
are drawn from the
the author's personal experiences
author's personal experiences as as an
an
Air
Air Force-Navy
Force-Navy exchangeexchange officer
officer serving
serving as as an
an F-14 instructor radar
F-14 instructor intercept officer
radar intercept officer
from September 1983
from September 1983 through
through March
March 1986.
1986.
20.
20. Lederer
Lederer and and Evans,
Evans, 18.18.
21
21.. "Three
"Three NewNew Night-Fighting
Night-Fighfing Aircraft,"
Aircraft," 63.
63.
22.
22. "Weinberger,
"Weinberger, Crowe Crowe Provide
Provide Additional
Additional Details
Details onon Libya
Libya Raid,"
Raid," Aerospace
Aerospace
Daily,
Daily, 26 26 June
June 1986, 495.
1986,495.

53
53
POINT TRAINING
JOINT TRAINING FOR
FOR NIGHT
NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

23
23.. 4440th
4440th Tactical
Tactical Fighter
Fighter Training
Training Group,
Group, Final
Final Report
Report.. Red
Red Flag 88-], 24
Flag 88-1, 24
October 1987-21
October 1987-21 November
November 19871987 (Nellis
(NeUis AFB,
AFB, Nev
Nev.:. : The
The EC
EC Corporation,
Corporation, 1987),
1987), 6. 6.
24.
24. MCM
MCM 3-1,
3-1, vol.
vol. 1,
1, General
General Planning
Planning and
and Employment Considerations, 44 July
Employment Considerations, July
1989, A7-4.
1989, A7-4.
25
25.. Maj
Maj Roger
Roger L. L. Smith,
Smith, A A Two-Edged
Two-Edged Sword
Sword:: Preparing
Preparing USAFE
USAFE for
for the the
Arena (FOUO/No
F-ow-Intensity Arena
Low-Intensity (FOUO/No Contract/NOFORN)
Contract/NOFORN) (Maxwell (Maxwell AFB,AFB, Ala
Ala.:. : Air
Air
University Press,
University Press, April
April 1990), 28, 42. (Information
1990), 28,42. (Information extracted
extracted is
is not
not FOUO.)
FOUO.)
26.
26. Capt
Capt Robert
Robert H. H. Brown,
Brown, "A "A Real Hog War
Real Hog War:: TheThe A-10
A-10 in in Low-Intensity
Low-Intensity
Airpower Journal 4,
Conflict,"AirpowerJournal
Conflict," no. 44 (Winter
4, no. (Winter 1990):
1990): 65.65.
27.. "Allied
27 "AUied Fire
Fire May
May Have
Have Killed
Killed Marines,"
Marines," Montgomery Advertiser, 22 February
Montgomery Advertiser, February
1991, 4A; and
1991, 4A; and "Gulf,"
"Guli," Montgomery Advertiser, 44 February
Montgomery Advertiser, February 1991,
1991, 10A
lOA..
28 John King,
28.. John King, "Friendly
"Friendly Fire
Fire Kills
Kills Two,"
Two," Montgomery Advertiser, 18
Montgomery Advertiser, 18 February
February
1991, IA.
1991, lA.
29. Brown,
29. Brown, 6464..
30.
30. AFM
AFM 1-1, 2-7.
1-1,2-7.
31.. Robert K.
31 Robert George and
K. George and Lonnie
Lonnie C. C. Goodson,
Goodson, "Planning,
"Planning, Leading
Leading andand Executing
Executing
at Large
Large Force
Force Package
Package:: TheThe Gorilla
Gorilla Lives,"
Lives," USAF
USAF Fighter
Fighter Weapons Review, Summer
Weapons Review, Summer
1985,5-8 .
1985,5-8.
32.
32. AFM
AFM 1-1, 2-8.
1-1,2-8.

54
54
PHOTO
PHOTO SECTION
SECTION
Pilot's helmet with night vision goggles.

i-

The USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center at Nellis AFB, Nevada, is responsible
for aU Red Flag activities, (Photo courtesy of TFWC/HO, Nellis AFB, Nevada.)

56
A pilot from a Red Hag Aggressor squadron checks his equipment. (Photo courtesy
of TFWC/HO, NeUis AFB, Nevada.)

An F-16 Ufts off from a NeUis runway. (Photo courtesy of TFWC/HO, NelUs AFB,
Nevada.)

57
-Tf:- ■■ ■; ■ ■-^Tl!!^ r'SlKiH"" ■ ■;''Eg5^

A silhouetted A-10 awaits the beginning of night operations. (Photo courtesy of
TFWC/HO. Nelhs AFB, Nevada.)

Crew chiefs prepare to launch Iheir F-16s during a Red Flag exercise. (Photo courtesy
of TFWC/HO, Nellis AFB, Nevada.)

58
An A-10 pulls up after bombing a tank target on the Nellis range. (Photo
counesy of TFWC/HO, Nellis AFB, Nevada.)

59
A busy ranip during a Red Hag exercise. (Photo courtesy of IhWC/HO, Nellis AFB,
Nevada.)

m
Chapter
Chapter 33

Current
Current Training
Training Programs
Programs

Chapter
Chapter 22 described
described aa scenario
scenario forfor possible
possible employment
employment of of joint
joint air
air
assets
assets in
in night
night warfare.
warfare. As As the
the reader
reader cancan see, such operations could be
see, such operations could be
extremely
extremely complex
complex and and require
require aa great
great deal
deal ofof planning
planning and and skill
skUl toto be
be
successful . The appropriate skills and experience can only be achieved
successful. The appropriate skills and experience can only be achieved
through
through regular
regular training
training under
under thethe most
most realistic
realistic conditions
conditions possible
possible..
This
This chapter
chapter examines
examines some some of of the
the current training programs
current training programs and and
exercises
exercises involving
involving joint joint night
night operations.
operations.
The
The intended
intended focusfocus of of this chapteris
this chapter is on
on large-scale
large-scale (above
(above wingwing level)
level)
training
training oror exercises
exercises involving
involving two two or or more
more services
services.. Air
Air Force
Force training
training
programs
programs at at wing
wing levellevel and
and below
below havehave already
already been
been the the subject
subject of of at
at
least
least two
two studies
studies.. In In his
his ARI
ARI research report, LANTIRN
research report, LANTIRN Operational
Operational
Training
Training forfor the
the F-15E
F-15E and F-16CID, Lt Col David G. Blair proposed
andF-16CID, Lt Col David G. Blair proposed
aa detailed
detailed training
training plan plan for
for aircrews
aircrews to to achieve
achieve individual
individual proficiency
proficiency
in
in night
night operations.'
operations.' In In aa 1988
1988 research
research report
report for
for Air
Air Command
Command and and
Staff
Staff College,
College, AndrewAndrew M. M. Gecelosky
Gecelosky recommended
recommended aa comprehensive
comprehensive
wing
wing training
training schedule
schedule to to ensure
ensure thatthat allall assigned
assigned squadrons
squadrons could could
achieve and maintain unit proficiency in night operations.2 Although
achieve and maintain unit proficiency in night operations.^ Although
the
the emphasis
emphasis in in both
both of of these
these reports
reports waswas specifically
specifically on on LANTIRN
LANTIRN
training,
training, thethe recommended
recommended number number and and types
types of of training
training programs
programs are are
applicable
applicable to to other
other kinds
kinds of of night
night training
trairring..
Neither
Neither of of the
the above
above studies
studies considered
considered the the requirement
requirement for for joint
joint
night training. This chapter discusses why such a training program is
night training. This chapter discusses why such a training program is
needed
needed todaytoday and and where
where the the opportunities
opportunities for for such
such training
training exist.
exist.
Specifically,
Specifically, this this chapter
chapter addresses
addresses what what joint
joint night
night training
training is is now
now
being
being carried
carried out out inin the
the following
following exercises
exercises and and locations:
locations: Red Red Flag,
Flag,
Nellis
Nellis AFB,
AFB, Nevada;
Nevada; Naval Naval Strike
Strike Warfare
Warfare Center,
Center, Naval
Naval Air Air Station
Station
(NAS),
(NAS), Fallon,
Fallon, Nevada;
Nevada; National
National Training
Training CenterCenter (NTC),
(NTC), Fort Fort Irwin,
Irwin,

61
61
CURRENT
CURRENT "TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS

Naval Strike
Naval Strike Warfare
Warfare Center
Center

The
The US US Navy
Navy equivalent
equivalent to to Red
Red FlagFlag is is the
the Naval Strike Warfare
Naval Strike Warfare
Center (Strike) located at NAS Fallon, near Reno, Nevada. The facilities
Center (Strike) located at NAS Fallon, near Reno, Nevada. The facilities
and training
and training capability
capability at at Fallon
Fallon areare similarto
similar to those
those at at Nellis
Nellis andand provide
provide
thecapability for large-scale, day
the capability forlarge-scale, day and
and night
night employment
employment with with composite
composite
forces . Missions at Fallon include air-to-air attacks against simulated
forces. Missions at FaUon include air-to-air attacks against simulated
enemy aircraft, air-to-surface
enemy aircraft, air-to-surface attackattack missions,
missions, and and electronic
electronic warfare
warfare
training.
training. However,
However, Fallon's
Fallon's facilities
facilities are considerably smaller
are considerably smaller and and less
less
sophisticated than those at
sophisticated than those at Nellis
Nellis. . For
For instance,
instance, a
a surface
surface attack
attack target
target
for
for an
an OCAOCA mission
mission at at Nellis
Nellis could
could veryvery well
well include
include aa bulldozed
bulldozed
runway, taxiway, and parking ramp; tires outlining the operations and
runway, taxiway, and parking ramp; tires outlining the operations and
maintenance
maintenance facilities and actual
facilities;; and actual aircraft
aircraft hulks
hulks forfor targets.
targets. TheThe samesame
target array on
target array on the
the Fallon
FaUon ranges
ranges may may be be limited
limited to to aa bulldozed
buUdozed runwayrunway
airstrip with a collection of
airstrip with a collection of old
old tires or
tires or two-dimensional
two-dimensional plywood
plywood targets
targets
to simulate
to simulate parked
parked aircraft
aircraft.. Despite
Despite thisthis lack
lack ofof sophistication,
sophistication, aircrews
aircrews
who
who havehave participated
participated in in both
both RedRed Flag
Flag andand Strike
Strike regard
regard the the training
training
20
at
at Fallon
Fallon to to be
be very
very comparable
comparable and and effective.
effective.^''
In
In addition
addition to the differences
to the differences in in the
the level
level of of sophisticated
sophisticated equipment,
equipment.
Strike has two differences in operational
Strike has two differences in operational training
training as
as compared
compared to
to Red
Red
Flag.. First,
Flag First, at
at Fallon,
Fallon, thethe air-to-air
air-to-air warwar isis not
not as
as fully integrated with
fully integrated with thethe
air-to-surface war. During Red Flag, air-to-air sorties are scheduled and
air-to-surface war. During Red Flag, air-to-air sorties are scheduled and
integrated
integrated in in support
support of of the
the air-to-ground
air-to-ground missions
missions.. At At Strike,
Strike, the the
21
air-to-air
air-to-air phase
phase is separated from
is separated from thethe air-to-ground
air-to-ground war. war. ' This
This allows
allows
the aircrews to concentrate more on developing their particular skills,
the aircrews to concentrate more on developing their particular skills,
but
but itit lessens
lessens thethe learning
learning experience
experience that that could
could bebe provided
provided by by aa more
more
fully
fuUy integrated
integrated campaign
campaign scheme.
scheme.
The second difference
The second difference involves
involves the the method
method by by which
which the the units
units areare
scheduled
scheduled to to participate
participate in in Strike
Strike.. As was discussed
As was discussed earlier,
earlier. RedRed Flag
Flag
scheduling is based on unit availability and does not necessarily
scheduling is based on unit availability and does not necessarily reflect
reflect
the
the expected
expected combat organization.. By
combat organization By contrast,
contrast, an an entire
entire carrier
carrier air
air wing
wing
(CVW)
(CVW) is is scheduled
scheduled for for training
training at at Strike
Strike as as part
part oftheir
of their regular
regular workup
workup
training before deployment.
training before deployment. The
The CVW
CVW includes
includes all
all of
of the
the aircraft
aircraft that
that
will
wiU be deployed on
be deployed on the
the carrier
carrier inin their
thek anticipated
anticipated combat structure and
combat structure and
strength. Through training at Strike, the CVW gets to train with those
strength. Through training at Strike, the CVW gets to train with those

71
71
CURRENT
CURRENT "TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS

EXPLAN
EXPLAN 323, 323, Air Air Warrior
Warrior involves
involves CAS CAS and and backup
backup aircraft
aircraft
inventory
inventory in in support
support of of Army
Army ground
ground forces
forces at at all
all levels
levels of of combat
combat?^ Zs

Army
Army units
vmits deploy
deploy to to Fort
Fort Irwin
Irwin as as two-battalion
two-battalion task task forces
forces forfor aa
two-week
two-week training
training period
period.. While
While one one battalion
battalion is is conducting
conducting live-fire
live-&e
exercises
exercises against
against simulated
simulated targets,
targets, the the second
second battalion
battalion is is practicing
practicing
against
against specially
specially trained
trained US US Army Army adversary
adversary units units in in large-scale,
large-scale,
force-on-force
force-on-force exercises.
exercises. After After the the first
first week,
week, the the battalions
battalions swap swap
roles .
roles.^^
Air Force
Air Force units tasked in
units tasked in CASCAS and and BAI BAI missions
missions at at the
the NTC
NTC
participate
participate in in both
both phases
phases of of training.
training. Techniques
Techniques and and procedures
procedures for for
integrating artillery fire and tactical air power are trained for during the
integrating artillery fire and tactical air power are trained for during the
live-fire
live-fire phase
phase with with live-ordnance
live-ordnance deliveries
deliveries.. Realistic
Realistic problems
problems of of
controlling and
controlling and integrating
integrating tactical
tactical air air power
power in in aa dynamic
dynamic battle, battle,
including
including basicbasic communications
communications procedures procedures and and identification
identification of of
friendly
friendly and
and enemy
enemy forces,
forces, areare practiced
practiced with with simulated
simulated attacks attacks against
against
live
live adversaries
adversaries in in the
the force-on-force
force-on-force phase, phase. Air Air Force
Force aircraft
aircraft that
that are
are
used
used inin Air
Air Warrior
Warrior include
include A-7s,
A-7s, A-1Os,
A-lOs, F-4s,F^s, andand F- lbs. The intent of the
F-16s. The intent of the
program
program is is to
to "exercise
"exercise joint
joint USUS Anny
Army-AirAir ForceForce planning,
planning, coordination,
coordination,
and
and execution,"
execution," and and toto "train
"train the
the way
way wewe plan
plan to fight." 27
to fight." ^''
Despite
Despite these
these excellent
excellent goals,
goals, there
there is is aa significant
significant gap gap in in the
the training
training
experience
experience at at the
the NTC.
NTC. Army Army battalions participating at
battalions participating at NTCNTC train
train for
for
around-the-clock
around-the-clock combat. combat. Each Each training
training rotation
rotation includes
includes at at least
least one
one
night
night battle
battle with
with all
all Army
Army assets,
assets, including
including helicopters.
helicopters.^^ 28
However,
However, at at
this
this time
time AirAir Force
Force aircraft
aircraft do do not
not fly
fly night
night CASCAS or or BAI
BAI missions
missions at at
NTC
NTC.^^ .29 Air
Air Force
Force nonparticipation
nonparticipation at at night
night hashas at at least
least two two negative
negative
impacts
impacts on on overall
overall joint
joint mission
mission effectiveness
effectiveness.. First,First, ground
ground forcesforces do do
not
not train
train in
in night
night operations
operations against
against aa realistic
realistic night
night airair threat
threat.. Air
Air Force
Force
sorties
sorties asas adversary
adversary air air during
during the the force-on-force
force-on-force phase phase couldcould provide
provide
more
more realistic
realistic exposure
exposure to to the
the difficulties
difficulties of of night
night movement
movement against against an an
air
air threat
threat.. Air
Air Force
Force missions
missions as as both
both friendly
friendly and and adversary
adversary air air with
with
different
different types
types of aircraft could
of aircraft provide ground
could provide ground forces
forces training
training in in how
how
to
to identify
identify and
and defend
defend against
against an an enemy
enemy air air attack
attack at at night
night..
A
A second
second negative
negative effect
effect isis that
that aircrews
aircrews do do not
not get
get the
the most realistic
most realistic
training
training possible
possible in in joint
joint CAS/BAI
CAS/BAI target target location
location and and identification
identification at at
night.
night. Tasking
Tasking as as either
either friendly
friendly or or adversary
adversary air air during
during the the night
night

73
73
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING FOR NIGHT
TRAINING FOR NIGHT AIR
AIR WARFARE
WARFARE

California;
California; the
the Marine
Marine Corps
Corps Air-Ground
Air-Ground Combat Center, Twentynine
Combat Center, Twentynine
Palms, California; Cope Thunder, Clark AB, Philippines (as
Palms, California; Cope Thunder, Clark AB, Philippines (as of
of this
this
writing);
writing); and Team Spirit,
and Team Spirit, Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea..

Requirements
Requirements for
for Realistic
Realistic Training
Training

Successful military
Successful military operations
operations requirerequire more
more than than equipment
equipment;; theythey
also
also require
require people
people who who are are skilled
skilled at at using
using that equipment.. The
that equipment The key
key toto
proper
proper employment
employment is is realistic
realistic training.
training. WhenWhen properproper andand realistic
realistic
training
training has
has been
been absent,
absent, employment
employment has suffered. This
has suffered. This was just as
was just as true
true
in World War 11 as it was in Operation Desert Storm . A few brief
in World War II as it was in Operation Desert Storm. A few brief
examples
examples willwill serve
serve to to emphasize
emphasize this this point.
point.
One
One early
early example
example of of how
how the the lack
lack ofof training
training has has had
had anan impact
impact on on
employment is found the
employment is found in
in the first
first B-29
B-29 night
night bombing
bombing raid
raid against
against Japan
Japan
on
on 10
10 March
March 19451945.. Night
Night bombing
bombing was was anew
a new tactic
tactic in
in which
which the
the B-29
B-29
crews had no experience. A significant concern for Gen Curtis E.
crews had no experience. A significant concern for Gen Curtis E.
LeMay,
LeMay, the the commander
commander of of thethe XXI
XXI Bomber
Bomber Command,Command, was was thethe
possibility
possibility of of fratricide
fratricide.. SinceSince the the B-29
B-29 crews
crews were were untrained
untrained in in night
night
operations, General LeMay feared that the gunners
operations. General LeMay feared that the gunners might
might get
get confused
confused
and
and shoot
shoot down
down somesome of of their
their ownown B-29s
B-29s in in the
the dark.
dark. ToTo prevent
prevent this,
this,
LeMay ordered all of the guns and gunners removed from the attacking
LeMay ordered all of the guns and gunners removed from the attacking
B-29s.3
B-29s.^ This
This was
was aa somewhat
somewhat radical radical solution
solution that
that was
was forced
forced onon LeMay
LeMay
because
because of of aa lack
lack of of time
time to to conduct
conduct nightnight training
training before
before the
the attack
attack..
A more recent example that pointed out a lack ofjoint force training
A more recent example that pointed out a lack of joint force training
occurred during
occurred during Operation
Operation Urgent Urgent Fury, Fury, the invasion of
the invasion of Grenada
Grenada in in
October
October 1983.
1983. Because
Because the the entire
entire operation
operation was was planned
planned and and executed
executed
in
in less
less than
than four
four days,
days, there
there was was no no time
time forfor specific
specific training
training and and
practice.
practice. This
This was further complicated
was further complicated by by the
the fact
fact that
that the
the planning
plaiming and and
execution staffs for Operation Urgent Fury had also been
execution staffs for Operation Urgent Fury had also been hastily
hastily
assembled
assembled and and had
had not worked together
not worked together before.
before. The The stafflacked
staff lacked certain
certain
critical
critical skills
skills for
for joint
joint operations,
operations, such such as as how
how to plan and
to plan and coordinate
coordinate
joint air and naval fire support
joint air and naval fire support for
for ground
groimd forces
forces.'*. A
A continuing
continuing joint
joint
stafftrainingprogram
staff training program in in peacetime
peacetime could have identified
could have identified andand eliminated
eliminated
some ofthese problem areas before the operation was even conceived .
some of these problem areas before the operation was even conceived.

62
62
CURRENT
CURRENT TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS

A
A lack
lack ofof joint
joint training
training also also affected
affected operations
operations in in Operation
Operation Desert
Desert
Storm
Storm.. During
During aa newspaper
newspaper interview interview on on 29
29 January
January 1991, 1991, Col
Col Charles
Charles
Burke,
Burke, aviation
aviation officer
officer of of thethe USUS Army
Army 3d 3d Armored
Armored Division,Division, stated
stated
that
that the
the first
first ofhis
of his unit's
unit' s tank-killing
tank-killing ApacheApachehelicopters
helicopters hadjusthad just arrived
arrived
near
near the
the front
front lines
lines aa fewfew days
days earlier.
earlier. Although
Although the the airair phase
phase ofof Desert
Desert
Storm
Storm hadhad started nearly two
started nearly two weeks
weeks before
before andand thethe ground
ground phase
phase could
could
be expected to commence at any time, Colonel Burke said that his pilots
be expected to commence at any time, Colonel Burke said that his pilots
wanted
wanted "more
"more timetime to to practice
practice night night flying
flying andand to to participate
participate in in joint
joint
training
training with
with A-10
A-10 jets jets before
before goinggoing into
into ground
ground war."war." 5^ Colonel
Colonel Burke
Burke
and
and his
his pilots
pilots were
were fortunate
fortunate that that they
they had
had thethe time
time to to conduct
conduct what
what
should
should have
have been
been peacetime
peacetime training training during
during an an ongoing
ongoing war. war.
Not all examples have had such fortunate outcomes, though. During
Not all examples have had such fortunate outcomes, though. During
joint
joint night
night operations
operations in in the
the recapture
recapture of of Khafji,
Khafji, Saudi Saudi Arabia,
Arabia, anan Air
Air
Force
Force A-10 pilot mistook
A-10 pilot mistook aa US US Marine
Marine light
light armored
armored vehicle vehicle (LAV)
(LAV) forfor
an
an Iraqi
Iraqi vehicle
vehicle and and attacked
attacked itit with
with aa Maverick
Maverick missile.
missile. As As explained
explained
by
by Maj
Maj PatPat Hoy,
Hoy, an an experienced
experienced A-10 A-10 pilot
pilot assigned
assigned to to the
the 422d
422d
Operational
Operational Test Test and and Evaluation
Evaluation SquadronSquadron at at Nellis
Nellis AFB,AFB, A-10A-10
threat-recognition
threat-recognition trainingtraining emphasizes
emphasizes US US Army
Army and and some
some other
other allied
allied
equipment
equipment but but does
does not not include
include US US Marine
Marine equipment.
equipment. The The friendly
friendly
equipment that is included has one feature in common-they all
equipment that is included has one featxu-e in common—^they all have
have
treads,
treads, not
not wheels
wheels.. The The BTR-60,
BTR-60, aa Soviet-built
Soviet-built armored armored personnel
personnel
carrier
carrier used
used by by Iraq,
Iraq, however,
however, has has wheels.
wheels. In In the
the midst
midst ofof aa battle,
battle,
particularly
particularly when
when seen seen at at night
night through
through an an infrared
infrared sensor,
sensor, thethe presence
presence
oftreads
of treads would
would meanmean that that itit could
could be be friendly,
friendly, butbut aa vehicle
vehicle with
with wheels
wheels
was presumed to be enemy.6 Unfortunately, the LAV uses wheels, not
was presumed to be enemy.^ Unfortunately, the LAV uses wheels, not
treads
treads.. Since
Since Air Force A-10
Air Force A-10 pilots
pilots dodo not
not regularly
regularly train train with
with Marines,
Marines,
this
this was
was anan unrecognized
unrecognized ambiguity.
ambiguity. Although
Although the the official
official findings
findings have
have
not
not yet
yet been
been published,
published, itit is is at
at least
least possible
possible thatthat aa lack
lack ofof joint
joint night
night
training
training between
between Air Air Force
Force and and Marine
Marine forces
forces waswas aa contributing
contributing factor
factor
in this incident.
in this incident.
The
The necessity
necessity for for joint
joint training
training is is recognized
recognized throughout
throughout the the armed
armed
services
services.. Air
Air Force
Force basic basic doctrine
doctrine states
states that
that "to"to accomplish
accomplish national
national
military objectives, our military forces trainto fight as an interdependent
military objectives, our military forces train to fight as an interdependent
team
team ofof land,
land, naval,
naval, and and aerospace
aerospace forces ." 7 In
forces."' Army Field
In Army Field Manual
Manual
100-5,
100-5, Operations,
Operations, this this is
is expressed
expressed as as "commanders
"commanders must must understand
understand

63
63
JOINT
JOINT TRAINING
TRAINING FOR NIGHT AIRWARFARE
FOR NIGHT AIR WARFARE

the
the techniques
techniques of of integrating Air Force,
integrating Air Force, Naval,
Naval, and
and Army firepower
Army firepower
effectively in the
effectively in the conduct
conduct of
of campaigns
campaigns and
and major
major operations."'
operations." But
But
how
how are
are those
those necessary
necessary skills practiced and
skills practiced and trained
trained for?
for? The
The remainder
remainder
of this chapter discusses some of those joint
of this chapter discusses some of those joint training
training exercises
exercises that
that we
we
have
have today.
today.

" Red
Red Flag
Flag

The
The first
first major
major training
training program
program to to bebe discussed
discussed is is Red
Red Flag,
Flag,
conducted by the 4440th Tactical Fighter Training Group (TFTG) at the
conducted by the 4440th Tactical Fighter Training Group (TFTG) at the
USAF
USAF Tactical
Tactical Fighter Weapons Center,
Fighter Weapons Center, Nellis
Nellis AFB.
AFB. As As described
described in in
COMTAC EXPLAN
COMTAC EXPLAN 80, 80, Red
Red Flag
Flag is
is aa six-week exercise divided
six-week exercise divided intointo
33 two-week
two-week periods.
periods. Each
Each period
period has has nine
nine and
and one-half
one-half daysdays of
of flying
flying
(Monday
(Monday throughthrough Friday)
Friday) against
against progressively
progressively more more challenging
challenging
targets
targets and
and threats.
threats. The
The flying
flying dayday has
has two
two launch
launch periods,
periods, an an "AM
"AM Go" Go"
and a "PM Go."
and a "PM Go." To
To ensure
ensure participation
participation by
by the
the maximum
maximum number
number of
of
aircrews
aircrews in in aa limited time, individuals
limited time, individuals are are restricted
restricted to to one
one mission
mission per per
day. Participating squadrons rotate out at
day. Participating squadrons rotate out at the
the end
end of
of the
the second
second and
and
fourth
fourth weeks
weeks to to allow other squadrons
allow other squadrons to to participate
participate in in the same exercise
the same exercise
schedule.9
schedule.^ The The Tactical
Tactical Air Command conducts
Air Command conducts fivefive Red
Red Flag
Flag exercises
exercises
each year, plus
each year, plus one
one Green
Green Flag
Flag (Red
(Red Flag
Flag with
with enhanced
enhanced electronic
electronic
warfare
warfare training)
training) and and one
one Maple
Maple FlagFlag (conducted
(conducted at at Cold
Cold Lake,
Lake, Alberta,
Alberta,
Canada). Given the similar nature of the three
Canada). Given the similar nature of the three different
different types
types of
of
exercises,
exercises, and and for
for purposes
purposes of of simplicity,
simplicity, we we will
will use
use Red
Red Flag
Flag as as aa
generic term
generic term forfor all
all three.
three.
The purpose of Red Flag
The purpose of Red Flag isis to
to expose
expose aircrews
aircrews to to the most realistic
the most realistic
combat
combat conditions
conditions possible
possible in peacetime environment.
in aa peacetime environment. In In these
these
exercises, the emphasis is on large-force composite
exercises, the emphasis is on large-force composite training
training with
with joint
joint
US forces
US forces andand composite
composite forcesforces from allied nations.
from allied nations. This
This affords
affords the the
aircrew
aircrew thethe opportunity
opportunity to to practice
practice withwith other
other types
types of of aircraft
aircraft andand
against a more challenging threat than
against a more challenging threat than would
would be
be available
available at
at their
their home
home
station. Conducted in
station. Conducted in the
the mountains
mountains and and desert
desert north
north of of Las
Las Vegas,
Vegas,
Nevada, a typical Red Flag mission package includes ingress through
Nevada, a typical Red Flag mission package includes ingress through
enemy fighters and
enemy fighters and SAMs,
SAMs, low-level
low-level navigation
navigation to to and attack on
and attack on aa

64
64
CURRENT
CURRENT TRAINING
TRAINING PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS

tactical
tactical target
target (truck park, airfield,
(truck park, airfield, railroad
raUroad station,
station, etc.)
etc.) defended
defended by by
SAMS
S AMs and
and AAA,
AAA, and and egress
egress backback through
through the the enemy
enemy defenses. Through
defenses. Through
remote
remote sensors,
sensors, aircraft-mounted
aircraft-mounted transmitters,
transmitters, and and computer
computer graphics,
graphics,
aa mission
mission in in progress
progress can can be
be monitored
monitored on on large-screen
large-screen video video at at the
the Red
Red
Flag operations building and then can be recorded for a complete
Flag operations building and then can be recorded for a complete
mission
mission review
review and and debriefing
debriefing.. This This debriefing
debriefing includes
includes the the effects
effects of of
enemy
enemy airair and-surface
and surface defenses, simulated air-to-air
defenses, simulated air-to-air missile
missile shots,
shots, andand
bomb
bomb scores
scores from from bothboth practice
practice and and live
live ordnance
ordnance drops.drops. Red Red FlagFlag
missions
missions can can bebe conducted
conducted either either during
during the the dayday or at night
or at night..
The
The current
current purpose
purpose and and intent
intent of Red Flag
of Red Flag is is to
to serve
serve as as the
the
culmination
culmination point point of of aa unit's
unit's training
training program,
program, not not asas the
the test
test bed
bed forfor
new
new tactics
tactics.. ToTo gain
gain the
the maximum
maximum benefit benefit fromfrom thethe short
short exposure
exposure time time
available,
available, aircrews
aircrews are are encouraged
encouraged to to use
use those
those tactics
tactics that
that they
they have
have
first
first practiced
practiced and and developed
developed at at home
home station,
station, notnot attempt
attempt to to develop
develop
new
new tactics
tactics in in aa new
new environment.
environment.'° I° If
If the
the aircrews
aircrews wantwant to to try
try aa new
new
employment
employment tactic, tactic, such
such as as aa newnew formation
formation or or aa new
new attack
attack pattern,
pattern,
they must first
they must first practice
practice it it at
at home
home station
station before
before attempting
attempting itit at at Red
Red
Flag . This is a valid and valuable building-block approach to training
Flag. This is a valid and valuable building-block approach to training
that
that changes
changes one one variable
variable (the (the combat
combat environment)
environment) while while keeping
keeping all all
other
other factors
factors constant
constant (the(the tactics)
tactics).. Attempting
Attempting to to change
change too too many